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Individual and group differences in minority influence
Kronheim, Steven Peter, Ph.D. The American University, 1990
Copyright ©1990 by Kronheim, Steven Peter. All rights reserved.
UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP DIFFERENCES IN MINORITY INFLUENCE
by
Steven Peter Kronheim
submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Psychology
Signatures of Committee:
Chair :
Deân ofI the College
October 16, 1990____ Date
1990
The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016
TEE AiffiHICAE D2IVE28ITY LIBIURY (c) COPYRIGHT
by
STEVEN PETER KRONHEIM
1990
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP DIFFERENCES IN MINORITY INFLUENCE
BY
Steven Peter Kronheim
ABSTRACT
The present study provided a modest test of
Moscovici's (1980) conversion and Latane's (1981) social
impact hypotheses of social influence with regard to minorities and majorities in groups. Eighty subjects were
tested in a 3 X 2 X 3 mixed factorial design, including two between-subjects factors (minority and majority influence; high, moderate and low levels of the need for cognition), and a within-subjects factor (a discussion session repeated three times). Subjects in six-person groups were exposed to minority (two persons) or majority (four persons) confederate statements against student decision making regarding tuition hikes. Subjects' attitudes, idea production and recall, and delayed behavioral response were assessed. Results were mixed. Majorities induced greater
immediate attitude change, but minorities yielded greater delayed response. Minorities also invoked more publicly opposing and neutral ideas, and production of questions posed to other group members. High need for cognition was generally associated with greater idea production, greater
i i public opposition to the confederate position, and more effortful thinking. The repeated measures factor had little effect. Limitations and implications for minority influence research, person-situation literature, and cognitive response analysis are discussed.
Ill ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
While writing a dissertation reinforces images of
individual aspiration and achievement, the overall process does take on aspects of a team effort. To my advisor, Tony
Ahrens, I am deeply grateful for his strong ability to highlight the essential issues of a research topic and uncanny attention to detail in getting the job done and done well. To my mentor and long-time associate. Bob Ruskin, I am profoundly in debt for his patience and unwavering support of my program of study. To my first doctoral advisor and friend, Elliott McGinnies, I am sincerely thankful for giving me the original opportunity to continue my graduate studies in the area of social influence and persuasion. I also wish to thank my fourth committee member, Jim Gray, for his perceptive comments and general support for which he has built a good and deserving reputation among graduate students in the Psychology department at American University.
I received much support from peers and aides at
American University. To my confederates, I express my appreciation for their assistance, particularly to Stacey
Palombi and Lisa Dorn, who participated above and beyond the
IV call of duty. I am also grateful to David Rose, former
graduate student and now a practicing clinical psychologist,
who offered technical help and comic relief throughout the dissertation process. Vivian Shayne at the Social Science
Research Laboratory and Tom Southall at the University
Computing Center provided invaluable computer support.
Finally, to my parents, sisters and extended family members for keeping the faith; to my son, Michael, and my intimate, Marcia, who learned all about perseverance (and taught me all about devotion); and to my friends and colleagues who suffered through my trials and have cheered my successes; to all of you, I humbly dedicate this scientific project. TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT i i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv
LIST OF T A B L E S ...... viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... x
Chapter
I . INTRODUCTION ...... 1
Majority Influence Research ...... 2 Minority Influence Research ...... 4 Criticisms of Minority Influence Research . . . 10 Minority and Majority Influence Conceptual Distinctions ...... 12 The Present S t u d y ...... 15 H y p o t h e s e s ...... 19
II. M E T H O D ...... 25
S u b j e c t s ...... 25 D e s i g n ...... 26 Instrumentation ...... 28 Need for Cognition S c a l e ...... 28 Student Ban on Tuition Hike Decision .... 33 Idea Space P a g e ...... 39 Cognitive Effort, Questions Posed and Argument Recall ...... 42 Debriefing Questions ...... 45 F l y e r ...... 45 Training Confederates ...... 46 Major Comment Categories ...... 48 Confederate Organizational Representative . . 50 P r o c e d u r e ...... 51
III. R E S U L T S ...... 60
O v e r v i e w ...... 60
VI Reliability Test for Confederate Comments Audio Recordings ...... 61 Need for Cognition ...... 64 Tuition Hike Decision F o r m ...... 65 Idea Space P a g e s ...... 69 Data Categories and Ratings ...... 69 Omnibus Analyses ...... 70 Main Effects and Post-Hoc Tests for the Between-Subjects Variables ...... 77 Questions P a g e ...... 86 D e b r i e f i n g ...... 95 F l y e r ...... 96 Influence Group and Attitude Change ...... 97
IV. DISCUSSION ...... 100
Predicted Effects of Minority and Majority Influence Groups ...... 100 Predicted Effects of the Need for Cognition . 105 Predicted Influence Group X Need for Cognition Interactions ...... 107 General Discussion ...... 112 Group Differences ...... 112 Individual Differences ...... 122 Implications for Future Research and Applied S e t t i n g s ...... 125
Appendix
A. RELEVANT ISSUES PRE-TEST ...... 129
B. INSTRUMENTS ...... 133
C. PROCEDURAL PROTOCOL ...... 146
D. FINAL DEBRIEFING...... 164
REFERENCES ...... 167
VI1 LIST OF TABLES
1. Median Ranks of University Relevant Issues ...... 34
2. AIDS Profile Judgments ...... 36
3. Need for Cognition Cell M e a n s ...... 64
4. Means and Standard Deviations for All Conditions and Cells of the Tuition Hike Decision Form .... 66
5. Mean Idea Space Cognition Ratings per Experimental Session by All Experimental C o n d i t i o n s ...... 71
6. Mean Ranks for Paired and Single Categories of Idea Space Page Cognitions by Influence Group and Need for Cognition Across All Discussion S e s s i o n s ...... 74
7. Mean Ranks of Single Categories of Idea Space Page Cognitions by Influence Group and Need for Cognition for All Three Discussion Sessions .... 75
8. Mean Ranks of Paired Categories of Idea Space Page Cognitions by Influence Group and Need for Cognition for All Three Discussion Sessions .... 76
9. Mean Ranks and Friedman Tests for Single and Paired Idea Space Page Cognitions by Influence Group Across All Discussion Sessions ...... 78
10. Mean Ranks and Friedman Tests for Single Idea Space Page Cognitions by Influence Group for All Three Discussion Sessions ...... 79
11. Mean Ranks and Friedman Tests for Paired Idea Space Page Cognitions by Influence Group for All Three Discussion Sessions ...... 80
12. Mean Ranks and Friedman Tests for Single and Paired Idea Space Page Cognitions by Need for Cognition Across All Discussion Sessions ...... 82
VI1 1 13. Mean Ranks and Friedman Tests for Single Idea Space Page Cognitions by Need for Cognition for All Three Discussion Sessions ...... 83
14. Mean Ranks and Friedman Tests for Paired Idea Space Page Cognitions by Need for Cognition for All Three Discussion Sessions ...... 84
15. Means and Standard Deviations for Question 1; To What Extent Were You Trying Hard to Think about This I s s u e ? ...... 88
16. Means and Standard Deviations for Question 2: How Much Effort Did You Put into Thinking about This Issue? ...... 89
17. Means and Standard Deviations for Question 3; How Many Questions Do You Think You Posed to Other Group Members During This Discussion Period? ...... 90
18. Means and Standard Deviations for Question 4: How Many Supporting Statements Do You Think Were Made by All Group Me m b e r s ? ...... 93
19. Means and Standard Deviations for Question 5; How Many Opposing Statements Do You Think Were Made by All Group Me m b e r s ? ...... 95
IX LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Mean Number of Questions Posed for Each of the Six Possible Combinations of Influence Group and Need for Cognition Categories for Each Discussion . . 91 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A current debate in social psychology concerns the
ways in which small groups exert influence over their
individual members. Groups engage in these activities
because they function as goal-directed social units designed
to elicit interaction and interdependence among their
members. However, when decisions are formed or judgments
are made, differences of opinion occur, ideas of individual
members clash, and attitudes toward a given issue can often
be distinguished between those who uphold the majority
viewpoint versus those who express a minority sentiment. Do
majority and minority members enact the same kind of social
processes when they attempt to persuade others? Do
individual group members process persuasive information and
respond behaviorally to these two forces in the same
fashion? Over the last few decades, the direction of scientific research in this area reflects two major conceptual models of majority and minority source influence:
(1) The "classic" theory which proposes a general form of
influence encompassing both sources; and (2) a more recent development which specifies differences in the way group 2
members process information and subsequently behave when
exposed to majority versus minority opinion sources.
