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8-14 70 pages Sartre: being-there other Files Index: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U-Z

3-13bein being-there ...... 4 Sartre correlates three degrees of consciousness with the two dialectic negations ...... 4 being[there]lived (lower case, Index) ...... 5 Being[there]posited/1neg (capitalized, Index) ...... 6 Unreflective/non-reflected first degree consciousness (index) ...... 8 Sartre’s early use of ‘pre-reflectiveI’ consciousness (9 hits in early BN) ...... 10

8-15bein ...... Lived experience 11 The ‘conception of "lived experiencelived" marks my change since L’Etre et Le Néant’ (IT41) ...... 11 lived I I I Experience as ‘life aware of itself’ without cognitive knowledge Fr=? 15

8-15bein ...... Sartre and Heidegger 17 Heidegger’s Dasein: subject-object human_realitylived vs. Sartre’s dualismI ...... 18 Heidegger: Being attuned as the fundamental nature of DaseinI ...... 22 ...... Equipment as ready-to-hand 24 Hubert L. Dreyfus: B&T circumspection is restricted to direct transparent environment/context ...... 25 John Haugeland: Disclosedness ‘presents a curious doubling’ ...... 27

8-15Hesa ...... Heidegger’s object without subject [ground] 28 Heidegger, ‘The perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the "cabinet of consciousness"...’28 Rüdiger Safranski: Heidegger’s foundered thinking ...... 31

8-14bein ...... Reflection: the French terms 32 French ‘mirror’ as English ‘reflect/mirror’ [refléter]lived ; reflected_on [reflété]lived ...... 32

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...... Reflectionlived-reflectinglived: [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived 33 ...... Reflectionlived-reflected_onlived: refletlived-reflétélived 34 French ‘think’ as English ‘reflection’ [réfléchir]lived; reflexion [réflexion]lived ; reflecting [réfléchissant]lived ...... 35 Reflective’ [réflexive]lived; reflexive [réflexif]lived ; reflexivity [réflexivité]posited ; reflexively [réflexivement]lived 37

8-14bein The Transcendence of the Ego, Tr. by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick, N.Y., Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, or Noonday Press, 1960. (1936) [Original translation modified by my Sartrean terms and clarifications] ...... 39

8-14bein ...... i. the I and the Me (TE31-60) 39 A. The theory of the formallived presence of the I [Je]lived (TE32-42) ...... 39 . The ‘transcendental Iposited is the death of consciousness’ (TE33, 37-8, 40) 41 Connectionslived&lived ‘of the Ilived/1neg to consciousnesslived/2neg are existential problems’ (TE34) 43 B. The Cogito (TE43) ...... 44 ...... Third_degreeontology consciousness (TE44) 48 ...... Unreflected ‘thoughtlived undergoes a radicalontology modification in becoming reflected_on [réfléchi]lived’ (TE45-50) ...... 50 ...... Unreflected actionlived continuously transformslived our projectslived without a reflexive [réflexive]lived consciousness (out of sequence E52-7) 54 ...... The Family Idiot: ‘Reflection [réflexion]lived shapes lived experiencelived according to its own endslived’ (FI 5:36) 60 ...... BondI of being[-there]lived unites reflected-on [réfléchi]lived to reflective [réflexive]lived (BN150, out of sequence) 63 By ‘way of conclusion’ (TE52-3) ...... 65

9-14bein ...... ii. the constitutionBN of the Egoposited/1neg (TE60-93) 66 Page 60-1 out of sequence at Sartre\The Other-Egoposited/1neg as an objectI in the worldI: in-itselflived, not for-itselflived (TE31, 60-1, BN102) ...... 66 A. Stateslived as transcendentlived/1neg unitiesI of consciousness (TE61-68) ...... 66 Pages 61-68 out of sequence at Sartre\Emotions-Hatredlived ‘is credit for an infinity of angerlived or repulsed consciousness in the past or in the future ... a veritable passage to infinity’ 66 B. The constitutionBN of actionslived (TE68-69) [not cited] ...... 66 C. Qualitieslived as optional unitiesI of stateslived (TE70-71) [not cited] ...... 66 D. The constitutionBN of the Egoposited/1neg as the poleI of actionsposited, stateslived, and qualitiesposited (TE71-91) [not cited] ...... 67 E. The Iposited/1neg and consciousness in the cogitolived (TE91-92) [not cited] ...... 67 Two consciousnesses cognitionI of one cognition between them: but othersI lived experience is radically impenetrable (TE93-103) 67 Egoposited/1neg is not the owner of consciousness; it is the objectposited of consciousness (TE96) 69

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Page 101-2 out of sequence at Sartre\Phenomenology-BN phenomenologyposited converts dualismsI of interiorI/exteriorI, beingI/appearanceI, potency/actI to that of the ‘infinite in the finite’ (TE63, 101-2, BNxlv) 70 ...... Remarks 2. (TE103), remarks 3. (TE104-6) [no citations] 70 The Emotions: fearlived is not origianally consciousness of being afraidposited (E50-2)...... 70

8-14bein ...... Appendix 72 Reflected-on [réfléchi]lived as an appearancelived for reflective [réflexif]lived as witness (of) itself: reflectivelived witness (of) reflected-onlived as appearancelived to itself (BN 151-4, 174, 239, 298, 340, inaccessible 2&1/2 pages) ...... 72

E N D O F T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

3-13bein being-there [This first alphabetical file could not fit intentions better.] Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-BEING-THERElived [êtren, êtrev ]. See *- capitalization; See Herein-being[-there]lived BN (p. 322, Fr. 361) sartre¶"Thus I am in the presence of things which are only promises beyond an ineffable presenceI which I can not possess and which is the pure ‘being-therelived’ of things..." The War Dairies (p. 39P, Fr. 55) "It remains to be determined [‘that is, as lived&lived limitation’] what this connectionok [of three degrees] between consciousnesslived/2neg and its possibleslived/1neg is. So far we have basically followed Heidegger. But now we can follow him no longer. Effectively, for him, the Dasein (being-therelived) is quite simply its own possibilities. But it would then be useless to posit3cog/1neg transcendencelived/1neg like him, if we fall back into another kind of immanencelivedc...” The Family Idiot (1:140-1, Fr. 1:148) "...The unlovedI child suffers from neglect, from naturelived present_to the selfI as inadequacy—through his futile efforts to grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] inaccessible significationslived—as passivitylived and as pure ‘being-therelived’ with no purpose or reason. Yet these negative and general characteristics do not emerge from any comparison. It is simply the lackI of loveI felt by the livinglived himself..." Sartre\Heidegger&Sartre-RRonald Aronson and Hubert L. Dreyfus: Dasein’s subject-object human_reality vs. Sartre’s dualism

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Joseph Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: (p. 10) states that for Heidegger, being, lower case, is ontic/ontological.

2-15bein Sartre correlates three degrees of consciousness with the two dialectic negations Sartre correlates normal and capitalized terms of the three_degrees_of_consciousness** with negation1 and negation2*** of the dialectic. Ten flags result: lived,posited,ontology,1neg,2neg, lived/1neg, lived/2neg, posited/1neg, ontology/1neg, ontology/2neg. Over 8,000 such flags exist in the twenty three data file’s 1000+ pages. [Bookmarked home-locations of Sartrean terms have citations supporting these flagged correlations.] Ref Herein-I ** Ref Sartre/Index of Terms-THREE_DEGREES_OF_CONSCIOUSNESS The three_degrees_of_consciousness are modes of consciousness_is_ consciousness_ (of)_something. Sartre posits a lived experience of first_degreelived consciousness with two other conscious modes, the second_degreeposited which includes the ontological third_degreeontology. *** The flag for negation1=term1neg and for negation2=term2neg. See being-there-2. The simultaneous Negation1 of Negation2 [Story line: a negation1 of negation2 situation in a single individual resisting his own attempt at a possible transformation. The negation2 is restraining the negation1 attempt to transform [surpass] the situation. We live, we learn.]

2-15bein being[there]lived (lower case, Index) lived Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-BEING[-THERE] ; ‘[-there]’ is a suffix added to offset our incessant abstractions. Without ‘[-there],’ Sartre claims that being does not exist. The Transcendence of the Ego (p. 46c, Fr. 30-1) ...But every unreflective [irréfléchi]lived consciousness, being[-there]lived non-theticlivedc consciousness of itself, leaves a non-theticlivedc memory [souvenir] that one can consult..." BN (p. lxiiic) "...In particular the preceding reflections have permitted us to distinguish two absolutelyontology separated regionsc of being[-there]lived: the beingI of the pre-reflective [préréflexif] cogitolivedc and the beingI of the phenomenonlived...";

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(p. 39c) "...Our being[-there]lived is immediately ‘in situationc;’ that is, it arises in enterprises and knows [connait]lived itself first in so far as it is reflected [refléte]lived in those enterprises..."; c lived (p. 174 , Fr. 210-11) "e...The reflected [reflété] makes itself qualified outside next to a certain beingI as not being[-there]lived that being. This is precisely what we call: ‘to be consciousness (of) somethinglived.’" (p. 258c) "...to perceivelived is to look atontology/1neg, and to apprehendontology/2neg a lookontology/2neg ... is to be conscious of being[-there]lived looked atontology/2neg..."; (p. 308c) "...For human_realitylived, to be is to-be-there; that is, ‘there in that chair,’ there at that table,’ ‘there at the top of that mountain, with these dimensions, this orientation, etc.’ It is an ontological necessityBNontology." (p. 317-8c, Fr. 357) "...The structuredial/lived of the worldI demands that we can not see without being[-there]lived visible..." Sartre\The Other-RWhat ‘is the being[-there]lived of being-for- otherslived’ (BN282) The Family Idiot (2:301c, Fr. 1:963) "...At once the conversionR is accomplished: it is a new momentdial/1neg of his personalization, he has found his being[-there]lived..."

2-15bein Being[there]posited/1neg (capitalized, Index) Notebooks for an Ethics (p. 37c, no ce) "(No. 41) The pursuit of posited/1neg Being ok is hell..." BN (p. 13c) "...If the beginning of logicposited is to be the immediate, posited/1neg we shall then find beginning in Being ok, which is ‘the indetermination which precedes all determination [‘that is, as limitation’], the undetermined as the absoluteontology point of departure.’ [paragraph break] "But posited/1neg Being ok, thus undetermined, right away [aussitôt] ‘passes into’ its contraryok e..." (p. 617c) "...We asked then if the discoverydial/lived of these two types of being[-there]lived [for-itself and in-itself] had resulted in establishing an posited/1neg hiatus which would divide Being ok (as a general category belonging to all existents) into two incommunicable regionsok, in each one of which lived posited/1neg the notion of Being must be taken in an original and singularok sense..."

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Sartre\Ontology-RIV. The For-Itselflived and the Being of Possibilitieslived The War Dairies: (p. 180c) "...Thus the pure eventlived which insures posited/1neg lived lived that Being ok is its own nothingness makes the world appear [apparaître] as totalitydial/lived of the in-itselflived transcendedlived/1neg by self- nihilating being[-there]lived/1neg..." Search for a Method CDR:(p. 19c) "...MarxismI [and physicists below] presents itself to us, as ideologists, as a disclosure of Beingposited/1neg, and at the same time as an unanswered interrogation as to the stage of the unfulfilled exigencylived carried over from this disclosure." (p. 22) "...Besides, and most important, the movementdial/1neg of Beingposited/1neg and the process of Knowledge [Savoir]posited/1neg are inseparable. This implies, as Hyppolite rightly says, that Knowledge [Savoir]posited/1neg of the (objectposited, worldposited, natureposited) is Knowledge [Savoir]posited/1neg of selflived and its reciprocallived..." (p. 35c) "(2) We have noticed the aporias of Beingposited/1neg and of Knowing [Connaître]posited/1neg in Marx. It is clear that the former is irreducible to the latter..." (p. 35c) "...Beingposited/1neg is the negation of Knowing [Connaître]posited/1neg, and KnowingI draws its being[-there]lived from the negation of Beingposited/1neg..." (p. 181, Ftn. 56c, Fr. 291) "...the materialist dialecticposited ... begins posited/1neg posited/1neg with Being ok (Nature without alien addition) and ends up with manlived; it too regards knowledge-reflection [connaissance]lived-[reflet]lived as ‘an opening to Beingposited/1neg (L’Étant) maintained in manI by BeingI (l’Étré).’" (p. 227c, Ftn. 68) "...the very structuredial/lived of actionlived as the organization of the unorganized primarily relates the for-itselflived to its alienatedc being[-there]lived as Being-in-itselflived..." CDR (p. 24c, Fr. 143) "But that is not all. For Hegelc, as we have seen, the apodicticityposited of dialectical knowledge [connaissance]lived implied the identity [logical] of Beingposited/1neg, Actionposited/1neg, and Knowledge [Savoir]posited/1neg..." c lived lived (p. 255 ) "...the collective is defined by its being[-there] ok, that is to say, in so far as all praxisI is constitutedCDRdial/group by its being[- there]lived as mere exisc; it is a material, inorganic object in the practico-

Sartre: being-there 7 inert_fieldR in so far as a discrete multiplicity of active individualslived posited 1neg lived produce themselves in it under the sign of the Other / ok, as a real unity within Being[-there]posited/1negc, that is to say, as a passiveI synthesisdial..." CDRII (p. 41c) "...At the point we have reached, what counts provisionally is to notice—when the knowledge [connaissance]lived/1neg concerning a reallived processlived/2neg is sufficient—from the point_of_viewdouble connection of 1st&2neg of totalizingposited, the possibleI is a dial/posible I I posited/1neg structure of the real . This relativity of possible Being ok— which we will study in itself somewhat further on12—makes the abstract universalposited into a secondary structureI of concrete_totalizationdial/lived..." The Family Idiot: Flaubert’s Neurosis-The ‘non-beinglived of Beingposited/1neg,’ ‘The beinglived of Non-beingposited/1neg,’ with EvilI in- between: ‘the ineluctable slippage of Beingposited/1neg toward NothingnessI’

10-13Unreflective/non-reflected first degree consciousness (index) See Herein-Sartre correlates three degrees of consciousness with two dialectic negations See Sartre\Heidegger&Sartre-Rüdiger Safranski: Heidegger’s foundered thinking -Heidegger: Being attuned as the fundamental nature of DaseinI -Equipment as ready-to-hand Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-UNREFLECTIVElived; early works As distinguished from non-reflective: Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 48c) "...all the non-reflective [non-réflexifs] memoriesc [souvenirs] of unreflected [irréfléchi]lived consciousness show melived a consciousness without a me [sans moi]..."; Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-irréfléchilived; Sartre\Index of Terms-NON-REFLECTEDlived; [non-réflexifs]; early works Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 48c) "...all the non-reflective [non- réflexifslived] memoriesc [souvenirs] of unreflected [irréfléchi]lived consciousness show me a consciousness without a me [sans moi]..."; BN: (p. liiic) "...it is the non-reflected [non-réflective]lived consciousness which renders the reflection [réflexion]lived possiblelived; there is a pre- reflective cogitolived which is the condition of the Cartesian cogitoI."

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Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-FIRST_DEGREElived Sartre, (source unknown) "...one cannot put life into perspective while living it—it steals up from behind and you find yourself inside it." and, "...The feeling of adventure comes retrospectively..." [The term ‘preconscious’ is not in the Annex.] The Emotions: (p. 52, Fr. 39, [example of lived&lived) "...There can be a continuous passage from the unreflective [irréfléchi]lived consciousness ‘worldI-acted’ (actionlived) to the unreflected [irréfléchi]lived consciousness ‘worldlived-odious’ (angerlived). The angerI is a transformationlived of the miscarried actionI. (p. 57c, as ) "...unreflectivelived behavior ... is conscious of itself non-theticallylivedc, and its way of being[-there]lived theticallypositedc conscious of itself is to transcendlived/1neg itself and to grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the worldlived as a qualitylived of thingslived..."; BN: (p. liiic) (p. 39c) "Thus in what we shall call the worldlived of the immediate, which delivers itself to our unreflectivelived consciousness, we do not first appear to ourselves, to be thrown subsequently into enterprises. Our being[-there]livedc is immediately ‘in situationc;’ that is, it arises in enterprises and knows [connait]lived itself first in so far as it is reflected [refléte]lived in those enterprises..."; Sartre\Freedom-Unreflective ‘spontaneouslived self-projection can never be deceived’ Sartre\Ontology-Counting cigarettes: Non-reflective consciousness renders reflection possiblelived Sartre\Temporality-Tennis court consciousness exists as internal_connectiondial/lived [of interior structures of consciousness] to the future [futur]lived Search for a Method: (p. 12c) "...Kierkegaard was perhaps the first to point out, against Hegel and thanks to him, the incommensurability of the reallivedc and Knowledge [Savoir]posited/1neg..." The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flaubert’s School Years-R He ‘invents on the reflexive [réflexif]lived level of the first degree what his Meposited/1neg of the second degree is supposed to begin to make out’ (3:188, Fr. 2:1295) (1:426-7c) "...what is fundamental and defines not only Gustave but all envious people is insatiability of the first_degreelived; for anyone tormented by envyI, pleasure—even immediate pleasureI—is impossible.

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Desirec comes afterward. If dissatisfaction characterizes desireI, it is because it is never awakened except by the acknowledged impossibility of being[-there]lived satisfied [reflected-on while living the experience]..."; *** The translation is lower case which would be appropriatelylived.

