MERCHANT ADVENTURER IN THE OLD SOUTHWEST:

WILLIAM PANTON, THE SPANISH YEARS,

1783-1801

by

THOMAS DAVIS WATSON, B.A., M.A.

A DISSERTATION IN

HISTORY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved

Annented

August, 1972 13

NO'*^ PREFACE

Cf The American Revolution suddenly intensified

Spain's perennial problem of guarding the approaches to

its vast New World empire. By war's end the

occupied only a relatively narrow strip of land along the

Atlantic coast, though its boundaries stretched westward

to the and southward to Spanish . The

new nation soon proved to be a restless, expansive neighbor

and a threat to the tenuous Spanish hold on the North Amer­

ican continent.

Spanish policymakers, of course, had anticipated

this development long before the end of the revolution.

Yet Spanish diplomacy failed to prevent the Americans from

acquiring territory in the Mississippi Valley and in the

Old Southwest.

In the postwar years endeavor? d to keep the

United States from realizing its interior claims. Spanish

governors of alternately intrigued with American

frontiersmen in promoting separatist movements, encouraged

them to settle in Louisiana and West t'iorida, and subjected

them to harassment by limiting their use of the Mississippi

They attempted also to extend the northern limits of West

Florida well beyond the thirty-first parallel, the boundary

established in the British-American peace settlement of

11 Ill

1783. The key to success in this latter undertaking lay in the ability of Spain to deny the United States control over the southern Indians.

Spain's efforts to impede the American westward advance ultimately failed. In failure, however, Spain succeeded remarkably in maintaining hegemony over the southern Indians through mastery of their trade. These

Indians—certainly the Creeks and --generally were disposed to resist American land-hunger. The success of Spanish Indian policy nevertheless may be attributed largely to the activities of , a Scottish merchant headquartered in Pensacola. His talents as an

Indian trader enabled him to build a commercial empire among the southern Indians that withstood all serious challenges during his lifetime. Panton's ability to manip­ ulate Indians by controlling their trade won for him the grudging respect, if not the esteem, of Spaniard and Amer­ ican alike.

This study attempts to place the Spanish phase of

Panton's career in perspective within the context of the struggle between Spaniards and Americans for control of the Old Southwest. It also brings to fruition in some measure the scholarly efforts of Elizabeth Howard West, who, in addition to serving as Librarian at Texas Tech

University from 1925 to 1942, devoted a prodigious amount of time to gathering data on Panton's activities from iv Spanish and British archival sources. Miss West had planned to edit key documents related to Panton's career as a publication, but the depression of the 1930's inter­ vened. Her research contributes substantially to this study. Unfortunately Panton's contemporaries left scant evidence shedding light on his character or his physical appearance. As a personality he remains a shadowy figure in the annals of the Old Southwest. His extant correspon­ dence creates the distinct impression that he was a practical-minded, extremely self-confident individual. First and foremost he was a typical late-eighteenth century British entrepreneur with special gifts for reaping personal gain from the demands of high politics.

I am indebted to Professor David M. Vigness for his direction of this dissertation and to Professors Lowell L. Blaisdell, William R. Johnson, James W. Harper, Robert A. Hayes, and Lewis E. Hill, the other members of my committee, for their valuable suggestions and criticisms. TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ii

Chapter

I. SPAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND THE INDIANS OF THE OLD SOUTHWEST 1 II. WILLIAM PANTON: A BIDDER FOR THE SPANISH FUR TRADE 35

III. STALEMATE IN THE WEST 71

IV, TRIALS AND TRIUMPH IN THE WEST 10 5

V. CHALLENGES FROM AROUSED REPUBLICANS .... 157

VI. THE REPUBLICAN MENACE COMPOUNDED 206

VII. PLUNDERED BY FRIEND AND FOE ALIKE 266

VIII. CAREER IN RETROSPECT 313

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS vi

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 329

V LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1. Map of the Old Southwest 16 7

VI CHAPTER I

SPAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,

AND THE INDIANS OF THE OLD SOUTHWEST

The ministers of His Catholic watched with a customary tinge of Anglophobia the disturbances signaling open rebellion in the British colonies of . They feared possible British military incursions into the Spanish portion of the New World, either as a way of com­ pensating for expenses incurred in dealing with the colonial insurgents or as means of quelling the anti- government grumblings of Englishmen at home. Consequently, Spanish authorities reappraised the defenses of the Carib­ bean and elsewhere in the empire.

The Bourbon , hoping to transform Spam into a more respected member of the European state system, had taken steps to revitalize their dominions in the eigh­ teenth century. Thus, the prevailing Spanish outlook included elements other than mere resignation to the even­ tuality of further setbacks to the imperial system. The reign of the reform-minded Charles III (1759-1788) had

Juan F, Yela Utrilla, Espana ante la independencia de los Estados Unidos (2 vols.; 2d ed.; Lerida: Gr^ficos Academia Mariana, 1926), I, 49-50, reached mid-passage by 1776, and the Spanish Empire teemed with ferment over plans and policies designed to reverse the seventeenth century trend toward moribundity and col­ lapse. The pervading spirit animating the Spanish bureauc­ racy called both for revitalizing the defense capabilities of the empire and for making that empire economically worthy of the increased defensive effort. First-rank Spanish officials, motivated by these precepts, quickly visualized the possibilities of securing advantages for their royal master out of the distress of Great Britain,

The Conde de Aranda, ambassador to the French court, mused early in 1776 that, although the rebellion of the English colonials regrettably set an unfavorable ex­ ample for their Spanish counterparts, Spain nevertheless should welcome a weakening of British power from whatever quarter it might rise. From Aranda's viewpoint, recovery by Britain of commercial losses attendant with an effective detachment of its North American possessions would be lengthy and difficult. To join with the French partner in the Family Compact in extending sub rosa military aid to the rebels, he suggested, would be convenient to Spain's 2 interest. On this point the Conde de Ricla, head of the

War Ministry, agreed. Ricla further suggested that a siz­ able military force be deployed to the Caribbean area

^Ibid., I, 64-65. immediately, preferably—because of its strategic central location—to Campeche. Haste was necessary to preclude a probable British blockade of Spanish ports prior to attacking some vulnerable point in the Caribbean. Once in position, these Spanish troops could be employed as a counterstrike reserve force or even committed to battle in North America should Spain later choose to ally openly with the Anglo-Americans. By its mere presence, Ricla estimated, the deployment would suffice to interject a strong measure of caution in British calculations against Spain. Under the Conde de Floridablanca, who in 1776 succeeded the Marques de Grimaldi as the Spanish Foreign Minister, the chances for a Spanish-United States alliance or, for that matter, even recognition remained remote. Floridablanca, as did his predecessor, abhorred republi­ canism and chose to avoid such a dangerous precedent for the Spanish colonies as openly abetting a revolution. Moreover, he could not be convinced that an independent Anglo-American nation constituted less threat to the Spanish position in the New World than the status quo. Besides, the Spanish government, should it choose to sup­ port the United States, had good reason to expect

-a Dietamen del Sor. Conde de Ricla, Archive General de Simancas, Secr^taria de Guerra, legajo 7311. I am in­ debted to Professor Allan J. Kuethe for making this citation available. retaliation in kind from its British adversary. Conse­ quently, Spain confined its help to the rebels to clan­ destine assistance in the form of subsidies and loans amounting all in all to some $645,000."^ Nor did Spain at first indicate any great willing­ ness to declare war against Great Britain after France in June 1778 became openly involved in the conflict. Florida­ blanca was an ardent nationalist who, unlike Grimaldi, harbored little fondness for the French. The Spanish court had been offended by being incompletely informed of French policy following the decision of the French foreign min­ ister, the Comte de Vergennes, in December 1777 to agree to an American alliance—the act which eventually led France into the struggle. France also had spurned recent Spanish requests for aid in disputes with the Portuguese and the British over control of portions of Spanish . Spain therefore tried to wring territorial conces­ sions from the British government in exchange for Spanish

4 Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 45-49, 240-243; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (: Oliver and Boyd, 1935), pp. 91-93; J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Anglo- Spanish Rivalry in North America (Athens: University of Press, 1971), p. 123. Dictamen de Ricla, loc. cit.,; Wright, Anglo- Spanish Rivalry, p. 127. neutrality before entering the war as a French ally.

Pressing its services as mediator of Anglo-French differ­ ences, the Spanish court hoped above all to regain

Gibraltar in return. But scorned by Great Britain in its

diplomatic overtures, enticed by promises of French mili­

tary and diplomatic support in achieving the relatively

ambitious Spanish war aims, and convinced that a more propitious opportunity to humble its traditional enemy would never again occur, Spain entered the war in June

1779.^

One of Spain's major war aims was to gain exclusive control over the Gulf of . In the peace settlement of the Seven Years War, Great Britain had received stra­ tegic and all of French Louisiana east of the Mississippi. Spain received what remained of Louisiana west of the Mississippi together with the Isle of Orleans, though reluctantly because it thus became the neighbor of aggressive Britons bent on making inroads into the closed o Spanish commercial system by any means whatsoever.

Morris, Peacemakers, p. 14; Wright, Anglo-Spanish Rivalry, p. 127. 7 Richard W. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence: The International History of the American Revolution (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 216. John W. Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez in Louisiana, 1776-1783, Publications of the University of California at Los Angeles in Social Sciences, Vol. IV (Berkeley: From 1768 onward, successive Spanish governors of

Louisiana had stood by virtually helpless to prevent the brazenly open contraband trade conducted by British mer­

chants with Spanish colonists from ships plying the

Mississippi. Halting these abuses proved impossible.

Neither the produce of Spanish Louisiana nor the tastes of its preponderantly non-Spanish inhabitants could be made to dovetail readily into the Spanish mercantilist scheme. Only with the conquest of between

1779 and 1781 by Louisiana's talented governor, Bernardo de Galvez, did British contraband activity come completely 9 to an end. Indeed, the economic incompatibility of Louisiana and West Florida with the metropolis gave precedence to international political objectives rather than conventional mercantilistic exclusivism in Spain's plans for these provinces. Aside from their strategic value in maintaining a Spanish monopoly over the , the Spanish court wished to transform them into well populated, effec­ tive barriers not only against British encroachments into the more vital portions of the empire, but also against University of California Press, 1934), pp. 75-76; E. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Pres'sV 1934) , pp. 21-35. 9 John G. Clark, , 1718-1812; An Economic History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 167, 222. those of the equally feared Ang^o-American frontiersmen. To do so required creating economic incentives in the prov­ inces of Louisiana and West Florida that would rapidly in­ crease their prosperity and make them immediately attractive to prospective immigrants. Experience had indicated that these objectives would be defeated should those provinces be forcibly integrated into the Spanish economy. Indeed, their ultimate ruin would more likely be assured.''"^

The postwar economic policy for Louisiana and West Florida materialized with the promulgation of the Royal Ce'dula of January 22, 17 82. The C^dula was the culmina­ tion of a series of special commercial privileges granted to Louisiana dating back as far as 1768 and the suggestions of a number of Spanish officials. For a ten-year period

Ibid., p. 221; Arthur P. Whitaker, "The Commerce of Louisiana and the at the End of the Eighteenth Century," Hispanic American Historical Review, VIII (May, 1928), 191-192; Isaac Joslin Cox, "The New Invasion of the Goths and Vandals," Mississippi Valley Historical Associa­ tion, Proceedings, VIII (1916), 181. Clark, New Orleans, pp. 167-176; Whitaker, "Com­ merce of Louisiana and Floridas," 192. Translations of this Royal Cedula appear in Arthur P. Whitaker, trans, and ed.. Documents Relating to the Commercial Policy of Spain in the Floridas with Incidental Reference to Louisiana, Publications of the Florida State Historical Society, No. 10 (Deland: Florida State Historical Society, 1931), pp. 31-39; and Lawrence Kinnaird, ed,, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794, Pt. II, Post-War Decade, 1782-1791, American Historical Association, AiTnual Report, 1945 (Vols. 2-4; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946- 49), 1-5. The subtitles for Pts. I and III respectively are: The Revolutionary Period, 1765-1781; and Problems of Frontier Defense, 1792-179X1 They will be citeJTnfra by~ sub-title only. 8 following the proclamation of peace, it permitted direct trade between both Louisiana and West Florida and French ports where Spanish consuls resided. The governor of

Louisiana received discretionary powers to allow trade with the French islands of the West Indies in certain cir­ cumstances . Trade in French goods was permissible at greatly reduced duty rates, but it was to be carried in

Spanish vessels. Spanish goods could enter duty-free.

The export of specie, except for the purchase of slaves, was prohibited. The privileges thus extended by the Royal Cedula were designed to remove any justifiable basis for smuggling, to create temporary markets for provincial products, and to grant their predominantly non-Hispanic inhabitants access to European goods more suitable to their preferences. Hopefully Spanish merchants and manufacturers could be in­ duced to offer goods suitable for Louisiana and West Flor­ ida, and the Spanish economy could be altered so as to 12 absorb their produce by the Cedula's date of expiration. Meanwhile, Spanish diplomats, alarmed by reports of the western territorial ambitions of the Continental

Congress, sought methods for containing the Americans,

Aranda, aided by the French, contrived in vain to prevent the United States from acquiring lands in the Mississippi

12 Clark, New Orleans, pp. 221-225. Valley. American diplomats countered by negotiating a preliminary treaty with Great Britain apart from French tutelage and presenting it in November 1782 as a fait accompli. Thus, the general peace settlement concluded in September 1783 left many questions unanswered in the area of future Spanish-United States relations.''"^

Paradoxically if not intentionally, separate British agreements with Spain and the United States set the conditions for the postwar Spanish-American conflict. 14 The former English colonies obtained generous territorial concessions. In the west, the United States boundary followed the mid-course of the Mississippi southward to the thirty-first parallel of north latitude. In the south, it ran from this point due east to its intersection with the Chattahoochee, then southward down the middle of the river to its confluence with the Flint, constricting West Florida to a narrow strip of coastline bordering the Gulf of Mexico. In addition. United States citizens gained joint perpetual rights with British subjects to navigate

13 Bemis, Diplomacy of American Revolution, pp. 215- 2 40, passim; Arthur P, Whitaker, The Spanish-: 1783-1795. The Westward Movement and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley (Boston: Houghton- Mifflin, 1927), pp. 9-10. 14 Morris, Peacemakers, p. 423; Whitaker, Spanish- American Frontier, p. 11. 10 the Mississippi "from its source to the Ocean. . . ."-^^ To Spain, Great Britain retroceded and assented to the retention of West Florida by right of conquest, a point of crucial significance in the pending controversy. On the navigation of the Mississippi, the Spanish-British treaty was mute.

The Spanish government raised no formal protest against the United States-British arrangements; nor did it seek a more precise agreement with Great Britain on the bounds of West Florida. These matters Floridablanca

deemed could be more prudently determined in separate 17 negotiation with the United States at a later date.

This date was hastened by a series of disturbing reports flowing into the Spanish Foreign Ministry from Spanish agents and officials at such disparate locations as London, Philadelphia, and New Orleans. The same theme repeated itself through these dispatches; scores of Amer­ icans were laying plans for occupying various portions of 18 the territory acquired at Paris.

15 U.S., Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, ed. by Hunter Miller (8 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931-1948), II, 155. 16 Ibid., 152-153; Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 10, 17 Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 54; Morris, Peacemakers, p. 424. 18 Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 63-67 11 Consequently by mid-1784 Floridablanca completed plans for countering the American advance. On June 26 a royal decree forbade Americans to navigate the Mississippi under pain of confiscation and arrest. Three days later Floridablanca drew up the Spanish version of the limits of West Florida, declaring it to extend in the west from the mouth of the Apalachicola upwards to its juncture with the Flint River and thence to its source. From this point the boundary proceeded in a straight northeasterly line to the source of the Euphasee (Hiwassee), In the north it followed the Hiwassee to its confluence with the River, thence westward along the Tennessee to the Ohio and, finally, along the Ohio to the Mississippi. By these two actions Floridablanca intended to retain exclusive control over the Gulf of Mexico, to prevent American smuggling activity, and to stifle the growth of American settlements in the west by choking off their only feasible trade outlet. The effectiveness of the new Spanish policy depended on controlling as much of the east bank of the Mississippi 19 and its hinterlands as possible in the south, Floridablanca justified his counterstroke against

American expansion on the premise that Spain retained West

19 Ibid,, pp, 67-68; Floridablanca's Instructions on Boundaries and Navigation, July 29, 1794, Joseph Byrne Lockey Papers, P, K, Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida. Cited infra as Lockey Papers, 12 Florida in its entirety by right of conquest. Great Britain hardly could cede to the United States in 1782 part of a province won by Spanish arms in 1781, A nation could scarcely dispose of lands it no longer possessed. Floridablanca remained unaware of the secret stipulation of the United States-British preliminary agreement of November 1782 that set the United States-West Florida boundary along an east-west line extending from the mouth of the Yazoo to the Chattahoochie should the province be recovered by Great Britain. Nor did he know that in 1764 the British government actually had set the northern boundary at that line. Consequently, the Spanish Foreign Minister relied on somewhat specious arguments in justi­ fying the Spanish claim. On the other hand, possessing both banks of the Mississippi placed the Spanish position of limiting its use in full consonance with international lawT . 20 To claim disputed territory was one matter; to control it, quite another. The overall population, includ­ ing slaves, of the vast provinces of Louisiana and the two

Floridas in the early 1780's numbered something less than

25,000. The loyalty of many, if not most, of these for­ merly French and British colonists to His Catholic Majesty

20 Floridablanca's Instructions, Lockey Papers; Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 11, 69-70; Wright, Anglo-Spanish Rivalry, p. 133; Morris, Peacemakers, p. 424. 13 21 was questionable. The defenses of the provinces con­ sisted of nothing more than an L-shaped line of widely scattered fortress-settlements stretching from St. Louis in the north to St. Augustine in the east with New Orleans situated at the vertex. On the perpendicular axis these outposts with few exceptions hugged the banks of the Mississippi; on the horizontal, the coastline. Their commanders over the passing years often lamented that their authority extended scarcely beyond the range of the cannon guarding the castillos under their charge. That the disputed ground lying within Florida­ blanca 's line comprised the largest share of the homelands of the Five Civilized Tribes of the Old Southwest was not unintentional. They figured importantly in the plans of the Spanish government for Louisiana and the Floridas, plans antedating considerably the establishment of peace. Although not consulted as to their preferences during the Paris treaty discussions of 1782-1783, the disposition of these some 45,000 Indians toward the post-1783 antagonists, the Spaniards believed, would largely determine which should eventually prevail. In the northeastern corner of the disputed ground the warlike dwelled in 4 or 5 towns nestled between the upper reaches of the Yazoo and the Tombigbee

21 Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 21-22. 14 rivers in present-day Mississippi. They claimed hunting grounds stretching northward into the bulge of land formed by the Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers. Southward, bounded roughly by the Mississippi and the Tombigbee, they reached to the mouth of the Yazoo, overlapping in this area with the hunting grounds of their neighbors and kins­ men to the south, the . Never great in numbers, the attrition of endemic warfare kept the Nation small. At the end of the American Revolutibn, the Chick­ asaws were capable of placing perhaps no more than 550 22 gunmen in the field. Below the Chickasaws the relatively docile Choctaws occupied some 70 villages situated in part along the upper waters of the Pearl and, to the southeast, alon^ the Pascagoula and Chickasawhay rivers. The Nation embraced three subgroupings, the Six Towns in the south, the populous Large Party to their north, and the Small Party to their northwest. The least martial in spirit of all the southern Indians, the Choctaws were noted for their

22 James Adair, The History of the American Indians; Particularly Those Adjoining to the Mississippi [sicT"^ EaFt and West Florida, Georgia, South and , and (London: E. and C. Dilly, 1775), pp. 352-358; R. S. Cotterill, The Southern Indians: The Story of the Civilized Tribes Before Their Removal (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), p. 67, U.S,, Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors, by John R. Swanton, Bulletin No. 73 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 449, 15 devotion to agriculture, their "incredible" fondness for alcohol, and their guile in extorting "gifts" from their white neighbors. With an overall population approaching 17,000, the fighting strength of the Choctaws amounted to 23 roughly 5,000 warriors.

To the east of the Chickasaws and Choctaws lay the Creek Confederation. Embracing a conglomerate of tribal backgrounds (e.g. enclaves of , Chickasaw, Hitchitee, and ), the dominant party in the confederacy was Muskhogean and distantly related to the Chickasaws and Choctaws. The Creeks were divided into two groups. Upper and Lower. The Upper Creeks lived in some 25 principal towns in lands embracing the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers around and above the point where they joined to form the Alabama. The 12 major settlements of the Lower Creeks were situated to the southeast along the Chattahoochee. Farther to the south and east seven towns lay well within undisputed Spanish territory, extending east of the Apa­ lachicola into the Florida peninsula. The , although independent of the Creek Confederation, remained in close association with their northern neighbors. The

23 Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 7-8; Adair, American Indians, pp. 282-290; Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians, p. 45 3; Bernard Romans, A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida, by Bernard Romans, a_ Facsimile Reproduction of the 1775 Edition with Introduc­ tion by Rembert W. Patrick, Floridiana Facsimile and Reprint Series (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), pp. 71-82. 16 Creeks claimed hunting grounds spreading outward from their centrally located towns over an area circumscribed by the Gulf of Mexico, the Tombigbee, the Tennessee and most of present-day Georgia beyond the Atlantic seaboard. Over 15,000 in number. Creek fighting strength approached 5,000.^^

The Nation occupied lands overlapping the northeastern corner of the disputed area. Depleted by smallpox epidemics and sporadic wars, the Cherokees could yet in the 1780's count on the services of some 2,000 gun­ men. Although since 1763 in frequent clash with the van­ guard of the Anglo-American westward advance, the Cherokees became an object of Spanish Indian policy only in the 1790's.^^ The Five Civilized Tribes of the Old Southwest bore much mutual resemblance in their life-styles, customs, and

24 Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 8-9; Adair, American Indians, p. 257; Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians, pp. 215-216; Benjamin Hawkins, "A Slcetch of the Creek Country in 1798 and 1799" in Benjamin Hawkins et al., The Creek Country (Americus, Ga.: American Book Co., 1938), pp. 24-25; William Bartram, The Travels of William Bartram, Naturalists Edition, ed. by Francis Harper (New Haveni Yale University Press, 1958), p. 308. 25 U.S., Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, The Indians of the Southeastern United States, by John R. Swanton, Bulletin No^ 137 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 114; Adair, American Indians, p. 232; Romans, Concise Natural History, pp. 91- 97; Arthur P. Whitaker, "Spain and the Cherokee Indians," North Carolina Historical Review, IV (July, 1927), 252-255. 17 interests. All had become relatively sedentary, tilling the soil adjacent to their villages and relocating when its fertility was depleted. Crops of corn, beans, pota­ toes, squash, and melons furnished the greater part of their subsistence, with men as well as women usually work­ ing in the fields. Custom forbade hunting before the autumn harvest. Indian families also kept hogs, and herds of cattle and horses grazed the open ranges surrounding 2 6 the Indian towns.

In each nation the town was the basic political unit, with a civil chief and a war chief at its head.

Policy was determined, however, only after prolonged, ceremonious open discussion in which the principal warriors and the elders participated. Policy decisions, once reached, lacked the force of law in the highly individual­ istic, near anarchistic Indian society. Chiefs relied on their stature and their powers of persuasion in asserting their leadership. Cogent oratory and custom rather than coercion determined the extent to which compliance was gained in any given situation. Twice yearly the town chiefs met in general tribal council, first in late spring and again after the fall harvest. Matters of general con­ cern, such as war and peace, were decided upon at these

2 6 Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 10-11; Hawkins, Sketch of the Creek Country, passim; Bartram, Travels, p. 325. 18 gatherings. Unanimous support from all tribal factions for an adopted course of action was nevertheless a rarity.

Opposing intratribal factions were commonplace, even to the point of espousing the respective causes of rival Euro­ pean powers. Unanimous support for a particular course of 27 action occurred only quite infrequently. While farming and animal husbandry afforded the Five Civilized Tribes with most of their subsistence, they had become thoroughly attuned to the use of European manufactures in most aspects of their daily lives. Tools, implements, guns, ammunition, housewares, blankets, clothing, textiles of all varieties, jewelry and adornments--even the ceremonial paints with which they decorated their bodies--they obtained through trade with their white neighbors. By the time of the Amer­ ican Revolution, artisanship and the domestic production of clothing, weapons, and tools had virtually ceased. These items could be obtained more cheaply and with greater ease through trade. The Indians of the Old Southwest, as elsewhere in North America, bartered peltry and skins for

European wares, but in the South deerskins were the domi- 28 nant commodity of the Indian traffic.

27 Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 12-13; Hawkins, Sketch of the Creek Country, pp. 67-68; Bartram, Travels, pp 313-314. 28 William Bartram, "Observations on the Creek and Cherokee Indians . . . 1789. With Prefatory and Supple­ mentary Notes by E. G. Squier," American Ethnological Society, Transactions, III, Pt. I (1853), 29. 19 With the ouster of France from Louisiana and Spain from the Floridas as a result of the , the British colonies of Georgia and South Carolina gained trade ascendancy among the Five Civilized Tribes. In 1764 the value of goods entering the Indian trade through Georgia alone was estimated at 12,000 pounds sterling at prime cost on the English market. These goods passed through London correspondents to Savannah mercantile houses which in turn consigned them to storekeepers in the interior, principally at Augusta. These storekeepers in turn consigned the trade goods to factors who resided among the Indians. Carried into each Indian village by trains of pack-horses, this same merchandise brought a conserva­ tively estimated exchange value in peltry of 28,000 pounds sterling. After an allowance of some 1500 pounds for shipping and insurance costs, London correspondents.

Savannah merchants, interior storekeepers, and Indian 29 traders each received a share of the swollen profits. In the ten-year period after 1763, exports of deerskins 30 from Georgia averaged over 240,000 pounds annually. In the years immediately preceding the American

Revolution, the southern fur trade had tended to shift

29 John R. Alden, John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier (Reprint; New York: Gordian Press, Inc., 1966), pp. 16-17, n. 38. 30 Romans, Concise Natural History, p. 25 7. 20 around toward the colonies of East and West Florida. These benefitted by their proximity to the principal Indian set­ tlements, the prevailing southerly flow of the river systems of the Old Southwest, and the westward flight of game from the settlement lines of the Atlantic seaboard colonies. During the hostilities and the British ban on commerce with the rebellious colonies, the Indian trade of Georgia and South Carolina dwindled into insignificance. Loyalist traders in the Floridas, retaining access to the English markets, carried on the trade, but at reduced volumes. The war curtailed hunting by the Indians, whose needs for goods were in large measure met by lavish wartime gifts from the Southern Indian Department as a means of retain­ ing their loyalty. Meanwhile, the southern deer herds, relieved of heavy hunting pressure, increased sufficiently to augur promising prospects for a flourishing postwar trade+. ^ . 31 Traders living among the southern Indians in the latter part of the eighteenth century were predominantly of British origin. Many came from the fringes of colonial society and had drifted into the Indian villages out of

31 Paul Crisler Phillips, The Fur Trade, concluding chs. by J. W. Smurr (2 vols.; Norman: University of Okla­ homa Press, 1961), II, 185-186; Peter J. Hamilton, Colonial Mobile (rev. ed.; reprint; Mobile, Alabama: First National Bank of Mobile, 1952), pp. 246, 308; Walter H. Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, 1774-1786 (Philadelphia: Univer­ sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1933), p. 176. 21 preference for an unbridled existence or to escape prose­ cution for crimes and misdemeanors. They almost invari­ ably took Indian wives, thereby building up their influence through family connections. Some were stable, prosperous men who dealt fairly with the Indians, but most were, as in the words of James Adair, "reprobate pedlars." The chicanery of the traders occasionally produced enough resentment to cause the Indians to massacre or expel traders from their midst. But their complete dependency on the white man's trade led the Indians to relent quickly and to reestablish their former connections. 33

The French and the British by the mid-point of the eighteenth century had long been fully aware of the impor­ tance of trade in obtaining the goodwill and cooperation of the Indians. The maintenance of good trade relations became an essential instrument of the Indian diplomacy of both powers well before the French and Indian war. The English, through their ability to offer quality goods at better terms, steadily gained mastery over the southern

32 Adair, American Indians, p. 2 30; Benjamin Hawkins, Letters of Benjamin Hawkins, 1796-1806, Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, Vol. Ill (Savannah: Georgia Historical Society, 1916), 166-170. 33 Bartram, Travels, pp. 51, 150; Romans, Concise Natural History, pp. 60, 73-74; "Journal of David Taitt's Travels from Pensacola, West Florida to and through the Country of the Upper and Lower Creeks, 1772," in Newton E. Mereness, ed.. Travels in the American Colonies (New York: Macmillan, 1916), pp. 504-505. Indians. Meanwhile, the Indians, courted from all quarters by the representatives of the contending powers, developed an acute sense of their position in the struggle. Becoming adept practitioners of balance-of-power politics, the Indians learned to play one side against the other to good advantage.

The Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws served intermittently as allies to British arms during the American Revolution. British Indian policy at the outbreak of war aimed at maintaining the Southern Indians in a state of friendly neutrality, fearing that war parties likely would be disinclined to discriminate between loyalist and rebel. The Cherokees, however, seeing the hostilities as an opportunity to strike against American usurpers of land in the Wautauga and Nollichucky Valleys, engaged in precipitate action against these settlements. Driven by the necessity of preventing an all but certain Cherokee defeat, John Stuart, the British Superintendent of the Southern Indian Department, in May 1777 urged the Choctaws and Chickasaws to support the Cherokees, reminding them that it was "the declared intention of the Rebels to

Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 17 8; Alden, John Stuart, pp. 15, 30-31; Manuel Serrano y Sanz, ed,, EspaKa y_ los indios Cherokis Y. Chactas en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII (Sevilla: Tip, de la "Guia Oficial," 1916), p, 21; Adair, American Indians, p, 260. 23 possess themselves of your lands. ..." of this inten­ tion most of the Creeks needed little by way of reminder. Once it became clear that the British had yielded in the struggle, large parties among the Cherokee and Creek nations became extremely disconsolate, feeling that they had been abandoned to the "tender mercies" of their former foes^ . 36 By 1784, the vanguard settlements of the American westward advance were pressing inward toward Floridablanca's Spanish claim. They lay along the Cumberland river around the present-day location of Nashville, eastward in the valleys of streams feeding into the upper Tennessee, and in Georgia to the south, they had reached the east bank of the Ogeechee. The Creeks and Cherokees protested that these settlements encroached on their hunting-grounds, lands of the utmost importance in providing the wherewithal to trade. Nor could these Indians find much solace in the early Indian policy assumptions of American leaders within and without the Congress of the Confederation. The Indians,

35 As quoted in Francis P. Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Inter­ course Acts, 1790-1835 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 27. 36 David H. Corkran, The Creek Frontier, 1540-1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), pp. 320-325; Randolph C. Downes, "Cherokee-American Relations in the Upper Tennessee Valley 1776-1791," East Tennessee Histor­ ical Society, Publications, VIII (1936), 38-39; Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 37-56. 24 because they had favored the British, were to be considered conquered peoples. The forfeiture of the vast interior territories by Great Britain applied to the Indians as well. Americans, moreover, were due compensation for losses from Indian depredations. Public lands were needed as bounties for veterans and for sales revenues to be applied to the public debt. Although the official outlook of Congress toward Indian rights to territory soon became less harsh, the weakness and distractedness of the central government permitted it to impose little restraint on the designs of land-hungry westerners. Moreover, the southern states had refrained from ceding their western lands to the Confederation. Since the claims of these states extended to the Mississippi, the southern Indians fell within their respective jurisdictions. The powers granted to Congress under the Articles of Confederation denied the competency of the central government in regulating the 37 affairs of Indians residing on state lands. In its inception, the Spanish approach to the

Indians inhabiting the disputed area depended upon two contingencies. The Spanish government planned to gain the

37 Prucha, American Indian Policy, pp. 30-33; Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967), pp. 5-8; George D. Harmon, Sixty Years of Indian Affairs, 1789-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), pp. 8-9. 25 affection of the Indians by providing them with satisfac­ tory trade arrangements. It would capitalize also on the apprehensiveness of the Indians toward the land hunger of the "restless" Americans.

The trade proposal represented no sudden departure from standing Indian policies. It was only made more politically expedient and hopefully more lucrative with the acquisition of West Florida. In the area of Indian policy, however, as in the area of commercial policy for Louisiana and the Floridas, Spanish officials would will­ ingly subordinate short-run economic gain to the greater interest of political objectives. 38

The first Spanish governor of Louisiana, , assumed the French practice of furnishing the Indians of Louisiana with trade outlets for their furs. He assured their peacefulness and contentment with gifts presented almost simultaneously with his assumption (at least nominally) of control of the government of Louisiana, His successors continued these practices. Bernardo de Ga'lvez indeed believed the French-English system of Indian control superior to the mission-presidio approach employed elsewhere in the Spanish Empire. He favored it strongly enough to recommend its adoption in other frontier areas

38 * Navarro to Jose de Galvez, April 15, 1786, Lockey Papers. 26 39 of the Spanish Empire,

Louisiana-based French traders had dealt with the Choctaws in addition to the Indian tribes to the west of the Mississippi and in the Illinois district from the earliest times of the Spanish regime through the end of the American Revolution, In their dealings with the Choctaws, Louisiana traders were hampered, but not en­ tirely driven out, by attempts of the British to engross the southern Indian trade through Mobile and Pensacola, British traders, however, enjoyed great advantages in vying for trade hegemony over the Indians because of the direct accessibility to supplies of English manufactures at lower costs, Spanish commercial regulations had severed connec­ tions with the French supply sources of Indian wares for­ merly relied upon by Louisiana traders. This led them to resort to illicit connections with British merchants along the Mississippi for goods and for market outlets for peltry.

Spanish governors, likely actuated by prudence, chose to 40 overlook these lapses of propriety. Before Spain's entry into the American Revolution,

39 Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez, pp. 35-37, 51; Elizabeth Howard West, "The Indian Policy of Bernardo de Galvez," Mississippi Valley Historical Association, Pro­ ceedings, VIII (1916), 100-101; Ulloa to Grimaldi, August T, 1786 in Kinnaird, ed., Pt. I, Revolutionary Period, 61-62. 40 Alejandro O'Reilly to Grimaldi, September 30, 1770 in Kinnaird, ed.,Pt. I, Revolutionary Period, 184; Clark, New Orleans, pp. 195-196. 27 the anti-English party among the Choctaws dispatched dele­ gates to New Orleans to petition for Spanish protection and trade. Galvez acceded to the latter request, but, to avoid incurring the wrath of the British, he declined the plea for Spanish protection. His pleas to the Spanish court that additional trade goods and gifts be shipped to Louisiana for this purpose, although honored in principle, apparently lay beyond the government's capacity to fulfill adequately. Upon the completion of the conquest of West Florida, the shortage of Indian trade goods and presents plagued Galvez even more. In late 1781 he complained to his uncle, Jose de Galvez, the influential Minister of the Indies, that Indian gifts requested in late 1779 had not yet arrived. Despite his policy of befriending the Indian tribes adjacent to Louisiana and West Florida, Bernardo contended, British Indian officials in East Florida through lavish gifts were luring away Indians formerly attached to Spain, This situation placed the Spanish provinces in grave peril. As a countermeasure, Galvez had promised the southern Indians that gifts in abundance from His Catholic Majesty would be forthcoming within eighteen months. Within this same time limit Spaniards were also to perfect trade arrangements to the complete satisfaction of their red neighbors. The urgency of Indian affairs, Galvez concluded, required an immediate mission to the Spanish court by his father-in-law, Gilberto Antonio de San Maxent. 28 Knowledgeable in Indian matters, Maxent would be capable of arranging for an adequate supply of trade articles and presents on a permanent basis. 41

Maxent was indeed well-versed in Indian affairs.

A native of France, he had emigrated to Louisiana by the late 1740's and, among other ventures, had entered into the fur trade. Unlike many of his fellow French colonists,

Maxent quietly accepted the transfer of Louisiana to Spain.

He ingratiated himself with the Spanish governors, continued to prosper, and reached the pinnacle of social prominence with his daughter's marriage to Bernardo. In naming Maxent as his emissary to the court, Galvez actually was placing concern for the family fortune alongside his 42 interest in establishing good Indian relations. Maxent's representations to the Spanish court touched on economic matters in Louisiana and West Florida beyond the immediate needs of the Indian trade; they

_ ^ Serrano y Sanz, Espana entre, p. 19; Caroline M. Burson, The Stewardship of Don Esteban Miro, 1772-1792 (New Orleans: American Printing Company, 1940), p. 48; Bernardo de Ga'lvez to Jose de Galvez, May 26, 17 81, John B. Stetson Collection, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida; Jose de Galvez to the Intendant of Louisiana, Elizabeth Howard West Papers, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida. These two latter sources will be cited infra as "Stetson Collection" and "West Papers," 42 James Julian Coleman, Jr., Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent: The Spanish-Frenchman of New Orleans (New oFleans: Pelican Publishing House, 1968), passim; Clark, New Orleans, pp. 59, 172-173. 29 contained several proposals for general commercial reform eventually incorporated in the Royal Cedula of 1782. The Cedula, however, also was designed to place Spanish trade with the Indians on competitive terms with British and Anglo-American sources. Maxent believed that the acquisition of West Florida offered an excellent oppor­ tunity to expand the fur trade to a highly profitable level. His inferences to the court held the fur trade to be the key to the development of Louisiana as well and, through duty receipts, of substantial interest to the Royal Exchequer. Maxent placed before the court the powerful political argument that, should Spain neglect to foster the Indian trade, it would be lost to the Anglo- Americans of Georgia and South Carolina. Maxent maintained that the Spanish market was too small to absorb the volume of skins involved, and Spain was unable to furnish the quantities and types of goods necessary to the Indian trade. The 15 per cent import duty in effect on trade goods from foreign sources made competition with the English impossible. Another rule required peltry exported from Louisiana to be carried to Spanish ports before reexport to markets in Northern . This depressed the trade because the attendant

Expediente of Maxent, October 4, 1781, West Papers. A translated version appears in Whitaker, Docu­ ments Relating to Commercial Policy of Spain, pp. 23-29. 30 delays caused spoilage from worm damage to pelts. As a basic remedy to the problems of the fur and other forms of trade, Maxent suggested that the commerce of Louisiana and West Florida be opened directly with French and other friendly ports in Europe and in the Indies. A mild duty— Maxent suggested 6 per cent—should be imposed on imports and exports. As has been shown, the Cedula of 1782 limited direct commerce to certain French ports; "other friendly ports" remained closed. But Maxent likely felt he had set the basis for the Indian trade approximately along the same lines it had followed under the French regime. More to the point as far as Maxent was concerned, Charles III agreed to a plan that endowed his loyal vassal with monopolistic control of the southern Indian trade. In October 1781 His Catholic Majesty, acting on a recom­ mendation of Bernardo de Galvez, appointed Don Gilberto "Lieutenant of the Governor and Captain General in all matters pertaining to the respective Indian Nations that inhabit the provinces of Louisiana and West Florida." This title, although possibly somewhat , was strength­ ened by an agreement with under which Maxent and a partner, Miguel Fortier, became royally designated Indian 44 merchants and purveyors of gifts.

Jose" de Galvez to the Intendant of Louisiana, March 18, 1782, West Papers; Burson, Stewardship of Miro, pp. 49-50; Duvon C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, eds., 31

According to the terms of the agreement, Maxent consented to procure goods valued at 80,000 pesos for an initial royal present to the southern Indians. These were to be distributed at proposed treaty congresses. An addi­ tional 100,000 pesos in trade items were to be purchased for storage in royal warehouses in Louisiana as a contin­ gency reserve against wartime disruption to commerce.

Finally, Maxent, on behalf of himself and his partner, promised to acquire an initial 200,000 pesos inventory of goods with which to open the Indian trade. Preferences would be given Spanish products insofar as practicable; the balance would be obtained in France. The Maxent firm would assemble and ship to New Orleans the entire 380,000 pesos in goods on its account and risk. Maxent and his partner would be reimbursed by the Royal Exchecquer to the amount of 180,000 pesos upon the safe arrival of the King's goods.

Financial arrangements for the purchase of the goods were also worked out between the court and Maxent.

The Spanish king advanced 50,000 pesos immediately and granted bills of exchange to cover the 330,000 pesos bal­ ance. Maxent pledged his personal fortune as collateral.

"Papers from the Spanish Archives Relating to Tennessee and the Old Southwest, 1783-1800" East Tennessee Historical Society, Publications, Pt. Ill, (1939), 79. These papers appear in series beginning with Pt. I (19 37) and continue through the present date. They will be cited infra as Corbitts, eds., ETHSP and the Appropriate Pt. No. 32 This transaction was subsequently modified. Jose de Galvez induced a Cadiz merchant, Fernando de Ravage, to assume a portion of the credit extended Maxent, apparently to expe- dite the purchases. 45

In 1782 Maxent traveled over Spain and France, gathering the supplies in fulfillment of his contract. Late that year, Maxent assembled his cargo aboard two ships and began the return voyage to New Orleans. The ships, reportedly borne into the Caribbean by unfavorable winds, fell prize to a British man-of-war and were sent to Jamaica for condemnation. The ships and cargoes were sold; Maxent and the crews met with imprisonment. 46

Maxent succeeded in negotiating loans with Jamaica merchants, bailed himself out of confinement, and repur­ chased a small fraction of the condemned cargoes. He and the other Spanish prisoners were released in early 1783 and made their way to Havana where, through the summer of 1783, Maxent continued to dispatch detailed instructions to

New Orleans for arranging the anticipated Indian congresses, establishing their trade, and distributing their gifts. 47

45 . / Jose de Galvez to the Viceroy of , October 30, 1782, and Jose' de Galvez to the Intendant of Louisiana, March 18, 1782, West Papers. 46 Coleman, Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent, p. 96. 47 Ibid., pp. 47-48; Maxent's Instructions, July 14, 1783, and Esteban Miro to Arturo O'Neill, August 1, 1783, West Papers. 33

After Maxent's return to New Orleans, a final blow fell completing the disaster that had beset his ambitious plans. Evidence gathered in Havana implicated Don Gilberto, along with his Jamaica merchant friends and Francisco de

Miranda of later revolutionary fame, in a plot gone awry to smuggle specie out of Cuba. A royal decree of December

1783 placed Maxent under house arrest and impounded his assets. His creditors pressing for payment, Don Gilberto's influence ebbed almost to the vanishing point. 48 From Spain, Don Bernardo, recently awarded the title of Conde de Galvez and elevated to the rank of Gov­ ernor and Captain General of Louisiana and the Floridas, instructed Esteban Rodriguez Miro, since January 1782 his acting governor in New Orleans, to assume Maxent's former responsibilities for Indian affairs. It is highly probable that Mird accepted his new assignment with reluctance and misgivings because Maxent's failures placed Spain's plans for imposing exclusive influence over the southern Indians in great jeopardy. The general congresses, already delayed to the point of danger, required an additional brief post­ ponement. Only half the amount of the necessary Indian presents were on hand for distribution, and supplementary goods were unobtainable in Louisiana at any price. The

"^^Coleman, Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent, p. 99; Whitaker, Documents Relating to Commercial Policy of Spain, p. 225, n. 16 . 34 Indian nations had repeatedly clamored for the establish­ ment of trade over the past several years in their visits to New Orleans, Pensacola, and Mobile and as often were promised Spanish compliance. The means for reaching a satisfactory agreement on permanent trade arrangements at the forthcoming Congresses were doubtful, and further delay would drive the Indians to consort with the Americans. 70 lose control of the Indians to the Americans would expose the provinces to Indian depredations and, even more ominous, subject them to being overrun by the American advance. 49 Miro based his fears concerning the loss of control over the southern Indians on good grounds. Throughout 1783 Spanish officials received alarming reports that enormous numbers of Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Creeks, disgruntled over Spanish promises backed only by non-performance, were making their way to East Florida for British presents and trade. Without goods, the Spaniards were powerless to intervene. ^ , 50

Miro" to Bernardo de Galvez, April 15, 1784, and Miro to Navarro, April 15, 17 84, West Papers; Mird' to Enrique Grimarest, February 10, 1784, Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. I, 115. O'Neill to , February 15, 1783, West Papers; Allevine et.. d. to , Kinnaird, ed. Pt. II, Post-War Decade, 71-73. CHAPTER II

WILLIAM PANTON:

A BIDDER FOR THE SPANISH FUR TRADE

The migration of loyalist refugees to East Florida during the American Revolution began as early as mid-1775. Prior to the evacuation of Georgia and South Carolina by British forces, however, movement to the southern colony had been erratic, with small contingents drifting in from time to time. Yet, by 178 3, their numbers, including slaves, swelled the population of East Florida to over 17,000. Among the earlier of these newcomers was William Panton.

William Panton, born about 1742 in Aberdeenshire, , had migrated to South Carolina at least by 1769.^ He established a residence in Charleston, obtained a South Carolina land grant, and quite likely became a planter.

Charles Loch Mowat, East Florida as a_ British Province, 1763-1784, University of California Publications m History, Vol. XXXII (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943), pp, 124-126, 136-138, 2 Unless otherwise indicated the account of Panton's pre-Spanish years draws on Elizabeth Howard West, "Panton, William," Dictionary of American Biography, ed. by Dumas Malone, XIV, 199-200; Marie Taylor Greenslade, "William Panton," Florida Historical Quarterly, XIV (October, 1935), 107-129; and Randy Frank Nimnicht, "William Panton: His

35 36 By the early 1770's he had entered into a mercantile part­ nership with Philip Moore, and their firm, Moore and Panton, operated in Savannah, Georgia, The ventures of this part­ nership possibly met with little success; late in 1775 the firm began to close out its accounts receivable. On the other hand, this step may have been the logical outcome of mass resentment southern patriots held against the well- known loyalist sympathies of the partners. At any rate, the partnership dissolved.

In June 1775 Panton attended a meeting of thirty- three prominent residents of Savannah. This gathering, described as the "last attempt" made in Georgia to effect a reconciliation of interests between loyalists and rebels,3 requested that the Provincial Congress petition George III to prevent Parliament from enacting revenue legislation over the colonies. It resolved that Georgia make common cause with other colonies in employing peaceful and lawful means for securing the restoration of American liberties. The group also resolved to maintain peace and order in

Early Career on the Changing Frontier," (unpublished M.A. thesis. University of Florida, 1968), pp. 14 et_. seq. Miss West devoted much of her life to research on Panton, and her papers are the best single source on the affairs of Panton, Leslie and Company. Mrs. Greenslade was a descendant of William Panton's sister, Mrs. Innerarity. The Nimnicht thesis gives a masterful account of Panton's early career in Georgia, South Carolina, and East Florida. Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia, 1763-1789 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958), p. 55. 37

Georgia. Following this meeting, all vestiges of royal

authority disappeared rapidly in Georgia. The Provincial

Congress and its executive agency, the Council of Safety, 4 gained the upper hand.

In January 1776, Panton petitioned the Council of Safety to release gunpowder he had purchased for the Indian trade as well as a sloop loaded with his provisions to be sold in East Florida. The petition was denied as being inconsistent with the public interest. About the same time Panton's commerce with East Florida also came under the scrutiny of the Council of Safety of South Caro­ lina, which described him as a person whose liberty endan­ gered the public safety. The Georgia council shortly thereafter followed suit. Undaunted, Panton continued to earn the animosity of southern patriots, As late as May 1776 he was siphoning much-needed foodstuffs into East Florida from Georgia despite the prohibitions of the revo­ lutionary committees, Panton's operations against the revolutionary cause led the Georgia Assembly in March 177 8 to include his name on a bill of attainder adjudging him guilty of high treason, subjecting him to the death penalty if captured, and confiscating his property. In May 1782 Panton was included in Georgia's act of banishment and confiscation.

4 Ibid., pp. 60, 62-63. 38 The animosity that Panton earned in Georgia and South Carolina was offset profitably by his rising esteem in the eyes of Governor Patrick Tonyn of East Florida. Panton ingratiated himself quite thoroughly with this con­ tentious and venal British official.^ Tonyn, from 1776 onward, worked energetically to foster Panton's interest.

Moore and Panton had dealt in dry goods, horses, and slaves; whether the firm also engaged in Indian trade is uncertain. Panton's career as an Indian trader likely began in December 1775 when Governor Tonyn, in a three-day Indian conference on the St. John's river, named the Tory Scotsman to be the official trader to the Creeks. Tonyn also wrote frequently to the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the colonies, and his successor. Lord George Germain, on Panton's behalf, asking their assistance in expediting shipments of guns, powder, and trade goods. Panton formed a new partnership with Thomas Forbes for his East Florida activities. The two possibly were related. They had journeyed together to the New World, and clearly had been well acquainted with one another in Charleston in the 1770's. Their firm, Panton, Forbes, and Company, besides trading with Indians, supplied Governor Tonyn with Indian presents and at intervals leased vessels for the use of the East Florida government. The firm also

5 Mowat, East Florida, pp. 83-84. 39 acted as provisioner of the East Florida Rangers, a pro­ vincial military force Tonyn organized in May 1776 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown. When he succeeded to the post of Superintendent of Indian Affairs following the death of John Stuart in March 1779, Brown designated Panton and Forbes as the supplier for the entire Cherokee and Creek trade. He also made extensive use of their commercial house in purchasing presents for the Southern Indian Department. The proficiency with which Panton, Forbes, and Company discharged its respon­ sibilities enabled well-equipped Creek and Cherokee war parties to lend substantial support to Cornwallis' southern 6 campaign. The company maintained at, least two trading outposts on St. John's River in East Florida. These were somehow procured from James Spalding of Spalding and Kelsall, a Scottish mercantile partnership headquartered at Frederica on St. Simon's Island off the southern coast of Georgia. Panton resided temporarily at Frederica before moving to East Florida and was long an acquaintance of Spalding, The naturalist William Bartram had visited these stores in

1774 while they were still in the hands of Spalding and

Ibid., p. 110; Cotterill, Southern Indians, p. 52; William Blount to , August 13, 179 3, in U.S., Congress, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 458. Cited infra as ASPIA, I. 40 Kelsall. One was located a few miles upstream from present-day Palatka, and the other still further upstream off the southern banks of Lake George. Panton and Forbes, after the capture of West Florida, quite probably estab­ lished a store at Picolata, on the St. John's abreast of St. Augustine, as an accommodation to the trade-starved southern Indians living to the northwest of the peninsula.

