THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES: AN ANALYSIS OF VENEZUELA AND BOLIVIA
Ashley P. Reaves
A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science.
Chapel Hill 2018
Approved by:
Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo
Graeme Robertson
Ashley Anderson
2018 Ashley P. Reaves ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ii ABSTRACT
Ashley P. Reaves: The Role of Civil Society in Competitive Authoritarian Legitimation Strategies: An Analysis of Venezuela and Bolivia (Under the direction of Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo)
An increasing amount of research analyzes the ways that various forms of hybrid regimes maintain stability in the face of regular elections and other domestic and international pressures. Within this literature, scholars emphasize three primary pillars of stability: repression, co-optation, and legitimation. While a significant amount of recent work has examined the role of repression and co-optation, legitimation has been largely put aside. Yet, scholars recognize the importance of legitimacy for regime stability. My research aims to contribute to our understanding of this third pillar through a qualitative analysis of the role of civil society in competitive authoritarian legitimation strategies. I focus on two recent cases in
Latin America: Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Bolivia under Evo Morales.
iii TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………… vi
CHAPTER 1: STABILITY IN NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES…………………………… 1
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….. 1
Hybrid Regimes...………………………………………………………...………...….. 3
Three Pillars of Regime Stability………………………………………………...……. 5
Civil Society and Legitimacy in Nondemocratic Regimes…….………...………..…... 7
CHAPTER 2: CIVIL SOCIETY IN LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES………...………..… 11
Civil Society as a Façade of Democracy…………………………….…...…………... 11
Venezuela……………………………………………………...….………….. 11
Bolivia………………………………………………………...……….……... 12
Using Civil Society to Reproduce Regime Discourse……………………………..… 13
Venezuela…………………………………………………...……………..…. 14
Bolivia……………………………………………………...………….……... 16
Civil Society as a Strategy to Increase Output Legitimation….…..…………………. 17
Venezuela………………………………………………...………………..…. 17
Bolivia…………………………………………………...………………….... 17
Civil Society for Limited Participation and Feedback………...……………………... 18
Venezuela…………………………………………………………….………. 19
iv Bolivia……………………………………………………………..………….. 19
Making Civil Society Play by the Rules………………………………...... ………….. 20
Venezuela……………………………………………………….……...…..…. 20
Bolivia…………………………………………………………….…...……… 22
Civil Society in State-Mobilized Contention……………………….…….…...…...…. 22
Venezuela………………………………………………………….………….. 23
Bolivia……………………………………………………………....…....…… 24
CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION…………………………..….…...…… 25
REFERENCES………………………………………………………………...……....……. 29
v LIST OF TABLES
Table
1. Overview of conditions and observed patterns in the four cases……………… 26
vi CHAPTER 1: STABILITY IN NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES
Introduction
Scholarship on the nature of hybrid regimes expanded drastically with their proliferation following the end of the Cold War. With a combination of democratic and authoritarian elements, it was often assumed that these regimes were simply in a transition phase, on their way to democratizing fully. Yet, as it became clear that hybrid regimes were indeed quite stable, how leaders in these regimes were able to maintain stability in the presence of various domestic and international pressures became a central question in the growing literature on the politics of hybrid regimes (Howard and Roessler 2006; Brownlee 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010).
In analyses of hybrid regime stability, scholars have focused on three main pillars of rulers’ strategies: repression, co-optation, and legitimation. A significant amount of recent scholarly work has examined the pillar of co-optation, providing insight into the ways institutions such as elections, legislatures, and parties serve as mechanisms for elite management and cohesion (Blaydes 2011; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2008; Pop-Eleches and
Robertson 2015; Reuter and Robertson 2012). Scholars have also emphasized the usefulness of strategic and “optimal” degrees of repression (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). In contrast, although legitimacy—particularly performance-based—was a key component of earlier research on stability when authoritarianism rose as a distinct regime type (Collier 1979; O’Donnell 1979), it has largely been brushed aside in the recent wave of scholarly work on nondemocratic regimes.
However, scholars have very recently begun making the case for re-incorporating legitimacy—defined as the belief in the authorities’ right to rule—into the research on
1 nondemocratic regime stability (Gerschewski 2013; Lorch and Bunk 2017; Mazepus et al. 2016).
Arguing that nondemocratic regimes cannot rely solely on abuse of power, Gerschewski (2013) places particular emphasis on re-incorporating legitimation when he presents a theoretical framework to explain regime longevity. Yet, systematic research into legitimation strategies remains scarce, and existing studies on legitimation largely neglect the role of civil society.
Lorch and Bunk (2017) begin to address this gap in the literature by examining the use of civil society in regime legitimation strategies in Algeria and Mozambique, linking them to strategies found in earlier research on authoritarian legitimation more broadly. They identify five key patterns: civil society as a façade of democracy, the regime making civil society play by the rules, civil society as a mechanism of limited participation and a feedback mechanism, using civil society as a strategy to increase output legitimation, and civil society reproducing historical discourse legitimating the regime. Given the research illuminating the heterogeneity of civil society and its potentially undemocratic elements, more research is needed to better understand how regimes incorporate this space into their legitimation strategies.