8-14bein Sartre’s early use of ‘pre-reflectiveI’ consciousness (9 hits in early BN) Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PRE-REFLECTIVE [préréflexif]lived; early works, usage was sometimes contrasted to non-reflective. BN (p. liiic) "...there is a pre-reflective [préréflexif]lived cogitolived which is the condition of the Cartesian cogitolived..."; (p. lxiiic) "...In particular the preceding reflections have permitted us to distinguish two absolutelyontology separated regionsc of being[-there]livedc: the beingI of the pre-reflective [préréflexif] cogitolivedc and the beingI of the phenomenonlived..."; (p. 49c) "...But consciousness affectsc itself with bad faithlived. There must be an original intention and a project of bad faithI; this projectI implies a comprehensionlived of bad faithI as such and a pre-reflectivelived apprehensionlived (of) consciousness as affectingI itself with bad faithlived..."; (p. 69c) "...But at the same time [simultaneity in three_degrees] the very lawontology of the pre-reflectivelived cogitolived implies that the beingI of believinglived ought to be [and is and is not] the consciousness of believingI." (p. 73c) "...we must return to the terrain [terrain] of the pre- reflectivelived cogitolived."; (p. 74c) "...[T]he first condition of all reflexiveness [réflexivitéposited only hit] is a pre-reflective [préréflexif] cogitolived..."; c lived (p. 78 ) "Hence we comprehend ok how it was that by questioning the pre-reflectivelived cogitolived without any conducting thread, we could not find nothingness anywhere..."; (p. 103c) "...Selfness [l’ipséité] represents a degree of nihilation carried further than the pure presence_toc self [soi] of the pre-reflectivelived [préréflexif]I cogitolived..." Sartre\Ontology-RSartre’s ‘first condition of all reflection is a pre- reflectivelived cogitolived’

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8-15bein Lived experience

9-15bein The ‘conception of "lived experiencelived" marks my change since L’Etre et Le Néant’ (IT41) Sartre, "On The Idiot of the Family," (p. 112P, 1971) "intelligencec, imagination, sensibility are one and the same thing for me and can be described by the word ‘experience’ (vécu)." Sartre, "The Itinerary of a Thought" (p. 41P, 1969) "...the relationship which Flaubert had with what is ordinarily called the unconsciousR, [is] lived what I would call a total absence of knowledgeFr=?, but a real lived I comprehension Fr=?. I distinguish here between comprehension Fr=? and posited Ic intellection Fr=?: there can be intellection of a practical conduct, but Ic only comprehension Fr=? of a passion. What I call le vécu—lived experience**—is precisely the ensemblelived of the dialecticallived process of psychic_lifec, in so far as this process is obscure to itself because it is a constant totalization [in course]c, thus necessarilyCDR a totalizationI which cannot be conscious of what it is. [Sartre, (source unknown) "...oneI cannot put lifeI into perspective while livingI it—it steals up from behind, and youI find yourselfI inside it.] One can be conscious of an external totalizationI, but one cannot be conscious of a totalizationI which also totalizes consciousness. ‘Lived experiencelived,’ in this sense, is perpetually susceptible of I comprehension Fr=?, but never of knowledgeFr=?. Taking it as a point of departure, one can know certain psychiclived phenomenalived by conceptsposited, lived I but not this experience itself. The highest form of comprehension Fr=? of lived experiencelived can forge its own languagelived—which will always be inadequate, and yet which will often have a metaphorical structuredial/lived of c lived I lived the dream itself. Comprehension Fr=? of a dream occurs when a man can express it in a languageI which is itself dreamtI. Lecan says that the unconscious is structuredI like a languageI . I would say that the languageIc which expresses it has the structureI of a dreamI. In other words, I I comprehension Fr=? of the unconscious in most cases never achieves explicit expression. Flaubert constantly speaks of e... the ‘unsayable’ e... something very definite for him. When he gave his autobiography to his mistress at the age of 25, he wrote to her: ‘You will suspect all the unsayable.’ Which did not mean family secrets or anything like that. Of course he hated his elder brother, but this is not what he was talking about.

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He meant precisely this kind of comprehensionFr=? of oneself which cannot be named and which perpetually escapes one. (p. 41-2P) "The conception of ‘lived experiencelived’ marks my change since L’Etre et Le Néant. My early work was a rationalistdial/posited philosophy of consciousness. It is all very well for me to dabble in apparently non-rational processes in the individuallived, the factposited remains that L’Etre et Le Néant is a monument of rationalityIpositedc. (p. 42) But in the end it becomes an irrationalism, because it cannot account rationallyI for those processes which are ‘below’ consciousness and which are also rationalIlived, but lived as irrational. Today, the notionlived of ‘lived experiencelived’ represents an effort to preserve that presence_to itself which seems to me indispensable for the existence of any psychic_fact, while at the same time this presenceI is so opaque and blind before itself that it is also an absence from itself. Lived experiencelived is always simultaneously present_toI itself and absentI from itself [absent-presence]c. In developing this notionlived, I have tried to surpass1neg the traditional psychoanalytic ambiguity of psychic_facts which are both teleological [teleological_structure and teleological_intention] and mechanicalposited, by showing that every psychic_factlived involves an intentionality which aims at something, while among them a certain number can only exist if they are lived I comprehended Fr=?, but neither named nor knownFr=?. The latter include the ‘stressR’ of a neurosis. A neurosis is in the first instance a specific wound, a defective structuredial which is a certain way of living a childhood. But this is only the initial wound: it is then patched up and bandaged by a system which covers and soothes the wound, and which then, like anti-bodies in certain cases does something abominable to the organism. The unity of this system is the neurosis. The work of its ‘stressI’ is intentional, but it cannot be seizedposited as such without disappearinglived. It is precisely for this reason that if it is transferred into posited/1neg the domain of Knowledge Fr=? by analytic treatment, it can no longer be reproduced in the same manner." ------** Three terms: [1] lived experiencelived [vécupp of vivrevi] [2] expérienceposited and [3] experience [éprouveontology]. [1] Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-LIVED EXPERIENCElived; [le vécu, live=vivrevtr, vivantadj, life=vie]; [Do not _;] cf. expérienceposited, below.

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c The Family Idiot: (2:3 ) "...[experience [vécu,]] must not be taken for a kind of Kantian unification of empirical diversity. There are no outside categories being applied here to experience [vécu]; it is experience [vécu] itself that is unified in a movementdial of circularity with the means at hand—the affects and ideas that prompt one to interiorizationlived of objectivelived structuresdial/lived..."; Sartre\being-there-RThe Family Idiot: ‘Reflection shapes lived experiencelived according to its own ends’ ------[2] Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-EXPÉRIENCElived or posited [expérience]; having knowledge of an experience; cf. critical_expérienceposited; cf. lived experience above, éprouveontology below; see expériencelived below; [We have kept the French noun’s é in the English translation to distinguish it from the verb for lived experience.] expérienceposited Sartre\Dialectic-RWe regressively use the unreflected content of critical_reflexion [réflexion]lived on the wholedial of contemporary knowledge to elucidate common_praxis. This sub-topic differentiates critical_expérienceposited, critical knowledge, and pseudo-knowledge in regressive expérienceposited. expériencelived CDR: (p. 49c) "[5] But we must at once [à la fois] deepen and delimit our terms. For when I say that the expériencelived must be reflexive [réflexive]lived, I mean that, in the singularitylived of its momentdial, it cannot be separated from the ‘totalization in course’ any more than reflection [réflexion]lived [in the singularitylived of its momentdial] can be distinguished from human praxis..."; The Family Idiot: (1:23c) "...When this double simultaneous belonging of the soul to the worldlived, the worldI to the soul, is the objectlived of an expériencelived concretelived and lived [vécue], Flaubert calls it quite simply poetry..." ------[3] Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-Fr. ÉPROUVEontology; [éprouver]; ‘tried, tested, felt, gone through, put to the proof’; or éprouve, ‘proof, test, ordeal’]; BN: (p. 276c) "...although I experience [j’éprouve]ontology/2neg with certainty the factposited of being-looked-atontology/2neg, I can not make this certainty pass into my expérienceontology/1neg of the otherlived-as-objectI...";

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(p. 297c, Fr. 336) "...But one look on the part of the otherI is sufficient to make all these schemes collapse and to make me experience [éprouve]ontology/2neg once more the transfiguration of the otherI..."; (p. 411c, Fr. 451) "...moreover [hate] could not be so without becoming an objectI. I experience [éprouve]ontology/1neg it as a perpetually fleeing character in the otherI-as-objectI..."; (p. 414c, Fr. 454) "...The welived is experienced [éprouve]ontology by a particular consciousness; it is not necessaryBNontology that all patrons at the café should be conscious of being we in order for me to experience [éprouve]ontology myself as being engaged in a we with them..." and "...I want to indicate that I experience [m’éprouve]ontology myselfontology/2neg as an objectI for ontology/1neg posited/1neg others ok, as an alienated Me , as a transcendence- transcendedlived/2negc..."

9-15bein Experiencelived as ‘lifeI aware of itself’ without theticposited I knowledge Fr=? Sartre, "On The Idiot of the Family," (p. 127-8P) [Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka] "What is new about the notion of experience that you often substitute now for what you used to call consciousness? [Sartre] "I suppose it represents for me the equivalent of conscious- unconscious which is to say that I no longer believe in certain forms of the unconsciousI even though Lacan’s conception of the unconscious is more interesting. . . . I want to give the idea of a whole whose surface is completely conscious, while the rest is opaque to this consciousness and without being part of the unconsciousI, is hidden from you. When I show how Flaubert did not know himself and how at the same time he understoodFr=? himself admirably, I am indicating what I call experienceFr=?—that is to say, life aware of itself, without implying any lived thetic knowledgeFr=? or consciousness. (p. 128) This notion of experienceFr=? is a toolFr=? I use, but one which I have not yet theorized 1 [1971]. I will do that soon.** I suppose that with Flaubert, experienceFr=? is when he speaks of the illuminations he has had which then leave him in the dark, so that he can’t find his way. He is in the dark before and after, but there is a moment in which he has seen or understoodFr=? something of himself."

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Sartre, The Family Idiot (4:36c) "...Flaubert does not claim that pain is solely the negation of lived experience [vécu]; he knows from expérienceposited that this ‘cerebral’ sensation is accompanied by a succession of physical disorders. In ‘strong’ people, that ought to produce the disorders without letting itself by absorbed by them. On the other hand, if the irritation descends into the limbs—if it becomes incarnate in the organism, if it lets itself be expressed by purely physiological upheavals—it can no longer be the means of ‘putting (anguishlived) in parentheses,’ but falls to the level of pure lived experienceI. The ontology lived distance ok from the world is annulled, since an object in-the-midst- of-the-worldposited, the bodyposited, is charged with materializing that absence, that flightposited, with making it into worldly determinationsdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’], such as a fit of weeping, or colic..." (5:36c) "...[W]ork is the interiorizationlived of the exteriorlived and the reexteriorizationI of the interiorI. As such, it is lived experiencec [vécu] and consequently discloses both itself—as imposed, for example, and remaining exteriorI as far as within interiorizationI—and, through it, the fundamental human_relationslived proper to this mode of production..." (5:37c) "...reflection [réflexion]lived shapes lived experience [vécu] I according to its own ends, though that experience ok is originally unreflectedc and becomes reflected_on [réfléchi]lived according to certain ruleslived that themselves issue from certain reflexive [réflexif]lived needs... Recourse to languagelived thus becomes necessaryCDRdial. And languageI ... isolates and transformslived into a finished product the knowledge [savoir]lived that existed implicitlyc in the worker's actlived... Namedc and thus perpetuated, these fragments of the reallived becomingI fragments of knowledge [savoir]lived are thereby falsified. Through this quality of false knowledge [savoir]lived they come close to being a nonknowledge [non- savoir]lived, which also existI on the elementary level of the living actualization of praxis—that set of opinions arising from pathos that are proffered, at this higher degree of elaboration, as learning from expériencelived. In fact, these extrapolations are inseparable from lived experience [vécu], and they form, if you will, class subjectivitylived. After processing they will become the clearest of what we call ideologies..." (5:41-2c) "...The objective_Spiritposited/1neg, while never on the side of pure lived experience [vécu] and freeCDRlivedc thoughtlived, exists as an actlived

Sartre: being-there 15 only through the activitylived of menlived and, more precisely, through the activityI of individualslived. As far as we are concerned, it is clear that without readers it [objective_Spirit] simply would not be[-there]..." (5:156c) "...the conduct of failure. By this we mean a behavior with two objectiveslived, the more superficial beingI to reach a definite goal and the more profound beingI to fall short of it. The first is the objectI of a formulated intention, one that is quite conscious; the second, implicitc but equally intentionalI, is the very meaningCDR of lived experience..." **1 Cannot find

8-15bein Sartre and Heidegger Heidegger\Lifework-Index Sartre\Anguish-Heidegger’s anxious nothingness -R Fearlived ‘is fear of being[there]lived in the worldlived whereas anguishlived is anguish before myselflived’: ‘the one is born in the destruction of the other’ (BN29-34) Sartre\Index of Terms-HEIDEGGER; see Heidegger\Lifework; Heidegger\Dasein; Heidegger\Boredom Sartre\Negation-RDaseinI’s groundlessnessI: ‘We are shown a negatingI activitylived and there is no concern to groundI this activityI upon a negativeI being[-there]I’ Sartre\Phenomenology-Heidegger: The matter itself, not a representation, is intended Sartre\The Other-RMy distancesontology disintegrate if usurped by an other’slived distancesI Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (p. 40-1) "It is often said that [Sartre] accepted all these themes from Heidegger and that his thought is second-hand. Yet Heidegger’s treatment of the same themes is, more often than not, abstract to the point of being neither ‘evident’ in Husserl’s sense nor even plausible... [M]any of [Sartre’s] pages on the central themes of existentialism have the plausibility and contact with experience which are lacking the similar analyses of Heidegger."

Joseph P. Fell, "Battle of the Giants over Being" (p. 257) "e?...in the later years neither vouchsafed more than passing reference to the other, and neither demonstrated great familiarity with the

Sartre: being-there 16

current thought of the other. Perhaps most remarkable of all, Heidegger and Sartre appear to have conversed personally just once, in December 1952, although Paris and Freiburg are separated by only 250 miles. Simone de Beauvoir records that Sartre went to Freiburg to give a lecture. While there, he paid a visit to Heidegger, perched on his eyrie, and told him how sorry he was about the play Gabriel Marcel had just written about him. That was all they talked about, and Sartre left after half an hour." Herbert Spiegleberg, The Phenomenological Movement (p. 463) "In the winter semester of 1933-34 Sartre had attended Heidegger’s lectures ... but personal contact was so slight that Heidegger later had difficulty remembering Sartre." Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" (p. 195, Basic Writings) "You [Sartre] ask, ‘How can we restore meaning to the word "humanism"?’ This question proceeds from your intention to retain the word ‘humanism.’ I wonder whether that is necessary. Or is the damage caused by all such terms still not sufficiently obvious? True, ‘-isms’ have for a long time now been suspect. But the market of public opinion continually demands new ones." Heidegger’s "Letter on Humanism," references Sartre on pages 208 and 214 but there appears nothing of substance. Robert Cumming, Starting Point (p. 22-26, Ftn 14) Sartre, accused of humanism, emerged from dialogue accusing Heidegger of mysticism.

11-09bein Heidegger’s Dasein: subject-object human_realitylived vs. Sartre’s dualismI Sartre BN (p. xlviiic, Fr. 14) "...For Heidegger also ‘human_realitylived**’ is ontic/ontologicalR; that is to say [c’est-à-dire], it can always surpass1neg the phenomenonlived toward its being..." (p. xlixc, Fr. 15, ce at Sartre\Phenomenology-II. The Phenomenonlived of Being and the Being of the Phenomenon) "...What then signifies this surpassing1neg toward the ontological, of which HeideggerI speaks? Certainly I can surpass1neg this table or this chair toward its being[-there]lived and posit the

Sartre: being-there 17 question of the beingI-of-the-table or the beingI-of-the-chair.2 But at that instant I turn my eyes away from the phenomenonlived of the table in order to fix the phenomenonI of being[-there]I, which is no longer the condition of all disclosure, but which is itself something disclosed—an apparition which as such, needs in turn a being[-there]I on the foundation of which it can disclose itself. ------Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (p. 42) "...Heidegger treats Dasein or human_practices as both [ontic] fact and [ontological] condition of possibilityontology (ontic/ontological in his terminology) without seeing this as an opposition that has to be resolved..." Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-In-the-World (p. 67) "[Being absorbed into] everyday skillful coping, there is awareness but no self-awareness. That is, there is no self-referential experience of acting as this is understood by Searle (and would have been understood by Husserl), i.e., no experience of volition with the conditions of satisfaction that this experience of acting cause the action... ‘[citing Heidegger] Self and world belong together in the single entity, Dasein’" (p. 90) "There is no such thing as my world, if this is taken as some private sphere of experience and meaning, which is self-sufficient and intelligible in itself, and so more fundamental than the shared public world and its local modes. Both Husserl and Sartre follow Descartes in beginning with my world and then trying to account for how an isolated subject can give meaning to other minds and to the shared intersubjective world. Heidegger, on the contrary, thinks that it belongs to the very idea of a world that it is shared, so the world is always prior to my world." ------Aronson, Ronald, Jean-Paul Sartre—Philosophy in the World (p. 90-

1) "...Husserl e... never ceased to affirm that things could not be dissolved in consciousness. If I view a tree, it remains where it was, unchanged. Consciousness does not apprehend by ‘digesting’. ‘To know is to

"explode towards"e...’ For Sartre, this was the ‘profound meaning’ of Husserl’s discovery: consciousness was a ‘connected series of explosions which tear us away from ourselves, which do not even allow a "myself"