The trade outlet at Picolata, however, offered an inadequate remedy for the Indian trade problem. Conse­ quently, in the winter of 1782-83 numerous delegates from Creek, Choctaw, and Cherokee villages—even representatives from the northern tribes—flocked to East Florida to vent their frustrations over trade stoppages as well as over the turn of the fortunes of war. At an assembly in January of over 2,000 Indians at Picolata, Tonyn and Brown listened to Indian "talks" expressing a general dissatisfaction over o wartime disruptions to trade. Moreover, as allies of His Britannic Majesty, the Indians had not expected to be aban­ doned to cope with the Americans alone. Superintendent Brown assured the Indians of the King's gratitude for their 7 Bartram, Travels, pp. 37, 46-72, passim; O'Neill to Unzaga February 15, 1783, West Papers; Homer Wright, "Diplomacy of Trade on the Southern Frontier: A Case Study of the Influence of William Panton and John Forbes," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Georgia, 1971), pp. 24-25. o J. H. O'Donnell, "Alexander McGillivray: Training for Leadership," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XLIX (May, 1965), 181-182. 41 military assistance and explained that the troop with­ drawal was only temporary. Redcoats were needed elsewhere against Spanish and French forces. Meanwhile, during the absence of British troops. Brown recommended that the Indians refrain from attacking the Americans. He also promised to arrange for more satisfactory trading facil­ ities as quickly as possible.

The Creeks were represented ably at Picolata by Alexander McGillivray, a young quarterbreed chieftain who had been born in 1759 near the Upper Creek village of 9 Little Tallassie. The first child of a union between

Lachlan McGillivray, an influential Scottish fur trader who also possessed extensive holdings in Georgia, and Sehoy Marchand, a half-French Indian princess of the power­ ful Wind Clan, Alexander spent his childhood years among his Indian kinsmen. In 1773 Lachlan sent the youth to Charleston for study under the tutelage of a Presbyterian minister cousin. Young McGillivray briefly interrupted his studies to become a clerk in the Savannah-based mer­ cantile house of Samuel Elbert, later a governor of Georgia. Alexander soon found the work disagreeable and

Q Scholarly accounts of McGillivray's background are given in John W. Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938), pp. 1-17; and Arthur P. Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1783-1789," North Carolina Historical Review, V (April, 1958), 181-203. Unless otherwise indicated the description of McGillivray's early years draws from these. 42 resumed his education. His later letters show him to be a literate, articulate, and at times a sensitive writer. His formal training apparently had been reasonably effec­ tive .

The revolutionary disturbances of 1775 terminated Alexander's exposure to civilization. His father, a staunch loyalist, was banished and eventually returned to Scotland. Alexander made his way back to Creek country, salvaging some slaves and moveable property from the family estate, valued in excess of $100,000 and confiscated by the Georgians. By 1777 Alexander was an assistant to David Taitt, a British commissary to the Creek nation. Two years later McGillivray succeeded Taitt and worked tirelessly to promote the British interest. Probably because of the leadership abilities he demonstrated in this capacity, the Creeks in May 1783 elevated McGillivray to the position of Head Warrior to succeed Emistisuguo, who had been killed in 1782 while trying to relieve the siege of Savannah. McGillivray placed the Creek nation on a war footing, sub­ ordinating the town chiefs to the war chiefs in the Creek villages as a measure against anticipated American encroach- ments.

O'Donnell, "Training for Leadership," 173, 179.

Ibid., 182-183; Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 55-56, 61. Meanwhile, Colonel Brown's promises at the Picolata conference to provide the Indians with satisfactory trade arrangements were quickly realized. Governor Tonyn en­ listed the services of Panton and Forbes and two other East Florida merchants, John Leslie and William Alexander, to establish a new trading post at a location more conve­ nient to the southern tribes. These individuals responded to Tonyn's urgings by combining their assets to form a new Indian trading partnership, Panton, Leslie and Company. This combination of resources probably grew out of the rather ambitious primary objective of the company. From its very beginnings the partnership intended to engross the entire southern Indian trade. Panton, as the company's agent in West Florida, assumed responsibility for directing 12 the firm toward this end. Alexander and Leslie both had engaged in commercial activities in East Florida prior to their association with

Panton, Leslie and Company, the former at least as early as

1771. In 1779 the two men formed a partnership and, among other endeavors, sold Indian presents to the East Florida

Charles McLatchy to O'Neill, December 15, 1783, in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. I, 112-113; Wright, "A Case Study of the Influence of William Panton and John Forbes," pp. 24-25; Panton to J. Leslie, March 15, 1785, U.S,, Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts, East Florida Papers, bundle 116L9. Cited infra as EF and appropriate bundle no. 44 13 government. Leslie continued his connections with the new company. From headquarters in St. Augustine he super­ vised the East Florida operations of Panton, Leslie and Company until 179 8. Alexander, however, after moving to the Bahamas, shortly thereafter relinquished his interest. Upon securing promises of protection from McGillivray and other Creek chieftains, Panton, Leslie and Company agreed to place an Indian store at a suitable site on the Gulf Coast of East Florida still under British control. The new location was intended to afford the southern Indians access to trade at transportation costs considerably lower than possible with the remote St. John's River posts.1 4 The compcuiy chose a location on the Wakulla River, a stream that joins St. Marks River before it empties into Apalachee Bay south of modern Tallahassee. The St. Marks post stood a few miles upstream from an abandoned fort previously occupied alternately by Spanish and British garrisons. Early in the spring of 1783, Panton, together with Charles McLatchy, a junior partner in the firm who was designated as its St. Marks agent, McGillivray, and other

"'••^Nimnicht, "William Panton: His Early Career," pp. 46-47. 14 Panton to McGillivray, February 9, 1792, West Papers; McGillivray to Miro', March 28, 17 84, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 73-74; McLatchy to O'Neill, December 15, 1783, loc. cit. Creek chieftains visited the newly-chosen St. Marks sire. While the post was being placed in readiness for business, Panton, recognizing McGillivray's potential usefulness, offered him some form of connection with the firm.

Panton's offer probably had not been extended to an acquaintance of the moment. He and McGillivray possibly met either in Charleston or Savannah prior to the American Revolution. Or perhaps they had been introduced on some occasion in 1780 while Panton served briefly with Lachlan McGillivray in the Commons House of Assembly, the legisla­ tive body formed by the restored royalist government of Georgia after the recapture of Savannah in December 1778. At any rate, each must have been aware of the other's repu­ tation .

At this juncture Governor Tonyn received news that Great Britain intended to retrocede East Florida to Spain in the definitive peace settlement. A public proclamation of April 21, 1783, informed the residents of the province of this dreaded development. Details of the final transfer

1 c McLatchy to O'Neill, December 15, 1783, loc. cit.; McGillivray to McLatchy, December 25, 1784, EF 116L9. Panton used a schooner owned by McGillivray under Spanish registry in transporting cargoes between Pensacola and islands in the West Indies at least as ^late as 1790. See Panton to Miro', February 12, 1789; Miro' to Panton, February 28, 1789; Vizente Manuel de Zespedes to Domingo Cabello, March 8, 1790, West Papers. Nimnicht, "William Panton: His Early Career," pp. 30-31 46 reached East Florida only in the spring of 1784. East

Florida residents were to be granted an eighteen-month period following September 19, 1783 in which to settle their affairs and remove their families and property to other British possessions. Land in the Bahamas and else- where was made available to the refugees. 17

In June 1783, Colonel Brown was ordered to with­ draw all British traders and agents from the Indian nations, an act equivalent to notifying the Indians that Great Britain had withdrawn from the war. McGillivray, distraught over what he considered an abandonment, asked Brown for British aid in case of a with Georgia and the Carolinas. Brown, in light of the diplomatic developments at Paris, advised McGillivray against war for the time being, but suggested that he apply to the Spanish governor

of Pensacola for munitions. The Spaniards, Brown surmised, 18 had every reason to be apprehensive of American expansion. Panton and his partners gave every indication that

they concurred with Colonel Brown's estimate. Moreover,

Panton, Leslie and Company intended if possible to capi­

talize on the misgivings of the Spaniards toward the Amer­

icans as a means of remaining in the southern Indian trade.

Thus, in September 1783, Governor Tonyn dispatched a letter

•"•^Mowat, East Florida, pp. 142-146. 18 Corkran, Creek Frontier, p. 324. 47 to Arturo O'Neill, the Spanish Governor of West Florida, informing him of the company's intent to remain at St. Marks. The firm, Tonyn stated, was experienced in the Indian trade. It could keep the Indians contented who otherwise might be forced to accept the overtures of Georgians and Carolinians, and who eagerly sought their trade. This eventuality, Tonyn continued, would cement American influence over the Indians. The opportunity for harmonious Spanish-Indian relations would be lost, and Spain's position in the Floridas would be jeopardized. 19 Thomas Forbes, having traveled to London, almost simultcineously made a similar yet more cautious and in­ direct overture to Bernardo del Campo, the Spanish minister to the Court of St. James. Forbes pleaded for His Catholic Majesty's protection of the St. Marks post during the transfer period. Because of its remoteness from St. Augus­ tine, the chances of its being plundered were strong. Forbes also provided Campo with an extensive list of items of English manufacture purported to be indispensable to the Indian trade. These, Forbes maintained, were obtained more cheaply in London than in other European markets and Indians had become thoroughly accustomed to their use. Spain, he suggested, should attempt to duplicate the

Tonyn to Governor of West Florida, September 19, 1783, Stetson Collection. 48 manufacture of English trade items at comparable prices and quality. In the interim it was imperative that Spanish traders procure Indian wares in England in order to meet their American competitors, whose resources were ample "for supplying all sorts of British goods." All in all, Forbes' communication to Campo constituted a thinly-masked hint of the expediency of permitting Panton, Leslie and Company to remain in East Florida at least temporarily under Spanish auspices.

Tonyn's letter to O'Neill recommending Panton, Leslie and Company reached the hands of Vicente Manuel de Zespedes, the Spanish governor-designate for East Florida, early in 1784. Zespedes, then in Havana preparing for the voyage to his new post at St. Augustine, decided to defer action on the matter until his arrival. His study of

Indian affairs, however, led him to believe that adequate 21 trade was essential to harmonious Indian relations. Zespedes arrived at St, Augustine on June 27. Some two weeks later Governor Tonyn formally relinquished control of the stone fortress guarding the approaches to the city.

The British evacuation, however, was accomplished tardily

^^Forbes to Campo, September 28, 1783, Lockey Papers. ^•''Zespedes to J, de Galvez, March 22, 1784, in Joseph B. Lockey, trans.. East Florida, 1783-1785, ed. by John W. Caughey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), pp. 188-189. 49 and only after extensions to the time specified in the Spanish-British agreement. Tonyn finally departed on November 13, 1785. In the interim, a large-scale exodus of Florida loyalists to the Bahamas got underway. Panton, Forbes, and Alexander joined in the outpouring to the Bahamas, each receiving land grants there from the crown. The brigantine Countess of Darlington carried seventy-two slaves, building materials, tools and other accouterments belonging to the company. Meanwhile, the partners had acquired harbor frontage in Nassau and were open for 22 general mercantile business by the seventh of October.

Under the charge of Thomas Forbes, the Nassau branch later served as an important entrepot for the company's trade in the Spanish Floridas. Panton, however, quickly returned to East Florida. Although he continuously maintained residence in Nassau, Panton remained on the mainland for the rest of his career.

Shortly after his arrival in East Florida, Zespedes discovered Indian affairs to be one of the "greatest cares" of his office. Groups of Seminoles and Lower Creeks

22 Helen Hornbeck Tanner, Zespedes m East Florida, 1784-1790, University of Miami Hispanic American Studies, No. 19 (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1963), pp. 28-33; Thelma Peters, "The American Loyalists in the Bahama Islands: Who They Were," Florida Historical Quar­ terly, XXXX (January, 1962), 231; Thelma Peters, "The Loyalist Migration from East Florida to the Bahama Islands," Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXX (October, 1961), 134. 50 descended on St. Augustine in August and September to recognize the transition to Spanish control and to clamor for presents. Other than sparse quantities of honey, sugar, rum, euid tobacco brought along from Cuba, Zeispedes lacked the expected "gifts." Panton and Leslie advanced the needed items to the Spanish governor on credit, thus earning his deep gratitude. Panton hoped that Zespedes would find it expedient to permit the company to import cunple trade goods so as to keep the Indians content with Spanish rule. His hopes were quickly realized.

It took little time to convince Zespedes that the Indians would fall into the American orbit by default should Spain fail to be as attentive to their wishes as 23 were the English. He forwarded to the Spanish court on August 16, 1784, a Panton, Leslie and Company memorial that offered the company's services to His Catholic Majesty and stipulated the terms on which it would remain under Spanish auspices. The memorial informed the crown of its decision to remain in East Florida if permitted to trade "on the same basis as formerly under the British government of this province." Spain should act favorably toward the company, the petitioners stated, because the peace of the Floridas

23'zd'spede. s to Juan Ignacio de Urriza, September 16, 1784, and Zespedes to O'Neill, September 12, 1784, in Lockey, trans.. East Florida, 1783-1785, pp. 271-274, 276- 279; Panton to Leslie, January 7, 1785, EF 116L9. depended on maintaining Indian friendship. Only adequate trade could attain this objective, because outright gifts raised governmental expenses to inordinate levels. Yet it would be nearly impossible for Spanish merchants to conduct trade properly; the Spanish economy could neither supply the accustomed goods nor absorb the high volume of returns in peltry. Hence the court should assent in allowing the company to carry out the trade and permit it direct two- way access to British markets. Because of its experience, capital, English credit connections, good-will, and under­ standing with the Indians, Panton, Leslie and Company pur­ ported to be Spain's best available choice. The company promised that its members would take an oath of obedience and fidelity to His Catholic Majesty, would remain loyal while under Spanish protection, and would obey Spanish laws.

It also promised to abstain from active involvement in any war against Spain, requesting only the privilege to with­ draw voluntarily upon due notice or without molestation if war made removal necessary. Expressing the company's pref­ erence for Spanish protection to relocation in an American 24 / state, the memorialists asked a hasty response. Zespedes, in his letter of transmittal, generally endorsed the pre­ tensions of the memorial. He also pointed out that the

24 Memorial of Panton, Leslie and Company, in Lockey, trans.. East Florida, 1783-1785, pp. 257-260. 52 company held the good-will of the powerful McGillivray, with whom Zespedes was duly impressed. Ze'spedes suggested that, should the court contemplate replacing the British company, it be accomplished gradually by introducing Spaniards into the firm. Thus the necessary experience with the intricacies of Indian trading could be gained. While awaiting the court's disposition of the matter, Zespedes allowed Panton, Leslie and Company to continue as if His Majesty had approved the petition.

Meanwhile, Bernardo de Galvez, now Governor and Captain General of Havana as well as Captain General of Louisiana and the Floridas, at first did not share his East Florida subordinate's esteem for Panton, Leslie and Company. The Captain General agreed that trade afforded the most efficacious means of Indian control. Nor did he doubt the feasibility of the company's proposals. He con­ ceded that an English company using English goods could maintain peace and friendship with the Indians, but he felt that the activity more probably would be for English rather than Spanish benefit. Since His Majesty had granted his subjects in Louisiana the privilege of direct trade with France, these Don Bernardo opined, should be the ones "to gain and preserve the friendship of the natives--a

Zespedes to B. de Galvez, August 16, 1784, in Lockey, trans.. East Florida, 1783-1785, pp. 254-257; Ze'ispedes to B. de Gdlvez, September 21, 1784, Lockey Papers 53 thing that is not so impossible as the English be- 26 lieve. ..." Owing to Maxent's fall from , to the urgency of the trade problem, and likely because the East Florida trade seemed of lesser importance, Don Bernardo's position toward Panton, Leslie, and Company softened somewhat. Thus, in June 1784, before Panton and Leslie had prepared their memorial and unknown to them, the Conde de Galvez had dispatched to Ze'spedes the court's approval for the British firm to continue. But the approval stipulated that the trade could be conducted only with Spanish goods or those permitted under the reglamento de comercio libre of October, 1778.2 7 This measure required exports and imports to and from foreign markets to pass through Spanish ports at high duty levels. Zespedes, in the venerable tradition of "obedezcp pero no cumplo," refrained from informing Panton and Leslie of the court's restrictions. The East Florida governor dreaded offending the British merchants, his only source for borrowing presents needed to placate Indian gift-seekers "who in their insatiable greed have presented themselves

^^B. de Galvez, to J. de Galvez, December 20, 17 83, in Whitaker, Documents Relating to Commercial Policy of Spain, p. 39. ^^B. de Galvez to Zeispedes, June 20, 1784, West Papers. 54 2 8 to me." He preferred to await a new ruling in the light of the information forwarded in the August memorial.

The Spanish court, at its usual deliberate pace, began a reconsideration of the trade question. On May 8, 1786, a Royal Order confirmed per ahora (temporarily) the status of Panton, Leslie and Company in East Florida on the requested terms. The firm continued to enjoy cordial relations with the provincial governor thereafter. This was not to be the case, however, in its affairs in the Old Southwest, where Zespedes had no authority.

In 1784 the provinces of Louisiana and the Floridas had been elevated to the status of a separate captaincy- general and placed under the supervision of the Conde de Galvez. They remained under his personal purview even following his promotion to the office of Viceroy of New Spain. Only after his death in November 1786 did they revert to the control of the Captaincy-General of Havana. Within this period, the province of West Florida extended at first along the Gulf Coast from the Pearl to the Apalachicola and, after 1785, to a point somewhere east of St. Marks. Its governor resided in Pensacola, with

Zespedes to B. de Galvez, October 21, 1784, in Lockey, trans.. East Florida, 1783-1785, pp. 296-297. The term obedezco pero no cumplo was used by Spanish colonial officials when refraining from implementing royal instruc­ tions believed detrimental to the true interests of the crown. While professing obedience to the majesty of the directive, the officer refused to comply until its pos­ sible harmful consequences were considered by his superiors the political-military commanders at Mobile and St. Marks as his subordinates. Although officially a separate province. West Florida in most respects was merely an extension of Louisiana, whose governor served as the immediate superior to the governor of West Florida. The

East Florida governor, however, reported directly to the 29 Captain-general.

Charles III also had introduced the office of the intendancy in Louisiana. As elsewhere in the Spanish Empire, the intendant exercised separate authority over all fiscal and commercial matters. Thus, while the gov­ ernor at New Orleans held primary responsibility for con­ ducting the Indian affairs of Louisiana and West Florida, he consulted with the intendant on matters related to Indian trade. From 17 88 to 179 4, the governor exercised the functions of the intendancy until the vacancy created by the departure of Martin Navarro was filled with the appointment of Francisco Rendon. In East Florida, the ^ 30 intendancy was never instituted. Thus, acceptance in East Florida in itself gave

Panton, Leslie and Company no particular advantage in the west. Panton and his partners, before proceeding with

Duvon Clough Corbitt, "The Administrative System in the Floridas, 1781-1821," II Pts., Tequesta, I (August, 1942), 41-47, and (July, 1943), 57-59. ^°Ibid., Pt. I, 47-49, Pt. II, 60. 56 their plans to engross the southern Indian trade, first had to win the approval of Spanish officials in Louisiana and West Florida. To this end, Panton exerted his full energies and talents. His basic strategy was simple, unoriginal and, in implementation, tediously repetitive. It called for emphasizing the existence of a harmony of interest between Spaniard, Indian, and merchant. The Spaniard was to be kept ever mindful that the Indian actively opposed American usurpation of his hunting grounds . Moreover, the Indian stood as the sole effective bulwark against the American menace to Louisiana and West Florida. Spanish protection of the Indians, together with adequate trade arrangements, would assure loyal and lasting resist­ ance to the Anglo-American advance. Satisfactory trade, however, required the introduction of an abundance of the preferred English goods, and no mercantile house other than Panton, Leslie and Company could fulfill this require­ ment. Thus, the Spaniard would see that a solution of the 31 American problem lay in a Spanish concession to that firm. To McGillivray fell the task of implanting Lhe message in Spanish ears. Genuinely fearful of the threat posed to Indian lands, justifiably resentful of the con­ fiscations perpetrated by the "distracted republicans" in

'^•'•Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1783-1789," 190-191. 57 Georgia, and disconsolate over abandonment by the British, the young Creek leader needed little coaxing to assume the role Panton assigned him. This he would do with alacrity, despite the fact that the inferences of the basic proposi­

t tion so patently constituted "almost an insult to average 32 intelligence." McGillivray, accompanied by a small retinue of Creek chieftains and warriors, visited Arturo O'Neill, the West Florida governor, in September 1783 to establish peace between Spain and the Creeks and to request trade from Pensacola. The Creek leader reported that the Indians, forsaken by the British, were generally dissatisfied. Georgia, he added, was pressing for a congress with the Creek nation, but he would work diligently at building widespread resistance to these overtures. McGillivray also offered his services in promoting in the Creek settle­ ments surrounding Pensacola friendship for the Spaniards. O'Neill, impressed by McGillivray's reputed influence and educated bearing, recommended to his superiors the wisdom of cultivating the friendship not only of McGillivray, but of the Creoles and Englishmen residing in the Indian M nations as well. These, because of their antipathy toward

32 Ibid., 191; Panton to Lachlan McGillivray, April 10, 1794, in Albert James Pickett, and Incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi, from the Earliest Times (3rd ed.; Sheffield, Ala.: Robert C. Randolph, 1896), pp. 430-431. 58 the Americans, could improve the possibilities of attaching if the Indians firmly to Spain. 33 :! ^^ McGillivray's attempts to prevent the Creeks from attending a treaty congress with the Georgians met only . ^ with partial success. Two Creek chieftains led a small >F< pro-American faction to Augusta in October from the pro­ posed parley. On November 1, 17 83, these leaders signed I a treaty with the Georgia commissioners. Both parties agreed to forget the immediate past. The treaty required M the Creeks to honor outstanding debts to Georgia merchants and to allow them to resume trade in their villages. It also confirmed a cession to the Georgians of some 800 square miles of land lying between the forks of the Oconee River made in May by the Cherokees, whose claim to the territory m conflicted with that of the Creeks. McGillivray and others of the anti-American faction refused to recognize the validity of the Augusta treaty, claiming that the signa­ tories were not duly authorized as representatives of the entire Creek nation. Moreover, they had acquiesced in the II . . ^ 34 demands of the Georgia commissioners under coercion. •I]' If McGillivray had needed any prodding, the Treaty of Augusta brought the immediacy of the threat of American

^"^O'Neill to Josef de Ezpeleta, October 19, 1783, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 62-63.

^^Corkran, Creek Frontier, pp. 324-325; Coleman, I' American Revolution in Georgia, p. 240. 59 encroachment onto Creek hunting grounds into clear focus. On January 1, 1784, acting on behalf of the Creek nation, McGillivray complained to O'Neill of the arbitrariness of the British-American boundary settlement that placed the Creek nation under American jurisdiction. As a "free Nation," the Creeks had the right to choose their own protector. Since the definitive treaty made Spain "the Master of the Floridas," McGillivray solicited Spanish protection for the Creeks. The benefits accrued by the Spaniards would be many. Hordes of restless, lawless, uncontrollable Americans had been spilling across the American frontiers since the peace. Their removal, once they established themselves, would prove difficult. More­ over, Georgia and the Carolinas were seeking energetically the Indian trade. If these states succeeded, the Indians would be turned against Pensacola and Mobile. The impend­ \i ing disaster could be prevented by installing adequate trade outlets in West Florida as in the time of the English McGillivray, mistakenly if not intentionally, stated that the East Florida articles of transfer stipulated that the Indian traders could remain and requested personal permis­ sion to bring a cargo of trade goods into Mobile from St. Augustine. This measure was not for private gain; rather it was necessary for his people, who were in dire need of supplies. In closing McGillivray offered his services to 60 35 Spain as Indian agent.

Two days later, McGillivray clarified for O'Neill his remarks about trade. The Indian leader informed the

Spanish governor that Panton's firm was to remain at St.

Augustine under arrangements with the Spanish crown. The company also had petitioned for a site in Pensacola or

Mobile and, if successful, McGillivray was to be awarded a part interest. It would be in the policy interest of 3 6 Spain to agree, McGillivray concluded.

Governor O'Neill, in the name of His Catholic Majesty, took the liberty to accept McGillivray's petition for Spanish protection. The court in May 1784 approved O'Neill's action, but instructed him to inform the Creeks that royal protection would stop short of involving Spain in a direct confrontation with the United States. Regard­ ing the trade petition, however, O'Neill evasively promised 37 only to refer it to Miro'and Maxent "at the proper time." But earlier in the year Don Arturo had sharply blighted the hopes of Panton, Leslie and Company for enter­

ing the West Florida trade. McLatchy, the company's partner

^^McGillivray to O'Neill, January 1, 1784, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 64-66. "^^McGillivray to O'Neill, January 3, 1784, in Ibid., pp. 66-69. •^^O'Neill to Miro^ February 17, 1784, in Ibid., J. de Galvez to B. de Galvez, May 2, 17 84, Lockey Papers 61 and agent at St. Marks, after learning of the impending transfer of East Florida to Spain, had requested permission from O'Neill to remain at St. Marks and continue in busi­ ness as Spain was not immediately prepared to assume the Indian trade. O'Neill advised him in February that the final articles of the peace treaty had not yet reached Pensacola, but that he might possibly be permitted to remain at St. Marks if he conformed to Spanish laws and the Catholic religion. Under no circumstances, however, could McLatchy remain in the Indian trade. Yet it would be perfectly legal for him to dispose of his goods on hand; O'Neill knew of a Pensacola merchant willing to buy up to 20,000 pesos in trade merchandise immediately. 38 McLatchy replied that Panton, Leslie and Company had no intention to trade in East Florida unless the Spanish governor of the province approved. Nor would the firm continue to trade in the interior without similar permission from West Florida. But to suspend the St. Marks trade immediately, McLatchy claimed, might cause the com­ pany to lose some 7,000 to 8,000 pesos for goods already credited to traders. These were expected to return in April and May, bringing furs and deerskins with which to discharge their debts. McLatchy reminded O'Neill that East

ane McLatchy to O'Neill, December 15, 1783, in Corbitts, eds. ETHSP, Pt. I, 112-213; O'Neill to McLatchy, February 6, 1784, Stetson Collection. 62 Florida still remained under British control, as the Spanish governor had not arrived at St. Augustine. Conse­ quently, Governor Tonyn had approved that the St. Marks post be resupplied, and the goods were expected momentarily. Should the wishes of Panton and his partners to remain in the Floridas be disapproved as expected, McLatchy insin­ uated, the company out of necessity might relocate in "some other country." Meanwhile, he had informed Panton and Leslie of O'Neill's ban and had suggested that either of the senior partners travel to Pensacola for direct consul- tations on trade matters. 39 McGillivray also protested O'Neill's orders closing the St. Marks trade, stating that the post had been opened at the request of the Indians as the only feasible alter­ native to trading with Americans. Goods available in Pen­ i sacola were insufficient to supply a single village. Before permitting its removal, he added, the Indians would defend the trading post. McGillivray again made known his personal ties to the company, and it would carry on its operations at least until a permanent trade agreement had been reached at the forthcoming Pensacola congress. Unaware of the predicament into which Maxent had fallen, McGillivray for­ warded to him a proposal for "keeping the Americans from

39McLatch y to O'Neill, March 4, 1784, Lockey Papers. 63 taking all the trade of this nation." In New Orleans, Governor Miro'and the intendant, Navarro, were perfecting their plans for handling the problems anticipated at the pending summer Indian con­ gresses. Both realized the dangers of delay in effecting a trade agreement satisfactory to the Indians, particularly to McGillivray. Both understood the implications of fail­ ure in the light of his thinly veiled threats to resort to the Americans. Nothing less than the peace and security of Louisiana and the Floridas was at stake. Yet Miro' and Navarro, quite likely for reasons somewhat separate from their zeal for His Majesty's service, had selected their

own proteg• e0 for the West Florida trade, a New Orleans 41 merchant, James Mather. Mirc^ recommended Mather as the spokesman for an association of Louisiana merchants known as Mather and Strother to McGillivray in April 1784. Mather, Miro' stated, was prepared to furnish the Indian trade immediately insofar as his current limited circumstances permitted. After pro­ curing additional merchandise, the Mather firm would be in a position to offer the Indians completely satisfactory

"^^McGillivray to O'Neill, March 26, 1784, and McGillivray to Miro", March 28, 1784, West Papers. ^•""Mircf to Navarro, April 15, 1784, Miro to B. de Galvez, April 15, 1784, and Navarro to J. de Galvez, April 16, 1784, West Papers. 64 trade terms. Miro also informed the Creek leader that commercial propositions of "all sorts" would be discussed at the Pensacola congress. 42

The long-awaited treaty discussions began on May 30, with Miro, Navarro, and O'Neill representing His Catholic Majesty. McGillivray served as the principal spokesman for the Creeks. The "most warlike nation of this continent," Navarro proudly reported, accepted the Spanish proposals routinely. 43 The treaty established peace between the Creeks and the vassals of the Spanish crown, and the Creeks recognized His Catholic Majesty as their protector. Spain promised to maintain the Creek trade on a permanent basis, unless war precluded compliance, and at mutually agreeable price schedules. The Creeks agreed to prevent all white men from entering their nation unless under valid Spanish passport and promised to surrender to the Spanish governor all United States prisoners so detained. They promised to uphold contracts made with traders duly licensed by the Spanish government trading at the prescribed prices and also promised to refrain from clandestine trade. Spain guaranteed Creek territories, but only insofar as they lay

^^Mird to B. de Galvez, April 15, 1784, West Papers; McGillivray to McLatchy, October 4, 1784, EF 116L9. ^"^Navarro to J. de Galvez, July 27, 1784, West Papers. 65 within Spanish dominion. Should war or other misfortune deprive the Creeks of their lands. His Majesty agreed to provide them with lands of equivalent value elsewhere in 44 his realms. A separate agreement of June 1, 1784, established the price schedule, or "tariff," governing 45 the terms of trade.

James Mather appeared at Pensacola during the negotiations, and Miro and Navarro "warmly" recommended him to McGillivray. The Creek chieftain mentioned his prior commitments to Panton, but a "high Spanish official" advised against rejecting Mather outright. The official mentioned "powerful motives" that endowed the New Orleans merchant with great influence; he was capable of harming the interests of any other businessman whomsoever. Suc­ cumbing to repeated offers of an interest in Mather's firm, McGillivray, without Panton's prior knowledge and consent, approved emergency plans later devised by Miro and Navarro

_ English translations of the treaty appear in U.S. Congress, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 278- 2 79; and Joseph M. White, A New Collection of Laws, Char­ ters and Local Ordnances of the Governments of Great Britain, France and Spain, Relating to the Concessions of Land in their Respective Colonies; Together with the Laws of New~Mexico and Texas on the Same Subject (2 vols.; Philadelphia: T. and J. W. Johnson, 1839), II, 318-322. 4 "^ An English translation of the tariff is found in John W. Caughey, "Alexander McGillivray and the Creek Crisis," New Spain and the Anglo-American West; Historical Contributions Presented to Herbert Eugene Bolton, ed. by Lawrence Kinnaird (2 vols., Los Angeles: privately printed, 1932), I, 285-286, 66 for Mather and Strother to supply the West Florida trade.

Otherwise the intendant cind governor would have withdrawn their support of the New Orleans firm. 46

Before leaving Pensacola for conferences at Mobile with the westward tribes, Miro, subject to royal confirma­ tion, appointed McGillivray as Spanish commissary to the Creeks at a salary of fifty pesos monthly. Under O'Neill's supervision, McGillivray*s duties included promoting Spanish influence over the Creeks, supervising trade

activity, maintaining peace with neighboring tribes, and 47 arresting illegal entrants into Creek domains. On June 22 and 23, similar treaties were negotiated with the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Alabamas. Separate trade tariffs, comparable to that effected with the Creeks, became integral parts of these agreements. These treaties differed from the Pensacola treaty in their lack of provi­ sions for territorial guarantees such as the limited ver- 48 sion that had been extended the Creeks, After returning to New Orleans, Miro and Navarro

negotiated a contract with James Mather as a provisional

^^McGillivray to McLatchy, October 4, 17 84; McGillivray to McLatchy, December 25, 17 84, EF 116L9, "^^Miro to Ezpeleta, August 1, 1784; Instructions to Alexander McGillivray, July 20, 1784, Lockey Papers, "^^Navarro to J. de Galvez, July 27, 1784, West Papers; Miro to Ezpeleta, August 1, 1784, Lockey Papers. 6 7 means of fulfilling their Indian trade commitments. Mather agreed to dispatch two vessels which would return with enough Indian goods to support the trade for one year. One cargo would be landed at Pensacola for the Creek trade; the other, at Mobile for the Choctaws and Chickasaws. Mather received permission to call at Danish, Dutch, or

English ports in search for goods, but agreed to pay six mmm per cent duties on all trade goods imported. The same duty rate would apply to exports of peltry as well. He also agreed to undertake the venture at full personal risk, promising not to expect reimbursement from the royal trea­ sury for any expenses incurred. On August 4, 1784, Mather received a passport to dispatch the Condesa de Galvez to "any friendly or allied island or any European port" in quest of Indian goods. The vessel carried two licenses 49 teii for return cargoes for Mobile and Pensacola respectively. liii^mKiiii Miro and Navarro justified their sweeping departure from the precepts set down by the Royal Cedula of 1782 on the iir5>erative need for restoring trade rapidly. Delay in con?)lying with the trade stipulations of the treaties would discredit Spain in the minds of the Indians. The Americans, with well-stocked stores available to the Indians, would reap the benefits, and the provinces would be endangered.

Memorial of James Mather, July 24, 1784, Lockey Papers; Mather Contract, July 24, 1784, Mather Passport and Licenses, August 4, 1784, West Papers. tmiiiu

11**^' 68 The two Spanish representatives also asked royal approval of the emergency steps they had taken and suggested points to be considered in effecting a more permanent arrangement, which they deferred to the judgment of the court. Perma­ nent stores at Pensacola and Mobile would preclude American hegemony over the Indians; moreover, if operated by mer­ chants, they would relieve the royal treasury of the burden of heavy outlays in conducting the trade. Adequate private trade would as well lessen expenditures for annual Indian gifts. The natives held a stated preference for English goods and, if convenient to the court, the use of these afforded the best means of keeping the Indians tractable. Should His Majesty contemplate using French manufactures, a gradual transition was suggested, Miro and Navarro cau­ tioned against selecting any merchant whose resources were ' t inadequate for conducting the trade on a continuing basis , '-^1 a difficult matter in Louisiana at the time, McGillivray's defection from Panton, however, was 1 only partial and, to the latter's great fortune, only temporary. It may have resulted from signs of discomposure and misgivings detected in Panton's conduct during the Pensacola dealings. Or it may have been another instance of McGillivray's often-to-be-demonstrated propensity to

^^Navarro to J. de Galvez, July 27, 1784, West Papers; Miro to Ezpeleta, August 1, 1784, Lockey Papers. 69 accept gratuities from whatever quarter offered. In any event, before departing from Pensacola, McGillivray suc­ ceeded in convincing Miro and Navarro of the wisdom of bringing in a small quantity of goods from St. Marks and St, Augustine as an interim measure. They granted this privilege on condition that the six per cent duties as applicable under the Royal Cedula of 1782 be paid. Panton hastened overland in July 1784 with the necessary passports and licenses to fulfill the commitment. 51 McGillivray returned to his home in Little Talassie pleased with the results of his diplomacy. He had gained Spanish protection for his nation which he believed would instill enough fear in the Georgians to halt their en­ croachments and lessen the probability of war. He confi­

dently foresaw that his associate, the unsuspecting Panton, nni: liiiiiil would eventually be established in Pensacola and his other III associate, Mather, in Mobile, Meanwhile, he ordered Amer­

ican traders operating out of Georgia to vacate the Creek tttiiii nation by December. i! iiitii!;: Panton very likely traveled eastward harboring an

McGillivray to McLatchy, October 4, 1784, McGillivray to McLatchy, December 25, 1784, EF 116L9; Navarro to O'Neill, June 11, 1784, Lockey Papers; O'Neill to Zespedes, July 17, 1784, EF 114J9. 1 ^^McGillivray to Panton, August 10, 1784, McGillivray to McLatchy, October 4, 1784, EF 116L9; McGillivray to O'Neill, November 20, 1784, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, p. 84. 70 emotional mixture of chagrin and determination. He had not i!l reached a firm understanding with Governor O'Neill, who was presumed to be favorably disposed to Panton's cause and capable of influencing the Conde de Galvez. Panton must find some means for parlaying his tenuous opening iff" into the west to a position more in consonance with his eunbitioiis. 1 In New Orleans, Miro and Navarro could take satis­ faction in having erected, with commercial promises, a barrier between Spanish North America and the United States. They, it seemed, had succeeded where Spanish diplomacy at Paris had failed. 54 1 51McGillivra y to Panton, August 10, 1784, EF 116L9. 54Whitaker , Spanish-American Frontier, p. 43. J:

l«mv^ CHAPTER III

STALEMATE IN THE WEST

William Panton reached St. Augustine from Pensacola in September 1784, only to find the company's stock of trade goods almost totally depleted. Governor Tonyn and Colonel Brown had made heavy purchases for Indian gifts in Panton's cQssence. He immediately approached the com­ plaisant Zespedes for a passport to journey to Nassau. There he would arrange to replenish the inventories of the St. Johns cuid St. Marks stores and fulfill the promises made to supply Pensacola temporarily. Panton, Leslie and Company expected the arrival of a consignment from London at the Bahctmas shortly. As added justification, Peuiton reported that the Indians and traders frequenting St. Marks were growing anxious over the shortages of goods on hand there. Ze'spedes complied readily with Panton's request in light of the reported emergency. Upon his arrival at Nassau in October, Panton dis­ covered goods in short supply there also. He decided to

Panton, Leslie and Company memorial to Zespedes, September 1, 1784, Lockey Papers; Zespedes passport to Panton, September 10, 1784, EF 116L9; Panton, Leslie and Company memorial to Zespedes, September 10, 1784, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 79-80. 71

i I 72 restock St. Johns and St. Marks with wares on hand and await another shipment from England before proceeding with those intended for Pensacola. Panton judged this would cause only a slight delay, expecting to depart no later than January 1, 1785. He anticipated with confidence that, once he reached Pensacola again, he and Governor O'Neill would agree quickly on terms for the company to operate in West Florida on a permanent basis. Panton chose to ignore the counsel of his friends against placing too great trust 2 m the word of Spaniards. Panton was delayed in Nassau longer than he had expected. He did not reach St. Marks until March, where he received the astonishing news of the Spanish arrangements with Mather. McGillivray's complicity in the affair came as a particular blow, since the Creek leader had known fully of Panton's determination to place stores in both Pensacola and Mobile. Panton vowed that McGillivray must choose one house or the other. Miro's support of Mather also disturbed Panton, who likely regretted his prolonged stay at Nassau. The company's plans for West Florida had 3 been rendered quite uncertain. William Panton finally sailed into Pensacola harbor

2 Panton to Zespedes, December 4, 1784, Panton to Carlos Howard, December 5, 1784, Panton to J. Leslie, January 5, 1785, EF 116L9. ^Panton to J. Leslie, March 15, 1785, EF 116L9. 73 on April 6, 1785, at the finish of an agonizingly slow eleven-day voyage from St. Marks against contrary winds. He was mortified to discover that O'Neill had departed for Havana for consultations with the Conde de Galvez. Panton lost no time in dispatching a letter to O'Neill in Havana, assuming he would return to Pensacola with full authority to negotiate on the company's proposals for the West Florida trade. If not, Panton speculated, O'Neill at least would bring back a rejection of the proposals.

In his letter to O'Neill Panton expressed concern that a New Orleans house backed by "powerful friends" had formed a project for supplying the entire West Florida trade. It bemused the Scottish trader to speculate on how the principals involved could bring such great influence to bear against Panton, Leslie and Company, particularly as they totally lacked experience in dealing with Indians. Yet Panton presumed the New Orleans group capable of effecting their proposals. He had never planned to oppose naturalized Spanish subjects in bidding for the trade, 5 especially "powerful" ones. Nevertheless, Panton asked O'Neill to ascertain if possible whether Mather and Strother would be given the

Cherokee and Creek trade as well as that of the Choctaws

"^Panton to T. Forbes, April 15, 1785, EF 116L9.

^Panton to O'Neill, April 15, 1785, EF 116L9. 74 and Chickasaws. If the West Florida governor could not arrange for Panton's firm to enjoy an equal footing with its competitors, he expected to withdraw. The promises of assistance from Zespedes and O'Neill remained a sine qua non for continuing. Regrettably, perhaps, the Amer­ icans then might succeed in breaking the Spanish influence over the Indians, Panton inferred. But, with proper back­ ing, his company stood ready to prove its worth. Panton apparently had not yet developed a full understanding of the political realities in Louisiana and West Florida. He seemed unaware of the Louisiana governor's supremacy over West Florida Indian affairs. Nor did Panton at this stage possess a clear understanding of O'Neill's character. Perhaps he placed too much weight on the Pensacola commandant's irritability at the meddlesome over- lordship of New Orleans. But O'Neill later would display an almost pathological distrust of Britons, causing Panton great consternation. Indeed, O'Neill had gone to Havana primarily to recommend that St. Marks be placed under the jurisdiction of West Florida and the abandoned fort there garrisoned with Spanish soldiers. British traders in contact with Indians at such a remote yet strategic site on the Gulf Coast put him ill at ease. O'Neill was greatly

^Ibid. 75 relieved when Galvez approved his recommendation.

Certainly Panton demonstrated his ignorance of the painstakingly slow Spanish decision-making process in expecting an official reply in a matter of a few months. The company's proposition represented too wide a departure from Spain's time-honored closed commercial system to merit quick final action. O'Neill on his return could shed no light on the Panton firm's future status in West Florida.

In May, McGillivray joined Panton in Pensacola, and the merchant immediately brought up a discussion of the Creek leader's dealings with Miro, Navarro, and Mather during and after the 1784 congress. McGillivray explained that he feared an outright rejection might have caused the treaty negotiations to take an unfavorable course, perhaps even resulting in a direct ban on the use of English goods, Indeed, McGillivray remarked, the Mather contract had been sent to Madrid with recommendations for approval. This action set highly favorable precedents for the future activities of Panton, Leslie and Company. Panton, unable to find excessive fault in this line of reasoning, agreed o to follow along a while longer. If McGillivray's explana­

tions gave indications of containing a tinge of casuistry.

O'Neill to B. de Galvez, January 9, 1785, B, de Galvez to Miro, May 6, 1785, West Papers. ^Panton to T. Forbes, May 21, 1785, EF 116L9; McGillivray to J. Leslie, May 22, 1785, Lockey Papers. 76 his later conduct in behalf of the Panton firm became exemplary.

Moreover, Panton could exult in having beaten his New Orleans rivals in the race for entry into the goods- starved Indian market. The Condesa de Galvez arrived late in June at Mobile with only 40,000 pesos in trade goods aboard, which represented the extent of the credit that Mather had been able to arrange. The southern Indians, however, required at that time 100,000 pesos in goods at the minimum for their annual consumption, 9

Panton had hoped the delay in arrival of Mather's trade wares would be even more prolonged. This might have permitted Panton, Leslie and Company to acquire great advantage. Once his company established credit with the Chickasaw and Choctaw resident traders, Panton speculated, it would be difficult to supplant. At the very least, possibilities for a division of the Indian trade between the two firms would improve considerably.

McGillivray lost little time in deprecating the performance of the Mather firm as "precarious" suppliers of the Indian trade. The Creek chieftain expressed relief that the Indians in their dire need had not been utterly

9 / Navarro to J. de Galvez, June 22, 1785, Navarro to J. de Gdvez, April 15, 1786, Lockey Papers, •^^Panton to T, Forbes, May 21, 1785, EF 116L9 . 77 dependent on Mather's efforts. His goods should have arrived some eight months earlier; moreover, the single small cargo was inadequate. Luckily for the Spanish provinces, the timely arrival of Panton had removed the pressure to resort to American trade.

Meanwhile, McGillivray had assembled spokesmen from the Creeks, Chickasaws, and Cherokees for a general discussion of the common problems of American encroachment and trade conditions. The three tribes requested McGillivray to petition Charles III as protector of the southern Indians to instruct Diego de Gardoqui, his envoy to the United States, to resist American pretensions to Indian lands based on the in settling the boundary dispute. In forwarding the memorial to O'Neill for transmittal to Spain, McGillivray praised Panton, Leslie and Company. The Indian nations represented at the council were "exceedingly well Satisfied" with the arrival of Panton's goods and expected that "the Trade thus begun" would be made permanent as agreed in 1784. Panton had been "long connected in this business," was well-disposed to advance the Spanish viewpoint, and was able "to furnish Goods equal to the Demand of the Indians." McGillivray added that he had requested Panton "to State to Your

McGillivray to J, Leslie, August 20, 1789, EF 119J9; McGillivray to J. Leslie, August 22, 1789, in Lockey, East Florida, 1783-1785, pp, 684-685, 78 , the Terms and conditions, on which he can with Safety continue. ..." By accepting Panton, Spain would nullify American efforts to engross the trade through tempting offers . Americans were in a position to extend attractive terms, "being at full liberty of Importing and exporting directly to and from London and their not being Subjected to heavy dutys and charges. ""'"^ O'Neill intimated to the Conde de Galvez that he suspected the Indians might accept the American offers. But if Miro and Navarro found means for giving the trade permanency, this could be avoided. 13 Undoubtedly, McGillivray feared American encroach­ ments through imposing trade dependency on the Indians. He seems, however, to have misrepresented the immediacy of the American threat to pressure the Spaniards to act favorodDly toward Panton. In September 1785 agents sent by Georgia to the Natchez district in connection with the Bourbon County scheme were reporting the Creeks as "infinitely . . unfriendly" to Americans. Many Choctaws and all Chicksaws, on the other hand, viewed Americans favorably and desired

1 2 McGillivray for the Chiefs of the Creek, Chick­ asaw, and Cherokee Nations, July 10, 1785; McGillivray to O'Neill, July 24, 1785, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 90-94. A Spanish translation of the McGillivray letter to O'Neill appears in Serrano y Sanz, Espana Y_ los Indios, pp. 24-25. •^^O'Neill to B. de Galvez, September 4, 1785, in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. I, 133. 79 American trade. But the Creeks had denied Georgia traders access to the westward dwelling tribes. McGillivray indeed had cut off American travel across Indian lands from Cumberland and the Atlantic coast to the Mississippi as a defensive measure against a rumored impending invasion of Natchez by .

