Invoking Authority in the Chickasaw Nation, 1783–1795

"To Treat with All Nations": Invoking Authority in the Chickasaw Nation, 1783–1795

Jason Herbert

Ohio Valley History, Volume 18, Number 1, Spring 2018, pp. 27-44 (Article)

Published by The Filson Historical Society and Cincinnati Museum Center

For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/689417

[ Access provided at 26 Sep 2021 02:59 GMT with no institutional affiliation ] “To Treat with All Nations” Invoking Authority in the Chickasaw Nation, 1783–1795

Jason Herbert

gulayacabé was furious in the fall of 1796. Like many Chickasaws, he was stunned to learn of the recent treaty between the United States and Spain, which now jeopardized his nation’s sovereignty. The deal, Uwhich gave the Americans navigation rights to the Mississippi River and drew a new border along the 31st parallel, was the culmination of constant jockey- ing between the empires over land and trade routes in the Southeast since the American Revolution. However, the Treaty of San Lorenzo (also called Pinckney’s Treaty) was little different from other imperial pacts in that American Indians were not invited to the table. Nevertheless, the pact meant relations in Indian country were to be amended. At a meeting at San Fernando de las Barrancas (present-day Memphis), Ugulayacabé railed against his Spanish friends. “We see that our Father not only abandons us like small animals to the claws of tigers and the jaws of wolves.” The United States’ proclamations of friendship, he continued, were like “the rattlesnake that caresses the squirrel in order to devour it.”1 Of course, not everyone shared Ugulayacabé’s frustrations. Piomingo, his main rival and the Americans’ staunchest ally, was thrilled. The Spanish decision to vacate Chickasaw territory also meant that Ugulayacabé’s support would dimin- ish, leaving Piomingo alone to determine Chickasaw foreign policy. It was a time of mixed feelings in the Chickasaw Nation, though its foreign policy was now in a fixed position to treat with a singular Euro-American power—the United States.2 The Chickasaws, like many other indigenous nations over the course of the eighteenth century, were much divided over which alliances were needed to ensure their continued survival. As a result, the leaders of the two factions, Piomingo and Ugulayacabé, often presented themselves as the heads of the nation while negotiating with their favored allies. Diplomats from both the United States and Spain understood that these were fictive representations but continued to treat with the Chickasaws as though the assertions were true—in hopes of strengthening their supporting factions, legitimizing their Native alliances, and obtaining favorable deals for land and market goods. To demonstrate the differing positions of Chickasaw leaders and how they made claims to political authority in the 1780s and 1790s, this article charts the evolution of those alliances via analyses of several key events in Chickasaw country: the Virginia-Chickasaw Treaty of 1783, the Mobile Treaty of 1784, the Hopewell

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Treaty of 1786, Chickasaw wars against the Creeks and northern Indians, and finally, the 1795 Treaty of San Lorenzo. Analysis of these events dem- onstrates that Chickasaw claims to power throughout the Ohio and Tennessee River valleys were often linked to their long- distance connections to American and Spanish leadership. Further, I argue that in making legitimate, yet often oppos- ing assertions of political authority, men like Piomingo and Ugulayacabé actually worked to guarantee national sovereignty and thereby serve as an example of how Native peoples resisted rival nations—Euro- American and indigenous alike—in the late eighteenth century. The American Revolution (which was “Characteristick Chicasan head”, illustration from Bernard Romans’s A Concise Natural history of to Chickasaws a civil war between British East and West Florida (1775). colonies and their sovereign) brought new LIBRARY OF CONGRESS challenges to Chickasaws, and their leaders wrestled with how to combat them. By that time, three men had emerged as speakers for the Nation: Mingo Houma, the “king” of the Chickasaws, often spoke as the head of the tribe. Paya Mataha was head war chief, a man whose oratorical abilities superseded that of Mingo Houma and who, due to his status, largely dictated wartime diplomacy. A third man, James Colbert, was Scottish by birth but raised among the Chickasaws from childhood. He spoke their language fluently and produced over a half-dozen offspring with his three Chickasaw wives. Because he was a trader, his ability to redistribute gifts within the nation meant that while he lacked official rank, his voice carried much influence. The British had assumed the Chickasaws, who had long remained the steadiest of British allies, would naturally come to their aid, along with the Cherokees, to check American and Spanish might in the region. But Cherokees attacked frontier settlements early in the war and in return suffered brutal counterattacks by rebel partisans. The Chickasaws were far more ambivalent about assisting their old allies. Paya Mataha’s pledge at Mobile in 1777 to continue their allegiance reassured the British; that only forty warriors accompanied him did not. Kathleen DuVal notes that his strategy to ensure Chickasaw independence was to assure the British of their support and then promptly do nothing at all. In spring of 1778, these plans were finally exposed, when Chickasaw warriors attempted a half-hearted blockade of the Mississippi River, which the Americans easily ran through. But in staying out of the fighting, Chickasaws also denied the plans of the Northern Indian Confederacy, which by then was the primary

28 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY JASON HERBERT advocate of a pan-Indian alliance against the Americans. This did not mean the confederacy would acquiesce to the Americans, either. In 1779, Mingo Houma, Paya Mataha, and Mataha’s brother Tuskau Pautaupau responded to Virginian demands for alliance or destruction by telling them, “Take care that we don’t serve you as we have served the French before with all their Indians, send you back without your heads.” Despite a short-lived defense of Pensacola against the Spanish in 1781, the Chickasaws never played a large military role in the war, thanks in large part to the maneuvering of Paya Mataha.3 The close of the American Revolution meant the Chickasaw Nation again needed to address the changes in Euro-American power in North America. In July 1783, Chickasaw leadership gathered to meet at Tcukillissa. The men— Mingo Houma, Paya Mataha, Tuskau Pautaupau, Piomingo of Tchoukafala, and Piomingo of Christhautra—emerged from the meeting with a message to the newly formed United States of America. The letter followed traditional norms of Chickasaw diplomacy. The Chickasaw mingos opened by addressing the president of Congress as “Friend & Brother” and claiming this was the first time the Chickasaws had spoken with the new nation. This was patently untrue—the Americans had sent messages to them throughout the Revolutionary War—but by asserting this, the men provided an opening for new relations between the nations. The Chickasaws were clearly sad to note that their “great father the King of England” had called home his troops, diplomats, and merchants. In their place remained “our Brothers the Americans,” whom they wished would “take us by the hand, and Smoke with us at the great Fire, which we hope will never be extin- guished.” Notice here how the Chickasaws deliberately delineated the difference in kinship, which points to how they envisioned their new relationship. Whereas King George III had been a “great father,” that is, one who showers his children with affection via gifts and goods, the young republic was instead “our Brothers,” a status denoting equality between the peoples. The positions of signatures on the letter is important. Mingo Houma had called the meeting and was the first on the document. Paya Mataha, his people’s head war chief, followed next, before the other three men’s endorsement. This was a sign to the Americans of a united Chickasaw nation, led by Mingo Houma, with the support of Paya Mataha, Tuskau Pautaupau, and the two men titled Piomingo.4 The Chickasaws claimed to receive talks from many places—the new states of Georgia and Virginia, the Spanish Empire, and the Illinois Confederacy had all made overtures for trade—and asked for an American clarification on its position. Chief among their concerns were white settlers along the Cumberland River who had been surveying their lands and hunting grounds and might “forcibly take part of it from us.” They asked the head chief of the Grand Council to stop the encroachment so that peace might reign between them and reiterated their kinship ties as brothers with the Americans, “from whare and whome we are to be

