Wetmore Wildfire Lessons Learned Review October 23, 2012 Wetmore, Colorado

Wetmore Fire 10/24/12 © John Wark

Lessons Learned Review (LLR) Team Members:

Barry Oelrich, State Safety Manager, BLM Colorado - Team Leader / Chief Investigator

Will Briggs, Zone Fire Management Officer, Arapaho and Roosevelt National Forest - Subject Matter Expert

Dave Ruhl, Supervisory Forestry Technician (Engine Captain), Black Hills National Forest - Subject Matter Expert

Unit Jurisdiction:

Front Range District / Royal Gorge Field Office, Cañon City, Colorado

Incident

While assisting in evacuation of civilians in the Greenwood subdivision, Battalion Chief (BC 3-2), Captain (Capt. 5-1) and several civilians dispersed throughout five vehicles were forced to take refuge in a safe area while the head of the fire passed by them. The safe area was situated on a gravel county road, surrounded by light fuels consisting of overgrazed pastures and isolated pockets of heavier fuels consisting of Ponderosa Pine and Pinion Juniper.

Background

The Wetmore Fire began Tuesday, October 23, 2012 near the town of Wetmore, Colorado. The initial report stated the fire started in the Mason Gulch area. The fire burned 1,998 acres in Pueblo and Custer counties, during the first operational period. During the initial phase of this incident, fifteen residential structures were destroyed and over 380 residents were evacuated with no injuries reported to the public or firefighters. More than 20 organizations responded to the Wetmore Fire, including: Buelah Fire Department, Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Canon City Fire Department, Chaffee County Fire Department, Colorado Department of Transportation, Colorado Mountain Rangers, Colorado Department, Colorado State Patrol, Cripple Department, Custer County, Florence Police Department, Fremont County, Long Department, Manitou Springs Fire Department, Pueblo County, Pueblo Department, Red Creek Volunteer Fire and Rescue, Department, South Arkansas Fire Department, South Metro Fire Department, Tallahassee Fire Department, USDA Forest Service (USFS), West Metro Fire Department, and Wetmore Fire Department.

Observed weather for October 23, 2012 as reported by the nearby Red Creek RAWS station at 1300 hrs: 74°F, 9% relative humidity (RH) with west/southwest (wsw) winds averaging 47 mph, gusting to 74 mph.

This area has experienced four major wildfire events and has been evacuated at least three times since 2005. Previously there had been no loss of homes or structures. http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_21848465/wetmore-evacuees-tell-tales-heroism-courage- face-wildfire

West side of the Wetmore fire, Highway 96 (right side) CR 390 (middle left) goes out of frame to the east. Wetmore Fire 10/24/12 © John Wark

Timeline

* all times are approximate, compiled from Initial Attack IC logs. Note, that in the 5 minute time span from 1355hrs to 1400hrs; BC 3-2 and Capt. 3-1 traveled over 1.5 miles and made contact with four civilians prior to the flame front.

13:15 Report of a fire in the Wetmore area. Engine-52 (E-52), BC 3, Battalion Chief (C 3-1), BC 3-2 responding.

13:45 Arrived on scene, radio traffic indicated structures being lost, evacuations taking place. Also reports of people trapped in houses. Due to Analog/Digital radio communication issues, all local LEO/VFD information relayed to BC 3-2 and / Capt. 5-1, via USFS Law Enforcement Officer 2072 (LEO 2072).

13:55 * BC 3-2 and Capt. 5-1 began driving east on County Road 390 (CR 390). Both firefighters were riding in BC 3-2 command vehicle (BC 3-2 CV) to check residence for evacuations. CR 390 is a 1.3 mile long, dead end road. Half way down CR 390 they encountered heavy smoke and fire on both sides of the road. BC 3-2 CV proceeded another 100 yards and was back into clean air, where they made contact with two civilians standing outside among several parked vehicles (pullout). The civilians asked if they could drive to safety going west on CR 390, BC 3-2 CV advised them they could not due to heavy smoke and increasing fire behavior. At this time BC 3-2 CV was approached by a third civilian who stated that his brother was trapped in a house on CR 390, at that time BC 3-2 CV had to focus on theirs and the civilians safety in light of the approaching fire. BC 3-2 CV advised the man not to proceed west on CR 390. BC 3- 2 CV continued driving east on CR 390 searching for a safe location for themselves and the civilians to allow the fire to pass. BC 3-2 CV arrived at the end of CR 390 and located several places to park the civilian vehicles and themselves.