Using McGillivray's timely representations to full advantage, Panton opened his campaign to obtain permission from Miro and Navarro to continue trading in Pensacola in June 1785. He first wrote seeking Navarro's approval, but received no reply. He then submitted a written request to Miro for an answer on the matter, depending on the same "liberality of sentiment" the Louisiana governor extended English settlers to gain an impartial hearing. The com­ pany's proposals, Panton stated, had been presented in complete candor and required only an official decision placing them in effect. He was prepared to "remove or remain" as directed. In August, his supplies almost exhausted, Panton

Thomas Green to Anthony Bledsoe, September 10, 17 85; Nicholas Long, William Davenport, and Nat Christmas to Governor Elbert, September 13, 1785, in Edmund C. Burnett, ed., "Papers Relating to Bourbon County, Georgia," American Historical Review, XV (January, 1910), 334-337; O'Neill to MircT, September 4, 1785, in Corbitts, eds. ETHSP, Pt. I, 130; Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 55-58. The Georgia legislature in February 1785 created Bourbon County out of lands adjacent to the Mississippi in an abortive attempt to wrest the Anglo settlements in the Natchez District from Spanish control. 80 went to New Orleans to settle matters in person. Meeting with Mir6, he declared that immediate arrangements for 1786 were becoming mutually imperative. Panton proposed to import from New Providence and St. Augustine 35,000 pesos in goods to meet immediate needs. For the 1786 season he wished to introduce by May two cargoes not to exceed 120,000 pesos in value. The use of two vessels would act as a safeguard against the loss of the full year's supply in case of mishap. Panton promised to pay six per cent duty on all imports, except those from St. Augustine. Customs officials there already had collected duties. He agreed to adhere to the prices set at the Pensacola congress. He asked for the privilege of exporting peltry and other products obtained in trade directly to the port of origin of the trade goods. When convenient, Panton proposed exporting peltry to Prance or Spain. Vessels car­ rying peltry must receive port clearance quickly to avoid spoilage from warm weather. Peltry exports, he suggested, 15 should be exempted from duty charges. Panton returned to Pensacola in September satisfied with the results of his mission. Miro, on the basis of the American "threat" as described by McGillivray, had prevailed

Panton to Miro, June 27, 1785, West Papers; McGillivray to J. Leslie, August 22, 1785, in Lockey, East Florida, 1783-1785, pp. 684-685; McGillivray to J. LesTIiT December 10, 1785, EF 114J9; Panton to Miro, July 30, 1785, in Corbitts, eds. ETHSP, Pt. I, 123-124. 81 upon Navarro to issue Panton an import license for 1786. The governor explained that Panton promised to obtain up to 150,000 pesos in trade goods, provided the duties were no greater than those imposed on Mather. As intendant, Miro added, Navarro had been empowered by the Conde de Galvez to establish traffic with the Indians by whatever means possible. Panton's offer, Miro' concluded, presented too "favorable an opportunity" for promoting the King's service to neglect. Navarro had responded to Miro's urgings favorably, granting Panton permission to bring into Pensa­ cola up to 125,000 pesos in goods for the 1786 trade needs. These could be obtained in any neutral or friendly port. Panton's exports and imports were to be assessed at six per cent, the rate established by the Royal Cedula of 1782, 16 and he was expressly prohibited from exporting specie. If Panton had expected to reach a permanent under­ standing in New Orleans on his firm's future status in West Florida, he expected more than Miro' or Navarro could grant. Not until October 10, 1785, did the Louisiana intendancy receive royal approval even to use the ad hoc measures for supporting the Indian trade as previously extended by

McLatchy to J. Leslie, December 10, 1784 in Lockey, East Florida, 1783-1785, pp. 742-743; Navarro per­ mit, September 16, 1785, West Papers; Miro to Navarro, September 16, 1785, in Duvon C, Corbitt, ed., "Papers Relating to the Georgia-Florida Frontier, 1784-1800," XIX Pts., Georgia Historical Quarterly XX-XXV (1936-1942), Pt, II, 76-77. Cited infra as Corbitt, ed,, GHQ, and appro­ priate Pt. No. Jlllliiiiil- 82 Bernardo de Galvez. The October instructions limited the m number of cargoes so imported to no more than two per year, but this limitation was extended on May 30, 1786, to cover the actual requirements of the trade. At the same time, the court recognized the convenience of Panton's presence at Pensacola temporarily. Doubts had arisen over Mather's ability to support the trade 17 ! Meanwhile, McGillivray employed his recently-awarded !

• title of commissary to the Creeks to secure advantages for 1.1 the company's East Florida operations. In an official letter of May 22, 1785, he reported to Zespedes the good effects of Panton's timely arrival in Pensacola in fore­ stalling a massive defection of the Indians from the Spcinish interest. But, McGillivray warned, continued imports were absolutely essential to maintain the present favorcible state of affairs. Thus Ze'spedes should support Panton, Leslie and Company trading posts at St. Johns and St. Marks to the fullest extent. Since the company was, the Spanish commis­ sary remarked, "Strictly Speaking ... a political affair," Ze'spedes should issue passports as frequently as necessary and without delay for small vessels to replenish trade stocks. Exceptions to the Spanish commercial routine in 1 iil l J. de Galvez to Navarro, October 10, 1785, Navarro to O'Neill, January 8, 1787, West Papers; Miro' to Zespedes, November 25, 1786, Lockey Papers.

!.- 83 this respect lay in the king's interest. 18 Zespedes immediately expressed his concurrence with 11 McGillivray's views on the value of the company to the ii

Tiriii royal service, pledging it his continued support as long iiiiii i I I M I II i I i • as he remained in command of the province. The Spaniard asserted that this policy would remain unalterable, in spite of the disposition of "others" toward the Panton firm. Ze'spedes promised to continue to allow the company to import Indian goods in whatever amounts necessary for the support of the trade until ordered otherwise. 19 How much this favorable attitude toward the inter­ ests of Panton, Leslie and Company resulted from John Leslie's assiduous cultivation of the Spanish governor's gratitude may not be determined empirically. 20 Nevertheless, Zespedes soon demonstrated his good intentions in a manner perhaps somewhat unusual for a Spanish commander of a minor frontier outpost. On June 15, prompted by McGillivray's official advice, Zespedes approved a passport for the

McGillivray to Ze'spedes, May 22, 1785, EF 114J9. This important document also appears in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 87-90. •'"^Zespedes to McGillivray, June 13, 1785, EF 114J9; Ze'spedes to O'Neill, June 15, 17 85, in Lockey, East Florida, 1783-1785, pp. 559-560. 20 "Representation With Regard to the Commerce of East Florida by Various Inhabitants of St. Augustine," in Whitaker, Documents Relating to the Commercial Policy of Spain, p. 187. 84 company to bring in goods from New Providence for St, Marks and, if needed, for Pensacola, Some two weeks earlier he had granted formal permission for McLatchy and other com­ pany dependents to remain at St. Marks, Yet a dispatch from Bernardo de Galvez had arrived at St. Augustine on May 16 informing Zespedes that St. Marks had been placed under the jurisdiction of West Florida. The East Florida governor then informed his superiors that the order con­ cerning the transfer reached its destination after the permission had been granted. Zespedes explained his reluc­ tance to countermand his action in light of the American threat. He later defended himself from allegations by Navarro concerning non-observance of jurisdictional pro- J

prieties by replying that the interests of His Majesty's ! 'I service held priority over protocol. !• McGillivray's exertions in securing advantages i under the provisions of the Treaty of Pensacola extended ) \ beyond the commercial sphere. His efforts to establish ''

Panton, Leslie and Company as the instrument for fulfilling

Spanish trade promises paralleled his activities in testing

the firmness of the Spanish commitment to support the Creek

Zespedes to J. de Galvez, June 20, 1785, Zespedes to J. de Galvez, September 16, 1785, in Lockey, East Florida, 1783-1785, pp. 224-226, 562-564; Passport for Panton, Leslie and Company, June 15, 1785, Safe Conduct^for Charles McLatchy, June 2, 1785, Lockey Papers; Zespedes to O'Neill, May 22, 1786, West Papers. 85 nation in its territorial claims. In the summer of 1785, Mad Dog, war chief of the Upper Creek village of Tuckaubatchee and a trusted McGillivray lieutenant, pre­ sented himself to Governor O'Neill in Pensacola. Creek war parties, the chief reported, had cleared the Georgia frontier of settlers living on Indian lands. Reminding O'Neill of promises of Spanish protection. Mad Dog solic­ ited a gift of gunpowder and balls for defense against retaliation. The Spanish commandant complied, issuing the Creek war chieftain four hundred pounds of powder and its equivalent in balls so the Indians might "defend themselves 22 from the Bears and other fierce Animals. ..." The prolonged contest between the Creeks and Georgians for X

control of the Oconee strip claimed by the latter under \n the 1783 Treaty of Augusta had begun. Meanwhile, at Philadelphia, the United States Con­ i gress deliberated on the southern Indian problem. On May ; 15, 1785, it adopted a committee report recommending that ^•I peace commissioners be sent to treat with the southern Indians for the purpose of establishing normal relations with these powerful tribes. Invitations from the peace commission went out to the Creek villages requesting the head-men to attend a conference on October 24 at Galphinton

^^O'Neill to B. de Galvez, May 30, 1785, in Corbitts, eds. ETHSP, Pt. II, 139-140. 86 on the banks of the Ogeechee river. Georgians, out of fear that the central government might reach an accord with the Creeks detrimental to the ambitions of its land- jobbers, immediately set out to wreck the pending confer­ ence. Governor Elbert dispatched his own messengers to the Creeks, informing them that the matter of fixing the boundary of the Oconee cession also would be settled at 23 Galphinton.

McGillivray and his following boycotted the Galphinton conference. Only a small delegation of Creeks headed by two pro-American chiefs, the Tallassee King and the Fat King, appeared. The American commissioners de­ clined to treat with such an unrepresentative delegation and departed for Hopewell to negotiate with the Cherokees,

Choctaws and Chickasaws. With these Indians their treaty- 24 making efforts proved more successful. In three separate conferences between November 18,

1785, and January 10, 1786, the American peace commissioners concluded treaties with the three Indian tribes. Each nation claimed the United States as its sole protector and in turn gained recognition of its territorial limits. Each

Kenneth Coleman, "Federal Indian Relations in the South, 1781-1789," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXV (Winter, 1957), 439-440. Randolph C. Downes, "Creek-American Rela­ tions, 1782-1790," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXI (April, 1937), 147-151. ^^Coleman, "Federal Indian Relations in South," 440-441. 87 treaty specified the exclusive right of Congress to regu­ late the Indian trade. The Chickasaw treaty reserved a small parcel of land at Muscle Shoals for a trading post to be established under the auspices of the central govern­ ment. Similar provisions in the Choctaw treaty permitted the government to select three such sites in Choctaw lands in the near future. The United States Commissioners were elated over obtaining these trade concessions. Congress was well informed on the importance of trade as an instru­ ment of Indian control, and at Hopewell its commissioners had been impressed by the commercial inroads already made 25 by the Spaniards.

Following the departure of the American commis­ sioners from Galphinton, their Georgian counterparts, with ii

111 little compunction against dealing with the small Creek contingent, negotiated a treaty on November 12, 17 85. The '<<* new agreement confirmed the cessions made at Augusta and added to this a new cession between the Altamaha and the St. Marys. Georgia authorities attempted to entice McGillivray into accepting the treaty by offering to return the confiscated family estate, but the Creek chieftain

25 Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, pp. 148-153; Harmon, Sixty Years, pp. 42-43, 49; Benjamin Hawkins, et. al to Richard Henry Lee, December 2, 1785, in ASPIA, I, 38-39. The treaties may be found in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs, Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties, comp. and ed. by Charles J. Kappler, S. Doc. 319, 58th Cong., 2d sess., 1904, Pt. II, pp. 8-16. 88 refused. Instead, in April 1786, he persuaded a Creek general council to declare war on Georgia,

McGillivray appeared in Pensacola in May with news that several Creek parties, supported by Cherokees, had been dispatched to clear American poachers off Indian border areas near Georgia and also at Muscle Shoals, The Cherokees were raiding the Cumberland settlements as well. The Creek nation, he added, was determined to resist Amer­ ican encroachment from the east, from the north, and even from along the Mississippi. McGillivray asked for con­ tinued Spanish support and protection. O'Neill took the liberty to furnish the Creek leader with a small quantity of gunpowder. The Spanish commandant believed it in the Spanish interest to keep McGillivray "grateful;" his in­ fluence over the Creeks might be put to good use in reach- 27 ing a favorable boundary settlement with the United States. The Conde de Galvez agreed with his subordinate in

Pensacola. Spain's "new friends," the Creeks, could be helpful in chastizing the Americans into assuming a more reasonable position on the boundary question. If not, the

Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, pp, 2 42- 243; Downes, "Creek-American Relations," 152-153; McGillivray to J. Leslie, in Lockey, East Florida, 1783- 1785, pp. 743-744; McGillivray to Miro', May 1, 1786, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 108-109.

^^O'Neill to Ze'spedes, April 19, 1786, EF 114J9; O'Neill to B. de Galvez, May 20, 1786, in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. II, 137-138. 89 Indians at least could stem the American advance until the boundary question was settled diplomatically. Spain therefore resolved to declare the negotiations at Hopewell invalid and the treaties null and void. Gardoqui was instructed to inform the of His Catholic Majesty's obligations to protect Indian terri­ torial claims that lay within West Florida, which Spain now asserted extended northward to an east-west line extending from the mouth of the Yazoo to the Apalachicola. Gardoqui also was ordered to propose that the remainder of the territory claimed by the southern Indians be declared neutral and placed under joint administration. Miro' re­ ceived instructions to furnish the Creeks with weapons. However, the arms distributed among the Indians were to be J kept at the minimum levels required for their defense and were to be distributed under strict secrecy. The instruc- > tions cautioned Miro' to exercise care not to place the Spanish government in a compromising position; a direct ! 2 p '^ confrontation with the United States must be avoided.

McGillivray met with Miro' in New Orleans and secured a grant of 5,000 pounds of gunpowder, twice that amount in musket balls, and a corresponding amount of gun flints to be delivered at Pensacola. O'Neill received

Serrano y Sanz, Espana entre, p. 25; Serr^ano y Sanz, Documentos, pp. 379-382; B. de Ga'lvez to Miro', May 20, 1786, Mirtf to B. de Galvez, June 28, 1786, West Papers. 90 orders to use all possible circumspection in issuing the munitions to the Indians. On Miro's suggestion, the West

Florida governor arranged for Panton to dole out the powder and ball in small lots to Indians appearing at his store at prearranged intervals. Should the Americans protest,

Spanish officials could explain that the Indians were buying ammunition under their trading privileges. 29

The precautions taken to mask the support given the Creeks, however, failed to maintain secrecy. Daniel

McMurphy, an Indian agent of Georgia, sent a protest to Pensacola in July 1786 against Spanish aid to the Creeks. McMurphy also complained of McGillivray's embargo against

trade with Georgia as well as his orders that all peltry J If 'I must be sent to Panton at St. Marks or Pensacola. ' McGillivray's tactics in excluding the Georgia-based trade ^ indeed had caused many American frontiersmen to speculate < on whether Spain and Great Britain had formed an anti- United States alliance. This, they reasoned, explained why Britons remained in the Florida Indian trade.

Georgia's ability to make war unassisted against

5^5 Miro' to O'Neill, June 20, 1786, m Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 117-118; O'Neill to Miro^ September l8";~1786, in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. II, 146-147; McGillivray to Ze'spedes, August 3, 1786, West Papers. •^^McMurphy to O'Neill July 11, 1786, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 118-120; Zespedes to B. de Galvez, May 6, 1786, Lockey Papers. 91 the Creeks, however, did not equal the desire of Georgians for Indian lands. Georgia sought aid from Congress, South Carolina, the Franklinites, the Chickasaws and the Choctaws against the Creeks. At the same time, a 1500-man militia force was dispatched to escort the commissioners named to negotiate a forced settlement with the Creeks at Shoulder- bone on the Oconee, If the negotiations failed, full-

scale warfare would commence. 31

The Georgians believed they had resolved the Creek crisis in the Treaty of Shoulderbone, signed in November 1786. Apprehensive of an attack on their lands, fifteen Indian towns sent representatives to the proceedings, Twelve of these were Lower Creek towns and consequently

i« prime targets for the vindictiveness of Georgians, The J .J treaty required the Creeks to give satisfaction for the J depredations committed on former raids, return the plunder, .^ confirm the Augusta and Galphinton agreements, promise to J k fix the boundaries, and recognize the Oconee River as the "^ new dividing line, Georgia requested and obtained five hostages as assurance of Creek compliance. McGillivray and 32 his party again denied the validity of the proceedings, 3 1 Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, pp, 153-15 5; Downes, "Creek-American Relations," 154-157; Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, p, 242. Downes, "Creek American Relations," 157-158; Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, pp, 245-24 6, 92 During the summer of 1786, Georgia's Indian agents had been active in the Creek, Choctaw and Chickasaw vil­ lages , McMurphy had demanded that Creek traders surrender their Spanish licenses and replace them with Georgia licenses at a fee of ten pounds sterling. While McGillivray was temporarily absent from the nation, McMurphy placed a bounty of four horseloads of goods on his head. When McGillivray returned, the Georgia representative fled. Ben James, a trader with influence among the Choctaws, accepted a Georgia commission to foment anti-Creek sym­ pathies and to establish trade, William Davenport, for­ merly at Natchez in connection with the Bourbon County episode, performed like services among both the Chickasaws ijj and Choctaws, Miro at first asked the Indians to expel 11 if -.1 Davenport and other Americans from their lands; later he I'j issued orders for their arrest, James, who had taken a j Spanish oath of allegiance, enjoyed powerful connections ''r i with Franchimastabe, the most influential Choctaw chief of .!^ the Lower Party, Miro" satisfied himself with warning James 33 to sever his American connections, Panton's agent at St. Marks, McLatchy, became

Enrique Roche to McMurphy, July 23, 1786, O'Neill to Miro, August 24, 1786, in Corbitts, eds. ETHSP, Pt. II, 142-143, 146; McGillivray to O'Neill, April 11, 1787, West Papers; Miro to McGillivray, April 26, 1786, Miro to Pedro Favrot, n.d., in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. II, 130-131, Pt. Ill, 66. 93 disquieted over the surge of aggressiveness from Georgia. If Spain wavered in aiding the Creeks, McLatchy feared, Georgians might vent their wrath by raiding the exposed St. Marks post. 34 Miro' too developed concern early in 1787 that con­ tinued aggressiveness from the Creeks might bring on con­ certed retaliation from the Americans. In March he reit­ erated to O'Neill the need for keeping munitions given the Indians^ at levels needed for purely defensive purposes. In May, the governor of Louisiana informed McGillivray of his wishes that some basis for peace with the Americans could be found. In these moves Miro' correctly anticipated the desires of the Spanish court, which in July dispatched instructions to the same intent. Yet the situation was such that all assistance could be withheld from the Creeks only with danger. Loss of all support might drive the

Indians into a settlement in which they agreed to become :•» i enemies of Spain. Thus, Spanish gifts of munitions con- | tinued to flow into Creek villages. The official explana­ tion to the Americans remained that the Creeks received these supplies in trade with Panton, or in annual presents as provided for in the Treaty of Pensacola. Neither could be stopped; the Indians, the Spaniards claimed, absolutely

^^McLatchy to J. Leslie, January 8, 1787, EF 114J9. 94 required arms and powder to earn their livelihood in the huntV, V . 35

McGillivray, encouraged by a visit from a delegation of Indians representing the northern confederation, asked in June for additional ammunition to sustain the skirmishes with the American frontier settlements. He shortly after­ wards reported having dispatched some four to five hundred warriors to attack settlements in the Cumberland area and along the Georgia frontier. Meanwhile, an American retal­ iatory force from Cumberland had launched a surprise raid on a French trading post located at Muscle Shoals, killing most of the traders and a few Creeks. This operation obtained its supplies from British outlets in Machillimackinac and i? i •I Detroit, but the Americans mistakenly believed it under I i McGillivray's control. Actually the Americans, in breaking j up the post, had removed an annoyance to Panton's operations. ^ His traders had been complaining that the French were under- J selling them and making serious inroads into the Creek ^ trade^. ^ . 36

Miro'' to O'Neill, March 24, 1787, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 145-146; Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1783-1789," 198; Antonio Valde's to Miro', July 31, 1787, Miro' to O'Neill, August 14, 1787, West Papers . •^^McGillivray to O'Neill, June 20, 1787, McGillivray to O'Neill, July 10, 1787 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 153-156; John Kelly to Panton in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. Ill, 65; Cotterill, Southern Indians, p. 71; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, pp. 188-189. 95

McGillivray responded to the Cumberland raid on

Muscle Shoals by launching a Creek war party against

William Davenport, who was busily engaged in erecting a trading post near Chickasaw territory. The Indian marauders succeeded in destroying the post, killing

Davenport and most of his party, and returning with eighty

"rifle guns" as booty. McGillivray advised that if the

Choctaws and Chickasaws remained friendly toward Americans they should be brought to heel by cutting of their trade.

Because the Chickasaws had taken no retaliatory action against the Creek party, Miro' believed that a majority of 37 the former still favored Spain, Miro' had reason to hope for, if not to expect, strong favor on the part of the Chickasaws for Spain,

These Indians, together with the Choctaws, had complained ll» since the summer of 1786 about the prices and trade policies •jl of Mather and Strother at Mobile, Moreover, early in 17 87, ! both nations sent delegations to solicit American trade. [^ The Indians were irritated because the Mather firm had not adhered to the tariff schedule for Mobile and rejected or downgraded too many deerskins. At first, Miro expressed little alarm over these complaints, confident that both

Mather and Panton were in a position to undersell any

^^McGillivray to Miro', July 25, 1787, Miro' to O'Neill, August 12, 1787, West Papers, 96 American competitors. But Panton also undersold Mather, causing him to complain against intervention from Pensa­ cola. In September 1786, Miro informed Panton that incur­ sions by his traders were interrupting Indian harmony, much to the governor's displeasure. Under no circumstances should Panton attempt to trade with the Choctaws and Chickasaws; this concession belonged to Mather, whom Miro' likewise had ordered to refrain from trading with the Creeks. Miro's attitude caused Panton much worry as to whether his services to the Spanish government received the support that they merited from the governor and in­ tendant at New Orleans. Mather's traders, disgusted with the Spanish proscription against purchasing from Panton in 'i' the light of continuing higher prices at Mobile, threatened •4- 38 ,, to quit. "' Further complications for Panton's West Florida activities arose out of the suspicions of Bernardo del K 1

Campo, the Spanish minister in London. In the spring of •« 1786, despatches began to flow from England to Spain reporting the arrival at London from Louisiana and Florida ports of vessels ostensibly of Spanish registry, but manned

Favrot to Miro, May 30, 1786, in Kinnaird, ed., Pt. II, Post-War Decade, 173; Serrano y Sanz, Espana entre, pp. 31-32; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 189; Miro to Favrot, July 6, 1786, in Corbitts, eds, ETHSP, Pt, II, 141; Miro to Panton, September 5, 1786, EF 114J9; O'Neill to Miro, December 24, 1786, West Papers, 97 by English crews. Moreover, their cargoes reportedly in­ cluded silver, and, contrary to practice, their captains refrained from presenting themselves at the embassy. Upon being queried by the Minister of the Indies on these reports, Navarro explained that English Navigation Acts, under penalty of confiscation, permitted only English- owned ships to import peltry and other American products.

Hence the necessity to avoid contact with Spanish offi- cials. , . 39

Campo's reports continued to mention the frequent

arrival at London of ships embarked from ports under the supervision of Miro' and Navarro. The Spanish minister suggested that perhaps English merchants were using the ,|iu\j

•II Florida Indian trade as a ruse for introducing contraband '\

English goods into Spanish colonies. Or, even more omi- i I nously, possibly the English "leeches" were working under- f J 40 ^ handedly to detach the Indians from Spam. j These speculations produced due alarm at the sk

Spanish court, which threatened to withdraw the commercial privileges of the North American provinces if gross

Floridablanca to J. de Gdlvez, March 16, 1786, J. de Galvez to Louisiana Intendant, March 21, 1786, Navarro to J. de Galvez, July 22, 1786, West Papers. ^^Campo to Floridablanca, September 5, 17 86, West Papers. 98 improprieties were being perpetuated. 41 Navarro defended himself and Miro" from Campo's allegations. He attested that the only ships under their jurisdiction proceeding to London were from West Florida and carried nothing more than peltry and small amounts of tar and pitch. Actually, he explained, these items repre­ sented the extent of the productive range of West Florida. Silver could not possibly be removed since there was none on hand to remove. The intendant also reminded his supe­ riors that the Americans, not the English, posed the immediate threat to the Spanish position in North America. The Indian trade Panton provided could not be dispensed with lightly if a possible American thrust into the very .; f vitals of New Spain were to be checked. To find a Spanish merchant as a replacement for Panton posed insurmountable difficulties. Spciniards possessing the requisite capital, i n Navarro indicated, hesitated to commit their funds to such > I a risky venture, one in which they lacked competence and "• experience. Moreover, the all-important McGillivray held connections with Panton, making notions of his removal doubly dangerous. Nevertheless, to remove further causes of suspicion

^-'•j. de Galvez to Intendant of Louisiana, October 5, 1786, West Papers. ^^Navarro to J. de Galvez, February 12, 17 87, West Papers. 99 at court over rampant contraband activity in West Florida, Miro" and O'Neill agreed in February 1787 on the prudence of refurbishing and garrisoning the abandoned fort at St.

Marks. This had been postponed because of lack of funds ^ 43 and manpower. Miro' and Navarro, again prompted by the pressures emanating from above, discreetly added numerous restric­ tions to the conditions for Panton's trading activities in 1787. They forbade the vessel Panton planned to dispatch to London for the year's supplies to touch at any other English port enroute to or from London for any reason what­ soever. Panton was ordered to post bond as surety against non-compliance with this stipulation. They stipulated that the captain and two-thirds of the vessel's crew must be Spanish subjects and, before returning from London, the captain must call upon the Spanish ambassador. Finally, ^ Panton must agree to limit his trade to the Creek nation f alone. Departure from this measure would subject his \ 44 property to confiscation according to Spanish law. Panton curtly refused the terms of Miro' and Navarro,

except the requirement to call on the Spanish ambassador.

Compliance with the others, the Scottish trader stated.

^^Miro'to O'Neill, February 15, 1787, O'Neill to Miro', February 15, 1787, West Papers. ^^Panton to Miro' and Navarro, February 15, 17 87, EF 114J9. 100 would bring ruin. He respectfully withdrew his request for a passport hampered by such instructions. Had he been extended terms similar to those for 1786, Panton added, he would be happy to remain in West Florida. Under the altered circumstances, however, Panton announced his in­ tention to withdraw to East Florida as quickly as he settled his affairs and collected his debts in Pensacola, The company there operated free from such restraints. Supplies on hand at Pensacola, Panton estimated, would be exhausted by February 1788, In the interim, Miro' and

Navarro should seek a replacement for Panton, Leslie and 45 Company m West Florida,

•» In Panton's estimation, the moment had arrived to *ij

• 'II wring from Miro and Navarro improvements for the company's :i .li status in West Florida. This was the underlying purpose I'» of the refusal. The Scot fully understood the predicament j that any interruption to the West Florida Indian trade ,j would create. The heightened tensions along the Creek- ij American frontier, to which Panton's influence with McGillivray had very likely contributed, would make trade displacement a grave risk. Panton also appreciated the fact that the resources of Mather and Strother were inade­ quate for supporting even the Chickasaw and Choctaw trade, much less that of the Creeks. Even with official support.

45 Ibid. 101 the Mobile-based firm's days were probably numbered, since its practices in culling deerskins and its pricing policies had become "obnoxious" in the eyes of its traders. Panton believed that Miro' and Navarro, regardless of their per­ sonal affinities, would not sacrifice "the peace and prosperity of a colony ... to the interests of one House." Governor O'Neill's opinion that the governor and intendant would relax their position somewhat encouraged Panton to believe his services were indispensable. 46 As a safeguard against being mistaken in his appraisals of the circumstances, Panton consulted with his other associates over plans for consolidating the company's

Indian trading activities in East Florida. The partners V*

It agreed that St. Marks enjoyed superior advantages over any 11 <]' other location in the province, provided somehow it should "» ' '' i'l remain under the control of Ze'spedes and the sheltering ''^j royal concessions of May IB, 1786. Otherwise the company % would establish a new site at the upper navigational limits \^ of the St, Marys river. Although the St. Marys location, because of its relative inconvenience, would likely reduce the company's volume of trade, higher profit margins real­ ized through savings on insurance coverage for shipping would compensate partly for the loss. Moreover, a lower volume of trade presented a not entirely unwelcome prospect

46Panto n to J. Leslie, February 22, 1787, EF 114J9, 102 in the light of lower price trends on the London fur mar­ ket. Ze'spedes replied that the actions of the Conde de Galvez in 17 85 rendered him (Ze'spedes) powerless to regu­ late the trade at St. Marks. But the East Florida governor urged the company to remain there until His Majesty's will was determined on the matter. In all probability the court would rule in favor of McGillivray's "friends" re­ maining at St. Marks, because, Zespedes pointed out, when he had submitted the Panton, Leslie and Company memorial St. Marks was indisputably under the jurisdiction of East Florida. In agreeing to the memorial. His Majesty under- stood the company intended its terms to apply to St. Marks ;;;

as well. Furthermore, removal would be contrary to the 'I

royal interests in providing for the well-being of the !>»

A rt ''^ T ^- 48 .1 Indians. J The East Florida governor immediately explained «<

Panton's situation to Jose de Galvez and included an account \^ of the advice given the company against hasty action.

Ze'spedes again reminded the Minister of the Indies of the

"evident predilection" of McGillivray toward the Panton

firm. It seemed, continued Zespedes, the royal order of

^^Ibid.; McLatchy to J. Leslie, March 12, 1787, EF 114J9. ^^Zespedes to McGillivray, March 27, 1787, EF 114J9. 103 May 8, 17 86, confirmed the company's rights to operate at St. Marks regardless of its subsequent transfer to West Florida, Indeed, the order of the Conde de Galvez readily might be construed as a temporary arrangement, since the wording of the order contained the words "for the present," Therefore, Ze'spedes requested that St, Marks be restored 49 to East Florida.

Meanwhile, Miro and Navarro replied to Panton's objections, implying that he had not understood their in­ tent. Panton's vessel, in case of storms, could seek haven in any non-Spanish port along his route. Only Spanish ports were forbidden, especially those of the Indies. But this presented no inconvenience because of the availability of other emergency harbors. The crew requirements presented no obstacle; naturalization was open to all crewmen on their request. Trade with the Creeks alone scarcely could work

a hardship, since this had been the case from the begin- H nmg. 50 I Should Panton change his mind, he would still be permitted a passport for London. This would give him the opportunity to submit a memorial directly to the Spanish ambassador for transmittal to His Majesty in explanation

Ze'spedes to J. de Ga'lvez, March 30, 1787, Lockey Papers . ^^Miro and Navarro to Panton, March 9, 1787, West Papers. 104 of why the trade must be conducted directly with London and without interference. But they reminded Panton of the absolute necessity of obtaining the approval of the Spanish Ambassador for the vessel to return to Pensacola. A royal decree of August 1786 made this mandatory. Panton availed himself of the offer to regain the passport he had refused earlier. It presented too splendid dn opportunity to ignore for pressing the Spanish court to accept his terms for remaining in the trade. Panton held iittle fear of a refusal for his vessel to return with fresh Supplies; this would be suicidal for Spain's Indian policy; Although Mird' and Navarro remained firm in denying him the Choctaw and Chickasaw trade, time and circumstances favoreci Panton's eventual success in this matter as well. With a bit moire perseverance, Panton concluded, he would liave his way with the Spaniards.

51Ibid . CHAPTER IV

TRIALS AND TRIUMPH IN THE WEST

James Strachan of Strachan and McKenzie, the Panton firm's London correspondents, and Captain Matthew Forrest, master of a company frigate, the Mary, called on Bernardo del Campo, His Catholic Majesty's ambassador I a 11M. to the Court of St. James, in August 1787. They bore a nmi! letter to the Spanish diplomat from Miro" and Navarro in which the Louisiana officials requested that he refrain from demanding excessive formalities in granting the Mary clearance for Pensacola. Panton, Leslie and Company, the letter explained, alleged that British Navigation Acts

permitted only British ships manned by British crews and 15: '11 sailing under the British ensign to enter the London harbor. The very act of presenting clearance papers, if detected by 51 the customs authorities, subjected the outgoing cargo to

confiscation. The company, because of the dangers involved, mill IIIIIIM contemplated withdrawing from the Florida Indian trade should the royal order imposing this requirement remain in effect.

j I •''Miro' and Navarro to Campo, March 14, 1787, West Papers 105 106 ! i.i.i.rUi.iJii In the ensuing conversation with the Spanish ambas­ sador, Strachan mentioned the depressed state of the London fur market. He noted that much of the past year's ship­ ments of peltry remained unsold and that pelts selling for two to two and one-half shillings in former years currently brought only one shilling. Campo agreed politely. Indeed, this very condition aroused Campo's suspicions that motives other than a desire to continue in a venture of such ques­ m tionable profits as the fur trade prompted the true interest [riririi; of the Britons in Florida. Smuggling seemed to be the over­ Mil riding objective, particularly since Panton wished to be rid of all inspections and investigations. In July, Campo may have recalled, a cargo of trade goods consigned to Mather and Strother had been insured at £30,000, which seemed excessive when compared against the shipping mani- 2 fest presented to the Embassy in requesting clearance. Despite his misgivings, the Spanish ambassador approved a passport for the Mary to return to Pensacola. But he sent Captain Forrest off with a stern warning that the passport covered only those goods listed on the cargo

manifest and not contraband items to be discharged clan­ IttH'' destinely in hidden coves along the Florida coastline. Campo also had the shipmaster deliver a rather sardonic

Campo to Floridablanca, July 13, 1787, Campo to Floridablanca, August 12, 1787, West Papers. 4' 107 message to Miro and Navarro, informing them that the London embassy no longer would intervene in monitoring the Florida fur trade. Since the crews and vessels engaged in this commerce for all practical purposes were English, not Spanish, Campo's competency to guard against abuses was 3 of doubtful value. Miro' and Navarro, however, struggling to gain a sympathetic hearing for the objections of Panton and Mather to the regulations of September 1786, also had laid the matter before the Spanish Ministry of the Indies. The threat of confiscation raised by the new restrictions, they reported, had caused both merchants to consider retiring from the fur trade. Compliance was impossible under existing English laws. Moreover, declining prices in the fur trade owing to mounting competition from the burgeoning cotton and woolen textile industries presented difficulties enough for Panton and Mather to overcome. Therefore, Miro' and Navarro suggested, there could be little harm in the two Indian tradesmen "being Englishmen in London . . . 4 when they are true Spaniards in our dominions." Since the description was somewhat inaccurate when applied to Panton, who only later took an oath of fidelity to the

Campo to Miro' and Navarro, August 29, 1787, West Papers ^Miro' and Navarro to J. de Galvez, March 24, 1787, Lockey Papers 108 Spanish crown, the Louisiana officials presented additional reasons to justify his retention. Panton's trade lessened the need for heavy governmental expenditures for gifts, •'iM:. i and McGillivray held an interest in the Panton firm. Be­ cause all men worked for either "honor or fortune," and because McGillivray was insufficiently compensated in the former, Miro" and Navarro indicated that "grave difficulties" militated against removing the latter. - .'^j Yet, in Panton's estimation, his position with respect to the restrictions of 1786 actually differed from that of Mather. Panton was not so much requesting their cancellation as he was insisting that his company's status in West Florida be placed on the same terms it enjoyed in East Florida under the Royal Order of May 8, 1786. The Scottish merchant interpreted this latter grant as permit­ ting his firm to trade with the Creeks "with British prop­ erty" and to market deerskins "when and wheresoever" it pleased. Among other concessions, according to Panton, the decree also required a six per cent duty to be levied against imports alone; exports were exempted. These terms, Panton remarked, were identical with those he had proposed in New Orleans in 1785. If allowed, his company would

'ibid. 'Panton to Miro' and Navarro, May 9, 1787, Lockey Papers The italics are in the original. 109 remain in Pensacola despite the ban against entering the Choctaw and Chickasaw trade because, he predicted, Miro' and Navarro would "see cause at a future day" to remove 7 this prohibition as well. Without the Choctaw and Chick­ asaw trade, however, the overhead of operating an expensive establishment at Pensacola was unnecessary. Meanwhile, the Spanish court had issued new instruc­ tions on August 16, 1786, that seemingly left arguments over the merits of prior restrictions a moot issue. The directive commanded the Louisiana intendancy to issue no further passports for the procurement of Indian trade wares without first consulting His Majesty, Navarro also was instructed to submit to the court a list of all the various items demanded by the Indians, Preparations were underway to introduce production changes into the Spanish economy o that would enable Spaniards to supply the Indian trade.

The revised position on handling the Florida Indian trade owed its existence to causes going beyond complaints emanating in the London embassy, A near-universal belief prevailed among Spanish merchants that the Royal Cedula of

1782 had been flagrantly abused by Louisiana commercial interests to pour streams of contraband merchandise into

^Ibid, Antonio Valde's to Navarro, August 16, 1787, West Papers. 110 all other parts of the Spanish Indies. In 1788, the powerful merchant consulados of the nine rehabilitated ports obtained royal assent for a thorough reexamination of the liberal commercial regime instituted in 1778 and thereafter. The probabilities for change toward a more conservative approach to trade regulation improved greatly after the death of the liberal-minded Jose de Galvez early in 1787. More specifically with respect to the Florida Indian trade question, his successor, Antonio Valdes, ex­ pressed his intentions in late 1787 to terminate the stay of Panton, Leslie and Company in both Floridas, Further­ more, a project for furnishing the Indian trade with Spanish duplications of foreign products had been intro­ duced well before the end of the American Revolution, It .1 had been suspended in 1781 after the acceptance by Charles jl 9 III of Maxent's proposals. , The argument that deflated prices on the London fur [

market made the Florida trade less desirable bore some jus- "1

tification. But the declining market affected fur pelts

more severely than deerskins in the period under question.

The deerskin market averaged six shillings per prime skin

in 1784; in 1789, five shillings. Barring a severe drop

Whitaker, Documents Relating to Commercial Policy of Spain, pp. xxxiii, n. 28, xli-xlii. Opinion of Gardoqui, ca. ITW, ibid., p. 123; Whitaker, "Commercial Policy of Spain," 193; Clark, New Orleans, p. 232. Ill and recovery in the intervening years, this price decline, although not inconsequential, was less drastic than those for beaver and otter pelts, which fell between one-third and one-half in value during the same time span. The pre­ ponderance of the southern trade was in deerskins; the pelts of fur-bearing animals taken in this region lacked the prime quality of those from more northern climes. During this interval, however, Panton experienced a more immediate and vexatious problem, one that likely obscured momentarily from his mind adverse developments in the capitals of Europe. The new problem caused a rapid deterioration in his relations with Miro and Navarro. In July 1787, O'Neill advised McGillivray that, in response to his request for military protection for the Indian trade at St. Marks, Governor Miro'would dispatch a detachment of troops to renovate the abandoned fort in the vicinity of Panton's store. McGillivray immediately arranged for a favorable reception from the neighboring Seminole villages, and by the end of 1787 the garrison had restored the fort to serviceable order without incident or

mishap. Panton had cooperated in the undertaking by trans­ 1. porting the Spanish soldiers to their new duty post at no cost. Then, to the astonishment of both Panton and McGillivray, Captain Luis de Bertucat, the new commander.

10Phillips , The Fur Trade, II, 101. 112 impounded a company vessel laden with a resupply of goods from Nassau for the St, Marks store.•^•'"

Mire/ had given Bertucat standing orders to prevent all arrivals and departures of shipping at St. Marks that lacked the express approval of customs officers at Pensacola. That port no longer would be considered under the control of East Florida; West Florida commercial rules governed instead. Goods thereafter must proceed to St. Marks via Pensacola after inspection by customs agents and the pay­ ment of the proper duties. Shipments of peltry also must call at Pensacola for the customs routine before departing for their final destination. 12

McGillivray responded to the altered conditions

•<\ mildly in contrast to Panton. It was "a pitiful policy to '1 cramp and embarrass our little commerce so much," McGillivray 13 %' declared; particularly so, he added, when his Creeks were 'J' t at war and had such limited time for hunting, Panton ful- j minated without restraint against the "Gentlemen to the j Westward" in an abrasive letter to Ze'spedes, claiming the

Miro' to McGillivray, July 13, 1787 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. Ill, 89; McGillivray to Ze'spedes, January 5, 1788, EF 116L9; Panton to Zespedes, January 5, 1788, Lockey Papers. 12 ^ Panton, Leslie and Company to Zespedes, April 4, 1788, EF 116L9 . McGillivray to Ze'spedes, January 8, 1788, Lockey Papers. 113 latest policy of Miro' and Navarro to be "Miserable and wretched" because it caused the company greater expenses 14 and delay. Then seizing upon an idea earlier propounded by Ze'spedes, Panton conveyed to the East Florida governor a belief that the Royal Order of May 1786 had acceded to the company's memorial "on the terms proposed by our- 15 selves," The irate Panton closed with a reminder of the yeoman services the company had performed for the Spanish crown, a statement that it had incurred $25,000 in losses over the years 1784-86 in unseating the Georgians from the

Indian trade, and a threat to withdraw—poorer but wiser-- if the restrictions at St. Marks were not removed. In a later, more subdued, letter to Miro' and Navarro, Panton 16 revised the loss figures upward to $30,000, .1

Panton failed to impress Miro with his argument on I the applicability of the company's East Florida privileges j to St. Marks. Miro' responded that he was not in possession j•"t of a copy of the royal order and could do nothing more than forward Panton's complaint to His Majesty for clarification and resolution. The single immediate relief measure that

Panton secured from New Orleans was permission to ship

"^^Panton to Ze'spedes, January 8, 17 88, Lockey Papers. '''^Ibid. The italics are Panton's, •'"^Panton to Miro and Navarro, January 28, 1788, West Papers, 114 peltry directly from St. Marks upon paying the proper duties. This measure was conceded because of the possi­ bility of storm damage to the perishable cargoes due to the scarcity of safe anchorages between St. Marks and Pensacola.

Zespedes, probably aware of the altered position of the court toward the Indian trade question, used caution in representing the plight of the company. The Spanish governor, in an evaluation of the international aspects of the Indian question, estimated that Panton and McGillivray most likely were free of direct connections with any official conspiracy to reassert British control over the Indians. But, he added, by their mere presence they symbolized the former British influence in the minds of the Indians. Their removal, however, must be exercised with extreme care, suggesting that Spaniards become asso­ ciated with Panton, Leslie and Company to learn the intri­ cacies of the business. Other Spaniards, less fortunate I in their private circximstances, should be assigned to live in Indian villages, learn their dialect and customs, and prepare themselves to become traders. Then and only then

Mirrf to Valde's, April 7, 1788, Stetson Collec­ tion; O'Neill to Gabriel Marin Pizarro, March 8, 1788, West Papers. ii 115 should the British company be replaced."^^ Ze'spedes, of course, agreed with Panton that the company's store at St. Marks was covered under the terms approved in its memorial of 1786.-^1^9

Panton simultaneously had suffered setbacks in his ambitions to assume the Choctaw and Chickasaw trade. Davenport's disastrous attempts in the spring of 1787 to install an Indian factory convenient to these tribes had impressed Miro' with the dangers inherent in massive dis­ satisfaction among the Indians with the Mobile trade. Miro's investigation of the problem revealed that the finances of Mather and Strother were in poor order because of the drop in deerskin prices in London the previous year. • Both Mather and Panton claimed to have suffered losses in |J 1786 from this cause, but Mather further informed MircT ij

that his firm had been forced by reversals to increase its ') :| selling prices for the 1787 season. Panton, on the other .| 20 s hand, kept his earlier price levels in effect. Consequently, Miro' sent a price list prepared by Mather and Strother to Panton for examination, requesting him to indicate the lowest prices at which he could furnish

"'"^Ze'spedes to Valdes, March 24, 1788 in Corbitts, eds. ETHSP, Pt. VI, 86-94. •'•^Ze'spedes to Panton, February 1, 1788, EF 116L9 . Miro" to J. de Galvez, June 1, 1787 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. Ill, 76-77. 116 the Mobile trade. Panton complied, forwarding his price list through the offices of Governor O'Neill. The Pen­ sacola commandant also informed Miro' that the Choctaws reportedly had asked the Creeks to grant traders from

Georgia safe passage through Creek lands. Discontent with the Mobile trade, O'Neill stated, not only was genuine, it was widespread. He recommended opening the Florida Indian trade to all interested parties. If one firm then should engross the entire trade, so much the better. 21

Panton later submitted a formal offer to assume the trade of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, declining, how­ ever, to admit Vicente Folch y Juan to a partnership in the company. Folch, a nephew of Miro', had recently been 22 appointed as commandant at Mobile, 111 Despite O'Neill's recommendations, Miro' hesitated l* i) to accept Panton's offer. Instead, with the approval of '^ Navarro, Miro' allowed Mather and Strother to sell "surplus" >I Indian goods in New Orleans as a means of relieving their 1 immediate financial plight. The two Spanish officials

^•'"O'Neill to Miro', June 8, 1787 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. Ill, 81. ^^O'Neill to Miro", July 20, 1787 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. Ill, 85. Folch, who served as commandant of Mobile from July 1787 until May 1790, apparently was an enterprising individual. Later, after becoming governor of Pensacola, he pried a $600 loan out of Panton to buy a brick kiln. Folch to Panton, November 9, 1796, Cruzat Papers. 117 also promised to support a Mather petition to the Spanish court for permission to exchange 50,000 pesos in highly inflated Louisiana paper currency for 50,000 silver pesos as a more permanent solution for the company's financial problems. These favors likely caused the Mather firm to reverse an earlier decision to close down its Mobile 23 operations by the end of 1787.

Meanwhile, to restore tranquility among the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Miro'' sent Captain Juan de la Villebeuvre as his special emissary to a fall assembly of these Indians,

Villebeuvre was to upbraid the Indians for having admitted

Americans into their midst, lure the pro-American Franchimastabe of the Choctaws to the Spanish cause, and promise that Mather and Strother would thereafter trade'at ,1 the same prices as Panton, But, in keeping with the I* treaties of 1784, the Indians must expel all American ''J intruders. 24 - 1 The results of Villebeuvre's diplomatic efforts 'ii pleased Miro'. Taski Etoka, the Chickasaw King, and a re­ tainer of warriors from both tribes accompanied the Spanish emissary on his return to New Orleans to attest that the

Indians had resolved to remain under Spanish protection.

O'Neill to Miro'', July 20, 1787, loc. cit. ; Miro' to Panton, August 15, 1787, West Papers; Miro' and Navarro to Valde's, April 1, 1788, Lockey Papers, ^'^Miro' to McGillivray, October 16, 1787, EF 114J9 . 118 They also promised to disavow the treaties of Hopewell which, the pro-Spanish Chickasaw spokesman affirmed, had been obtained by the Americans through deceit and guile. He also expressed general satisfaction with the new trade arrangements at Mobile and delivered a request from 25 Franchimastabe for a Spanish medal.

Despite these assurances, the American party among the Chickasaws earlier had persuaded the Chickasaw King to concede to Turner Brashears, an American trader, the right to locate at the Chickasaw Bluffs on the east bank of the Mississippi, the present site of Memphis. Brashears, who formerly traded with the Choctaws under Spanish license, 2 f. had opened trade with the Chickasaws by September 1787. The year 178 8 brought no improvements to the finan­ cial position of Mather and Strother. Losses in the New I'l Orleans fire of March 1788 caused the firm to petition '\ Governor Mire? for a loan of 6,000 pesos with which to meet 'j the demands of its creditors. Folch reported that Mather's ij

2 c ^ Serrano y Sanz, Espana entre, p. 40; Talk of Taskietoka in Manuel Serrano y Sanz, ed., Documentos historicos de la Florida y_ l£ Louisiana siglos XVII al XVIII (Madrid; Libreria General de Victoriano SuZrez, 1912), pp. 393-394. ^^Alexander Frazer to O'Neill, June 12, 1787 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. Ill, 85; O'Neill to Miro', Sep­ tember 8, 1787 in ibid., Pt. IV, 100-101. Colonel John in his travel account mentions sighting at Chickasaw Bluffs in March 1791 the blockhouse erected by Brashears. A Tour Through the Southern and Western Territories of the United States of North America; , . , . (Richmond: by the author, 1792), p, 24. 119 agents were issuing goods on credit only to preferred risks. Most of the traders were returning to the Indian villages empty-handed and disgusted. A prominent Choctaw chief, Taboca, and other headmen had departed for Phila­ delphia to ask Congress for American medals and American trade. Miro again warned the Indians that they must pre­ vent Americans from entering their lands; expressed his alarm to Josef de Ezpeleta, the Captain General of Havana; and suggested that Gardoqui formally protest to Congress the invalidity of the American treaties. Apparently still intrigued with the possibilities of the Indian trade, Folch suggested that an eight-man partnership be formed as a

27 I remedy for the Mobile trade problem. II 'II •l<: Meanwhile, throughout 1787, McGillivray made good use of his power to secure Spanish arms and ammunition for 111 ii I) his adherents to increase steadily his anti-American fol- '1 lowing among the Creeks. Miro and his superiors, however, jlj remained greatly alarmed at the consequences of McGillivray .j provoking broad American support for general retaliatory measures. Instructions arrived in the fall from Havana requiring future Spanish assistance to the Indians to be given judiciously and sparingly. The Creeks must be

^^Mather and Strother petition to the Governor, July 18, 1788, West Papers; Miro to Ezpeleta, April 1, 1788, Lockey Papers; Folch to Miro, April 26, 1788 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. IV, 100-101. 120 impressed with the dangers of abusing Spanish protection; future gifts of arms were to be made for hunting instead of fighting. In order to remain prepared defensively, the Indians must be cautioned against waste in expending ammunition. Ezpeleta shortly afterwards bluntly admonished

Miro' to guard against becoming inadvertently implicated with McGillivray in a war against the Americans, 2 8 By October McGillivray had developed anxiety as to

Miro's exact position in supporting future Creek forays into the Cumberland settlements and elsewhere, advising the governor he had suspended action against Brashears at Chickasaw Bluffs until Spanish intentions were made known. In December, Mird" urged McGillivray to negotiate for peace 29 with the Georgians and other Americans, !