Sartre: being-there 18

the leisure to form behind them’e... (p. 91) It existed only as it moved out of itself towards objects." (p. 94) "Sartre argues that the existence of consciousness depends on the existence of things, while Heidegger’s formula being-in-the-world means that man and his world emerge simultaneously. For Heidegger, man is man in so far as he forms a world—a connected system of instrumental objects with himself as their center of reference, and his survival as their ultimate purpose. All dualismsR, such as subject and object, consciousness and things ... arise afterwards ... and fail to describe the underlying unity of man-in-the-world." (p. 95) "Heidegger’s [Dasein] has an instrumental totality arrayed around it. Dasein remains the starting point and goal, for whose sake all tools exist and all actions are taken. Sartre ... interprets Dasein as consciousness ... totally spontaneous, empty, nothing. It cannot act on the world. The things around it are independent ... and have no connection with it." (p. 97) "The for-itselflived negates the in-itselflived ... and so there emerges an ordered, structured, world and a consciousness that lived comprehends Fr=? it. But what is this if not the hidden return of pre- conscious constitutingBN processes?" ------Ftn. 2. "Perhaps a more intelligible paraphrase would be, ‘the question of what it means to be a table or a chair.’ Tr." Ref Misc. Authors-Aronson, Ronald; Sartre\Negation-Rknower-known ------** 11-14Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-HUMAN REALITYlived; -Dasein [Da=there, Sein=Being]; Sartre’s human_realitylived: Robert Cumming, The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, (p. 115, Ftn. to BN p. 28) "Réalité humaine is Sartre’s translation of Heidegger’s Dasein."; The War Diaries (p. 324c, no ce) "...Heidegger [showed] melived that there was nothing beyond the projectc through which human realitylived realizedlived itself..." BN: (p. 246c) "...I make a worldlived exist as a complex of instruments which I use for the ends of my human realitylived...";

Sartre: being-there 19

(p. 308c) "...For human realitylived, to be is to-be-therelived; that is, ‘there in that chair,’ there at that table,’ ‘there at the top of that mountain, with these dimensions, this orientation, etc.’ It is an ontological necessityBNontology..."; Search for a Method: (p. 170c) "...human realitylived eludes directposited knowledge [savoir]lived to the degree that it makes itself." CDR: (p. 58c) "...‘Human realitylived’ is a synthesis at the level of techniques, and at the level of that universal technique which is thoughtlived..." The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flaubert’s Neurosis-RThere ‘is no more specific problematic of human realitylived’; Sartre\The Other-RHeidegger’s ontic being-with as ontologicalI being-in-the-worldlived (BN 247-8) -Heidegger’s being-with as membership in a crew: Sartre’s critique (BN 244-7) ------Heidegger’s Dasein: Herein-RHeidegger, ‘The perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the "cabinet’ of consciousness"...’ What Is Metaphysics (p. 105c) "..."Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call ‘transcendenceI ...’; (p. 109c) "...Being itself is essentially finite and revealslived itself only in the transcendenceI of Dasein which is held out into the nothing." BN: (p. 73c) "...Heidegger endows human realitylived with a self- understandingFr=? which he defines as an ‘ekstatic pro-ject’ of its own lived possibilities ... But how could there be an understandingFr=? which would I I not in itself be the consciousness (of) understanding Fr=?? This ekstatic character of human realitylived will lapse into a thing-like, blind in-itselflived unless it arises from the consciousness of ekstasisI...";

8-15bein Heidegger: Being attuned as the fundamental nature of DaseinI Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time (p. 29c) "We must free ourselves from the prejudice that, because phenomenology calls upon us to apprehend the matters themselves, these matters must be apprehended

Sartre: being-there 20 all at once, without any preparation. Rather, the movement toward the matters themselves is a long and involved process..."

Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (p. 61) "e...A stone either has a property or does not have it. We, on the contrary, can have something and at the same time not have it, that is, not know of it. We speak, after all, of the unconscious. In one respect it is at hand, and yet in another respect it is not at hand, namely insofar as it is not conscious. This strange ‘at hand and at the same time not at hand’ arises from the possibility of being conscious of something unconsciouse..." "We can thus see already that we will not get by with the distinction between ‘unconscious’ and ‘conscious’. To awaken an attunement cannot mean simply to make conscious an attunement which was previously unconscious. To awaken an attunement means, after all, to let it become awake and as such precisely to let it be. If, however, we make an attunement conscious, come to know of it and explicitly make the attunement itself into an object of knowledge, we achieve the contrary of an awakening. The attunement is thereby precisely destroyed, or at least not intensified, but weakened and altered."

(p. 62) "e...This conception of man as a living being, a living being that in addition has reason, has led to a complete failure to recognize the essence of attunement. The awakening of attunement, and the attempt to broach this strange task, in the end coincide with the demand for a complete transformation of our conception of man." (p. 64) "For naturally man is in the first place the rational living being. Initially, and in the first instance, this rational living being thinks and wills. Feelings are certainly also at hand. Yet are they not merely, as it were, the adornment of our thinking and willing, or something that obfuscates and inhibits these? After all, feelings and attunements constantly change. They have no fixed subsistence, they are that which is most inconstant. They are merely a radiance and shimmer, or else something gloomy, something hovering over emotional events. Attunements—are they not like the utterly fleeting and ungraspable shadows of clouds flitting across the landscape?" (p. 67-8) "...Attunements are the fundamental ways in which we find ourselves disposed in such and such a way. Certainly we often take this

‘one is in such and such a way’ e... as something indifferent, in contrast to

Sartre: being-there 21 what we intend to do, what we are occupied with, or what will happen to us. And yet this ‘one is in such and such a way’ is not—is never—simply the consequence or side-effect of our thinking, doing, and acting. It is—to put it crudely—the presupposition for such things, the ‘medium’ within which they first happen. (p. 68) And precisely those attunements to which we pay no heed at all, the attunements we least observe, those attunement which attune us in such a way that we feel as though there is no attunement there at all, as though we were not attuned in any way at all— these attunements are the most powerful." "...attunements never emerge in the empty space of the soul and then disappear again; rather, Dasein as DaseinI is always already attuned in its very grounds. There is only ever a change of attunement." ------See Heidegger\Boredom-Profound boredom as concealed cultural attunement

8-15bein Equipment as ready-to-hand Heidegger, Being and Time (H. 68) "We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern ‘equipment’. Tr. Ftn. "The 'Zeug' in 'das Zeug' has no precise English equivalent. While it may mean any implement, instrument, or tool, Heidegger uses it for the most part as a collective noun which is analogous to our relatively specific ‘gear’ (as in ‘gear for fishing) or the more elaborate ‘paraphernalia’..." (H. 69) "Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable. In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to’ which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which is—as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific 'manipulability' of the hammer.

Sartre: being-there 22

The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right—we call readiness-at-hand. Only because equipment has this ‘Being-in-itself’ and does not merely occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal. No matter how sharply we just look at the 'outward appearance' of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand. If we look at Things just 'theoretically'. we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character. Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the ‘in-order-to’. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection. " Ref Sartre\being[-there]-Unreflective/non-reflected first degree consciousness (index) John Haugeland, "Dasein’s Disclosedness" (p. 31, while qualifying in footnote 19 that "The terms ‘norm’ and ‘role’ are not Heidegger’s.") "To say that a hammer is a hammer only as belonging to nails, boards, wooden structures, and the like, is to say that the equipmental/functional role of hammers as such is to drive nails into boards, and so on. The normative relationships among equipment that make for a concrete equipmental whole are role-relationships: e.g., what a hammer is for ... assignments; and, as I interpret Heidegger, the roles themselves are involvements." "...thing-concepts are not adequate; for they themselves fail to grasp the essence of the thing. The currently predominant thing-concept, thing as formed matter, is not even derived from the essence of the thing but from the essence of equipment." Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, cited in Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (p. 62) "Equipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment: inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room." (p. 63) "The functionality that goes with a chair, blackboard, window is exactly that which makes the thing what it is." See Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Basic Writings, discussion of equipment from 158ff.

Sartre: being-there 23

8-15bein Hubert L. Dreyfus: B&T circumspection is restricted to direct transparent environment/context Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (p. 66) "Not only is equipment transparent: so is the user. Heidegger calls the user’s grasp of his environment in his everyday way of getting around, ‘circumspection.’" (p. 346 Ftn.) "The term circumspection** is not used consistently by Heidegger. (In Basic Problems of Phenomenology) it clearly means nonthematic awareness of the environment [context, below], but in Being and Time Heidegger restricts circumspection to direct transparent coping and uses disclosure to name our nonthematic awareness of context [the environment, above]..." Heidegger, Basic Problems in Phenomenology (p. 75) in Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (p. 178) "When something available is found missing . . . circumspection comes up against emptiness***, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was available with, and what it was available for." Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (p. 71) "When equipment malfunctions, Heidegger says, we discover its unusability by the ‘circumspection of the dealings in which we use it,’ and the equipment thereby becomes ‘conspicuous.’ ‘Conspicuousness presents the available equipment as in a certain unavailableness’ (Basic Problems in Phenomenology, 73)." ------Heidegger, The History of the Concept of Time (p. 274) in Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (p. 103-4) "Circumspection oriented to the presence of what is of concern provides each setting-to-work, procuring, and performing with the way to work it out, and means to carry it out, the right occasion, and the appropriate time. This sight [below] of circumspection is the skilled possibility of concerned discovery." Heidegger, Being and Time (H. 65, Translators’ Ftn 1) "...The prefix ‘um-’ [as in ‘Umsicht’, circumspection], however, not only may mean ‘around’ or ‘about’ but ... ‘in order to’..." (H. 69 Ftn 2) "The word ‘Umsicht’ which we translate by ‘circumspection’ is here presented as standing for a special kind of ‘Sicht’ (sight)... ‘Umsicht’ may accordingly be thought of as meaning ‘looking around’ or ‘looking around for something’ or ‘looking around for a way to get something done’ ... a kind of awareness in which one looks around before one decides just what one ought to do next."

Sartre: being-there 24

------See Herein-John Haugeland: Disclosedness ‘presents a curious doubling’ ** Ref Heidegger\Lifework-Index of Terms-CIRCUMSPECTION; cf. Sartre\Freedom-practico-inert_field *** Not memory, ‘[as he] now sees for the first time what the missing...’

12-09bein John Haugeland: Disclosedness ‘presents a curious doubling’ John Haugeland "Dasein’s Disclosedness," in Heidegger: A critical Reader (p. 27) "...maybe, to disclose is to be evidence for. That fits ... revealing what is hidden, or divulging a secret, and is also related to truth. But another undeniable prerequisite for discovery is discoverers..." (p. 32) "‘Makes sense of,’ like ‘discloses,’ has the formal structure of a two-place relation: Y makes sense of Z... To understand making sense, however, we shall also, and perhaps especially have to consider Y, that to which sense is made, that which somehow ‘does’ the sense-making. This presents a curious doubling: if we are to understand Y in its capacity as making sense of things, then we must, in effect, make sense of Y in that capacity. In other words, Y has to occupy both argument places..." (p. 40) "On one reading ... Y makes sense of itself in more or less the way that it makes sense of things—by casting itself in terms of publicly defined worldly roles. This, I think, is what Heidegger means by everyday or ‘unowned’ self-understanding, and disclosedness in the mode of publicness. On the other reading ... Y makes sense of itself as itself making sense of things—Y understands itself not at all as a thing but as a sense-maker. This possibility ... is, I believe, what Heidegger means by owned self-understanding, and disclosedness in the mode of resoluteness."

8-15Hesa Heidegger’s object without subject [ground] Foucault\The Order of Things-In science both subject and object are constituted Sartre\Flaubert’s Neurosis-There ‘is no more specific problematic of human_realitylived’ than manlived as in-itself Sartre\Groups&Reciprocity-formalismposited Sartre\The Other-Heidegger: ‘ekstasisI’ as standing outside: Its past already goes ahead of it

Sartre: being-there 25

Sartre\being-there-Counting cigarettes: Unreflective consciousness renders reflection [réflexion]lived possibleI , with BN (p. liiic) "...In other words, every positionalposited consciousness of an objectI is at the same time a non-positionallived consciousness of itself..." Sartre, The Emotions (p. 78c, Fr. 54) "...Consciousness, transcendslived/1neg itself, through its essencelived; it is therefore impossible for it to withdraw into itself so that it may doubtlived that it is outside in the objectI..." Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel (p. 284P ) "But Hegel denies that the subject is an individual self, and that it can be intelligible distinguished from the objects it is aware of..." Hazel Barnes "Introduction," BN (p. xiiic) "...if consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_an object, it is consciousness of not being[-there]lived the objectI..."

10-12Hesa Heidegger, ‘The perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the "cabinet of consciousness"...’ Heidegger, Being and Time (H. 62) "When DaseinR directs itself towards something and grasp’s it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of being is such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when DaseinI dwells alongside the entity to be known, and determines its character; but even in this ‘Being-outside’ alongside the object, DaseinI is still ‘inside’ as a Being-in-the-world which knowsc. And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the ‘cabinet’ of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the DaseinI which knows remains outside, and it does so as DaseinI. If I ‘merely’ know about some way in which the Being of entities is interconnected, if I ‘only’ represent them, if I ‘do no more’ than ‘think’ about them, I am no less alongside the entities outside in the world than when I originally grasp them." ------

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Alan Watts, The Book (p. 114) "...when the line between myself and what happens to me is dissolved ... I find myself not in a world but as a world which is neither compulsive nor arbitrary: it just happens, and all happenings are mutually interdependent in a way that seems unbelievably harmonious." (p. 138) "If ... self and other, subject and object, organism and environment are the poles of a single process, THAT is my true existence. As the Upanishads say, ‘That is the Self. That is the real. That art thou.’" ------Anthony Gottlieb, 1-7-90 NY Times Book Review, "Heidegger was attempting what he saw as nothing less that a revolution in man’s understanding of what it is to be... The key idea is his rejection of the notion that man’s relation to the world is one of subject to object... [T]he hammerer is not aware of his tool as an object at all. He just gets on with it. Conscious awareness of an object is just not part of the job. Heidegger held that much, if not most, human activity is unguided by conscious awareness. It is selfless absorption in a task..." ------Max Charlesworth, "Sartre, Laing, and Freud" (p. 24) "The whole drift of Heidegger’s philosophy is to try to overcome the separation of the self from the world, subject from object**—the idea that we find expressed in its most dramatic form in Descartes’ philosophy, namely, that I, this conscious subject exists in an inner private world, separately from, and over and against, the objective, outer, public world. Man exists, Heidegger says, as ‘a being-in-the-world’ immersed, so to speak, in the world, and madness arises when this fundamental attitude of the ‘Dasein’ is disruptede..." ------Hugh J. Silverman, Inscriptions: Between phenomenology and structuralism, (p. 33, linking Heidegger to a way out of Husserl’s problematic phenomenological reduction) "e...For Heidegger, when speaking of human being, the object of a self-reflective noetic act is Dasein, but Dasein is also the subject—the entity doing the inquiring. Hence, if Dasein were to constitute itself as both ‘subject’ and ‘object’ then both meanings would be given and filled in a single act. The possibilities of a ‘subject’ and those of an ‘object would be combined in the same experiencee..."

Sartre: being-there 27

------Michael Gelvin, A Commentary on Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ (p.

55) "e...Heidegger points out that it is a natural error to see the world as made up on ‘objects,’ which are then known by a ‘subject.’ This is because, in our development, the ontic world is discovered bit by bit. Furthermore, our language at least in its early primitive stages is an object language. However, this should not blind us to the fact that there must be something that enables us to learn of the world at all, and to speak at all." ------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-SUBJECT-OBJECT UNION [Heidegger] Pol...\The Self-R The self did not exist prior to Socrates’ ironic cross-questioning of others with knowledge that he knew nothing; Robert SolomonR, In the Spirit of Hegel (p. 284P ) "SUBJECT: that which is other than all possible objects of consciousness ("pure and simple negativity"). The I of Descartes and of Kant..."

8-15Hesa Rüdiger Safranski: Heidegger’s foundered thinking Safranski, Martin Heidegger (p. 366, Publisher above) "It was only natural that Heidegger should have sought to answer the question of proximity** by looking back at Being and Time. There he had tried to discover what is the closest, the primal, for the Dasein that finds itself in the world. The bottom line of this investigation has been that initially we do not experience ourselves or our world in a quasi-scientific attitude. The world is not, in this sense, our ‘representation,’ because first of all we experience out being-in-the-world. This Being-in is decisive and primary. The attuned Being-in is fearful, bored, worried, busy, dazed, devoted, ecstatic.*** Only against this background of the initial Being-in can it happen that we reflect ourselves outward, that we make certain ideas for ourselves, that we carve out ‘objects’ from the continuum of our caring and relating. The fact that there is a ‘subject’ that is confronted by ‘objects’ is not a basic experience but is the result of a secondary, abstract performance. If original Being-in is the closest, if in that proximity the things of life can unfold in their whole profusion, then a paradoxical constellation arises. Since thinking causes us to lose immediacy, any thinking that strives for proximity is, in consequence, expected to think against its own distancing tendency. Thinking that is at home in

Sartre: being-there 28 mediation is expected to get close to the immediate. But, in doing so, will it not then be like a fish out of water? Would this not amount to making thinking undo the effects of thinking? A revival of Hegel’s ‘mediated immediacy’? And is it at all possible to think back into that proximity? Heidegger’s reply is laconic: thinking is doing its job only if it is ‘broken’ by that jobe... [W]hat is really needed, ‘[is] a foundered thinking (ÜH, 34).’ This wrecked thinking is no misfortune, indeed it shows that one is on the right road. Where does the road lead? To proximity. But what is it looking for in that proximity of which we have meanwhile learned that it means the elementary and primary Being-in?..." ------Ref Sartre\being[-there]-Unreflective/non-reflected first degree consciousness (index) ** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PROXIMITY; BN: Sartre\The Other-RMy distancesontology disintegrate if usurped by an other’slived distancesI *** "Letter on Humanism," page unknown.