In this paper, I undertake a qualitative analysis to examine the role of civil society in competitive authoritarian regime legitimation strategies. I analyze two cases in Latin America:
Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Bolivia under Evo Morales. In the process, I investigate whether the theoretical patterns identified by Lorch and Bunk (2017) hold in other kinds of competitive authoritarian regimes, analyze how these patterns vary, and identify conditions under which these variations occur. I find that four patterns generalize to my cases: civil society as a façade of democracy, civil society as a mechanism of limited participation and a feedback mechanism, using civil society as a strategy to increase output legitimation, and civil society reproducing regime discourse. The final pattern—making civil society play by the rules—does
2 not generalize to Venezuela and Bolivia. I explain this divergence by the reversed nature of the
regime trajectories. While Algeria and Mozambique transitioned from fully-closed authoritarian to competitive authoritarian, Venezuela and Bolivia have a more democratic history that places constraints on the government’s ability to legitimately control the civil society space. Finally, I introduce a new pattern not addressed by Lorch and Bunk, the use of civil society in state-led mobilization, which I find in Venezuela but less so in Bolivia. Bolivia’s pre-existing density of civil society organizations, and the rise of the MAS on the back of these organizations, limits
Morales’ ability to completely mobilize from the top.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I review the relevant existing literature on hybrid regime stability, legitimacy, and the role of civil society in nondemocratic regimes. In the process, I reveal the lack of sufficient attention to questions surrounding the role of civil society in hybrid regime legitimation strategies and argue for the need to address this gap in the literature by expanding our theoretical formulations and hypothesis testing to this domain.
Following my literature review, I proceed to analyze the patterns of legitimation strategies in my two cases, highlighting patterns and divergences and expanding upon the findings and theoretical contributions of Lorch and Bunk (2017). I conclude with a discussion of my findings and recommendations for future research.
Hybrid Regimes
I aim to further our understanding of the role of civil society in the legitimation of hybrid regimes, and indeed, both of my cases fall under this regime type.1 In hybrid regimes, where
1 Given the wide variation among hybrid regimes, scholars often disagree as to which regimes should be considered hybrid, versus democratic or authoritarian. The case of Bolivia could be contested, but it appears to have moved further away from democracy under Morales. For an extensive discussion of how the MAS has weakened democracy by concentrating power, undermining horizontal accountability, and threatening the opposition, see Madrid (2012, Chapter 6).
3 democratic and authoritarian elements are combined, political competition is officially legal but often skewed by the strength of authoritarian institutions or the weakness of independent organizations. While these regimes have existed for a long time, they have proliferated dramatically since the end of the Cold War (Robertson 2011, 2). Given their significance and diffusion, understanding the dynamics of these regimes is important. Indeed, we have seen an increase in scholarship on hybrid regimes, effectively bridging the two literatures on democracy and authoritarianism (e.g. Diamond 2002; Howard and Roessler 2006, Levitsky and Way 2002;
Robertson 2011).
Hybrid regimes exist on a scale of “hybridness”, with some more closely resembling fully-closed authoritarian regimes and others more similar to fully-democratic regimes.
Additionally, countries can be quite different with respect to which specific institutions are responsible for the regime’s hybrid classification. As such, the hybrid classification often fails to inform us of anything specific about the hybrid nature of the regime (Levitsky and Way 2010).
Due to these issues, scholars have often constructed more specific and analytically useful typologies, classifying hybrid regimes as competitive electoral authoritarian, hegemonic electoral authoritarian, or electoral democratic, among others (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002,
2010).
Although there is disagreement, my cases are typically considered competitive authoritarian (Balderacchi 2018; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Mainwaring and Pérez-Líñan 2015;
Weyland 2013). According to Levitsky and Way (2010), regimes are competitive authoritarian
when there is electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying
degrees of harassment and violence that skew the playing field in favor of incumbents. Thus, competition is real but unfair. As I discuss in greater detail below, while legitimation is an aspect
4 of the stability of all nondemocratic regimes, it is likely to play a particularly important and
unique role in the stability of hybrid—and competitive authoritarian—regimes.
Three Pillars of Regime Stability
Gerschewski (2013) provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding
nondemocratic regime stability. Through a synthesis of the main arguments of classic and more
recent research efforts, he derives three pillars upon which regime stability rests: repression, co-
optation, and legitimation. Most of the recent scholarly work on nondemocratic regime stability
has analyzed the role of co-optation, although there has also been the recognition of the role of
strategic repression (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). In contrast, legitimacy has been put on the
back burner. In particular, scholars have examined the role of specific institutions such as
legislatures, parties, and elections in regime stability (Blaydes 2011; Gandhi and Lust-Okar
2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Manion
1996; Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2015; Reuter and Robertson 2012, 2015; Schedler 2002, 2006;
Svolik 2012; Truex 2017). These institutions form the backbone of the co-optation pillar. The primary mechanism of emphasis has been elite management and cohesion, as these institutions help settle and mediate intra-elite conflicts and provide information for leaders regarding the
loyalty and competence of regional and local authorities.
With less freedom to rely solely on repression, relative to totalitarian and fully closed
authoritarian regimes, hybrid regimes must draw heavily on alternative sources of stability.
Although repression is still useful, it is too costly a way to maintain stability in the long run. The
use of seemingly democratic institutions to co-opt elites allows the regime to tie strategically-
relevant actors to the success of the regime. Legitimacy is another alternative source of stability, often associated with regime survival because it functions as a resource of support in times of
5 crisis (Tyler 2006, 377). Legitimacy, particularly performance-based, was often at the core of
classic studies (Collier 1979; O’Donnell 1979). Although it has been considered less relevant in
recent research, it is beginning to make a resurgence in the literature on nondemocratic regime
stability, with scholars examining its importance for regime longevity (Burnell 2006;
Gerschewski 2013), the differences in sources of legitimacy across regimes (Gerschewski 2013),
and the interaction of the international and domestic dimensions of legitimacy (Hoffmann 2015).
Gerschewski (2013, 18) argues that we miss an important causal factor when we bracket
out legitimation and makes the case for re-incorporating it into the explanation of nondemocratic
regime longevity. In understanding the different sources of legitimacy, he proposes a distinction
between specific and diffuse support (2013, 19). Specific support captures performance-based, or output, legitimacy, which typically stems from economic outcomes or stability and order. On the other hand, diffuse support stems from political ideologies, charismatic leaders, protection from
supposed external threats, or from religious, nationalistic, or traditional claims to rule. While co- optation is aimed at elites, and strategic repression is aimed at both elites and the masses, legitimation strategies are primarily targeted at the masses. As I explain below, this targeting at the masses, with the aim of increasing specific and diffuse support, makes civil society a particularly useful tool for leaders in hybrid regimes. Indeed, the existing literature on legitimacy as a source of regime stability is limited by its lack of attention to specific legitimation strategies and the role of civil society in those strategies.
Mazepus et al. (2016) comparatively examine legitimation strategies in hybrid regimes, finding that tactics are similar in Russia, Venezuela, and Seychelles, while the content of the regime strategies differs. In other words, these regimes use similar types of actions to foster their legitimacy, but the narratives by means of which these strategies are justified and sustained differ
6 across cases. Thus, Mazepus et al. (2016) help reveal the existence of certain patterns in
legitimation strategies across countries. While this study begins to fill the gap in the research on
legitimation strategies, the literature is still very limited, particularly with respect to the role of
civil society.
Civil Society and Legitimacy in Nondemocratic Regimes
Conceptualized as a sphere distinct from the state, the family, and the market, civil
society has long been perceived as a positive force for democracy (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens 1992; Cohen and Arato 1992; Putnam 1995; Diamond 1994; Vachudova 2005; Evans
2011, 40). It has often been credited with having played a crucial role in the collapse of
communism and the resulting transitions to democracy. Consequently, a substantial proportion of
international aid and democracy promotion efforts in nondemocratic regimes has been aimed at
the development of civil society (Alagappa 2004).
Yet, scholars have examined more recently the role of civil society in authoritarian
regimes, finding that civil society can exist in these regimes and is not necessarily pro-
democracy (Alagappa 2004; Cavatorta 2013; Dimitovova 2010; Giersdorf and Croissant 2011;
Froissart 2014; Kopecký and Mudde 2003; Lewis 2013; Lorch 2006; Perinova 2005; Spires
2011; Petrone 2011; Wiktorowicz 2000; Ziegler 2010) and that it lacks genuine independence as
the state often limits, manipulates, and co-opts civil society organizations (Dimitrovova 2010,
526; Lorch 2006; Petrone 2011, 168, 177-84; Spires 2011, 5-10; Wiktorowicz 2000). Civil society can also play different roles during different transition periods, and in fact, it can change from a force against an authoritarian regime to a mixture of state-supporting and countervailing forces. These fundamentally different roles of civil society are highlighted by Uhlin (2006) in his study of civil society in Russia and the Baltic states. Similarly, analysts have begun to broaden
7 the definition of civil society to include non-liberal, undemocratic, or anti-Western actors
(Cheskin and March 2015; Lewis 2013). Indeed, according to Kopecký and Mudde (2003), it is
“uncivil society” that often includes the most authentic social movements, such as Russia’s radical nationalist realm, at least in terms of genuine public support and mass participation.
These existing studies effectively demonstrate the heterogeneity of the civil society space. While much of this heterogeneity is simply a result of the natural and expected diversity of civil society actors, it is also due to the role of the state. There are wide variations in the attitude of governments and regime leaders to civil society organizations (Alagappa 2004).
While civil society is conceptualized as a sphere distinct from the state, there is often overlap, especially in nondemocratic regimes. Some regimes allow civil society organizations to be actively involved in policymaking, while others view them as a threat and seek to suppress or eliminate them outright. Still other regimes work to limit, co-opt, and manipulate the civil society space in an attempt to acquire its benefits without the particularly threatening costs.
As I stated earlier, the target of legitimation is primarily the masses, with the aim of increasing specific and diffuse support—the two sources of legitimacy. Civil society, as a space distinct from the state, presents an ideal domain for legitimation strategies aimed at the masses.
Indeed, this is one reason the state in nondemocratic regimes often interacts with and manipulates civil society in more direct ways than is typical in democracies. Not only do they likely aim to prevent opposition and contentious behavior that might be threatening, but they also interact with civil society actors to increase support for the regime, thereby strengthening regime legitimacy and stability.
Civil society actors can increase both specific and diffuse support. Nondemocratic regimes often permit, support, or even create civil society organizations that focus on activities
8 such as education, health, environmental protection, poverty alleviation, and disaster relief. Such
activities can aid the state in providing outcomes that increase performance-based, or specific,
support. In contrast, these regimes often prohibit civil society organizations that aim to take part
in activities deemed threatening to the stability of the state, such as certain political or religious
activities. Regimes can also use civil society to increase diffuse support by supporting, creating,
and co-opting civil society organizations that can advance particular narratives supporting the
regime’s claim to rule. Whether it is an ideological, religious, or traditional claim, or if the
regime is held up by a charismatic leader or a rally-around-the-flag effect due to some supposed threat, civil society organizations can take a leading role in keeping the narrative alive. This can take place through rhetorical means or through certain types of contentious behavior, such as countermobilizations in support of the regime. While there have been several case studies of such state-organized contention, a selective emphasis on this may obscure the more mundane and less visible functions of civil society in normal times, functions that may be just as crucial to the longevity of the regime (Alagappa 2004).
Although scholars acknowledge that civil society may contribute to legitimating authoritarian rulers, we lack sufficient research examining this relationship and the use of civil society in specific regime legitimation strategies. A notable exception is a comparative analysis of Algeria and Mozambique by Lorch and Bunk (2017). They derive five patterns from research on civil society under authoritarianism and link them to broader legitimation strategies from research on authoritarian legitimation. These strategies include using civil society as a façade of democracy, making civil society play by the rules, using civil society as a mechanism of limited participation and for feedback, using civil society to increase output legitimation, and using civil society for regime discourse.
9 In the pages that follow, I examine the cases of Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and
Bolivia under Evo Morales, providing empirical insights on how these patterns derived by Lorch and Bunk (2017) might play out and interact in different contexts. In the process, I highlight variation across my cases, and between my cases and those examined by Lorch and Bunk, and I provide potential explanations such variation.
I chose these two cases—Venezuela under Chávez and Bolivia under Morales—for a number of reasons. As discussed above, both are often classified as hybrid regimes (Balderacchi
2018; Eckman 2009; Gilbert and Mohseni 2011; Madrid 2012; Marshall and Jaggers 2011). The two African cases examined by Lorch and Bunk (2017) are also hybrid regimes, and my research aims to assess whether their patterns hold for hybrid regimes in other regions. Thus, my research tests the generalizability of these findings to the Latin American region. On the other hand,
Venezuela and Bolivia experienced a different, somewhat opposite, trajectory from Algeria and
Mozambique. While Algeria and Mozambique transitioned from closed authoritarianism to competitive authoritarianism, Venezuela and Bolivia had a history of political liberalism before backsliding towards a less competitive regime type. I expect this variation to translate to differences in the patterns derived by Lorch and Bunk. With a more democratic history, there are greater potential legitimacy costs associated with competitive authoritarian manipulations of civil society. Consequently, civil society is likely to have more autonomy from the regime. Thus, my research on the use of civil society in the legitimation strategies of these two regimes will advance the literature by testing the generalizability of the previously identified patterns and by potentially providing conditions under which you get particular outcomes.
10 CHAPTER 2: CIVIL SOCIETY IN LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES
Civil Society as a Façade of Democracy
In their analysis of Algeria and Mozambique, Lorch and Bunk (2017) find that governments use civil society as a façade of democracy. This can take many forms, with governments pointing to the existence of civil society organizations as evidence of pluralism and democracy, tolerating their growth while preventing significant criticism of the state, and allowing organization and mobilization with co-optation. Lorch and Bunk also demonstrate that the use of civil society as a façade of democracy can be aimed at both domestic and international targets. This legitimation strategy has been implemented in both Venezuela and Bolivia.
Venezuela
For Chávez and Venezuela, the primary target of the first pattern—using civil society as a
façade of democracy—has been the domestic audience. Further, the focus of Chávez was on a
specific type of democracy, which can be largely attributed to the country’s history. The
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement-200 (MBR-200) rejected liberal, representative government
in favor of a more participatory, direct form of government. An emphasis on the mobilization
and participation of citizens was coupled with an emphasis on executive power and strong
leadership that interprets the will of the people (Smilde 2011, 7). This was an effort to
demonstrate a departure from the operations of the former Punto Fijo democracy, widely viewed
as elitist. Chávez’s argument that the existing political system had become isolated from the
people won broad acceptance, especially from the lower classes. Moreover, in the Southern Cone
countries, the revolutionary Left was marginalized in an authoritarian context and therefore came
11 to value liberal democracy as providing a space in which to organize. In contrast, the Left was
marginalized in Venezuela in the context of representative democracy (Smilde 2011, 7).
In his rise to power, Chávez promised to re-found the state and restructure the polity in ways that would build “popular power” through the promotion of grassroots participation, organization, and mobilization (López Maya and Lander 2011). Thus, civil society played a key role in implementing and demonstrating the supposed shift from elitist government to
“participatory and protagonistic” democracy (Hellinger 2011b, 52). Yet, rather than bottom-up organizational processes, civil society’s organizational forms were created and promoted from above. Indeed, the Urban Land Committees and Bolivarian Circles, two prominent civil society groups, stemmed from a presidential decree (García-Guadilla 2011, 86). The Communal Council program was also geared toward building “popular power” through state-sponsored community organizations. Nevertheless, the government is able to build domestic legitimacy through the idea that these civil society organizations demonstrate the existence of the desired form of democracy. Indeed, in surveys, members of the Bolivarian Circles proclaimed strong participatory democratic values (Hawkins and Hansen 2006, 124).
Bolivia
As in Venezuela, and for similar reasons, Morales and his party, the Movement for
Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS), target their façade-of-democracy efforts on citizens at home. Since Bolivia’s return to civilian rule in 1982, formal democratic procedures have been in place, allowing all Bolivians to participate in the exercise of political power through voting. Yet, parties were unrepresentative and unresponsive. Bolivia was dominated by a small group of white-mestizos and widely regarded as a closed system that operated primarily for the benefit of particular elite groups. Movement leaders classified the existing democracy as a sham,
12 and indeed, the goal of mobilizations that ultimately brought the MAS and Morales to power was
to deepen and extend democracy (Grisaffi 2013, 50). As in Venezuela, there was an emphasis on
a more direct, participatory form of democracy.
The history of the MAS, itself, provides further explanation for why Morales might expect this strategy to be particularly effective. As a movement-based party, much of its core base of support derives from civil society groups and organizations, many of whom emphasized participatory democratic procedures. For example, members of the Coca Unions—key supporters of Morales—exhibit this conception of democracy in their activities, as every member of the community meets to debate and enact their laws. Indeed, after rising to the presidency, Morales continued to serve as general secretary of the Coca Federations (Grisaffi 2013, 48). Additionally,
Vice President Alvaro García Linera claimed that the MAS represents a new form of government run by and for the nation’s social movements and that these movements are in direct control of the state apparatus through the MAS (García Linera 2006, 25). The reality of the situation reveals this to be mostly just words, a claim designed to ensure legitimacy, as Morales steadily slipped into patronage politics and co-optation (Grisaffi 2013, 49). Some scholars go so far as to say that many supposed participatory, radical democratic processes are actually vertical and at times authoritarian processes of the government (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 262).
Using Civil Society to Reproduce Regime Discourse
Another legitimation pattern is the use of civil society to reproduce the regime’s discourse. This discourse centers on historical narratives or foundational myths that serve to strengthen the regime’s claims to popular legitimacy. While research on authoritarian legitimation suggests the frequent use of such discourse (Kailitz 2013), there has been a lack of research on whether civil society organizations replicate or strengthen it. In their comparative
13 analysis of Algeria and Mozambique, Lorch and Bunk (2017) find the civil society actors often
reproduce this discourse, cite these narratives and/or myths as influencing their decision to
organize or participate, and even claim the discourse as part of their own organizational identity.
All of these manifestations are found in Venezuela and Bolivia, with some being particularly
pronounced in Venezuela.
Venezuela
Chávez utilized a number of historical narratives and foundational myths to strengthen
his claim to popular legitimacy. While his discourse included elements from panindigenous and
Afro-Venezuelan ideologies, socialism, rejection of capitalism and the West, neofascism,
liberationist Catholicism, and evangelical Protestantism (Smilde 2011, 21), the key tenets
centered on nationalist myths of figures such as Simón Bolívar, his own charisma, and the use of
an “us versus them” dichotomy. Early in his presidential tenure, Chávez directly linked his goals of patriotism, liberation, and independence with the ideas originally espoused by Simón Bolívar
(Mazepus et al. 2016, 357). Thus, Bolivarianism, Chávez’s interpretation and implementation of
Bolívar’s ideas, served as the ideological foundation of his presidency. Later, Chávez was able to capitalize on his own charisma, drawing less on the legacy of Bolívar to legitimate his policies and more on the new ideological banner of Chavismo (Mazepus et al. 2016, 359).
A third principle component of the regime’s discourse played on the dichotomy of “us versus them.” This narrative largely stemmed from the problems of the former regime and
Chávez’s attempt to capitalize on these issues by demonstrating how life would be better under his rule. The former Punto Fijo democracy fostered citizen alienation and discontent, as the pacted nature of its 1958 transition put into place an exclusionary two-party system that suffered from corruption and ineffective delivery of basic goods and services following a drop in oil
14 prices and rising debt burden (Handlin 2016). Under Chávez, anybody who expressed criticism
of the government could be considered part of the opposition and labeled a traitor (Mazepus et
al. 359). Challenges from enemies, mainly private business, that included an attempted coup
d’état, a national strike in the oil industry, and a referendum to recall him from office helped him
effectively instill this narrative and consolidate his legitimacy (Mazepus et al. 2016, 358).
Chávez frequently promoted these narratives, and civil society actors often reproduced it.
In one of Chávez’s later speeches, he declared to the crowd, “I am Chávez, you are Chávez, we are all Chávez” (Chávez 2012). Following his death, supporters took to the streets and social
media to proclaim, “Todos somos Chávez” (Mazepus et al. 2016, 359). With respect to the “us
versus them” narrative, loyalist Chavista activists were promoted as champions of the poor and
disenfranchised, engaged in a war against a nefarious opposition. According to Chaplin (2014,
36), the use of discursive tactics that placed Chavista activists on the good side proved to be a
successful strategy for domestic legitimation. In their surveys and conversations, Hawkins and
Hansen (2006, 122) find that members of the Bolivarian Circles tended to see potential civil
society opposition groups as illegitimate golpistas (coup-plotters) and the Bolivarian movement
as the true expression of the Venezuelan people.
Chávez not only referred to civil society organizations in ways that played into the
foundational or historical discourse, but he also outright instructed them to reproduce the
language. With the formation of the Bolivarian Circles, he encouraged them to study the
ideology of Bolivarianism in order to effectively promote and defend the revolutionary process
and maintain the goal of diffusing revolutionary ideals (de la Torre 2013, 67; Hawkins and
Hansen 2006, 125). There is also evidence of civil society activists embracing the narrative as
part of their own organizational identity. In surveys of, and conversations with, members of the
15 Bolivarian Circles, Hawkins and Hansen (2006, 120) find that members focus on their relationship to Chávez as a charismatic leader, with a resulting lack of a unique sense of identity.
Bolivia
As in Venezuela, much of the Bolivian regime’s discourse is based on a break with the perceived injustices of the country’s past. While indigenous peoples represented a majority of the population, they were treated as a minority. Indeed, the movements that ultimately brought
Morales to power called for a new model of governance built on indigenous traditions (Grisaffi
2013, 48-50). Similar to Chávez, Morales announced that he would re-found the nation, although his would be a founding with and for the indigenous people (Grisaffi 2013, 48). The government describes this shift of power away from the traditional elite toward the mostly indigenous peoples as the “proceso de cambio” (process of change). Morales declared, “Until now Bolivia has been ruled by a few families that have all the political and economic power. They despise, humiliate, marginalize, and hate the majority of the indigenous population. After 525 years of colonization, we indigenous peoples are part of the construction of a new Plurinational State and we have full participation in international political organizations and forums” (Smith 2018).
While the process is not as top-down as it is in Venezuela, Bolivian civil society actors do reproduce the regime’s narratives and claim them as part of their own identity. Social organizations often perceive themselves as “protagonists” of the “proceso de cambio” (Cordoba and Jansen 454). Members of the Coca Unions frequently echo Morales’ words that “all of us are presidents here” and “there are a lot of Evos here” (Grisaffi 2013, 48). Furthermore, active civil society organizations, with their primarily indigenous social bases, maintain a deep identification with Morales and the “proceso de cambio” (Abbott 2015).