The apprehensiveness of the Spaniards over becoming I ill witnesses to an all-out war on their frontiers was not without justification. In the summer of 1787, Congress > 'tit| studied plans for putting the Georgia and Franklin district defenses in order. Since the only effective means lay in a costly offensive war against the Creeks, a lack of funds caused Congress to abandon its plans to intervene. Georgia,

^^O'Neill to Miro', September 17, 1787 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt, IV, 101; Miro' to O'Neill, November 6, 1787,' Ezpeleta to Miro', November 25, 1787, Lockey Papers. ^^McGillivray to Miro', October 4, 1787 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, 160-162; Whitaker "Alexander McGillivray, 1783-1789," 190. 121 on the other hand, initiated preparations in October to mobilize a militia force of up to 3,000 frontiersmen; called again for aid from Franklinites, Choctaws, and Chickasaws; and dispatched James Seagrove to St. Augustine to request that Spain cease arming the Creeks. Serious clashes between Creek parties and the Georgia militia had erupted in September, and filibustering raids by Georgia frontiersmen were expected momentarily in East Florida as vengeance against Panton, Leslie and Company stores. Zespedes explained in a letter to Governor Mathews of Georgia that few munitions had been given the Indians over the past years, and these for hunting only, Zespedes later reported that Seagrove while in St. Augustine seemed quite

Ill interested in learning whether an official relationship !lt 30 "'T existed between Spain and Panton, Leslie and Company. }j» lik By the spring of 1788, the political leaders of ^'J

Georgia, frustrated in their futile efforts to marshal 4 sufficient force against the persistent Creeks, sought to \^ turn their Indian problems over to Congress. The leader­ ship of Georgia hoped that Congress could arrange some sort of Indian truce until the new federal government was in­ stalled. They gave Panton, Leslie and Company much credit

^^Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, pp, 165-166; Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 29 8; Ze'spedes to Ezpeleta, November 9, 1787, Zespedes to Governor Mathews, December ?, 1787, Miro' to Ezpeleta, December 20, 1787, Lockey Papers; Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp, 71, 119. 122 for being the principal source behind the dogged resistance 31 of the Creeks.

American peace feelers began to reach McGillivray in the spring of 1788, and the Spaniards, much to his dis­ appointment, continued their promptings toward a negotiated settlement. O'Neill, acting on orders from Miro, wrote

McGillivray in April that His Majesty had approved Miro's action in curtailing the Creek offensive and had ordered

Gardoqui to represent the Creek position before Congress.

Miro, O'Neill continued, would "be happy to hear the con- 32 elusion of peace." At a conference with O'Neill at Pensacola in May, •» McGillivray received detailed instructions on the manner i; If in which he was to negotiate with the Americans, The Creek .'ll, leader was advised to establish peace, but he was not to j'J lid relinquish the protection of Spain over the Creek nation. '}

^•* Above all, he should refuse to grant trade concessions to } the Americans. Bitter over the realization that a treaty H•\ would likely entail a substantial territorial cession,

McGillivray groused about Spanish urgings for "Instant peace with America" while reserving the Creek trade to

^•"•Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, pp. 165-166; Downes, "Creek-American Relations, 1782-1790," 16 3,

•^^Miro to O'Neill, April 1, 1788, West Papers; O'Neill to McGillivray, April 21, 1788 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 177-178. 123 33 Spain. The Creek chieftain had become as disenchanted with Spanish trade policies as with Spanish support.

Neither seemed to favor his interests any longer.

Navarro sent Valdes in January 1788 a lengthy background report on the nature of the Florida Indian trade for consideration by the court in perfecting the proposed new arrangements. The intendant also included a number of recommendations that he considered essential for the lasting success of any revised trade program. 34

The stores at Pensacola and Mobile, Navarro ex­ plained, consigned goods to traders on credit at prices 100 per cent above prime cost. After transporting their goods to their respective towns in the interior, the traders added 50 per cent more to the selling price. If the

Indians and then the traders honored their credit obligations, tIJ 'i the returns to the merchants provided handsome profits. ^ But complete debt recovery occurred only rarely, which made 'ij .1 the excessive price mark-ups necessary. Indeed, Navarro 3 commented, both Mather and Panton complained of experi­ encing considerable credit losses. The Indian trade, then, > because of the extensive credit requirements and the

Mircf to McGillivray, July 8, 1788, Lockey Papers; McGillivray to Miro', June 12, 178 8, McGillivray to J. Leslie, November 20, 1788 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 183-184, 206. Navarro to Valde's, January 8, 1788, West Papers. 124 uncertainty of recovery, differed from usual business ven­ tures. Thus, the need for special care on the part of the court in making its preparations. The court, Navarro continued, should avoid conduct­ ing the trade on the accounts of the royal treasury. This would lead to endemic embezzlement, as in the experience of the French. Instead, the trade should be awarded to one firm amply endowed with capital resources. In its first two years of operation the firm should plan to incur heavy expenses, grant enormous sums in credit at high risk, and expect little or nothing by way of returns. In the interim it should arrange to dispose of its receipts of peltry, which constituted the major return on goods ex­ changed. Navarro also warned that price drops in the fur

The New Orleans officials forewarned Panton and

Mather that permission for their ships to return would be contingent on the approval of the Spanish court. Each merchant, however, received letters to present to the

Spanish embassy in London as well as for Floridablanca.

These explained the expediency of allowing the ships and 36 sorely needed cargoes to reenter West Florida. Strachan and Captain Forrester again called on Campo in June 1788 to deliver the letters of Miro and Navarro and also to present to the ambassador a new company memorial. The lengthy document began with an account of the company's experience in East Florida through May 17 86, and included a statement that the firm had received at that time royal permission to operate on the exact terms it had j'i requested. Consequently, the memorialists claimed, a ^1)

'!!* second royal order would be required to countermand their | privileges at St. Marks, These included freedom to trade ^ in English goods and to transport peltry to English ports; hence, the restrictions imposed there in 1787 were in- 37 valid.

-^^Miro' and Navarro to Valde's, February 22, 1788, West Papers. "^^O'Neill to Pizarro, March 10, 1788, West Papers,

^^Campo to Floridablanca, June 4, 1788, Panton, Leslie and Company memorial to Campo, April 2, 1788, Lockey Papers. 127

As an indication of the company's services to His

Majesty, the petitioners suggested that Campo compare the tranquility of the Floridas and Louisiana with the turmoils and turbulence enveloping the frontiers of Georgia and also northward across the Ohio. Peace for the Spanish provinces, however, had been obtained not without great cost to

Panton, Leslie and Company in underpricing its Georgia competitors. The company, moreover, held no intentions to continue under the recent impositions which soon would assure it of utter ruin and prevent it from keeping its

Indian customers contented. All duties and restrictions must be removed entirely as a condition of remaining.

The memorial requested passports for vessels to proceed to St, Marks and Pensacola, but not laden with goods. If permitted, they would go in ballast to remove 111 lik the dependents and effects of the firm, which the partners 'J X hoped might be withdrawn duty free similar to the terms |J \ granted for the British evacuation of East Florida,

But, the memorialists added, should His Majesty abolish the restrictions, all grounds for complaint would vanish. The company would remain with pleasure, especially,V should His Majesty also deem it proper to extend the com­ pany's East Florida privileges to Pensacola and confer on it the exclusive right to the Choctaw and Chickasaw trade.

This would enable the company to offset the losses incurred in the Creek trade through competition with Americans with 128 profits derived from the western tribes. It made little sense, the petitioners implied, to deny them the advantages of the Mobile trade only to see it, and consequently con­ trol over all three tribes, eventually fall into American hands. Whosoever might be placed in the trade, the memorial concluded, must be extended identical benefits as requested by Panton, Leslie and Company to succeed in retaining the Indians for the Spanish cause. Panton authored the memorial to Campo, interpreting the royal concession covering East Florida more liberally than in the previous year. In letters to Zespedes and Miro, and in conversations with O'Neill, the Scotsman followed

T5 r Panton, Leslie and Company to Zespedes, April 4, 1788, Panton to Miro' and Navarro, March 11, 1788, Miro' to Valde's, July 13, 1788 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. VII, 92-95; Ze'spedes to Gonzalo Zamorano, October 2, 1786, same to same, January 26, 1790, in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. Ill, 185, Pt. IV, 278-279. 129 McGillivray had followed Panton's lead in exhorting Spanish officials to liberalize the trade regime, much to Miro''s discomfort. The Louisiana governor felt compelled to remind the Creek leader that, should Panton be relieved of duties, the commercial agreement with the Indians would be of no benefit whatsoever to Spain. These assessments, Miro' remarked, at least partially defrayed the costs of Indian presents. 39 Trading activity in Georgia indeed posed a threat to Panton's commercial hold over the Creeks in 1788. McGillivray found it necessary to send out raiding parties to break up trading posts on the Altamaha. Miro' and Navarro, it seems, were sufficiently impressed with the competition from Georgia to relinquish their exactions on 40 !'* Panton's profits. ,,1 im •\ On the other hand, Miro, because of Panton's pre- '^ '•n tensions toward displacing Mather at Mobile, represented > the April memorial unfavorably to the Ministry of the '" Indies. Mather, Miro' affirmed, paid import and export duties at Mobile and should not be displaced involuntarily. Moreover, since Panton had declined to take an oath of McGillivray to Miro^ June 12, ^1788 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 183-185; Miro"" to McGillivray, July 8, 1788, Lockey Papers. ^^McGillivray to Panton, September 20, 1788 in Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 385-388. 130 allegiance, perhaps he should be removed.'*''" The Louisiana governor expressed this viewpoint after Panton refused an alternative remedy to outright duty relief. Miro'' had pro­ posed to endorse a request from Panton for permission to sell one-fourth of his imported goods on the New Orleans market in exchange for continued duty payments. In refusing Panton remarked that he should be awarded this as an addi­ tional concession. Such action by the court would place his company on a more equal basis with Georgia merchants, as they were not limited solely to the Indian trade. 42 Earlier, however, Miro" had approved Panton's posi­ tion on duty relief on the grounds of falling profits and

ii the difficulties in finding an acceptable replacement. Yet II

.11 O'Neill put little faith in Panton's veracity concerning III .J losses, having been informed that profits at Pensacola f» lik 43 "I alone by mid-1788 approached 80,000 pesos. ^ i Campo, despite his repugnance toward the British } firm's presence in the Floridas, forwarded the Panton '" memorial to Floridablanca together with a cautiously-worded dispatch relating the possible adverse consequences of the

^^4iro' to Valde's, August 28, 1788, Lockey Papers. Ibid, and enclosure, Panton to Miro, August 8, 1788. ^"^Miro'to Valdes, July 13, 1788 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. VII, 92-95; O'Neill to Miro', September 10, 1788, Lockey Papers. 131 company's precipitate removal. The Indian trade must be maintained, Campo reflected soberly, and it would be diffi­ cult, if not completely impractical, for Spaniards to act as satisfactory substitutes for the British merchants should they be dismissed. The Spanish ambassador found it perplexing to envision means for conducting the trade profitably, given the inadequacies and the incompatibility of the Spanish economy for such a venture. 44 On the other hand, Campo had taken great pains not to divulge these judgments in his conversations with Strachan and Forrest. The Spanish ambassador interpreted the threat to withdraw as a ruse for obtaining further privileges. Consequently, after feigning hesitancy, he

•II*I agreed to issue a passport for a small return cargo. But '•I I the intervening exchange between the ambassador and the two Britons was marked with cynicism and admonitions, if 45 £,.* not outright acrimony. J Campo declared his suspicions of rampant smuggling because of the practice of Panton's vessels calling at the Bahamas on the return voyage to Pensacola. Strachan and Forrest denied the accusations and, as a measure of good faith, promised the>Mary would avoid the British islands

ITCamp o to Floridablanca, July 4, 1788, Lockey Papers. ^^Ibid45 . 132 on its return. The passport specified as much. The two Britons remarked that the low prices of deerskins (4 to 4J$ shillings) on the London market made duty relief necessary. Campo replied that it seemed strange for merchants to employ a vessel in carrying 100,000 articles of such dubious value, unless it be for the purpose of enjoying the subsidy for prepared hides recently enacted by Parliament. Campo terminated the interview by stating with pretended candor that, should the firm have attempted at least to include Spanish products in their inventories, it might enjoy greater con­ fidence from the Spanish government. On the other hand, continual clamor for greater commercial liberties gave the company an odious appearance. The Spanish ambassador adamantly refused, however, to grant Strachan and McKenzie a passport for a second ship to travel in ballast and return with deerskins, despite their explanations that the volume of annual receipts of skins exceeded the cargo capacity of one vessel. Fortu­ nately for the Panton firm, Valde"s overruled Campo's 46 decision several weeks later. In August the court decided to extend the trading privileges of Panton and Mather through the 1788-89 season.

^^Campo to Strachan and McKenzie, July 13, 1788, Valde"s to Miro', August 29, 1788, West Papers. 133 thus confirming the emergency measures initiated earlier by Miro'' and Navarro. The extension allowed the court to defer action on the trade question until it could be exam­ ined thoroughly by the Supreme Council of State. One month later the council called upon Navarro for advice in its deliberations. The former intendant, relieved of his duties by personal request, had returned to Spain after an absence of some twenty years. 47 As the Supreme Council of State finally turned its full attention to Florida Indian policy, the eventuality that either Panton or McGillivray might occupy prominent positions in any future Spanish scheme seemingly becsune 111 progressively remote. Both had fallen under deep suspi- z cions originated by Governor Arturo O'Neill. For some

^Valde"s to Miro", August 29, 1788, Decision of the Junta Suprema de Estado, September 22, 1788, West Papers. ^^O'Neill to J. de Galvez, February 20, 1787, O'Neill to Miro, May 21, 1787 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 144, 152-153. 134 background and the relative independence of the Creek com- 49 missary from absolute Spanish control. Certainly, the conduct of McGillivray and Panton in reacting to the trade impediments and the munitions cut-off added to O'Neill's misgivings. . . 50 Then, on June 4, 1788, O'Neill reported that since the recent fears of a possible British-Spanish break had arisen Panton and McGillivray had become noticeably recal­ citrant in their relations with constituted Spanish authority. As evidence, O'Neill cited the grousings of both concerning commercial restrictions, Panton's insis­ tence on retaining his British citizenship, and McGillivray's

II •II surly independence despite his Spanish pension. Miro', 'H: O'Neill recommended, should devise plans for replacing Ill McGillivray and Panton "by persons who pride themselves ];• Mil as loyal vassals of the King." The persons in question. 1<'iw. 51 "i^ O'Neill remarked, were devoid of affection for Spain. ';> Miro*" replied that O'Neill's suspicions as to •\ Panton's loyalty were not without significance, but the extreme importance of the Pensacola trade made his removal

^^O'Neill to Ezpeleta, February 29, 1788, West Papers. ^^Miro' to O'Neill, April 1, 1788, West Papers. ^"'"O'Neill to Miro", June 4, 1788, Lockey Papers. An abridged translation appears in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, p. 180. 135 a matter of great delicacy. A replacement for Panton was not immediately available. Moreover, the court appeared to be formulating plans to place the trade under Spaniards O'Neill in the meantime should ascertain precisely' McGillivray's interest in Panton's company; the Creek must be offered a similar relationship with whatever firm assumed the trade. But, Miro continued, he remained unconvinced of sufficient grounds for suspecting McGillivray's conduct in the light of past performance. His independence repre­ sented nothing unusual, given his prominent position as the principal chief of the Creek nation. To attempt to 1'* undermine the authority of McGillivray, Miro observed, ijji III III represented a disproportionately serious risk when weighing 'l!i 111 the benefits of success against the dire consequences of P liH failure. Miro ordered his subordinate at Pensacola to i refrain from initiating "novel acts" against McGillivray ij and Panton. 52 i O'Neill continued his attacks on McGillivray and Panton, accusing them of being guided undoubtedly by "pro- British passions." The Pensacola commandant reiterated his position on the need to dispense with McGillivray's services without loss of time. Miro peremptorily informed O'Neill of the great embarrassment caused by his suspicions.

^^Miro to O'Neill, June 18, 1788, Lockey Papers. 136 especially as they were grounded on no firmer evidence than possession by Panton and McGillivray of "British hearts." No action against the two would be contemplated unless more tangible forms of evidence of their wrongdoing surfaced* J. 53

Miro" quickly reported the affair to Valde's, noting nothing extraordinary concerning the "British hearts" of O'Neill's suspects. For this very reason, Miro'' judged, Panton and McGillivray would remain loyal to Spain in the face of the American threat to their interests. Panton's conduct Miro described as cooperative, except for his reser­ vations against taking a complete oath of fealty. Even

should Panton be replaced, Miro' advised against attempting y* '*i'Ci to supplant McGillivray. This action most likely would :.' serve to drive the Creeks into the American orbit.5 4 -i ilj In Pensacola, however, the determined O'Neill "i launched an aggressive campaign to fill the dossiers of :jiK McGillivray and Panton with incriminating charges. The Pensacola commandant queried drunken Indians as to McGillivray's movements; cultivated his known opponents; seized upon rumors spread by Irish traders who had earned the Creek commissary's displeasure; intimidated his

^^O'Neill to Miro', June 22, 1788, Miro''to O'Neill, July 8, 1788, Lockey Papers. Miro" to Valdes, July 13, 1788, Lockey Papers. 137 relatives and close followers; and monitored Panton's activities through John Maypother, O'Neill's son-in-law and a company employee. McGillivray, not unaware of

O'Neill's maneuverings, resigned his Spanish position in dismay and disgust. 55

At this juncture, rumors began to filter into Pensacola concerning the arrival of a "strange Englishman" among the Lower Creeks. Subsequent reports on this visi­ tor, when weighed against the early reticence of Panton and McGillivray on his appearance, not only confirmed O'Neill in his convictions, they momentarily shocked Miro' into doubts as to his misplaced confidence.

This mysterious person, however, was actually no V* «ll intruder, but William Bowles returning to his 'Iif* III "I adopted homeland after one of his extended absences. Yet

Miro' to Ezpeleta, August 16, 1788 and enclosures of O'Neill correspondence, Lockey Papers; McGillivray to Miro', August 20, 1788, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 195-196. ^^Miro'' to Ezpeleta, August 16, 1788, Lockey Papers. 138 a sovereign TIndia J- n empire.5. 7

Born on the Maryland frontier in 176 3, Bowles served the Tory cause in the American Revolution, eventu­ ally attaining the rank of ensign in a Maryland loyalist regiment. In 1778, his regiment was deployed in the defense of Pensacola. An incident occurring shortly after his arrival caused Bowles to withdraw temporarily from His Britannic Majesty's service. He soon thereafter drifted into the Creek country, settling eventually in the Lower Creek village of one father-in-law. Chief Perryman, along the banks of the Chattahooche. When the Spanish siege of Pensacola became imminent, Bowles returned and soon after regained his regimental commission. He acquitted himself '11 well in the ensuing action and, following the British sur- JU li render, he and his regiment were paroled by the Spaniards "• I.'* to New York. At the war's end, Bowles was mustered out on J'J •'5 half-pay. Eventually he journeyed to Nassau in the Bahamas, ^% where his ambitions for the Creek enterprise reached final ,.| perfection. As his biographer has so appropriately pointed out, Bowles' detractors labeled him with many epithets, but

The standard scholarly biography of Bowles is J. Leitch Wright, Jr., William Augustus Bowles; Director General of the Creek Nation (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 19^7) . Unless otherwise indicated, the data con­ cerning the 1788 arrival of Bowles is drawn from this source, pp. 1-35. 139 none ever described him as "dull." An adventurer of many talents, Bowles effused an air of magnetism that enabled him to persuade men of his unquestioned ability to accom­ plish the impossible.

The Bahamas in the 1780's were divided politically by bitterly intense factional strife. One faction, the Board of American Loyalists, consisted primarily of affluent refugees from East Florida. Panton, his partners, and their close followers belonged to this group. The opposing faction consisted of original "Conch" settlers; refugees from West Florida whom the haughty East Floridians viewed condescendingly; and Lord Dunmore, appointed Gov­ ernor in 1786, and his rapacious band of supporters. At ^11 'I'l .» ii issue was the political control of the islands, with the II 58 I Conch faction enjoying the upper hand. 'I Bowles enlisted the support of—or was enlisted by—Dunmore and two merchant partners, John Miller and •% Broomfield Bonnamy. Each had a compulsion for bringing ,1 about the downfall of Panton, Leslie and Company. Perhaps, as the unreliable Louis Le Clerc Milfort stated, Dunmore II' sought revenge for being thwarted in an attempt to condemn as illicit contraband 6,000 pesos brought into Nassau on a Panton vessel. The British governor indeed strove inces­ santly to seize Panton, Leslie and Company cargoes for

^Peters, "American Loyalists in the Bahama Islands," 229-231. 140 alleged violations of British commercial regulations. Or, as many Bahamians of the day, Dunmore perhaps envisioned regaining control of the Old Southwest for country and for personal gain, fully aware of the lingering British influ­ ence among the Indians in the persons of the resident traders. Miller resented his treatment at the hands of Spaniards during their brief wartime occupation of the Bahamas. He, as well as Bonnamy, also viewed with hunger and resentment the privileged position of the Panton firm.^° The plans of the conspirators relied for success on the plight of the Creeks resulting from the withdrawal of Spanish support and the dictum to make peace with their Georgian antagonists. Given McGillivray's disenchantment, 'ii'i If the time seemed ripe both for breaking Panton's envied ^S . . 'I position and alienating the Indians from Spanish control. i'l This could be done with gifts of munitions, offers of armed '^ support from filibusterers, and promises of better trade 3 i' terms. i After his arrival, Bowles, from headquarters at

59 Milfort, Memoirs; Or, a_ Quick Glance at My Var- ious Travels and My Sojourn in the Creek Nation, tranF7~ and ed. by Ben C. McCary (Kennesaw, Georgia: Continental Books Co., 1959), pp. 74-76; J. Leslie to Ze'spedes, October 3, 1788, EF 116L9; J. Leitch Wright, Jr. "British Designs on the Old Southwest: Foreign Intrigue on the Florida Frontier, 1783-1803," Florida Historical Quarterly, XLIV (April, 1966), 266-267. 6 0 Peters, "American Loyalists in the Bahama Islands " 231. 141 Cussitah, soon began his counsels with the headmen of the Lower Creeks, posing as an official emissary of His Britannic Majesty and Dunmore. The adventurer promised gifts of munitions, men to assist in the war with Georgia, and better terms of trade. Bowles also dispatched an emissary to McGillivray bearing a gift and a letter from Dunmore. 61 Bowles simultaneously began to undermine the con­ fidence of the Indians as to the solvency, policy and permanency of Panton, Leslie and Company. The firm, Bowles insisted, had gone bankrupt and this explained its high prices. Furthermore the English king and Dunmore had determined that Panton and his associates no longer should • ^11 i' trade with the Indians . Orders had been given to conf is- ,![ til cate their vessels and goods in all British ports. The nT I?I partners, Bowles alleged, had become Spaniards; the Indians should mistrust them. But all would be rectified shortly; other merchants in the Bahamas would take their place. •'1 McGillivray later informed Panton of the envy of his Nassau rivals over the company's position, "tho God knows with what n reason. .,62

^Milfort, Memoirs, p. 75; J. Leslie to Ze'spedes, EF 116L9. Wright, William Augustus Bowles, p. 28. ^^Diego de Vegas to O'Neill, September 11, 1788, J. Leslie to Ze'spedes, October 3, 1788, McGillivray to Panton, February 2, 1789, West Papers. 142 Bowles' activities assumed a prominent place in O'Neill's dispatches to Miro. The Pensacola commandant interpreted the developments in the Creek nation as ema­ nating from the machinations of Panton and McGillivray. Their design, O'Neill calculated, was to pressure the court into granting the desired commercial privileges or, even worse, to secure, with British support, a free port on the Atlantic between the Altamaha and the St. Mary's. In this assertion O'Neill gave as evidence rumors and allegations surrounding an offer made by McGillivray in April 1787 to James White, then recently appointed by Con­ gress as the Commissioner of the Southern Indian Department. The Creek spokesman had proposed that Congress create a

new Indian state south of Georgia in return for a cession •»» !!l of the Oconee lands. Probably McGillivray and Panton in- «ll deed hoped for such an arrangement. Early in 1788, jl|

McGillivray had applied strong raiding pressure on fron- ".jj 63 { tiersmen in the coastal region below the Altamaha. J Miro discounted O'Neill's information. The Louisiana

governor hesitated to impute the existence of any official

connections between the British government and the Bowles

episode, nor did he believe Panton and McGillivray seriously

^^O'Neill to Miro', July 23, 1788, Lockey Papers; O'Neill to Miro", July 28, 1788, same to same, September 10, 1788, in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. VII, 95-98, 101- 103; Ze'spedes to Valde's, May 9, 1788, Lockey Papers; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, pp. 157-158. 143 sought an opening to the Atlantic. More likely, Miro" sur­ mised, the intrusion resulted from McGillivray's desires to pressure Spain for renewed support and Panton's to secure the concessions for which the company asked.

Meanwhile, Bowles, McGillivray, and the Creeks reached an agreement. Bowles would return to the Bahamas to raise recruits, arrange for delivery of the promised munitions, and send a supply of trade goods to the environs of Apalachee Bay. McGillivray would gather pack horses to receive the munitions, which were to be delivered at the

mouth of the Indian River on the coast of East Florida

R below St. Augustine. ft

'•» V* McGillivray explained to the Spanish authorities m

ment to the last "single bullet," But, he promised, the

Spaniards could be assured that the Creeks harbored no

secret designs against the security and interest of the

^^Miro'to Ezpeleta, July 28, 1788. ^^O'Neill to Miro", August 22, 1788, Lockey Papers.

^^McGillivray to O'Neill, August 12, 1788, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 191-193. 144 Spanish provinces.

The Bahamian supporters of Panton, Leslie and Com­

pany had alerted Zespedes as well as the directors of the

firm as to the objectives of Bowles. In August, Panton

revealed to O'Neill information received from Nassau con­

cerning the plot, explaining that Dunmore had authorized

it "as a bad turn to the House of Panton and Company."

O'Neill, however, preferred to cling to his belief that

both Panton and McGillivray were implicated. ^"^

The Pensacola commandant continued to pass on to New Orleans all rumors gleaned from McGillivray's enemies concerning the affair. The wildest of these held that McGillivray would make peace with the Americans pursuant ;ij

'II to attacking Pensacola, St. Marks, and St. Augustine. The !!! 'I' Spaniards were to be driven out with active assistance j'»

from the Bahamas, and Panton and the English residents "I A among the Creeks were to be unmolested. Goods then would A

flow freely into ports along the Gulf Coast, Miro, it

seems, became sufficiently impressed with these rumors to

contemplate calling a general Creek congress in 1789 to

reassure them of Spanish protection and to undermine 6 8 McGillivray's control.

en Panton to O'Neill, August 6, 1786, West Papers; O'Neill to Miro, August 15, 1788 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. VII, 99-100. c o Miro to Ezpeleta, November 18, 1788, Lockey Papers. 145 Information passed on to Ezpeleta by Zespedes, further information from Panton to New Orleans, and testi­ mony given by defectors from Bowles' party eventually re­ moved suspicions over Panton's complicity in the affair. McGillivray, however, remained suspect, and Panton, John Leslie, and Ze'spedes strove feverishly to impress upon the Creek leader that Bowles was a declared enemy of McGillivray's benefactors. 69 Bowles meanwhile had returned to Nassau to prepare the expedition. With the aid of Dunmore, Miller, and Bonnamy, the adventurer gathered vessels, arms, ammunition, and provisions, and struggled to recruit followers. Fi­ nally, in October, the newly self-styled "Colonel" Bowles and some fifty recruits slipped out of the Bahamas with •ll two transports and landed at the Indian River. There the ' u 'ik immediate objectives of the armed intrusion were divulged. Bowles would lead an attack to plunder the Panton, Leslie ;J and Company store on the St. Johns, and Bonnamy would pro- "• ceed in an armed schooner from Nassau to attack the Spanish fort and plunder the Panton store at St. Marks. Bowles then would supplement his tiny force with 1,000 to 1,500 warriors on his march to the Creek nation, raid the frontier

Ze''spedes to Ezpeleta, October 18, 1788, JPanton to J. Leslie, November 20, 1788, Lockey Papers; Ze'spedes to McGillivray, October 8, 1788, EF 114J9; McGillivray to Panton, September 20, 1788 in Pickett, History of Alabama, pp. 385-388. 146 settlements of Georgia, and reward his "veterans" with land grants and stolen slaves. The plans soon went awry. The party drew few Indian followers and little hospitality from the Seminoles. Bowles hesitated to attack the store at St. Johns after Indians tricked him into believing its defense had been heavily reinforced by troops from St. Augustine. By then, however, most of his recruits had deserted, made their way to St. Augustine, and surrendered. 71 Meanwhile, Spanish policy was again reversed, and in December 1788 McGillivray received promises of fresh munitions to hold out against the Georgians. Panton delib­ erately had temporized during the lengthy feud between O'Neill and McGillivray, knowing that his interests depended A 'li on the good will of both. The perceptive Scot correctly j'S predicted that a rapprochement between McGillivray and the ^ Spaniards would follow promises of restored aid. The decision to withdraw support from the Creeks had made them i desperate for succor from any quarter, a policy Panton by inclination and self-interest had termed unwise. McGillivray, encouraged by renewed Spanish support.

70 Wright, William Augustus Bowles, pp. 30-32; Lawrence Kinnaird, "International Rivalry in the Creek Country," Pt. I, Florida Historical Quarterly, X (October, 1931), 79-83. 71 Wright, William Augustus Bowles, 32; Kinnaird, "International Rivalry," 84-85. 147 promised to have Bowles ejected from the Creeks and to expropriate as "gifts" for his people any trade goods delivered from the Bahamas. The Creek leader, however, insisted that the Creeks had full rights to accept assist­ ance from all outside sources. Bowles, with his lieu­ tenants and a few Creek and Cherokee spokesmen, repaired to the Bahamas. From here they later embarked on a roundabout journey to England for conferences with Whitehall in an abortive attempt to capitalize on the Nootka Sound 72 crisis. Panton, McGillivray, and the Spaniards, however, had not heard the last of this determined intriguer. In the early months of 1789, Panton worked to resolve the "little" differences remaining between McGillivray and the Spaniards. Mutual distrust continued. McGillivray complained against the tardiness of the Span­ I* iards in distributing the promised munitions while engaging '3 himself in similar dilatory tactics to forestall American •'1 overtures for a peace conference. Spanish policy had re­ "1 mained consistent in encouraging an American treaty that would leave the Creeks under Spanish protection and tied

Panton to J. Leslie, November 20, 1788, Lockey Papers; Panton to J. Leslie, January 22, 1789, EF 116L9; O'Neill to Miro, January 10, 1789, Stetson Collection; Panton to Miro', January 9, 1789, McGillivray to O'Neill, February 2, 17 89, West Papers; Wright, William Augustus Bowles, pp. 33-54; Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1783- 1789," 200-201; Miro' to McGillivray, December 13, 1788 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 209-210. 148 to West Florida for their trade. McGillivray for his part waited impatiently for arms with which to back his resolve 73 against making territorial cessions to the Americans.

Meanwhile, the combined implications of Bowles' intrusion, the continuing financial difficulties of Mather and Strother, and the ambitious long-range trade project decided upon by the Spanish Supreme Council of State rapidly shifted Spanish policy toward fulfilling Panton's fondest ambitions. Mather's supply ship returned to New Orleans late in 1788 with only 10,000 pesos in goods. Their London correspondent had refused to risk more than this amount after learning the court had refused the 17 88 petition of the New Orleans merchants for relief. In i« u arrears by some 200,000 pesos, Mather and Strother pre­ ;i :!l vailed upon Mird' to support a second petition to the Spanish court, or, if this was impossible, to grant a six-month loan Jjk 74 ;; with which to ease their pressing obligations. -^^ The small quantity of trade goods received, even ^ should Mather and Strother have been so inclined, were insufficient to meet the Choctaw and Chickasaw trade

^^Panton to Miro', January 22, 1789, Stetson Collec­ tion; McGillivray to Panton, May 20, 1789, Miro' to Fran­ cisco Cruzat, June 20, 1789, West Papers; Downes, "Creek- American Relations, 1782-1790," 170-175. ^^Memorial of Mather and Strother to Miro', New Orleans, n.d., 1789, Miro' to Cruzat, February 28, 1789, West Papers; Miro' to Valde"s, May 20, 1789, Stetson Collec­ tion. 149 requirements. Consequently, Miro asked Panton to assume the Mobile trade under the same terms previously extended to Mather and Strother. As added inducement, the Louisiana governor promised to urge the Spanish court to agree to

Panton's memorial of 17 88. The New Orleans merchants,

Miro explained, had decided to relinquish their conces- 75 sion,

Panton accepted the offer, but with reservations.

The Scottish merchant pointed out that his reluctance derived from the recent restrictions imposed on his trading procedures, the losses sustained over the past four years, and uncertainties over the future. It was unfortunate,

Panton remarked, that Miro''s offer came before the court 11 \ had acted on the company's petition. Panton could not II resist observing how incomprehensible it was for the !'! Spanish government to object to the loss "of a few thousand ..k

Dollars in duty's [sic]" which hardly defrayed collection i expenses when compared to the advantage of "keeping the

Indians contented and seperated [sic] from Georgia , . . 76 which with good management would last for ages, , . ." Meanwhile, he would dispatch vessels in search for emer­ gency supplies for Mobile.

^^Miro' to Panton, February 28, 1789, Stetson Collection. ^^Panton to Miro", April 7, 1789, West Papers. 150 Miro" faithfully adhered to his promise to promote Panton's cause, explaining to Valde"s the need to "inspire" the Scotsman to continue his operations in face of the menace from Bowles. The Louisiana governor also recited earlier caveats such as the risk of placing the trade in inexperienced hands and the difficulties of finding a replacement who would remain indefinitely in such a per­ ilous undertaking. He also indicated that Panton's request for guaranteed permanency and relief from imposts was justified, given the general market conditions and the 77 extensive credit operations necessary to the trade. Meanwhile, Navarro had completed an initial report on commercial conditions in Louisiana and West Florida. Although the former intendant denied that the decadence of the Indies trade was owing to smuggling from Louisiana, he agreed that English goods, and hence commerce with London,

•i could be dispensed with through introducing items dupli- X cated by Spanish manufacturers. After preparing an exten- }i sive list of the goods required and their factory costs in France and England, Navarro embarked on a court-approved mission to England to procure specimens of products to be imitated by Spanish artisans. This ambitious project fell victim to the wars generated by the French Revolution, as

^^Miro' to Valde^'s, February 12, 1789, Lockey Papers; Miro''to Valde's, May 20, 1789, Stetson Collection; Mird to Panton, December 12, 1788, West Papers. 151 eventually did most of Spain's overseas empire. Before departing, however, Navarro advised Valdes that the court had no alternative but to allow Panton and Mather to con- tinue until the project could be implemented.7 8 On March 16, 1789, the Supreme Council of State recommended that Panton and Mather be exempted from duties in order to buy time for Navarro to bring his production and commercial proposals to fruition. On March 23, a royal order reflected the King's approval of this decision and stipulated the conditions under which the duty exemptions would apply. His Catholic Majesty, the order explained, approved the measure in order to supply his Indian wards with their necessities at lower costs. The news reached Panton by the end of July. 79

0 Under the terms of the royal directive, Miro was to prepare a list of all the types of goods required by the trade, and these alone were to be imported by Panton. No more than two vessels per year, however, could be em­ ployed in bringing Indian cargoes to Pensacola and Mobile. Trade at these ports would adhere to the price levels set

Valde's to Navarro, October 27, 1788, In forme of Navarro, January 15, 1789, Navarro to Valdes, June 12, 1789, West Papers; Navarro to Valdd's, December 8, 17 89, Stetson Collection. ^^Decision of the Junta Supreme del Estado, March 16, 1789, Royal Order of March 23, 1789 as enclosed in Cabello to Ze'spedes, June 26, 1789, Panton to Mird', July 31, 1789, West Papers. 152 by the tariffs established in 1784. The order specifically excluded goods intended for the Louisiana Indian trade from duty-free treatment. Finally, the factories at Pensacola 8 0 and Mobile must obtain their rum and salt from Havana.

These general rules were amplified further by Miro'.

Panton's vessels were permitted to carry sugar crates obtained from sawmills located along the lower Mississippi as cargoes on voyages to Havana for rum. St. Marks, over­ looked in the drafting of the royal order, was placed on the same basis as the two westerly ports. In the case of war or of a desire to withdraw voluntarily, the company would be entitled to a twelve-month period of grace in

ill which to settle its affairs. Should Panton or any partner I' 11 die in the Spanish provinces, his estate would be exempted from Droit d'Aubaine. Panton received permission to cater 11 .ik to the immediate needs of the garrisons and residents of i^ •ill! Pensacola, Mobile, and St. Marks, but he must take care "j4^ not to abuse this privilege. No exempted English goods, however, must be introduced into New Orleans, inadvertently or otherwise. Later, in compliance with Panton's request, the court made the duty exemption retroactive for 1788,

^^Ze'spedes to J. Leslie, July 24, 1789, Marie Taylor Greenslade Papers, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida, cited infra as Greenslade Papers. 153 the period for which Panton initially had requested . . ^ 81 relief.

Panton made known his satisfaction with the new arrangements, stating that he stood prepared to prove his worthiness. Eventually, after being shown by Strachan and McKenzie a duplicate copy of the royal decree obtained from East Florida, even the redoubtable Marques del Campo acquiesced. The company was destined after securing the Spanish diplomat's compliance to enjoy little or no offi­ cial disruption to its commercial routine for some six 82 years.

McGillivray, nearly on the eve of departing for

Rock Landing on the banks of the Oconee and talks with SI* United States peace commissioners, received the news of '* il •«i the trade concessions with great elation. For several "' u» I'll months he had been receiving invitations from United States "E -•i commissioners for talks to settle all differences between X the contending parties. The commissioners emphasized that ,lj the establishment of peace would take precedence over land cessions, invited the Creeks to accept United States pro­ tection, and offered to establish trade based on abundant

O 1 , y Panton to Miro, July 31, 1789, Miro to Panton, August 10, 1789, Lockey Papers. ^^Miro' to Valde's, October 1, 1789, Panton to Miro', January 14, 1790, Valde"s to Governor of Louisiana, January 25, 1790. 154 supplies of goods at low prices. The Creek chieftain received instructions from Miro' to make peace without violating any terms of the Treaty of Pensacola. But now the Spanish governor encouraged McGillivray to resist territorial demands by the Americans. This McGillivray was prepared to do, since the long promised arms had been distributed. Panton also had advised against territorial cessions and above all against a trade agreement. If granted his petition, Panton had asserted that he could easily deal with the Creeks as cheaply as Georgians. He urged McGillivray to suppress his misgivings about Spanish support, which was safer than placing his confidence in "those republican Gentry. "^"^ The news of Panton's concession added the single weapon lacking in McGillivray's arsenal for use against the Ill '?J Americans. The Creek spokesman now could deflate the arau- '^ ments of the pro-American party for trade arrangements and :,'u restore widespread good-will for Spanish protection among \ the Creeks. With Panton able to sell "as cheap as the Georgians," McGillivray observed that he could exclude trade

8 3 United States Commissioners to McGillivray, January 29[?], 1789; Andrew Pickens and Henry Osborne, talk to Creek Indians, Panton to McGillivray, June 7, 1789, West Papers. Miro'to McGillivray, July 22, 1789 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 243-244. 155 discussions and territorial cessions from the agenda with 84 ease. McGillivray, at the head of a large, well-armed, and truculent Creek party, proceeded to the Oconee and camped on the west side of the Rock Landing. The United States commissioners arrived September 20, 1789. Four days later they read a draft of the proposed treaty to the Creek assembly. McGillivray abruptly departed the follow­ ing day, paying no heed to the formalities surrounding proper leave-taking. He explained to Miro" that he ter­ minated the discussions because the American commissioners had insisted on establishing exclusive United States pro- tection over the Creeks and had demanded that they relin- !i: r • 11 quish the disputed Oconee strip. The Louisiana governor Ill approved the impasse, objecting only to McGillivray's hasty ••r departure. McGillivray, however, left unmentioned his •••< i demands that provisions for a free port on the Atlantic ; between the Altamaha and the St. Marys be made an essential "< 85 feature of any agreement with the United States. Panton most likely envisioned his position at the

^^McGillivray to Miro', August 12, 1789, McGillivray to Panton, August 12, 1789, West Papers. ^^McGillivray to Miro', December 10, 1789, West Papers; McGillivray to Panton, October 8, 1789, Miro' to McGillivray, January 12, 1790 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 251-256; ASPIA, I, 74, 77-78; Downes, "Creek- American Relations, 1782-1790," 177-180; U.S. Commissioners to Secretary of War, November 20, 1789 in ASPIA, I, 78-79. 156 end of 1789 in glowing terms. After a series of reversals, his objectives for the company had been attained. Panton grudgingly had been awarded the Indian commerce by a Spain that was powerless to do otherwise, and on conditions striking in their resemblance to those proposed in January 1788 by Martin Navarro. The Scottish tradesman's influ­ ence over the Indians had become known all too well to the leaders of the newly instituted Federal Government. But Panton's position at the zenith of the southern Indian trade was destined often to be challenged, severely imperiled, and eventually eroded in the coming decade.

II I T Hi I?! "i.k I "1 CHAPTER V

CHALLENGES FROM AROUSED REPUBLICANS

Panton and the Spanish authorities found themselves during 1790 and 1791 engaged in converting the broad pro­ visions set forth in the Royal Order of March 23, 1789, into a workable routine. In response to a query by Panton, the Spanish court had explicitly denied as inapplicable to the company's status in the Floridas the British legal tenet that "what is not expressly forbidden is permitted." The stipulations of the royal concession lawfully could be

• ••i revised or amplified only through prior consultation with ijfi if and approval by the court. A series of problems arose, however, that tended to offset the rigidity of this proviso; and Panton sought to transform these unforeseen developments i i; into opportunities for broadening his company's privileges. I i' His efforts were partly successful. When Panton assumed the Mobile trade, Miro" had been forced to authorize him to procure additional goods on an emergency basis, granting passports for a company vessel to proceed to Jamaica, Nassau, or Nova Scotia to obtain

^Valde's to Governor of Louisiana, January 25, 1790, West Papers. 157 158 urgently needed supplies. The Ministry of the Indies approved Miro's action in this particular instance, but

indicated that future deviations should be unnecessary.

As provided for by the royal concession, two cargoes of

trade goods per year shipped directly from London to 2 Pensacola and Mobile must become the standard practice.

Uncertainties arising from the Spanish restrictions of 1787 and 1788, however, had caused Panton, Leslie and Company's London correspondents misgivings as to the per­ manency of their Florida clients. Consequently, in 1789, Strachan and McKenzie, unwilling to risk a large credit consignment of goods to Pensacola, sent but a fraction of Panton's order for 1790 directly to West Florida and the •in balance, to Nassau. Thus Miro" found it necessary again in :ii February 1790 to permit Panton to procure needed supplies •ik from this port. In addition, Miro' delivered to Panton, along with the required passports, a letter to the Marque"s «t del Campo imploring him to refrain from imposing excessive H

restraints in clearing goods for the 1791 trading season. Documents substantiating the royal confirmation of the

company's position in the West Florida trade also went out 3 to Strachan and McKenzie.

^Ibid. •^Miro', passport to Panton, Leslie and Company, February 20, 1790, Panton to MircT, April 18, 1791, West Papers; Panton to Miro', February 14, 1791, Stetson Collec­ tion. 159 Luis de Las Casas, who had replaced Ezpeleta as Captain-General of Havana, approved Miro's emergency action in allowing Panton's vessel to proceed to Nassau. But Las Casas implied that only in emergencies should the Louisiana governor allow contact between Pensacola and British West Indies ports. Yet, another voyage to Nassau became neces­ sary in October 1791. Goods had arrived there during the summer intended in part for the 1791 trade needs and in part for 1792. Assurances of cooperation from Campo, having allayed the fears of Strachan and McKenzie, thereafter made departures of this sort from the prescribed rules unneces- 4 sary. Precedents for traffic between West Florida and the Bahamas, however, had been established. These prece­ dents were strengthened by exigencies growing out of the 1 Nootka Sound crisis, which for a time threatened to bring '• .ik about a British-Spanish war. The Spanish court quickly decided that the eventuality of war must not disrupt the 1 southern Indian trade; Panton, Leslie and Company received •»i assurances that its operations would remain undisturbed. Fears of wartime shortages, however, delayed the implementation of the royal directive requiring the company

^Casas to Miro', February 5, 1791, Panton to Miro', October 23, 1791, Panton to Miro', January 3, 1792, West Papers. ^Floridablanca to Campo Alange, January 12, 1790, Urriza to Valdd's, January 20, 1790, West Papers. 160 to acquire its supplies of salt from Havana. In Cuba, salt was distributed under royal monopoly, and the intend­ ancy not only doubled the price, it also hesitated to release the quantities demanded by the Indian trade. This dilatoriness continued well into the fall of 1790, and consequently Panton, Leslie and Company asked permis­ sion to bring in salt from the Bahamas, By this time, the company had become well settled in its Mobile opera­ tions, and John Forbes, a younger brother of Thomas Forbes, had been named a junior partner and agent at the new loca­ tion, Forbes, trading with American immigrants settled along the Tensas and Tombigbee rivers north of Mobile,

I* wished to ship a cargo of corn and lumber on the same 'I,' vessel to be dispatched to the Bahamas for salt. Indeed, ni' Forbes maintained, the prosperity of the Mobile district would be well served should permission for similar exports < 'XX of local products be made routine. Miro', however, hesi- > •li tated to give his approval. The company was free to export "< the products in question, but imports from New Providence 7 were contrary to the orders of the crown. Panton, however, took the liberty to import five hundred barrels of salt from Nassau in January 1791,

^Panton to Miro', August 6, 1790, West Papers.

^J. Forbes to Miro", October 22, 1790, Stetson Collection; Miro' to Folch, November 2, 1790, J. Forbes to Miro', November 4, 1790, West Papers. 161 reporting the matter to Miro'' as a fait accompli. He ex­ plained to the Louisiana governor-intendant that contin­ uing delays on the part of Havana had necessitated the action, adding matter-of-factly that he hoped to escape suspicions of becoming a "contrabandista over salt." Because of the Nootka crisis or for other reasons, Miro''s scruples over contact with the Bahamas slowly relaxed. By late 1791 he had begun to authorize not only the impor­ tation of salt and other items essential to the Indian trade from the British Islands, but he assented routinely to the export of produce from Mobile as exchange payment.

As part-owner of a salt works in the Bahamas, Panton must g have been doubly gratified by these developments.

The threat of war also made it impossible for Panton <« 'A to obtain all-important supplies of gunpowder and ball from nl

Ml British sources. But he experienced no difficulty in MJ arranging for loans of sizeable quantities of these items ,.u "••? from Spanish magazines in Pensacola and New Orleans. As a Jj, contingency against interdiction by British privateers, •*^

Panton raised the possibility of exporting peltry to London under flags of truce, pointing to the company's privilege to withdraw peaceably in case of war as reasonable grounds

^ Miro" to O'Neill, January 5, 1791, Panton to Miro, January 30, 1791, West Papers; Miro', passport to Panton, Leslie and Company, June 27, 1791, Miro'to O'Neill, October 27, 1791, Stetson Collection; Pope, Tour, pp. 44-45. 162 for employing this subterfuge. On the other hand, imports of trade goods, he suggested, might necessitate the use 9 of neutral vessels. These proposals, of course, never proceeded beyond the speculative stage. By 1791, the Nootka crisis had subsided. Almost simultaneously with the Nootka crisis, a less imminent, yet in its final outcome, a more formidable challenge to the Spanish—hence to Panton's—position sunong the southern Indians had risen. The greatly strengthened federal government of the United States had been invested with authority in 1789, and as chief executive immediately had directed its energies toward reaching a solution of the southern Indian problem. The long-standing hostile conditions along the southern frontier made a peace settlement with the Creeks of paramount impor­ tance. Determined in its resolve to achieve this objective, the federal government was indisposed to accept as final the impasse growing out of the Rock Landing conference. By I May 1790, Washington's personal emissary. Colonel , bearing a peace-or-war ultimatum to McGillivray, together with an assortment of other compelling considera­ tions, appeared among the villages of the Upper Creeks.

Panton to Miro", August 20, 1790, Miro'to O'Neill, December 11, 1790, Panton to Miro', January 30, 1791, West Papers; Panton to Governor of Pensacola, August 13, 1790 in Kinnaird, ed., Pt. II, Post-War Decade, 375. 163 With full approval from separate assemblies conducted by the Upper and Lower Creeks, Willett in June and July escorted McGillivray and other Creek chiefs overland to New York to negotiate with federal representatives. •'"^ Several reasons have been suggested to explain McGillivray's decision to relent and treat with the Amer­ icans. The Creek spokesman perhaps succumbed to an oppor­ tunity to alleviate his financially straitened condition, to assurances against territorial designs, to further assurances of United States cooperation in thwarting the ambitions of the three Yazoo land companies chartered in 1789 by Georgia to carve out settlements in Indian lands, to the threat of a war of annihilation, and to the oppor- tunity to retain his ascendancy over the Creeks through personal mastery of their trade in the face of an impending Spanish-British war. j

To these must be added another consideration; the '3

Arthur P. Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1789- 1793," North Carolina Historical Review, V (July, 1928), 289-294; William Marinus Willett, A Narrative of the Mili­ tary Actions of Colonel Marinus Willett, Taken Chiefly From His Own Manuscript. Prepared by His Son, William M. Willett (New York: G. and C. and H. Carvill, 18317, pp. 100-113; Benjamin Hawkins to McGillivray, March 6, 1790 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 256-259. •^•"•Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1789-1793," 294-297; J. Leitch Wright, Jr., "Creek-American Treaty of 1790: Alexander McGillivray and the Diplomacy of the Old Southwest," Georgia Historical Quarterly, LI (December, 1967), 384-386. 164 Spaniards continued to urge McGillivray toward a peace settlement with the Americans, albeit a peace that would 1 2 leave the Spanish-Creek treaty of 1784 uncompremised. McGillivray, in explaining his decision to parley in New York, emphasized that the United States in return promised to counter speculative schemes of the Yazoo com­ panies. On this matter all parties concerned shared a harmony of interests. Although the grants lay entirely within Chicksaw and Choctaw lands, their settlement would encircle the Creeks with hostile American frontiersmen. Spanish pretensions to territory in the Old Southwest would vanish, as would Panton's trade position. The federal

government, aside from losing control over plans for an •il* KI|( orderly settlement of the interior, might be dragged pre- cipitately into an unwanted Spanis. h, war. 13 l.'M .ki Indeed, the Yazoo maneuverings had disturbed Panton •I sufficiently to lead him to hint to Miro" that McGillivray's pay and allowances be increased drastically to keep him ]Jj from succumbing to lucrative offers from "lunatic pecu­ lators." Panton had felt it necessary, moreover, to under­ take an extensive tour among his newly acquired Choctaw and

•"•^MircT to McGillivray, April 7, 1790, in Corbitts, eds. ETHSP, Pt. XIV, 144-145. -••^McGillivray to J. Leslie, May 6, 1790, EF 116L9; McGillivray to Panton, May 8, 1790, West Papers; McGillivray to Miro", May 8, 1790, in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. XV, 83-85. 165 Chickasaw clients in May 1790. The Scottish merchant wished to steel their resolve in resisting American en- ticements. Panton, on hearing of Willett's presence among the Creeks, had terminated his discussions with the Chickasaws and made a forced march of three hundred miles to Little Tallassie. He had hoped to counsel his associate on how to deal with the Americans, but was mortified to discover that McGillivray already had departed for New York. Al­ though Panton felt less confident than McGillivray over the probabilities of securing an American treaty that would leave his Spanish commitments completely inviolate, the Scotsman nevertheless believed the Creek leader would *ji ;' ^ reject any proposals that might be construed as "injurious to Spain or disgraceful to himself and friends." 15 The negotiations in New York took place under the close scrutiny of both Spanish and British agents. This I caused Secretary of War , the harried chief ijj American negotiator, to keep McGillivray's movements under close surveillance behind a heavy shield of obsequiousness. These external interferences indeed may have restrained the

Panton to Miro', April 18, 1790, same to same, July 4, 1790, West Papers; Panton to Miro', May 4, 1790, in Sanz, ed. Documentos historicos, pp. 400-401. •^^Panton to Miro", July 12, 1790, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 266-267. 166 American representatives from driving as hard a bargain as they had wished. The final treaty, signed August 7, 1790, displayed much less than a complete abandonment of the trust Spain and his "friends" had bestowed on McGillivray.

The Treaty of New York consisted of open and secret articles. The open agreement established perpetual peace and friendship between Creeks, Seminoles, and Americans and specified the federal government as the exclusive pro­ tector of all portions of the Creek nation falling within the limits of the United States. The Creeks ceded all claims to their hunting grounds to the east of the Oconee, but retained possession of those between the Altamaha and the St. Marys. This territorial arrangement partially repudiated the Shoulderbone treaty with Georgia. The agreement provided for a joint Creek-United States survey party to mark the new boundary beginning in October 1791 and guaranteed absolute tribal control over all remaining Creek lands within the jurisdiction of the United States. The remaining open articles, minor in nature, set procedures for maintaining amicable relations, extended aid in con­ verting the Creeks to a more "domestic" form of existence.

Mississippi, Department of Archives and History, "Mississippi Provincial Archives, Spanish Dominion," IV, 296-301. Cited infra as MPASD. McGillivray to Miro', February 26, 1791, Wright, "Creek-American Treaty of 1790," 388-392. 167

I'M

I •'1

Figure 1 168 and permitted the United States to assign four resident interpreters to Creek villages. 17 President Washington and his advisors had hoped to entice McGillivray into breaking his connections with both Panton and Spain by including generous trade concessions in the treaty. The American negotiators assigned much importance to McGillivray's earlier demands for a free port and also assumed him to be personally interested in pre­ serving the Creek trade monopoly. Consequently, Secretary of State had submitted a plan by which the United States might capitalize on these assumptions. He pointed out the advantages that would accrue from "sub­ stituting citizens of the [United States] instead of •] British subjects, as associates of Colo. McGillivray. ..." ;J

»' To achieve this purpose, Jefferson indicated, almost cer- * tainly would require allowing McGillivray to retain absolute r control of the Creek trade and granting it duty exempt J treatment. Thus, Jefferson suggested, the treaty should ,h specify that all persons wishing to trade with the Creeks first obtain a special license from the President and that the licenses so granted be strictly limited in number. The treaty also should specify that, prior to receiving a license, applicants must be approved by the Creek nation.

•^^The open articles appear in ASPIA, I, 81-82. Willett, Narrative, pp. 106-107; Henry Knox to President, July 6, ITW: 169 Finally, it should include privisions for duty-free treat­ ment of the Creek commerce. Since the treaty, once rati­ fied by the Senate, would have the full force of law, it would bestow de facto sanction on a McGillivray trade monopoly—particularly if it were tacitly understood "that the stipulated number of licenses be sent to him blank, to fill up."-^^ But the negotiations failed to detach McGillivray from Panton or, for that matter, from the Spaniards. The Creek spokesman resisted every American inducement to relinquish the Spanish trade connection, even the persuasive argument that the Nootka Sound crisis portended an imminent war certain to disrupt Spanish commerce. Forewarned of McGillivray's interest in a British mercantile firm, the '»,' It Americans became painfully aware of his predilections ..I toward Panton, Leslie and Company during the treaty confer­ 4 ences. Washington and Knox at one point even offered to extend American citizenship to Panton and his associates, grant their firm privileges identical to those enjoyed under Spain, and allow them access to an Atlantic port. McGillivray replied that he doubted whether the Britons

George Washington, The Diaries of George Wash­ ington, 1748-1799, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick (4 vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925), IV, 54; "Opinion on McGillivray's Monopoly of Commerce with Creek Indians" in Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. XVII: 6_ July to 3_ November 1790 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 288-289. 170 would accept.

Consequently, the parties agreed to defer action on any definite United States-Creek trade arrangements unless mutual agreement was reached on or before August 1, 1792, in subsequent discussions. The United States Senate ratified this stipulation as part of Secret Article I of the final treaty.^^ Quite likely this provision was in­ tended to give McGillivray time to discuss the American commercial offers with Panton.

The same article gave McGillivray an important option for escaping any possible dire consequences to the Creek trade leading from the Nootka incident, as well as

from vagaries in future Spanish policy. In case of ob­ Ml

• 1« structions rising from "war or prohibitions by the Spanish III

llT) government," the President was empowered to appoint "per­ («» I'M sons ... to introduce into and transport through the ^ i territories of the United States to the . . . Creek nation" i i duty exempt goods up to $60,000 in value annually. This ;" concession, similar in principle to Jefferson's

19 United States Commissioners to Secretary of War, November 20, 1789, ASPIA, I, 15, 78-79; Washington to Senate, August 4, 1790, ASPIA, I, 80; Carlos Howard to Quesada, September 24, 1790, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 281-284. 20 A total of six secret articles were made part of the treaty. These are contained in Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States^ II"^ 5T4. 171 recommendations for handling the trade issue, would remain effective "as long as such obstructions shall continue."^''" In seeking the advice and consent of the Senate on this article. President Washington likely displayed a trace of chagrin in reporting that "the arrangements of the trade with the Creeks have caused much embarrassment." Their trade, he continued, was "almost exclusively in the hands of a company of British merchants, who, by agreement, [made] their importations of goods from England, into Spanish ports." Washington conceded the importance of trade control as a principal means for the "political management" of Indians, without which the United States might be power­ less to hold the Creeks to specific performance of their treaty obligations. Yet, it would prove even more disas- >i iii trous to the interests of the United States to leave the |{S Mk Creek commerce liable to interruption "at the caprice of !5 two foreign Powers." Although rechannelmg the Creek trade J through the United States constituted a matter of "real u^lili] importance," Washington resignedly reported that the under­ taking would "require time, as the present arrangements cannot be suddenly broken, without the greatest violation 22 of faith and morals."

Ibid. ^^Washington to Senate, August 4, 1790, ASPIA, I, 80. 172

Another secret article gained McGillivray's assent

"to cultivate the firmest friendship between the United

States and the said Creek nation." In return McGillivray received an appointment as brigadier general in the United

States Army at $1,200 in annual salary. To qualify for these emoluments, the Creek chieftain took an oath of 23 allegiance to the United States.

After his return, McGillivray reported the develop­ ments at New York to Spanish officials with reasonable candor. Recognition of United States protection over Creek villages lying within United States territory, the Creek leader explained, could be obviated by Spanish diplomacy in the pending boundary agreement. The trade article, he at first reported, seemed necessary in face of the Nootka i

(Jul crisis, but became superfluous with its subsidence. He 'I subsequently made known the full ramifications of this j!j article with accuracy and openness. On the matter of his jj appointment as brigadier general and his United States ^iJ pension, however, McGillivray was much less than candid; he was evasive and untruthful. In one instance, McGillivray reported that he had accepted the military rank with resig­ nation after "being repeatedly pressured to do so." In another, McGillivray stated that he had refused the

^"^"Alexander McGillivray's Oath of Allegiance to the United States," Gulf States Historical Magazine, I (July, 1902), 47-48. 173 generalship because of the prerequisite oath of allegiance. The pension, he explained, was offered as compensation for loss of the family estate confiscated by Georgia.

The loyalty of McGillivray at New York to both Spain and Panton has been questioned elsewhere. McGillivray's disloyalty to the Spaniards may scarcely be questioned.

His mistrust of the firmness of Spanish support on the basis of past performance he expressed openly to a Spanish offi­ cial only four days after the Treaty of New York had been 25 signed. The Creek leader apparently even hoped to use the agreement with the United States as a lever to pry a more binding commitment out of the Spanish government. But despite the blandishments of the American nego- * lit ir tiators, McGillivray's loyalty to Panton survived intact. Il>jl' The Creek chieftain's acceptance of a United States pension ^J' rut has been attributed to a desire for independence from p. Panton's largesse, thus becoming the key to a successful 26 outcome for the United States. The free port option I also has been singled out as the principal inducement

McGillivray to Howard, August 11, 1790, McGillivray to Miro', February 26, 1791, same to same, June 8, 1791, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 273-276, 288-293. ^^McGillivray to Howard, August 11, 1790, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 273-276. ^^Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1789-1793," 299. 174 27 leading to the final agreement. According to this posi­ tion, McGillivray's thorough awareness of the crucial relationship between his control of the Creek trade and his political ascendancy made this concession a powerful inducement. Should war have made implementation of the free port option necessary, McGillivray, with or without Panton, would have done so. That trade control was of prime significance to McGillivray's political hold over the Creek nation lies beyond question. Yet, whether McGillivray would have found it either convenient or necessary to drop Panton, Leslie and Company "like hot potatoes" if pressed by the exigencies of war seems improbable. Rumors of Panton's

iir and McGillivray's interest in an opening to the Atlantic I* ;i i' cropped up along the Georgia frontier and in the Creek ' country as early as 1788. These, of course, grew out of the discussions in 1787 between McGillivray and James White, « I the United States Indian Commissioner. In all likelihood, v •"^ their interest related to a search for alternatives in face of the then repressive policy measures of Spain. McGillivray had broached the same matter again to the American commissioners at the abortive Rock Landing Ibid.; Wright, "Creek-American Treaty of 1790," 386-389. Wright elaborates very cogently upon the polit­ ical importance of the "free port" concession to McGillivray personally. 175 conference of 1789. By then, however, Panton had obtained Spanish sanction for the long-desired duty exemptions and had assumed the Mobile trade. Both likely estimated the chances for retaining a virtual monopoly of the southern Indian trade as almost infinitely better under Spanish auspices than under the United States. McGillivray, whatever his other qualities, lacked the steadiness, industry, and frugality requisite to suc­ cessful entrepreneurship. To split with Panton would have entailed finding an American replacement, one in whom he could place complete trust--an almost impossible task. That McGillivray's power depended on his trading connec­ tions suffices to obviate any motivation for independence lit from Panton, pecuniary or otherwise. Moreover, the intent Si behind the secret article granting the free port concession went beyond any contingency rising from the Nootka crisis; BS it explicitly included obstructions to trade rising from .1 "prohibitions of the Spanish government [for] as long as )j 2 8 "* such obstructions shall continue."

Consequently, it seems that McGillivray attempted to secure for himself and for Panton a concession that en­ hanced the security of their position immeasurably. The repugnance of Panton and his associates for republicanism in all probability would have melted away in the event of

See p. 171, supra 176 complete trade stoppage due to war, particularly since they could retain their status as English subjects under the secret proviso. Citizenship bore crucial significance to their free access to the London market under British 29 Navigation Acts. Moreover, the concession gave Panton, Leslie and Company valuable insurance against future Spanish policy reversals contrary to its interests. Panton and his associates enjoyed the option of transforming them­ selves instantly into competitors against any proposed Spanish replacement. Whether the members of the Senate fully understood who Washington had in mind in requesting presidential authority to designate "persons" to implement the free port option is doubtful. But there can be little doubt that Washington held no misunderstanding of the precise nature of his request.

II Before learning of the terms of the treaty, Miro' 1> anticipated with remarkable accuracy the trade strategy .j. that unfolded at New York. The Louisiana governor shrewdly ,j;

«l.l estimated that McGillivray might be prevailed upon to divulge the nature of the Spanish trade connection and perhaps be enticed to approach Panton on placing his firm under the aegis of the United States. This likelihood, Miro'speculated, comported well with the "notorious"

^^Phillips, Fur Trade, II, 12, 200. 177 eagerness with which the United States sought the Creek trade. Perhaps Mird's confidant, General , had passed on information that influenced these insights. Wilkinson had reported earlier that at Rock Landing McGillivray demanded from the outset "a free Port on the Atlantic exempt from duty of any Kind. ..." While the Creek party was traveling to New York, the same source transmitted a rumor to Miro' that Panton, John Leslie and McGillivray were seeking Georgia citizenship, reminding the Louisiana governor that "Scotchmen throughout the World ..31 are guided by the basest Interests— Despite his growing mistrust, Miro" responded cau­ tiously to the new state of affairs. He limited himself ' to remonstrating with McGillivray against forming close ';« connections with Americans and inviting him to New Orleans

It for consultations. Reversing an earlier position, Miro J recommended an increase in salary to 2,000 pesos a year as \}M McGillivray had requested before departing for New York. jj III The Louisiana governor also recommended dispatching a Spanish subject as commissary to the Creeks to keep matters under close surveillance, emphasizing the wisdom of taking

^^Miro'to Las Casas, October 16, 1790, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 285-286. ^•••Wilkinson to MircT, January 26, 1790, same to same, July 20, 1790 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. XIV, 133-315, Pt. XVI, 108. 178 advantage of McGillivray's pleas for administrative assist­ ance. The court approved both measures and even instructed Miro to increase McGillivray's salary by as much as was deemed necessary; retaining the friendship of the powerful Creek chieftain was designated as extremely important.^^ The Treaty of New York never became effective. The Spaniards, apprehensive over its implications for the boundary question, maintained that it infringed on the Treaty of Pensacola of 1784. The Georgians, because of the threat it posed to state land claims, and because it sealed the fate of the Yazoo land companies, denounced the 33 United States-Creek treaty. But the most disruptive in­ fluence against its implementation came with the return of William Augustus Bowles to the Lower Creeks in August 1791. ;«

•ll Adhering to the "control through trade" principle, '^ Bowles in his absence had continued his assault on Panton, Leslie and Company. Writing to the Captain-General of y. Havana in August 1789, Bowles had accused his commercial Jj rivals of supplying Spanish subjects with more English goods than their Indian charges. He also alleged that

"^^Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1789-1793," 300; Miro''to Valde's, August 10, 1790, MPASD, III, 228-230; Mirc^ to , November 20, 1790, West Papers; Instruc­ tions [of Floridablanca] to MircT, December 25, 1790, Lockey Papers. ^\hitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1789-1793," 300; Wright, "Creek-American Treaty of 1790," 392-395. 179 Panton, in collusion with O'Neill, had misrepresented to the Spanish ministry the miserable state to which the Indians had fallen under monopolistic price-gouging tactics Bowles further alleged that Panton had placed a price on his head to silence his protests in behalf of justice. Proclaiming his earnest desire for preserving amicable Spanish-Indian relations, Bowles asked that Panton, Leslie and Company be replaced by a mercantile house in which the Indians could place complete confidence. Upon this, he maintained, rested the possibility of continued Indian harmony.

While in England, Bowles continued his representa­ tions to Spanish officials as self-appointed "Director General of the Creek Nation." At this juncture, however, Bowles definitely entertained visions of creating the lit II sovereign Indian . Consequently, the '^ •lit Director General sought Spanish approval for the Indians, as the actual possessors of the Floridas, to establish free ports for the purpose of engaging in direct trade with Nassau. In return, Spanish settlements would go unmo­ lested. The arrival of Director General Bowles and his

•^^Bowles to Ezpeleta, August 21, 1789, Lockey Papers. ^^Wright, William Augustus Bowles, pp. 53-54. 180 small Indian delegation in London had coincided with the peak tension point of the Nootka crisis. Thus Bowles, while dealing through the Marque's del Campo, also sought from Whitehall a formal anti-Spanish British-Indian alli­ ance. British interest, however, subsided with the res­ toration of good relations with Spain. Undaunted, Bowles continued his negotiations with British officials. The Director General succeeded in gaining assurances from Home Secretary William Grenville that existing commercial regu­ lations would permit ready access to Nassau for merchant 36 vessels flying the Muskogee ensign. Enjoying the continuing support of Dunmore and Miller, Bowles appeared among the Lower Creek villages in the late summer of 1791. He bore gifts, promises of a f II better trade, and hopes of building on the disaffections of .1•'.I 3» .'M Seminole, Lower Creek, and Cherokee elements an impressive 'J political confederation among the southern Indians. Bowles -^ was determined to gain Spanish recognition for Muskogee | 37 ^ either peaceably by negotiations or by force. From Nassau, Thomas Forbes had kept his partners informed of Bowles's preparations to return to the main­ land. The Spanish commanders were alerted accordingly. Forbes also had reported that the rumored objective of the

36 Ibid., pp. 49-50, 54. •^^Ibid., pp. 54-57 181 Director General was to organize an Indian attack against St. Marks as the initial act in asserting Indian control of the coastline from the mouth of the Apalachicola to the southern tip of the peninsula. Forbes, however, errone­ ously calculated that Bowles once again would attempt to ingratiate himself with McGillivray.^^ Instead, the Director General planned to break McGillivray's control and become his replacement.

In his "talks" to the Lower Creeks, Bowles announced that he had come to protect the Indians from McGillivray, Panton, and the Americans. McGillivray, Bowles alleged, had betrayed the Creeks at New York by giving away their lands. He also amplified on the rumors of a connection It between the Yazoo companies and McGillivray in which the i ;i chieftain was prepared to surrender additional vast tracts ' ••it of hunting lands. But, fortunately for the Indians, Bowles

^^T. Forbes to J. Leslie, August 1, 1791, West Papers; Quesada to O'Neill, August 20, 1791, EF 114J9. 182 Bowles asked cessions from the Indians to establish two ports in order to open contacts with the Bahamas. The first, on the mouth of the Indian River south of St. Augustine, would serve the Seminoles primarily. The second, to be located on the Ochlockonee or the Apalachi- cola, would be accessible to all southern Indians, 39 McGillivray reported to Panton that Bowles' primary- objective seemed to be the ruination of the company. But the Director General's assault on McGillivray's power proved equally important. On a visit to the Lower Creeks, McGillivray attempted but failed to lure the heavily- protected Bowles into capture under the pretext of a desired conference. Three assassins that McGillivray jjj II •I appointed found it impossible to carry out their task. ]» y McGillivray, dejected by the success of his opponent's 'j erosive tactics, declared himself "absolutely worn down" •••< with the cares of office and proceeded to Pensacola for jJ •I £ ^ 40 reassurances from Panton as well as for personal safety. ^ Meanwhile, the Spaniards, alarmed at the inroads Bowles was making at McGillivray's expense, genuinely feared the renewed menace to their weak foothold in the

•^^Wright, William Augustus Bowles, pp. 58-60; McGillivray to Panton, October 28, 1791, same to same, March 12, 1792, West Papers. ^^McGillivray to Panton, October 28, 1791, West Papers; Wright, William Augustus Bowles, pp. 59-60. 183 Floridas. They adopted an ambivalent position toward the Director General, fearing the consequences of strong opposition. Panton, on the other hand, reported the move­ ments of Bowles and his merchant cohorts in Nassau to Spanish officials and confidently predicted the inevita­ bility of his downfall. The Scottish merchant observed that Bowles' success in maintaining his influence over any sizeable Indian following depended on adequate supplies of trade goods and gifts from the Bahamas, and these were slow in forthcoming. Meanwhile, Bowles and a contingent of Indians pro­ ceeded to a site near the mouth of the Ochlockonee and erected the first free port of the state of Muskogee. But it Si only a trickle of goods moved through, much to the disil- lusionment of the Indians. Supplies became so critically * short that the Director General, never lacking in audacity, ;J sent for provisions from Panton's store at neighboring St. | Marks, asking that he be billed as a British Director of ll] Indian affairs. 41 I On December 30, 1791, Francisco Hector, Baron de Carondelet, replaced Miro'as governor of Louisiana. From New Orleans the new Spanish governor began to coordinate a land-sea expedition against Bowles in which McGillivray

^•^Wright, William Augustus Bowles, p. 65; Bowles to R. Leslie, January 9, 1792, Stetson Collection. 184 and Panton were requested to lend assistance. Before the Spanish plans could be implemented, however, Bowles, leading a few whites and some one hundred Indians, captured Panton's store at St. Marks. What good-will the Director General could not preserve by way of gifts from Nassau he would at the expense of his rivals. 42 Panton received a report of the capture of his St. Marks post early in February and estimated his losses in goods at a minimum of $10,000. Should the deerskins on hand also be removed, the loss would be even greater. 43 Panton, however, lacked the temperament to spend undue time contemplating losses. He immediately brought to bear against his adversary all of his influence, his powers of ijj persuasion, and promises of reward for Bowles' life. In a caustic letter to McGillivray, the Scottish « merchant stated that "the vessels which Bowles expected J [were] neither more nor less than the Goods in our Store." | Panton called on the recently irresolute McGillivray as '»\ the "First Chief" of the Creeks to bring together the headmen and ask what the company had done to merit such "* treachery from the Indians. In Panton's mind, as recompense

Carondelet to McGillivray, January 19, 1792, EF 114J9; Carondelet to Panton, January 31, 1792, West Papers; Wright, William Augustus Bowles, pp. 65-66. ^"^Panton to Carondelet, February 9, 1792, West Papers. 185 for his supporting the Indians in times of starvation and when they were beset by enemies, they had "Joined with a Scoundrel to destroy me—." He indicated his willingness to forego restitution, but not blood satisfaction. Panton demanded "the Life of that Villain Bowles" or his delivery 44 to the Spaniards for trial. In a "talk" addressed to the Creek nation, Panton reminded the Indians of their "solemn" promise to protect the store at St. Marks as a prior condition to its establishment. Unlike Bowles, Panton stated, he had not appeared among the Indians "in the Garb of Poverty and Wretchedness;" nor did he lead them "with lies to the Sea, there to gape at the Wind, looking for Vessels that [would] never arrive." Instead, S-II ' Panton continued, he had supported the Indians in all their ;* .r 111 troubles. He laid the principal burden of blame on Bowles n ^# for the misconduct of the Indians and would be reconciled ,;j if they apologized to McGillivray for having deserted him J'•i

under the calumnious influence of "that Prince of Liars," ••'1 whom the Indians must punish. 45 To others, Panton dangled such incentives as cancellation of debt and lifetime free­ dom from poverty for the death of Bowles, "a publick Pirate, who it becomes every good man's duty to hunt down

ll!}' ^"^Panton to McGillivray, February 9, 1792, West Papers. "^^Panton talk to Creek Indians, February 19, 1792, West Papers 186 as one woud a mad Dog--," 46

Meanwhile, Jose' de Hevia, in command of thirty-four Spanish soldiers and a hastily-armed packet boat, had joined the Spanish garrison at St. Marks. Despite the urgings of Robert Leslie, lack of manpower had prompted the commandant of the garrison to act prudently against Bowles and his company. Although adequate for defense of the fort, the tiny detachment was powerless to recapture Panton's store. Consequently, the systematic plundering continued unabated.4 7 Nor had Bowles made any hostile overtures against the Spaniards. Perhaps the Director General calculated that the moment was auspicious for supplanting McGillivray ••' and Panton through peaceful negotiations. In discussions ;!, within the walls of the castillo, Hevia nurtured the growth "« .jii f of these possibilities in Bowles' mind. The Spanish officer .4 alleged that his government was prepared to negotiate with I Bowles along the lines suggested earlier to the Foreign «•. Ministry. St. Marks, however, provided an improper setting for reaching accords of such consequence for the fate of the Floridas. The Director General, Hevia suggested, should accompany him back to New Orleans for conversations with Carondelet. Bowles would receive a safe-conduct pass and

^^Panton to R. Leslie, March 4, 1792, West Papers. Wright, William Augustus Bowles, pp. 66-67. 187 a pledge that he could depart from New Orleans on his own volition after forty days, whatever the outcome of the 48 discussions. Bowles consented to go to New Orleans, leaving his lieutenant, George Wellbanks, in command. Wellbanks was to remain in custody of Panton's store and to see to the security of the port on the Ochlockonee. Bowles announced to his Indian supporters that the Spanish governor had sent for him and, while he was in New Orleans, their Director General would conclude a peace treaty with the Spaniards that would contain satisfactory commercial arrangements. Somewhat later, Milfort, ordered to St. Marks by McGillivray as the leader of a large party of loyal Creek warriors, persuaded Wellbanks and Bowles' i;

1.1 Indian followers to surrender the Panton, Leslie and Com- l 11 pany store. The losses incurred by the Bowles raid were « later reported at ^2,681, a figure not necessarily grossly ,, 49 1^^

inflated. J^ In New Orleans, Bowles argued energetically before the Baron de Carondelet the advantages of a Spanish- Muskogee alliance. Although duly impressed with Bowles'

"^^Ibid., pp. 68-69, ^^Ibid., pp. 69-70; Bowles to Indian Chiefs, Jan­ uary 28, 1792, EF 114J9; "Losses to Bowles Robbery as computed by 24 Jun 1792" (signed R. Leslie, Ed, Forrester, Jno. Innerarity), West Papers. 188 demeanor and ability, Carondelet remained non-committal, seeing little advantage for Spain in rejecting one set of British Indian agents only to replace them with another. The Baron therefore enticed Bowles to travel to Havana where he would have further consultations with Captain General Las Casas. The expanse of the Gulf of Mexico would make contact with disaffected Indians more difficult. From Havana, Bowles was subsequently dispatched to Spain to endure a long period of political confinement that even­ tually would take him to the Philippines. Bowles finally escaped his captors in mid-1798 at a tiny French island off the West African coast while on a return voyage to Spain. He was destined once again to return to Muskogee 5 0 '• and resume his harrassment of Spain and Panton. * !'. Panton, meanwhile, assumed mistakenly that Bowles i, u would be prosecuted for his robbery at St. Marks. Indeed, i Panton asked that Carondelet furnish evidence obtained ,. from statements by Bowles and his accomplices so that his I "aiders and abetters" in Nassau also could be brought to justice. However, Panton quickly discovered that accusa­ tions levelled by Bowles had raised unanticipated suspicions in the mind of the Baron. Charges of disloyalty to Spain en Wright, William Augustus Bowles, Chs. V and VI, passim 189 brought Panton and McGillivray under close investigation. While in New Orleans, Bowles had insinuated that McGillivray had gone over to the Americans, even to the extent of becoming interested in the Yazoo companies, and that the Creek chieftain also had prevailed upon his spon­ sor, Panton, to assist in undermining Spanish influence among the Indians. Once this goal was achieved, Bowles affirmed that McGillivray planned to persuade the Indians to reco^ize the Yazoo grants. The appointment of Carondelet as governor of Loui- siana has been termed "deplorable." 53 Inexperienced m dealing with the realities of American intrigue in the Old Southwest and suspicious by temperament, Carondelet was !; 'V prone to accept unquestioningly even the least plausible ,« ii of the incessant rumors of threats to the security of Loui- *T « kl siana and West Florida. Almost invariably he responded by •5 attempting to shore up Spanish defenses. Because of peren­ nial shortages of troops, however, his defensive measures usually were limited to finding means for preserving and strengthening the Indian barrier to the American advance.

Panton to Carondelet, April 12, 1792, West Papers; Panton to O'Neill, May 28, 1792, Stetson Collection; Carondelet to Floridablanca, March 22, 1792, MPASD, IV, 41-46. ^Carondelet to Floridablanca, March 22, 1792, MPASD, IV, 41-46; Bowles to Carondelet, March 13, 1792, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 310-313. ^^hitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 153-156. 190 In the long run, Carondelet desired to place reli­ able Spanish resident agents among the southern tribes, to extend for the first time Spanish hegemony over the Cherokees, to erect forts at strategic sites in Indian lands, and to create a viable southern Indian confederation as a formidable ally of Spain. At face value the objec­ tives coincided with the interests of Panton, Leslie and Company, whose prosperity depended on exclusive control of the southern Indian trade. But Carondelet, temporarily convinced that Panton's English background rendered him untrustworthy, accepted Bowles' accusations. The Baron indeed suggested unsuccessfully to his superiors that opening New Orleans to the commerce of the world would • I 55 eliminate the need for Panton's concession. On the other hand, Panton quickly gave evidence of a genuine inclination * w ij to cooperate in implementing the new Indian policy. With r •i the Creeks and Cherokees where his services were relatively jj indispensable, Carondelet unhesitatingly used Panton's good ,Jj offices. But among the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Carondelet and his subordinate, Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, the popular

54 Mary A. M. O'Callaghan, "The Indian Policy of Carondelet in Spanish Louisiana" (unpublished Ph.D. disser­ tation. University of California at Berkeley, 1942), pp, 8-9; Arthur P. Whitaker, "Spain and the Cherokee Indians, 1783-98, " North Carolina Historical Review, IV (July, 1927), 255-256. ^^Carondelet to Floridablanca, March 22, 1792, MPASD, IV, 41-46. 191 English-speaking governor of the Natchez district, attempted to act independently of Panton. Accordingly, problems arose affecting the trade position of the Panton firm's Mobile location. For some time these problems made for mutual mistrust and dissatisfaction, but they are more properly dealt with elsewhere in this account.

Before elaborating the broad design of his Indian policy, Carondelet endeavored to determine the state of affairs in the Creek nation following Bov/les' no longer voluntary departure. The Louisiana governor sought infor­ mation as to the sentiment of the Indians toward the absence of their Director General and whether his detention might provoke a joint Creek-American attack. Carondelet » also tried to verify Bowles' allegation that the Creeks J I had repudiated McGillivray's leadership because of his I•1 pro-American tendencies. On the basis of another of Bowles' rumors Carondelet alerted his commandant at Mobile to 5 exercise vigilance against American settlement activity in the area of the Yazoo land grants, Indians were to attack these as quickly as they were established.

The sojourn of Bowles among the Lower Creeks also left the plans of the United States quite unsettled. The time set for marking the Creek boundary—October 1791—had

Carondelet to Folch, March 22, 179 2, Carondelet to Francisco Guessy, March 22, 1792, in Kinnaird, ed. Pt. Ill, Problems of Frontier Defense, 15-18. 192 passed unheeded. Upon learning of Bowles' capture, Wash­ ington and his Cabinet experienced the same degree of relief as had Panton and the Spaniards. In January 1792, the President appointed James Seagrove as a temporary United States agent to the Creeks. Seagrove immediately requested a meeting with McGillivray at Rock Landing to deliver to him dispatches and communications that promised great satisfaction. But their precise nature the American did not disclose. McGillivray declined the invitation, promising to meet once the upheaval caused by Bowles fully subsided.

In subsequent exchanges with Seagrove, McGillivray discovered that one purpose of the proposed meeting was to

make final preparations for running the boundary, to which III :i he gave his assent, Carondelet, however, acted immediately 41

II to dissuade McGillivray if possible or, if not, the Creeks from taking any such action.

•"J In March 1792, Pedro Olivier, recently appointed '!<'

Hi as Spanish agent to the Creeks in accordance with Miro''s earlier plans, arrived at Little Tallassie ostensibly to assist McGillivray with the cares of his office. Actually, however, Olivier carried instructions to keep McGillivray

Cotterill, Southern Indians, p. 92; Seagrove to McGillivray, January 14, 1792, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 303-304; Panton to Carondelet, March 22, 1792, West Papers. 193 under surveillance and to preserve the Creek commitment to the Spaniards. Carondelet then dispatched new instruc­ tions to Olivier to the effect that he must persuade the Creeks not to run the proposed boundary, with or without McGillivray's consent. Olivier also received orders to restore McGillivray's loyalty to Spain. If the Creek chieftain relinquished his United States pension, the loss of income would be compensated. If he refused, arrange- 58 ments would be made .for Bowles' return. Carondelet at the same time expressed his amazement at Panton's hesitancy in dissuading his friend McGillivray from concluding the boundary settlement, a step so inimical « to their mutual interest. The Louisiana Governor urged Panton "as a protectee of Spain" to attempt to disrupt "a treaty so contrary to the interests of the Creek Nation" II Hi as well as those of Spain, England, and his own. The southern Indians, Carondelet stated, would thereafter enjoy ? the full protection of His Catholic Majesty in defense "i against American usurpation and aggression. More specif­ ically, Panton was free to assure McGillivray of ample supplies of Spanish arms to resist any American attempt to seize forcibly the Oconee lands. If necessary.

Carondelet to Casas, March 22, 1792, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, p. 313; Carondelet to Olivier, March 30, 1792, in Kinnaird, ed., Pt. Ill, Problems of_ Frontier Defense, 21-22; Carondelet to O'Neill, May 8, 1792, West Papers. 194 Carondelet also was prepared to engage the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Cherokees, and as allies for the Creeks against American encroachments.^^

The message of the Louisiana governor at first bewildered Panton, who felt it necessary to remind his correspondent that the Treaty of New York came about from Spanish insistence on a Creek-American peace settlement. Why, Panton wondered, should Carondelet be amazed at a foreigner who merely refrained from acting contrary to the explicit policy of Spain, particularly in the face of a fait accompli.

The Scottish merchant frankly opined that

Carondelet's doubts of McGillivray reflected undue influ- ence from Bowies' fabrications. Bowles' abilities to com- !i S. mand the affection of the Creeks were overestimated. His « influence followed from his pretensions as an official '4I representative of England rather than from any personal leadership qualities. Bowles, Panton observed, succeeded by playing on the nostalgia of the Indians for the British era when expenditures for gifts and provisions averaged B20,000 annually and in the war years over three times as

59 Carondelet to Panton, March 24, 1792, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 316-317. ^^Panton to Carondelet, April 16, 1792, West Papers. This letter also appears in Corbitt, ed. GHQ, Pt. IX, 391-394. 195 much. If Carondelet wished "to make [the Indians] equally attached to Spain be at the Same expence and there is no danger. , . ,

Panton regretted having learned of Carondelet's wishes to overturn the treaty at so late a date for suc­ cessful remedial action. The Indian merchant nevertheless departed immediately on an extended mission to the Creeks and Cherokees to foment anti-American sentiment. Panton reached McGillivray's home on April 30, 1792—practically on the eve of the Indian chief's departure for conferences with Seagrove at Rock Landing, The Scottish merchant easily convinced his protege' to find a pretext for stalling Seagrove and to travel instead to New Orleans for discus­ sions with Carondelet, Panton also prevailed upon

McGillivray to assemble the principal Creek leaders so t Hi that Olivier could explain Spanish policy. Panton then iJ departed for the Cherokee nation and, on a leisurely return journey through the Creek towns, joined Olivier in harangu­ 'I ing the Indians to resist becoming entangled in American designs. The Creeks were urged not to recognize the ces­ sion made at New York by refusing to mark the boundary.

Panton and Olivier also informed the Creeks of Carondelet's plans to build up a solid wall of resistance among the southern tribes against American land hunger; Spain,

^^Ibid. 196 committed to their protection, simultaneously would repre­ sent the cause of the Indians through diplomatic channels.

In the meantime, ample supplies of arms for the defense of. 6 2 their lands awaited in Pensacola. Panton also availed himself of the opportunity to attest to the poverty of the United States government, which he alleged was in no position to afford the Creeks with abundant gifts. The Americans, moreover, manufactured very few goods and, like the Indians, depended largely on the English market for their requirements. The Scottish trader exhorted his listeners to expel--after robbing— all American traders who appeared in their midst. 6 3

Impressed with such arguments, the Creeks prepared themselves for a fall conference at Pensacola with i I Carondelet. McGillivray, at New Orleans, concluded an I,«i agreement with the Baron that committed the Creek nation «

•A and Spain to a formal defensive alliance and mutual terri- ,. torial guarantees. Carondelet believed McGillivray left |j H New Orleans a "new man." The proposed conference, however.

Panton to O'Neill, May 28, 1792, Stetson Collec­ tion; Deposition of John Ormsby, May 11, 1792, Anonymous letter to Savannah Gazette, June 29, 179 2, Seagrove to Washington, July 5, 1792, ASPIA, I, 297-298, 309, 286-287; J. Leslie to Quesada, October 2, 1792, EF 116L9; McGillivray to Enrique White, May 6, 1792, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, p. 321. ^^Deposition of James Leonard, July 24, 1792, ASPIA, I, 307-308. 197 failed to materialize; nor was the treaty formally approved by the Creek nation prior to McGillivray's death. But throughout the summer of 1792 parties from most Creek vil­ lages presented themselves at Pensacola and St. Marks for gifts of arms and ammunition from Spanish magazines. To assure an ample supply of these, Carondelet commissioned Panton to procure an extraordinary shipment of 2,000 stand 64 of Indian trade guns from New Providence. For all prac­ tical purposes, the Treaty of New York had been repudiated. While among the Lower Cherokees, Panton stayed at the home of John McDonald, a resident trader, a former British agent, and an acquaintance from the Revolutionary War years. To the casually curious, the Scottish trader masked the actual purpose of his visit by explaining that he had come to collect old debts and promote new business. ••I But before departing, Panton enlisted the services of McDonald for Spain and, with McDonald's assistance, relayed to the disgruntled Cherokees Carondelet's invitation to seek Spanish protection. Panton also offered the Cherokees favorable trading terms through Pensacola. As a demonstra­ tion of good faith on the part of the Spaniards, the Scot

Deposition of Richard Finnelson, November 1, 1792, ASPIA, I, 288-290; McGillivray to Carondelet, May 30, 1792, Carondelet-McGillivray Treaty, July 6, 1792, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 327-329; Olivier to O'Neill, July 23, 1792, Panton to Carondelet, September 7, 1792, West Papers; Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1789-1793," 304-305. 198 delivered to John Watts and Bloody Fellow, Cherokee chiefs. Governor O'Neill's personal invitation to visit Pensacola. Besides official promises of Spanish support, the Cherokee guests could expect to find there generous gifts of arms and ammunition. Panton, aware through experience of the trade advantages to be derived from promoting Spanish hegemony, worked diligently in behalf of Carondelet's cause 6 ^ before taking leave of the Cherokees. Panton had arrived among the Cherokees at a propi­ tious moment. These Indians, even more than the Creeks to their southward, had been sorely pressed to defend their hunting lands against the steady intrusions of American frontiersmen. Congress, before the Federal era, had been

'I J powerless to uphold the territorial guarantees extended "1 the Cherokee nation in the Hopewell Treaty of 1786 in the face of the sovereignty of North Carolina. When that state J ratified the constitution and ceded its western lands to the federal government late in 1789, Washington and Secre­ tary Knox had consented to boundary revisions of the Hopewell agreement as being necessary for legitimizing earlier American encroachments. In 1790, Congress organized

Deposition of James Leonard, July 24, 1792, minutes of James Carey [to William Blount] November 3, 1792, ASPIA, I, 307-308, 327-329; Blount to Secretary of War, July 4, 1792, in United States, Department of State, The Territorial Papers of the United States, Vol. IV: The Territory South of the River Ohio, 1790-1796, ed. by Clarence E. Carter (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), 157-161. 199 the Territory South of the Ohio, and in July 1791, William Blount, as territorial governor and Indian superintendent, secured from the Cherokees the required boundary adjust­ ments in the Treaty of Holston. Panton's arrival in the summer of 1792 fell between the first annual distribution of gifts by Blount under the Holston agreement and the return of Bloody Fellow from a conference with Washington. The conference had produced some measure of good will for the United States among the Cherokees; Bloody Fellow had succeeded in obtaining United States recognition of Cher­ okee land claims in the Kentucky district together with an increase in their annuity. 6 fi McDonald concentrated his efforts on behalf of Panton and Spain in breaking down the newly acquired affinity of Bloody Fellow for Americans. Once this was accomplished, John Watts travelled to Pensacola, returning with abundant military stores and encouragements to expect 1 firm Spanish support for Cherokee resistance. The good-will f nurtured so carefully by United States agents waned. Cher­ okee spokesmen began to talk of reversing the Holston agree­ ment. Sporadic skirmishes erupted in the Cumberland dis­ trict, and McDonald escorted Bloody Fellow and other

6 6 Downes, "Cherokee-American Relations," 50-53; extract of James Carey to Blount in U.S. Congress, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 285-286. Cited infra as ASPFR. 200 influential Cherokees on -a state visit to New Orleans as far as Pensacola1 . 67

In sending the delegation to New Orleans, Panton reported that support for war against the Americans had risen appreciably among the Creeks and Cherokees, Should Carondelet choose, the spring of 1793 "may Commence with as Bloody a War as ever the Southern States experienced—",^^ But the Louisiana governor must receive the Cherokees warmly and give them firm promises of Spanish support. The impres­ sion the Indians carried from New Orleans, Panton observed, would decide their future course.

Spanish activities among the Indians in the summer of 1792 had not escaped the attention of United States observers along the southwestern frontier. Seagrove dis­ credited McGillivray's explanation that Bowles had prompted Carondelet's interference in marking the Oconee boundary. The Creek agent, doubtful of McGillivray's integrity, ,- described him as a man with too many masters. Caught IP between the interests of opposing powers, it is little wonder that McGillivray described himself as "a keeper of

6 7 Deposition of Richard Finnelson, November 1, 1792, ASPIA, I, 288-290; Red Bird to Blount, September 15, 1792, ASPFR, I, 284; McDonald to Panton, June 7, 1792, same to same, October 6, 1792, Panton to Carondelet, No­ vember 6, 1792, West Papers. ^^Panton to Carondelet, November, 1792, West Papers. 201 Bedlam, and nearly fit to be an inhabitant."^^

As the full implications of Carondelet's policy became more clearly understood, Seagrove believed Panton

to be more responsible for the heightened anti-United

States activity than the Baron. The Scot, Seagrove de­

clared, was "from interest as well as inclination . , .

an inveterate enemy of the United States." The United

States agent also declared that Panton wielded "more in­

fluence over Mr. McGillivray, than any person living. . , ."

Seagrove suggested that the United States formally protest

against the interferences of Panton, Leslie and Company to the Spanish court. 70

Nor did Panton escape notoriety in the reports of other American observers, Blount credited the Cherokee disturbances to the Spaniards "and their instrument, Mr. Panton." Georgians, enraged over Panton's activity in promoting Creek hostility, railed against the Scotsman

"with the most inveterate enmity." John Leslie in St. Augustine feared the angry frontiersmen might even raid 71 the company's East Florida posts.

^^McGillivray to Seagrove, May 18, 1792, ASPFR, I, 287; Seagrove to Knox, May 24, 1792, ASPIA, I, 296-297. 70 Seagrove to Knox, May 24, 179 2, same to same, September 8, 1792, ASPIA, I, 296-297, 310-311, 71 Blount to Secretary of War, November 8, 1792, ASPIA, I, 325-327; J. Leslie to Quesada, October 2, 1792, EF 116L9. 202 Panton, however, escaped personal embroilment in United States-Spanish diplomatic exchanges; Olivier, on the other hand, was not so successful. Jefferson lodged an official complaint with Jaudenes and Viar, the Spanish representatives in Philadelphia, concerning a Spanish agent in United States territory who was inciting Indians to break their treaty commitments. Such action, Jefferson complained, contravened conventional practices of foreign agents and should cease. Little more could be obtained in reply from the Spaniards except that the Treaty of New York was prejudicial to Spanish claims to what actually was dis­ puted territory. Although Jaudenes and Viar conceded that Spanish agents admittedly should refrain from interfering |] with Indians residing in United States territory, they !i questioned whether the case of the Creeks fell in this 1 category. That remained to be settled by boundary nego- I . . 72 5 tiations, f \\ Despite Carondelet's militant approach to Indian i affairs in the summer of 1792, the basic policy of the

Spanish court remained unchanged. Whatever the Baron's desires may have been for a Spanish-supported Indian offensive to roll back the westward advance, he failed to

Jefferson to Jaudenes and Viar, July 9, 1792, Lockey Papers; Jaudenes and Viar to Jefferson, July 11, 1792, Jefferson to Washington, November 2, 1792, ASPFR, I, 138-139. Jaudenes and Viar had replaced Gardoqui as Spain's representatives in the United States. 203 convince his superiors to depart from the principles laid down in the 1780's. Spain still wished to avoid provoking the United States unduly while maintaining His Catholic Majesty's claim as exclusive protector of the Indians. Gifts of munitions to the Indians still were to be limited strictly to defensive needs.^"^ These policy limitations, of course, left Carondelet ample leeway for pursuing his plans for a southern Indian confederation. Accordingly, when the Cherokees reached New Orleans in November, 1792, they found themselves in the company of numerous representatives from the Chickasaw and Choctaw nations. These had appeared "spontaneously" so that Carondelet could lay the groundwork for a general Indian congress proposed for the spring of 179 3, at which time a political confederation of the southern, together with as '

I many of the northern tribes as possible, would be perfected. J (1 Carondelet reported that the November Indian talks were ^ successful. The pending confederation, he maintained, was ' 1 "the only recourse that Spain [had] to hold the Americans ^ within their boundaries." Should Spain regain for the Indians their lost lands either through diplomacy or, as Carondelet preferred, by supporting them in war, they would remain ever grateful. Consequently, he encouraged the Indian delegates to believe that Spain would restore their

_ Casas to Carondelet, July 5, 1792, Lockey Papers. 204 boundaries as they existed in the British era. Yet he lacked authority to promise the Indian delegates access to arms for other than defensive purposes.^^ In February 1793, McGillivray, gravely ill, arrived at the home of Panton, where he died on the seventeenth. The "Poor fellow," Panton informed Carondelet, "left us at an untoward period. ..." 75 For the purposes of the Scottish merchant and the governor, the loss of McGillivray indeed seemed untimely. While visiting New Orleans in the summer of 1792, the Creek chieftain had impressed Carondelet favorably. He judged McGillivray to be free from American influence and once again a useful instrument for forestalling the American 76 advance. Carondelet also had looked forward to utilizing McGillivray's services in forging the pending Indian con­ federacy. Moreover, incidents of violence between the American faction of the Chickasaws and the Creeks threat­ ened to expand into full-scale warfare. Without McGillivray's stabilizing influence, this menace to

Carondelet to Aranda, November 8, 1792, in Corbitts, eds.., ETHSP, Pt. XX, 134-136; Carondelet to Chiefs, Warriors and Others of Cherokee Nation, November 24, 1792, ASPFR, I, 281; Whitaker, "Spain and Cherokee Indians," 258. ^^Panton to Carondelet, February 16, 1792, same to same, February 20, 1792, West Papers. McGillivray to Panton, November 28, 1792, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 346-349; Las Casas to Carondelet, January 16, 1793, Lockey Papers. 205 inter-tribal peace and harmony well might wreck Carondelet's 77 Indian policy.

Panton in 1792 had enhanced his reputation as a stumbling-block for United States Indian policy, American observers viewed with pessimism the prospects for Creek- United States peace should Panton, as rumored, assume the mantle of Creek leadership, Seagrove, previously active in attempting to build American influence, worked energet­ ically at attaching McGillivray's former lieutenants to the United States, As early as November 1792 the United States agent had attempted not only to secure Creek compliance on marking the boundary, he had broached the subject of establishing American trading posts on the Altamaha and the St. Mary's. McGillivray had rendered these efforts harmless.^^ Always the faithful guardian against the Amer­ ican threat to Panton's trade, McGillivray also had mini­ mized the credit risk, a matter of no small importance to the company's profit margin. His successor or successors might not necessarily be so solicitous of Panton's needs.

