MERCHANT ADVENTURER IN THE OLD SOUTHWEST: WILLIAM PANTON, THE SPANISH YEARS, 1783-1801 by THOMAS DAVIS WATSON, B.A., M.A. A DISSERTATION IN HISTORY Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved Annented August, 1972 13 NO'*^ PREFACE Cf The American Revolution suddenly intensified Spain's perennial problem of guarding the approaches to its vast New World empire. By war's end the United States occupied only a relatively narrow strip of land along the Atlantic coast, though its boundaries stretched westward to the Mississippi and southward to Spanish Florida. The new nation soon proved to be a restless, expansive neighbor and a threat to the tenuous Spanish hold on the North Amer­ ican continent. Spanish policymakers, of course, had anticipated this development long before the end of the revolution. Yet Spanish diplomacy failed to prevent the Americans from acquiring territory in the Mississippi Valley and in the Old Southwest. In the postwar years Spain endeavor? d to keep the United States from realizing its interior claims. Spanish governors of Louisiana alternately intrigued with American frontiersmen in promoting separatist movements, encouraged them to settle in Louisiana and West t'iorida, and subjected them to harassment by limiting their use of the Mississippi They attempted also to extend the northern limits of West Florida well beyond the thirty-first parallel, the boundary established in the British-American peace settlement of 11 Ill 1783. The key to success in this latter undertaking lay in the ability of Spain to deny the United States control over the southern Indians. Spain's efforts to impede the American westward advance ultimately failed. In failure, however, Spain succeeded remarkably in maintaining hegemony over the southern Indians through mastery of their trade. These Indians—certainly the Creeks and Cherokees--generally were disposed to resist American land-hunger. The success of Spanish Indian policy nevertheless may be attributed largely to the activities of William Panton, a Scottish merchant headquartered in Pensacola. His talents as an Indian trader enabled him to build a commercial empire among the southern Indians that withstood all serious challenges during his lifetime. Panton's ability to manip­ ulate Indians by controlling their trade won for him the grudging respect, if not the esteem, of Spaniard and Amer­ ican alike. This study attempts to place the Spanish phase of Panton's career in perspective within the context of the struggle between Spaniards and Americans for control of the Old Southwest. It also brings to fruition in some measure the scholarly efforts of Elizabeth Howard West, who, in addition to serving as Librarian at Texas Tech University from 1925 to 1942, devoted a prodigious amount of time to gathering data on Panton's activities from iv Spanish and British archival sources. Miss West had planned to edit key documents related to Panton's career as a publication, but the depression of the 1930's inter­ vened. Her research contributes substantially to this study. Unfortunately Panton's contemporaries left scant evidence shedding light on his character or his physical appearance. As a personality he remains a shadowy figure in the annals of the Old Southwest. His extant correspon­ dence creates the distinct impression that he was a practical-minded, extremely self-confident individual. First and foremost he was a typical late-eighteenth century British entrepreneur with special gifts for reaping personal gain from the demands of high politics. I am indebted to Professor David M. Vigness for his direction of this dissertation and to Professors Lowell L. Blaisdell, William R. Johnson, James W. Harper, Robert A. Hayes, and Lewis E. Hill, the other members of my committee, for their valuable suggestions and criticisms. TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ii Chapter I. SPAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND THE INDIANS OF THE OLD SOUTHWEST 1 II. WILLIAM PANTON: A BIDDER FOR THE SPANISH FUR TRADE 35 III. STALEMATE IN THE WEST 71 IV, TRIALS AND TRIUMPH IN THE WEST 10 5 V. CHALLENGES FROM AROUSED REPUBLICANS .... 