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supplyed with necessaries in the manner our great father supplied us.” They also repeated their desire to know with whom they should communicate, so that such a person might “rescue us from the darkness and confusion we are in.” They then turned to the elephant in the room—Spain. The men claimed they maintained a relationship with the Spanish only as an auxiliary trade source but preferred their American brothers’ support. Their young men had been advised to wait for their goods, they added, so that no blood, of white or red men, might be spilled.5 It is particularly important to see that in the immediate aftermath of the American Revolution, Chickasaw leadership—and the people it represented— was united in favor of a general peace in Indian country. Its endorsement of luminaries like Mingo Houma, Paya Mataha, Tuskau Pautaupau, and a rising war chief named Piomingo illustrates this point. However, as Kathleen DuVal has demonstrated, Southeastern American Indians understood that in the post- war years no nation could afford to go it alone, and these men knew it. But the decisions on which an alliance could secure that peace soon revealed divisions within Chickasaw ranks.6

No contemporary portraits of Piomingo (1750-1801?) exist. This illustration from James H. Malone’s The Chickasaw Nation (J.P. Morton & Company, 1922) inaccurately portrayed him as a Plains Indian and depicted a common stereotype of Native leaders at the time. FILSON HISTORICAL SOCIETY

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In November, several chiefs journeyed to French Lick (just north of present- day Nashville) to meet with emissaries from Virginia. This was the first treaty conference with the newly formed republic, and strict adherence to Native protocols was paramount. Treaty conferences were far more than negotiations. Metaphor- laced speeches often referred to the experiences of the human condition: skies were made clear, roads opened, and fires from multiple peoples burned as one. As David Andrew Nichols has pointed out, conference rituals set participants at ease and made possible the construction or renewal of social bonds. But these conferences were also theatrical arenas in which men demonstrated their claims to authority. Civil chiefs could showcase their oratorical abilities as they called on their social relations to cement alliances and trade networks. War chiefs, however, displayed their martial prowess in dances and ball games. Americans and Europeans had parts to play as well, as gentlemen.7 Virginia gentlemen Colonels Joseph Martin and James Robertson hoped to “strengthen tht [sic] chain of friendship” between themselves and the Chickasaws but also asked the Indians to drive out Wabash Indians who might make their chain “rust and corrupt.” Mingo Houma responded by claiming that he “came here for the good of all men women and children” and that while the talks were arranged by the Mountain Leader (Piomingo), he came only to “conclude a firm and lasting peace.” The following day, Martin reaffirmed the Virginia peace overtures by passing a string of symbolic white beads to the assembled chiefs and confirmed boundary lines between the two, who were from then to be “one people.” The meeting was completed after a brief talk from Piomingo, who declared, “Peace is now settled, I was the first that pro- posed it, as to the differences that are settled, upon over lands I am very ready to remove them, and am in hope no more blood shed by either party which will give general satisfaction to my people and I hope to the Governors, I have no more to say only wish the land to be observed, that was spoken of and claimed by the King.”8 Several things regarding this treaty are notable. First is the man whose name appeared above the others on the document: Mingo Houma, the “king” of the Chickasaws. While previous scholars have claimed that the Chickasaw king was more of a mouthpiece for the Nation than a diplomat, Mingo Houma’s actions reveal him to be a canny negotiator. Mingo Houma pointed this out when he reasserted that Piomingo had reassembled the congress and that he (Mingo Houma) was only there to reassure the peace. However, as Robert Cotterill has previously illustrated, Mingo Houma deflated the Virginians’ hopes of a land cession by refusing to even speak of one, claiming he lacked the authority to conduct a sale. Therefore, we see in his actions how a singular leader could at once assert and deny his own claims to authority as a way of negotiating with foreign powers.9

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Next is Piomingo, who clearly held sympathies toward the Americans: he, along with James Robertson, arranged the meeting. Piomingo had previously befriended Robertson, and that friendship became the bedrock for early Chickasaw-American relations. Further, it should not be a surprise that it was Piomingo who reached out to the Americans. Though his given name was Tushatokoa, he had earned the title of Mountain Leader by spending years in Cherokee towns as a younger man. That time far away from the Chickasaw homeland allowed Piomingo to develop the skills needed to become a capable diplomat. His position of second signatory on the document denoted his status within society and ability to speak for it.10 Perhaps more important than the names on the document are those that are not. While Piomingo was the highest ranking war chief in French Lick in November 1783, he was not the highest ranking war chief in the nation. That honor belonged to Paya Mataha, whose actions illustrate the growing political divide in Chickasaw country. Despite maintaining close ties to the British in the years before the American Revolution, by 1783 Paya Mataha had become receptive to Spanish overtures and did not attend the French Lick conference. Growing Spanish influence had not gone unnoticed in the Gulf South. In 1775, Adair had worried that the Spanish were eagerly moving to sway Indians into their fold: “The Spaniards have wisely taken the advantage of our misconduct, by fortifying Louisiana, and employing the French to conciliate the affections of the savages; while our legislators, fermented with the corrupt lees of false power, are striving to whip us with scorpions.” Paya Mataha saw as key to Chickasaw longevity a trade partnership that could supply his people with needed goods. The elderly war chief saw a Spanish coupling with former British traders (and Chickasaw suppliers) Panton, Leslie & Company, as the best way to accomplish this and continually invited Spanish traders into Chickasaw towns. By 1784, he claimed to consider himself a Spaniard, and requested that upon his death, which occurred in the spring, his body be draped in a Spanish flag and cremated.11 Over the next decade, three new men presented themselves as the leaders of the Chickasaw Nation in order to secure alliances and trade deals that often contradicted one another. The deaths of Paya Mataha, Mingo Houma, and James Colbert, which opened a vacuum in the Chickasaw hierarchy, made this possible. The measles that probably claimed Paya Mataha’s life also took Mingo Houma’s around the same time. James Colbert, father of multiple Chickasaw children and a man who strongly favored the Americans, died the previous winter after falling from his horse. In keeping with cul- tural rules of ascendancy, Mingo Houma’s nephew, Taski Etoka, followed him. Taski Etoka seems to have been disliked by both the Americans and the Spanish. American major John Doughty referred to him as “a dissipated