^^Carondelet to Las Casas, March 9, 1793, Lockey Papers; Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, p. 349, n, 339, '''^Seagrove to Secretary of War, April 19, 1793, ASPIA, I, 378-379; Las Casas to Carondelet, January 16, 179 3, Lockey Papers; McGillivray to Panton, November 28, 1792, in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 346-349; O'Neill to Carondelet, February 20, 1793, Stetson Collec­ tion . CHAPTER VI

THE REPUBLICAN MENACE COMPOUNDED

The overtures James Seagrove made to the Creeks in November 179 2 to gain their compliance with the Treaty of New York and to open Creek-American trade greatly disturbed Panton. Although Secretary of War Knox, adhering to the treaty's terms, forbade Seagrove licensing American traders to Creek villages, his plans to establish trading posts along the Georgia frontier received full approval. The Creek responses in November to the trade proposal were non­ committal; while they displayed no particular enthusiasm, the Indians raised no pointed objections. But, motivated partly by a vested interest in opening the Creek trade, Seagrove worked assiduously to build American influence. ,! (! In these endeavors he enjoyed moderate initial success. In 1791, a general drought had prevailed over much of the Old Southwest, and the corn harvests of the Indians suffered accordingly. Crop failures were particularly severe among the Lower Creeks, who, with the onslaught of

"^Las Casas to Carondelet, January 16, 1793, Lockey Papers; Secretary of War to Seagrove, October 3, 1792, ASPIA, I, 259-260; Daniel M. Smith, "James Seagrove and the Mission to Tuckaubatchee, 1793," Georgia Historical Quar­ terly, XLIV (March, 1960), 42. 206 207 winter, faced famine and mass-starvation. The United States wisely placed 10,000 bushels of corn at the dis­ posal of Seagrove for famine relief. The corn, together with other assorted gifts, he used to good advantage in building up pro-American sentiment. While Panton vainly urged Carondelet to approve a conference of Creek chiefs at Pensacola to settle McGillivray's heirship, Seagrove in June 179 3 succeeded in securing a formal invitation to . . 2 visit the Creek nation. Disturbances along the Creek-Georgia frontier, however, delayed momentarily Seagrove's visit and, con­ comitantly, the spread of American influence. In March a party of Lower Creeks entered the Seagrove concern at Trader's Hill on the St. Mary's, killed the storekeeper and another person, and carried off the merchandise as plunder. While retreating, the same party brutally mas- i sacred three men, one woman, and two children within six miles of the scene of the robbery. Panton at first be- I.iil * lieved the account to be exaggerated. However, Seagrove believed that the Spaniards, Panton, and James Burges, a trader who resided among the Lower Creeks, were implicated, particularly since the raiding party also had carried off

Jefferson to Carmichael and Short, June 30, 1793, ASPFR, I, 265-267; Milfort to Carondelet, April 9, 1793 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. XXII, 79-80; Smith, "Mission to Tuckaubatchee," 4 8. 208 the store's accounts. Acting without official instructions, he therefore attempted to have Burges and three other whites opposed to the American interest killed in retaliation. Spanish officials denied any complicity on the part of 3 residents of the Floridas. The raid in all probability grew out of the confusion McGillivray's death generated, the aftermath of Bowles' sojourn, and the resounding victory of the northern Indians in November 1791 over the American expedition led by General Arthur St. Clair. A small party of the victorious Shawnees had arrived in the Creek nation in late 1792 to seek an alliance against the Americans, causing much agitation for coup among younger 4 Creek warriors. Georgians, however, exasperated by federal Indian policy, Spanish interference, and past Creek depredations, cared little about causes of renewed Indian hostility. Widespread indignation over the April murders and subsequent iilii horse- , cattle- , and slave-stealing forays caused Governor !l.:-! f Edward Telfair to activate the Georgia militia. Seagrove admonished Telfair against precipitate offensive action, but to no avail. Georgia militiamen attacked a party of

_ Governor of Georgia to Secretary of War, April 3, 1793, Seagrove to Secretary of War, April 19, 1793, ASPIA, I, 368, 378-379; Panton to Carondelet, April 10, 1793, Stetson Collection; declarations of J. Hambly, J. Allen and Pen, Chief of Alachua, August 31, 1793, ASPFR, I, 270. ^Smith, "Mission to Tuckaubatchee," 46-48. 209 Indians bound for Augusta to escort Seagrove on his offi­ cial visit to the Creek nation, A nephew of the influen­ tial chief Alexander Cornell, a brother-in-law to McGillivray, and whose pro-Americanism Seagrove had pains­ takingly cultivated, died in the attack. Seagrove imme­ diately sent profuse apologies, implored restraint until justice was done, and emphasized that Georgia rather than the federal government had taken up the sword. Expeditions by the Georgia militia, however, intensified in the fall, and Seagrove, for reasons of personal safety, postponed his mission until November.

The success of the northern Indians against St. Clair also had impressed Carondelet. Like the more rest­ less among the Creek braves, the Louisiana governor be­ lieved that the Indian possessed fighting abilities superior to those of the American. Accordingly, he viewed a Spanish- Indian alliance as the best means of strengthening the defenses of Louisiana and West Florida. Carondelet's inex­ perience in Indian affairs probably caused him to over­ estimate Indian prowess. In reality, the Indian of warfare lacked the required discipline for protracted military campaigns.

Ibid., 49-53; Durouzeaux to White, October 8, 1793, Seagrove to Cornell, July 5, 1793 in Kinnaird, ed., Pt. Ill, Problems of Frontier Defense, 179-180; 220-221. Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 164-165 210 Blissfully unaware of his faulty assumptions, Carondelet approached the implementation of his Indian plans with vigor and enthusiasm. He understood well enough, moreover, the need for two separate sets of tactics in dealing with the southern Indians. The relative remote­ ness of the Chickasaw and Choctaws from American settle­ ments left these Indians free from the problem of the perennial threat of encroachment. Consequently, United States agents found them to be more tractable to friendly overtures. Indeed, both tribes on their own volition had sought treaties and trade with the Americans following the American Revolution, and both had grown restive with Spanish trade arrangements while Mather and Strother held the Mobile concession.

Of the two tribes, the Chickasaws presented the Spaniards with the most serious problems. American set­ tlers enjoyed more favorsQDle access to Chickasaw villages by land and water routes and, of greater importance, these Indians were divided almost evenly into American and Spanish factions. The American faction looked to the war chief Piomingo for its leadership, while the latter followed Taski Etoka, the Chickasaw king, and the war chief Ugula Yacabe. Piomingo, whose affinity for Americans traced back at least to the years of the Revolution, consistently sought trade connections with the United States. In 1790, an ex­ pedition under the command of Major John Doughty had 211 attempted to fulfill these wishes by establishing a post at Muscle Shoals. Creeks and Cherokees, however, attacked the expedition, forcing it to retreat. Doughty reported

that a post at Muscle Shoals would be untenable without 7 the consent of the Creeks.

Muscle Shoals had long been a strong attraction to American land speculators, as had Chickasaw Bluffs and Walnut Hills—present-day Memphis and Vicksburg respectively Carondelet and his representative at Natchez, Gayoso, con­ curred in the belief that the only safe means of denying these sites to American settlement lay in their prior occu­ pation by Spaniards. To Gayoso fell the primary responsi­ bility of acquiring approval from the Indians to erect o Spanish forts at these strategic locations. Panton as early as 1790 had attempted to impress upon Piomingo, "a sensible, talkative little Indian," the "dangers" of consorting with Americans. The Scottish mer­ chant soon after had recommended that Spanish agents be assigned to the Choctaws and Chickasaws as the best means

•7 Panton to Miro', July 4, 1790, West Papers; Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 47, 83, 83n., 91-92; Colton Storm, ed., "Up the Tennessee in 1790: The Report of Major John Doughty to the Secretary of War," East Ten­ nessee Historical Society, Proceedings, XVII (1945), 119- 132. o Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 53-56; Jack D. L. Holmes, Gayoso: The Life of a Spanish Governor in the Mississippi Valley, 1789-1799 (Baton Rouge: Loui- sTana State University Press"^ 1965) , pp. 144-161, passim. 212 of countering American influence. In 1792, Panton again brought forth this recommendation, naming Benjamin James and John Mcintosh as "fit" selections. The Scot admitted that James, who exercised powerful influence over Franchimastabe, formerly was "warpt a little in favour of the Americans, but now [was] sufficiently weaned of that connexion. ..." Mcintosh, whose political sentiments apparently lay beyond reproach, resided among the Chick­ asaws. Because of their connections and their knowledge of Indian customs and language, Panton continued, the qualifications of these men were superior to the prospec­ tive appointees whom "Your Excellency [i.e. Carondelet] 9 has about You. ..." Panton left unmentioned that Mcintosh, whose influence was questionable, was a trusted acquaintance of long-standing, and that James served as an important resident factor of Panton, Leslie and Company. Ever-mindful of business affairs, the Scottish merchant fully appreciated the profitability of uniting Spanish political authority with the interests of his company in the person of a single representative. The career of McGillivray provided irrefutable testimony of this.

^Panton to Miro', July 4, 1790, Panton to Carondelet, September 7, 1792, West Papers. The latter also appears in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. X, 78-79. Panton placed too high an estimate on the loyalty of James, who almost simultaneously described himself to Blount as tolerating Spanish domina­ tion through necessity; q.v., James to Blount, June 30, 1792, ASPIA, I, 284. 213 However, Carondelet ignored Panton's suggestions, particularly because of disturbing reports emanating from Gayoso. In April, the governor of the Natchez district informed his superior that Panton earlier had remarked casually to Taboca, the principal Choctaw chief, that he probably would live to see the return of his "old friends," the English. Panton's powerful influence over the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Gayoso reminded Carondelet, could be offset only by appointing trustworthy Indian agents. Gayoso and his adjutant, Esteban Minor, recommended Turner Brashears for consideration. A former competitor of Panton's, Brashears not only was a son-in-law to Taboca, he enjoyed the full confidence of Franchimastabe. Carondelet even­ tually assigned Villebeuvre to reside among the Choctaws as a westward counterpart to Olivier. In October, the Louisiana governor also recommended that the Choctaws and Chickasaws be permitted to trade directly with New Orleans subject to 6 per cent duties on exports and imports as the correct alternative in countering the American trade threatA-u A. . 10 Meanwhile, in May 1790, Gayoso had negotiated a treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws in which the

^Gayoso to Carondelet, April 14, 1792, MPASD, IV, 89; Gayoso to Carondelet, July 21, 1792, Carondelet to Aranda, October 1, 1792 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. XIX, 87-90, Pt. XX, 129-130; "Diario de Esteban Minor," in Sanz, ed., Documentos historicos, p. 434. 214 Indians recognized the northern limits of Spanish West Florida to be the same as when in possession of the British. Article Six of the treaty explicitly affirmed Spanish possession of Los Nogales or, as called by Amer­ icans, Walnut Hills. The Spaniards valued the territorial recognition the treaty provided because it afforded means for thwarting the grandiose settlement project of the South Carolina Yazoo Company. The following March Gayoso personally led a Spanish contingent to Walnut Hills and directed the initial groundwork for the erection of Fort Nogales. The district soon thereafter was opened for settlement by emigrants from the United States. The Spaniards, however, failed to explain clearly that they actually intended to open Walnut Hills for set­ tlement, and this oversight quickly drew complaints from Choctaw spokesmen. Because of its location alongside a relatively narrow stretch of the Mississippi, the Walnut Hills district long had served as a crossing for Indian parties bound for hunting in Louisiana. Consequently, Taboca and Franchimastabe objected to the Spanish settle­ ment as an infringement on their hunting grounds. Moreover, they objected even more vehemently to Gayoso's having

•^"^Treaty of Friendship with the Choctaws and Chick­ asaws," ASPFR, I, 280; Jack D. L. Holmes, "Spanish Treaties with West Florida Indians, 1784-1802," Florida Historical Quarterly, XLVIII (October, 1969), 151; Whitaker, gpanish- American Frontier, pp. 161-162; Pope, Tour, pp. 28-29. 215 established a trading post at the site as well. Indian hunting parties, the chiefs complained, instead of return­ ing home with deerskins, exchanged them at Walnut Hills, The post provided all too easy an avenue for massive debt evasion, a condition that threatened Panton's traders living among the Choctaws with ultimate ruin."*"^

Gayoso replied that Spain enjoyed the right to occupy the Walnut Hills district by right of conquest, because it fell within the settlement line established earlier by the Indians and the British. He also explained that the trading post had been opened for the convenience of the Indians, who otherwise were obligated to make the tedious journey to Mobile for trade. The proximity of the Walnut Hills post to the best hunting grounds, Gayoso added, also would promote Indian prosperity by stimulating interest in hunting. 13 The Indians agreed that the British indeed had acquired settlement rights to Walnut Hills, but insisted that they had neglected to make the promised payment for the cession. In May, the Spaniards gained approval for the settlement by agreeing to make the overlooked payment, but

12 Panton to Carondelet, April 16, 1792, West Papers; Franchimastabe to Gayoso, March 28, 1792, Gayoso to Carondelet, April 24, 1792, MPASD, IV, 89, 128-129. 13 Sanz, Espana entre, pp. 45-46; instructions of Gayoso to Minor in Sanz, Documentos histcfricos, pp. 407- 414; Gayoso to Carondelet, April 20, 1792, MPASD, IV, 89. 216 not without agreeing also to halt trading at Nogales.''"^ The Choctaw chiefs surmised that motives other than altruistic concern for Indian welfare lay behind Gayoso's support for the Walnut Hills post. Information obtained from a trader with connections there indicated that the Spanish official had a personal interest in the trade. In explaining the affair to Carondelet, Gayoso freely admitted to sending a small quantity of goods to Walnut Hills as an interim measure for the convenience of the Indians and to encourage their hunting activity. He added he had intended no harm to Panton, who was "deserving of confidence and consideration." Carondelet, Gayoso sug­ gested, should propose that Panton assume the trade at the new location, ^. . 15 A proposal was unnecessary; Panton requested per­ mission to trade at Nogales in April 1792. He justified his request on the grounds that a site at Nogales would permit cheaper selling prices, counteract American influ­ ence, and prevent rival competition from ruining the Mobile trade. Panton added that Mather, his predecessor, had en­ joyed the privilege of maintaining a location on the Yazoo.

•^^Diario de Esteba'n Minor in Sanz, ed., Documentos histd'ricos, pp. 422-429; Sanz, Espana entre, pp. 48-60; Gayoso to Carondelet, April 14, 1792, MPASD, IV, 89. ^^Gayoso to Carondelet, April 20, 1792, MPASD, IV, 61-66. 217 As added inducement, Panton later promised to promote John Maypother, O'Neill's son-in-law and a known Spanish infor­ mant, as overseer of the Walnut Hills venture. Carondelet, however, disinclined to foster Panton's interests, explained that his request first must be approved by the Spanish court. In the meantime, trade competition from Nogales continued despite heated protests from Panton, John Forbes, and various Choctaw traders. 16 The United States chose this time to intensify its Indian activities. James Robertson, the United States agent to the Choctaws and Chickasaws, received instructions to solicit Indian warriors for service in the forthcoming northern Indian campaign under General "Mad Anthony" Wayne. Governor Blount was ordered to invite the Choctaws and Chickasaws to a conference near Nashville for the same purpose. The United States also intended to use the gathering to promote friendship and to obtain the consent of the two tribes to locate a trading post at the conflu­ ence of Bear Creek and the Tennessee. Both Blount and Robertson were well-disposed toward their assignments; as land speculators, these two frontiersmen long had hoped to establish settlements at Muscle Shoals and Chickasaw

Panton to Carondelet, April 16, 1792, same to same, October [?], 1792 [?], Carondelet to Panton, Septem­ ber 14, 1792, J. Forbes to Carondelet, October 31, 1792, West Papers; James to J. Forbes, September 28, 1792 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. XX, 124. 218 17 Bluffs.

In April 1792, the United States sent commissioners to the Chickasaw and Choctaw nations, bearing invitations to the Nashville conference as well as messages from Presi­ dent Washington. The Americans told their Indian audiences of the pleasure the United States government felt because of the good will they had displayed since Hopewell, and expressed hope that the two tribes were pleased with the conduct of the United States as well. The President, the agents promised, wished to extend the Indians a "well regulated and mutually advantageous trade" as soon as cir­ cumstances permitted. The American spokesmen assured the

Indians of a warm welcome at the conference, where an 18 abundance of gifts and provisions would await them. A band of unruly young Creeks attended the conclave held among the Choctaws and harassed the American visitors

Consequently, the Choctaw spokesmen delivered guarded re­ plies to the American talks. The meeting broke up quickly as a result of disturbances incited by the Creeks who, be­ fore departing, warned the Choctaws against accepting the

•'•^Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 92-93; Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 54; Secretary of War to Blount, April 22, 1792, ASPIA, I, 253-254. "^^Shaw, McClure, and Hampton to Choctaw Nation in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. XIX, 80-81. 219 American invitation•^ ^- .1 9

Few Choctaws attended the August conference, but the Chickasaws, particularly the Piomingo faction, appeared in large numbers. Blount, pleasingly enough to the Indians, disclaimed any interest on the part of the United States in Chickasaw or Choctaw lands. But he argued vigorously to gain approval for the trading post. Ugula Yacabe, wary that this concession would lead to loss of land, resisted

Blount's arguments with equal vigor. Piomingo, wishing to avoid the wrath of the Creeks, also demurred. 20 Carondelet, who abhorred even the slightest contact between Americans and Indians, viewed the developments of 21 1792 with displeasure. They strengthened his resolve not only to press ahead with his plans for the Indian con­ federacy, but also to obtain the consent of the Indians to erect forts on tribal lands to frustrate American expan­ sionist tendencies. Two sites, one on the Tombigbee below Muscle Shoals, and the other at Chickasaw Bluffs, drew Carondelet^s full attention. The acquisition of both would require consent of the Chickasaws, which Carondelet decided

•^^McGillivray to Carondelet, July 22, 1792 in Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, pp. 232-233. ^^Sanz, Espana entre, pp. 89-90; proceedings of the Cumberland conference, August 7-11, 1792, ASPIA, I, 285-288; Gayoso to Carondelet, July 21, 1792, West Papers.

^"^Gayoso to Carondelet, July 21, 1792, West Papers. 220 to acquire through the good offices of John Turnbull.

Turnbull's career in the Old Southwest had embraced a variety of activities. Following the American Revolution, he emigrated from United States territory to West Florida.

He then returned briefly to the Cumberland district, en­ tered the Indian trade, and soon lost his original invest­ ment. Returning to the Mobile area, he found employment with Mather and Strother and, together with John Joyce, managed the firm's Mobile store. Turnbull also received permission from Miro to introduce American settlers on the

Tombigbee and Tensas rivers in the environs of Mobile.

This enterprise earned for Turnbull the perpetual enmity of McGillivray, who made no allowances along Creek frontiers 22 even for those Anglo-Americans who became Hispanicized.

Along with these many pursuits, Turnbull also found time to sire two sons by a Chickasaw wife. In some fashion Turnbull and Gayoso developed a close relationship that led the Spaniard to sponsor the 23 merchant in the trade at Walnut Hills. Oblivious to the protests of Panton, Turnbull in the summer of 1792 moved to a plantation site near Baton Rouge, apparently with the

-_ — McGillivray to Miro', May 26, 1789, McGillivray to Carondelet, January 15, 179 3 in Caughey, McGillivray of_ Creeks, pp. 234-235, 349-350. ^"^Carondelet to Panton, August 15, 1797, Mobile (Alabama) Public Library, Forbes-Innerarity Papers. Cited infra as Forbes Papers. 221 intent of enlarging his trading enterprises. Turnbull's confidence rested on having convinced the Baron de Carondelet that his diplomacy with the Chickasaws enjoyed greater chances for success through a trader with strong triba^ -w l1 connections4-- . 24 Turnbull and Carondelet struck a bargain. The trader, working through his two sons, would reach an agree­ ment with the Chickasaws to estcdDlish a trading post at Chickasaw Bluffs. When the post was completed, the Span­ iards would be asked to erect a fort to protect it against American attack, and Turnbull would continue in the Chick­ asaw Bluffs trade. All that remained was to find some subterfuge suitable for overcoming Panton's increasingly vehement objections.2 5 The pretext arose in connection with the Indian gathering at New Orleans in November 1792. Following the visit Carondelet related to Pemton, McGillivray, and John Forbes an account of the Chickasaw King's "misbehaviour" during the meetings. The Baron ex­ plained that on no less than three occasions the Chickasaw King had demanded publicly that Turnbull be granted

•A i Lanzos to Carondelet, August 12, 1792 in Kinnaird, ed. Pt. Ill, Problems of Frontier Defense, 72-73; Villebeuvre to Carondelet, January 16, 1793 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. XXI, 142-144. ^^Gayoso to Carondelet, March 5, 179 3, West Papers; Panton to Carondelet, November 6, 1792, Carondelet to Gayoso, March 5, 1793 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. XX, 132-133, Pt. XXII, 65-66. 222 permission to open a store at Mobile to trade with the Chickasaws and Choctaws. The Chickasaw leader had been so obstinate and unyielding in his demands that Carondelet finally felt compelled to consent. Denial, he claimed, would have been tantamount to turning the trade over to the Americans, who eagerly promised not only trade, but aid to the Chickasaws in case of war with the Creeks, Turnbull, Carondelet stated, would be subject to the same import and export duties as other colonists, while Panton's firm still would enjoy its officially preferred position, Panton, however, was cautioned against harassing his new competitor and to refrain from using his duty privileges 26 to ruin Turnbull, Carondelet's explanations scarcely soothed Panton's disquietude over his undesired competitor. He petitioned again for a post at Walnut Hills, making known his dis­ pleasure with both candor and vehemence. The irate Scots­ man informed Carondelet that Turnbull had instigated the action of the Chickasaw King, and "for a Couple of Shirts" he, Panton, could have gotten "any chief in that nation to say as much." The haste with which Carondelet had approved, Panton observed, prevented him from arguing against the proposal, and, he added, "to my very great injury" the

26 Carondelet to Panton, November 21, 1792, Carondelet to Lanzos, November 22, 1792, West Papers; Caughey, McGillivray of Creeks, p. 352, n.345. 223 governor had broken the terms of the royal agreement. Panton also pointed out the logical inconsistency of Carondelet's justification of the Turnbull concession. It was impossible for the Chickasaws to go over to the Americans so long as the Creeks and Cherokees forbade it; Moreover, American traders faced too great a disadvantage in price competition. But, Panton continued, should Carondelet confine Turnbull's trading activity strictly to Mobile, little harm would result. Should he be per­ mitted to trade from his plantations at Tombigbee and Baton Rouge, however, he would provide too tempting an opportunity for the Indians to evade payment of Panton, Leslie and Company debts. Panton also warned Carondelet

of Turnbull's "untrustworthiness," but predicted confi- 27 dently, "keep him at Mobile and I will trounce him."

Panton suspected that Turnbull was merely an agent for a "united force of the Merchants of New Orleans" who

resented the royal privileges bestowed on the British firm, These merchants, Panton learned, earlier had petitioned

Carondelet to abolish the company's favored position.

Interpreting the several Royal Orders that confirmed his company's status, the Scottish merchant stated that twelve

Panton to Carondelet, December 12, 1792, same to same, January 1, 1793, same to same, January 2, 1793, West Papers. The latter two also appear in Corbitt, ed,, GHQ, Pt. XI, 198-201. 224 months prior notice was necessary before any alterations to the agreements between company and crown could be made. In this, he presumably referred to the twelve-month period of grace specified for withdrawal in case of war. Panton opined that "those orders, or Laws, Cannot legally be altered, suspended or revocked [sic], by any power on Earth, short of the same authority that formed them--" However, he indicated the terms on which the company would sell out to the complaining merchants and authorized Carondelet to convey the offer. They must secure the com­ pany in its outstanding debts and buy the company's fixed and moveable assets at their fairly appraised value. They must take the goods on hand at 30 per cent above prime cost; two-thirds of the purchase price must be in cash; the balance could be arranged on time, provided reasonable interest was paid and sound security offered. The dis­ gruntled merchants, Panton concluded, either could accept 28 these terms or "be silent hereafter." Turnbull, against Panton's hopes, did not limit his trade to Mobile. Instead, he moved goods and rum up

the Mississippi and, at Walnut Hills, into the Yazoo and deep into the Chickasaw and Choctaw hunting lands. This permitted him to obtain large quantities of pelts and deerskins that otherwise would have gone to pay debts owed

2 8 Panton to Carondelet, January 1, 179 3, loc. cit. 225 Panton's traders. These losses were not inconsequential to Panton, Leslie and Company and consequently brought com­ plaints from Panton and his associates alike. John Forbes in Mobile complained that if Turnbull's practices continued, "we must bid adieu to this place" because "w£ must supply the Traders & he_ brings up the Skins." Panton passed on the complaints to Carondelet, threatening to withdraw if they went uncorrected. The Choctaw and Chickasaw trade, Panton claimed, was of particular importance to profits. Because this trade was free from American competition, the company charged the Choctaws and Chickasaws slightly higher prices to offset lower profits earned in dealing with the Cherokees and Creeks. The recent losses caused by Turnbull, when added to those incurred in the Bowles robbery, amounted to an "insupportable sum." Carondelet,

Panton hoped, would order Gayoso to stop Turnbull, removing 29 all cause for further complaint. Panton apparently also induced Franchimastabe to visit Mobile for the purpose of lodging a formal complaint against Turnbull. The Indian chieftain, bemoaning the con­ fusion created by the Yazoo commerce, reminded the commandant that Turnbull had received permission to trade only at 29 J. Forbes to Panton, May 15, 179 3, Panton to Carondelet, June 7, 179 3, West Papers. 226 Mobile. Consequently, he should be made to comply.^*^

Turnbull, meanwhile, had failed to obtain permis­ sion from the Chickasaws to set up a trading post at Chickasaw Bluffs. Instead, the Chickasaws wanted him to remain permanently on the upper reaches of the Yazoo at a site more conveniently located to their villages. They lacked enough horses to journey great distances for sup­ plies, the Chickasaws claimed. Turnbull was willing to comply, but Carondelet was not. The Louisiana governor in June 1793 ordered Turnbull's trade on the Yazoo halted immediately, stating that their bargain applied to Chick­ asaw Bluffs only. Moreover, requests for funds to fortify the site had been rejected. Consequently, Carondelet ob­ served, Turnbull's disruptive tactics were no longer war­ ranted. Gayoso meanwhile had impressed Turnbull with the importance of securing rights to Chickasaw Bluffs if he intended to assume the Chickasaw trade permanently. If Carondelet temporarily abandoned Turnbull and the fort pro­ ject, Gayoso chose to hold matters in abeyance until more propitious circumstances arose. Panton had gained only .^ 31 temporary respite .

Franchimastabe talk to Lanzos, April 22, 1793, Lanzos to Carondelet, April 25, 1793 in Kinnaird, ed. Pt. Ill, Problems of Frontier Defense, 151-153.

Villebeuvre to Carondelet, March 8, 1793, Taski Etoka to Villebeuvre, March 10, 1793, Gayoso to Carondelet, May 31, 1793 in Corbitts, eds,, ETHSP, Pt. XXII, 96-98, Pt, XXIV, 62-63; Carondelet to Gayoso, July 25, 1793, West Papers, 227 In July, Carondelet offered Panton an opportunity to place a trading post at Walnut Hills. He must, however, consent to pay 6 per cent on all imports and exports until His Majesty decided whether to waive duties at the new site. The Baron stated that he was powerless to offer Panton more; he could not summarily forbid Turnbull from trading either in Mobile or in Natchez, Panton accepted reluctantly, remarking that the extra expenses involved in no way would increase profits. Acceptance was the only alternative to forestalling additional losses from Turnbull's activities. War with France, however, precluded Panton

from acting on the offer, and the Walnut Hills trade plans 32 were abandoned forever.

Meanwhile, Panton had assisted in halting a Creek- Chickasaw war in early 1793, demonstrating to Carondelet his usefulness to Spanish Indian policy. The war had grown out of attempts begun by McGillivray as early as 1788 to discourage contacts between the followers of Piomingo and American authorities. The attendant bloodshed had instilled resentment among the Chickasaws, who then exacted satisfac­ tion with retaliatory killings of Creeks. Efforts to per­ suade Piomingo to abandon his American connections, under

Carondelet to Panton, July 27, 1793, EF 116L9; Panton to Carondelet, August 18, 1793, Lockey Papers; Panton to Carondelet, October 15, 1793 in Corbitt, ed,, GHQ, Pt. XIII, 383-385. 228 way immediately prior to McGillivray's death, fell through following his demise. By April 1793, the Chickasaws, positioned behind hastily erected stockades, aided by

American arms and ammunition, prepared for a state of 3 3 seige by a 1,200 man Creek war party.

Carondelet deplored the drift toward full-scale hostilities between the Creeks and Chickasaws. Indian warfare threatened to nullify the Baron's plans for an Indian confederation; moreover, he dreaded the possibility that hostility might drive the Chickasaws irretrievably into the embrace of the Americans. Therefore, he quickly followed up on a formal protest lodged earlier against United States interference in the affairs of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Indians purportedly bound by treaty to the exclusive protection of Spain. Among other objections, Carondelet had taken umbrage against United States agents distributing among these Indians silver medals inscribed, "friendship and trade, without end." In his new complaint, the Baron accused Governor Blount of deliberately inciting the Chickasaws to war as a means of acquiring rights to the

33 J. Forbes to Carondelet, November 7, 1792, Stetson Collection; Villebeuvre to Carondelet, January 16, 1793, Piomingo to Carondelet, February 11, 1793, Milfort to Carondelet, April 9, 1793 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt. XXI, 144-146, Pt. XXII, 79-80; Carondelet to Lanzos, May 7, 1793, West Papers; Milfort to Carondelet, May 26, 1793 in Kinnaird, ed., Pt. Ill, Problems of Frontier Defense, 160-162. 229 34 Chickasaw Bluffs area. Carondelet simultaneously called on Gayoso, Panton, and the resident Spanish Indian agents to work toward an immediate restoration of peace.

Panton took advantage of the conflict to reprove Carondelet's earlier actions on behalf of Turnbull, Per­ mitting this interloper to make trade inroads among the Chickasaws, Panton argued, had weakened his control over them, thus enabling them to move closer to the American interest. The Scottish merchant nevertheless threatened the Creeks with trade stoppage and harangued them into realizing that the war benefitted their American enemies by making it easier for them to take Indian lands. These arguments abruptly halted the massive Creek invasion, and "talks" from Panton delivered by Ben James to the Choctaws and Chickasaws convinced Piomingo that he must embrace the opportunity for restoring peace. Panton's peacemaking efforts not only evoked the praise of Spanish authorities, they also impressed United States observers with the power­ ful influence the Scottish merchant wielded over the

IndiansT ^- . 35

Jaudenes and Viar to Jefferson, May 25, 1792, same to same, June 18, 179 3, Jefferson to Short and Carmichael, June 30, 1793, ASPFR, I, 263-267, ^^Panton to Carondelet, March 14, 179 3, West Papers; Milfort to Carondelet, May 26, 1793, "Indian Speeches at Long Town," June 1, 179 3 in Kinnaird, ed., Pt, III, Prob­ lems of Frontier Defense, 160-167; Villebeuvre to Gayoso, Jlme 87 1793 in Corbitts, eds., ETHSP, Pt, XXIV, 64-67; Blount to [Secretary of War], May 23, 1793, same to same, August 13, 1793, ASPIA, I, 454-458; memorandum of Secretary 230 In 1793, unfortunately for the respective interests of Carondelet and Panton, a new, seemingly more menacing, form of republicanism emerged from Europe to overshadow temporarily the dangers posed by the determined, yet rela­ tively cautious. Federalist-controlled United States govern­ ment. In January, the National Convention, as supreme ruling authority of the First French Republic, sent the hapless Louis XVI (1774-92) to the guillotine. In March, France declared war on Spain, thrusting that nation into an unaccustomed role as ally to Great Britain in the Wars of the First Coalition. In April, the Girondist-leaning Citizen Edmond Genet, recently accredited as the French Minister to the United States, arrived in Charlestown, Genet had been instructed not only to gain the cooperation of the United States against the enemies of France, he also was charged with fixing the blessings of the French Revolu- 36 tion on Spanish Louisiana and the Floridas. The outlook shared by most inhabitants of Charles- town assured Genet a warm welcome. Lingering bitterness of War and Pickens in U.S., Department of State, Terri­ torial Papers of the United States, Vol, IV, The Terri­ tory South of the Ohio, 1790-1796, ed. by Clarence E. Carter (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), 178-179; Panton to Carondelet, October 15, 1793 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XIII, 383-385. ^^Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Origins of Genet's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," in The Significance of Sections in American History, introduction by Max Farrand~~(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19 32) , pp. 62-72 . 231

over British occupation during the American Revolution,

economic discontent associated with an as yet incompletely

ameliorated post-war depression, a populist-inspired

mood of resentment against an oligarchical political

establishment—all of these made for an atmosphere of

Francophiliau 1 • . 37

Encouraged over the popular reception extended by

the citizenry of Charlestown, Genet lost little time in

communicating his plans to Governor William Moultrie, who

proved to be highly receptive. Gen^t, with the good offices

of the governor at his disposal, immediately issued letters

of marque to eager American privateers. The French minister

followed up this action by laying the groundwork for the

capture of East Florida by an army recruited from southern

backwoodsmen. Before departing for Philadelphia and ill-

fated intrigues against Louisiana with George Rogers Clark

and other disgruntled men of the Western Waters, Genet placed Michel Ange Bernard de Mangourit, the French consul

at Charlestown, in charge of preparations for the East

Florida expedition. 3 8

3 7 Melvin H. Jackson, Privateers m Charleston, 1793-1796, Smithsonian Studies in History and Technology, No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1869), pp, 3-6. ^^Turner, "Genet's Projected Attack," p. 72; R, R. Palmer, "M.A.B. Mangourit: a Revolutionary Republican," William and Mary Quarterly, IX (October, 1952), 486-487. 232 Mangourit soon found many Georgians enthusiastic over the opportunity to partake in a military campaign against East Florida. Besides sharing pro-French tendencies similar to those held by South Carolinians, many citizens of Georgia bitterly resented the Spaniards for supporting the Creeks, Among the first Georgians attracted to Mangourit was Samuel Hammond, an officer in the Georgia militia. By the summer of 1793, Hammond, commissioned a colonel in the Revolutionary Legion of America, held the

principal responsibility for French military preparations 39 against Florida,

Pecuniary incentives added to Samuel Hammond's interest in French intrigue. A brother, Abner, and Leroy, an uncle, were associated with the mercantile firm of Hammond & Fowler, a concern interested in expanding its meager Indian trade. The Hammonds saw in the French plans an ideal means of supplanting their formidable rival, Panton, Leslie and Company, while also gaining the lucra­ tive business of supplying the French invasion force, Samuel Hammond convinced Mangourit that, to succeed, the expedition would require, if not active support from

39 Richard K. Murdoch, The Georgia-Florida Frontier, 1793-1796; Spanish Reaction to French Intrigue and American Designs, University of California Publications in History, No. 4 TBerkeley, University of California Press, 1951), pp. 13-15. 40 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 233 the Creeks, at least their approval. This could be gained, Samuel estimated, by reaching an agreement with certain Creek chieftains over whom he and Abner enjoyed influence. At the very minimum, the accord would assure safe passage through Creek lands for the invasion forces. Hopefully it also might bring the Creeks into active support. If not, they could be persuaded to recognize French domination of East Florida easily by making the destruction of Panton, Leslie and Company's posts on the St, Mary's and St. Johns the primary objective of the expedition. Once Creek trade passed into the hands of Hammond & Fowler, complete control over the Indians would follow. But, Samuel informed

Mangourit, funds for the necessary treaty gifts must be

4: A-u 41 forthcoming. Mangourit sent Samuel Hammond $1,500 to buy the gifts through Hammond & Fowler together with a draft of proposals for a French-Creek treaty. In March 1794 an agent of Hammond's travelled into the Creek nation to arrange the treaty negotiations, but to no avail. The 42 plans for the invasion of Florida soon after went awry. In August 1793, President Washington, enraged over

"^•^Ibid,, pp. 20-27; S. Hammond to Mangourit, n.d. in Frederick Jackson Turner, ed., "The Mangourit Correspon­ dence," in U.S., Smithsonian Institution, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1897 (Wash- Ing'ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), pp. 595- 596. '^^Murdoch, Georgia-Florida Frontier, pp. 21-23, 27. 234 the conduct of Genet, had demanded his recall. Political control in France meanwhile had passed to the Jacobins, and Jean Antoine Joseph Fauchet had received instructions to proceed to the United States to repair the damages Genet had caused to Franco-American relations. On March 2, 179 4, Fauchet dismissed Genet; four days later in a public advertisement he forbade French nationals to violate American neutrality and revoked French commissions issued earlier for that purpose. Mangourit, however, sensing the value of East Florida as an entrepot and as a haven for French privateering operations, continued his preparations for the Florida campaign. On March 26, little more than a week before the scheduled date for launching the invasion. Citizen Fonspertuis arrived at Charlestown to relieve

Mangourit of his consular duties. The immediate invasion 43 threat to East Florida collapsed. The abortive invasion scheme also had attracted

the support of General Elijah Clarke, a prominent Georgia

frontier leader and Revolutionary War hero. Clarke, a

land speculator and an inveterate opponent of the Treaty of New York, had gathered a band of backwoods filibusterers for the invasion with promises of rewards in the form of

East Florida land grants. Determined not to be frustrated entirely in their filibustering ambitions, Clarke and his

43Jackson , Privateers in Charleston, pp. 35-41. 235 followers marched northward from the environs of the St.

Mary's, crossed the Oconee north of Rock Landing, and raised a settlement on Creek lands which they proclaimed to be the "Trans-Oconee Republic." Governor George

Mathews, equally embittered at federal Indian policy, at first ignored this open violation of the United States- 44 Creek treaty by Georgians .

In July 1794 Panton received from his traders re­ ports of Clarke's activities in the vicinity of the Oconee, The Scottish merchant passed the information on to Spanish authorities, stating that the Indians, low on arms and ammunition, were powerless to repulse the intruders. Fur­ thermore, Panton warned, if unopposed, the settlement would become "a rendezvous for all the vagabond French Americans on the Continent" and hence a serious threat to the security of the Floridas, Conditions west of the Oconee remained unchanged through September, and Panton urged that the Creeks, who were eager to drive the usurpers back into Georgia, be supplied the arms needed for the task, Panton later inspired in Carondelet an interest to lead Spanish troops in a surprise attack against Clarke, Such action, however, became unnecessary; pressure from Clarke's oppo­ nents in Georgia and threats from President Washington

Murdoch, Georgia-Florida Frontier, pp. 50-56, 66-6 7; Jacob Townshend to Panton, July 14, 1794, Panton to White, n.d.,in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVI, 259-261. 236 pressured Governor Mathews into securing the abandonment of the trans-Oconee settlement. By late 1794 French- inspired threats against the Floridas and the trade empire of Panton, Leslie and Company had subsided. "^^

On the other hand, French privateers operating out of Charlestown added to the mounting misfortunes of Panton, Leslie and Company. Although French corsairs had appeared occasionally in Charlestown harbor before mid-1793, the port became crucially important to French privateering operations during the two succeeding years for several reasons. The Federalist-dominated courts in the north, in contrast to Charlestown, adhered more closely to principles of strict neutrality in admiralty cases. State officials in South Carolina as well as federal customs agents dis­ played a cooperative spirit in handling French prizes. Aside from the prevailing pro-French sympathy, the citizens of Charlestown welcomed the economic benefits connected with privateering. Moreover, British military and naval units, with the support of French royalists, either had

seized or neutralized French ports in Saint Domingue and in the Lesser Antilles by mid-1794. 46

55 Murdoch, Georgia-Florida Frontier, pp. 6 6-67; Panton to Carondelet, September 30, 1797, West Papers. 46 Jackson, Privateering m Charleston, pp, 11, 17^ 19-20; Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812 (2 vols 3rd ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1894), I, 110- 115. 237

Three sea-captains, Jean Baptiste Carvin of

1'Industrie, Jean Bouteille of la_ Sans Pareille, and

William Talbot of I'Ami de la Pointe-a-Pitre, dominated privateering operations out of Charlestown. The former two had sailed northward out of the French West Indies bearing letters of marque and reprisal in early 1793.

Talbot, a native Virginian, had turned to privateering as a means of avenging losses inflicted by the notoriously venal vice-admiralty court in the Bahamas. In December

1793, he had sailed the American armed schooner Fair Play to Guadeloupe, renamed and placed the vessel under French registry, and became a naturalized French citizen. 47 By the latter half of 1793, French privateers were cruising the Florida Passage and also were guarding the approaches to St. Augustine. In December, Bouteille and Carvin captured the Aurora, a schooner under the command of a Captain Dickie, and sent the prize to Charlestown for condemnation proceedings. Although assessed at £4,000 in value by the British Consul, the Aurora, when processed through the French consular court, somehow was purchased by Penman & Co. for fcl50 and returned to Dickie. Two months later Bouteille again took the Aurora outward bound from Nassau to St. Augustine with one year's supply of

^^Jackson, Privateering in Charleston, pp. 14-15, 52-54. 238 trade goods for Panton, Leslie and Company's East Florida stores. The cargo was valued at some L4,400. Subjected a second time to condemnation proceedings, the Aurora and cargo sold for slightly over fc3,800. In April, Captain Talbot captured a Panton, Leslie and Company frigate, the Grenada Packet. This vessel, bound for London out of Pensacola, carried a cargo of peltry valued at some fcl3,800. Talbot dispatched his prize to Savannah where, on April 25, the vessel accidentally caught fire and burned, causing severe property damage along the harbor frontage. The cargo, removed beforehand, brought the captors approximately til,600. On learning of the fire, Panton indicated that he could have borne his losses without regret if the Grenada Packet had been the means of burning Savannah to the ground. While the cargo had been insured, the company absorbed the loss of the vessel. The cargo aboard the Aurora, however, was uninsured. Although Panton, Leslie and Company sus­ tained no further direct losses to French cruisers, its insurance costs, depending on departure points and destina­ tions, increased three-to six-fold. By mid-1794, Panton estimated company costs from losses and increased premiums 48 associated with the war at slightly under $100,000.

IhiA., pp. 17, n.26, 54-55, 131, 136-137; Panton to J. Forbes, July 4, 1794, Cruzat Papers; Panton to J, Forbes, July 11, 1794, Forbes Papers; Panton to Carondelet, July 3, 1794, West Papers. 239 John Galphin, a half-Creek trader with close ties to Panton, persuaded the Lower Creeks to ask Governor Mathews why Georgia allowed "American" privateers to enter Savannah with a Panton ship laden with Indian merchandise. Since Georgia claimed to be at peace with England and Spain, the Indians observed, the state must have condoned such action from a desire to impoverish them by disrupting their trade, Mathews replied that he neither knew nor

cared "anything about Mr, Panton or his Ship," which, he added, may have been captured by the French, 49

The effects of general warfare on European commer­ cial patterns and practices worked unfavorably against Panton, Leslie and Company's terms of trade, Indian goods, especially arms and ammunition, became scarce and costly, and the London fur market all but collapsed. Traffic with French fur buyers virtually halted, while German, Russian, and English furriers and tanners bought only sparingly. Panton, Leslie and Company, as suppliers of over one-half the deerskins on the London Market, occasionally had used its market power in the early 1790's to maintain steady prices. The war made this practice impossible. Although scarcities in trade items abated by 1796, prices remained above their prewar levels. On the other hand, peltry

Talk, J. Galphin to Chiefs, Lower Towns, July 24, 1794, EF 114J9; address to Head Men & Warriors of Creek Nation, August 11, 1794, ASPIA, I, 496-497, 240 prices rose only after 1800. Insofar as possible, tho company shifted the burden of its deteriorating trade position to its Indian customers. These, however, generally unable to comprehend the underlying reasons why goods became at once costly and scarce, developed suspicious and sullen attitudes,

War with France also made it necessary for Spain to cancel the trade privileges granted Louisiana and West Florida in the Royal Cedula of 1782. This was accomplished in a Royal Cedula of June 9, 1793, a directive that com­ pletely revised Spanish commercial regulations for these provinces. The new rules opened trade between Louisiana and Florida ports, and all friendly and allied powers with which Spanish commercial treaties were in effect. Origi­ nally, foreign ships were required to call first at either of two minor peninsular ports before proceeding to Louisiana and the Floridas, but in June 1794 this stipulation was removed. The decree imposed an import duty of 15 per cent on goods from foreign sources; export duties remained at 6 per cent. The customs regulations, of course, gave pref­ erential treatment to Spanish merchants, carriers, and manufacturers. Exports of silver, except for the purchase

^^Phillips, Fur Trade, II, 101-102; Panton to Miro, July 4, 1790, Panton to Carondelet, April 4, 1793, West Papers; White to Carondelet, August 23, 1793, in Kinnaird, ed,, Pt, III, Problems of Frontier Defense, 200-201; Panton to'carondelet, March 16, 1794 in Corbitt, ed,, GHQ, Pt, XIV, 83, 241 of slaves, continued to be illegal, and trade between Louisiana or Florida ports and those of other Spanish provinces was proscribed•w ^ ,5 1

Spanish authorities quickly ruled that the June

1793 decree was inapplicable to the status and privileges of Panton, Leslie and Company. On the other hand, the measure's attractiveness caused Panton to entertain notions of expanding the scope of his firm's activities. After examining the decree, Panton intimated to Carondelet it should "produce much good to these Colony's" and inquired if the Baron wished the company to open a "House in New

Orleans." If so, Panton promised he would "endeavour to merit those marks of Royal favour held out to those who shall increase the commerce of his dominions. ..." If we may believe the travel account of John Pope, Panton's inquiry, if nonchalant, was not devoid of seriousness. While visiting New Orleans in April 1791, Pope observed American merchants conducting a "tolerable trade" at price levels approximately 100 per cent above those prevailing in the United States. Panton's request, however, seems to have gone ignored^ . 52

^•'"The text of the decree appears in Whitaker, trans, and ed,, Documents Relating to Commercial Policy of Spain, pp. 177-185. ^^Panton to Carondelet, October 15, 1793 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XIII, 383-385; Pope, Tour, p. 41; Gardoqui to Alcudia, July 31, 1794, White to Carondelet, November 15, 1793, Stetson Collection. 242 British admiralty rulings required vessels pro­ ceeding from England to the West Indies to travel in convoy. Consequently, Panton, Leslie and Company experienced delays in obtaining supplies when needed. The supply problem was magnified by the fact that, under peacetime conditions, the company arranged for vessels to arrive sufficiently early in the year to unload, take on peltry, and clear before mid-April. Warm weather greatly increased the probabil­ ities of worm damage to the highly perishable skins. Therefore, with Carondelet's approval, Panton dispatched light vessels, frequently laden with West Florida produce, to Nassau in search of goods in short supply and to engage ships to remove deerskins during the proper season. British cruisers kept the Bahamas well-stocked with prize cargoes 53 obtainable on good terms. Meanwhile, in November 179 3, at the height of the French intrigues, James Seagrove arrived at Tuckaubatchee to deliver his long-delayed messages to a general council of the Creek nation. By the time of his departure the following April, the United States Indian agent had gained several advantages for the United States. Seagrove re­ stored temporary peace between Creeks and Georgians, obtained promises from the Indians to adhere to the Treaty

^"^Panton to Carondelet, August 31, 1793, same to same, March 14, 1793, same to same, April 15, 179 3, West Papers . 243 of New York, enhanced the influence of the United States at the expense of Spain, and caused William Panton much consternation.

Since the treaty of New York, Secretary Knox and President Washington had followed Panton's activities with keen interest. They understood clearly that the Scottish merchant presented the primary obstacle to the spread of American influence over the southern Indians, So long as Panton--whose conversion to the American cause was deemed impossible--controlled the trade of part of the Cherokees, most of the Creeks, and all of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Spanish hegemony would continue. Consequently, the United States adopted tactics for dealing with the Creeks similar to those employed earlier with such telling effect by William Augustus Bowles, Seagrove and his retainers among the Creeks played on the susceptibility of the Indians to intimations of trade exploitation at the hands of Panton,

But, unlike Bowles, United States agents were prepared to 54 follow through on promises of gifts and trade. In October, before Seagrove's arrival at Tuckaubat­ chee, Joseph Cornell led the way in implementing the new

United States demarche. This influential spokesman not only attacked Panton, he also impugned the loyalty of the

^Blount to Secretary of War, August 13, 1793, same to same. May 23, 1793, ASPIA, I, 454, 458; Washington to Congress, December 16, 1793, ASPFR, I, 247. 244 defunct McGillivray, Upon arriving at Pensacola, Cornell emphasized, Panton had promised to trade on the same terms as those offered under the English. Subsequently, how­ ever, the merchant had drawn McGillivray so completely into the interest of Panton, Leslie and Company as to make him betray the Creek nation. From that time onward Panton had "stolen" the peltry of the Creeks by undervaluing skins and by charging double the amount necessary. Next, Seagrove, after making a liberal distribution of gifts, expanded on this topic with telling effect. The United States agent remarked that for some ten years the Creek trade had rested in the hands of one man. This, Seagrove implied, went far in explaining the nakedness and want he observed among the Creeks. The Indians had no friends to the southward, only greedy impostors. On the other hand, Seagrove continued, their father. General Washington, wished only to see his Creek wards warmly dressed instead of naked. Because of this, he intended to erect trading posts where Indians would be able to acquire three blankets for the price formerly paid for two. Wondering aloud at how much longer Indians would submit to robbery, Seagrove admonished the Creeks to embrace both Spaniards and Americans in peace 55 and to trade with those who offered better prices.