14:00 BC 3-2 CV proceeded west on CR 390, to gather up the vehicles at the pullout and bring them to the area adjacent to the metal building. Shortly after they began to drive west on CR 390, they were stopped by a homeowner standing near a minivan (fourth civilian / white stairway). At the same time the original three civilian vehicles from the pullout, plus one additional were driving toward them, they were forced to leave the pullout due to the rapidly approaching fire. All the civilians were told to drive east to the large metal barn, stay in their vehicles and turn on the air conditioning. At this point the flame front was close enough and moving so fast that BC 3-2 CV was forced to drive in reverse heading east on CR 390. As BC 3-2 CV backed up, the fire caught up to them on both sides of the road. “As we arrived at the metal barn the fire on the south side hit the road and a few seconds later the fire on the north side hit the road. The vehicles with us took some heat but nothing too bad. We then checked on the civilians after the heat diminished. We contacted the IC and notified them of the situation.”

14:00* BC 3-2 CV called BC 3-1; requesting they begin driving east on CR 390 toward their location once the fire activity died down.

14:10 BC 3-1 arrived at the metal barn. BC 3-2 CV began leading three civilian vehicles west on CR 390, they received a radio call from E-52 with a report of a man who was trapped in a house on the County Road (CR 391). BC 3-2 CV ensured the civilian vehicles were out of danger, then instructed them to continue driving west on CR 390. BC 3-2 CV turned around and proceeded to CR 391 road to look for the gentleman in question.

14:30* BC 3-2 CV, unable to locate anyone on CR 391.

Metal Barn at the east end of CR 390, Wetmore Fire 10/24/12 © John Wark

Lessons Learned

Communications

Inadequate communications are often cited as a recurrent cause of operational problems during the initial attack of a wildland fire incident. A breakdown in communications was experienced between BLM firefighters and local county emergency services responding to the Wetmore fire due to incompatible radio systems and local county emergency services not utilizing the Multiple Area Coordination (MAC 10) channel during this incident. County emergency services operate on 800 megahertz (Ultra High frequency) radio system and federal resources operate using a VHF (Very High Frequency) radio system. The two systems cannot “talk” to each other unless an interface/interop box has been set up near the incident. During multi-jurisdictional incidents within the county, resources have the ability to communicate on the MAC 10 channel while operating on the 800 megahertz radios. Only one 800 megahertz portable radio is carried on each local BLM engine. Local BLM Division Chiefs and Battalion Chiefs do not carry these radios in their vehicles. Communication issues were reduced by the actions of LEO 2072. LEO 2072 was actively monitoring radio traffic from the Sheriff’s Department, and then LEO 2072 relayed the radio traffic overheard to BC 3-2 and Capt. 5-1 regarding structures on fire, evacuations in progress, civilians trapped in houses in need of assistance evacuating from Greenwood subdivision down CR 390. LEO 2072’s quick action contributed to BC 3-2 & Capt. 5-1 successfully locating the trapped civilians and guiding them down CR 390 into a safe area to protect them from the advancing fire front.

 Radio communication issues regarding 800MHz and VHF radio systems continue to be an issue nationwide. Until all agencies are able to communicate effectively during an emerging incident on a compatible system, firefighter and public safety is placed at a greater risk.

 Develop and implement a joint communications plan with cooperators outlining frequencies to be used during a wildfire incident that involves a multi-agency response. FCC Designated Interoperability Channels – VHF (Narrow Band) are available through the Department of Homeland Security. Improve pre-planning and training in frequency use and radio operations with cooperators.

Defensible Space

Protecting life, property, resources and critical infrastructure is the primary incentive for mitigating the threat from a wildfire in the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI). Areas with higher fuel loading and structure density cause additional concern during wildfire incidents for firefighter and public safety. The Greenwood subdivision is at risk from another wildfire impacting the community. Wildfire mitigation techniques using Firewise guidelines which can be found at (http://www.firewise.org ) would decrease the risk to homeowners and that of emergency personnel responding to wildfires in this area. Firewise practices and procedures can significantly reduce structural ignitability by interrupting fire spread and reducing receptive fuel beds in and around structures.

Consideration should be given to provide safe egress for the public during a wildfire event and safe ingress/egress routes for emergency personnel conducting fire suppression operations. Wildfires do not recognize governmental or jurisdictional boundaries. Cooperation between all agencies is essential to reduce the risk from wildfire.

Good Standard Business Practices

 Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 applied Risk Management practices throughout the incident which led to a successful outcome. Numerous times Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 used this process to quickly evaluate the situation and develop mitigations to lessen the risk associated with the conditions.  Intra-crew communications and working relationships between the BLM fire staff and LEO 2072 were directly responsible for the outcome of no injuries or loss of life to civilians during this near miss. If not for the close working relationship with LEO 2072, Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 might not have received word of the need for public evacuations on CR 390.  Throughout the incident Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 conducted their actions professionally, competently and calmly. These actions led to the public staying together and arriving at a suitable safe area, and not scattering or heading into unsafe locations.