32 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY JASON HERBERT character, to be bought for a small Price,” while William Panton conceded Mingo Houma was “an Actor…and was paid for acting.” However, those frustrations may have been the result of a man who shrewdly played off of outsiders’ perceptions of him to the benefit of his nation. Piomingo followed Paya Mataha to become the tribe’s head war chief. He had previously been the number two man in that position, so his promotion should not be seen as a surprise. What may be surprising, however, is that Piomingo did not share Paya Mataha’s Spanish allegiance, favoring instead a partnership with the Americans. Further, while Paya Mataha had worked in his old age to maintain peace in his lands, Piomingo was not afraid to risk open war in Chickasaw country, though only did so once he believed he had a strategic advantage. A third man, less well-known in history, also rose to prominence at this time. Ugulayacabé became the most vocal proponent of the pro-Span- ish faction within the nation. In doing so, the Chickasaw Nation became similar to a dam over a river, the pressures around it reinforcing its integrity.12 The Chickasaw-Virginia Treaty gravely concerned the Spanish, who saw the Americans as a direct threat to their plans of resurrecting their empire in North America. By 1784 they had aggressively pursued Creeks to form an Indian buffer zone between their possessions and those of the United States. The Creeks were thought a natural ally for the Spanish. Their lands abutted Georgia, and they had expressed frustrations for decades over white incursions into their hunting grounds. Further, they numbered nearly fifteen thousand and were thought powerful enough to significantly challenge the American military in the field. Finally, if the Creeks could be swayed to ally with the Spanish, then perhaps they could bring in their Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw brothers. The Spanish found a believer in Upper Creek leader Alexander McGillivray, who saw a Spanish partnership and its guaranteed trade with Panton & Leslie as the necessary ingredi- ents for a united indigenous coalition in the Southeast and actively worked to bring aboard the Creeks’ Native brothers.13 In June, the Spanish succeeded in getting all four major nations, including Piomingo’s faction of Chickasaws, to meet in Mobile. The month-long discussions came at a significant cost to the Spaniards; their quartermaster reported “fifteen tons of fresh bread, almost seven tons of fresh meat, 1,277 pounds of bacon, twenty-seven tons of rice, fourteen tons of beans, 892 bar- rels of corn, and seventy-one pots of beans” were consumed during the con- vention. Spain agreed to guarantee Chickasaw sovereignty in exchange for the return of Spanish captives and a pledge to expel traders from any other nation. In addition, the Chickasaws agreed to live in peace with every other tribe except the Kickapoos. Finally, the Spanish reiterated that they had no desire for any land cessions from the nations present. Pleased with the proceedings, Ugulayacabé ratified the Mobile Treaty of 1784.14

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So what do we make of Ugulayacabé’s endorsement of the Mobile Treaty? What more do we make of Piomingo’s participation but nonendorsement? What about how signatures were received by the Spanish? Ugulayacabé’s approval of the Spanish treaty likely points to his status as a peace chief and not a war chief, as the Chickasaws were not in a state of war at the moment and the talks were largely centered on trade. In this regard, Piomingo would have been an honored guest, but one without a national voice. If this was true, however, why would Piomingo have organized the French Lick accords seven months earlier? One possible explanation is that each man was acting within Chickasaw society as a fanimingo—a man designated to represent foreign parties’ interests before the national council. However, this role seems to have died out, along with the last man recorded as such, by 1757. Another, less compli- cated, explanation is that each man bartered with the Americans or Spanish because of personal connections to members within each empire. Piomingo was extremely close friends with Virginian James Robertson, and Robertson’s home at French Lick was a natural meeting point to renew bonds of allegiance and construct new trade programs. Ugulayacabé had been a member of the small Francophile contingent; it is likely that after the American Revolution he saw in the Spanish a people who practiced the same religion and spoke a familiar-sounding language. Whatever the reasons for their devotions, in the 1780s and 1790s Piomingo and Ugulayacabé were continually wooed by both the United States and Spain. Those courtships, in turn, demonstrate the sway the men held in their nation and their abilities to speak for it.15 The United States courted Chickasaw leaders, Piomingo in particular, at talks in Hopewell, South Carolina, during January 1786. The Americans began by offering good tidings to the chiefs, their wives, and their children. They hoped the Chickasaws would receive their “humane and generous act” “with joy and gladness…in grateful remembrance,” though due to the recent war the extent of the territory of the republic would be explained to the Indians, but it was undetermined when that explanation would occur. Piomingo interjected that he wished to have everything explained to him prior to his talks, and the Americans acquiesced. He then rose to deliver the lengthiest account of his on record:

The period has arrived that I have visited you to see you, and to regulate every thing that respects us. These beads are our credentials of peace and friendship, and two of us have come to bring the talks of the nation. These white beads are of little value but in our nation, where they are kept even by our children, with veneration, as tokens of peace and friendship. When I take you by the hands, the day will never come, that discord will break my hold. Although I may not be eloquent, yet I wish my talks to be as much esteemed as if I was, it being my sincere desire that what I say should be construed most friendly. My talks are not long, and I hope, when you see these beads, you will remember my friendship.16