^^Smith, "Mission to Tuckaubatchee," 53-55; White to Carondelet, November 11, 1793 in Kinnaird, ed., Pt, III, Problems of Frontier Defense, 227-229; Milfort to Carondelet, March 20, 1794, West Papers. 245 These arguments produced desirable results. Mad Dog, the White Lieutenant of the Okfuskies, and the Hol­ lowing King of the Cussitahs—all influential Creek chieftains--mellowed toward the American cause. Panton, who was moved to comment on Seagrove's "ability in the Art of creating dissension," developed high respect for the effectiveness of the United States agent. Once Seagrove finally departed, Panton expressed relief that some of the S6 damage he caused had been countered. Nor was it merely the words and actions of Seagrove that so unsettled Panton. In December 1793, President Washington, in his annual address to Congress, described the government's problems with the Cherokees and Creeks as being on a "critical footing," the solution of which hinged on creating "ties of interest" between these tribes and the United States. Next to meting out justice to Americans who violated the rights of these Indians, Washington continued, "the establishment of commerce [was] most likely to con­ ciliate their attachment." To be effective, however, the Indian trade "must be conducted without fraud, without extortion, with constant and plentiful supplies, and with a ready market for the commodities of the Indians" at fair

^Panton to J. Forbes, May 6, 1794, same to same, June 29, 1794, Cruzat Papers; Talk, White Lt., Mad Dog, A. Cornell to Panton [May, 1794], EF 114J9; Las Casas to Campo de Alange, May 19, 1794 in Kinnaird, ed., Pt. Ill, Problems of Frontier Defense, 286-289, 246 prices. Private citizens, the President observed, would shun the Indian trade "unless allured by the hope of a profit. ..." On the other hand, the government could conduct the trade without hope for gain so long as it in­ curred no losses. Washington concluded by recommending that Congress enact the necessary laws to make the Indian trade a government monopoly.^^

Panton lost no time in bringing Washington's remarks to Carondelet's attention. This development, the Scot mused, when combined with the other misfortunes that had befallen the company, demanded a thorough reappraisal of the company's future prospects. He surmised that the Spanish authorities "must alter their conduct to Indians and show a degree of liberality greater to anything I have seen in my time or all is lost." The concerned Panton reduced his order for the 1795 season's supplies to the minimum and requested the backing of the Spanish government as a condition for continued operations. It had become impossible, Panton observed, for the private resources of the partnership "to hold out any longer against the purse of the United States and foes on every quarter." if the Spaniards withheld assistance, Panton intended either to

57 J. D. Richardson, ed.. Compilation of the Mes- sages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897"Tl0 voIsT 53d Cong., 2nd Sess., House Misc. Doc. No. 210, Pts, 1-10) I, 138-142. 247 withdraw completely from the Indian trade or possibly to continue on a limited basis "in order the better to cover 58 up my real intentions." The nature of these are uncer­ tain. Probably Panton hoped to capitalize on the commer­ cial advantages afforded by the Royal Decree of June 9, 1793. On May 2, 1794, Panton, on behalf of his company, formally petitioned Carondelet for Spanish assistance against the United States government. Referring to Wash­ ington's December address, Panton stated pithily, . . . Never was there a hansomer [sic] Compliment paid to man than what he paid to us by this Speech, although we were not named in it, Since it was a fair acknowledgment of the Superiority of our establishment to that of any Commercial combination they could oppose to us, which rendered it necessary to bring forth the Purse of the united [sic] States against us, and it bears equal testimony to our moderation and fairness in dealing with the Indians, because it showes [sic] that to undersell us it is requisite to let the Indians have Goods at first Cost—From various Speaches [sic] of Seagrove . . . there need be no doubt that Congress has adopted the measure, for he has most Solemly [sic] assured them that they will have goods even below prime Cost—59

Panton explained that, to preserve its influence

over the Indians, the Spanish government must accept one

^^Panton to J. Forbes, February 3, 1794, Greenslade Papers; Panton to Butler, March 30, 1794, Panton to J. Forbes, April 17, 1794, Cruzat Papers. ^^Panton, Leslie & Co. memorial to Carondelet, May 2 1794 West Papers. This important document also appears in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XV, 150-153. 248 of two alternatives. The first, and most amenable to the wishes of Panton, Leslie and Company, called for the Spanish government to buy out the company in both Floridas and to conduct the trade as a government monopoly. Spain would pay for the company's stocks at cost plus handling charges and purchase its fixed and moveable assets at their fairly appraised value. The total amount necessary was estimated at $400,000, which was to be deposited with Strachan and McKenzie, the company's London correspondents. Should the Spanish government select this alternative, Panton, Leslie and Company offered to act in London as His Catholic Majesty's correspondents, thus assuring Spain of continued access to the company's experience and good will.

The second alternative called for Spain to extend a ten-year interest-free $400,000 loan together with firm promises of indemnification should the company find it necessary to sell at a loss in competition with the United States, Under this plan, the petitioner stated, the part­ ners stood to lose only their time and efforts. The Spanish government, however, must buy all Indian presents from Panton, Leslie and Company exclusively, guarantee the concern a complete monopoly of the southern Indian trade, and allow the establishment of a post at Walnut Hills on a duty free basis (the bitterness over Turnbull's activities had not subsided). Finally, the Spanish government must promise to adopt a more liberal Indian gift policy, one 249 comparable to that employed by the British, for the Amer­ icans were "Sparing no Cost" to detach the Indians.^°

Carondelet,before receiving the Panton memorial, had agreed in principle on the need for official support for the company. Spain, by indemnifying Panton, Leslie and Company for its losses in underselling the United States government, could maintain the status quo. Within two to three years, Carondelet speculated, the Americans, realizing unsatisfactory results from their efforts, would abandon their trade scheme. He also agreed on the expediency of increasing expenditures for Indian gifts considerably. In forwarding the memorial to the Spanish court, the Louisiana governor endorsed the first alternative, particularly since Panton agreed to train Spaniards in the nuances of the business before leaving Pensacola. Spain, by buying out the company, could rid itself of overdependence on English influence in controlling the Indians, a matter of signifi­ cance in the event of a Spanish-British war. Moreover, the provinces could enjoy the economic benefits in an area of overriding economic importance. On the other hand, Francisco Rendon, Navarro's belated replacement as intendant, favored the second alternative. In this fashion the com­ pany's experience could be retained; moreover, the Spanish government could expect repayment on a loan. The loan

Ibid. 250 could be arranged in four annual installments, and should be made in Florida rather than in London. Panton, Rendo"n suggested, then should be allowed to dispatch funds from

the provinces only as needed.

Carondelet meanwhile encouraged Panton to believe that the court would be favorably disposed to indemnify the company for losses incurred in competing "against the force of America, and their endeavours to take [the trade] from you." Panton, however, alternately grumbled privately over the parsimony of the Spaniards in doling out Indian gifts, marveled at his "extraordinary" good fortune in retaining a heavier volume of trade than expected during the summer of 1794, and prepared to increase his supply order for 1795. Quite probably, he speculated, the plans

of the United States were not as yet completed, and the 62 traders needed assurances of future credit. Washington's plans for instituting the federal

factory system for the Indian trade indeed matured slowly.

In 1794, a House Committee studied the President's recom­

mendations of 179 3, but Congress took no further action.

^•'"Carondelet to Alcudia, April 9, 1794 in American Historical Association, Annual Report for the Year 1896 (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), I, 1052-1056; Carondelet to Las Casas, July 27, 1794, Lockey Papers; Rendo'n to Gardoqui April 25, 1795, Stetson Collection. ^^Carondelet to Panton, July 29, 1794, Greenslade Papers; Panton to J. Forbes, June 4, 179 4, same to same, June 24, 1794, same to same, June 29, 1794, Cruzat Papers. 251 This prompted Washington to repeat the recommendations in a November congressional address. The following spring Congress began deliberations on a bill to establish government-sponsored trade. Although this bill met with defeat, in March 1795 Washington's supporters managed to obtain the passage of a compromise experimental measure authorizing the purchase up to $50,000 in goods to be sold in the Indian trade as the President might direct,^^

The War Department chose to use the limited appro­ priation to establish two government factories for trading with the Cherokees and Creeks. Secretary Knox allocated two-thirds of the funds for stocking a government factory at Coleraine on the St. Mary's for the Creeks; the remainder went to supply a Cherokee trading post at Tellico in present-day eastern Tennessee. The federal experiment, however, began under less than auspicious circumstances. Before opening the factories, the government had to await the arrival of new shipments of Indian goods from London in the fall. American merchants had exhausted their sup- plies.^*

6 3 Richardson, ed.. Messages and Papers, I, 162-168- U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. I, "An Act Making Provision for the Purposes of Trade with the Indians," March 3, 1795 p. 442; Harmon, Sixty Years, pp. 99-100; Edgar B, Wesley, "The Government Factory System Among the Indians, 1795- 1822," Journal of Economic and Business History, IV (1931- 32), 490-491, 64 Report, Secretary of War to Senate, December 12 1795, ASPIA, I, 583-584, 252

Congress enacted a measure in May 1796 that gave permanency to the experiment of the preceding year. This act appropriated an additional $150,000 with which to maintain inventories for the Indian trade at prices that would cover the government's total costs. Supporters of the bill in the Senate justified government intervention

in the Indian trade as the only means of supplanting

British traders. Once these were eliminated, the United 6 ^ States would withdraw. Without doubt, Panton, Leslie and Company had earned a ranking position among those to

be eliminated. Panton futilely attempted to use the American law

to force the Spanish government to act favorably on the May 1794 memorial. Compared to United States activity in the field of Indian affairs, he cautioned, the Spanish court seemed "to have dropt into a slumbers [sic]" from which he wished it might "awake in time to have anything remaining

U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. I, "An Act for Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes," April 18, 1796, pp, 452-453; Wesley, "Government Factory System," 491-492. ^^Harmon, Sixty Years, pp. 95-98; Ora Brooks Peake, A History of th£ United States Factory System, 1795-1822 iDenver: Sage Books, 1954), pp, 13-15. The United States government opened no new factories until 1802, when posts at Chickasaw Bluffs and at Ft. St, Stephen, situated to the north of Mobile, were activated. These sites lay within the trading sphere of Panton, Leslie, and Company. 253 fi 7 in contention." The Spaniards, however, were much too preoccupied with more pressing wartime problems, and Panton's admonition passed unnoticed.

Meanwhile, Genet's plans for George Rogers Clark

and western frontiersmen to invade Louisiana had shaken

Carondelet thoroughly. In 1793, the Louisiana governor worked frantically to set the provincial defenses in order,

to suppress treasonable Jacobin tendencies within the

French Creole element, and to shape Spain's southern Indian

allies into a cohesive fighting force. He hoped to secure

the third objective by executing his plans for forming the 6 8 Indian confederation. Carondelet gave Gayoso the task

of making the confederation a reality. The governor of the Natchez district successfully accomplished his assignment in a treaty congress of Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Creeks held at Los Nogales in October 179 3. The Treaty of Nogales, later ratified by the Cherokees, confirmed the prior treaties of Mobile and Pensacola of 1784, forged an offensive-defensive military alliance be­ tween the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Cherokees, and Creeks, and created an inter-tribal council for settling internal dis­ putes and for dealing with the Spaniards, It included

^^Panton to Carondelet, August 1, 1896 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVI, 264. ^^O'Callaghan, "Indian Policy of Carondelet," pp. 18-19. 254 guarantees of Spanish protection for the Indians and dip-

lomatic support for their boundary claims against the

United States. It also regularized procedures for the

distribution of annual gifts by the Spaniards, a measure

tied closely to Carondelet's desire to obtain sites for Spanish forts in Indian territory, 69

John Turnbull, at Gayoso's request, played a prominent role in informal dealings with the Chickasaws to further the plans to fortify Chickasaw Bluffs. To achieve this goal, both played on the affections of the Chickasaw war chief Ugula Yacabe for Turnbull. During and after the Nogales congress, Turnbull and Gayoso worked to acquire the support of Ugula Yacabe in promoting Turnbull's interest in opening trade at the strategically important site as a prelude to Spanish occupation. Succumbing to gifts, blandishments, and promises of a Spanish pension, Ugula Yacabe promised to promote the Spanish interest among the Chickasaws,

While waiting for Indian approval to trade at

Chickasaw Bluffs, Turnbull had resumed trading with the

Chickasaws along the Yazoo by May 1794. Panton, who now

^^Holmes, Gayoso, pp. 151-154; Holmes, "Treaties with West Florida Indians," 148-149; Sanz, Espana entre, pp. 91-92. ^^Gayoso to Carondelet, December 6, 1793, West Papers. 255 suspected Gayoso's complicity in Turnbull's activities, again complained to Carondelet. On this occasion the Scottish merchant was reluctant to protest too severely against his competitor. An overly querulous approach might have earned Carondelet's disfavor and jeopardized the com­ pany's petition for Spanish financial support. Panton,

it seems, also believed that Turnbull and his backers were 71 on the verge of experiencing financial difficulties.

Turnbull indeed soon after decided to retire from the Indian trade. On January 30, 1795, in the presence of the Baron de Carondelet, representatives of Turnbull & Sons and Panton, Leslie and Company signed a formal contract stipulating the terms of withdrawal. The agreement per­ mitted Turnbull to ascend the Yazoo in the spring of 1795 with a limited quantity of goods provided by Panton, Leslie and Company in order to collect back debts. All unused goods as well as deerskins received in trade were to be turned over to the Panton firm by the following October. The Turnbull firm was to be compensated for the deerskins at two reales per pound. In return, Panton, Leslie and Company would assume without recourse the outstanding debts of Turnbull & Sons, provided that those of questionable

^•'•panton to J. Forbes, March 27, 1794, same to same. May 6, 1794, same to same. May 29, 1794, same to same, June 29, 1794, Cruzat Papers; Villebeuvre to Carondelet, May 7, 1794 in Kinnaird, ed., Pt. Ill, Prob­ lems of Frontier Defense, 280-282. 256 risk did not exceed $4,000. For this consideration, the Panton firm agreed to pay Turnbull & Sons $4,000 in two 72 annual installments.

This agreement, however, failed to settle the dif­ ferences between the two contending parties. Turnbull broke promises made to assist John Forbes in the fall of 1796 in settling the accounts assumed by Panton, Leslie and Company. Instead, Turnbull, living up to his reputa­ tion for shiftiness, had preceded Forbes into the Chick­ asaw nation and colluded with former creditors in inflating their arrears. Panton and Forbes considered this as suf­ ficient evidence of bad faith to render the 1795 agreement null and void. Consequently they thereafter resisted Turnbull's attempts to collect the agreed upon installments, even in the face of admonitions from Carondelet. The dis­ pute was finally settled in March 1800 by arbitration pro­ ceedings held at Mobile. The arbitrators held that Forbes had failed to prove breach of contract and found Panton,

Leslie and Company liable for payment of Turnbull's debts 73 up to $4,000 with interest from November 1798.

^^Panton to Carondelet, March 16, 1795, Stetson Collection; Panton, Leslie and Company-Turnbull & Sons, contract, January 30, 1795, West Papers. « ^^J. Forbes to J. Joyce, November 2, 1796, depo­ sition of Turner Brashears, November 5, 1796, Stetson Col­ lection; J. Forbes to J. Joyce November 15, 1796, J, Forbes to Panton, September 5, 179 8, West Papers; Carondelet to Panton, August 15, 1797, Forbes Papers; decree of arbitra­ tion March 28, 1800, Innerarity-Hulse Papers, 257 Carondelet in the meantime, still determined to erect a fort on the Chickasaw Bluffs, was prepared to settle Turnbull in the trade there if necessary to secure the permission of the Indians, As late as March 22, 1795, Carondelet instructed Gayoso to gain consent from the Chickasaws for Panton o£ Turnbull to trade at the bluffs. Nine days later, however, likely prompted by misgivings over provoking Panton into a disastrous withdrawal, Carondelet offered Panton, Leslie and Company generous terms for establishing a post at Chickasaw Bluffs, Panton readily accepted,

Carondelet's terms awarded Panton free transit of the Mississippi to and from Chickasaw Bluffs and duty exemptions on all trade conducted there. He also permitted the company to trade, but not exclusively, with all northern Indians who frequented the area as well as those calling at any established or future Spanish post situated north of Natchez. 75 Panton at this point quite probably considered himself on the threshold of entering the lucrative northern fur trade. While Panton and John Forbes hurriedly prepared to

^"^Jack D. L. Holmes, "Fort Ferdinand on the Bluffs: Life on the Spanish American Frontier, 1795-1797," Ten­ nessee Historical Magazine, XIII (1959), 51-52; Panton to Carondelet, April 18, 1795, West Papers. ^^Ibid.; Carondelet to Panton, May 6, 1795, West Papers 258 send men, materials, and supplies to build and stock a post at the newly acquired site, Gayoso, on May 30, 1795, took formal possession of the Chickasaw Bluffs for the

Spanish crown. Construction was begun immediately on

Fort Fernando de las Barrancas, and by fall the outpost was sufficiently completed to guard the upriver approach 7 fi along the Mississippi,

The fortification of Chickasaw Bluffs was the final measure taken by Carondelet to forestall the American west­ ward advance. As Spanish soldiers and masons and Panton's retainers worked to place the site in readiness, Manuel de Godoy, the court favorite, and the Supreme Council of State were busying themselves with the task of effecting a major Spanish diplomatic realignment. The war with France had gone badly for Spain. Faced with a severely depleted treasury, with French troops on Spanish soil, and with backstairs intrigues against his envied position, Godoy had opened secret peace negotiations with the French Direc­ tory. Peace with France, however, would almost certainly bring about British enmity. Godoy's strategy consequently called for forming a Franco-Spanish-American coalition against Great Britain which in turn required a

^^Holmes, Gayoso, pp. 166-167; Rendo'n to Panton, Leslie and Company, May 9, 1795, J. Forbes to Renddn, July 27, 1795, West Papers; J. Forbes to Carondelet, May 29, 1795, Stetson Collection. 259 reconciliation of the differences between Spain and the United States. Although totally disinterested in a Spanish alliance, the United States greatly desired to settle the Mississippi question as well as the southern boundary dis­ pute. For this purpose, Thomas Pinckney, appointed by Washington as envoy extraordinary and sole commissioner plenipotentiary, had arrived at the Spanish court in June.7 7

The Treaty of Basel, signed in late July, restored peace between Spain and France, but had failed to secure the hoped for Spanish-French alliance. The disappointed Godoy nevertheless appreciated the expediency of resolving Spain's differences with the United States, particularly in the light of the Jay treaty. Godoy lacked complete knowledge of the details of this accord between the United States and Great Britain that had been ratified by the Senate earlier in the month of July. Consequently, the court favorite persuaded the Supreme Council of State on August 14 to ignore Carondelet's reports on the impending success of his defensive program. It produced an enormous drain on dwindling Spanish resources; moreover, Spain could ill-afford the risk of massive American resentment becoming

tpj Samuel Flagg Bemis, PincJcney 's Treaty: A Study of America's Advantage from Europe's Distresses, 1783-1800 TlTaltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1926), pp. 280-324; Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 205-208. 260 the basis of a United States-British offensive alliance.^^

In the Treaty of San Lorenzo, signed October 27,

1795, Spain recognized the thirtv-first parallel of north latitude as the northern limits of West Florida as well as the right of United States citizens to navigate the Mis­ sissippi. The fifth article provided for mutual coopera­ tion between the signatories in preventing Indian attacks along the Spanish-American frontier. This article, Ly stipulating that both parties would "endeavour to make the advantages of Indian trade common and mutualy [sic] bene­ ficial to their respective Subjects and Citizens," gave

Panton, Leslie and Company an option to continue its 79 operations . William Panton considered the treaty a prime example of Spanish duplicity, protesting that his company had been "abandoned entirely to the Americans," whom the firm had "highly exasperated," The treaty rendered it highly doubtful whether the company could collect the $200,000 in outstanding debts owed the company by the southern tribes, the concerned merchant maintained. He informed Carondelet that the Spanish court must compensate the company for loss the treaty likely would occasion.

^^Bemds, Pinckney's Treaty, pp. 305-322; Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 196-198. ^^Miller, ed.. Treaties, II, 323. 261

Otherwise, the company must "either submit to absolute ruin or bow our knees to those whom we have much offended & endeavour to soften their resentment in the best manner we ..80 Can —

Panton at the same time suggested alternatives to his partners that might prevent the company from becoming involved in "more perplexity and loss." The Scottish mer­ chant was convinced that the firm, despite the treaty proviso permitting its continuance, would find it impossible to "contend with the purse of the United States." The partners might consider becoming "Americans and sollicit

[sic] being the agents of Congress. ..." If this proved unfeasible, they might "wind up" the company's affairs as quidkly as possible. On the other hand, Panton suggested, should the partners succeed in convincing American author­ ities that the company intended to risk competition with the United States, that government then might be persuaded to buy out the firm and secure its Indian accounts. He 81 considered relief from the Spanish court as unlikely.

Carondelet, expressing belief that his government eventually would compensate Panton, Leslie and Company for its losses, pleaded with Panton to remain. The Baron,

^^Panton to Carondelet, July 25, 1796 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVI, 262-263.

^•^Panton to R. Leslie, July 28, 1796, Forbes Papers. 262 highly distrustful of Americans, feared thf; loss of the company's influence over the Indians would expose the

Spanish provinces to United States-inspired Indian attacks.

He also accurately predicted that the Spanish court even­ tually would move to overturn the commitments made at San

Lorenzo. Panton complied with Carondelet's v/ishes, hoping to extract advantage from whatever quarter possible in salvaging the company's interests. 82

The United States discreetly yet relentlessly worked to consolidate its influence over the southern Indians and to overcome the dilatoriness of the Spaniards in fulfilling their treaty commitments. United States commissioners, led by Benjamin Hawkins (who was subsequently named United States Indian Commissioner South of the Ohio), negotiated a new treaty with the Creeks at Coleraine in June 1796. At this conference Hawkins thoroughly explained to the Indians the factory system of trade. The Treaty of Coleraine re­ affirmed the Treaty of New York, awarded the Creeks $6,000 in annual gifts, and gained Creek approval for the President to establish at his discretion two government factories on the Indian side of the Creek-American frontier. The next year the United States relocated its St. Mary's trading

o 2 Carondelet to Panton, July 4, 1796, Panton, Leslie and Company to John Savage, August 12, 1797, Green­ slade Papers; Arthur P, Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803: A Study in Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy (New York: DT Appleton-Century Company, 1934), pp, 54-56. 263 post at a site near Ft. Wilkinson under the provisions of the Coleraine agreement. In March 1798 Spanish forces evacuated Walnut Hills, the last remaining Spanish outpost in United States territory. Despite Indian resistance, a joint United States-Spanish commission completed the West Florida boundary survey in late 1799. 8 3

In the face of the American advance, Panton, Leslie and Company had slowly curtailed its operations. Panton had hoped to relocate the Chickasaw Bluffs store at a site in northern Louisiana, but had received little encouragement from Carondelet on the matter. Only in 1799, however, did the company finally remove from Chickasaw Bluffs, abandoning the site after the United States government instructed the Chickasaws to prevent company employees from growing corn and grazing cattle at the location. At approximately this same time the company drastically reduced its inventories and personnel at St, Marks. As early as October 1796 the company had begun to settle its affairs with the Cherokees, 84 who never had been brought firmly under Spanish influence.

J. Leslie to R, Leslie, May 9, 1796, Greenslade Papers; talk, U.S. Commissioners to Creeks, June 23, 1796, ASPIA, I, 601-602; Whitaker, Mississippi Question, pp. 55- 58; Peake, Indian Factory System, pp. 13-15; Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs, II, 46-50. ^"^J. Forbes to Carondelet, n.d. in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVI, 266-267; Carondelet to Panton, October 8, 1797, Greenslade Papers; J. Forbes to Panton, October 14, 1798, W. Simpson to J. Forbes, March 1, 1799, Cruzat Papers; Whitaker, "Spain and Cherokee Indians," 269. 2 6 4

Despite assurances from Hawkins to the contrarv,

Panton persisted in his forebodings of total disaster from trade competition by the United States government. This potential threat, however, only partly materialized. At the turn of the century, Panton, Leslie and Company retained almost complete control of the Choctaw and Chickasaw trade, but only slightly over one-third of that of the Creeks.

Its exports of deerskins alone from West Florida in 1797 and 1798 approximated 340,000 and 200,000 pounds respec­ tively. Hawkins, convinced that the survival of the southern

Indians depended on converting them into farmers and animal husbandmen, discouraged trade in peltry, particularly on credit. This, plus gifts bestowed judiciously to influ­ ential Indians, kept most resident traders associated with the Panton firm. As a British citizen, Panton could buy goods more cheaply than the United States government, which purchased its supplies from established American mercantile .. 85 firms, Nevertheless, from 1796 onward Panton's troubles multiplied. The affairs of his company once again became

J. Forbes to Folch, November 15, 1801, West Paoers; Hawkins to Secretary of War, March 1, 179 7, same to'same, November 19, 1797, Hawkins to E, Price, October 23, 1797, Hawkins to Panton, May 2, 1798 in Hawkins, Letters, pp. 91-93, 209-210, 238-242, 309-310; Phillips, Fur Trade, II, 217; Whitaker, Documents, pp. 257-258. 265 thoroughly entangled in European economic warfare. To this, ratlier than competition from United States factories, the decline of the company may be attributed. CHAPTER VII

PLUNDERED BY FRIEND AND FOE ALIKE

The influx of French privateers into the Gulf of Mexico in the summer of 1796 perplexed William Panton. Reports circulated in Pensacola that Spanish ports in the West Indies had been thrown open to the admission of British merchantmen taken as French prizes. Cruisers plying the waters adjacent to the Gulf Coast had rendered it haz­ ardous for Panton, Leslie and Company vessels to enter or leave the harbors of Mobile and Pensacola, Panton fretted over rumors of French privateers operating out of New Orleans with Carondelet's full knowledge—despite the fact that the company's ships and cargoes provided the prime attraction. This, the Scottish merchant observed cynically, was his "reward , . . for preserving these Provinces in peace and quietness for Eleven years past," But Panton scarcely could bring himself to believe accounts of an impending Spanish declaration of war against Great Britain. The King of Spain, Panton calculated, stood to lose much and gain nothing by such action, and kings usually behaved with more proper concern for their personal

•'"Panton to R. Leslie, September 8, 1796, Forbes Papers. 266 267 interests. However, he erred in his assessment; news reached Pensacola in January 1797 that Spain had gone to war against the British the past October.

The war presented Panton with serious problems.

The most immediate was to arrange for the safe disposal of deerskins and peltry on hand in West Florida. Not only was there need to safeguard these against capture; to avoid losses from worm damage they must be dispatched to markets before the warm season. Once this matter was resolved, the Spanish government must decide whether Panton, Leslie 2 and Company would remain undisturbed.

At the time the war news reached Pensacola, a company brigantine, the Sheerwater, rested at anchor in Pensacola harbor. Panton quickly requested from Vicente Folch, governor of West Florida, a safe-conduct pass for the vessel to proceed with part of the peltry on hand either to Charlestown or to Nassau where the vessel's cap­ tain would engage enough neutral ships to remove the bal­ ance. The Scottish merchant justified the request on the twelve-month period of grace agreed to by the Spanish crown in 1790 that enabled the company to remove its effects from the Floridas by the most expedient means in case of a Spanish-British war, Folch referred the petition to Gabriel

2 Ibid,; Hawkins to Ma^or John Habersham, February 9, 1797, in Hawkins, Letters, p, 76, 268 Mann Pizarro, the customs officer at Pensacola, who de­ clared himself powerless to comply under existing directives. These, Pizarro replied, permitted authorities at Pensacola to issue passports to the company for London only. The intendant at New Orleans alone held power to authorize voyages to Charlestown or Nassau. Five days later Panton, having fitted out the Sheerwater for sailing, asked for a passport to London, Pizarro, with his suspicions justifi­ ably aroused, reversed his earlier position and refused the passport, Panton, frustrated and fearful of losses from further delays, sent a trusted employee overland to

New Orleans to expedite acquiring the necessary sailing permits•4- , 3

Panton meanwhile also had placed the problems con­ fronting the company before the Baron de Carondelet and Juan Ventura Morales, the ad^ interim intendant. The Scots­ man again explained the necessity of removing the accumu­ lated skins quickly so as to prevent loss, maintaining that the withdrawal privilege made this a matter of right. On the other hand, should the Spanish government wish for Panton, Leslie and Company to continue in the Indian trade, it must permit certain innovations. Wartime restrictions, of course, prohibited direct commercial contact between

•^Panton to Folch, January 9, 1797, same to same, January 14, 1797, West Papers; Panton to Carondelet, Jan­ uary 26, 1797, Stetson Collection, 269 West Florida and England. Thus the Spanish crown must allow neutral vessels of United States registry to call in West Florida with trade goods owned by United States merchants. This would enable the company to barter skins for goods in Florida ports in order to replenish its stocks, thereby eliminating the risk of losses to privateers. The company also must retain its duty-exempt status under the revised procedures. But, Panton concluded, should the company be required to withdraw, he hoped the Spanish authorities would place no impediments in the way of sal­ vaging what remained of its movable property by the most convenient means. Justice and decency demanded as much, he maintained, particularly in light of the enormous losses 4 suffered by the company in its service to the provinces. Unfortunately for Panton, however. Morales' sym­ pathy for the company's plight fell considerably below that displayed by Carondelet. In a long and stormy career as a Spanish colonial official in Louisiana and West Florida, Morales earned a well-deserved reputation for contentious­ ness. His incessant quarrels with Spanish governors re­ sulted in numerous futile requests for his replacement. Ministerial officials in Spain, however, placed too great faith in Morales' demonstrated zeal for resisting

^Panton to Carondelet, January 13, 1797, minutes of Junta de Real Hacienda, January 31, 1797, West Papers. 2 70 extravagance in colonial expenditures to condone his removal1 . 5

In October 1796, even before official notice of the Spanish declaration of war reached New Orleans, Morales had questioned Carondelet on the validity of Panton, Leslie and Company retaining its privileged status. From the intendant's viewpoint, the Treaty of San Lorenzo, by allow­ ing United States citizens trade access to the Indians, apparently obviated any further need for the services of the British firm. At least. Morales inferred, the company should lose its duty free status. On this occasion, Carondelet, expecting a reversal in Spanish policy toward the United States, replied that secret reasons of state prevented any change in the company's privileges.

Carondelet again supported Panton's interests in the disposition of his January 1797 proposal. The Louisiana governor agreed that the royally-sanctioned one-year safe removal period precluded any official interference with the company's prerogative to dispose of skins in its possession by means of its own choice. Carondelet then quite guile­ fully simulated disinterestedness while convincing Morales

Jack D. L. Holmes, "Dramatis Personae in Spanish Louisiana," Louisiana Studies, VI (Summer, 1967), 155-161.

^Morales to Carondelet, October 28, 1796, Carondelet to Morales, November 3, 1796, Morales to Gardoqui, December 1, 1796, West Papers. 271 of the expediency in allowing Panton, subject to later royal confirmation, to continue the trade on the terms reauested. The company, Carondelet reasoned, afforded the sole means of preventing the prevalent restiveness of the southern Indians over the Treaty of San Lorenzo from developing into open hostility against Spanish settlements. Moreover, failure to cooperate with Panton, Leslie and Company might evoke enough resentment among the company's traders to cause them to incite the Indians into attacking and plun­ dering Spaniards. Should the court decide against sup­ porting the company as requested in its May 179 4 memorial, prior losses, together with competition from United States factories, would in time cause Panton to retire voluntarily.

The Indians under these circumstances scarcely could blame 7 Spaniards for the company's withdrawal. With Carondelet's counsels in mind. Morales called a meeting of the Junta of the Royal Treasury to consider Panton's petition in the light of the Indian problem. The Junta agreed in principle to allow Panton, Leslie and Com­ pany to remain in the trade and to use American shipping and trade outlets. But the Junta also approved an earlier decision of Morales to bring the company's activities under closer scrutiny by customs officials. All company cargoes

^Carondelet to Morales, January 30, 1797, Green­ slade Papers. 27z entering and leaving West Florida ports were to be checked carefully so that only items directly related to the Indian trade received duty exemptions. Before sailing, all ships employed by the company were to obtain express approval o from the intendancy. These restrictions countermanded many of the prac­ tices adopted by the company through the course of its operations in West Florida--practices that, Panton inferred, usage had sanctioned with permanent official acceptance. He promptly asked Morales to modify the directive to cover specific activities that would leave the company's status 9 unchanged insofar as wartime circumstances permitted. Panton wished to know if the intent of the ruling prevented the company from transshipping goods and peltry between its Pensacola headquarters and its stores at Mobile, St. Marks, and Chickasaw Bluffs without first obtaining passports from New Orleans. Customarily the company had been required only to submit a list of the goods to be shipped to the customs officer, who then compared the list against the freight. If no discrepancies were observed, the customs officer authorized the shipment. If required to consult with the intendant each time need arose to

^Morales to Folch, January 21, 1797, Folch to Panton, February 12, 1797, minutes of Junta de Real Hacienda, January 31, 1797, West Papers. ^Panton to Morales, February 15, 1797, West Papers 273 transship goods or skins, Panton stated, the conr.any would suffer unnecessary inconvenience and costly delay. He asked Morales to waive this requirement.

The Scottish merchant also explained that a royal order obliged the company to procure salt and rum used in the Indian trade from Havana, In the past, ships dispatched for these items had been permitted to carry as ballast on a non-dutiable basis tar, pitch, and barrel staves produced in West Florida. This arrangement had served to defray expenses and had kept prices charged the Indians low. Panton presumed Morales would continue this indulgence and also dispense with the formality of applying to New Orleans for passports in these cases.

At times, Panton continued, the large quantities of salt demanded by the Indian trade had been unobtainable in Havana. Thus, the company had been permitted from time to time to acquire salt from neutral or friendly West Indies ports where, incidentally, prices were lower. On these voyages company vessels not infrequently had been allowed to export maize from Mobile to exchange for salt. Because this practice also tended to lower selling prices, Panton presumed it too would remain in effect.

Occasionally in the past the company had been granted the special favor of dispatching vessels to Campeche for dyewoods, a commodity ideally suited for ballast when combined with peltry shipments to England. Panton intimated 274 that this concession, although favorable to the company, was not indispensable; dyewood could be obtained from British loggers in the Bay of Honduras duty-free. Yet Panton hoped Morales would raise no objections to occa­ sional summer voyages to Campeche for dyewood, as many of the company's smaller ships were not otherwise employed in that season,

Panton also requested that ox-hides exported by the company be exempted from duty since the Indians also bartered small quantities of these. Nor did he overlook reminding Morales that the company enjoyed the privilege of importing free from impost a large variety of goods intended for household consumption as well as for sale to West Florida garrisons. The Scottish merchant concluded his requests with a recital of the numerous losses suffered by the company in the past, implying that it continued to operate primarily at the request of Carondelet, Panton promised that the company would remain until the Spanish court perfected arrangements for a suitable replacement as requested in the May 1794 memorial. In the meantime he earnestly hoped that Morales would offer the same encour­ agement and protection as had his predecessors.

Once more Carondelet supported virtually every concession requested by Panton, but Morales' scrupulous rigidity in applying royal directives prevailed. In this the intendant ad interim enjoyed the support of the Junta, 275 which met for a second time to deliberate on the company's affairs.. • . 10

Morales, in communicating the Junta's resolutions to Panton, began on a note of condescension. The delay in replying. Morales asserted, was due to Panton's practice of corresponding with the intendancy in English. If the Scottish merchant genuinely wished to avert future delays, he should communicate in Spanish so as to make unnecessary the time-consuming task of translation. With respect to obtaining salt and rum from Havana, the company must use either Spanish ships commanded by a Spaniard and manned by at least a two-thirds Spanish crew or it must resort to American ships and crews. No Englishmen were to be per­ mitted access to such a strategically crucial port as Havana during the war. Ox-hides could be shipped duty-free, but not tar, pitch, maize, or barrel staves. Although per­ mitted in the past, this practice actually constituted an abuse of the royal privileges granted the company. Under no circumstances should Panton entertain the false notion that he was free to trade with British loggers in Honduras in peace or war. On the other hand, the Junta might permit voyages to Campeche for logwood, but each case must be decided on its own merits. Panton might continue to sell

•'•^Carondelet to Morales, March 14, 1797, decision of Junta de Real Hacienda, March 17, 1797, West Papers. 276 goods to the West Florida garrisons to satisfy their imme­ diate needs, but Morales warned that he would instruct the subdelegado in Pensacola to monitor these sales scrupulously in order to prevent abuse. Passports from New Orleans to cover transshipments within the provinces were declared unnecessary; only ships clearing for foreign ports need carry passports issued by the intendancy. Other than the requirements to pay duties on tar, etc.. Morales concluded, the revised regulations caused the Panton firm no harm and provided a framework in which the company must operate until His Majesty decided on the company memorial.

In compliance with a separate mandate from

Carondelet, Panton and his employees in March 179 7 promised under oath neither to interfere in the Spanish war effort nor to give aid and comfort to Spain's enemies. Other than isolated instances of harassment and intimidation from residents of Pensacola which caused Panton to observe that in wartime "the fittest country for a Man to be in, is his own," the company then began an uncomfortable adjustment 12 to the greatly altered conditions of trade. Meanwhile Panton, worried that the discussions by

"'•"'•Decision of Junta de Real Hacienda, March 17, 1797, Morales to Panton, March 21, 1797, West Papers, •'"^Declaration of neutrality of Panton and depen­ dents, March 10, 1797, Stetson Collection; Panton to Carondelet, March 22, 1797, West Papers. 277 Spanish officials in New Orleans of the company's status might drag on into the summer, had decided to dispose of the company's peltry on his own initiative. He dispatched a messenger overland to Savannah in February with instruc­ tions for a Charlestown merchant, Henry Grant, to send American ships and what trade goods were immediately avail­ able to Pensacola. These were to be exchanged for Panton, Leslie and Company deerskins, which were to be consigned under Grant's name for shipment. An American schooner, the Julius Pringle, arrived in Pensacola on March 21 with a small cargo of trade goods consigned to Panton, Leslie and Company by Grant under an arrangement made earlier. The Julius Pringle had sailed from Charlestown before Panton's new instructions arrived. He nevertheless per­ suaded the captain to agree to accept a cargo of peltry 13 as payment, which was consigned to Grant. Much to Panton's consternation, however, Pizarro,

while permitting the trade goods to be unloaded, refused

to sanction the Julius Pringle's departure unless approved

by Morales, The Scottish merchant then rushed a second

messenger overland to New Orleans to obtain passports for

the Julius Pringle as well as other American vessels

"'•^Panton to Morales, March 22, 1797, West Papers; Hawkins to Ensign Thompson, February 9, 1797, in Hawkins, Letters, pp. 75-76. 278 expected momentarily at Pensacola.

Panton's efforts to hasten the departure of peltr\- cargoes, however, evoked little sympathy from Morales. The intendant delayed action on the passport request several days on the pretext that it had been presented in English, thus requiring translation. Moreover, he issued a passport for the Julius Pringle only. The other passports, he main­ tained, could be issued only after the vessels arrived. Indeed, Morales reprimanded Panton for having acted arbi­ trarily in engaging ships before the Junta had decided on the proper procedures. The Julius Pringle, Morales asserted, should have been confiscated or at least ordered out of Pensacola without permission to unload. But on this one occasion. Morales continued, he condescended to overlook Panton's impropriety as he was indispensable to the Indian trade. In the future, the intendant warned, Panton would do well not to arouse suspicion by flaunting authority. The intendant also ordered Pizarro to forbid the loading of the expected vessels until proper passports were first ^ n 15 obtained from New Orleans. Before the tardy reply of Morales reached Pensacola,

Panton and Folch had conspired together in fabricating a

•'•^Panton to Morales, March 22, 179 7, West Papers,

""•^Ibid,; Morales to Pizarro, April 1, 1797, West Papers 279 pretext for clearing the Julius Pringle and two other small American vessels that had arrived in the meantime. Folch alleged to an urgent need for sending a bundle of dispatches to Havana without delay. Consequently, he approached Panton on renting a company schooner, the Shark, to carry the documents to their destination, Panton, how­ ever, had reportedly insisted on a guarantee of 1,500 pesos should the Shark fall prey to British privateers. The Scottish merchant then allegedly had proposed that Folch clear the ships for Charlestown in return for delivery of the dispatches en route free of charge. Folch avowed that he had accepted due to the "importance" of the dispatches. Morales, after delivering a sharp rebuke, grudgingly accepted the fait accompli. Yet, despite Panton's exertions, unfavorable prices on the American market and worm damage apparently lowered the company's profits on the 1797 peltry shipmentsV,- ^1. 6 The officious intendant next devoted his attention to correcting recently discovered minor discrepancies be­ tween bills of lading and the actual number of items trans­ shipped from Pensacola to other company stores. Since receiving duty exempt status in 1789, Panton had insisted

Folch to Pizarro, April 7, 1797, Panton to Folch, April 7, 1797, Folch to Morales, April 11, 1797, Morales to Pedro Varela y Ulloa, May 10, 1797, West Papers; Panton to Gayoso, January 2, 1798, in Corbitt, ed,, GHQ, Pt. XVIII, 375-376, 280 on minimum formality in customs checks on tho grounds that they were superflous. As no actual duties were involved, the Scottish merchant had resisted successfully the stan­ dard practice of customs agents in opening bundles and crates for an itemized count of the contents. This, he claimed, only burdened the company with extra expenses in repackaging merchandise for protection against shopwear or for reconsignment to other stores. Consequently, Spanish agents had limited their inspections to comparing shipping manifests against unopened packages while the company's vessels were being loaded or unloaded. But Morales insisted that henceforth Spanish customs regulations requiring all items, dutiable or otherwise, to be inspected carefully must be followed. He ordered Folch to see that Panton,

Leslie and Company adhered strictly to regulations, espe- 17 cially with regard to imports. Pizarro pointed out the lack of a royal customs house in Pensacola made compliance with Morales' new orders difficult. Indeed, to follow the directive properly,

Panton must be made to arrange his goods for inspection in an empty company warehouse, Pizarro declared. Following his examination, Panton then might repack the goods for

"'•^Pizarro to O'Neill, January 16, 1790, O'Neill to Mird', January 26, 1790, Miro' to O'Neill, February 20, 1790, Folch to Pizarro, August 17, 1790, West Papers. 231 18 shipment or storage as applicable.

Panton protested against the procedure as beinq

"unjust and unnecessary." It contravened established prac­ tices and constituted an infraction of the agreement between the company and the crown. Before altering any company privilege, Panton insisted, the Spanish government must give twelve months' prior notice. During this grace period, the company, if it desired, might withdraw. Panton further claimed that Pizarro's idea would entail expenses for erecting "a new Magazine and [keeping] it empty for the accomodation of the Contador," plus the added costs of packing and unpacking. Panton insisted that Folch order

Pizarro to follow the former procedures, refusing to comply 19 unless under express orders from the King. Panton earlier had appealed to the court; to Carondelet; to Gayoso, who replaced Carondelet as governor- general in August 1797; and to O'Neill, who had been trans­ ferred to Merida in Campeche in 179 3; for assistance in curbing the excesses of Morales. All but the court had agreed to help, bringing Panton to believe Morales soon 20 would be made to "climb upon the stool of repentance."

•'•^Pizarro to Folch, August 18, 1797, West Papers.

•'•^Panton to Folch, October 8, 1797, West Papers. ^^Carondelet to Panton, March 8, 1797, O'Neill to Panton, May 8, 1798, Greenslade Papers; Gayoso to Panton, September 9, 1797, Cruzat Papers; Panton to J. Forbes, August 15, 1797, Forbes Papers. 282 Following Panton's refusal to submit to the new customs regime, harassment from Morales indeed abated.

Meanwhile, at the same time Panton had set in motion deliberation in New Orleans on the company's war­ time status, he and his associates also had sought to clarify their legal position from the British viewpoint. The partners particularly wished to devise a safe means of evading condemnation proceedings in British prize courts. For this purpose Panton, Leslie and Company solicited separate professional opinions from Sir William Scott and a Doctor J. Nicholl, experts in British admiralty law. These both agreed that, should the partners remain in the Floridas and continue the Indian trade, their cargoes, whether carried in neutral or British vessels, were liable to condemnation as legitimate prizes. Nicholl expressed the further opinion that legally the partners would be considered as Spanish subjects. On the other hand, both concurred that if the partners and their effects were cap­ tured while in the act of withdrawal from the Floridas, British admiralty courts most likely would order the prop­ erty restored. In this case restitution would be applicable whether the destination of the partners were a new location in either British or neutral territory. But both experts warned that evidence indicating any intent by the partners to remain in Spanish possessions would subject cargoes consigned in the company's name to valid seizure. This 283 applied also to peltry exported directly to England to retire company indebtedness to British subjects.^"^

Potential and actual problems encountered in 179 7 in their totality greatly discouraged Panton. He had anticipated correctly the adverse legal advice against attempting to maintain direct access to the London market. Yet experience in procuring the types and quantities of items needed for the Indian trade from United States out­ lets proved not only to be expensive, but almost impossible. Nor had American buyers demonstrated much enthusiasm for taking the enormous volume of peltry off the company's hands except at reduced prices. Interference from the intendant further aggravated the generally undesirable trading conditions. Moreover, rumors circulated openly of an impending transfer of the Floridas to France—an event that would in all likelihood result in the company's pre­ cipitate ejection. There also remained the specter of ultimate ruin in competing with the United States govern- 22 ment trading factories. For an undetermined interval during 1797, Panton contemplated moving the company from the Floridas, notifying

^•'"Admiralty opinions, April 20, 21, 1797, Greenslade Papers. ^^Panton to Gayoso, January 2, 1798, same to same, February 6, 1798 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVII, 375-377; Panton, Leslie and Company memorial to Charles IV, June 20, 1797, West Papers, 284 the Spaniards to appoint a suitable replacement by May 1798. Perhaps the Scotsman only feigned an intent to re­ tire as a means of goading the Spanish court to take action on the company's request for financial assistance, but pri­ vate correspondence with relatives in England indicates Panton's sentiments for leaving were likely genuine. By 1798, however, Panton and his colleagues apparently had determined to hold to their tenuous position as best they could, maintaining the trade by whatever means possible in the expectation of an imminent restoration of peace. The partners then seemingly hoped their tenacity might be re­ warded with some form of compensation for prior losses by the Spanish court. Prospects for obtaining the cooperation

of the United States in settling the not inconsequential 23 indebtedness of the southern Indians also appeared good. As an improved adjustment to the exigencies of war­

time trade, in 1798 Panton, Leslie and Company utilized the

services of James Gairdner and Company of Charlestown as

correspondents. This business house acted as consignee

for trade goods ordered from London by the Panton firm.

By making use of the "broken voyage" ruse, Gairdner and

^"^Carondelet memorial to Charles IV, July 1, 1797, John Innerarity, Sr. to Panton, January 8, 179 8, same to same, June 2, 179 8, Greenslade Papers; White to Panton, October 11, 1797, same to same, February 24, 1798, Panton to J. Forbes, November 9, 179 7, Cruzat Papers; Robert S. Cotterill, "A Chapter of Panton, Leslie and Company," Journal of Southern History, X (August, 1944), 276-277, 285 Company then shipped the merchandise on its account to Pensacola in American vessels. Although costly, this practice overcame to some extent shortages of Indian wares 24 as experienced in 1797,

On the other hand, Panton had been unable in 179 7 to make satisfactory arrangements for the disposal of the company's deerskins. This prompted him to take a calcu­ lated risk early in 1798, John Forbes, bearing Spanish letters of safe conduct, accompanied a cargo of deerskins carried by a company vessel. The Sisters, bound for Charles­ town. Upon arrival, Forbes was to find an intermediary interested in dispatching the company's peltry on to the London market on a continuing basis. Should The Sisters be hailed down by a British privateer, Panton believed that the presence of Forbes, together with the safe conduct papers, would safeguard against an unfavorable decision in condemnation proceedings. As a partner in the firm, Forbes

was to allege that he was engaged in removing the company's • 25 effects from Spanish possessions. The Sisters indeed fell prey to the Plover, a

British privateer commanded by a Captain Newton, and was

sent to Nassau for condemnation. The captor agreed to

^^Panton to Gayoso, January 2, 179 8, same to same, February 6, 1798 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVII, 375-377.

25,Ibid, ... 286 allow The Sisters to resume its voyage to Charlestown after Forbes posted bond for the value of the cargo.