8-14bein Reflection: the French terms

8-14bein French ‘mirror’ as English ‘reflect/mirror’ [refléter]lived ; reflected_on [reflété]lived ; réflexive [réflexive]lived Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-refléter; no hits; "to reflect, to mirror"; Infinitive Not found in files, 1hit=refletent]; Hazel Barnes’ se refléter=‘to be reflected,’ ‘to be mirrored back.’ Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-reflétposited; reflection; Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-reflétélived; reflected_on BN: Herein-Reflected-on [réfléchi]lived as an appearancelived for reflective [réflexif]lived as witness (of) itself: reflectiveI witness (of) reflected- onI as appearanceI to itself (BN 151-4, 174, 239, 298, 340, inaccessible 2&1/2 pages) The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flauert’s Constitution-Rlove’sI ‘absenceI is made knownlived as a defectlived of being[-there]lived’; Ref Sartre/Index of terms-reflétantlived; reflecting; Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-réflexivelived, reflective;

Sartre: being-there 29

Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 44c) "...but it must be remembered that all the writers who have descried the Cogitoposited/1neg have dealt with it as a reflective [réflexive]lived operationc, that is to say, as an operationI of the second_degree..." CDR: (p. 47c) "...totalization [in course] must include within itself its own reflective [réflexive]lived retotalizationI as an essential structuredial/lived and as a totalizingposited process within the process as a wholedial."; c (p. 650 ) "... "e...Recurrence, controlled from the outside as a determination [‘that is, as limitation’] projected from everyone, through posited 1neg c dial/lived Others / ok, into the false totality of a common field and, in realitylived, into pure reflexive [réflexive]lived flightlived, is what we shall call manufactured exterioritylived." (3:189c) When, in fact, he does the Garcon, Gustave takes a reflexive [réflexive]lived attitude and feigns his own reflection [réflexion]lived as a conductive milieu for the lookontology/1neg of his pantagruelesque ‘Meposited/1neg.’ I lived This means that he invents, on the reflexive [réflexif] levelok of the first degreeR, what his ‘Meposited/1neg’c of the second degreec is supposed to make out from immediate and reflected_on [réfléchie]livedc consciousness..."

8-14bein Reflectionlived-reflectinglived: [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-refletlived-reflétantlived=reflectionlived- reflectinglived; BN; (p.78c) "...It is the obligation for the for-itselfontology/1neg never to exists except in the form of an elsewhere in connectionontology&ontology [rapport] [of three degrees] to itselfontology/2neg, to existI as a being-therelived/1neg which perpetually effects in itself a break in beingposited/1neg. This break does not refer us elsewhere to another beingI: it is only a perpetual reference of selflived [soi] to selfI [soi], of reflection [réflexion]lived to the reflectinglived [reflétant]lived, of the reflecting [reflétant]lived to the reflection [reflet]lived. This reference, however does not provoke an infinite movementdial in the heart of the for-itselfI but is given2neg within the unity of a single actlived..."; (p. 298c) "...but with reflection [réflexion]lived the case is different since the ‘reflected-reflecting’ [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived which is reflected-on [réfléchi]lived existsI for a ‘reflected-reflecting’ [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived which is reflexive [réflexif]lived...";

Sartre: being-there 30

(p. 624c) "...In the case of the for-otherslived the (reflection- reflecting) [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived reflected [reflété]lived was distinguished from the (reflection-reflecting) [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived reflecting [reflétant]lived in that each one had to not-be the other...";

8-14bein Reflected onlived-reflectinglived: [reflété]lived-[reflétant]lived ; and vise versa Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-reflétélived-reflétantlived; The War Dairies (p. 180c, Fr. 221) "...Consciousness exists for-itselflived cR c beyond that tree as what is not that tree; the nihilation joining ok between reflection [reflet]lived and the reflected-on [reflété]lived ensures that consciousness can be for itself only by reflecting [reflétant]lived itself as being[-there]lived, precisely, nothingness of the worldlived where there is that tree. Which signifieslived it is non-theticlived/2neg consciousness of itself as theticlived&lived consciousness of that tree; the tree is the transcendentlived/1neg theme of its nihilationontology&posited..." BN: (p. liic) "...If we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be lived&lived an immediate non-cognitive connection ok [of three degrees] of the selflived/1neg to itselflived/2neg..."; (p. 298c) "The reflective [réflexive]lived nihilationI, however, is pushed further than that of the pure for-itselflived as a simple consciousness of self. In consciousness of selfI, in fact, the two terms of the duality ‘reflected-reflecting’ (reflété-reflétant) [reflété]lived-[reflétant]lived were so incapable of presenting themselves separately that the duality remained perpetually evanescent and each term while positing itself for the other become the other. But with reflection [réflexive]lived the case is different since the ‘reflected-reflecting’ [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived which is reflected-on [réfléchi]lived exists for a ‘reflected-reflecting’ [reflet]lived-[reflétantlived] which is reflexive [réflexif]lived..."; Herein-Reflected-on [réfléchi]lived as an appearancelived for reflective [réflexif]lived as witness (of) itself: reflectiveI witness (of) reflected-onI as appearanceI to itself (BN 151-4, 174, 239, 298, 340, inaccessible 2&1/2 pages) The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flauert’s Constitution-RLove’s ‘absence is made knownlived as a defect of being[-there]lived’ Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-reflétantlived; reflectinglived-reflected-onlived

Sartre: being-there 31

The Family Idiot: (1:140c) Nevertheless the shattered but indissoluble unity of the reflecting [reflétant] and the reflected-on [reflété]lived manifests a simple ontological fissure [fission]..."

8-14bein Reflectionlived-reflected_onlived: refletlived-reflétélived Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-refletlived-reflétélived; reflectionlived- reflected_onlived The War Dairies (p. 180c, Fr. 221, ce, repeated above) "...Consciousness exists for-itselflived beyond that tree as what is not that tree; the nihilationcR c lived lived joining ok between reflection [reflet] and the reflected-on [reflété] ensures that consciousness can be for itself only by reflecting [reflétant]lived itself as being[-there]lived, precisely, nothingness of the worldlived where there is that tree. Which signifieslived it is non-theticlived/2neg consciousness of itself as theticposited&1neg consciousness of that tree; the tree is the transcendentlived/1neg theme of its nihilationontology&posited..."

8-14bein French ‘think’ as English ‘reflection’ [réfléchir]lived; reflexion [réflexion]lived ; reflecting [réfléchissant]lived Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-réfléchirlived; to reflect back, reflecting, consider, meditate; Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 43c, Fr. 27) "...This is what Husserl calls I lived lived e. . . the possibility of reflecting [réfléchir] in memory [souvenir] . In other words, I can always perform any recollection whatsoever in the personallivedc mode, and right away [aussisôt] the I [Je]lived appearslived [apparaît]..." The Emotions: (p. 51c) "...Not much reflection [réfléchir]lived is needed lived I to comprehend ok that, on the contrary, the emotion returns to the object at every instantok and is fed there..." (p. 53c, Fr. 40) "Now it is certain that we can reflect [réfléchir]lived on our actionlived. But an operationc on the universe is carried out most IR lived often without the subject’s leaving the unreflective [irréfléchi] planeok.

The Psychology of Imagination: (p. 4 , Fr. 14) "e...For the present we only wish to attempt a ‘phenomenology’positedc of the image. The methodposited is simple: we shall produceI images, reflect [réfléchir]lived upon them, describe them; that is, attempt to determine [‘that is, as limitation’] and classify their distinctive characteristics."

Sartre: being-there 32

The Family Idiot: (2:116, Fr. 1:771, out of sequence in V3) "...when he is inclined to reflect [réfléchir]lived, in effect, he is already in the hands of otherslived—that is to say [c’est-à-dire] of his parents, in the first place..." Ref Sartre\Index of terms-réfléchi~eslived; reflectiveadj as thoughtful, respectful, deliberative; The Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 65c) "...These two reflections [réflexions]lived apprehendlived the same certain givens2neg, but the one affirms more than it knows [savait]lived, directing itself through the reflected_on [réfléchie]lived consciousness upon an objectlived situated outside consciousness." See Herein-BondI of being[-there]lived unites reflected-on [réfléchi]lived to reflective [réflexive]lived (BN150, out of sequence) See Herein-Reflected_on [réfléchi]lived as an appearancelived for reflective [réflexif]lived as witness (of) itself: reflectivelived witness (of) reflected-onlived as appearancelived to itself (BN 151-4, 174, 239, 298, 340, inaccessible 2&1/2 pages), with BN: (p. 151c) "...Thus it is necessary [faut] at once [à la fois] that the reflexive [réflexif]lived be_and_not_be the reflected_on [réfléchi]lived..."; See Sartre\Ontology-Counting cigarettes: Unreflectivelived consciousness renders reflection [réflexion]lived possiblelived, with BN (p. liiic, Fr. 19) "Furthermore the reflecting [réflexive]lived consciousness positsc the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchi]livedcR as its object. In the actlived of reflecting [réflexion]lived pass judgment on the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchi]lived am ashamed of it, I am proud of it, I will it, I refuse it, etc..." ------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-reflexionlived; [réflexion]lived; c sartre¶ Transcendence of the Ego (p. 61-2 , Fr. 45-6) "e...Reflection [réflexion]lived has limits, both limits of validitydial/lived and limits in factposited. (TEp. 62) It is a consciousness which positsposited a consciousnessposited/1neg..." c The Family Idiot: (1:211 , Fr. 1:219) "e...Gustave at fifteen years old— lived at thirteen—wrote in order to be comprehended ok and to be avenged. He endlessly ponders his situationlived, first from one angle, then from another, but for reasons which are not yet clear he can raise himself to reflection [réflexion]lived only by meditating on an imaginaryposited character who might be considered, if you will, a possiblelived Gustave—realizedontology [as doubly ontological project1neg and situation2neg], perhaps, but in another time or 2neg another world e..."

Sartre: being-there 33

lived (2:116, Fr. 1:771) "e...Rather than make his ‘I [Moi] ’ appearancelived [apparaître] to be a transcendentlived1neg quasi-objectontology/1neg on the horizon of his reflected_on [réfléchi]lived consciousness, Gustave often prefers to produce an imaginary reflection [réflexion]lived on the reallived unreflected [irréfléchi]lived consciousness he supposes otherslived have of him. He enters into their thoughtlived; he sees it as if it were his own and the objectlived [their thought] that appearslived [apparaît] as the transcendentlived/1neg pole of other judgments and their affectionlived—it is himselflived in the third person. (3:184c) "The Garcon was born of a doubling: sometimes there reallylived are two actors—as in the ‘consecrated caricature’ [‘inventions which the group subsequently preserved in the form of rituals’]—but one of them actslived out unreflecting [irréfléchie]lived spontaneitylived and the other the reflection [réflexion]lived on that spontaneityI..." (3:191c, Ftn. 128c) "The cogitolived remains, of course, his immediate possibility. Besides, we have seen that the Garcon is at the lived levelok of reflexion [réflexion] . But the deviation makes itself by passage to the imaginary: Gustave through reflection [réflexion]lived plays the role of the Otherposited/1neg and, unrealizingR** himself, makes himself an observerlived through the Giant; thus his Egoposited/1neg, in the unreal, lived posited/1negc posited 1neg appears [apparaît] to him as the Object of the Other / ok." See a Sartrean posed problem at Sartre\Temporality-R Psychic_durationlived, historicitylived, universal timeposited (BN158-63), and -R2 Durationposited; original_temporalitylived; psychic_temporalitylived; psychelived; psychic_lifelived; psychic_factlived; (BN150) ------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-réfléchissantlived; reflecting2, reflétant=1 Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 44c) "...Insofar as mylived reflecting [réfléchissant]livedc consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_itself it is non- positionallived consciousness..."; The Family Idiot (3:188, Fr. 2:1295) "...Here he is, then reflecting lived [réfléchissante] on lived experienceok by pretending that his reflection [réflexive]lived is intersected by a look of the second instance that is directed down onto his Egoposited/1neg..."

Sartre: being-there 34

8-14bein Reflective’ [réflexive]lived; reflexive [réflexif]lived ; reflexivity [réflexivité]posited ; reflexively [réflexivement]lived Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-réflexivelived after TE; reflectiveadj Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 44c, as second_degree) "...but it must be remembered that all the writers who have descried the Cogitoposited/1neg have dealt with it as a reflective [réflexive]lived operationc, that is to say, as an operationI of the second_degree..." Subsequent to Transcendence of the Ego became reflective [réflexive]lived. BN: (p. 150-1, Fr. 186) "But aside from the factposited that it is difficult to explain the upsurge ex nihilo of the reflective [réflexive]lived consciousness it is completely impossible in this way to account for its absoluteontologyc unity with the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchi]lived c I lived (p. 282 , Fr. 322) "e...the being which is revealed to the reflective [réflexive]lived consciousness is for-itselfI-for-otherslived..." Herein-BondI of being[-there]lived unites reflected-on [réfléchi]lived to reflective [réflexive]lived (BN150, out of sequence) CDR: (p. 47c) "...totalization [in course] must include within itself its own reflective [réflexive]lived retotalizationI as an essential structuredial/lived and as a totalizingontology process within the process as a wholedial."; c (p. 650 ) "e...Recurrence, controlled from the outside as a determination [‘that is, as limitation’] projected from everyone, through posited 1neg c dial/lived Others / ok, into the false totality of a common field and, in realitylived, into pure reflexive [réflexive]lived flightlived, is what we shall call manufactured exterioritylived." The Family Idiot: (3:189c) "...This means that he invents, on the reflexivelived level of the first_degreec, what his ‘Meposited/1neg’ of the second_degree is supposed to perceivelived from immediate and reflected_on [réfléchi]livedc consciousness. ------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-réflexiflived; reflexiveadj; The Psychology of Imagination (p. 3, Fr. 13) "...It is this reflexive [réflexif]lived act which permits the judgmentposited ‘I have an imageposited’..." BN: (p. 157c note contradictory usage) "...I can make many an error when recalling to myself in the reflexive [réflexif]here posited and only hit as posited I our files c posited posited mode ok my past feelings or my past ideas ; this is because I am on

Sartre: being-there 35

posited dial/posited the planeok of memory [mémoire] . At that moment I no longer am my pastIlived, but I am thematizingc it. We are then no longer dealing with the reflexive [réflexif]here lived act..." ------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-réflexivitéposited: BN (p. 74c, only hit) "...[T]he first condition of all reflection [réflexivité]posited is a pre-reflective cogitolived..." ------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-réflexivementlived: reflexively; 3 hits; BN (p. 276c) "...Since mylived shamelived, as an Erlenislived which is reflexively [réflexivement]lived apprehensible as a witness for the otherlived, for the same reason as it is its own witness, I am not going to put it in question as an objectposited of the worldlived which can on principleposited be placed in doubtlived..." CDR: (p. 54c) "...As soon as I reflexively [réflexivement]lived grasp lived/2neg lived/1neg lived lived [transforms to ] this bondok of interiority which links me to the culturallived totalization [in course]R, I disappear as a cultivated lived lived dial individual ok to manifest myself as the synthetic bond between everyone and what might be called the cultural field... I reflexively lived lived [réflexivement] interpret the operations of my singularok life [vie]."

8-14bein The Transcendence of the Ego, Tr. by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick, N.Y., Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, or Noonday Press, 1960. (1936) [Original translation modified by my Sartrean terms and clarifications]

8-14bein i. the I and the Me (TE31-60) It is undisclosed whether the section titles are Sartre’s or the translators.