16 Civil Society as a Strategy to Increase Output Legitimation
Civil society organizations can also be used to increase output legitimation. According to
Lorch and Bunk (2017), governments aim to do this by tolerating welfare-oriented organizations,
allowing them to provide services the state is unable to provide, co-opting organizations and
taking credit for welfare-related outcomes, or working with civil society organizations and
holding public events with them in order to strengthen output legitimacy and take at least partial
credit. The Chávez and Morales governments have taken many of these actions.
Venezuela
Chávez supported welfare-oriented civil society organizations, several of which often
collaborated with the state. The government symbolically and materially supported civil society
organizations that were only just emerging at the end of the Punto Fijo years. These
organizations include the Urban Land Committees, which worked for the normalization of
property titles and the right of citizens to dignified and adequate housing, as well as Technical
Water Committees, which worked to establish regular water service in their neighborhoods
(Smilde 2011, 8). The Urban Land Committees were among the most important popular social organizations that emerged, maintaining a presence in the majority of Venezuela’s poor barrios
(García-Guadilla 2011, 80). The Bolivarian Circles also contributed to output legitimacy through
their high level of coordination with the government’s official programs (missions) promoting
education, health, and economic self-sufficiency. They were particularly active in remedial
education and health programs (Hawkins and Hansen 2006, 108). They also helped bring
welfare-related government programs to their communities (Hawkins and Hansen 2006, 110).
Bolivia
Similarly, Morales has tolerated welfare-related civil society organizations, and the
17 government has collaborated with them on government-prioritized programs and projects. In public discourse, Morales has expressed disdain for NGOs, describing them as representative of neoliberalism and serving as instruments of capitalism and imperialism. He also declared that only unions can speak for civil society (Cockburn 2014, 73). Yet, in their research on NGOs in
Bolivia, Cordoba and Jansen (2016) conclude that the public confrontation between the MAS government and NGOs mainly involve the political NGOs. Those organizations aiming to provide political education, raise awareness of constraining social relations, create spaces for political participation, or support other organizations that criticize the government have been treated with hostility by Morales. In contrast, technical NGOs fostering projects that aim to deliver technologies that solve production problems and aim to incorporate the poor into production networks have largely avoided confrontations with the state. Local and international
NGOs have also met with government officials to collaborate on projects. Further, Morales introduced rules that condition the presence of certain development NGOs on support for the government’s own development programs and priorities.
Civil Society for Limited Participation and Feedback
A fourth pattern in the use of civil society for legitimation purposes is the use of civil society as a mechanism of limited participation and feedback. Governments can channel discontent, preventing things from getting out of hand, by allowing civil society groups to participate, collaborate, and consult on policies or laws that aim to address issues relevant to them. This participation can be broadcast widely to portray the regime as responsive, and it can also provide the regime with useful feedback regarding pressing social demands. At the same time, it is often just window dressing, used by the regime to legitimate its decisions (Lorch and
Bunk 2017). This pattern is evident in both of my cases, as well.
18 Venezuela
The 1999 Venezuelan constitution contains a number of instruments designed to demonstrate an increase in civil society participation and government responsiveness such as participation in the nomination processes of public officials and incentives for local organizations to make demands of the government (Smilde 2011, 8). Popular participation was also institutionalized with the mandating of consultation with and participation of particular social groups (Hellinger 2011b, 32). Both the Bolivarian Circles and Communal Councils have played roles in local governance. Implemented through the legislature, the Communal Council program established a set of procedures by which small communities could join together to form neighborhood organizations that would assume a variety of local governance functions. At its peak, there were estimates of over 30,000 Councils (Handlin 2016).
Bolivia
The Bolivian government also solicits consultations, input, and feedback from civil society groups. Morales has held many popular consultations with social organizations, traveling around the country to attend grassroots meetings (Grisaffi 2013, 50). The state also engages
NGOs in policy debates and consultations on issues affecting civil society actors and socio- political reforms at large, allowing participation from civil society actors and receiving feedback on issues relevant to them. In one example, an NGO law was negotiated with civil society umbrella organizations, and their input was integrated before the law was passed (El-Mahdi
2011, 91). Dense networks of neighborhood associations in urban areas and peasant unions or traditional indigenous communities in rural areas also participate in municipal budgeting processes (Abbott 2015). While the Morales government appeared to boost the influence of subordinate social groups, acquiring greater legitimacy, it also concentrated power in the
19 executive at the expense of the legislature, courts, and nonpartisan oversight agencies (Anria
2016, 104-5). Furthermore, significant opportunities to participate in decision-making processes
have been limited (Anria 2013, 38). This evidence suggests that the solicitation of civil society
participation is primarily aimed at demonstrating inclusiveness and responsiveness, while
legitimating decisions that were either already made or not too significant.
Making Civil Society Play by the Rules
The final pattern highlighted by Lorch and Bunk (2017) is what they refer to as making
civil society play by the rules. Essentially, their argument is that civil society organizations are embedded in a web of government regulations, and that by complying with these constraints, the organizations are reaffirming and legitimating the regime’s rule. Although Lorch and Bunk do
not suggest as much, the key aspect of this argument is the compliance of existing organizations.
Without this compliance, it seems that no amount of legislation would contribute to the regime’s
legitimacy. Lorch and Bunk point to the trend of passing restrictive NGO legislation and limiting
foreign funding as evidence of this broader pattern, but if civil society actors protested these
constraints and attempted to work around them, they would not be contributing to legitimation.
Instead, this strategy would be more about keeping a lid on potential threats, which is different
from attempting to attain legitimacy. It is not clear how well this pattern plays out in my two
cases. Both governments have certainly applied constraints on civil society organizations, but
there is plenty of evidence to suggest a lack of compliance.
Venezuela
The Venezuelan government has regulated NGOs and created laws to criminalize anti-
government protest (de la Torre 2013, 62). The Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and
National Self-Determination in Venezuela forbade NGOs that defended political rights or
20 monitored public bodies from receiving international assistance (de la Torre 2013, 72). In
another example, the Venezuelan Workers Confederation had an antagonistic relationship with
the government and lacked the leadership and direction to launch concerted opposition. The
government ended state subsidies they had been receiving prior to Chávez coming to power and
proposed to audit the labor leadership’s assets. Furthermore, Chávez promoted the creation of a
parallel official union movement called the Bolivarian Workers Front to mobilize workers
behind the government’s projects, beginning with the destruction of the Venezuelan Workers
Confederation (Coppedge 2002, 20). There also have been many cases of the government
denying funding and jurisdiction to existing charitable organizations and giving it to local
Chavista organizations (Hawkins and Hansen 2006, 122).
Nevertheless, opposition civil society groups hardly complied with or accepted the rules
of the regime. And indeed, individuals had some freedom in organizing interest groups and
social movements (Coppedge 2002, 34). The opposition frequently mobilized into the streets,
student-led protests were held in opposition to the government, and opposition movements had
success at times. For example, opposition movements often denounced the Bolivarian Circles as
thugs, playing a key role in the negative image many citizens had of the Circles in their later
years (Handlin 2016). Civil society groups also have demonstrated an awareness of their
autonomy. For example, when a student movement emerged in reaction to the government’s
decision not to renew the broadcast license of an opposition television network, opposition
parties attempted to seize upon the opportunity. Yet, a sector among the students warned of the
dangers of co-optation and the need to develop a movement with a broader appeal to previously excluded segments of the population (Hellinger 2011a, 342).
21 Bolivia
As in Venezuela, the Bolivian government has co-opted existing popular organizations,
retaliated against organization leaders for engaging in activity on behalf of the opposition, and
created parallel organizations when existing indigenous organizations withdrew support. Indeed,
the line between party and popular organization is tenuous. Additionally, the government has
regulated NGOs and criminalized anti-government protest (de la Torre 2013, 62). In 2013,
Morales passed legislation allowing him to revoke an organization’s permit if it deviated from a list of acceptable activities (de la Torre 2013, 73). Vice President Alvaro García Linera launched an attack on several well-respected Bolivian research organizations, accusing them of lying and
political meddling to advance the interests of foreign governments and corporations (Abbott
2015).
Yet, Bolivia’s civil society organizations have maintained a high degree of autonomy
from the Bolivian government. Social movements have spearheaded bottom-up mobilizations
that have had a meaningful impact on government behavior, at times forcing Morales into policy
reversals (de la Torre 2013, 66). For example, when the government elected to end a
longstanding policy of fuel subsidies in 2010, a wave of strikes, marches, and road blocks led to
the government rescinding its proposal. Furthermore, this activity was led primarily by the
sectors of society that constituted the MAS’s primary support base (BBC 2011). Similarly,
grassroots activists helped secure opposition victory in the 2015 mayoral election in the city of
El Alto, and peasant organization protests led to the resignation of high-level officials and a
favorable agrarian reform proposal (Anria 2015, 173-5).
Civil Society in State-Mobilized Contention
Another pattern, not recognized by Lorch and Bunk, is the use of civil society in state-led
22 mobilization. Recent research has examined the use of state-mobilized contention in hybrid
regimes (Cheskin and March 2015; Robertson 2009; Robertson 2011). Much of this research
emphasizes the use of top-down, state-led mobilization to manage civil society, contributing to
the maintenance of stability in the presence of regular elections and other pressures. Not only do
these mobilizations act to counter any potential bottom-up movements perceived to be potentially threatening to the state, but they also serve in the construction of regime legitimacy by demonstrating the existence of substantial regime support. In my examination of Venezuela and Bolivia, I find that Chávez relied heavily on state-led mobilization for legitimation purposes, while Morales has been less able to do so.
Venezuela
Chávez frequently mobilized supporting civil society groups to counter opposition
mobilization. The Bolivarian Circles often served as shock troops to be mobilized into the street
to counter opposition protest activity. They also actively mobilized other supporters and
community members to participate in these counter-mobilizations (García-Guadilla 2004). Such mobilizations occurred in response to the general strike of late 2002 and other opposition protests. The Circles also succeeded in shutting down the newspaper El Nacional after leading a major protest alleging unfair treatment of the government, and they were credited with helping lead the massive popular protest that demanded the return of Chávez after the 2002 coup
(Roberts 2006). In addition to mobilizing existing supporting organizations, Chávez demonstrated an ability to create new movements when necessary to effectively counter particular threats. For example, in response to an upsurge in student activism and mobilization, the government created its own pro-government student groups, which engaged in selective counter-protests to demonstrate that a substantial segment of the younger generation was aligned
23 with Chávez and Bolivarianism (Handlin 2016).
Bolivia
In contrast to Chávez, Morales has not effectively created movements to use for counter-
mobilizations against opposition forces. The government has used co-optive strategies vis-á-vis grassroots groups to influence their leadership and behavior (Anria 2015, 97). Further, it is common for individuals to be sanctioned for not participating in government-sponsored activities. For example, not participating in state-mobilized protests or other mobilizations can result in fines and/or the loss of basic services such as water or electricity (Martínez 2013;
Morales 2015). Yet, mobilization is often both top-down and bottom-up. Anria (2013, 20) finds that autonomous mobilization is common in rural areas, while a more top-down strategy occurs in urban areas, correlating with the movement’s rural protest origins and subsequent urban expansion under electoral pressure. Furthermore, organizations maintain considerable autonomy from the MAS, often mobilizing when Morales does not approve, thereby placing limits on his authority (Anria 2013, 37). Thus, while Chávez created movement organizations, Morales relies primarily on co-optation of pre-existing organizations.