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Piomingo was followed by a man recorded as Mingotushka, whom we can reasonably assume was the new Chickasaw king, Taski Etoka, when he told the Americans, “My predecessor loved you white people in his time, and I mean to do the same. Our two old leading men are dead, and we two come as suc- cessors in their business, with the same friendly talks as they had, which were always friendly.” As in the Treaty of French Lick, the Chickasaw king committed only to assuring peace between his people and a Euro-American nation; the head war chief was primarily responsible for arranging the meeting and pushing the Chickasaws’ agenda. Piomingo reaffirmed his status and ability to speak for the nation when he concluded the talks by declaring, “I take place, as head leading warrior of the nation, to treat with all nations.”17 What the parties agreed to basically negated the Spanish Mobile Treaty of two years prior by placing the Chickasaws “under the protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign whatsoever.” It secured for the United States the “exclusive right of regulating trade” in Chickasaw country and fixed the bound- aries between the two peoples. While Piomingo was loathe to give up any land, he agreed to a small outpost near present-day Bear Creek on the Tennessee River, in return for annual annuities. The Creeks and Cherokees were furious, claiming the Piomingo had ceded their hunting grounds; Piomingo ignored them. Piomingo’s actions here are important to consider. He understood the weight of his decision. The Creeks were roughly eight to ten times larger than their nation and, according to trader William Panton, could “cut [them] to pieces in one month.” To prevent this, the Chickasaws negotiated a clause into North Carolina’s treaty with the Creeks to prevent the nation from committing “hostilities on us as we are too weak to do anything of consequence against the Creeks.”18 Hopewell was important for Piomingo and his followers. By securing the alliance, Piomingo and the chiefs present hoped to secure their positions back home. In opening an official trade partnership with the young republic, they hoped to guarantee the Chickasaw Nation’s integrity and make it an obstacle against aggressive neighbors, namely the Creeks. Further, they hoped that the United States would be responsible for curtailing white invasions onto Chickasaw property. In doing so, the Chickasaws would avoid any wars with the Thirteen Fires that Piomingo was sure they could not win.19 The new treaty was not received well in Spanish outposts or in Creek country, let alone Ugulayacabé’s camp. Spanish officials in New Orleans believed the pact at Hopewell was little more than a “mummery” sealed by “some drunken Indians.” McGillivray, seeing Piomingo’s actions as a threat against his plans for a united Indian confederacy, railed against the war chief in a letter to Pensacola governor Arturo O’Neill, claiming the treaty sold off Creek lands and that “such Conduct of the Chickasaw Chiefs has enraged Most of the rest of the Confederate Nations to attack & chastize that people.” The Creek leader

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followed through with his threats, ordering raids into Chickasaw country as punishment for their noncompliance. McGillivray also ordered the assassination of Piomingo, and while unsuccessful, his men did kill the Mountain Leader’s brother and nephew in 1789.20 The attempt on Piomingo’s life signals more than the frustrations of one foreign leader toward a rival. McGillivray’s actions demonstrate just how much power Piomingo held. Assassinations are political affairs, and if Piomingo lacked the ability to sway his nation’s foreign policy, an assassination would not have been necessary. But the war chief did have that power and often exercised it. Ordinarily, due to his status as head war chief, if Piomingo had called for it an attempt on his life would have been justification for a general war on the Creeks. But unfortunately for him, the Americans were not as reliable at making good on their word as the Creeks. Piomingo complained to Joseph Martin in 1787 that the Americans had yet to send any weapons or munitions to his people, leaving them to speculate that the Americans “only meant to jockey us out of our lands.” The Chickasaws had to receive trade from some place, he warned: “Necessity will oblige us to look to new friends if we cannot get friends otherwise.”21 Piomingo’s grievances were heard in Philadelphia, and George Washington responded, in doing so recognizing Piomingo’s status in Chickasaw country. While he did not directly send arms to the Chickasaws, he warned his country- men against settling on Native lands. In August 1790, Washington issued a proclamation stating it had become “peculiarly necessary” to enforce the Hopewell Treaties between the United States and the Choctaws and Chickasaws, warning all citizens to govern themselves by the pact, lest they “answer the contrary at their peril.” The president followed a few months later with a letter written specifically to “Piamingo, or the Mountain Leader, Head Warrior and First Minister, and the other Chiefs and Warriors of the Chickasaw Nation” in which he reassured his “Brothers” that the promises made at Hopewell would be upheld. Washington reiterated that the United States was not interested in Chickasaw lands and that “if any bad people tell you otherwise they deceive you, and are your enemies, and the enemies of the United States.” The Americans would send needed goods to the Chickasaws, he promised, and pleaded with them to “hold fast the Chain of Friendship, and do not believe any evil Reports against the justice and integrity of the United States.”22 Washington’s letter to the Chickasaws is important because he addressed it first of all to Piomingo, ignoring Taski Etoka and Ugulayacabé. In doing so, Washington played to Piomingo’s role as the leading diplomat in his country. Further, by continually addressing the Chickasaws as the Americans’ brothers, he reaffirmed a sense of equality between the two nations, whether or not he actually believed it. But again, American promises proved as hollow as an old cherry tree when guns and ball and powder failed to appear in Chickasaw country.

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This put Piomingo in a perilous position. Creek raids not only killed Chickasaw men, they cut off whatever supplies the Americans tried to send. For instance, in early 1790 Creeks and Chickamaugas ambushed a detachment of Americans under Maj. John Doughty who were being led by three Chickasaw scouts while ascending the Tennessee River. Doughty was initially reported killed, but while six of his men died, he survived to report the attack. Lacking supplies and likely suffering from questions about his leadership inside Tchoukafala and other towns, Piomingo made a bold move. Instead of waiting for the Americans to come to his aid, he went to theirs.23 As Piomingo was head war chief, his position as head of the Chickasaw Nation was dependent on action. In this case, going to the Americans’ aid was not only about helping an ally in hopes of receiving support down the line; by undertaking a mission of great distance and danger, Piomingo reaffirmed his status within society and ability to speak for it by demonstrating command over not only geograph- ical but vertical distance—supernatural power. In 1791, he gathered between forty and fifty warriors and headed north to assist the army of U.S. general Arthur St. Clair. The Americans were engaged in a war against many of the Chickasaws’ traditional foes to the north and had previously requested Chickasaw aid. On October 29, Piomingo and his men, including James Colbert’s sons William and George, arrived near present-day Cincinnati, where they were deployed as scouts to search for indigenous foes. After patrolling far to the north almost to Detroit, the Chickasaws returned to find St. Clair’s army destroyed, in what was the great- est American loss to an indigenous opponent. Despite their the Chickasaws’ limited participation in St. Clair’s expedition, Piomingo’s actions in leading them to the Americans’ aid were powerful indeed. By assisting the United States in a war it was badly losing, the Chickasaws not only positioned themselves as equal to the United States but put the young republic in a position of returning the favor to their Indian allies. In early 1792, Henry Knox advised George Washington: “Piamingo of the Chickasaws ought to be rewarded liberally for his joining our troops the last Campaign, and he ought to be cultivated in future—The Chickasaws and Choctaws are good friends, and Piamingo may be the means of uniting both tribes General Arthur St. Clair ( 1737-1818). in our service.”24 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