8-14bein A. The theory of the formallived presence of the I [Je]lived (TE32-42) Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (p. 32-3, Fr. 13-5)"It must be accorded to KantR**a that the ‘Ilived***_Think’ lived**b [Je Pense] must be able to accompany all our representations****.’ But need we then conclude that an IlivedR [Je] in factposited inhabits all our stateslived of

Sartre: being-there 36 consciousness and actually effects the supreme synthesisdial of our expérienceposited? This inference would seem to distort KantianI thoughtI . The problem of Kant’s critique being one of validitylived, KantI affirms nothing concerning the existence of the factposited of the I_Thinklivedc [Je Pense]. On the contrary, he seems to have seen perfectly well that there are momentsdial of consciousness without the ‘I’lived [Je], for he says ‘must be able to accompany.’ The problem, indeed, is to determine [‘that is, as limitation’] the condition of possibilityontology of expérienceposited. One of these conditionslived is that I [je] can always consider mylived perceptionposited or thoughtlived as minelived: nothing more [not deduced unconscious in next sub-topic]." [my paragraph break, continuing-2] ------**a Robert SolomonR, In the Spirit of Hegel (p. 11c) "[In the] idea of making sense of experience [w]hat changes with Descartes is the importance of the idea of ‘experience’ itself, and what changes with KantI is that the enterprise is no longer ontological, no longer concerned with the ‘true nature of things’ so much as with what KantI called ‘the necessary conditions for the possibilityontology of experience’..."; (p. 200-201c) "...KantI rejects the commonsensical idea that one simply ‘sees’ oneself in experience; rather, one discovers the activity of the self through reflection on experience, as its transcendental source of principlesI ; (p. 201c) "...KantI continuously emphasizes the factposited that the self is always ‘behind’ our experience and never its object..." ibid. The Passions (p. 89, 1st edition) "KantI introduced the concept of a ‘transcendental Ego,’ literally, the Self that constitutes the world but yet is never an object in that world. The idea of a Self that watches and organizes, itself free from view and free from judgment..." [Kant’s self, Sartre states, is the non-phenomenal self which we point to over our shoulder.] **b German capitalized ‘Think’. ------*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-I; The Transcendence of the Ego translators, Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick, correct 6 occurrences of the French ‘Je’ with italicized ‘Je’. At Herein-Egoposited/1neg is not the owner of consciousness; it is the objectI of consciousness (TE96), they corrects 4 more occurrences. ------

Sartre: being-there 37

**** Later in BN (p. 125c) "...Representations and volitions are idols invented by the psychologists..."

8-14bein The ‘transcendental Iposited is the death of consciousness’ (TE33, 37-8, 40) Working on 3-15 Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (p. 33, continuing-2) sartre’s¶"But there is in contemporary philosophy a tendency—traces of which could be neo-KantianI criticism, and an intellectualism like that of Brochard [Victor, 1848-1907]—which consists of making into a realitylived the conditions of possibilityontology determinedI through the critique. This is the tendency taken when certain writers ask, for example, what ‘transcendental_consciousness’ can be. If one poses the question in these terms, one is naturallyposited constrained to conceive this consciousness— which is constitutiveBN of our empirical consciousness—as an unconscious. But Boutroux, in his lectures on the philosophy of Kant, has already done justice to these interpretations. [Fr. 15] KantI was never preoccupied in the way in which empirical consciousness is in factposited constitutedBN, to the point of deducing, in the manner of a Neo-Platonic process, from a higher consciousness, from a constitutedBN hyper- consciousness, he never deduced empirical consciousness. Transcendental_consciousnessc is only the ensemblelived of conditions necessaryBNontology [for the possibility] to the existence of an empiricalposited consciousness. In consequence, to realizelived/1neg&2neg the transcendental_I [Je], in making the inseparable companion of each of our ‘consciousnesses,’ is to judge on factposited and not on validitydial/lived, and to take a point of viewlived&ontology radicallyontology different from that of Kantlived. And then to pretend to authorize KantianI considerations on the unity necessaryBNontology for expérienceposited, would commit the very error of those who make of the transcendental_consciousness a pre-empirical unconsciousposited. ------(TEp. 37, out of sequence) "...the existence of a transcendental Iposited [is not] justified by the need that consciousness has for unity and individualityI . It is [not] because I can say mylived consciousness, and because Peter and Paul can also speak of theirlived consciousnesses, that these consciousnesses

Sartre: being-there 38 distinguish themselves from each other. The [transcendental?] I? is [not] the producer of inwardness. (TEp. 38, out of sequence) "Now, it is certain that phenomenologyposited does not need to appeal to any such unifying and individualizingI . By intentionality consciousness transcendslived/1neg itselflived/2neg... The objectlived/1neg is transcendentI to the consciousnesslived/2neg which grasps [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] it, and it is in the objectlived/1neg that the unity of the consciousnesses is found." (TEp. 40, out of sequence) "...the phenomenologicalposited conception of consciousness renders the unifying and individualizingI role of the II totally useless. It is consciousness, of the contrary, which makes possibleI the unity and the personality of my I. The transcendental Iposited, therefore, has no raison d’être." ------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-TRANSCENDENTAL_I ; Sartre’s usage appears to be limited to this work. (above) "...Transcendental_consciousness is only the ensemblelived of conditions necessaryBNontology [for the possibility] to the existence of an empiricalposited consciousness..." Transcendence of the Ego: Herein-sub-topic below; REgoposited/1neg is not the owner of consciousness; it is the objectposited of consciousness (TE96); Sartre\Negation-Forest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick: Sartre’s nothingnessI vs. Husserl’s transcendental_Ego

8-14bein Connectionslived&lived ‘of the Ilived/1neg to consciousnesslived/2neg are existential problems’ (TE34) Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (p. 34, Fr. 15) "If we find accord with Kant on the question of validitydial/lived, the questionI of factposited is still not approached. Consequently, it may be posed succinctly at this point: The I_Thinklived** [Je Pense] must be able to accompany all our representationposited, but does it in factposited accompany them? Supposing, moreover, that a certain representationI, A [object], passes from some statelived unaccompanied by the I Think** [Je Pense] to a stateI in which the I Think [Je Pense] does accompany the A, will there follow a modification of the structuredial/lived of A [as object], or will the representationI remain basically unchanged? [Fr. 16] This second questionI leads us to pose a thirdI

Sartre: being-there 39

. The I Think [Je Pense] must be able to accompany all our representationsI. posited posited lived But should we understand ok here that directly or indirectly the unity of our representationsI is realizedlived, posited, or ontology having both 1neg&2neg by the lived I I Think [Je Pense], or that one must comprehendok that the representations of a consciousness must be united and articulated in such a way that it is always possibleI in their regard to note an ‘I Think’ [Je Pense]. This thirdI questionI seems to arise at the levelc of validitydial/lived and, at this levelI, seems to renounce KantainI orthodoxy. But in realitylived this is a questionI of factposited, which may be formulated thus: is the I [Je] that welived meet in our consciousness rendered possibleI by the syntheticdial unity of representations or else is it the I which in factposited unitesI the representationsI to each other? (TEp. 35, Fr. 16) "If we abandon all the more or less forced interpretationsI of the I_thinklived [Je pense] offered by the post-Kantians, and nevertheless wish to solve the problem of the existence in factposited of the I [Je] in consciousness, we recognize on our path the phenomenologyI of HusserlR. Phenomenologypositedc is a scientific, not a criticalc study of consciousness. [Fr. 17] Its essential way of proceeding is by intuitiondial/lived. Intuition, according to HusserlI, puts us in the presence of the thing. We must understandposited, therefore, that phenomenologyI is a scienceI of factposited, and that the problems it poses are problems of factI; though, moreover, their comprehensionlived and consideration can still be from Husserl’sI designation of phenomenologyI as a descriptive science. lived&lived lived/1neg Problems concerning the connections ok [of three degrees] of the I [Je] to consciousnesslived/2neg are therefore existential problems. [Fr. 18] The transcendental_consciousness*** of Kant, Husserl finds and graspsI through the ἑ ποχῄ . But this consciousness is no longer an ensemblelived of logicalposited conditions, but is an absoluteontology factI. Nor is this transcendental_consciousness a hypostatization of validityI, an unconscious which floats between the reallived and the ideal?. It is a reallived consciousness accessible to each of us as soon as the ‘reduction’ is performed. And it is indeed this transcendental_consciousness which constitutesBN our empiricallived consciousness, our consciousness ‘in-the- worldlived,’ our consciousness with its psychiclived and psychophysical ‘melived’ [‘moi’]." ------

Sartre: being-there 40

** Kant’s German capitalized ‘Think’. *** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-TRANSCENDENTAL_CONSCIOUSNESS

9-14bein B. The Cogito (TE43) Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego (p. 43-4, Fr. 26-7) "The ‘Ilived_thinklived’ [pense],’ of Kant is a condition of possibilityontology. The Cogitoposited/1neg of Descartes and of Husserl is a consistency of factposited. Welived have heard of the ‘factual_necessityontology’ of the Cogitoposited/1negI, and this expression seems to melived most apt. Well, it is undeniable that the Cogitoposited/1negI is personalI . [Fr. 27] In the [Kantian] ‘I [Je]I thinkI ’ there is an I [Je] who thinksI . Welived attain here the I [Je] in its purity, and it is indeed from the Cogitoposited/1neg that an ‘Egologyposited/1neg’ must depart. The factposited that can serve our departure is, then, this one: each time welived grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] our thoughtlived, whether by an immediate intuitionlived, or by an intuitionpositedc which rests on memory [mémoire]posited, welived graspI an I [Je]lived/2neg which is the I [Je] of the graspedI thoughtlived/2neg, and which is given2neg, in addition, as transcendinglived/1neg this thoughtI and all other possibleI thoughtsI. If, for example, I [je] want to recall such landscape as glimpsed from the train, yesterday, it is mylived possible to make that landscape come back to memory [souvenir]lived as such, but I [je] can also recall that I [je] see that landscape. This is what HusserlI calls the possibilityI of reflecting [réfléchir]lived in memoryc [souvenir]lived. In other words, I [je] can always operate any recollection in the personal**lived modec, and right away [aussisôt] the Iposited [Je] appearslived [apparaît]. (TEp. 44) Such is the guarantee of factposited of the affirmationdial of KantianI validitylived. Thus it appears [appparaît] that there is not one of mylived [three_degrees of] consciousnesses which I [je] do not grasp [transformlived/2negtolived/1neg] as provided with an I [Je]. (p. 44P, Fr. 27-8) "But it must be remembered that all the writers who have described the Cogitoposited/1neg have given it as a reflective [réflexive]lived operationdiac, that is to say [c’est-à-dire], as an operationI of the second_degree***. This Cogitoposited/1neg operatesdiac through a consciousnesslived directed upon consciousness, a consciousnesslived which takes consciousnesslived as an object. [continued same paragraph below] ------

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See Sartre\Flauert’s School Years-EgologyI ‘of the GarconI: Two menI in melived ... a bookwormposited/2neg, a traveling salesmanposited/1neg’ (3:184), and sub-topic; The Family Idiot (1:167c, Ftn. 7) "...But with most of us, passivity and activitylived are equitably joinedI [réparties]: the dialectic of the Egoposited/1neg (melived [passivity]—Ilived [Je] —selfnesslived, alterityposited—act and drama) is a complex movementdial..." ------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PERSONNALlived [person]; same hyperlink as PERSON(S) [personne]n; [not pron indéf]; All hits on person and personal have been checked in French.; cf. personalization, personality; see below, Looking at one’s own personlived as an object for the otherlived; Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 43c, above) "...In other words, I can lived c always perform any recollection whatsoever in the personal mode ok, and right away [aussisôt] the Iposited [Je] appearslived [apparaît]..." BN: Sartre\The Other-Personallived existence and selfnesslived as ‘presence_to_self,’: Egoposited/1neg as indiferent signI of the personlived (BN103), with BN (p. 103c) "...consciousness by the pure nihilating movementdial of reflection [réflexion]lived makes itself personal; for what confers personallived existence on a being[-there]I is not the possession of an Egoposited/1neg—which is only the [indifferent] signlived of the personality—but it is the factposited that lived lived the being[-there] exists for itselfok as a presence_to itself."; (p. 239c) "...selfnesslivedc, the foundation of personallived existence, was altogether different from an Egoposited/1neg or from a reference of the EgoI to itself..."; (p. 426c, Fr. 467) "...Confronting an inanimate thing which has not been worked on, for which I myselflived fix its mode of uselived and to which I myself assign a new use (if, for example, I use a stone as a hammer), I have a non-theticlivedc consciousness of mylived self as a personontology/2neg [using a stone as hammer]; that is to say [c’est-à-dire], of mylived selfness, of my own ends, and of my freeBN inventiveness..." The Idiot of the Family: (2:6c) "...the personlived represents the abstractlived and endlessly retouched product of personalization..." ------Looking at one’s own personlived as an object for the otherlived

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BN: (260c) "...The unreflective [irréfléchi]lived consciousness does not grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the person directly or as its objectlived; the personlived is presented to consciousness in so far as the person is an objectI for the otherlived. This signifieslived that all of a sudden I am consciousness of myselflived as escaping myself, not in that I am the foundation of my own nothingness but in that I have my foundation outside myself..."; The Family Idiot: (2:14c) The [actor’s] raw materialI is his own personlived, his purpose is to be unreally an_otherlived. Of course everyone plays at what he is..."; (2:22c) "...indeed, insofar as he is his own actor, helived perceiveslived himself as a characterlived [in a play] and not as a personontology/2neg..." ------*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-SECOND_DEGREEposited; See Herein- Sartre correlates three degrees of consciousness with two dialectic negations; The Psychology of Imagination: (p. 3c) "...Thus the imageposited as image is describable only by an actposited of the second_degree in which the lookposited/1neg turns itself away from the object2negc for the sake of directing itself onto the making of which this objectI is given2neg. It is this reflexive [réflexif]lived actlived which permits the judgment ‘I have an imagelived’..." BN: (p. liiic) It is not reflexion [réflexive]lived which revealslived the lived consciousness reflecting [réfléchie] to itself. Quite the contraryok, it is the non-reflectivec [non-réflexifslived] consciousness which renders the reflection [réflexive]lived possibleI ..." c c I (p. 95 ) "e...For value to become the object of a thesis, it is needed that the for-itselflived which value2neg haunts must appear before the regard of reflection [réflexive]lived. The reflexive [réflexive]lived consciousness, in fact, posesc the Erlenis reflected-on..." (p. 151c) "...Thus it is necessaryI [faut] at once [à la fois] that the reflexive [réflexif]lived be_and_not_be the reflecting [réfléchi]lived..."; The Family Idiot: (3:189c) When he does the Garcon, Gustave takes a reflexive [réflexive]lived attitude and pretends that his own reflection [réflexive]lived is a conductive medium for the look of his Pantagruelesqueposited/1neg ‘melived [moi].’ This means that he invents, to the lived livedR posited/1neg reflexive [réflexif] levelok of the first_degree , what his Me

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[Moi]’c of the second_degree is supposed to begin to see from immediate and reflecting [réfléchi]lived consciousness..." [‘he invents, to the reflexive lived [réflexif] levelok of the first degree’ equates the adjective "reflexive [réflexif]" levelok to the "first degree" noun. See Sartre/Flaubert’s School Years-Can Gustave’s Otherposited/1neg usurp his unreflectivelived?] (5:143c) "...Thus, when the young writer unrealizes himself as the artist, he becomes more at one with the imperative content of his work, which must be the unrealI, or the derealization of realitylived. His role favors it, and he is better at inventing the unrealI (or derealizationI) because he is unreallyI an artist or a derealizedI bourgeois. He would, in short, produce imageIs to the second_degreeposited. And these are required by absolute-art because of their double dose of nothingness..."

9-14bein Third_degreeontology consciousness (TE44) Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego (p. 44-5, Fr. 28-9, continuing my paragraph break) sartre¶Let us agree: the certitude of the Cogitoposited/1neg is absoluteontology, for as Husserl said, there is an indissoluble unity of the reflecting [réfléchissante]lived consciousness and the reflected_on [réfléchie]lived consciousness (to the point that the reflecting [réfléchissante]lived consciousness could not exist without the reflected_on [réfléchie]lived consciousness. But the factposited remains that we are in the presence of a synthesisdialc of two consciousnesses, one of which is consciousness of the other. Thus the essential principlepositedc of phenomenologyposited, ‘all consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_something**’ is preserved. Now mylived reflecting [réfléchissante]lived consciousness does not take itself for an objectlived when I [je] realizeontology/1neg&2neg the Cogito2ont/1neg. What it affirmsdial concerns the reflected_on [réfléchie]lived consciousness. Insofar as mylived reflecting [réfléchissant]lived of consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_itself it is non-positionallivedc consciousness. (TEp. 45) It becomes positionalposited only by directing itself upon the reflected_on [réfléchi]lived consciousness which itself was not a positionalposited consciousness of itself before being[- there]lived reflected_on [réfléchie]lived. Thus the consciousness which saysposited ‘I think’ [‘Je pense’] is precisely not the consciousness which thinkslived. Or rather it is not its own thoughtlived which it positspositedR1 by this theticposited actposited. We are then justified in asking ourselves if the I [Je]posited/1neg which thinksposited is common to the two superimposed consciousnesses [reflecting

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[réfléchissante]lived consciousness and the reflected_on [réfléchie]lived]***, or if it [I [Je]posited/1neg] is not rather that of the reflected-on [réfléchie]lived consciousness. All reflecting [réfléchissant]lived consciousness is, indeed, in itself unreflected [irréfléchi]lived, and a new actlived of the third_degree**** is necessaryBNontology in order to positR2 it. Moreover, there is no infinite regress here, since a consciousness has no need at all of a reflecting [réfléchissante]lived consciousness in order to be conscious of itself. It simply does not positI itself as an objectI****. [continued-1] ------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-CONSCIOUSNESS IS CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOMETHINGlived; cf. modes; Above as non-positionallived: ‘Insofar as mylived reflecting [réfléchissant]lived of consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_itself it is non- positionallivedc consciousness.’ BN: (p. lxic) "...This means that transcendencelived/1neg is the constitutiveBNc structuredial/lived of consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a beingI which is not itself..."; (p. lxiic) "...To say that consciousness is consciousness (of) somethinglived is to say that it must produce itself as a revealed- revelationlivedc [‘part of the object is revealed as it is, by revealing to us what we are’] of beingI which is not it and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness revealslived it."; (p. 69c) "...Thus to believelived is not to believeI any longer because that is only to believeI—this in the unity of one and the same non- theticlived consciousness of self..."; (p. 75c, ce) "...Thus the ontological judgment ‘belieflived is consciousness (of) beliefI’ can under no circumstances be taken as a statement of identity [logical]; the subject [consciousness] and the attribute [being-in-itselflived] are radicallyontology different though still within the indissoluble unity of one and the same being[-there]lived."; BN c ( p. 174 , Fr. 210-11) "e...The ‘something [pure negation]’ which must qualify the reflected [reflété]lived, in order that the couplec ‘the- reflection-reflecting [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived’ may not collapse itself in nothingness is pure negation’. The reflected [reflété]lived makes itself qualified outside next to a certain beingI as not being[-there]livedc that being. This is precisely what we call: ‘to be consciousness (of) somethinglived.’"

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Sartre\Ontology-RObject ‘of consciousness must be distinguished from consciousness by its absence, by its nothingness’ ------*** TE: (p. 44c) "...as Husserl said, there is an indissoluble unity of the reflecting [réfléchissante]lived consciousness and the reflected_on [réfléchie]lived consciousness (to the point that the reflecting [réfléchissante]lived consciousness could not exist without the reflected_on [réfléchie]lived consciousness. But the factposited remains that we are in the presence of a synthesisdialc of two consciousnesses, one of which is consciousness of the other..." **** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-THIRD_DEGREE; ontological; Herein- Sartre correlates three degrees of consciousness with two dialectic negations; BN: (p. 151c, defining) "...Thus it is necessaryI [faut] at once [à la fois] that the reflexive [réflexif]lived be_and_not_be [soit et ne soit] the reflected_on [réfléchi]lived..." * The Emotions: Herein-R H2-13Unreflected actionlived continuously transforms our projects without reflection The Psychology of Imagination: Sartre\Imagination-R4. Third Characteristic: The Imaginative Consciousness Positsposited Its object as Nothingness; ------**** i.e., it exists as BN (p. 624c) "...the (reflection-reflecting) [reflet]lived[reflétantlived] reflected [reflété]lived was distinguished from the (reflection-reflecting) [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived reflecting [reflétant]lived in that each one had to not-be the otherlived..."

6-15bein Unreflected ‘thoughtlived undergoes a radicalontology modification in becoming reflected_on [réfléchi]lived’ (TE45-50) The Transcendence of the Ego (p. 45-7, Fr. 29, continuing-1) "But is it not precisely the reflexive [réflexif]lived actlived which gives birth to the Me [Moi]posited/1neg in the reflected_on [réfléchi]lived consciousness? Thus would be explained how every thoughtlived graspedR [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] by intuitionlived possesses an Ilived [Je]**a, without falling into the difficulties noted in the preceding section [A. The theory of the formal presence of the I]. Husserlc would be the first to acknowledge that an unreflected [irréfléchi]lived thoughtlived undergoes a radicalontologyR modification in becoming

Sartre: being-there 46 reflected_on [réfléchi]lived. But needI one confine this modification to a loss of ‘naïveté’? (TEp. 46) Would not the apparitionlived of the Ilived [Je]**b be what is essential in this change? (TEp. 46, Fr. 30-1) "One must evidently revert to a concretelived expérienceposited, which may seem impossible, since by definition an expérienceI of this genus*** is reflective [réflexive]lived, that is to say, supplied with an Ilived [Je]**c. But every unreflective [irréfléchi]lived consciousness, being[-there]livedc non-theticlivedc consciousness of itself, leaves a non-theticlivedc memory [souvenir]lived****1 that one can consult. To do so it suffices to try to reconstituteBN the complete momentdial/posited where this unreflected [irréfléchi]lived consciousness appeared [parut] (which by definition is always possibleI ). For example, I [j’] was absorbed just now in my reading. I [Je] am going to try to remember the circumstances of my reading, my attitude, the lines that I [je] was reading. I [Je] am thus going to revive not only these exteriorlived details but a certain depth of unreflected [irréfléchi]lived consciousness, since the objects could only have livedc been perceived ok as consciousness and since they remain relative to it. That consciousness must not be posited as an objectI of reflection lived posited [réflexive] . On the contraryok, I [je] must direct my attention to the revived objectsI, but without losing sight of the unreflected consciousness, in keeping with this sort of conspiracy with it and by drawing up an inventory of its contentcons in a non-positionallived manner. There is no doubtlived about the result: while I [je] was reading, there was consciousness of the lookc [‘being looked atontology/2neg’ or ‘looking atontology/1neg’], of the heroes of the novel, but the I [Je]ontology was not inhabiting this consciousness. (TEp. 47) It was only consciousness of the objectposited [book, character, plot] and non- positionalI consciousness of itselflived. These results I [je] can now grasp [transformslived/2negtoposited/1neg] a-theticallylived [athétiquement] to make of them the objectposited of a thesis and declare there was no I [Je]posited/1neg in the unreflectiveI [irréfléchi]lived consciousness..."; TE sartre¶ ( p. 48-9, Fr. 32) "e The objection that this takes place in memory...And reflexive lived [réflexif] memory , to which we are obliged to have recourse in order to reinstate elapsed consciousness, besides its questionable character owing to its naturelived as memory [souvenir]lived, remains suspect since, in the opinion of HusserlI himself, reflection [réflexive]lived modifies the spontaneous consciousness. Since in consequence all the non-reflectivec

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[non-réflexifs]lived memories [souvenirs]lived of unreflected [irréfléchi]lived consciousness show melived a consciousness without a me [sans moi], and since, on the other hand, theoretical considerations concerning consciousness which are based on intuitionlived of essencelived have constrained us to recognize that the Ilived [Je]**d cannot be a part of the dial/lived internalok structure of Erlenisse, we must therefore conclude: there is no I [Je] on the unreflective [irréfléchi]lived level. When I run after a streetcar, when I [je] look at the time, when I [je] am absored in contemplating a portrait, there is no Ilived [je]**e. (TEp. 49, Fr. 32) There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc., and non-positionallived consciousness of consciousness. In fact, I am then plunged into the worldlived of objectsposited; it is they which constituteBN the unity of my consciousness; it is they which present themselves with values, with attractive and repellant qualities—but me, I [Je] have disappeared, I [je] have annihilated myselflived. There is no place for me [moi] on this level. And this is not a matter of chance, due to a momentary lapse of attention, but happens because of the very structuredial/lived of consciousness. (TEp. 49-50, Fr. 32-4) "This is what a description of the cogitolived will make even more obvious to us. Can one say, indeed, that the reflexive [réflexif]lived actlived grasps [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the I [Je] and the thinkinglived consciousness to the same degree and in the same way? Husserl insists on the factposited that the certitude of the reflective [réfléchi]lived actlived comes from graspingI consciousness without facets, without profiles, completely (without Aschattungen). This is evidently so. On the posited contraryok, the spatio-temporal object always manifests itself through an infinity of aspects and is, at bottom, only the ideal unity of this infinityI. As for significationslived, or eternal truths, they affirmdial their transcendencelived/1neg in that the momentdial of their appearinglived [apparaissent] they are given2neg as independent of time, whereas the consciousness which grasps [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] them is, on the contrary, individuatedI [individualisée] through and through in durationlived. (TEp. 50) Now we ask: when a reflective [réflexive]lived consciousness graspsI the Iposited/1neg_think [Je pense, italicized as Kant’s German], does it give itself to graspI a full and concretelived consciousness gathered into a reallived momentdial of concreteI durationlivedc? The reply is clear, the Ilived [Je]**f is not given2neg as a concreteI momentI, a perishable structuredial/livedc of my actual

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I consciousness. On the contraryok, it affirms its permanence beyond this consciousness and all consciousnesses, and—although it scarcely resembles a mathematical truth—its type of existence comes much nearer to that of eternal truth than to that of consciousness." ------To resolve the simultaneity of the second_degreeposited and the first_degreelived, See Herein (below)-Unreflected actionlived continuously transformslived our projectslived without a reflexive [réflexive]lived consciousness (E52-7) See Sartre/Ontology-Counting cigarettes: UnreflectiveI consciousness renders reflection [réflexion]lived possibleI Ref Herein-Sartre correlates three degrees of consciousness with two dialectic negations **a-f The translators [FW&RK] here correct 6 occurrences of the French ‘Je’ with italicized Je’s, and at Herein-Egoposited/1neg is not the owner of consciousness; it is the objectI of consciousness (TE96), corrects 4 more occurrences. *** ‘Genus [genre]’ refers back to ‘revert’, both being reflective [réflexive]lived, rather than expérienceposited. ------****1 Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-MEMORY [souvenir]lived [mémoire]posited; memorie as [souvenir]lived Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 43c, Fr. 27) "...If, for example, I want to remember a certain landscape glimpsed [apercu] yesterday from the train, it is possiblelived for melived to bring back the memory [souvenir]lived of that landscape as such, but I can also recollect that I [je]posited/1neg was seeing that I landscape. This is what Husserl calls e. . . the possibility of reflecting [réfléchir]lived in memory [souvenir]lived. In other words, I can always perform livedc c any recollection whatsoever in the personal mode ok, and right away [aussisôt] the I [Je]posited/1neg appearslived [apparaît]..."; (TEp. 46c, from sub-topic above) "...but every unreflective [irréfléchi]lived consciousness, being[-there]livedc non-theticlived consciousness of itself, leaves a non-theticI memory [souvenir]lived that one can consult...’; (p. 48c, from sub-topic above) "...all the non-reflective [non- réflexifs]lived memories [souvenirs]lived of unreflected [irréfléchi]lived consciousness show melived a consciousness without a me [sans moi]ontology/2neg...";

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memorie as [mémorie]posited 6-15bein Unreflected actionlived continuously transformslived our projectslived without a reflexive [réflexive]lived consciousness (out of sequence E52-7) Sartre, The Emotions (p. 52-7, Fr. 39, continuing my paragraph break, out of sequence from Sartre\Emotions-Chapter three: A sketch of Phenomenological Theory) sartre¶The subject who seeks the solution of a practical problem is outside in the worldlived, he graspsR [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the worldI every instant through his actslived. If he fails in his attempts, if he gets irritated, his very irritation is still a way in which the worldI appearslived [apparaît] to himlived. And, between the actionI which miscarries and the angerlived, it is not necessaryBNontology for the subject to who fails [échoue] upon his behavior, to intercalate [between miscarriage and anger] a reflexive [réflexive]lived consciousness. There can be a continuous passage from the unreflectivec [irréfléchi]lived consciousness ‘worldI-acted’ (actionlived) to the unreflectedI [irréfléchi]lived consciousness ‘worldlived-odious’ (angerlived). The angerI is a transformation**lived of the miscarried actionI. E sartre¶ lived BN ( 52-3, Fr. 40) "To comprehend ok better the meaning of what is to follow, it is necessaryBNontology that the reader bear in mind the essencelived of unreflectiveI-conduct [irréfléchi]lived. There is too great a tendency to believelived that actionlived is a constant passing from the unreflectiveI [irréfléchi]lived to the reflexive [réflexif]lived, from the worldlived to ourselflived. (p. 53) We grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] a problem (unreflective [irréfléxion]lived-consciousness of the worldI); then we grasp ourselflived as having the problem to solve (reflexion [réflexion]lived); on the basis of this reflection [réflexion]lived we conceive an actionlived insofar as it ought to be carried on by us (reflexion [réflexion]lived), and then we redescend into the worldlived to carry out the actionlived (unreflectiveI [irréfléchi]lived), no longer considering anything but the objectlived actedlived upon. Then all new difficulties, all partial checks exigent on a restriction of adaptation, drive lived us back to the reflected_on [réfléchi] planeok. Hence, a constant going and coming which is constitutiveBN of actionlived. (Ep. 53-7, Fr. 40)"Now it is certain that we can reflect [réfléchir]lived on our actionlived. But an operationc on the universe is carried out most often R lived without the subject’s leaving the unreflective [irréfléchi] planeok. For

Sartre: being-there 50 example, at this momentI I am writing, but I have no consciousness of writing. Will it be said that habit has made melived unconscious of the movementsI my hand is making as it forms the letters? That would be absurd. Perhaps I have the habit of writing such and such wordslived in such and such order. In a general way, one should distrust explaining things by ascribing them to habit. (Ep. 54, Fr. 40-1) In realitylived, the art of writing is not at all unconscious. It is a presentlived structuredial/livedc of my consciousness. Only, it is not conscious of itself. To write is to take an activelived consciousness of the wordsI insofar as they are born under mylived pen. Not of wordsI insofar as they are written by melived [as afterthought or evaluation]: I intuitivelylived apprehendlived the wordsI insofar as they have this structuralI quality of issuing ex nihilo, and yet of not being creatorsI of themselves, of being passively createdI. At the very momentI that I trace one of them, I do not pay attention to each solitary stroke that my hand forms; I am in a special statelived of waiting, creativeI waiting; I wait for the word—which I know [sais]lived in advance—to borrow the hand which writes and the strokes which it traces in order that it [the hand1neg] may realizeontology/1neg&2neg itself2neg. To be sure, I am not conscious of the words in the same way as when I lookI over a person’slived shoulders and read what he is writing. But that does not mean that I am conscious of myselflived as writing. The essential differences are as follows: first, mylived intuitiveIc apprehensionlived of what mylived neighbor is writing is of the type called ‘probable evidencedial/lived.’ I grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the words which his hand forms well in advance of its having completely formed them. (Ep. 55) But at the very moment when, on reading ‘indep. . .,’ I intuitivelylived graspI ‘independent,’ the word ‘independent’ is given2neg as a probable realitylived (in the manner of the table or the chair). Contrariwise, mylived intuitivelived graspI of the wordsI I am writing delivers them to melived as I lived R certaince ‘a special certainty... [T]he words which I write are exigencies . The very way I graspI them through my creativec activitylived constitutesBN them as such; they appearlived [apparaissent] as potentialitieslived/2neg having to be realizedlived/1neg. Not having to be realizedI by melived. The melived [moi] does not appearI [apparaît] here at all. I simply sense the traction which they exert. (Ep. 56, Fr. 41-2) I feel their [the words] exigencyI objectivelylived. I see them realizingI themselveslived/2neg and at the same time demandinglived/1neg to be realizedI further. I may very well thinklived that the wordslived which my

Sartre: being-there 51 neighbor is forming as exigentsI of their realizationI from himlived. I do not feel this exigenceI. On the contrary, the exigenceI of the words1neg which I trace2neg is directly presentlived; the wordsI have weight and are felt. They tug at my hand and guide it. But not in the manner of live and activeI demons who might actuallyI push and tug at wordsI; the wordsI have a passiveI exigenceI. As to my hand, I am conscious of it in the sense that I see my hand directly as the instrumentlived by which the wordsI realizeI themselves. My hand is an objectposited in the worldlived, but at the same time, my hand is presentI and lived. Here I am at the momentI hesitating: shall I write ‘therefore’ or ‘consequently’? That does not at all imply that I stop and think about it. Quite simply, the potentialities ‘therefore’ and ‘consequently’ appearI [appairaissent]—as potentialities—and come into conflict. We shall try elsewhere to describe in detail the worldI actedI upon. What is important here is to show that actionI as spontaneous unreflective [irréfléchi]lived consciousness constitutesBN a certain existential levelI [couche] in the worldI, and that in order to actI it is not necessaryBNontology to be conscious of the self as actinglived—quite the contraryI. (Ep. 57, Fr. 42, copied to page 52 above) In short, unreflectivec [irréfléchi]lived conduct is not unconscious; it is conscious of itself non- theticallylivedc, and its way of being theticallypositedc conscious of itself is to transcendlived/1neg itself2neg and to grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the worldlived I lived lived as a quality of things . Thus, one can comprehend ok all those I I exigencies and tensions of the world which surrounds use..." ------Sartre, BN (p. 460 , Fr. 505, out of sequence from Sartre\Freedom-When ‘we yield to fatigue, we are conscious of all the implications’)"e...Every singular possibilitylivedR, in effect, is articulated in an ensemblelivedc. It is necessaryBNontology to conceive on the contrary this ultimate possibilityI as the unitary synthesisdial of all our actual possiblesI: each of these possiblesI resides in an undifferentiated statelived in the ultimate possibilityI until a particular circumstance comes to throw it into relief without, however thereby suppressing its qualityI of belonging to the totalitydial/lived. In effect, we pointed out in Part Two that the perceptivelived apprehensionlived of any objectlived whatsoever made itself on the ground of the world. By this we meant that what the psychologists are accustomed to call ‘perceptionposited’ I posited cannot be limited to objects which are strictly ‘seen’ or ‘understood ’ok

Sartre: being-there 52 etc. at a certain instantc but that the objectsI considered refer by means of implications and various significationslived to the totalityI of the existent in- itselflived from the standpoint of which they [objects] are apprehendedlived. Thus it is not true that I proceed by degrees from that table to the room which I am in, and then going out, pass from there to the hall, to the stairway, to the street in order finally to conceive as the result of a passage to the limit, the worldlived as the sum of all existentsI. Quite the contraryI, I can not perceivelived any instrumentallived thinglived whatsoever unless it is in terms of the absoluteontologyRc totalityI of all existentsI, for mylived first being[- there]lived is being-in-the-worldlived." ------See Herein-Unreflected ‘thoughtlived undergoes a radicalontology modification in becoming reflected_on [réfléchi]lived’ (TE45-50), second paragraph. See Sartre\Temporality-B. The Dynamic of Temporality [of the for-itself] Sartre\Imagination-4. Third Characteristic: Imaginativeposited Consciousness Positsposited Its ObjectI as NothingnessI, in answer to, "1. How the unreflective [irréfléchi]lived consciousness positsposited its objectposited..." ** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-TRANSFORMATIONlived [transformation; transformer]; dialecticlived, intentional; See below, Individual transformations, Social transformations, Marx’s and Sartre’s formalism. Individual transformations: The Psychology of Imagination: Sartre\Imagination-R2. The SignI and the Portrait, with, (p. 28c) "...That objectposited is the office in which I have business to attend to. The objectI is not in these wordslived, but, thanks to the inscription, it does not escape melived completely: I assign a place to it, I have knowledge [savoir]lived of it. The material on which my intentionlived was directed, becoming transformedlived by that intentionI, now forms an integral part of my actual attitude; it is the materialI of my actlived, it is a signlived..." The Emotions: (p. 52c) "...There can be a continuous passage from the unreflective [irréfléchi]lived consciousness ‘worldlived actedI’ (action) to the unreflectedc [irréfléchi]lived consciousness ‘worldI odious [‘monde- odieux’]’ (angerlived). The second is a transformationlived of the otherI ."; The War Dairies: (p. 180c) "...Thus for example, intuitivelivedc knowledge [connaissance]lived** is inruption of the nothing into

Sartre: being-there 53 immanencelived, which transformslived the immanenceIc of the in-itselflived into the transcendencelived/1neg of the for-itselflived. Thus the pure eventlived which posited/1neg lived insures that Being ok is its own nothingness makes the world lived dial/lived/2neg posited/1neg 1neg appear [apparaître] as totality of the In-itselfok surpassed through being[-there]lived that nothingness itself1neg..." The Family Idiot: (4:37c) "...Thus Flaubert’s illness, an idealived that moved into his bodylived, is also the vain effort of his bodylived to transformlived itself into an ideaI..." Social transformationslived CDR (p. 68c, ce) "...It [critical expérienceposited] seeks, on the basis of synchroniclived [‘ensemblelived of the present’] structuresdial/posited and their contradictions, the diachroniclived [‘in its human depth’] intelligibilitydial/posited of historicalI transformationslived, the order of their conditions and the intelligibleI reason for the irreversibility of Historyposited/1negc, that is to say, for its direction..."; (p. 83c) "The only reallived difference between primitive syntheticdial temporalityCDRR and the time of elementary praxis results fromS&A the materialI environment which, by not containing what the organism seeks, transformslived the totalitydial/lived as future [future]lived realitylived into possibilitylivedR..."; (p. 166c) "...[circulation of precious metals in the Mediterranean world] transformslived human praxislived into antipraxis, that is to say, into a praxisI without an author [authorless act]R, transcendinglived/1neg the given2neg towards rigid endslived, whose hidden meaningCDRlived is counter-finality..." c CDRII: (p. 14 ) "...The practical and technical relationok [of three degrees]lived&posited as 1st&2neg of manlived/2neg to the Universeposited/1neg as a field of scarcitylived is transformedlived in and through work; and these transformationsI are necessarilyCDRdial/lived interiorizedlived/1neg (alienation) as lived lived/2neg I I objective transformations of interhuman relations ok, in so far as they express scarcitylived..." The Family Idiot: (1:72c) "...because of it, Flaubert would be transformedlived in that strange celebrity, the greatest French novelist of the second half of the nineteenth century..."; Sartre\Flaubert’s Constitution-Rtruthlived ‘is a controlled lived lived I transformation modifying human_relations ok through the thing’s modification’

Sartre: being-there 54

------Marx’s and Sartre’s formalism: CDR: (p. 81c) "... matter, outside of it, reduces the livingI bodylived to an inorganicc status precisely to the extent that the bodyI transforms matterI into a totalitydial/lived..."; (p. 90c) "...the crucial momentdial of labour is that in which the organismI makes itself inert (the manlived applies his weight to the lever, etc) in order to transformlived the surrounding inertiac."; Sartre\Dialectic-R1&2Analytical_Reason as syntheticI transformationlived of its dialectic precursor; Sartre\Groups&Reciprocity-Marx's and Sartre's formalismposited: ‘menlived make Historyposited/1neg within the exact measure to which Historyposited/1neg makes themlived’ (CDR97-8) The Family Idiot (2:172c) "...To be sure, a dialecticlived is established between the character and the interpreter: the actor transformslived the character to the precise extent that he is transformedlived by it..."

9-14bein The Family Idiot: ‘Reflection [réflexion]lived shapes lived experiencelived according to its own endslived’ (FI 5:36) The Family Idiot (5:36-7, Fr. 3:42, continuing same paragraph repeating last sentence; out of sequence from Sartre\Flaubert’s Neurosis-DetotalizedI totalizationI as ‘each reader totalizingI his reading in his own way’) "By the use he makes of it, the instrument therefore becomes the worker's organ of perception: it discloses the worldlived and manlived in the worldI. Thus the most elementary praxis, insofar as it is actual and lived from the interiorlived, already contains as an immediate condition of its later development and as a reallived momentdial of that development, in short, in the living statelived, an livedc livedR1 livedc intuitive , implicit and nonveral knowledge [savoir] ok, a certain posited ontologyc livedc direct and totalizing yet wordless comprehension ok of contemporary manI among men and in the worldlived, hence an immediate grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] of the inhumanity of man and his subhumanity, the first seed of a political attitude of refusal.** On this level all thoughtlivedc is given2negc but it is not posited for itself, and so in its extreme compressionlivedc it escapes verbalpositedR2 elaboration. I have said lived enough about it, however, to make us comprehend ok that

Sartre: being-there 55 superstructuresdial/posited are not the point of this disclosure but merely the upper levels of elaboration in which this practico-theoretical knowledgeI [savoir]posited is isolated, posited for itself, and systematically made explicit, hence becoming theoretico-practical. Here we must take reflection [réflexion]lived as a starting point, for reflection [réflexion]lived shapes lived I experience [vécu] according to its own ends, though that lived experience ok is originally unreflectivec and becomes reflected_on [réfléchi]lived according to certain ruleslived that themselves issue from certain reflexive [réflexif]lived needs. (5:37) In other words, in the totalitydial/lived of praxis, reflection [réflexion]lived isolates the momentdial of theory, which has never existed alone but only as a practical mediationlived determined [‘that is, as limitation’] by the end itself. Thus it makes itself a recourse to languagelivedR. And languageI, on the one hand, isolates and transforms into a finished product the knowledge [savoir]lived that existedI implicitly in the worker's actlived. It gives namesc and hardens in the form of defined structuresdial/lived all the elements that have interpenetrated in the culturallived disclosure of work lived&lived as 1st & 2neg (mode of production, relationsok [of three degrees] of production, institutional ensembleslived, mores, lawsontology, etc.). NamedI and that way even perpetuated, these fragments of the reallived becoming fragments of knowledge [savoir]lived find themselves, at a stroke, falsified. Through this character of false knowledge [savoir]lived they come close to being a nonknowledge [non-savoir]lived, which also exist on the elementary level of the living actualizationI of praxis—that ensemblelived of opinions arising from pathos that are given2neg, at this higher degree of elaboration, as knowledges [connaissances]lived from expérienceposited. In fact, these extrapolations are inseparable from lived experience [vécu]c, and they form, if you will, classR subjectivitylivedc. After treatement they will become the clearest of what we call ideologies. Thus, along-side falseI knowledge [savoir]lived, whose origin is a practical and nonveralizedI knowledge [savoir]lived, ideologiesI that impose themselves on the worker—ideologiesI of his classc, or the middle or ruling classesc are introduced or reintroduced into him in the form of recipes explicitly presented as a verballived expose or a tied ensemblelived of determinations [‘that is, as limitation’] of discourse that would illuminate his condition and offer him the means to tolerate it. This involves chiefly, of course, a conceptionposited of the worldlived and of men as formed by the ruling class in grasping [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] its

Sartre: being-there 56 environment through the systematic exercise of power, and inculcated— by means which we know [connaissons]lived—in the working classes as though it were a universal ideologyI, or a body of knowledge [savoir]lived." lived lived (5:38, Fr. 3:46, see out of sequence note above) "e...verbalized value systems and ideologiesI remain in the mind, or at the very least in the memory, because languagelived is matter and because their elaboration has given the materialI inertia. Written words are stones. Learning them, interiorizinglived their combinations, we introduce into ourselves a mineralized thoughtlivedc that will subsist in us by virtue of its very minerality, until such time as some kind of materialI labor, actinglived on it from outside, might come to relieve us of it. I call these irreducible [nonknowledge] passivities as an ensemblelived the objective_Spiritposited/1neg. And this definition has no negative intent, no voluntarylived deprecation. In a society of exploitation, of course, these structureddial/posited ensemblesposited are harmful to the exploited classes to the extent that they are introduced into everyone from the outside and recast in the memory as ramparts against any sudden awareness. But taken in themselves they [structuredI ensemblesI] simply manifest this necessityCDRdialc: matter is the mediatinglived element between menlived to the same degree that through their praxis they become mediatorsI between different stateslived of matterI. The objective_SpiritI is cultureI itself but only in accordance with its becoming the practico-inert." ------Sartre, BN (p. 95c) "...In order for valueIc to become the object of a thesis, the for-itselflived which it haunts must also appearc before the regard of reflection [réflexion]lived. Reflexive [réflexive]lived consciousness in fact accomplishes two things by the same stroke; the Erlenis reflected-on [réfléchie]lived is posited in its natureposited as lack, and valueI is disengaged as the out-of-reach meaningBN of what is lackedI. Thus reflective [réflexive]lived consciousness can be properly called a moral consciousness since it cannot arise without at the same momentdial disclosing valuesI. It is obvious that I remain freeBN in my reflective [réflexive]lived consciousness to directposited my attention on these valuesI or to neglect them.." ------See Sartre\Anguish-Anguishedlived apprehensionlived mediatesI the world’slived possibleI projectsI;

Sartre: being-there 57

Sartre\Language&Comprehension-Feeling ‘is discourse and discourse is feeling’ Ref Herein-Sartre correlates three degrees of consciousness with two dialectic negations ** Copied to Sartre\Intelligibility of History-One historylived as human liberation: Our contemporary nonverballived comprehensionlived of its possibilityI

4-15bein BondI of being[-there]lived unites reflected-on [réfléchi]lived to reflective [réflexive]lived (BN150, out of sequence) Sartre, BN (p. 150, Fr. 186, out of sequence from Sartre\Temporality-Doubt) "The reflective [réflexive]lived is the for-itselflivedc conscious of itselflived. As the for-itselfI is already a non-theticlived consciousness of self, we are accustomed to representposited reflection [réflexive]livedR as a new consciousness, abruptly appearinglived [apparue], directed on the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchi]livedR, and living [vivant] in symbiosis with it. One recalls here the old idea ideae of Spinoza. (BNp. 150-1, Fr. 186) "But aside from the factposited that it is difficult to explain the upsurge ex nihilo of the reflective [réflexive]livedc consciousness it is completely impossible in this way to account for its absoluteontologyc unity with the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchi]livedc, a unity which alone renders conceivable the lawsontologyc and the certainty of the reflective [réflexive]lived intuitionlived. We cannot here, in effect, define the esse of reflected-on [réfléchi]lived as a percipi since its being is such that it does not need to be perceivedlived in order to exist [Bishop Berkeley’s claim]. And its [the lived c lived&lived as 1st&2neg a reflected-on, réfléchi] primary connectionok [of three degrees] ** lived posited&posited as with the reflection [réflexive] can not be the unitary relationok 1st&2negc of a representationposited/1neg to a thinkingposited/2neg subject. If the knownlived**b [connait]lived existant is to have the same rank of being as the knowinglived**c [connaissant]lived existentI, then it is in the perspective of lived d naive_realism ** that we must describe the connectionok [of three degrees]lived&lived as 1st&2neg of these two existentsI. (BNp. 151) but in this case we are going to encounter the major difficulty of realismontology***: how can two completely isolated independents, provided with that sufficiency of I being which the Germans call Selstāndigkeit**** enter into connection ok with each other, and in particular how can they enter into that type of

Sartre: being-there 58

livedc lived internal_relation ok [in a totality] which we call knowledge [connaissance] ? If first we conceive of reflection [réflexive]lived as an autonomous consciousness [by itself], we shall never be able to reunite it later with the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchie]lived. They will always be two, and if— to suppose the impossible—the [autonomous] reflective [réflexive]lived consciousness could be consciousness of the consciousness reflected-on lived [réfléchie] e... there could be only an externalok joining between the two consciousness; at most we could imagine that the [autonomous] reflection [réflexive]lived isolated in itself possesses an image of the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchie]lived, and we would then fall back into idealism. Reflective [réflexive]lived knowledge [connaissance]lived and in particular the cogitolived would lose their certainty and would obtain in exchange only a certain probability, scarcely definable. It is agreed then that reflection [réflexive]lived must be united to that which is reflected-on [réfléchi]lived by a lived lived bondok of being[-there] , that the reflective [réflexive] consciousness must be the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchie]lived." [continued] ------Ref Herein--Index **a,b,c See knowerlived-knownlived with, BN (p. liic) "...If we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate, non-cognitive connectionok [of three degrees]lived&lived of the selflived to itselflived..." **d Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-NAIVE_REALISMlived; 2 hits; cf. knowerlived- knownlived; BN: (p. 239c) "...On this plane as for naive_realismlived, being[-there]lived measures truthlivedc; for the truthI of a reflective [réflexive]lived intuitionlived is measured by its conformity to beingI: consciousness was there before it was known [connue]lived. Therefore if consciousness is affirmeddial in the face of the otherlived, it is because it lays claim to a recognition of its being[- I lived posited there] and not of an abstract truth e..."; ------*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-REALISMposited; BN: Sartre\Ontology-RRealism and idealism of externally united substances; c Search for a Method: (p. 32, Ftn. 9 ) "e...The only theory of knowledge [connaissance]lived that can be validdial/livedc today is one which is founded on that truthlived of microphysics: the experimenter is a part of the

Sartre: being-there 59 experimental system. This is the only position which allows us to get rid of all idealist illusions, the only one which shows the reallived manlived in the midst of the realI worldlived. But this realismlived necessarilyCDRdial implies a point of departure; that is, the revelationontology of a situationlived is effected in and through the praxislived which changes it..."; Hazel Barnes, "Sartre as Materialist," (p. 661c) "In the Critique Sartre made his decision in favor of a materialistic monism. ‘The only monism which starts with the human world and which situatesI men in Natureposited/1neg is the monism of materiality. It alone is a realismposited (CDRp. 248, Fr. 1960 edition).’" **** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-SELSTĀNDIG=cognitive; Not a Sartrean term; German Dictionary=‘independent.’

8-14bein By ‘way of conclusion’ (TE52-3) Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (p. 52, Fr. 36) "By way of conclusion..." "First, the I [Je]lived is an existent. It has a concretelived type of existenceI, undoubtedly different from the existenceI of mathematical truths, of meaningsBNlived, or of spatio-temporal beings, but no less reallived. The I [Je]lived gives itself as transcendentlived/1neg. (TEp. 53) "Second, The I [Je]lived proffers itself to an intuitionlived of a special kind which grasps [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg], always inadequately, the reflective [réfléchi]lived consciousness. Third, the I [Je]lived never appearslived [apparait] on the occasion of a reflexive [réflexif]lived actlived. In this case the complex structuredial/lived of consciousness is as follows: there is an unreflected [irréfléchi]lived actlived of reflexion [réflexion]lived, without an I [Je]lived which is directed on a reflective [réfléchi]lived consciousness. The latter becomes the object of the reflecting [réfléchissant]lived consciousness without ceasing to affirmdial its own object (a chair, a mathematical truth, etc.). At the same time, a new object appearslived [apparaît] which is the occasion for an affirmationI by reflexive [réflexive]lived consciousness and which is consequently not on the same lived planeok as the unreflected [irréfléchi] consciousness (because the latter consciousness is an absoluteontology which has no need of reflexive lived [réflexive] consciousness in order to exist), nor on the same planeok as the

Sartre: being-there 60 object of the unreflective [irréfléchi]lived (chair, etc.). This transcendentlived/1neg object of the reflexive [réflexif]lived actlived is the I [Je]lived.

9-14bein ii. the constitutionBN of the Egoposited/1neg (TE60-93)

Page 60-1 out of sequence at Sartre\The Other-Egoposited/1neg as an objectI in the worldI: in- itselflived, not for-itselflived (TE31, 60-1, BN102) 9-14bein A. Stateslived as transcendentlived/1neg unitiesI of consciousness (TE61- 68)

Pages 61-68 out of sequence at Sartre\Emotions-Hatredlived ‘is credit for an infinity of angerlived or repulsed consciousness in the past or in the future ... a veritable passage to infinity’

9-14bein B. The constitutionBN of actionslived (TE68-69) [not cited]

9-14bein C. Qualitieslived as optional unitiesI of stateslived (TE70-71) [not cited]

9-14bein D. The constitutionBN of the Egoposited/1neg as the poleI of actionsposited, stateslived, and qualitiesposited (TE71-91) [not cited]

9-14bein E. The Iposited/1neg and consciousness in the cogitolived (TE91-92) [not cited]

9-14bein Conclusions (TE93-106) Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (p. 93, Fr. 74) In conclusion, we would like simply to offer the three following remarks... [Remarks one follow]

6-15bein Two consciousnesses cognitionI of one cognition between them: but othersI lived experienceI is radically impenetrable (TE93-103) Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (p. 93-6, Fr. 74-7) 1. The conceptionposited of the Egoposited/1neg which we propose seems to us to effect the liberation of the Transcendentalposited field, and at the same time its purification.

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"The Transcendentalposited Field, purified of all Ego-logicalposited/1neg structuredial/posited, recovers its primary transparency. In a sense, it [Transcendentalposited Field] is a nothing, since all physical, psycho-psychical, and psychic_objectsposited, all truthslived, all valueslived are outside it [Transcendental FieldI]; since my Meposited/1neg [Moi] has itself ceased to be any I TE lived part of it [Transcendental Field ] e... ( p. 94) Doubts , remorse, the so-called ‘mental crises of consciousness,’ etc—in short, all the contentconsposited of intimate diaries—become sheer performance. And perhaps we could derive here some sound precepts of moral discretion. But, in addition, we must bear in mind that from this point of view [for both knower and thing known] mylived emotions and my stateslived, mylived Egoposited/1neg itself, cease to be mylived exclusive property. To be precise: up to now a radicalontology distinction has been made between the objectivitylived [matter acting on man] of BN lived a spaceo-temporal thing or of an externalok truth, and the subjectivity of psychical ‘statesI.’ It seemed as if the subjectI had a privileged status with respect to his own statesI. When two menlived, according to this cognition, talk about the same chair, they reallylived are talking about the same thing. This chair which one takes hold of and lifts is the sameI as the chair which the otherlived sees. There is not merely a correspondence of images; there is only one objectI. but it seemed that when Paul tried to lived I lived comprehend ok a psychical state of Peter, he could not reach this stateI, the intuitivelived grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] of which belonged only to Peter. He could only envisage an equivalent, could only create empty conceptsposited which tried in vain to reach a realitylived by removing livedc lived lived essence from intuition . Psychological comprehensionok occurred by analogylived. (TEp. 95) PhenomenologyI R as non Sartrean has come to teach us that stateslived are objectslived, that an emotionlived as such (a love or a hatredlived) is a transcendentlived/1neg objectlived and cannot shrink into the interiorlived unity of a ‘consciousness.’ Consequently, if Paul and Peter I I bothok speak of Peter’s love , for example, it is no longer true that the one speaks blindly and by analogy of that which the otherI graspsI in full. They graspI the sameI thing. Doubtless through different procedures, but these procedures may be equally intuitionallived. And Peter’s emotionI is no more certain for Peter than for Paul. For bothok of them, it belongs to the category of objects which can be called into question. But the wholedial of this profound and novel [non Sartrean] conceptionposited is compromised if the

Sartre: being-there 62

Meposited/1neg [Moi] of Peter, that Meposited/1neg [Moi] which hateslived or which loves, remains an essential structuredial/lived of consciousness [it is not an essential structure of consciousness]. The emotionI, after all, remains attached [but not essential] to the Me [Moi]posited/1neg. This emotionlived ‘sticks to’ the Me [Moi]posited/1neg. If one draws the Me [Moi]posited/1neg into consciousness, one draws the emotionI along with it. To us, it seemed, on the contrary, that the Me [Moi]posited/1neg [is] a transcendentlived/1neg objectlived, like a statelived, and because of this factposited it was accessible to two sorts of intuitionlived: an intuitiveI grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] of the consciousness of which it is the Me [Moiposited/1neg, Peter’s], and an intuitiveI graspI less clear, but no less intuitiveI, by other consciousnesses [Paul’s]. (TEp. 96) In a word, Peter’s Me [Moi]posited/1neg is accessible to mylived intuitionlived as well as to Peter’s intuitionI, and in other cases it is the objectI of inadequate evidencedial/lived. If that is the case, then there is no longer anything ‘impenetrable’ about Peteras posited; unless it is his very consciousness [as lived experience]. But his consciousness is radically impenetrable. We mean that it is not only refractory to intuitionlived, but to thoughtlived. I cannot conceive Peter’s consciousness without making an objectI of it (since I do not conceive it as being[-there]lived my consciousness). I cannot conceive it because the I would have to thinklived of it as pure interioritylived and as transcendencelived/1neg at once [à la fois], which is impossible. A consciousness cannot conceive of a consciousness other than itself. Thus we can distinguish, thanks to our conceptionI of the Meposited/1neg [Moi], a posited sphere accessible to psychology, in which the method of externalok observationposited and the introspectivec methodI have the same rights and can mutually assist each other, and a pure transcendentalposited sphere accessible to phenomenologypositedc alone."

9-14bein Egoposited/1neg is not the owner of consciousness; it is the objectposited of consciousness (TE96) Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (p. 96-7, Fr. 77-8) "This transcendentalpositedR sphere is a sphere of absoluteontologyc existence, that is to say, a sphere of pure spontaneities which are never objects and which determine [‘that is, as limitation’] their own existenceI. The Meposited/1neg [Moi] being[-there]lived an objectI, it is evidentI that I shall never be able to say: my consciousness, that is, the consciousness of mylived Meposited/1neg [Moi] (save in

Sartre: being-there 63 a purely designative sense, as one says for example: the day of myontology/2neg baptism). (TEp. 97) The Egoposited/1neg is not the owner of consciousness; it is I lived the object of consciousnesse... The reflective [réflexive] attitude is correctly expressed in this famous sentence by Rimaud (in the letter of the seer): ‘Ilivedc is the otherlived.’ The context proves that he simply meant that the spontaneityI of consciousness could not emanate from the Iposited/1neg **a [Je], the spontaneityI goes toward the Iposited/1neg **b [Je], rejoins the Iposited/1neg **c [elle], lets the Iposited/1neg **d [elle] be glimpsed beneath its limpid density, but is itself given2neg above all as individuated and impersonal_spontaneityI e..." (TEp. 98-9, Fr. 79) "We may therefore formulate our thesis: transcendental_consciousnessR is an impersonal_spontaneityI. It determines [‘that is, as limitation’] its existence at each instant, without our beingI able to conceive anything before it. Thus each instant of our conscious life revealslived to us a creationc ex nihilo. Not a new arrangement, but a new existenceI. (TEp. 99) There is something distressing for each of us to grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] in the actlived this tireless creationI of existenceI of which we are not the creatorsI. At this plane man has the impression of ceaselessly escaping from himself, of overflowing himself, of being surprised by riches which are always unexpectede..." ------**a-d The translators [FW&RK] correct 4 occurrences of the French ‘Je’ with italicized I, and Herein-Unreflected ‘thoughtlived undergoes a radicalontology modification in becoming reflected,’ corrects 6 more occurrences.]

Page 101-2 out of sequence at Sartre\Phenomenology-BN phenomenologyposited converts dualismsI of interiorI/exteriorI, beingI/appearanceI, potency/actI to that of the ‘infinite in the finite’ (TE63, 101-2, BNxlv)

9-14bein Remarks 2. (TE103), remarks 3. (TE104-6) [no citations] fearlived is not originally consciousness of being[-there]ontology afraid, any more than the perceptionontologyc of this lookontology/1neg is [originally] consciousness of perceivingontology the lookI.

Sartre: being-there 64

9-14bein The Emotions: fearlived is not origianally consciousness of being afraidposited (E50-2) Sartre, The Emotions (p. 50-1, Fr. 38-9, out of sequence from I Sartre\Emotions-Chapter three: A sketch of Phenomenological Theory) "e...For most psychologists everything takes place as if the consciousness of the emotion were first a reflective [réflexive]lived consciousness, that is, as if the first form of the emotion as a factposited of consciousness were first to appearlived [apparaître] as a modification of our psychic being[-there]lived, or, to use everyday languagelived, to be first grasped [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] as a statelived of consciousness. And certainly it is always possibleI to take consciousness of emotion as the affectivelived structuredial/lived of consciousness, to say I’m angry, I’m afraid, etc’. But fearlived is not originally consciousness of being[-there]posited afraid, any more than the perceptionlivedc of this lookontology/1neg is [originally] consciousness of perceivingposited the lookI. Emotional consciousness is, at first, unreflectivec lived [irréfléchi] , and on this planeok it can be conscious of itself only on the livedc E non-positional modeok. ( p. 51) Emotional consciousness is, at first, consciousness of the worldlived. It is not even necessaryBNontology to ring up lived posited the whole theory in order clearly to comprehend ok this principle e... It is evident, in effect that the man who is afraid is afraid of something. Even if it is a matter of one of those indefinite anxieties which one experiences [éprouve]ontology in the dark, in a sinister and deserted passageway, etc., one is afraid of certain aspects of the night, of the worldI. And doubtless, all psychologists have noted that emotion is set in motion by a perceptionlived, a representation-signal, etc. But it seems that for them the emotion then withdraws from the objectlived in order to be absorbed into livedc lived itself. Not much reflection [réfléchir] is needed to comprehend ok that, on the contrary, the emotion returns to the objectI at every instant and is fed there. For example, flightlived in a statelived of fearI is described as if the objectI were not, before anything else, a flightI from a certain objectI, as if the objectI fled did not remain constantly present in the flightI itself, as its theme, its reason for being[-there]lived, that from which one flees. (Ep. 52) And how can one talk about angerlived, in which one strikes, injures, and threatens, without mentioning the personlived who represents the objectivelived unity of these insults, threats, and blows? In short the affectedlived subject and the affective objectlived are bound in an indissoluble

Sartre: being-there 65 synthesisdial. Emotion is a certain way of apprehendinglived the worldI. Demo is the only one who has perceivedlived this, though he gives no reason for it. [continued same paragraph below] ------See Sartre\Flaubert’s Constitution-Another’s loveI as foundation and guarantee of our own value and mandate Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-COGNITIVE [cognitif]=; cognitive second and third_degree consciousnesses. BN: (p. liic, Fr. 19) "...Consciousness of selfc is not couplec. If we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate non-cognitive lived&lived lived/1neg lived/2neg connectionok [of three degrees] of the self to itself ..." (p. 163c, Fr. 198, ce) "(2) The ‘Psychic’ is given2neg solely to a special category of actslived—the acts of the reflexive [réflexif]lived for-itselflived..."

8-14bein Appendix

8-14bein Reflected-on [réfléchi]lived as an appearancelived for reflective [réflexif]lived as witness (of) itself: reflectivelived witness (of) reflected-onlived as appearancelived to itself (BN 151-4, 174, 239, 298, 340, inaccessible 2&1/2 pages) Sartre, BN (p. 151-2, Fr. 187, out of sequence from Sartre\Temporality-Doubt) "But on the other hand, there can be no question here of a total identification of the reflexive [réflexif]lived with the reflected-on [réfléchi]lived, which would suddenly suppress the phenomenonlived of reflection [réflexive]lived by leaving only the phantom duality ‘the reflection-reflecting’ [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived to subsist. We meet here, once again, that type of being[-there]lived which defines the for-itselflived reflection [réflexive]lived demands—if it is to be apodicticposited evidencedial/lived—that the reflexive [réflexif]lived be the reflected-on [reflété]lived. But to the extent that it [reflexive being the reflected-on] is knowledge [connaissance]lived, the reflected-on [réfléchi]lived must necessarilyBNontology be the object for the reflexive [réflexif]lived; and this implies a separationI of being[-there]lived. Thus it is necessaryI [faut] that the reflexive [réflexif]lived at once [à la fois] be_and_not_be [soit et ne soit]*** the reflected-on [réfléchi]lived. This ontological structuredial/ontology we have already discovereddial/lived at the heart

Sartre: being-there 66 of the for-itselfI, but then it did not have to make the same significationlived. It supposed, in effect, in the two terms ‘reflected’ [reflété]lived and ‘reflecting’ [reflétant]lived on the part of the drafted dualityI, a radicalontology Unselständigkeit [see selstāndig]; that is to say [c’est-à-dire], such an inability on the partI of the terms to be posited separately that the dualityI remained perpetually evanescent and each term, while positingI itself for the other, became the other. (BNp. 152) But in the case of reflection [réflexive]lived, the case is slightly different since ‘the reflection- reflecting [reflet]lived-[reflétantlived],’ which is reflected-on [réfléchi]lived exists for a ‘reflection-reflecting [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived’ which is reflexive [réflexif]lived. In other words, the reflected-on [réfléchi]lived is an appearancelived for the reflexive [réflexif]lived without thereby ceasing to be witness (of) itself, and the reflexive [réflexif]lived is witness of the reflected-on [réfléchi]lived without lived thereby ceasing to be an appearance to itselfce..." BN lived lived ( p. 152) "ce?...The reflected-on [réfléchi] knows [saurait] itself observedlived. It may best be compared—to use a concretelived example—to a manlived who is writing, bent over a table, and who while writing knows [sait]lived that he is observedlivedc..." See Herein-H1-12Unreflected actionlived continuously transforms our projects without reflection 4-13 (BNp. 153, Fr. 188) "In the upsurge of the for-itselflived as presence to being[-there]lived, there is an original dispersion: the for-itselfI is lost outside, next to the in-itselflived, and in the three temporalBN ekstasis. It is outside of itself, and in its inmost heart this for-itselfI is ekstaticI since it must lookI =[chercher] for its being[-there]lived elsewhere—in the reflecting [reflétant]lived if it makes itself a reflection [reflet]lived, in the reflection [reflet]lived if it positsposited itself as reflecting [reflétant]lived. The upsurge of the for-itselfI confirms the failureI of the in-itselfI, which has not been able to be its own foundation. Reflection [réflexion]lived remains for the for-itselfI a permanent possibilitylived, an attempt to recover being[-there]lived. By reflection [réflexive]lived the for-itselfI, which has lost itself outside itself, attempts to put itself inside its own being[-there]I. Reflexion [réflexion]livedc is a second effort by the for-itselflived to found itself; that is, to be for itself what it is. Indeed if the quasi-duality the reflection-reflecting [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived were gathered up into a totalitydial for a witness which would be itself, it would be in its own eyes what it is. The goal in short is to overtake that lived I being[-there] which flees itself while being[-there] what it is in the modeok

Sartre: being-there 67 of non-being and which flows on while being[-there]lived its own flowI, which escapes between its own fingers. The goal of it is to make itself a 2neg I given , a given which finally is what it ise..." BN lived ( p. 154, Fr. 189) "e...The motivation ok of reflection (reflexion) [réflexion]lived consists in a double attempt, simultaneously an objectificationc and an interiorizationlived. To be to itself as an objectI-in-itselflived in the absoluteontologyc unity of interiorizationI—that is what the beingI-of- reflection [réflexive]lived has to be. "This effort to be to itself its own foundation, to recover and to dominate within itself its own flightlived, finally to be that which is fled— this effort inevitable results in failureI ; and it is precisely this failureI lived which is reflection [réflexive] e..." BN c ( p. 174 , Fr. 210-11) "e...The ‘something [below, pure negation]’ which must qualify the reflected [reflété]lived, in order that the couplec ‘the- reflection-reflecting’ [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived may not collapse itself in nothingness is pure negation [above, something]. The reflected [reflété]lived makes itself qualified outside next to a certain beingI as not being[-there]lived that being. This is precisely what we call: ‘to be consciousness (of) somethingc’." (BNp. 239, Fr. 277, out of sequence Sartre\The Other-Conclusion to III: Discovery lived of oneself and others in the cogito) "e...the being[-there] of consciousness of self could not be defined in terms of knowledge [connaissance]lived. Knowledge [connaissance]lived begins with reflection [réflexive]lived but the game of ‘the reflection-reflecting [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived is not a subject-objectI couplec, not even implicitly. Its beingI does not depend on any transcendentlived/1neg I consciousness; rather its modeok of being is precisely to be in question for itself. We showed susequently in the first chapter of Part Two**** that lived&lived as 1st&2neg lived the relationok [of three degrees] of the reflection [reflet] to the lived I reflecting [reflétant] was in no way a relation ok of identity [logical] and could not be reduced to the Meposited/1neg’ [Moi] or to the "I am I" [Je suis je] of Hegel. [Fr. 278] The reflection [reflet]lived does not make itself be the reflection [reflétant]lived; we are dealing here with a being[-there]lived which nihilates itself in its being[-there, reflectant]lived and which seeks in vain to dissolve into itself as a self. If it is true that this description is the only one lived posited which allows us to comprehend ok the original fact of consciousness, then we must judge that HegelI has not succeeded in accounting for this

Sartre: being-there 68 abstractlived doubling of the Meposited/1neg which he gives as equivalent to consciousness of selfI. Finally we succeeded in getting rid of the pure lived posited unreflective [irréfléchi] ok consciousness of the transcendental "I" which obscured it and we showed that selfnessc, the foundation of personallivedc existence, was altogether different from an Egoposited/1neg or from a reference of the EgoI to itself. There can be, therefore, no question of defining consciousness in terms of a transcendentalposited Egology. In short, consciousness is a concretelived being[-there]lived sui generis, not an c posited&posited as 1st & 2neg abstract unjustifiable relationFr=? [of three degrees] of identity [logical]. It is selfnessc and not the seat of an opaque, useless Egoposited/1neg. Its beingI is capable of beingI reached by a transcendentalI reflection [réflexive]lived, and there is a truthlivedc of consciousness which does not depend on the other; rather the very being[-there] of consciousness, since it is independent of knowledge [connaissance]lived, pre-existsc [préexiste] its truthI. On this plane as for naive_realism, beingI measures truthI; for the truthI of a reflective [réflexive]lived intuitionlived [below] is measured by its conformity to beingI: consciousness was there before it was known [connue]lived. Therefore if consciousness is affirmeddial in the face of the otherlived, it is because it lays claim to a recognition of its being[-there]lived and not of an astract truthposited [above, ‘truth of a reflective [réflexive]lived lived intuition ] e..." (BNp. 298, Fr. 337, out of sequence from Sartre\The Other-I ‘exist for-myself not abstractly but engaged’: ‘being-in-the-midst-of-the-world which comes to the otherlived through me is a reallived beinglived’) sartre¶"The reflective [réflexive]lived nihilationI, however, is pushed further than that of the pure for-itselflived as a simple consciousness of self. In the consciousness of selfI, in effect , the two terms of the duality ‘reflected-reflecting’ (reflété-reflétant) [reflété]lived- [reflétant]lived were so incapable of presenting themselves separately that the duality remained perpetually evanescent and each term while positing itself for the otherI became the otherI . But with reflection [réflexive]lived the case is different since the ‘reflection-reflecting’ [reflet]lived-[reflétant]lived which is reflected-on [réfléchi]lived exists for a ‘reflection-reflecting’ [reflet]lived- [reflétant]lived which is reflexive [réflexif]lived. Therefore, reflected-on [réfléchi]lived and reflexive [réflexif]lived, each tend toward independence, and the nothing which separates them tends to divide them more profoundly than the nothingness which the for-itselflived has to be separates the

Sartre: being-there 69 reflection [reflet]lived from the reflecting [reflétant]lived. Yet neither the reflexive [réflexif]lived nor the reflected on [reflétélived] can secrete this separating nothingness, for in that case reflection [réflexion]lived would be an autonomous for-itselfI coming to directposited itself on the reflected-on [réfléchi]lived, which would be to suppose a negation of exterioritylived as the preliminary condition of a negation of interioritylived. There can be no reflection [réflexive]lived if it is not entirely a being[-there], a beingI which has to be its own nothingness." "Thus the reflective [réflexive]lived ekstasis is found on the path to a more radicalontology ekstasisI—the being-for-otherslived..." ------**a&b See Sartre\Ontology-For-itself’slived becoming specifically not in- itselflived as being-in-the-worldlived *** Copied Sartre\Existentialism-is and is not **** This chapter, Sartre\Ontology-Part Two, Ch. One: Immediate Structures of the For-Itself (73-105)