157 VI. THE REPUBLICAN MENACE COMPOUNDED 206 VII. PLUNDERED BY FRIEND AND FOE ALIKE 266 VIII. CAREER IN RETROSPECT 313 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS vi SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 329 V LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 1. Map of the Old Southwest 16 7 VI CHAPTER I SPAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND THE INDIANS OF THE OLD SOUTHWEST The ministers of His Catholic Majesty watched with a customary tinge of Anglophobia the disturbances signaling open rebellion in the British colonies of North America. They feared possible British military incursions into the Spanish portion of the New World, either as a way of com­ pensating for expenses incurred in dealing with the colonial insurgents or as means of quelling the anti- government grumblings of Englishmen at home. Consequently, Spanish authorities reappraised the defenses of the Carib­ bean and elsewhere in the empire. The Bourbon dynasty, hoping to transform Spam into a more respected member of the European state system, had taken steps to revitalize their dominions in the eigh­ teenth century. Thus, the prevailing Spanish outlook included elements other than mere resignation to the even­ tuality of further setbacks to the imperial system. The reign of the reform-minded Charles III (1759-1788) had Juan F, Yela Utrilla, Espana ante la independencia de los Estados Unidos (2 vols.; 2d ed.; Lerida: Gr^ficos Academia Mariana, 1926), I, 49-50, reached mid-passage by 1776, and the Spanish Empire teemed with ferment over plans and policies designed to reverse the seventeenth century trend toward moribundity and col­ lapse. The pervading spirit animating the Spanish bureauc­ racy called both for revitalizing the defense capabilities of the empire and for making that empire economically worthy of the increased defensive effort. First-rank Spanish officials, motivated by these precepts, quickly visualized the possibilities of securing advantages for their royal master out of the distress of Great Britain, The Conde de Aranda, ambassador to the French court, mused early in 1776 that, although the rebellion of the English colonials regrettably set an unfavorable ex­ ample for their Spanish counterparts, Spain nevertheless should welcome a weakening of British power from whatever quarter it might rise. From Aranda's viewpoint, recovery by Britain of commercial losses attendant with an effective detachment of its North American possessions would be lengthy and difficult. To join with the French partner in the Family Compact in extending sub rosa military aid to the rebels, he suggested, would be convenient to Spain's 2 interest. On this point the Conde de Ricla, head of the War Ministry, agreed. Ricla further suggested that a siz­ able military force be deployed to the Caribbean area ^Ibid., I, 64-65. immediately, preferably—because of its strategic central location—to Campeche. Haste was necessary to preclude a probable British blockade of Spanish ports prior to attacking some vulnerable point in the Caribbean. Once in position, these Spanish troops could be employed as a counterstrike reserve force or even committed to battle in North America should Spain later choose to ally openly with the Anglo-Americans. By its mere presence, Ricla estimated, the deployment would suffice to interject a strong measure of caution in British calculations against Spain. Under the Conde de Floridablanca, who in 1776 succeeded the Marques de Grimaldi as the Spanish Foreign Minister, the chances for a Spanish-United States alliance or, for that matter, even recognition remained remote. Floridablanca, as did his predecessor, abhorred republi­ canism and chose to avoid such a dangerous precedent for the Spanish colonies as openly abetting a revolution. Moreover, he could not be convinced that an independent Anglo-American nation constituted less threat to the Spanish position in the New World than the status quo. Besides, the Spanish government, should it choose to sup­ port the United States, had good reason to expect -a Dietamen del Sor. Conde de Ricla, Archive General de Simancas, Secr^taria de Guerra, legajo 7311. I am in­ debted to Professor Allan J. Kuethe for making this citation available. retaliation in kind from its British adversary. Conse­ quently, Spain confined its help to the rebels to clan­ destine assistance in the form of subsidies and loans amounting all in all to some $645,000."^ Nor did Spain at first indicate any great willing­ ness to declare war against Great Britain after France in June 1778 became openly involved in the conflict. Florida­ blanca was an ardent nationalist who, unlike Grimaldi, harbored little fondness for the French. The Spanish court had been offended by being incompletely informed of French policy following the decision of the French foreign min­ ister, the Comte de Vergennes, in December 1777 to agree to an American alliance—the act which eventually led France into the struggle. France also had spurned recent Spanish requests for aid in disputes with the Portuguese and the British over control of portions of Spanish South America. Spain therefore tried to wring territorial conces­ sions from the British government in exchange for Spanish 4 Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 45-49, 240-243; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Edinburgh: