Wetmore Wildfire Lessons Learned Review October 23, 2012 Wetmore, Colorado
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Wetmore Wildfire Lessons Learned Review October 23, 2012 Wetmore, Colorado Wetmore Fire 10/24/12 © John Wark Lessons Learned Review (LLR) Team Members: Barry Oelrich, State Safety Manager, BLM Colorado - Team Leader / Chief Investigator Will Briggs, Zone Fire Management Officer, Arapaho and Roosevelt National Forest - Subject Matter Expert Dave Ruhl, Supervisory Forestry Technician (Engine Captain), Black Hills National Forest - Subject Matter Expert Unit Jurisdiction: Front Range District / Royal Gorge Field Office, Cañon City, Colorado Incident While assisting in evacuation of civilians in the Greenwood subdivision, Battalion Chief (BC 3-2), Captain (Capt. 5-1) and several civilians dispersed throughout five vehicles were forced to take refuge in a safe area while the head of the fire passed by them. The safe area was situated on a gravel county road, surrounded by light fuels consisting of overgrazed pastures and isolated pockets of heavier fuels consisting of Ponderosa Pine and Pinion Juniper. Background The Wetmore Fire began Tuesday, October 23, 2012 near the town of Wetmore, Colorado. The initial report stated the fire started in the Mason Gulch area. The fire burned 1,998 acres in Pueblo and Custer counties, during the first operational period. During the initial phase of this incident, fifteen residential structures were destroyed and over 380 residents were evacuated with no injuries reported to the public or firefighters. More than 20 organizations responded to the Wetmore Fire, including: Buelah Fire Department, Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Canon City Fire Department, Chaffee County Fire Department, Colorado Department of Transportation, Colorado Mountain Rangers, Colorado Springs Fire Department, Colorado State Patrol, Cripple Creek Fire Department, Custer County, Florence Police Department, Fremont County, Long Canyon Fire Department, Manitou Springs Fire Department, Pueblo County, Pueblo West Fire Department, Red Creek Volunteer Fire and Rescue, Rye Fire Department, South Arkansas Fire Department, South Metro Fire Department, Tallahassee Fire Department, USDA Forest Service (USFS), West Metro Fire Department, and Wetmore Fire Department. Observed weather for October 23, 2012 as reported by the nearby Red Creek RAWS station at 1300 hrs: 74°F, 9% relative humidity (RH) with west/southwest (wsw) winds averaging 47 mph, gusting to 74 mph. This area has experienced four major wildfire events and has been evacuated at least three times since 2005. Previously there had been no loss of homes or structures. http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_21848465/wetmore-evacuees-tell-tales-heroism-courage- face-wildfire West side of the Wetmore fire, Highway 96 (right side) CR 390 (middle left) goes out of frame to the east. Wetmore Fire 10/24/12 © John Wark Timeline * all times are approximate, compiled from Initial Attack IC logs. Note, that in the 5 minute time span from 1355hrs to 1400hrs; BC 3-2 and Capt. 3-1 traveled over 1.5 miles and made contact with four civilians prior to the flame front. 13:15 Report of a fire in the Wetmore area. Engine-52 (E-52), BC 3, Battalion Chief (C 3-1), BC 3-2 responding. 13:45 Arrived on scene, radio traffic indicated structures being lost, evacuations taking place. Also reports of people trapped in houses. Due to Analog/Digital radio communication issues, all local LEO/VFD information relayed to BC 3-2 and / Capt. 5-1, via USFS Law Enforcement Officer 2072 (LEO 2072). 13:55 * BC 3-2 and Capt. 5-1 began driving east on County Road 390 (CR 390). Both firefighters were riding in BC 3-2 command vehicle (BC 3-2 CV) to check residence for evacuations. CR 390 is a 1.3 mile long, dead end road. Half way down CR 390 they encountered heavy smoke and fire on both sides of the road. BC 3-2 CV proceeded another 100 yards and was back into clean air, where they made contact with two civilians standing outside among several parked vehicles (pullout). The civilians asked if they could drive to safety going west on CR 390, BC 3-2 CV advised them they could not due to heavy smoke and increasing fire behavior. At this time BC 3-2 CV was approached by a third civilian who stated that his brother was trapped in a house on CR 390, at that time BC 3-2 CV had to focus on theirs and the civilians safety in light of the approaching fire. BC 3-2 CV advised the man not to proceed west on CR 390. BC 3- 2 CV continued driving east on CR 390 searching for a safe location for themselves and the civilians to allow the fire to pass. BC 3-2 CV arrived at the end of CR 390 and located several places to park the civilian vehicles and themselves. 14:00 BC 3-2 CV proceeded west on CR 390, to gather up the vehicles at the pullout and bring them to the area adjacent to the metal building. Shortly after they began to drive west on CR 390, they were stopped by a homeowner standing near a minivan (fourth civilian / white stairway). At the same time the original three civilian vehicles from the pullout, plus one additional were driving toward them, they were forced to leave the pullout due to the rapidly approaching fire. All the civilians were told to drive east to the large metal barn, stay in their vehicles and turn on the air conditioning. At this point the flame front was close enough and moving so fast that BC 3-2 CV was forced to drive in reverse heading east on CR 390. As BC 3-2 CV backed up, the fire caught up to them on both sides of the road. “As we arrived at the metal barn the fire on the south side hit the road and a few seconds later the fire on the north side hit the road. The vehicles with us took some heat but nothing too bad. We then checked on the civilians after the heat diminished. We contacted the IC and notified them of the situation.” 14:00* BC 3-2 CV called BC 3-1; requesting they begin driving east on CR 390 toward their location once the fire activity died down. 14:10 BC 3-1 arrived at the metal barn. BC 3-2 CV began leading three civilian vehicles west on CR 390, they received a radio call from E-52 with a report of a man who was trapped in a house on the County Road (CR 391). BC 3-2 CV ensured the civilian vehicles were out of danger, then instructed them to continue driving west on CR 390. BC 3-2 CV turned around and proceeded to CR 391 road to look for the gentleman in question. 14:30* BC 3-2 CV, unable to locate anyone on CR 391. Metal Barn at the east end of CR 390, Wetmore Fire 10/24/12 © John Wark Lessons Learned Communications Inadequate communications are often cited as a recurrent cause of operational problems during the initial attack of a wildland fire incident. A breakdown in communications was experienced between BLM firefighters and local county emergency services responding to the Wetmore fire due to incompatible radio systems and local county emergency services not utilizing the Multiple Area Coordination (MAC 10) channel during this incident. County emergency services operate on 800 megahertz (Ultra High frequency) radio system and federal resources operate using a VHF (Very High Frequency) radio system. The two systems cannot “talk” to each other unless an interface/interop box has been set up near the incident. During multi-jurisdictional incidents within the county, resources have the ability to communicate on the MAC 10 channel while operating on the 800 megahertz radios. Only one 800 megahertz portable radio is carried on each local BLM engine. Local BLM Division Chiefs and Battalion Chiefs do not carry these radios in their vehicles. Communication issues were reduced by the actions of LEO 2072. LEO 2072 was actively monitoring radio traffic from the Sheriff’s Department, and then LEO 2072 relayed the radio traffic overheard to BC 3-2 and Capt. 5-1 regarding structures on fire, evacuations in progress, civilians trapped in houses in need of assistance evacuating from Greenwood subdivision down CR 390. LEO 2072’s quick action contributed to BC 3-2 & Capt. 5-1 successfully locating the trapped civilians and guiding them down CR 390 into a safe area to protect them from the advancing fire front. Radio communication issues regarding 800MHz and VHF radio systems continue to be an issue nationwide. Until all agencies are able to communicate effectively during an emerging incident on a compatible system, firefighter and public safety is placed at a greater risk. Develop and implement a joint communications plan with cooperators outlining frequencies to be used during a wildfire incident that involves a multi-agency response. FCC Designated Interoperability Channels – VHF (Narrow Band) are available through the Department of Homeland Security. Improve pre-planning and training in frequency use and radio operations with cooperators. Defensible Space Protecting life, property, resources and critical infrastructure is the primary incentive for mitigating the threat from a wildfire in the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI). Areas with higher fuel loading and structure density cause additional concern during wildfire incidents for firefighter and public safety. The Greenwood subdivision is at risk from another wildfire impacting the community. Wildfire mitigation techniques using Firewise guidelines which can be found at (http://www.firewise.org ) would decrease the risk to homeowners and that of emergency personnel responding to wildfires in this area. Firewise practices and procedures can significantly reduce structural ignitability by interrupting fire spread and reducing receptive fuel beds in and around structures.