Wetmore Fire Conclusion

48 hours after the Wetmore fire Initial Attack, the LLR team was able to sit down and discuss what had taken place on CR 390. The lessons learned from this incident come directly from the participants statements and the documents provided.

Throughout this incident, BC 3-2 and Capt. 5-1 conducted themselves in a professional and competent manner. They displayed excellent judgment and made information based decisions through their continual use of situational awareness (SA) developed throughout the fire. Examples being:

 Immediately as they began to drive east on CR 390, both firefighters began actively assessing and analyzing what they were seeing, noting the conditions, safety zones, fuel types and densities as they went past them along the route.

 Sensitivity to operations; It’s easy to forget about the big picture when you start getting overwhelmed and hurried. BC 3-2 and Capt. 5-1 remained calm and didn’t forget their years of training and experience from previous fires; this was a major benefit to civilians who were looking to them for guidance.  BC 3-2 and Capt. 5-1 both stated they could have retreated and driven out (west) on CR 390, but stayed due to civilians that were present.

 When specifically asked 48 hours after incident; “What would you do different if you could go back?” Both, without hesitation stated “nothing”.

 Because of the good situational awareness maintained, BC 3-2 and Capt. 5-1 were able to remove themselves from harm’s way in a short period of time, along with keeping civilians and five civilian vehicles from being damaged or destroyed. The area chosen to allow the flame front to pass only required 10 minutes to cool enough for additional support to arrive.

Statements

Civilian Statement

Civilian 1 residence address: 1054 CR 390.

Civilian 1 received a reverse 911 call sometime between 13:45 and 13:55 hrs advising her of a wildland fire in the Greenwood subdivision and that residents living within that location needed to evacuate. While listening to the message she stepped outside and observed fire in her front yard being pushed by wind gusts up to 74 mph (recorded at the Red Creek RAWS site).

Civilian 1 along with her husband (Civilian 2) grabbed belongings and loaded their young child into their minivan. Civilian 1 drove the minivan out of the driveway behind Civilian 2 who was operating their other vehicle. While driving out the driveway, Civilian 2 encountered a vehicle (Civilian 3) trying to find an egress route.

Civilian 2 advised them they could not get out through Civilian 2’s driveway as it was a dead end. As the group discussed egress options Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 arrived at the entrance to the driveway. BC 3-2 instructed all three civilian parties that they could not proceed west on CR 390 and that they needed to drive east to a metal barn located at the end of the road.

Two additional civilian vehicles (Civilian 4 and 5) met up with the group at this time and they all preceded toward the metal barn with Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 following closely behind. During this time the vehicles could barely keep ahead of the advancing fire which was burning on both sides of CR 390.

Civilian 4 and 5 made it to the metal barn and parked alongside the structure while Civilians 1, 2, 3 were overtaken by smoke just short of the footprint, unable to see outside the vehicles they stop.

Within seconds, the fire caught up with the group (Civilian 2 in the lead, followed by Civilian 1, Civilian 3 and BC 3-2/Capt. 5-1 in the rear) burning past the group along both sides of the road. Civilian 1 stated several times that she “did not feel like they would make it out of there” and tried to text a family member to advise them of their situation.

While the fire burned and progressed past the group, Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 went to each vehicle advising them to keep the vehicles running and to turn on the air conditioning in the vehicles. Civilian 1 said having the firefighters go car to car and talking with everyone provided reassurance that the situation was not as dire as they had thought it was.

The group was parked in that location for around 20 minutes and then escorted out to the main road by Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2.

LEO 2072 Statement

USFS LEO Ranger 2072 Below are bulleted notes provided by LEO 2072, the first responder on scene at the Wetmore wildfire.