24 CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examine the use of civil society for regime legitimation strategies by Hugo
Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia. I find that several of the patterns found by
Lorch and Bunk (2017) in Algeria and Mozambique generalize to my two cases, while one does
not. Additionally, I suggest another pattern that I find in Venezuela. These findings are
summarized in Table 1. Specifically, the use of civil society as a façade of democracy, as a
participation and feedback mechanism, to reproduce regime discourse, and to increase output
legitimacy all generalize to my cases. There are some differences, such as the more direct and
top-down approach Chávez took to instruct organizations to reproduce discourse. Yet, some
variation is expected across all cases. The general patterns hold.
On the other hand, there is evidence that civil society organizations do not always play by
the rules in Venezuela and Bolivia. Unlike in Algeria and Mozambique, where even opposition
organizations claim to cooperate with state institutions, take on more conciliatory roles, and
generally accept the regime, civil society groups in Venezuela and Bolivia frequently directly
challenge the state and sometimes win. This variation could be due to the somewhat reversed
trajectory of the regimes. Whereas Algeria and Mozambique transitioned from fully-closed
authoritarian regimes to more competitive authoritarian, Venezuela and Bolivia have a more
democratic history with a subsequent transition to the hybrid spectrum. Indeed, Venezuela
experienced one of the region’s longest standing democracies prior to the Bolivarian era (Ellner
and Tinker Salas 2005). Thus, citizen experience with, and approval of, certain democratic ideals
places constraints on the regime’s ability to control civil society.
25 Table 1. Overview of conditions and observed patterns in the four cases Algeria Mozambique Venezuela Bolivia Conditions Regime type Competitive Competitive Competitive Competitive authoritarian authoritarian authoritarian authoritarian
Regime transition trajectory Closed → Closed → Democratic Democratic Hybrid Hybrid → Hybrid → Hybrid
Pre-existing civil society ? ? Weak and Dense and co-opted autonomous
Patterns Façade of democracy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reproduce regime discourse Yes Yes Yes Yes
Increase output legitimation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Limited participation / feedback Yes Yes Yes Yes
Play by the rules Yes Yes No No
State-mobilized contention ? ? Create Co-opt
Source: my research and Lorch and Bunk (2017)
Finally, I propose a new pattern: the use of civil society in state-led mobilization. By mobilizing pro-regime civil society groups, governments can effectively demonstrate the existence of regime support. As such, citizens contribute to the construction of regime legitimacy. This strategy is particularly useful when opposition forces are mobilizing, as pro-
regime mobilization can both discourage the opposition and signal regime strength. In my
research, I find that Chávez relied heavily on the use of state-led mobilization, particularly in response to anti-regime contention. Moreover, the groups that mobilized were always groups created at the top. In contrast, pro-regime mobilization in Bolivia is more bottom-up, although
Morales does make an effort to co-opt movements.
This variation can likely be explained by the differences in the countries histories and in
26 how the two presidents rose to power. Civil society was quite weak in Venezuela during the
Punto Fijo years, with relatively few social actors that were well-organized. Furthermore, establishment parties had been thorough in their penetration of social organizations, resulting in a lack of autonomy in civil society (Coppedge 2002, 18-20; Hellinger 2011b, 31). Political elites retained significant control over unions, business confederations, student organizations, neighborhood associations, professional organizations, and the like. When Chávez rose to the presidency, he invested a great deal of energy and resources in creating new forms of social organization and mobilization, as I detail above (Handlin 2016). This provided Chávez with significant control over the dominant civil society organizations, allowing him the ability to mobilize effectively from the top down.
In contrast, Morales rose to power as the leader of the MAS, which is a movement-based party. Nearly all of the most prominent popular organizations that support Morales and the MAS preceded his rise to the presidency (Anria 2015; de la Torre 2013, 27). Consequently, these organizations have been able to maintain a significant degree of autonomy, preventing Morales from mobilizing them in the Venezuelan manner. Indeed, his legitimacy may actually be threatened by an attempt to overly control his support base that helped him rise to power. When social movements have the resources to challenge a leader, as in Bolivia, that leader must actively negotiate the claim to be ruling on their behalf. In contrast, under conditions of a weak and co-opted civil society, leaders like Chávez are freer to impose this legitimacy claim. Thus, the preexisting density of civil society organizations and the background of the MAS limit the options available to Morales in using civil society to strengthen regime legitimacy.
These findings contribute to our understanding of hybrid regimes and a key pillar of their stability. Specifically, my research follows other recent work in bringing legitimacy back into
27 studies of nondemocratic regime stability. Furthermore, the role of civil society is a particularly
under-theorized and under-studied area within the research on regime legitimation strategies.
Understanding this role of civil society, the various manifestations of it, and the conditions under which such manifestations are most likely to appear is especially significant given the importance of an independent civil society. Indeed, manipulating and mobilizing civil society
actors through state resources undermines the autonomy that is at the heart of the role that civil
society is supposed to play.
Our understanding of the role of civil society in regime legitimation is still quite limited.
Future research should continue investigating the generalizability of the patterns identified above
and the conditions under which they hold. Such research should extend beyond competitive
authoritarian regimes to other types of hybrid regimes and fully-closed authoritarian regimes.
Another potential avenue of research is to examine the effectiveness of these legitimation
strategies. It is likely that certain strategies are more effective than others and that particular
conditions contribute to variation in such differences.
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