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Within Chickasaw ranks, Piomingo lived up to his title as head war chief, or as Adair translated it, the “far-off leader.” That the United States had been soundly beaten mattered little. Chickasaw warriors returned home with scalps, new rifles, medals, and clothes. They were feted with adoration as they passed through American towns, and newspapers heralded their appearances. While the American war had been a disaster, Piomingo’s expedition had been a stunning success, and it reinforced his claims to leadership within the nation. By 1793, even McGillivray grumbled that Piomingo’s was the most important voice in Chickasaw country.25 However, other voices continued to speak for the Chickasaws. Taski Etoka told Spanish trader Alexander Fraser that he would “send the Americans a Talk not to send any more talks to them [the Chickasaws] & that he has taken fast hold of the Spaniards by the hand.” Yet even Ugulayacabé was persuaded to meet—along with a “very full representation” of his nation, including Piomingo—at James Robertson’s home in Nashville in August 1792. While far from approv- ing the Americans as allies, he claimed that if a war broke out between the United States and Spain, he would remain neutral, though he would not allow the United States to ever take Chickasaw lands. While there, he made claims to higher authority than Piomingo, call- Young Chickasaw warrior (c. 1830). ing him his warrior but also referring to Piomingo as his WIKIMEDIA COMMONS father. As Atkinson has previously suggested, his assertions probably meant that the men shared a mutual respect and were unified in opposition to any land cessions. Despite telling Spanish officials he intended only to spy on Piomingo’s faction during the conference, Ugulayacabé actually gifted Southwestern Territory governor William Blount a string of white beads and pledged peace and friendship with the Americans. While Ugulayacabé’s assertions sound like those of an individual vowing to defend his homeland, when coupled with his remarks on Piomingo’s rank, it is clear that Ugulayacabé intended to speak for all of the Chickasaws, regardless of how many actually spoke for him.26 Ugulayacabé’s invocations of his national authority demonstrate that Chickasaw leadership was not as politically entrenched as either the Americans or Spanish believed. Even Taski Etoka hoped to meet with Governor Blount the following spring. Ugulayacabé’s conversion also seems to have elevated Piomingo’s stature in the Southeast, as Blount called him the leader of the “much stronger party.” Further, the renewal of friendship between the Chickasaw Nation and the United States had international repercussions. Alexander McGillivray, seeing Ugulayacabé’s changing posture toward the Americans, made a mistake that doomed his hopes of his grand southern Indian confederacy.27

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On February 8, 1793, Creek warriors attacked four Chickasaw hunters, killing one of them. Upon scalping him, “they very much hacked and mangled his body, and threw it into a pond of water.” This extraor- dinary insult seems to have enraged the entire nation, as a national council immediately convened. On the fourth day, the assembled chiefs “unanimously determined to make war against the Creeks” and Piomingo dispatched forty warriors in pursuit of Creek scalps. Three Cherokee men were present at the council fire that night and argued for a general peace in the land. Piomingo would not hear it. He fumed “that he was so determined on war that Governor William Blount (1749-1800). his very breath was bloody, that they LIBRARY OF CONGRESS [the Cherokees] might go home, and join the Creeks if they chose it, as he supposed they would, for he knew that had both been long at war with his friends the people of the United States though they pretended peace and friendship.” Piomingo continued: “[The Creeks] have made very light of us…saying that [as] we were but a handfull of people, they could lay us desolate in a little time.” Bolstered by a gift of five hundred stand of arms and ten thousand pounds of lead, powder, and flint from Anthony Wayne, the Chickasaws openly defied the Creeks and went to war. Even Ugulayacabé, having suffered the loss of a nephew, actively recruited the Choctaws to join in against the Creeks.28 Piomingo’s 1793 call to war may have been the fullest expression of his power within Chickasaw society. He had the full support of the Chickasaw national council, including Ugulayacabé and Taski Etoka, though the latter continued to try to secure a peace with the Creeks. As in his campaign north of the Ohio River, Piomingo and other Chickasaws were welcomed in American frontier towns by parades of militia and cavalry. By engaging the Creeks and their Chickamauga allies, the Chickasaws likely saved the Cumberland settlements in present-day Tennessee, as well as those in Kentucky, from annihila- tion. The American government rewarded the Chickasaws for their aid by fun- neling weapons to the towns along the Mississippi River. According to Wendy St. Jean, within two years the Chickasaw Nation had become “a formidable stronghold with the most advanced weaponry of the time,” including rifles, swivel guns, and howitzers.29

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However, this did not stop Spanish authorities from at least trying to keep the Chickasaws allied with them. They believed the 1784 Mobile Treaty was still legitimate, and their main trading partner, William Panton, tried to cool hostilities between the Creeks and Chickasaws by cutting off weapons to the Creeks. Panton feared, as did Louisiana governor Baron Luis Héctor de Carondelet, that Creeks would inevitably kill a Choctaw man and engulf the entire region in a war that might pit the United States and Spain against one another. Spain, and more so the Creeks, received another setback when McGillivray died on February 17, 1793.30 With warfare against the Creeks at a temporary lull, Piomingo continued to assert himself as the de facto head of the Chickasaw Nation by again leading warriors to assist an American army, this time commanded by Gen. “Mad” Anthony Wayne in the summer of 1794. While multiple Chickasaw men ultimately served with Wayne and his subsequent victories over the Indians who defeated St. Clair three years prior, Piomingo and several others detoured to Philadelphia, where they met with George Washington, who greeted them with “great satisfaction.” The president lavished the headman with a significant number of gifts, including a personal sum of $1,000, clothes for his followers and presents for pro-American men and women at home in Chickasaw towns. Piomingo’s trip to Philadelphia served the same purpose as his previous travels to the Northwest Territory. By meeting directly with Washington, he not only presented himself as the leader of the Chickasaws but also showed the Chickasaws as equal partners with their “brothers,” the Americans. He would give the goods he received in Pennsylvania to his kinsmen, according to tribal customs of authoritarian redistribution.31 Piomingo’s claims to authority were nearly undone, however, by a rumor that spread throughout the Southeast, announc- ing that the war chief had been killed while serving in Wayne’s campaign. He arrived in Knoxville in 1795 to inform Governor Blount that rumors of his demise had been greatly exaggerated. Not embellished, though, was the death of Taski Etoka, who succumbed to old age in late 1794 while Piomingo was upcountry. Taski Etoka’s brother Chinubbee succeeded him, and the new king was said to be under the influence of Ugulayacabé, who by this time had become disenchanted with the

Americans and had restarted negotiations General Anthony Wayne (1745-1796). with Spain. Ugulayacabé made assertions LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

40 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY JASON HERBERT

of his own when he allowed Spain to build a palisade on the bluffs near present- day Memphis. The new fort, called San Fernando de las Barrancas, was home to 150 soldiers and hosted a trade store operated under the direction of Panton & Leslie. Due to fears of reprisal from Piomingo’s American faction, which by 1795 was more numerous than the Spanish affiliates, many of Ugulayacabé’s followers moved close to be under the protection of the fort. Even Piomingo seems to have reluctantly allowed the fort to remain, due to the threat of a reignited Creek- Chickasaw War. The fort would not remain in Spanish possession for long, however, as Pinckney’s Treaty between the United States and Spain called for its aban- donment, and it was closed in 1797.32 With Spain’s withdrawal from Chickasaw country came the loss of Ugulayacabé’s influence and thus his ability to affect and vocalize Chickasaw policy. He disap- pears largely from the historical record after the Spanish exit, a nineteenth-century traveler claimed he shot himself in 1799. Vindicated in his alliance with the United States, Piomingo pressed against the Creeks before managing a lasting peace with his enemies in 1797. He, too, died before the turn of the century, passing away of unknown causes in either late 1798 or early 1799, and was buried in his hometown, Tchoukafala. Modern Chickasaws remember both men; both are listed as “historic figures” on the Chickasaw Nation’s official website. Piomingo is remembered even more prominently: he was named to the Chickasaw Nation’s Hall of Fame in 2010 and memorialized by a large statue currently in Tupelo, Mississippi. That the Chickasaw Nation remembers these men speaks to their real- ized positions of authority in the late eighteenth century.33 The actions of men such as Piomingo, Ugulayacabé, and Taski Etoka demonstrate that in their time, Chickasaw leaders invoked the authority of a nation that at the same time did and did not exist. While the Chickasaws certainly lived in the hills and valleys of present-day northern Mississippi, they were not the united group their leaders claimed. Deep crevices existed in the Chickasaw political landscape, and that men such as these three could navigate those obstacles to negotiate with foreign powers without triggering a civil war speaks much to their abilities. In presenting themselves as leaders of a fictional united nation, the Chickasaw chiefs blunted Spanish, American, and Creek plans long enough to ensure their own tribal integrity into the nineteenth century.

1 Ugulayacabé’s name was actually a title he earned as a Mary Quarterly 67 (July 2010): 487–89. Americans often young man and may loosely translate to “Okla-ayaka- called him “Ugly Cub,” apparently a mispronunciation abe,” which means “slayer of many nations.” He was also they found physically accurate. Jack D. L. Holmes, known as “Wolf’s Friend” or “Wolfe’s Friend,” due to Gayoso: The Life of a Spanish Governor in the Mississippi his affiliation with a white man named Wolfe. Charles Valley, 1789–1799 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State A. Weeks, “Of Rattlesnakes, Wolves, and Tigers: A University Press, 1965), 149. Harangue at the Chickasaw Bluffs, 1796,” William and

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2 I will use the terms “nation” and “tribe” interchangeably. Department, 1780–1800, http://wardepartmentpapers. Both words are European constructions, and neither org/document.php?id=21. quite gets at the fluid nature of southeastern coalitions. 9 Arrell M. Gibson, The Chickasaws (Norman: University 3 Tuskau Pautaupau quoted in Colin G. Calloway, The of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 67; Robert S. Cotterill, “The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Virginia-Chickasaw Treaty of 1783,” Journal of Southern Diversity in Native American Communities (New York: History 8 (Nov. 1942): 495. Cambridge University Press, 1995), 226, 221; Michelene E. Pesantubbee, “Nancy Ward: American Patriot or 10 For instance, in 1793 Cherokee elder Bloody Fellow said Cherokee Nationalist?” American Indian Quarterly 38 Piomingo was his “old friend & Can Speak my tongue as (Spring 2014): 192–96; Kathleen DuVal, Independence well as a Cherokee.” Quoted in Atkinson, Splendid Land, Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution (New Splendid People, 126; James Henry Malone noted in 1922 York: Random House, 2015), 11–24. that Piomingo’s first appearance in the historical record was of him venturing far from Chickasaw country to raid 4 For instance, in 1782, the representatives of the against the Senecas. James H. Malone, The Chickasaw Chickasaw Nation told Americans, “Making a peace with Nation: A Short Sketch of a Noble People (Louisville, KY: you doth not intitle us to fall out with our Fathers the John P. Morton & Company, 1922), 336. While Adair English.” A Talk from us to be delivered by Mr. Simon translated Piomingo’s title to “far-off leader,” we do not Burney to the Commanders of every different Station have an English translation to the name/title Tushatokoa. between this Nation and the fall of the Ohio River, July 9, 1782, Draper Manuscript Collection, Tennessee 11 DuVal has explained how in 1783 Paya Mataha held the Papers, series 20, vol. 1, roll 1, Division of Archives rank of “head leading warrior” in the nation. Unlike the and Manuscripts, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, role of mingo, or, roughly, chief (which he also held), Madison; James R. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid national war chief was not passed through lines of descent People: The Chickasaw Indians to Removal(Tuscaloosa: but instead was an earned position. Paya Mataha was the University of Alabama Press, 2004), 120–21. Chickasaws’ head war chief; Piomingo of Tchoukafala was the second-highest ranking war chief. Duval, 5 Colin G. Calloway, The World Turned Upside Down: Independence Lost, 12–23. Adair, History of the American Indian Voices from Early America (New York: Bedford, Indians, 360. William Panton was an English trader 1994), 124–26. based out of Pensacola with significant ties to Indian country. The Spanish requested Panton stay in Florida 6 DuVal, Independence Lost, xxi. after they regained nominal control of the peninsula, hoping his relations with Native peoples would foster 7 While we have no accounts of Chickasaw women at allegiance to the Spanish sovereign. Jane M. Berry, “The treaty negotiations, we can infer that Chickasaw women Indian Policy of Spain in the Southwest 1783–1795,” were likely present for larger, more ceremonial talks Mississippi Valley Historical Review 3 (Mar. 1917): 467; such as at French Lick and Hopewell, because women Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The played roles in preparing food for events like religious Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685–1815 ceremonies. Since many of the rituals men undertook (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 173–80; during international talks mirrored those at the Bush (the Daniel H. Usner Jr., Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a annual Green Corn Dance held by almost all southeast- Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley ern American Indians), it is a near certainty that women before 1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina attended diplomatic meetings. However, Adair notes Press, 1992), 273–75. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid that women in Chickasaw society had less influence on People, 124. Further, Paya Mataha’s desire to be buried in tribal decisions than they did in nations like the Creeks Spanish traditions should probably be seen as a symbolic The History of the American and Choctaws. James Adair, one, rather than as representation of Spanish fealty. Indians, ed. Kathryn E. Holland Braund (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 143–57, 354–72. 12 Atkinson notes that a Spanish burial of Paya Mataha David Andrew Nichols, Red Gentlemen and White would have been highly irregular and against Chickasaw Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order customs. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 124, on the American Frontier (Charlottesville: University of Maj. John Doughty and William Panton quoted on 127. Virginia Press, 2008), 11. 13 Alexander McGillivray was the biracial son of Scottish 8 Samuel Cole Williams, Beginnings of West Tennessee: In trader Lachlan McGillivray and Sehoy Marchand, a the Land of the Chickasaws, 1541–1841 (Johnson City, daughter of a Frenchman and Creek woman. By all TN: Watauga Press, 1930), 34; Atkinson, Splendid Land, accounts, his ability to speak either of the two Creek Splendid People, 123; “The Treaty at French Lick with dialects was extremely spotty, but due to his mother he the Chickasaw,” November 5, 1783, Papers of the War was considered a full member of the society, with his

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membership of the powerful Wind clan a catalyst for 21 Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 134. his upward mobility. He and his father had supported the British during the American Revolution, and the 22 Proclamation by the President, August 26, 1790, and the loss of family property afterward inclined him to hate President to the Chickasaw Nation, December 30, 1790, the Americans. John Walton Caughey, McGillivray of in The Territorial Papers of the United States, ed. Clarence the Creeks (1939; rep., Columbia: University of South Edwin Carter, 28 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, Carolina Press, 2007), xv–xvii, 11–13. 1934–), 4:34, 41.

14 Gibson, Chickasaws, 77; Atkinson, Splendid Land, 23 Arthur Campbell to Henry Knox [month illegible] 29, Splendid People, 124; Jack D. L. Holmes, “Spanish 1789, Papers of Arthur Campbell, Filson Historical Treaties with West Florida Indians, 1784–1802,” Florida Society, Louisville, KY [hereafter FHS]. Campbell was Historical Quarterly 48 (Oct. 1969): 143–44. aware of the problems McGillivray presented and argued to Washington that “the insolence of the Indian half bred 15 The fanimingo (roughly translated as “squirrel king”) M’Gillivray ought to be checked, or rather that he may served as a spokesman for non-Chickasaw peoples in quickly be rendered a useless tool of the Governor of tribal councils. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, the Bahamas.” Campbell to Gen. Washington, May 10, 18–21. The website Ethnologue lists a 75 percent lexical 1789, Campbell Papers, FHS; New York Daily Advertiser, similarity between Spanish and French. “Spanish: A May 26, 1790; New-York Daily Gazette, July 3, 1790. Language of Spain,” Ethnologue: Languages of the World, ed. Gary F. Simmons and Charles D. Fenig, 20th ed. 24 Michelle LeMaster has demonstrated how American (Dallas, TX: SIL International, 2017), https://www. Indian men drew on rhetorics of manhood linked ethnologue.com/language/spa. to martial ability to assert their place within society. Boys were not considered men until they had proven 16 “Proceedings of Hopewell,” in The New American themselves in battle or in the hunting grounds. Both State Papers, 1789–1860: Indian Affairs,ed. Thomas were exclusively the domain of men, and success on C. Cochran, 13 vols. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly either was required to earn an adult name and ascend Resources, 1972), 6: 62–64. within town or national ranks. For instance, the man who during the 1770s and 1780s held the title of Paya 17 Ibid. Mataha, which Adair said was “the high name of a war leader,” earned that moniker in part for having killed The 18 “Treaty with the Chickasaw, January 10, 1786,” over forty men in combat. Michelle LeMaster, Brothers Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, Born of One Mother: British-Native American Relations Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale University, New in the Colonial Southeast (Charlottesville: University of Haven, 2009, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ Virginia Press, 2012), 51–83. In the case of Choctaw chic1786.asp; Wendy St. Jean, “How the Chickasaws leader Taboca, Greg O’Brien has demonstrated that Saved the Cumberland Settlement in the 1790s,” travels of great distances were akin to sacred journeys for Tennessee Historical Quarterly 68 (Spring 2009): 4–5. many southeastern peoples. Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750–1830 (Lincoln: University of 19 The Americans came away from Hopewell believing they had Nebraska Press, 2002), 64–65. While neither Piomingo sealed a permanent pact with the Chickasaws. Henry Knox nor the Colberts were present at St. Clair’s defeat, one later recalled how little acrimony was created between the Chickasaw man who was there was said to have killed two nations due to the Chickasaws’ distance from the frontier and scalped eleven men before falling to his twelfth settlements. Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, and Joseph adversary. The Americans “greatly lamented” his loss. Martin reported to Congress, “We found no difficulty in our New York Daily Advertiser, Dec. 19, 1791. For a fuller treaty with these Indians, who are the most honest and well account of the battle, see Colin G. Calloway, The Victory informed, as well as the most orderly and best governed of with No Name: The Native American Defeat of the First any we have seen.” Unfortunately for the Chickasaws, the American Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), United States was slow to deliver on its promises. Adding 125–27; John Steele to Arthur Campbell, Jan. 29, 1792, insult to injury, Cherokees robbed many of the parties of Campbell Papers, FHS; Report of the Secretary of War their gifts on the way home from South Carolina. Knox to to the President, Jan. 17, 1792, in Carter, Territorial Washington, July 7, 1789, and Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Papers, 4:111–15. Pickens, and Joseph Martin to John Hancock, Hopewell, Jan. 14, 1786, in New American State Papers, 6:59–60, 61–62. 25 Adair, History of the American Indians, 118; Calloway, Victory with No Name, 126–27; Gibson, Chickasaws, 86. 20 Manuel Serrano y Sanz, Spain and the Cherokee and Claypoole’s Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), Nov. 26, Choctaw Indians in the Second Half of the Eighteenth 1791; McGillivray to Carondelet, Jan. 15, 1793 in Caughey, Century, trans. Samuel Dorris Dickinson (Idabel, OK: McGillivray of the Creeks, 351. Potsherd Press, 1995), 26. McGillivray quoted in Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 133.

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26 Quoted in Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 137; Cherokees, but lamented to James Robertson that he Governor Blount to the Secretary of War, Knoxville, Aug. was limited to “defensive operations only,” and directed 31, 1792, in Carter, Territorial Papers, 4:166; Gibson, Robertson to keep the Chickasaws supplied in corn “to Chickasaws, 86. Taski Etoka was not present, as he had give them satisfaction and keep them attached to the gone to Creek lands to seek a stop to the sporadic raids, United States.” Blount to Robertson, Dec. 3, 1792, though he asked his younger brother Chinubbee to go in Box 1, Folder 7, Robertson Papers; St. Jean, “How the his place. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 154; Chickasaws Saved the Cumberland Settlement in the Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 336. 1790s,” 13–14.

27 Governor Blount to the Secretary of War, Knoxville, Sept. 30 St. Jean, “How the Chickasaws Saved the Cumberland 20, 1792, in Carter, Territorial Papers, 4:174; Piomingo Settlement in the 1790s,” 7–8; Blount to Knox, May 23, did not seem warm to Blount as he was to Robertson 1793, in Carter, Territorial Papers, 4: 259–61; Charleston or Washington, declaring to Spanish envoys that the City Gazette and Daily Advertiser, May 15, 1794; governor was a thief who had been “putting things in his McGillivray died from complications of gout at William own barns that were intended for the red men.” St. Jean, Panton’s Pensacola home. Caughey, McGillivray of the “How the Chickasaws Saved the Cumberland Settlement Creeks, 351. David Narrett relates that Panton was the in the 1790s,” 11–12. one man “whose callous embrace he [McGillivray] could not escape.” David Narrett, Adventurism and Empire: The 28 Blount to Knox, Knoxville, Mar. 23, 1793, in Carter, Struggle for Mastery in the Louisiana-Florida Borderlands, Territorial Papers, 4:247–48; St. Jean, “How the 1762–1803 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Chickasaws Saved the Cumberland Settlement in the Press, 2015), 229. 1790s,” 7–8; Gibson, Chickasaws, 88; Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 156; Maryland Journal (Baltimore, 31 Philadelphia General Advertiser, July 8, 1794, Draft of a MD), Apr. 19, 1793. Speech to the Chickasaw Indians, in Carter, Territorial Papers, 4:349; Alan D. Gaff, Bayonets in the Wilderness: 29 For attacks by Upper Creeks and Chickamaugas, see Anthony Wayne’s Legion in the Old Northwest (Norman: “Autobiography of Isaac Shelby,” 27, Shelby to Knox, University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 143; Atkinson, , Jan. 10, 1794, Feb. 10, 1794, in Isaac Shelby Papers, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 165. FHS; Extract of a Letter from John Thompson to Governor Blount, Turkey’s Town, Sept. 2, 1792, and 32 Williams wrote that the negotiations with Ugulayacabe Extract of a Letter from Leonard D. Shaw, agent of the lasted over a month and ultimately cost the Spanish U.S. to the Cherokee Nation, to Gov. Blount, Aug. 29, $30,000. Williams, Beginnings of West Tennessee, 53; 1792, William Blount Papers, 1749–1800, FHS. A Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 177; Gibson, May 14 letter from South Carolina announced that the Chickasaws, 90; “Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Creeks had declared war on the United States but that Navigation between Spain and the United States: the Chickasaws and possibly the Choctaws were fighting October 27, 1795,” Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale. their Native neighbors. If so, the writer claims, “by these edu/18th_century/sp1795.asp. means we will avoid being troubled by them; but if they do attack our frontiers they cannot penetrate very far, as 33 In April, Piomingo informed the United States that he this country is very populous and they could easily be expected a “large army of Creeks that’s Coming against repelled.” Regardless, Georgia instituted a draft for its this Nation.” Ever the strategist, Piomingo evacuated militia, and an Augusta man wrote, “Indian alarms are Tchoukafala before the attack and ambushed the become now very serious.” New-York Daily Gazette, June Creek force, inflicting significant casualties. Friends 11, 1793. “The Creek nation must be destroyed,” one & Brother of the Chickasaw Nation, Apr. 29, 1795, settler implored, “or the south western frontiers, from Draper Manuscript Collection, Tennessee Papers, vol. the mouth of the St. Mary’s to the western extremities 5, reel 2. By September 1795, both the Upper and of Kentucky and Virginia, will be incessantly harassed Lower Creeks showed “every disposition for peace” with by them and now is the time.” General Advertiser, July the Chickasaws. Barnard to Blount, September 16, 1, 1793. See also New York Daily Advertiser, Oct. 29, 1795, Box 1 Folder 6, James Robertson Papers, TSA. 1793; “Richmond, October 30,” Charleston City Gazette “Piominko: Chickasaw Leader and Diplomat,” and and Daily Advertiser, Nov. 9, 1793. Citizen of the Mero “Wolf’s Friend: Chickasaw War Leader, Spanish Ally, and District to Robertson, July 10, 1792, Box 1, Folder 4, Rival of Piominko, both on Chickasaw.tv, 2017, https:// Robertson Papers, Tennessee State Archives, Nashville www.chickasaw.tv/history/document/piomingo-profile, [hereafter TSA]. Southwestern Territory Governor https://www.chickasaw.tv/historic-figures/document/ William Blount badly wanted to attack the Creeks and wolfs-friend-profile.

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