Neither litigant stood to gain by subjecting the deerskins to worm damage by further delay. In Charlestown Forbes

succeeded in reaching an agreement with James Gairdner and

Company, which undertook to remove the peltry remaining in

West Florida, Although the company thereafter lost no

deerskins to British privateers, Forbes' delayed arrival

in Charlestown prevented the dispatch of American ships in

time to reach West Florida before warm weather. This 2 c caused some loss from worm damage, The vice-admiralty court in Nassau heard the case against the cargo of The Sisters in March 1798. Witnesses formerly employed as ships officers by Panton, Leslie and Company gave incriminating testimony against the practices of the firm, affirming that company vessels had sailed regularly under dual sets of registry papers--British and Spanish—and, more recently, American and Spanish. The deponents also divulged information on the connections between the Panton and Gairdner firms, and--even more damaging--one deponent testified that Panton and all com­ pany employees in Pensacola had taken an oath of allegiance to Spain in April 1797. The court ruled in favor of the

^^Panton to Gayoso, May 9, 1798 in Corbitt, ed,, GHQ, Pt. XVII, 379. 287 prize captain, but Panton, Leslie and Company entered an appeal1. 27

Several months later another privateer from the

Bahamas captured the Nancy enroute to Pensacola with trade goods shipped by Gairdner and Company. The vice-admiralty court also upheld this cargo as being a legitimate prize of war, probably on evidence of the Gairdner firm's connec­ tion with Panton's trading operations. Just as it appeared the broken voyage arrangement might be rendered useless, the British Board of Trade ruled that neutral ships could carry on their own account British manufactures other than items expressly forbidden into enemy ports. Under this technicality broken voyages via Charlestown continued with­ out further loss, if not molestation, from British priva- 28 teers, An earlier decision by the Board of Trade was even more favorable to the interest of Panton and his associates In November 1797, acceding to the demands of British manu­ facturing and commercial interests, the board opened ports in the Bahamas and Jamaica to ships from Spanish colonies

^^Depositions of G. Fulford and Wm, Cooke, March 21, April 8, 1798, West Papers; Panton to Gayoso, June 11, 1798 in Corbitt, ed,, GHQ, Pt, XVIII, 67-68. ^^Panton to Gayoso, August 4, 1798 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVIII, 70-71; Liverpool's rulings on rights of neutral'ships, December 28, 1798, Cruzat Papers; Panton to J. Forbes, October 23, 1800, Greenslade Papers; Panton to Gayoso, October 9, 179 8, West Papers. 288 traveling under licenses issued by appropriate British governors. Regulations governing this traffic permitted smaller Spanish vessels and British ships of any size to carry specie and a variety of colonial products, including hides, deerskins, peltry, and logwood, into the free ports. These items could be exchanged for British manufactures, except goods considered contraband of war, Orders-in-

council forbade British cruisers from capturing duly licensed ships, Spanish or British, engaged in this trade. 29 Upon learning of this relaxation in British trade measures, Panton immediately asked Gayoso and Morales for permission to trade through Nassau. The Louisiana officials, however, hesitated to lend their approval without the con­ sent of the Captain-General of Havana. The matter was held in abeyance until October 179 8 while waiting for a decision by the Captain-General that never came. The British navy had brought communications between Cuba and New Orleans almost to a standstill. Gayoso finally consented, justi­ fying his initiative on the grounds that poor trading conditions had reduced the Indians to desperation. Other­ wise, he observed, they might have resorted to dealing with

Nassau Free Port blank passports, n.d,, additional instructions of George R., n.d., Forbes Papers; Frances Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies: A study in""Commercial Policy, 1766-1822 (London; Longmans, Green and~"Co., 1953), pp. 96-101. 289 interlopers from the Bahamas.

The favorable changes in British trade regulations greatly relieved the problem of maintaining open trade channels to and from London. The Panton firm alternately used Nassau and Charlestown as intermediate ports for broken voyages. These, of course, added to the company's costs, as did continued losses from worm damage due to occasional delays in obtaining passports from New Orleans. 31

On the other hand, a resurgence of French priva­ teering activity from 179 8 onward offset the advantages gained by the diminution of the British threat. The Cato, a small vessel employed in the company's East Florida oper­ ations, fell prize to a French cruiser early in the year. A second company ship, the Margaret Ann, was taken as a French prize while carrying peltry out of Mobile in 1800. In the same year two company brigs, the Campbell and the Greenwood, were lost at sea with no survivors, all of which kept insurance premiums well above peacetime levels. In

Panton to Gayoso, May 22, 179 8, same to same, September 10, 1798 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVII, 380- 381, Pt. XVIII, 71-72; Gayoso to Panton, October 16, 1798 in "The Panton, Leslie Papers," Florida Historical Quar­ terly, XV (April, 1937), 250. ^"'"Gayoso to Panton, May 22, 1799 in "Panton, Leslie Papers," loc. cit. 250-251; Panton to [] October 97~T799, Stetson Collection; Morales to Panton, October 21, 1799, J. Leslie to Panton, March 7, 1800, Cruzat Papers; J. Forbes to Marque's de Casa Calvo, February 5, 1801, West Papers. 290

November 1801 the company reported that war-related costs in the form of higher insurance premiums, losses of unin­ sured cargo and ships to privateers, and accidents at sea since the beginning of hostilities in 1793 had reached

$400,000.^^

Meanwhile, John Leslie, at the suggestion of Panton and John Forbes, had departed for England in the latter part of 1798 to extricate the company from a number of its wartime difficulties. Leslie was to seek special commer­ cial concessions from the British government, to represent the company in appealing the condemnation of the cargo of

The Sisters, and to clear up misunderstandings with Strachan 33 and McKenzie that had risen since the onset of the war. The relations between the Panton firm and its powerful London correspondents by mid-179 8 had become strained to the breaking point. Panton complained that Strachan and McKenzie had been remiss in fulfilling a request to seek official protection for the company to withdraw from the Floridas. The Scottish merchant believed the British government scarcely would deny such protection,

^^Panton to Gayoso, February 6, 1798 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVII, 376-377; Wm. Simpson to Panton, October 23," 1800^ Cruzat Papers; Panton to J. Forbes, October 23, 1800, Greenslade Papers; J. Forbes to Folch, November 15, 180l' deposition of Fulford and Cooke, March 21, 1798, West Papers. ^"^J. Innerarity, Sr. to Panton, July 6, 1798, Greenslade Papers; J. Leslie to Panton, July 6, 1798, Innerarity-Hulse Papers. 291 for it had recognized the status of Panton, Leslie and Company in the Spanish Floridas from the outset. Pantr.n also believed the London firm had begun to act arbitr.iri ly in handling routine business affairs, overcharging on com­ missions in the sale of peltry, procuring overpriced trade goods, and assigning insurance to underwriters on the basis of privilege. Consequently, Panton had refrained from consigning the 1797 peltry exports to Strachan and McKenzie. He also considered engaging the London firm of Penman, Shaw and Company as correspondent should Strachan and McKenzie refuse an offer to handle the sale of peltry at a reduced 34 commission of 2 per cent.

Strachan and McKenzie retaliated by obtaining from the Lord Mayor's Court in May 1798 a writ of attachment against the property of Panton and his partners "wherever it [might] be found" for alleged indebtedness in excess of 620,000. Thomas Forbes, the partner in Nassau, estimated that Strachan and McKenzie also intended to buy all other outstanding indebtedness of Panton, Leslie and Company and then force a settlement. Forbes advocated resisting the demands of Strachan and McKenzie; statements in Panton's possession indicated they indeed had been overpaid. As a member of a second partnership, Forbes and Munro, Forbes

34 J. Innerarity, Sr. to Panton, January 28, 1798, same to same, June 2, 1798, Greenslade Papers; Panton to Gayoso, March 25, 1798 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XVII, 378. 2^^2 intended to attach in Nassau a cargo and ship belonging to Panton, Leslie and Company as a countermeasure against

Strachan and McKenzie, thus compelling that firm to enter a lawsuit on less favorable grounds than London. 35

One month before taking legal action against the Panton firm, Strachan and McKenzie had obtained the special order-in-council that protected the property of Panton, Leslie and Company from seizure while it was actu­ ally being withdrawn from the Floridas to the Bahamas, The royally sanctioned directive, in fulfillment of Panton's earlier request, was carefully worded to cover not only property in the company's possession at the time war was declared, but also property received in payment for goods introduced into the Floridas before the war. These privileges were to remain in effect for two years from May 3, 1798,^^

The two-year period of grace as well as the stipu­ lation protecting property acquired after the declaration of war undoubtedly were justified on the need for settling company affairs and collecting back debts before evacuating the Floridas. These provisions, however, made the

^^J. Innerarity, Sr. to Panton, June 2, 179 8, same to same, June 16, 1798, Greenslade Papers; T, Forbes to Panton, July 25, 1799, Cruzat Papers. "^^George R, Order-in-Council, May 3, 1798, Stetson Collection; Strachan and McKenzie to Forbes and Munro, April 21, 1798, Forbes Papers. 293 order-in-council flexible enough to protect peltry exports should Panton and his partners decide to remain in the trade. A sworn statement by any of the principals sufficed to verify that any given outgoing cargo was being removed as part of the overall process of withdrawal. Panton, of course, had requested these privileges before the Board of Trade had opened Nassau to commerce with Spanish colonies. Most probably he had done so to corroborate the expert legal opinions on the company's status under admiralty law solicited in April 179 7. At any rate, although doubting the order-in-council through retroactivity might avert the loss of the cargo of The Sisters, Panton was pleased it had been granted. It could serve as an additional weapon in warding off rapacious British privateers and before its date of expiration, he hoped, the hostilities might cease. 37 The order-in-council also may have been useful to John Leslie in effecting a reconciliation between Panton and the London correspondents. Leslie for whatever reasons apparently bore less animosity toward Strachan and McKenzie than did Panton. By October 1800 the London firm had re­ sumed at least partly its services to Panton, Leslie and

•^^Ibid.; Panton to Gayoso, October 9, 1798, West Papers. 294 38 Company.

Both Panton and Leslie strove to acquire further concessions from the British government in 1799. Above all they sought approval for direct trade between Pensacola and London in British or neutral ships or both, especially for the highly perishable exports of peltry. Next in importance, the partners asked permission to import gun­ powder, lead, saddles, and nails—items expressly prohib­ ited as contraband. They also wished for a two-year extension on the time allotted for withdrawal.

The war had made the company's sources of supply for crucially important powder and ball extremely precarious Not even neutral vessels could carry powder to the Floridas under any pretext without risking capture by British cruisers. Naturally Panton's business acumen made him quite reluctant to advance other trade goods to Indians on credit unless they included ammunition—the wherewithal for ob­ taining deerskins necessary for repayment. As early as February 1797 Panton had requested Carondelet's permission either to borrow or to buy powder and ball from royal stores. The Spanish government, when convenient, had loaned ammunition to the Panton firm, but not without

^^J, Innerarity, Sr, to Panton, March 12, 1799, Panton to J. Forbes, October 23, 1800, Greenslade Papers; Casa Calvo to Ramo'n de Lopez y Angulo, November 5, 1800, West Papers; J. Leslie to Panton, February 26, 1799, Cruzat Papers. z 'J ^ Morales having insisted on undesirable terms. Panton had wished the Spanish government to advance powder and lead

at a price no higher than that charged the company's

Indian customers. The firm, he stated, followed the prac­

tice of underselling American competitors appreciably in

this line of merchandise, a tactic designed to foster good will and to assure successful hunts. But Morales had in­

sisted on charging the company New Orleans prices, which were nearly double Panton's selling prices. The intendant

also had required the company to mortgage property as 39 security for the loan, Panton, in supporting the company's request to the British government for special permission for importing ammunition and for direct trade, argued that these conces­ sions ultimately would benefit the Indians, who were "friends of Great Britain." It was only good policy for the government to preserve the fondness of the Indians for the British by eliminating oppressive trading conditions that kept the red men in a state of deprivation. Besides, the company since 17 83 had kept open an important market for British manufactures, had created employment for British shipping, and had provided the British treasury

^^Panton to Carondelet, February 15, 1797, Panton to Gayoso, March 7, 1798, Panton to Casa Calvo, December 23, 1797, West Papers; Casa Calvo to Panton, March 5, 1800, Greenslade Papers; Panton to [Bouligny], October 9, 1799, Stetson Collection. 296 with an estimated B217,600 in import duties and excises on finished buckskin products, all of which, Panton asserted, constituted "an advantage to our Native Country v/hich [merited] some attention, ..." Once lost, the Scotsman observed, the advantage might never be regained.

In presenting Panton's views to Lord Liverpool of the Board of Trade, Adam Gordon represented the Scottish merchant as "a man of tried and unshaken loyalty ... to his native country." Panton's pleas, supported by the intercessions of Gordon and Leslie, brought a favorable response from the Board of Trade early in 1800. Panton, Leslie and Company received permission to import from Nassau slightly over half its annual requirements of 10,000 pounds of gunpowder and 20,000 pounds of ball as well as saddles and nails. The firm also obtained approval to ship deer­ skins directly to London, but temporarily failed to gain 41 consent to import directly from England. The company, however, in August 1800 lost its appeal of the condemnation of the cargo of The Sisters, a ruling that left John Leslie astonished. Yet counselors had advised against introducing evidence in support of the

"^^Panton to Adam Gordon, July 24, 1799, Cruzat Papers. ^•'"Orders of the Privy Council, February 27, 1800, Cruzat Papers; Casa Calvo to Lopez y Angulo, March 15, 1800, West Papers; William Dowdeswell to Portland, August 10, 1800, Greenslade Papers. 297 company's newly found favor with the Board of Trade. Such an imprudent course of action might have led to a loss of the company's privileges, as relations between the commercial-minded Board of Trade and prize-minded naval commanders were never too cordial.

On the other hand, a measure enacted by Parliament in May 1800 granting British citizens temporary rights to import in neutral vessels products from enemy colonies in America aided Leslie in obtaining permission for the com­ pany to engage in similar activities. The intent of the act was to promote the exchange of foreign colonial produce for British manufactures and to make the British Isles a war­ time entrepot for European colonial trade. Thus, since Pan- ton, Leslie and Company was ideally suited for this purpose, Liverpool could readily agree to grant the firm a concession reaching beyond the letter of the law. Leslie received special license for the company to carry British goods on its ships directly to New Orleans. These could be exchanged for an equivalent value of colonial products which then 43 could be dispatched in company vessels to English markets.

J, Leslie to T, Forbes, August 22, 1800, Green­ slade Papers; "Liverpool's Rulings on the Rights of Neutral Ships," December 28, 1798, Cruzat Papers. ^^J. Leslie to Liverpool, April 15, 1800, Cruzat Papers; Thomas Lack to Gordon, April 28, 1800, "An Act to Permit the Importation of Goods and Commodities from Countries in America, . . .," May 1, 1800, Panton to J. Forbes, October 23, 1800, Greenslade Papers. 20 8 Panton and his partners valued this particular con­ cession for reasons beyond facilitating the Indian trade; it complemented separate negotiations underway with the Spanish court on the question of indemnification.

As early as June 179 7 Panton had appealed to the crown for a decision on the May 1794 memorial. The 1794 petition had been shunted along a tedious path through the Spanish bureaucracy, traveling from the Treasury to the War Ministry before coming to rest within the Ministry of State, Lack of funds, Spanish acquiescence in the American westward advance, and more pressing considerations con­ cerning national survival had acted to hold the Panton memorial in abeyance. Meanwhile, the Scottish merchant, with the good offices of a certain John Savage of Madrid, 44 had continued to press for favorable action. Panton reminded the court that the company had con­ tinued despite the threat of competition from the United States primarily at the request of Carondelet, who had en­ couraged the partners to expect Spanish support or at least compensation for losses. Losses to French privateers and higher insurance costs, Panton informed the crown, had risen to $185,659. These and competition from the United States would force the company to retire by May 1798.

^^Savage to Panton, Leslie and Company, February 2 5 1797 Forbes Papers; Panton, Leslie and Company Memorial to'charl4s IV, June 20, 1797, West Papers. 299 Panton consequently had asked Governor Carondelet to buy the company's property, to arrange for a replacement, and to allow the company to collect its debts before retiring. Debt collection, the petitioner continued, had become a delicate matter in the light of competition from the United States. Undue pressure might drive the Indians into trading with the Americans. For these considerations, Panton stated. His Majesty should indemnify the company for its losses and also formally request the United States to assist in recovering the back debts. Furthermore, should France as rumored gain control of the Floridas, the transfer agree­ ment in justice should recognize explicitly the company's 45 interests. Carondelet corroborated Panton's June 1797 appeal and further informed His Majesty that the Indian trade re­ mained highly important in guarding the provinces against Indian depredations. A Spanish trade outlet offering cheaper terms than those of the United States also might keep the Indians secure in their lands, preserving somewhat their value as a buffer. Attesting that the past services of the company merited consideration as a matter of equity, Carondelet also promised to try to persuade Panton to

^^Panton, Leslie and Company Memorial to Charles IV, June 20, 1797, West Papers. 300 extend his deadline for suspending the trade. 4 fi

The firm endorsement given the Panton memorial by

Carondelet encouraged the Scotsman to believe that the

Spanish court, despite the Treaty of San Lorenzo, might agree to some form of support for the company, or at least compensate it for losses. Panton advised Savage, in his dealings with the Spaniards, to emphasize the company's role in underselling the United States government notwith­ standing mounting losses. The agent in Madrid should im­ press upon the Spaniards that the Americans as yet had made

"but little progress" in acquiring the Indian trade, "the 47 object they [had] long sought and contended for. ..."

By mid-1799, however. Savage's exertions on behalf of his British clients had produced no results. The demands of war prevented the Spanish authorities from considering

Panton's memorials. Moreover, should a favorable decision be forthcoming. Savage advised that lack of money precluded 48 any form of financial reimbursement as a settlement. Consequently, Panton altered the terms of the com­ pany's request. In lieu of monetary indemnification, it would accept commercial privileges with other Spanish

^^Memorial to King by Carondelet, July 1, 1797, Greenslade Papers. ^^Panton to Savage, August 12, 1797, Greenslade Papers. ^^Panton to Savage, April 19, 1799, Greenslade Papers; Savage to Panton, May 25, 1799, Cruzat Papers, 301 colonies as well as an Indian trading concession west of the Mississippi, As a basis for negotiations, Panton sug­ gested his firm be allowed to trade in dyewood from Campeche as well as sugar from Havana with Nassau and Charlestown.

The privilege might be made effective for two years beyond the duration of the war. The Spanish government also might consider permitting the Panton firm to conduct a general trade with other Spanish colonial ports, exchanging goods for local products. This, Panton observed, scarcely could harm Spanish commerce since the government already had opened its colonial ports to neutral shipping. 49 The war indeed had caused the opening of Spanish colonial ports to neutral commerce. United States vessels in particular since October 1797 had dominated the Spanish coloniaT • l-1 trade^ J , 50 The efforts of Panton and Savage succeeded in arousing at least some interest for the company's problems in the Ministry of State, In February 1800, Mariano Luis de Urquijo, who had succeeded Godoy as Minister of State, instructed the Governor of Louisiana, the Marque's de Casa Calvo, to submit a detailed report on the continued

^^Panton to Savage, April 19, 1789, Greenslade Papers; Savage memorials to Charles IV, August 4, 1799, September 9, 1799, West Papers. ^^Whitaker, Documents Relating to Commercial Policy of_ Spain, xlvii-1; Clark, New Orleans, pp, 240-244. 302 usefulness of Panton, Leslie and Company and also on the merits of its claims. If these were justified, Casa Calvo was to comment on proper means of compensation. Six months later he completed his assignment in a manner quite favor­ able to the interests of the Panton firm. The governor asserted that indemnification was justified; the company indeed had incurred some $400,000 in cumulative losses. Rather than recommending any specific form of indemnifica­ tion, he approved in principle any of the alternatives suggested earlier. Casa Calvo insisted that control of the Indian trade remained indispensable to the security of the provinces, and it was virtually impossible to find a suitable replacement for Panton's company.

Meanwhile, the Spanish court had suggested several commercial concessions to Savage possibilities for indemni­ fying his client. These would permit Panton, Leslie and Company to engage in trading in Spanish sugar and dyewood as requested earlier and also would allow the firm to intro­ duce slaves into Louisiana, By September 1800, however, Panton considered permission for trading in Havana sugar and Campeche dyewood of no great potential advantage, par­ ticularly since rumors of peace were in the air. He ex­ pected price drops in these commodities at the end of the

^•'•Urquijo to Governor of Louisiana, February 26, 1800, West Papers; Casa Calvo to Urquijo, October 8, 1800, Lockey Papers , 303 hostilities. The Louisiana slave trade would suffice onl• if granted as a monopoly. Instead, Panton wanted the privilege of supplying British goods to Campeche duty-free, which might explain his earlier interest in that area as a source for logwood ballast. Above all else, Panton pre­ ferred to sell the company to the Spaniards for $200,000.^^ He had become thoroughly weary from the stresses of the Indian trade.

Panton's negotiations with the Spanish and British governments as well as his exertions to continue somehow the war-strained trade served quite similar purposes. Basically, the Scot hoped to choose a proper time for the company to retire from the Floridas while keeping intact as many of its assets as possible. His ability to close out the company's rapidly mounting credit among the southern Indians weighed heavily on the attainment of this greater objective. In turn, success in this area depended to a large extent on the cooperation of the United States. Panton and John Forbes had begun to seek assistance from the United States as early as 1796, when Forbes had visited the Knoxville area to gain the assistance of United States Indian officials in collecting from the Cherokees. This initial contact was followed up with a visit by John

^^Panton to J. Forbes, September 22, 1800, Green­ slade Papers. 304

McKee, formerly a United States agent to the Cherokees, to

Panton's Pensacola headquarters in March 1797. Before

departing, the American agent officially assured Panton

that the United States government would "facilitate" the

company's efforts to collect its debts from the southern

Indians. Later developments reveal that Panton considered

cessions of Indian land as the proper form of reimburse-

mentA. . 53 Land payments by Indians as a means of retiring trading debts in all likelihood was not an unknown practice to Panton. In 1773, during his years in the southern colonies, the British Indian Department had negotiated such settlements with the Creeks and Cherokees. Thus, his decision to resort to the same method seems more paradoxical than unusual. The very lands Panton had exhorted the Indians to hold against American encroachment he later sought for himself—and he wanted American aid in obtaining them. Panton, ever mindful of developments in his trading sphere, realized that the United States, under the aegis of Benjamin Hawkins, had embarked on a program of "civi­ lizing" the southern tribes, especially the Creeks. These were to be enticed away from hunting into the more sedentary occupations of farming and livestock-raising, pursuits, of

^^Cotterill, "A Chapter of Panton, Leslie and Com­ pany," 276-277. 305 course, that required considerably less territory. Panton's decision to settle company arrears for land in­ dicates his awareness that the United States position eventually would prevail; hunting, and hence the fur trade, was doomed.

As quid pro quo for support from the United States government Panton very likely promised to promote accept­ ance of the American viewpoint among the Creeks. Or, he may have agreed to allay the fears and to dispel the resent­ ment of the Indians against the work of the joint United States-Spanish boundary commission in fixing the West Florida line.

In 1798 and 1799, Panton and Forbes worked assidu­ ously through their agents as well as those of the United States in setting the climate for Indian land cessions. In 1799, Forbes suggested that Panton inform Gayoso of the company's intention to petition the United States Congress for approval to accept land in payment of Indian debts. Gayoso, Forbes surmised, scarcely could refuse without offering alternative forms of compensation. Furthermore, "like all Spaniards," Forbes continued, Gayoso was "igno­ rant of the true value of lands so circumstanced." Whether

^^Cotterill, Southern Indians, p. 12 4; Whitaker, Mississippi Question, p. 77. 306 from "ignorance" or for other reasons, Gayoso approved.^^

United States agents among the southern tribes apparently were willing to cooperate with the company in its quest for Indian lands. But they reported that Secre­ tary of War James McHenry was too disinterested and "indo­ lent" to obtain the necessary official approval. Instead, quite likely he was overly distracted in 1799 by Federalist Party schemes to "avert peace" with the French to pay much attention to Indian affairs. Other reasons, such as the restiveness of the Indians over trade shortages and high prices, made it expedient for Panton to defer action on the delicate matter of land cessions. Moreover, William Augustus Bowles returned for a long overdue reunion with his fellow countrymen in the state of Muskogee in October 1799--an even more compelling reason for a cautious approach to the land question.

After escaping his Spanish captors in mid-1798,

Bowles had gone to London where he lingered for some seven months recuperating from his long imprisonment, pleading

Hawkins to Panton, May 20, 1798 in Hawkins, Letters, pp. 309-310; Daniel McGillivray to Panton, April 24, 1798, William Simpson to J. Forbes, March 1, 1799, J. Forbes to Panton, January 13, 1799, Cruzat Papers; Gayoso to J. Forbes, February 21, 1799, West Papers. ^^D. McGillivray to Panton, July 13, 1798, Panton to Edward Forrester, September 22, 1798, J. Forbes to Panton, April 30, 1800, Cruzat Papers; Creek Nation to Hawkins, November 25, 1799, Greenslade Papers; to Hawkins, October [1799], West Papers, 307 with the Pitt Ministry for support in the capture of the Floridas, and interesting former supporters as well as new prospects in the future of Muskogee. John Leslie, at first astounded at Bowles' presence, thought of having him arrested and prosecuted on criminal charges. But Leslie had to abandon this plan, for no British court could claim proper jurisdiction for the plunder of the St. Marks store. The Director-General departed for Barbados in February 1799 with official encouragement--if not full support--for his return to the Creeks, After a leisurely, meandering itinerary that led through Jamaica and the Bahamas, Bowles

reached the environs of the mouth of the Ochlockonee only 57 to be shipwrecked in a sudden storm. Salvaging what baggage he could, Bowles and the small retinue he had acquired in the West Indies proceeded into the Lower Creek villages for a joyful reception. Acclaimed again as Director-General by a small following of Lower Creeks and Seminoles, Bowles pronounced his inten­ tion to undo the Treaty of San Lorenzo, denounced the Spaniards for their abandonment of the Indians, proclaimed the sovereighty of Muskogee, declared he would send off Panton "in Irons as a traitor" to the British and Indians, and all the while yearned for the sight of a British troop

^'^Wright, William Augustus Bowles, pp. 94-115, passim; J. Leslie to Panton, February 26, 1799, Cruzat Papers. 308 convoy breaking over the horizon of the sea.^^

Meanwhile, Panton and the Spaniards, for months well-informed of Bowles' movements, prepared their defenses.

Supplies were removed from the St. Marks store to the

Spanish fort, and the company's cattle were herded to safer pastures. The Spaniards dispatched armed galleys to patrol

Apalachee Bay with orders to capture Bowles and to inter­ cept any supply vessels that might appear, Tomas Portell, commandant at St, Marks, announced a price of $4,500 had been placed on Bowles, dead or alive. 59 Early in 1800 the Director-General struck back at his antagonists. With some 300 Indians and less than a dozen white followers he first captured the St, Marks trading post and next sent a formal declaration of war to Commandant Portell, demanding that he surrender the fort. The Spanish officer refused, and Bowles laid seige with his Lower Creek and Seminole braves. In Pensacola, Folch and Panton, perhaps incapable of conceiving Indians employed in disciplined seige tactics, sent the Sheerwater to St. Marks with supplies for the garrison and gifts for bribing away the Director-General's army. But Bowles captured the

^Wright, William Augustus Bowles, p. 118; Hawkins to Panton, October 9, 1799, Cruzat Papers. ^^Forrester to Panton, October 1, 1799, same to same, October 6, 1799, Cruzat Papers; Wright, William Augustus Bowles, pp. 118-119. 309

Sheerwater just after it hove into the St. Marks River, gaining plunder, supplies, and two small cannon with which to menace the garrison. Portell, although not under immi­ nent danger of being overrun, despaired of relief and surrendered. The arms of Muskogee prevailed over the

Spaniards in mid-May following a six-weeks action. Portell later was cashiered from the Spanish service for the sur- 60 render.

Folch immediately organized land and sea forces to recapture the surrendered outpost. Assuming personal com­ mand, the Pensacola commandant embarked for St, Marks with three armed galleys and a moderate-sized contingent of troops. Following a brief bombardment of the stone-walled 6 1 fort, Bowles and his Indians retreated.

Panton later reported the company's losses at

$16,059, possibly an inflated figure. Yet, what caused the harried Scotsman even greater concern was his belief that Folch might keep as spoils of war the recaptured

Sheerwater and the company's goods that Bowles had not carried off. In remonstrating against Folch, Panton avowed such a step would be "a hardship indeed , , , were my prop­ erty to be torn from me by my friends as well as my ene­ mies," As Bowles could be considered nothing more than

60,Wright , William Augustus Bowles, pp, 127-130, 170. ^^Ibid., pp. 134-136. 310 "a robber by Sea, as well as by Land," justice required 62 restitution.

The St. Marks incident contains tragic irony. The then seemingly indomitable Bowles, the first to challenge seriously the trade empire of William Panton, also became the last of the failing Scotsman's tormentors.

Almost perceptibly the war had drained Panton's will to continue the trade against such formidable odds, and over the immediate past years he had complained bit­ terly and often of his misfortunes. Fatigued from having played "a losing game for eight Years past," Panton ear­ nestly desired its end "before the last shilling [should] go." He had begun to dream wistfully of retirement on his father's farm in northeastern Scotland. By the middle of 1800, John Forbes observed that his mentor no longer pressed the Spaniards for advantage with the same vigor as in the turbulent years before the Treaty of New York. Drained emotionally by the cares of the concern and plagued by failing eyesight, a rheumatic condition, and even more dangerous physical infirmities, Panton by the end of 1800

^^Cotterill, "A Chapter in Panton, Leslie and Com­ pany," 277; Panton to [Casa Calvo], July 24, 1800 in Corbitt, ed., GHQ, Pt. XIX, 169-170. Corbitt erroneously lists the addressee as Gayoso. 311 was gravel1y ill-n . 63

On January 20, 1801, Panton, swollen and suffering from a dropsical condition, was placed aboard the Shark and, attended by a physician, departed hastily for Havana.

Medical advice held that a change to a more favorable climate was absolutely necessary to preserve the Scotsman's life, causing the Shark to get underway before letters of recommendation from Casa Calvo to influential relatives in

Cuba arrived in Pensacola. Unfavorable winds made for a tedious three-week voyage, but Panton's low spirits improved 64 as the Shark finally made her way past El Morro Castle.

But Spanish authorities quickly delivered a telling blow to Panton's revived hopes; he was refused admittance as an Englishman, and the Shark was ordered to put out to sea immediately. It was decided to remove the failing Panton to Nassau, but heavy seas enroute forced the Shark to seek haven at Key West. An unsympathetic British naval officer

^•^J, Innerarity, Sr, to Panton, January 8, 179 8, Panton to James Burges, September 21, 179 8, Panton to J, Forbes, April 26, 1800, T, Forbes to Panton, January 3, 1801, Greenslade Papers; J. Forbes to Panton, May 30, 1800, Cruzat Papers. ^^Casa Calvo to J. Forbes, February 4, 1801, J. Forbes to Casa Calvo, February 5, 1801, same to same, March 10, 1801, same to same, April 29, 1801, West Papers; [Fowler] to [Forbes], March 21, 1801, Greenslade Papers. ^^[Fowler] to [Forbes], March 21, 1801, Greenslade Papers. 312 detained here there two days v/hile he weighed the merits of sending the schooner to Jamaica as a prize. Finally released, the Shark proceeded toward the Bahamas, but again quickly encountered contrary winds and rough seas.

William Panton, emaciated and completely exhausted, passed away in his sleep on the twenty-sixth of February. His death, reported his physician, was all the more tragic, fi fi because Panton's "desire to live was great." Buried at Great Harbour on Berry Island, the merchant-adventurer fell victim more to the antagonists whom he had professed to serve than to the elements.

Ibid, CHAPTER VIII

CAREER IN RETROSPECT

As with most imposing personalities, William Panton's contemporaries saw in him many lights and shades. He impressed Arturo O'Neill as being a typical Scottish Calvinist whom the Indians held in high esteem. The French adventurer Louis LeClerc Milfort, once a kinsman to McGillivray by marriage and his trusted follower, described Panton as a "close friend" and a trustworthy benefactor of the Creeks. On the other hand, John Pope, an American visitor in Pensacola in 1791, viewed Panton as a monopolist who "uniformly imposed" on the Indians. Andrew Ellicott, the chief surveyor for the United States in the joint Florida boundary commission, saw Panton as a person who lived in "elegant stile [sic], highly esteemed for [his] great hospitality and politeness by all classes of people."

Panton, a bachelor, indeed lived sumptuously in an impressive three-story brick mansion that served as his Pensacola headquarters—an edifice appraised at over $14,000 in 1801, Possessed of a lively interest in

"'"McGillivray to McLatchey, September 18, 1784, EF 116L9; Milfort, Memoirs, p. 73; Pope, Tour, p. 44; Ellicott, Journal, p, 211. 313 314 gardening and horticulture, he covered the grounds of his estate lavishly with shrubbery and fruit trees. Items regularly imported for household consumption included ample quantities of fine wines, beer, cider, cheese, butter, salmon, cod, bacon, hams, beef tongue, sugar, mustard, and spices, Panton extended open hospitality to the numerous chieftains and traders who called at Pensacola constantly as well as less frequent visitors from elsewhere. His favors to Spanish officials were equally bountiful, in­ cluding the procurement of a carriage for Gayoso's lady, a spirited white stallion for Carondelet, a matched team for the Spanish consul at Savannah, and free passage on a company vessel for O'Neill and his household effects to his new post in Campeche, These of course, together with a considerable yearly outlay for Indian presents, Panton

considered as business expenses. Entertainment and gifts 2 averaged $18,000 annually. A man of loyalty to family and friends, William

Panton provided for the needs of his father, John, in his

declining years. He also came to the rescue of a

^Greenslade, "William Panton," 112-113; Appraisal of Panton residence by James Wilkins, Florencio Ximenez, and Nicolas Lopez, March 14, 1801, list of goods necessary to the trade of the Creek Indians, August 24, 1789, Panton to carondelet, June 14, 1793, Casa Calvo to Urquijo, February 26, 1800, West Papers; O'Neill to Carondelet, April 11 1793, Panton to Gayoso, October 9, 1798, Stetson Collection; J. Forbes to Panton, March 28, 1799, Cruzat Papers; Manuel Rengil to Panton, May 20, 1799, Greenslade Papers. 315 brother-in-law who was beset with financial difficulties from business reversals. He sent McGillivray's orphaned son, "Aleck," together with a cousin, to be educated in Scotland. Young McGillivray, however, became incurably consumptive and apparently survived his sponsor by only several months.

The lack of grammatical precision in Panton's cor­ respondence is amply compensated for by his articulateness. Endowed with a sharply satirical wit, he often resorted to colloquialisms in emphasizing particular points. For example, in admonishing O'Neill to forget his suspicions of McGillivray in 1792, Panton remarked: "The readiest [sic] way to make ones Wife a Whore is to let her see that you Suspect her." He dealt with Spanish officials straight­ forwardly—if not always truthfully. A man of action, Panton as a decision-maker weighed alternatives carefully, but once determining a course of action, he pursued it with great resolve. Highly self-confident, Panton generally demonstrated little proneness to languish in doubt even when confronted with great adversity.

In short, William Panton had those qualities that

characterized the monopoly-minded merchant-adventurer class

^Greenslade, "William Panton," 116-119; J. Innerarity, Sr. to Panton, January 8, 1798, same to same, July 20, 1798, Greenslade Papers. ^Panton to O'Neill, November 9, 1792, West Papers. 316 of his times. Without doubt Adam Smith would have given his fellow Scot a prominent rank among those of his coun­

trymen whom the great economist described as "a nation of

shopkeepers." By inclination a "bold . . , undertaker,"

Panton possessed the "habits , . . of order, economy and

attention" that Smith attributed to eighteenth-century 5 British merchants, Panton's versatile entrepreneurial talents qualified him well to direct his company's efforts toward its prime objective—that of engrossing the southern

Indian trade. In pursuing this objective, William Panton's entre­ preneurship consistently followed a set of assumptions concerning political and economic realities of the post- Revolutionary era. The degree to which he succeeded in attaining the company's ambitious goal related directly to the validity of his assumptions.

With the retrocession of the Floridas to Spanish

control, Panton assumed the Spaniards would find their

resources inadequate to the task of implementing an effec­

tive "trade control" Indian policy. Failure to fill the

commercial void generated by the British departure would

lead to the establishment of American hegemony over the

southern Indians by default. This in turn would destroy

An Inquiry Into the Wealth of Nations, ed. by Edwin Cannon with introH'uction by Max Lerner, Modern Library Series (New York: Random House, 1937), pp. 384- 385, 579. 317 the chances of the Spaniards to arrest the Anglo-American advance.

Panton's strategy for gaining acceptance by the Spaniards called for convincing them that his services were superior--preferably indispensable—as a supplier of goods for the Indians. This goal he would achieve through the agency of the principal spokesman for his Indian cus­ tomers, Alexander McGillivray. The Creek chieftain from 1785 until his death worked diligently at promoting Panton's interest. In doing so, of course, McGillivray simulta­ neously enhanced his own. He shared in the company's profits, enjoyed Panton's largesse, and gained stature by aligning himself with the most important source of polit­ ical power over the Indians--their source of supply. Americans as well as Spaniards soon learned of McGillivray's power to sway the Creeks to do his will. Although also genuinely interested in preserving the integrity of Creek lands, he promoted exclusivism for Panton and the Spaniards with the scalping knife. Hence the harmony of interest that bound together Panton, the Creeks, and the Spanish

crown. Yet neither in New Orleans nor in the Escorial

were "trade" and "Panton" ever fully accepted as synonymous

terms. Officially the company never enjoyed more than re­

signed toleration from the Spaniards. Their thoughts turned

recurrently to the desirability of finding a suitable 318

Spanish replacement for the Panton company, a none-too- simple task. Louisiana officials, of course, repeatedly pointed out the necessity of detaching McGillivray from

Panton's interest before he could be dismissed with safety.

McGillivray's role in gaining a foothold for Panton and in assuring his continued acceptance was of primary signif­ icance. Following the Creek chieftain's death, the Spanish court became too embroiled in the problems of war to con­ sider seriously the Indian trade question.

While Panton correctly assumed his firm's relative indispensability, he miscalculated the obduracy and dila­ toriness encountered in dealing with the Spaniards for control of the entire southern Indian trade and for duty­

free status. But, true to his calling as depicted by Adam

Smith, William Panton's supreme loyalties were to self-

interest. If necessary for attaining his mercantile objec­

tives, Panton, again through the agency of McGillivray, might deal with "distracted republicans" for a base of operations on the Atlantic.

Panton's most faulty assumption, however, related to his assessment of the final outcome of the Spanish-

American struggle for control of the Old Southwest. While the Scottish merchant appreciated the weakness of Spain

6casa Calvo pointed this out as late as March 1800; q.v., Casa Calvo to Lopez y Angulo, March 5, 1800, West Papers. 319 relative to the other powers of western Europe, he at first held little respect for the viability of the newly established American nation. Panton could foresee no major difficulties that might preclude a Spanish-Indian alliance from keeping at bay American frontiersmen only nominally affiliated in a weak political union of former English colonies,

William Panton's respect for the United States as a potentially worthy adversary was aroused first in 1787 and 1788 with the Spanish curtailment of Creek warfare against frontier settlements, During this interval feelers went out for trade accommodations on the Atlantic. Once the Spaniards acceded to Panton's demands for duty exemp­ tions and resumed their support of the Creeks, however, Panton's fears of the American advance were dispelled temporarily.

These fears were revived with the death of

McGillivray and its consequences for Creek solidarity.

Coincidentally, the ministrations of Seagrove portended an intent by the newly strengthened United States govern­ ment to implement the Treaty of New York. With President

Washington's request for government-sponsored trade, Panton was jarred into a thorough reappraisal of his firm's posi­ tion. Assuming that the "federal purse" would be as aggressive a competitor as he, Panton contemplated with­ drawal from the trade unless firm Spanish support were 320 forthcoming. Panton misjudged the competitiveness of the none- too-effective United States factory system. Rather, it was the Treaty of San Lorenzo that ultimately made his firm's long run position untenable in the Old Southwest, a fact he fully understood. With the southern Indians living under United States control, Panton no longer could rely on enforced exclusivism to stifle competition or to minimize his company's extensive credit risks. Again he contemplated an accommodation with the United States.

The Spanish declaration of war against the British in October 1797 complicated Panton's problems to enormous proportions. He was forced to resort to a strategy of survival and withdrawal, one that would buy time for sal­ vaging the firm's assets as much as possible. The war increased his risks and reduced his profits to the extent that he considered the Indian trade no longer desirable. Panton began in earnest to cadge the Spanish government into assuming his company's operations while simultaneously seeking new trade outlets in the Spanish Empire for his entrepreneurship. He also set in motion plans for con­ verting his accounts receivable into another form of asset-- Indian land. At that point, death intervened. In announcing Panton's demise to Casa Calvo, John Forbes intimated that he had been deprived of a sincere friend? moreover, the Spanish government had lost a 321 faithful servant. As Panton's successor, Forbes also wished to know whether his passing had altered the com­ pany 's status. While disclaiming any ability comparable to that of the deceased Panton in managing the Indians, Forbes promised to spare no effort in carrying on the business as best he could."^ He was, in effect, attempting to fulfill his partner's desires to recoup the company's losses insofar as possible before disengaging from the Florida trade. The Spanish government, still convinced of the usefulness of the firm in maintaining peaceful rela­ tions with the Indians, permitted it to continue. Even­ tually it was reorganized as John Forbes and Company and continued in the Floridas until the end of the Spanish period.

Conditions in the 1800's, however, greatly altered the company's mode of operations as well as its objectives. The Jefferson administration made it clear from the outset that the company no longer could exercise assertiveness in dealing with Indians inhabiting United States territory. For that matter, the Indians also indicated they no longer would tolerate commercial exclusivism as imposed during the Panton years. The Spanish-British war had weakened permanently the company's once unchallengeable influence

7 J. Forbes to Casa Calvo, April 29, 1801, West Papers 322 o in the Old Southwest.

Consequently, the company continued the Indian trade mostly to placate the Spaniards so as to justify its continuance in the Floridas. Forbes and his associates actually devoted the greatest part of their energies to collecting Indian arrears owed Panton, Leslie and Company.

Fortunately for Forbes, if not for the southern Indians, President Jefferson in 1802 suddenly decided the Panton firm's debts could be utilized in promoting the policy objectives of the United States. He authorized the War Department to encourage Forbes to believe that, should he press the Indians for land as compensation for indebted­ ness, the American government would support his claims. Although Forbes would be prohibited from accepting Indian lands lying within the United States as payment, he could suggest that the Indians sell lands to the federal govern­ ment. The government promised Forbes its support in getting the sums to be paid for Indian lands applied to the Panton 9 firm's claims. Forbes heartily accepted, and in an August 1803 conference with General Wilkinson a company agent submitted

^D. McGillivray to Panton, October 9, 1799, Cruzat Papers; talk. Mad Dog to J. Forbes, May 31, 1801, Green­ slade Papers; to Wilkinson, September 14, 1802 in Territorial Papers of the United States, V, 176- 177. ^Cotterill, "A Chapter of Panton, Leslie and Com­ pany," 279-280. 323 a statement of some $172,000 in total claims against the southern Indians. The amount specified apparently shocked the sensibilities of even the notorious General Wilkinson, who later characterized it as a "monstrous sum." By the eve of the , the company had completed arrange­ ments with the Indians for the payment of nearly the entire amount, either in money or in the form of a 1,200,000 acre land cession in Spanish Florida. This tract, known as the Forbes grant, lay between the Apalachicola and the Wakulla. The cession not only erased the trade debts of the Seminoles and the Lower Creeks, it satisfied company claims for losses in the Bowles raids as well.

Fire destroyed Panton's former Pensacola residence- headquarters in 1849. The company accounts, together with Panton's letter books—believed until then to be extant-- presumably perished in the blaze. Consequently, it is generally accepted that no significant direct evidence of the company's actual profit and loss experience exists.

Nevertheless, at least until the war years, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the company earned high profits. A Spanish report of July 1793 on Panton's prices at St. Marks indicates that traders received credit for $26.00 per hundredweight, or slightly over 1 shilling

10 Ibid., 282-292, passim. "'•"'•Greenslade, "William Panton," 107-108. 324 per pound for deerskins. This figure compares favorably with John Pope's statement that deerskins exchanged for 14 pence per pound at Pensacola in 1791. Deerskins sold on the London market in 1793 for 4 shillings per pound, a decrease of 2 shillings from the 1784 market price. Panton stated in 1799 that the company's yearly sales of deerskins never had fallen below 248,000 pounds. Thus, the company realized in 1793 at the very minimum gross receipts of $235,600 on deerskins alone; in 1784, $377,350. Assuming that the terms extended to traders in 1791 and 1793 applied uniformly throughout the prewar years, the company exchanged goods valued at $64,600 for each 248,000 pounds of deerskins. This would place minimum net receipts for deerskins sold on the London market in 1793 at $171,000; in 1784, $312,750,"^^

Quite likely Panton's 248,000 pound minimum applied more closely to the years when the company controlled only the Creek and Seminole trade. In 1786, Navarro estimated the annual amounts of goods traded at Pensacola and Mobile 13 at $60,000 and $40,000 respectively. Thus, in assuming

"'"^Relacion de los precios a_ que vende sus Mercancias la Casa de Panton a~os tratantes. . . ., July 23, 179 3, We'st PapeFs; Pope, Tour, p. 44; Panton to Adam Gordon, July 24, 1799, Cruzat Papers; Phillips, Fur Trade, II, 101, n. Panton, Leslie and Company used a conversion factor of 4.75 in computing dollars in terms of sterling. "'"^Navarro to J. de Galvez, April 15, 1786, West Papers. Navarro's estimates may have been conservative. While United States Indian Commissioners reported in 1789 that the Creeks consumed fcl2,000 ($57,000) in goods 325 the Chickasaw and Choctaw trade Panton increased the com­ pany's volume of business by about two-thirds. To this must be added the East Florida trade, estimated at approx­ imately $25,000 annually. Therefore, the adverse price trends on the London market affected the company's total earnings much less than the minimum figures would indi­ cate. The increased volume of trade after 1789, as well as the duty exemptions, tended to keep the company's earnings from the Indian trade rather stable in the prewar years. If the company's total costs averaged as much as 30 per cent--the figure Panton quoted in 1793 as the per­ centage above prime cost at which he would sell the firm's merchandise to Turnbull's followers--its yearly profits from deerskins were somewhere between $150,000 to $200,000 Navarro stated that Panton and Mather customarily priced goods at 100 per cent above prime cost, while Pope 14 estimated the increase to be about 500 per cent. Pope's figure seems more nearly correct. The high selling prices

annually, William Blount stated in 179 3 that the company imported B40,000 ($190,000) in trade goods yearly. Casa Calvo listed the Company's merchandise inventory needs in 1800 at $150,000, and John Forbes in 1804 stated the com­ pany's yearly imports from Europe were $128,000. Q.v., U.S. Commissioners to Secretary of War, November 20, 1789, Blount to [Secretary of War], August 13, 1793, ASPIA, I, 78-79, 458; Casa Calvo to Urquijo, February 26, 1800, West Papers; Whitaker, Documents Relating to Commercial Policy of Spain, p. 258. "'"^Navarro to Valde's, January 8, 178 8, West Papers; Pope, Tour, p. 45. 326 were justified on the grounds that the Indian trade in­ volved high credit risks. Yet, while McGillivray lived, Panton, Leslie and Company's credit losses most likely were negligible. He tolerated no debt evasion among the Creeks and at least assured that the Choctaws and Chick­ asaws remained isolated from American trade sources and hence in no position to evade their debts.

The company's earnings during the war years de­ clined, but in this era it becomes difficult even to approximate profit levels. The "cost-price squeeze," added insurance costs, losses to privateers, increased credit risks because of American competition, shortages of goods, losses from worm damage—all of these affected earnings. On the other hand, whether the company actually suffered net losses is doubtful. Juan Ventura Morales and Ramon de Lopez y Angulo, viewing the company from the office of the intendancy, both believed Panton's complaints of losses to be exaggerated. Morales doubted the company's pretensions as to the undesirability of the Indian trade per se because Panton had sought a trade concession west of the Mississippi as one form of indemnification. Lopez y Angulo believed (probably erroneously) the company to be earning $200,000 in profits annually as late as 1800.

"'"^Lopez y Angulo to Casa Calvo, February 14, 1800, Morales to Secretary of State, December 31, 1801, West Papers, 327 Again, only during 1798-1801 did the company experience any significant defection of its traders and Indian cus­ tomers to United States factories. In these years the company could not meet United States price competition and also experienced disruption to its supply channels. War-related problems made the southern Indian trade less attractive as well as less profitable from the company's standpoint.

Some three months after Panton's demise, the Creek chieftain Mad Dog reflected forlornly on the prospects for a successful hunt in the approaching fall. The sufferings of his people from deprivation and heavy indebtedness dis­ turbed him. Creek hunters, he perceived, must redouble their efforts in taking deer and other game. But procuring expensive ammunition for hunting seemed hardly worth the effort. Formerly so abundant, the deer were "almost

gone. „17 Had William Panton been alive, it is unlikely that the problems behind Mad Dog's uneasiness might have caused

sudden surprise. Encouraged by experiments of United

States agents in growing upland cotton on Indian hunting

"'"^James McQueen to Panton, February 8, 179 8, D. McGillivray to Panton, Leslie and Company, April 16, 1801, Cruzat Papers; Speaker for Creek Nation to Colonel Hawkins, November 25, 1799, Greenslade Papers. "'•^Mad Dog to J. Forbes, May 31, 1801, Greenslade Papers. 328 lands, Panton, Leslie and Company already had placed an 18 order for a cotton gin. The merchant-adventurer had foreseen that the forces that one day would be labeled manifest destiny soon would make the era of the Indian in the Old Southwest fade into the past. Thus did the man who until the mid-1790's had aided Spain so effectively in frustrating the endeavors of the United States to gain control of the southern Indians change his views, In the face of wavering Spanish resolve to resist the American advance, he realized his powerless- ness to preserve the trade empire he had forged with such determination in the 1780's. But, unlike so much of his Indian clientele, William Panton held no compunction against abandoning a lost cause when necessary for pro­ moting his self-interest, Panton's mastery of the southern Indian trade fell victim more to the awesome forces unleashed by the revolu­ tionary age in which he lived than to any great lack of astuteness. Much of his adulthood spanned unusually tur­ bulent years, momentous in their consequences for mankind. Given these circumstances, William Panton adjusted to his many adversities remarkably well. His versatility easily might have inspired envy and admiration in many of his peers.

"'•^J. Forbes to Panton, April 30, 1800, Hawkins to Panton February 7, 1801, Cruzat Papers; Whitaker, Docu­ ments Relating to Commercial Policy o^ Spain, xxxvii. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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