 LEO 2072 has lived in/near Wetmore for 3 years. Knows the community and the people well.  There has been an ongoing problem from the last three fires; our engines (BLM / USFS) can’t communicate with the local cooperators on fires.  Still can’t believe no lives were lost (civilian and rescuers).  Red Flagged day, from 8am on, kept getting automated weather updated via radio notifying of extreme conditions (high temperatures, high winds, and very low relative humidity).  LEO 2072 was notified of by a phone call from neighbor, reporting seeing smoke in the area near Wetmore.  As LEO 2072 was driving toward fires location, there was already a column going up into the air, Pueblo Interagency Dispatch tones out call.  LEO 2072 notified Pueblo Interagency Dispatch and local authorities of the fire.  Contacted CSP to have Hwy 96 shut down.  LEO 2072 has progress impeded by fire while on Hwy 96; the fire blew up and rolled over in front of the patrol truck crossing highway 96, there was bright red flames and heavy smoke to either side of the roadway and the vehicle, no visibility due to thick smoke in front of the vehicle, was able to back the vehicle through thick smoke and out of the immediate fire danger. Retreated to the General Store.  The fire had “explosive growth” not spotting, but exploding out on all sides.  Called dispatch, requested “send everything you can”. Called Custer County Sheriff, begin reverse 911 of immediate area. Requested notification of Pueblo County for the same to the east. Structures threatened properties already involved. People running toward wherever they could get away from fire. Many running/driving blindly through smoke, many gathering at Wetmore general Store parking lot which is also immediately in danger. LEO 2072 advised civilians to coordinate in getting people farther away to safety before other responding units arrive.  Immediately began evacuating Greenwood Drive (hardtop road running parallel w/ Hwy 96). Located, and assisted (at times carrying) people from involved and threatened homes, placing them in patrol vehicle, many houses burning as they departed.  A propane and/or fuel tank blew out next to an involved residence while on foot, sent shrapnel toward LEO 2072 and the patrol truck. Both LEO 2072 and truck struck by metal, no major injuries sustained by LEO 2072 just minor scrapes.  LEO 2072 drove through the fire several times to respond to reports of persons trapped by fire in homes and cars both by 911 calls and word of mouth, and get to homes with known elderly, blind, and disabled. Carried some civilians out in back of patrol truck. Either gained or attempted to gain access to all residences involved with fire nearby to ascertain if residents had evacuated and were not trapped. LEO 2072 almost trapped again in vehicle on road, (overhead utility lines burning and falling, visibility lost) picked up three more civilians running out of smoke/fire, had to back out to escape fire. Could no longer safely access the sub-division  LEO 2072 and a DOW Officer located and treated a reported injured party in the Wetmore General Store parking area. Woman was in hysterics had to be restrained and drug away from fire by officers to keep her from re-entering sub-division to get horses.  LEO 2072 advises CSP dispatch to respond medical units to staging for potential “walking wounded” and designates a staging/triage area at the intersection pull-out of highway 96 and highway 67. Coordinates this on the ground with CSP Trooper Supervisor who has arrived.  LEO 2072 Departs Highway 96 east to get ahead of running fire and evacuate new homes at Pueblo County Line that will be in danger. Coordinates Radio traffic direct with Pueblo County Emergency Services Bureau, has units responding for evacuation and traffic control out of Pueblo.  Volunteer Fire Department(s) (VFD’s) could not communicate with outside resources (might not understand how to operate radios and change frequencies).  LEO 2072 realizes many units now arriving at scene to assist with no coordination, attempts to standardize all initial communications traffic for life safety issues. IA efforts are being coordinated by federal fire with federal personnel on FS/BLM VHF frequencies.  LEO 2072 requested Colorado State Patrol (CSP) use frequency MAC 9 / CSP chose MAC 10 -- some but not all --in-coming and now on-scene resources are notified of a unified communications frequency, but many did not have capability to switch.  LEO 2072 stated he’s been around fire his whole adult life; this was the scariest thing he’d ever seen.  Civilians were running for their lives, abandoned cars and just ran.  LEO 2072 realized all the radio traffic for incoming fire crews and dispatch was taking places on VHF frequencies, at that time LEO 2072 started to relay everything coming from the 800 MHz radio system to the VHF radio system of responding BLM resources.  County Sheriff should be Command or delegate IC, No clear organizational structure being set.  Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 arrived on scene; immediately they began to verbally, thru direct face to face instructions and with hand signs direct local VFD’s on what /where to go. VFD’s overwhelmed, didn’t know where to begin. Some VFD’s began suppression efforts on homes already destroyed.  LEO 2072 has himself and other officers utilize a form of local preplanned evacuation procedures (Urban SAR) ensuring homes cleared going house to house and marking was working, but houses kept starting on fire.  When LEO 2072 looked back at the radio logs; at times, he was communicating with 16 different entities and relaying everything to Federal resources via VHF frequencies.  MAC 10 was being overwhelmed with radio traffic.  Due the communications issues, rescuers were put into a very dangerous situation.  Had Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 not been there to help civilians, we would have lost people.  911 calls relayed that led to Capt. 5-1 and BC 3-2 being on CR 390; “Help my car is burning”, “I’m running out of the fire, don’t know where I am”, “help me”, numerous reports of civilians still in homes, trapped on CR 390.  During the initial 2 hours there were no definitive command and control communications efforts other than LEO 2072, federal fire resources, and a handful of police officers working with LEO 2072 on MAC 10.

Facing east on CR 390, Wetmore Fire 10/25/12, B. Oelrich

The "pullout" left side of picture, facing east on CR 390, Wetmore Fire 10/25/12, B. Oelrich