Another element worthy of consideration and presumably
orthogonal to the minority/majority influence distinction,
juxtaposes the role of individual inclination or desire to
engage in purposeful information processing with that of the
group influence situation.
Majority Influence Research
Traditionally, social influence in groups has been
conceptualized in terms of the power a majority has to
extend its authority over a minority or deviant view (Allen,
1965). That a single prevailing opinion in a group rarely
exists has been recognized by most investigators, but most
studies examine discrepant beliefs between majority and minority members and how those beliefs are resolved in favor of the majority. Thus the classic autokinetic effect
research by Muzafer Sherif (1935), influence against deviants (Schacter, 1951), and line judgment tasks by
Solomon Asch (1955) generally tested conforming behavior.
For example in Asch's research, a group of seven individuals
(six confederates and one true subject) were asked to choose one line out of a group of three that was most similar in length to a standard line. After a couple of trials in which all "subjects" agree in their judgments, the actual 3
subject then listens as each group member selects the
"wrong" line. Seventy-six percent of the subjects were
swayed to respond with the majority decision at least once.
Variations of Asch's experiment and others which
followed identified conditions which influenced conformity
levels. For instance, increasing the number of confederates
in a group likewise increases the amount of conformity but
at some point, the exact number of which continues to be
debated, a law of diminishing returns appears (Gerard,
Wilhelmy, & Connolley, 1968). If subjects are given the
opportunity to respond anonymously to judgment tasks,
conformity drops significantly (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
Conforming behavior also shifts with corresponding changes
in status; low-status group members are more likely to
conform during initial group sessions; as their acceptance
in the group rises and their status correspondingly
increases, their latitude of nonconformity also expands
(Hollander, 1958).
Together, these experiments reveal a common descriptor typically identified in conformity research.
Dubbed "normative social influence," it describes an
individual member's sensitivity to group pressure. He or she usually acknowledges and publicly complies with the group's prevailing opinion or norm on a given issue (Deutsch
& Gerard, 1955). 4
Minority Influence Research
Another basic tenet of group influence is posed,
however. Under conditions of "informational social
influence," the individual group member is more likely to
internalize and privately accept the group view. It is in
this situation that minorities do have disproportionate
effects and at least induce a substantial influence upon
majority opinion in the group even if they do not prevail.
Famous real-life instances of minority persuasion abound,
not the least of which include the historical debate and
eventual ratification of the U.S. Constitution by the
original thirteen states. Fictional accounts also reveal
dogged determination of the few prevailing over the many.
Consider the lone juror whose persistence and tenacity
overturns a majority's initially overwhelmingly guilty
verdict in Reginald Rose's "Twelve Angry Men" (1955).
While American social psychologists studied the
parameters of conforming behavior, their European counterparts examined the power of minorities. No doubt much of this discussion in diverging research traditions can be explained by the fact that minority influence research began in Europe, that recent American interest in small group processes has waned, and that European social psychology stresses social and anthropological factors while
American social psychologists focus on cognitive and
individual perspectives (Maass & Clark, 1983; 1984). 5
Serge Moscovici and his colleagues inaugurated an
impressive series of studies demonstrating minority
influence in perception experiments (Moscovici, 1985;
Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; Moscovici, Mugny, &
Van Avermaet, 1985; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980; and Nemeth,
Swedlund, & Kanfi, 1974). The standard experimental
paradigm called for subjects' estimations of hue and
brightness of a colored slide. Though special filters
rendered the slide in the blue spectrum, two confederates in
a group of six were paid to say that they saw a green slide.
As the trials of observation were repeated, more subjects in
this condition also reported that the slides were green
compared to subjects unexposed to a minority influence in a
control group. These results were not duplicated when
confederates randomly peppered their "green" responses with
half as many "blue" answers. Moscovici concluded that
consistency was imperative if minorities were to persuade
successfully other group members.
Since then, other investigations have uncovered
effects of minority influence in jury decision making
(Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974), social problems (Mugny, 1974), and creative problem solving (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1983).
For example, subjects asked to identify a standard in an embedded figure produced more novel correct solutions when paid minority confederates focused subjects' attention. In 6
fact, more correct answers were discerned regardless of whether or not the minority viewpoint expressed by these confederates was correct. This was true in spite of the
fact that the minority source was seen as correct less often than the majority source (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983).
Though the general notion of consistency in successful minority influence procedures is well- established, its exigencies have undergone revision since
Moscovici's landmark study (Penrod, 1986; Nemeth, 1986;
Maass & Clark, 1984). First, Nemeth, et al. (1974) demonstrated that the perception of consistent, not necessarily repetitive, minority presentations held the key to influence. Here, minority confederates identified varying luminescent blue slides for fifty percent of the trials as "green-blue" and fifty percent of the trials as
"green". In one condition, when their responses were presented among other subjects randomly, no significant influence was detected. But in another condition, when confederates identified only the brightest slides as
"green", subjects' answers were influenced significantly compared to a simple repetitious green response. Under these conditions, subjects also noted that they felt confederates were more certain in their judgments than in the random condition. 7
Second, Mugny (1975) confronted high school students
with an extreme anti-militarist minority viewpoint. While
two minority spokespersons were judged equally consistent in
terms of message content, subjects were more likely to shift
their initially negative opinions toward the extremist with
a more flexible style of negotiation. Mugny concluded that
flexibility in the pattern or style of presentation
represented a dimension that could not be overlooked in minority influence success.
Another dimension of minority influence research concerns the extremeness of opinion. Nemeth & Markowsky
(1972) argue that social influence is curvilinearly related to opinion discrepancy under conditions of majority
influence. That is, when discrepancy between opposing views expressed in a group is large or small, influence should be weak. Most of the support for this view comes from the social judgment approach of persuasion research as elaborated by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif &
Hovland, 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1967). This theory suggests that persuasive attempts are most successful when an external stimulus falls within a subject's "latitude of noncommitment," a kind of no-man's land where outside influence sources can neither be assimilated because they are too similar nor contrasted (i.e., rejected) because they are too dissimilar compared to the person's initial judgment. 8
While social judgment theory may explain some
aspects of attitude discrepancy results when behavior in
groups is characterized by conformity, the evidence for
minority success is even less certain. In some cases, more
extreme minorities are perceived as less likeable (Hensley &
Duval, 1976) and less persuasive (Levine & Ranelli, 1978).
Other researchers failed to find a significant relationship
(Maass, Clark, & Haberkorn, 1982). Mugny (1975) argues that
discrepancy or extremeness alone cannot account for these
findings. Nemeth & Endicott (1976) presented data that
suggest that people are swayed more by discrepant messages
when the persuader's opinion is on their side of an issue,
but this was tested only under majority influence. Clark's
(1988) recent study in group polarization found that minorities had a greater impact when advocating risky versus
cautious decisions on risky choice dilemmas.
Still another factor examined in minority influence
reflects the manner in which a position on an issue is addressed within the framework of the larger cultural view or "Zeitgeist". Paicheler (1976, 1977) demonstrated that when the operationally defined construct of feminism is extolled by a minority source, the persuasive effect is successful only when the view is concordant with attitudes widely held in society. Though pre-tests in Paicheler's work showed that group and societal norms were in basic 9
agreement, Maass & Clark (1984) note that the relationship
between cultural and laboratory social influence remains
unclear. Current trends in social psychological research
recommend further consideration of cultural forces (e.g.,
Ryff, 1987).
One last direction in minority influence research is
of a distinction Maass, et al. (1982) have drawn between
single and double minorities. Single minorities are
identified by their stance on a given issue. Double minorities differ from majority both in terms of their beliefs as well as the category of persons they may represent. In the laboratory, some evidence indicates that a double minority, saddled with two "burdens", is less persuasive than a single minority (Maass, et al., 1982). An appropriate application of this principle may be seen among individuals who are both gay and politically extreme (Clark
& Maass, 1988). But the social influence waters get muddied in at least two respects. First, one has to be careful not to ignore the possibility that a belief among minority members could actually be a position held by the majority of their category. Most gays are, in fact, politically moderate to liberal. Second, the distinction drawn between category membership and attitude can be fluid; up until a decade or so ago, homosexuals were generally viewed as individual deviates ascribing to a peculiar, if not 10
destructive, lifestyle. With the development of the gay
rights movement, what was previously an individual sexual
orientation now constitutes a specific interest group
capable of lobbying for its own purposes, though negative
stereotypes remain in many sub-cultures. It is no wonder
that the complexity of double minorities limits the
attention it probably deserves.
Taken together, these studies provide ample support
for the presence of a minority influence effect. It is
notable that minorities are most effective when they are consistent (Moscovici, et al., 1969; Nemeth, et al., 1974;
Tanford & Penrod, 1983), flexible (Mugny, 1974) and exude an air of confidence (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974). Neither
likeability (Nemeth, et al., 1974; Nemeth, 1977; Wolf, 1979) nor factual correctness (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983) appear terribly important. Minority influence effects are found among various social and political issues (Paicheler, 1976,
1977; Mugny & Papastamou, 1980), and generalize across different age groups (Mugny, 1975) and cultures.
Criticisms of Minority Influence Research
Despite this mounting empirical evidence for minority influence, some methodological and theoretical concerns remain. As Maass & Clark (1984) report, one difficulty may lie partly in the nature of the research 11
itself. Group processes have largely been ignored in favor
of group outcome data. No attempt has been made to examine,
statistically or otherwise, how minority influence may alter
group decisions over time. Most experiments utilize groups
of subjects who lack both a history and in some cases,
meaningful interaction. Field studies or field experiments
have yet to be conducted despite the assertion that minority
influence research offers such high hopes for application in
real world settings.
Some evidence has accumulated suggesting that
minorities may simply operate under principles similar to
majorities. Research by Doms & Van-Avermaet (1980),
Sorrentino, King, & Leo (1980), and Wolf (1985) failed to
differentiate minority from majority influence. As a
result, some investigators insist that a single, overriding
theory of social influence will account for most of the
observed group differences in these studies. First, Latane
(Latane, 1981; Latane & Wolf, 1981) and later Tanford &
Penrod (1984a, 1984b) both put forward theories of "social
impact" which examined the nature of influence and the
"diminishing returns" of additional group contributors as the number is increased. According to this view, numbers of group members, not the way in which they are perceived, are the key to understanding who can influence who more.
Generally speaking, the larger the group, the greater the 12
pressure for conforming behavior. However, the strength of
each additional member's contributions to the group decision
diminishes proportionally to the increased size of the
group. For aggregate behaviors where overt influential
attempts are weak, these general theories do explain both
majority and minority influences (Nowack, Szamrej, & Latane,
1990). But when the actions occur in the few studies which
utilize small groups where interactive behavior occurs and
final judgments do not have to be one-sided, these theories
simply do not tap into those conditions which distinguish minority from majority influence (Moscovici, 1980; Maass &
Clark, 1984).
Minority and Majority Influence Conceptual Distinctions
The crux of the distinction between these two sources of persuasion in small groups is two-fold. First, some researchers point to the fact that majorities and minorities may adapt slightly different styles of argument.
Mugny (1982) further suggests differentiating between behavioral style, i.e., the consistency of an argument, and style of negotiation or flexibility of a position. The first construct refers mainly to the content of a persuasive message; the second describes the manner in which a message is presented. Neither condition, by itself, will guarantee minority influence, but together they do explain shifts in 13
group members' opinions under conditions of minority
influence. Majorities probably do not require such strident
regulations to ensure conforming behavior by virtue of their
superior numbers, but this is speculative. Maass & Clark
(1984) argue that Tanford & Penrod's (1984a) meta-analysis
purportedly designed to rectify minority/majority differences and unify their influences under a single banner of social impact theory failed to provide a definitive test.
For example, Moscovici's, et al. (1969) early findings of a minority's "consistent" source of influence have never been satisfactorily explained by this theory.
Interestingly, an entire line of related research evolved around the attempt to determine which of the two factors, status characteristics of a group leader or style of behavior, is ultimately more influential in group decision making. Berger, et al. (1982) proposed that group members rationally judge a leader's qualifying characteristics (e.g., status and message-relevant persuasive communications) during the influence process.
However, something of a watershed occurred when Lee & Ofshe
(1981) found that the leader's dress and manner of speech had a more powerful impact than her or his substantive qualities on group decision making. Critics (e.g., Berger &
Zelditch, 1983) argued that the two factors were poorly defined, but Nemeth (1983) wisely recommended against 14
promoting one factor over the other. While both factors are
correlated, there are probably decisive examples (e.g.,
attention, time constraints) where each explains more
influence in group decision making than the other. It is
her contention that minority research documents cases where
minority sources persuaded a group, using the right
behavioral style, in spite of their apparent lower status
and regard in the presence of majority group opinion.
Second, group members will respond to minority and
majority presentations that reflect their own expectations
during the persuasion process. For instance, some
theoretical contributions utilize attribution judgments. It
was Moscovici himself who proposed that, based on Kelly's
(1967, 1973) conceptualization, minorities are perceived as
being distinctive from the majority, not merely by fewer
numbers, but as a separate entity entirely. As subjects
spend time and effort deliberating over a minority's
distinctiveness, they will produce an attribution for the
minority's behavior based upon specific and important
qualities of the presentation itself. They may then be
"converted" to the minority side of an issue. Under majority influence, group members must overtly "compare"
their opinions with others because the sheer numbers of a majority demand immediate attention. Finding their beliefs
lacking in support, they are motivated to seek consensus 15
with other group members. This search for consensus helps
steer group members toward conforming behavior to the
majority position.
Moscovici's approach is credible, but incomplete.
He rests his case on Kelly's model of attribution at the
expense of other principles of attribution which produce
reasonable explanations as well. The promotion of
distinctiveness as an explanation is weak because many
experiments which demonstrate minority influence are one-
shot studies in which groups lack a history and hardly
represent well-organized persuasive approaches as in the
real world. Evidence also exists to suggest that another of
Kelly's ideas, the discounting principle, is just as
plausible for it notes that a cause of behavior will lose
viability in the face of other, more explicable accounts.
Maass and her colleagues (Maass, et al., 1982; Maass &
Clark, 1983) have shown that majority opinion will prevail
if the position appears more plausible compared to a minority approach that utilizes rigid arguments and emphasizes the extremeness of the minority position.
The Present Study
With strong evidence supporting minority/majority
influence differences, the present study seeks clarification of the conditions under which a minority source exerts 16
influence by addressing the problem in terms of the
underlying processes involved. Coinciding with Maass &
Clark's (1984) critique presented earlier, three areas of
social psychological research provide justification for a
process-based analysis.
First, recent evidence in the field of social cognition offers methodologies and technologies to examine group process beyond overt, behavioral outcomes (Fiske &
Taylor, 1984). Support for and recognition of factors that mediate the relationship between social stimuli and overt behavior reject a "black box" view of the locus of human activity. Social cognitivists recognize the contribution of internal processes which provide a means of tapping into the mechanisms underlying observable behavior (Brewer & Kramer,
1985). One such approach, "cognitive response analysis", provides researchers with a self-report technique designed to elicit subject cognition on a specific topic (Cialdini,
Petty, & Cacioppo, 1981).
Minority influence research offers fertile ground for this approach. The fact that group members admit to significantly higher levels of stress and coercion from the majority also suggests the possibility that their level of thoughtfulness on the issue being addressed is limited
(Nemeth, 1986). In fact, evidence accrued by Nemeth and her co-workers (Nemeth, 1977; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983; Nemeth & 17
Kwan, 1985, 1987) suggests that under minority influence,
subjects think more and think harder.
A second area of research that supports a process approach to examining minority influence comes from recent evidence in persuasion. Petty & Cacioppo (1986) formulated a dual-track theory of persuasion which postulates two separate means of processing information; a central route which reflects a person's focus on the issue at hand, and a peripheral route in which more attention is directed toward less ideational cues. Similar to Chaiken's (1980)
"systematic information processing" concept, use of the central route means that a person's attention and effort are directed toward the actual content of the message. More absorbed by the arguments rather than the way in which they are presented, the listener will carefully gauge the information and be less inclined to respond in a knee-jerk fashion to a call to imminent compliance with the persuader's request. The message, therefore, will have a delayed effect, influencing the recipient at a later time.
Parenthetically, this listener should exert greater cognitive effort since attention remains focused on the central issues of the topic.
Use of the peripheral route, however, leads to more immediate decision making. The target person faces an influx of information that, though irrelevant to the 18
persuasion topic itself, nevertheless offers ample reasons
for conforming to the wishes of a persuader. The subtle use
of images with sexual overtones in advertising is one such
maneuver, as is "stacking the deck" with a substantial group
majority pressuring a person to shift her/his opinion in its
direction (Cialdini, 1984). A majority source, then, should
be more successful when the route is peripheral, as in
having people pay more attention to their overwhelming
numbers or to emotional aspects of the message; a minority
source may be more influential when the route of persuasion
is central and requires a subject's direct attention and
thinking.
Third, Moscovici was close to identifying a subtle difference between minorities and majorities when he suggested a public and private distinction (Moscovici,
1980). Social psychologists have long suspected and provided evidence that subjects exposed to emotionally- threatening circumstances which require public acknowledgement of their behavior will alter or modify their actions in conformity research (Asch, 1955), in obedience experiments (Milgram, 1974), in sexually sensitive research
(McGinnies, 1949) and in counterattitudinal advocacy studies
(Kronheim, 1979). Maass & Clark (1983) and Mugny (1976) support the notion that people alter their judgments in the face of different influential sources depending upon whether 19
they will present their positions in front of others, or in
some more covert fashion. It seems that conformity
situations induce public compliance while minority influence
instills more private acceptance. Again, cognitive response
analysis provides a method for measuring private acceptance
while avoiding a subject’s concern with public recognition
of a personal opinion.
Hypotheses
It is hypothesized that subjects will produce more
cognitive activity, especially the type of thinking most
relevant to the experimental manipulation, and exert greater
cognitive effort under minority influence. Minority
influence should also induce subjects to refrain from
publicly discussing their thoughts, while majority influence
should encourage subjects to air their ideas, particularly
in favor of the majority view. Majority influence subjects
will also demonstrate greater overt attitude change.
Finally, subjects should indicate greater susceptibility to minority influence at a later, or delayed, stage in the persuasion process.
An experimental design that analyzes cognitive
responses during the process of persuasion and calls for an overt, behavioral response at a later date, should satisfy
Maass and Clark's (1984) concerns for the lack of process 20
treatment in previous minority influence research.
Consistent presentation by the persuader is operationally
defined by the set number of relevant opinion categories and
statements made by confederates in a timed discussion period
thus alleviating some of the conceptual confusion
experienced in other influence studies. Finally, a modest
test of the two models of social influence is possible.
Significant differences between influence groups both in
terms of process (immediate versus delayed effect) and
outcome data (amount of relevant cognition) would support
the notion that minority and majority influences operate
differently. Non-significant differences may be interpreted
as indirect support for the general social impact model of
influence.
In addition to the impact of such situational forces
as minority/majority influence, it is reasonable to consider
whether or not individuals may carry some enduring
personality characteristic which strongly affects their
cognitive capacity. The relative contribution of
situational and intrapersonal processes represents a long
standing debate in personality and social psychology. After
decades of attempts to encapsulate human behavior into
three, four or five succinct personality traits or dimensions, Mischel (1968; 1973; 1989) called for a
revisionist approach. He recommended incorporating both 21
situational and dispositional perspectives to personality by
recognizing their interactive and interdependent
relationship. The present status of the person-situation
debate is neither static nor bleak. Real gains have been
made by identifying conditional (Wright & Mischel, 1987) and
specific individual behaviors subject to global person-
situation interactions (Buss, 1987). The present study
offers an opportunity to make a modest contribution to the
person-situation debate literature.
Levine & Russo (1987) and recently Kruglanski &
Mackie (1990) have called for a more extensive examination
of the individual motivational factors that might mediate minority/majority influence. While other intra-individual variables (e.g. gender) have been addressed in the minority
influence literature (Arbuthnot & Waynor, 1982; Feldman-
Summers, Montano, Kasprzyk, and Wagner (1980), cognitive
responses are not among them. Yet research in persuasion sufficiently documents the viability and pervasiveness of cognitive response analysis (Cooper & Croyle, 1984).
Cognitive responses represent an appropriate avenue for further exploration because they address the issue of individual differences in cognition. Cacioppo & Petty
(1982) proposed that people differ on their need to "engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors" and produced a validated scale to measure this need. This "need for 22
cognition" has been found to be unrelated to social
desirability and qualifies as a significant individual
difference variable. Subjects who score high on the scale
report more cognitive effort and recall more message
arguments (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983), and are more
likely to think about issue-relevant information (Cacioppo,
Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986). Accordingly, it is
hypothesized here that subjects with a high need for
cognition should exhibit more topic-relevant cognitive
responses, recall more comments made by all members of a
small group discussion, and exert greater cognitive effort.
The exact nature of the relationship between source
influence and this individual difference variable is not clear, but it seems reasonable to suggest that a situation which minimizes the need to think (majority condition) will elicit the greatest individual differences in dependent measures between subjects with high and low needs for cognition. Consequently, a situation which maximizes the need to think (minority condition) will probably have relatively little effect on individuals who are predisposed to high needs for cognition. An earlier study in attitude change by Altman & McGinnies (1960) uncovered a significant interaction between the individual difference variable of ethnocentrism and influence group. Subjects who scored high on the California E scale were unaffected by differences in 23
minority and majority influence when ranking other group
members on a measure of personal attraction. Thus, in the
present study, an interaction is hypothesized; a minority
source condition, relative to a majority influence, should
minimize differences between subjects scoring high and low
on the need for cognition scale.
An alternative view of this predicted interaction,
however, is conceivable and should not be overlooked. While
a salient topic of discussion in the experiment should
produce these differences, it is possible that interest in
the issue could be so low as to negate meaningful
differences in the majority source condition in which case
minority influences could lead to greater differences. On
the other hand, ceiling effects could occur with a topic
that is so charged with interest that differences between
influence sources are minimized.
One final hypothesis concerns the relationship
between need for cognition and private versus public acceptance. Subjects with a high need for cognition should be thoughtful and hence more private in their susceptibility
to a persuasive message than those with a low need for cognition (Cacioppo, et al., 1986). Low need for cognition subjects would be expected to engage in less message
intensive thinking and be more susceptible to public acceptance or conforming behavior. An important objective 24 of this study, then, is to capture both group and individual differences in minority influence. CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Eighty female subjects were recruited for
participation in the experiment. This sample size is
exactly the median number of subjects among recently completed experiments in the collection of attitude change data from college undergraduates exposed to persuasive communications immediately relevant to their lives (Johnson
& Eagly, 1989). All present subjects were undergraduate students from psychology classes at The American University
in Washington, D.C. Most were introductory psychology students. Subjects volunteered by writing their names and telephone numbers on "Group Dynamics" experiment announcement sign-up sheets posted near the Psychology
Department. When subsequently contacted, appointments for their assigned experimental participation times were made.
The decision to test only one gender, female, was based on two premises, one methodological and one practical.
First, gender similarity or differences were neither a consideration in the original minority influence research, nor were they examined here. In addition to the other two
25 26
between subjects variables and the one repeated measure, the
prospect of a fourth order interaction arising from the
inclusion of gender was deemed beyond the scope and plausible interest of the study. Also, American University has a large female population in psychology classes;
inclusion of males would technically constitute a type of minority representation potentially confounding or obscuring the minority influence effect of interest. Second, the design of this experiment required confederate training and participation. It was more practical to obtain female than male undergraduate psychology major confederates and match them to same-gender subjects.
Design
The experiment was a 2 X 3 X 2 mixed factorial design with one repeated measure. The two between-subjects factors included a condition for the source of social influence (minority versus majority persuasion) and an individual difference variable (high, moderate and low levels of the "need for cognition"). The one within- subjects factor consisted of a discussion period repeated three times. After each discussion period ended, subjects were presented with a brief series of dependent measures described below. 27
Subjects were assigned to six-person groups. In the
majority condition, this meant that two actual subjects were
exposed to persuasive comments by four trained confederates.
In the minority condition, four true subjects were subjected
to persuasive comments by two trained confederates. To
produce an equal number of forty subjects in each of these
social influence conditions, twenty majority and ten
minority influence groups were run.
All means of assessment were administered during the
experiment, except for one measure of delayed behavioral
intent. In addition to the social influence condition
already described, the other between-subjects variable was
assessed by having subjects initially respond to a
questionnaire measuring their interest in thinking (need for
cognition). A series of dependent variables assessed
subjects' responses to the experimental manipulations. One
dependent variable consisted of pre- and post-experimental
judgments of the issue covered in the discussion sessions.
The following dependent measures were administered
after each of the three five-minute discussion segments:
the number and type of cognitions produced by each subject,
two questions assessing cognitive effort, the number of questions posed to other group members, and the number of comments made by all group members supporting and opposing
the discussion topic as asserted by the confederates. One 28
final dependent variable, measuring a delayed effect for
attitude change, was administered after debriefing at the
end of the experiment. Subjects were then asked to mail in
their response within two weeks if they were interested in
seeking further issue-relevant information.
Instrumentation
Need for Cognition Scale
In addition to the source of social influence, a
second between-subjects factor assessed individual
variability on interest in thinking about various things.
Cacioppo Sc Petty (1982) developed a 45 item measure designed
to assess individual interest and preference for effortful
thinking. Murphy (1947) and Asch (1952) originally proposed
the concept of and presented anecdotal evidence for an
individual's desire to ponder and deliberate with effort.
Early attempts to measure this construct began over thirty
years ago with Arthur Cohen (Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955;
Cohen, 1957), a member of Carl Hovland’s persuasive
communication research team, at Yale University. He first
created a "situations checklist" containing a list of
hypothetical situations to which a subject had a limited choice of responses. For example, subjects would be presented with the statement;
Participation in a discussion group for solving a problem is most satisfying when: a. the problem is vital to you and others in the group, 29
b. the problem is clear and the purpose of the group is evident, c. the group is small and the discussion friendly.
According to Cohen, the response most fitting a need
for cognition is (b), presumably because the need to think
demands conceptual clarity. Second, a "hierarchy of needs" measure was constructed. This consisted of a series of
statements reflecting five needs: achievement, affiliation, autonomy, recognition and cognition. Subjects were then administered a questionnaire containing numerous statements arranged in sets of three. The subjects were asked, for every possible combination, to rank the statements within each set in terms of their perceived importance. Upon finding a significantly positive correlation between these two measures of cognitive need, Cohen combined them for the purpose of distinguishing high, moderate and low levels of a need for cognition, a technique which has been adopted for this study as well. Cohen furnished no other details describing his method, though his scale was adopted by others (e.g., Adams, 1959).
In a brief series of studies, Rosen and his colleagues (Rosen, 1963; Rosen, Siegelman, & Teeter, 1963;
Rydell & Rosen, 1966) expanded the need for cognition construct to include items tapping power and religiosity among other factors. Rosen's theoretical foundation for need-cognition was more akin to Murray's (1938) drive- 30
reduction model of need satisfaction. That is, people who
have a high need for cognition are driven to think to reduce
an uncomfortable level of tension. Rosen factor analyzed
subjects' responses to need-cognition statements and
developed a list of key variables, exemplary items of which
are included in the instrument used in the present study
(e.g., abstract thinking and thinking enjoyment).
Unfortunately, Rosen never really presented data that showed
a drop in actual tension or discomfort as a result of
satisfying the need to think. Given this broad
interpretation of cognitive motivation and the lack of
evidence supporting drive-reduction theory, it is not
surprising that a large proportion of the intercorrelations
among variables were fairly weak, making meaningful
interpretation quite difficult.
Cacioppo & Petty's (1982) scale is the first true
example of a need for cognition construct. It resembles
McClelland's need for achievement measure in item
construction and manner of validation (McClelland, Atkinson,
Clark, & Lowell, 1953). After the construction phase, 45
statements describing different situations related to cognitive need remained. Examples of items that loaded highest on the first factor, best described as "the tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking" (p. 119), included "I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new 31 solutions to problems," and "I would prefer a task that is
intellectual, difficult and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought."
Subjects could respond to these items on Likert-type scales with ratings ranging from +4 = "very strong agreement" to 0
= "neither agreement nor disagreement" to -4 = "very strong disagreement". Approximately half of the items were written so that "negative" responses would also yield cognitive desire thus eliminating a "yes" answer response set. For university faculty, the average score was 2.18; assembly line workers produced an average of .70.
Further analysis demonstrated a predictably significant positive relationship between need for cognition, intelligence and creativity (Olson, Camp, &
Fuller, 1984), no relationship between need for cognition and social desirability to appear cognitively interested, and a weak negative correlation between need for cognition and dogmatism (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Ahreling (1987) recently reported successful application of the Need for
Cognition measure to predictions of behavioral intention during the 1984 American Presidential campaign.
A shorter, eighteen item scale was constructed to make the measuring process more efficient (Cacioppo, Petty &
Kao, 1984). A factor analysis revealed higher loadings on the first factor accounting for 37% of the total variance 32
(as opposed to 30.1% in the 45 item test). A 16 item
version of the scale yielded similar loadings, 38.8%,
comparing favorably to Cacioppo, et al.'s findings (Perri &
Wolfgang, 1988). Thus, a shortened version of the Need for
Cognition scale receives strong validation and meets the
basic requirements for producing smaller, useful versions of
the original instruments (Carmines & Zeller, 1979).
The present study utilized this more efficient form
(see Appendix B). On a single page, subjects were asked to
respond to the 18 items by marking an "X" on adjacent lines each accompanied by the same evaluative categories employed by Cacioppo & Petty (1982) used to anchor, but not force,
judgments. A nine-point graduated template (9 = higher need
for cognition; this could either be "very strong agreement"
if the statement were written in the direction of higher cognitive need or "very strong disagreement" if the statement were written in the direction of lower cognitive need) was used to measure subjects' judgments. This procedure minimizes subject preconceptions about number values by omitting them entirely and maximizes measurement precision by allowing subjects to indicate their response either exactly on the category demarcation or in between categories.
To facilitate examination of individual differences, the range of need for cognition scores was divided into 33
thirds representing a high, moderate and low need for
cognition. This method has been used successfully with
other personality variables (Kronheim, 1979). Dividing the
range of scores into thirds allows a more precise
distinction between high and low levels on need for
cognition and provides an opportunity to study subjects who
score in the middle of the range.
Data from seven subjects in the pilot study yielded
scores ranging from 4.19 for the lowest obtained need for
cognition, to 7.44 for the highest obtained need for
cognition on the nine point scale. The mean for the four
subjects in the minority condition was 5.91 and and was 6.22
for the three subjects run in the majority condition. The
standard deviation for all subjects was 1.70, revealing
nothing particularly unusual about the sample data
collected. One other published study using the 18 item
scale did not report means, but did furnish a range which,
when converted to a nine-point scale yielded a highest need
for cognition score of 8.8 and a lowest need for cognition
score of 3.6 (Leone & Dalton, 1988).
Student Ban on Tuition Hike Decision
To identify a salient issue for college students, a university-relevant issues list was distributed to a total of 19 volunteer pilot subjects recruited from a social 34
psychology class at American University (see Appendix A).
They were asked to rank order 18 issues (including raising
the campus drinking age and scheduling classes on Saturdays)
in terms of how they would personally be affected. Subjects
were also asked to rate the importance of each issue on a 7
point scale ranging from "not at all important" (1) to "very
important" (7). The results of this issue list ranking are
presented below in Table 1.
TABLE 1
MEDIAN RANKS OF UNIVERSITY RELEVANT ISSUES
Relevant Issue Median Rank Mean Importance 1) Restrict Computer Usage 11.5 3.94(2.24) 2) Expel From Substance Abuse 10.8 4.22(1.77) 3) Sell Condoms in Dorm 12.8 3.33(1.46) 4) End Course Evaluations 12.3 4.72(2.08) 5) Raise Drinking Age 6.0 4.67(2.00) 6) More Required Courses 2.8 5.17(1.58) 7) Schedule Saturday Classes 3.4 4.50(2.28) 8) Institute Dress Code 6.5 4.39(2.28) 9) Voluntary Class Prayer 9.0 4.00(2.28) 10) Use Admissions Quota 7.7 4.72(1.84) 11) Mandatory "AIDS" Testing 7.0 4.56(2.23) 12) Double Parking Fines 17.1 2.78(2.21) 13) Reduce Library Hours 6.3 4.78(1.77) 14) End Fast Food Franchises 9.3 3.56(2.25) 15) Grant Community Access 14.5 2.61(1.69) 16) No "Greek" Dorm Recruiting 16.3 2.28(1.84) 17) Sign-in Dorm Visitation 8.5 3.50(1.29) 18) Raise Cost Of Tuition 2.5 6.06(1.80)
Note; standard deviations are in parentheses 35
Table 1 presents median ranks which show
overwhelming salience for the ranked issue, "raising the
cost of tuition by 5 percent" (fW = 2.5). The only other
issues which come close to this ranking are "scheduling
classes on Saturday morning" and "increasing the number of
required college courses". Frequency data describing the
relative importance of each issue by itself indicate that
the tuition cost item received greatest consideration with a
mean importance rating of 6.06 (SD = 1.80) out of seven
points. Students apparently concurred that raising the cost
of tuition is a very important topic of concern to them.
Immediately following administration of the issues
ranking, a one paragraph profile describing an imaginary
university student was distributed to the same subjects to
test for prevailing opinion on an AIDS-related subject (see
Appendix A). The purpose of this pre-test was to determine both the relevancy of the topic as well as the technique of eliciting responses. The individual in the profile was
identified as the first student expelled from college for refusing to submit to a mandatory testing for the AIDS virus. In one version, the student announced that she had contracted AIDS and had no intention of curbing her sexual activity. The other account was exactly the same except for the omission of this statement. In both cases, subjects were asked to respond to the profile by voting on the 36
fairness of the school's dismissal policy by indicating how
they thought most students would vote, and by noting how
confident they were that most students would vote like them.
These latter questions served as manipulation checks to
determine if students' decisions were in the direction of
what they perceived as the majority, or prevailing, opinion.
While it was thought that the two separate AIDS profiles
would encourage voting for a "majority" opinion ("yes" in
the first example and "no" in the second example), the
manipulation was unsuccessful, as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
AIDS PROFILE JUDGMENTS
Aids Student Refuses Test
Yes ? No
School Has Fair Policy 3 2 3
Other Students Vote Like Me 39% 60% 62%
Confidence of Vote Estimate 5.0 5.5 5.0
No Aids Student :Refuses '
Yes ? No
School Has Fair Policy 4 2 4
Other Students Vote Like Me 39% 42% 76%
Confidence of Vote Estimate 5.2 5.5 5.5 37
The only minor effect may have been "false
consensus": most subjects, thinking that other students
would vote like them, indicated higher levels of confidence
in their decisions.
Lack of clear findings for the AIDS profile led to
the adoption of a shorter statement describing students'
general concern for the increasing cost of tuition.
Nineteen subjects were asked to indicate on a 7 point scale
(ranging from 7, "absolutely agree" to 1, "absolutely
disagree") whether they agreed or disagreed with the premise
that students should be kept out of the decision making
process regarding tuition hikes. It was expected that most,
if not all, students would disagree (majority opinion) to
some extent with this premise.
In the event that some students could initially
support the banning of students from the tuition hike decision making process, a pilot experiment was conducted to assess this possibility as well as the nature of responses to other measures and the implementation of the experimental procedure itself. Because the procedure and wording of questions and instruments were so similar to those used in the actual experiment, examples of pilot measures are not included in an appendix, but minor alterations are mentioned for each measure discussed below. 38
A graduate template procedure was employed for all
three tuition hike decision questions, including the first
and most important question, "Should students be kept out of
the decision making process regarding tuition hikes?" This
measurement procedure requires the subject to respond to the
question by placing a mark which best represents the
subject's response on a horizontal continuum ranging from
"absolutely agree" to "absolutely disagree" with the
question or statement. Numerical values are assigned to
subjects' responses only after data collection, whereby an
incrementally marked scale is placed next to the horizontal
continuum affording an accurate recording. Results from the
pilot study revealed student judgments well within the realm
of acceptability. Subjects were too few to make any
meaningful estimate of minority and majority condition
comparisons, however mean data indicate reasonably typical
scores. On the first question, subjects shifted from a pre
test mean of 1.84 to a post-test mean of 2.66, in the
predicted direction toward banning students from the tuition
hike decision making process.
Subjects were then asked to indicate on a five-point
scale (ranging from 5, "absolutely agree", to 1, "absolutely disagree") if they thought other subjects would vote like
them. Results showed that subjects shifted from a pre-test mean of 2.24 to a post-test mean of 3.31, in the expected 39
direction and in response to being exposed to other
"students'" (confederates) opinions that clearly differed
from their own.
Pilot subjects were also asked to indicate on a 7
point scale (ranging from 7, "absolutely confident" to 1,
"absolutely not confident") what level of confidence they
would estimate for their decision about how they thought
other students would vote. The mean for the pre-test was
6.01 and 5.60 for the post-test, a minor change reflecting a
slight but not unusual weakening of confidence given
subjects' exposure to opinions contradicting their own.
Idea Space Page
The Idea Space Page is a dependent measure selected
to test the hypothesis that minority influence subjects
should think more about the relevant discussion issue than
subjects in the majority condition. This includes
differences resulting from effortful thinking in favor of or
opposed to the issue, and to ferret out potentially subtle
patterns of change in thinking from the first to the second
to the third discussion session. This procedure is a composite of Idea Space Page scales previously used with
slight modifications for the present study (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1984; Olson, Toy, & Dover, 1982; MacKensie, 1986;
Corn St Weinberg, 1984; Maass & Clark, 1983; Petty & 40
Cacioppo, 1977, 1979; and Petty, Cacioppo, & Heesacker,
1981). Utilization of this method has been successful in
persuasion research, both for more "basic" types of attitude
change research and more applied aspects of consumer
research. For example. Corn & Weinberg (1984) used an idea
space page device to record subjects' thoughts about leader and challenger brand product similarity. MacKensie (1986) discovered that subjects engaged in consumer research reliably produce more target relevant thoughts on paper when given more time to think about the advertisement in question.
The Idea Space Page constructed for the present study (see Appendix B) consists of a single page of paper divided into twelve equal sections, allowing ample space to record one thought, with minimum detail, per space.
Instructions appearing at the top of the page ask subjects to list every relevant thought or idea that they had during the specific discussion, one idea per section. After completing this task, subjects are directed to the bottom of the page where instructions explain how to fill in two smaller boxes which appear in the upper left hand corners of each larger box. The first small box or "column" is made available for indicating whether the recorded thought was said publicly out loud (by writing the capital letter "L") or remained unspoken and kept privately to themselves (by 41
writing the capital letter "K") in the presence of the group
during the discussion. After completing this task, subjects
are then instructed to indicate in the second box or column
whether the same thought they recorded supported (by writing
the capital letter "S") opposed (by writing the capital
letter "0") or was neutral to (by writing the capital letter
"N") the premise that students should be kept from the
formal decision making process regarding tuition hikes.
Subjects report this information after each of three
discussions is conducted.
Data obtained from the pilot experiment demonstrated
the subjects' ability to follow these instructions and
complete all boxes. Actual results indicated nothing
unusual about subjects' judgments, but were too few in
number to suggest anything but the coarsest estimates about
the nature of the data. For instance, no meaningful
differences emerged between majority and minority conditions
for the average total number of comments per subject (M =
6.58 for minority and M = 7.33 for majority). Subjects did
report rather reliably for both social influence conditions
that most comments they recorded were said out loud during
the discussions (M = 5.94 comments per discussion for "said out loud" versus M = 2.10 comments per discussion for "kept
to yourself"). It is quite difficult to ascertain meaning
in the changes of this data from the first through the third 42
discussions. Moreover, any investigation of the effect of
the need for cognition construct was considered more
suitable for the actual experiment.
Cognitive Effort, Questions Posed and Argument Recall
An instrument simply identified as a "Questions
Page" contains five items (see Appendix B). The first two
questions tap cognitive effort. For the first question, "To
what extent were you trying hard to think about this issue
during the 1st discussion?", subjects were asked to mark an
"X" along a continuum under which three descriptive phrases
were present to aid their judgments; on the far left, "not
hard at all"; in the center, "somewhat hard"; and at the far
right, "extremely hard". Subjects performed a similar procedure in response to the second question, "How much effort did you put into thinking about this issue?" with only slight changes in descriptive markers in the same positions: "not much at all"; "some"; and "very much".
Similar to the assessment method used for the tuition hike decision and need for cognition instruments, a seven point graduated template, with the higher score toward the
"extreme" or "very" end of each scale, was placed over the continua for accurate measurement.
These cognitive effort questions were adapted from
Cacioppo, et al. (1983) with only slight changes as already 43
noted. Cacioppo and his colleagues used these questions to
estimate subjects' cognitive effort when evaluating the
quality of an editorial supposedly written by a student
journalist. For the present study, an a priori decision was
made to average the responses of two items as an overall
estimate of cognitive effort. However, any decision to
average these statements was first dependent upon obtaining
a significant correlation between the two.
The two original cognitive effort questions employed
in the pilot study deviated slightly from those used in the
actual experiment. Pilot study scales contained actual
equidistant demarcations resulting in a nine-point scale.
These marks might have confused subjects since there were
only three anchoring phrases for subjects' judgments.
Therefore, the graduated marks on the scales were
eliminated, resulting in the seven point scale described
above. Regardless, means obtained on both questions were
fairly similar ("trying hard", M = 4.38; "how much effort",
M = 4.73). The pattern of data between questions 1 and 2 were similar between minority influence subjects ("trying hard", M = 4.21; "how much effort", M = 4.62), and majority
influence subjects, ("trying hard", M = 4.61; "how much effort", M = 4.89) but represented too small of a sample to draw any meaningful conclusions, beyond noting that subjects understood and responded to the questions. Hence, no 44
attempt was made to analyze data changes from first to
second to third discussions.
The third question on this page asked subjects to
indicate how many questions they thought they had personally
posed to other group members during the specific discussion.
Subjects were asked to circle a number from "0" to "15+"
questions that corresponded to their answer. An average of
3.29 questions per discussion was obtained in the pilot
study. Subjects in the minority condition reported an
average of 2.91 questions posed, while those in majority
condition suggested they had queried more with an average of
3.78 questions. The sample is too small to warrant
discussion of these results except to point out that all
subjects were capable of responding to the dependent
measure. Further consideration of the "questions posed"
responses as well as the impact of the need for cognition
construct, is presented in the Results sections below.
The fourth and fifth questions on this page asked
subjects to specify, respectively, how many statements they
and all group members made that either supported or opposed
the banning of student participation in formal tuition hike decision making. Similar to the number-of-questions posed
item, these two latter questions used a number series scale, each of which ranged from "0" to "20+". The pilot study used similar questions with the exception of asking subjects 45
to specify the number of statements made by all other group members excluding themselves. Averages between social
influence conditions were similar. In the minority condition, the average number of supporting statements made by others was 5.42, and in the majority condition, the average was 5.22. For opposing statements, the average minority response was 4.50 and the average majority response was 4.33. Given the paucity of pilot data, no attempt was made to scrutinize data on the basis of need for cognition.
Debriefing Questions
Subjects were asked to respond to two open-ended questions just prior to debriefing (see Appendix B). One question directly asked what the subjects thought the experiment was about. The other question addressed an affective aspect of the study, that is, what subjects liked or disliked about the experiment. Responses to this question might produce some insight into subjects' reactions to the instruments and procedure that a straightforward question would miss. Most subjects in the pilot study reported that they thought the experiment was about attitude change and most indicated that they enjoyed taking part in the discussions. 46
Flyer
At the conclusion of the experiment and after debriefing subjects about the nature of the research without divulging sensitive information related to the hypotheses, subjects were handed a self-addressed stamped flyer requesting their support for a dummy organization, "Students for Fair Tuition", which was said to examine college cost issues. The flyer clearly states that the organization supports restricting student input in university tuition cost decisions. Subjects were asked to indicate whether or not they would be interested in learning more about the organization by simply writing their name and address in the space provided and returning the flyer by mail within two weeks. Unfortunately, due to the unavailability of confederates toward the end of the Spring semester, pre testing of this measure was not possible.
Training Confederates
Invoking majority and minority-based persuasive communications required use and training of confederates to play the appropriate roles in the small group discussions.
Except for their preprogrammed comments, they were counseled and trained to behave like real subjects in every foreseeable way. Confederates were solicited from varied sources: advanced undergraduate courses in psychology. 47
contacts through individual professors, and posting of
request signs for experimental assistants at prime locations
on the campus of American University. A total of eight
female confederates were used over the course of thirty
experimental sessions. Two of the confederates received
their initial training before and during the running of the
pilot study in the spring of 1988. Confederates who took
part in the experiments were trained on each of the four
categories of comments they were asked to verbalize during
each of the three discussion segments of a given
experimental session. To minimize confusion over role playing, however, confederates usually concentrated on one category of comments.
Four categories of comments were derived from a larger pool of potential statements that a student could make in a discussion of whether or not students should be banned from the formal decision making process concerning tuition hikes (see Appendix C; comments are embedded within the verbal procedural protocol). Each category contained three comments, one of which was verbalized per discussion segment. This procedure controlled for a minimum number of comments that each confederate was to make for each segment.
In the majority condition, there were four confederates, so each confederate would make one "programmed" comment per segment. In the minority condition, there were two 48
confederates, so each confederate here would make two
programmed comments per discussion segment. In this
fashion, the total minimum number of comments was matched,
regardless of the influence condition.
Confederates were trained to respond in one of a
number of ways if and when real subjects questioned them
about their statements or position on the issue. These
elaborations were essentially extensions of the comments
that they had already uttered. Confederates were reminded
to sustain their style of comment delivery throughout the
discussion segments and experimental sessions. It was
impractical to train confederates to deliver their lines at
particular timed intervals during each discussion session.
Confederates were, however, tutored such that one of them
would always begin each discussion session, and that all
comments would be verbalized well before the five-minute
period for each session ran out. Their statements, as well as those of the subjects, were audio-taped for possible
later examination. Initial "starting" comments were rotated
so that no one confederate and no single category could dominate or produce either a primacy or recency effect in subject exposure to the persuasive communications. 49
Major Comment Categories
Pour major categories of persuasive comments or
arguments were produced for confederate use. Each category
contained three specific comments.
(a ) What students could do in place of direct
representation on a formal panel or committee deciding
tuition hike levels. (1) "Well, our parents could write
letters expressing their opinions to tuition committee."
(2) "Our parents could use their influence or connections
with a member of the tuition committee to raise issues to
the chairperson or other members." (3) "You know, we don't need to be on the tuition committee; we could advertise our concerns and write to the school newspaper."
(B) What students cannot do or the restrictions they
face given their subordinate decision making role, compared to administration and faculty, in the academic community.
(1) "As students, we don't have any real power in making most university decisions, so why bother here?" (2) "Most of us probably shouldn't have a say in who decides about tuition because we don't pay for it." (3) "Hmmm, we don't have access to all the information that administrators have in order to make an informed opinion."
(C) The likely consequences if students were granted total or pivotal decision making power to determine tuition hikes. (1) "If we did have power, we could be attracting 50
all of the power-crazy students with extreme ideas who would
turn off everybody else." (2) "If we had our way, we would
probably lower tuition and that would mean less money for
the library, career center and upkeep for buildings and
utilities." (3) "Let's say students did have formal
decision making power. If we could and did decide to lower
tuition, we'd end up with poorer teachers and a lousier
education."
(D) The economic Zeitgeist of prevailing conditions
that affect other organizations and institutions faced with the situation of rising costs. (1) "Students wouldn't have to worry about tuition hikes if there were another tuition payment plan available — like an installment plan averaged out over four years of school." (2) "Anyway, if students don't like how much it costs to go to school, let them go somewhere else. After all, car buyers can't tell General
Motors how much their cars should cost." (3) "Look, you're a student and if you want to attend a particular school, you'll pay for it no matter what the cost.
Confederate Organizational Representative
Confederates were also employed and trained for playing the role of the representative from the dummy organization, "Students for Fair Tuition". The confederate memorized and presented to all experimental participants 51
three salient points regarding their organization and
request for student response: (1) confederates introduced
themselves and explained how they had learned about the
experiment and had met the principal investigator; (2) a
statement about the nature and purpose of the organization
was briefly made; and (3) students were asked to respond to
the flyer within a two week period. Care was taken to
stress the separation or distance between the conduct of the
experiment and the request for student inquiry about the
organization.
Procedure
Subjects were contacted by phone to arrange
scheduled experimental time slots such that the required
number of subjects per group would always equal six. Nearly one-third of the experimental sessions had to be rescheduled due to a failure to meet this mandatory group size. There was no evidence to indicate any systematic difference in session postponement due to relevant subject characteristics
(e.g., need for cognition) or the actual time of running the sessions (e.g., day versus night).
Upon arrival at the Social Behavior Laboratory at
American University, subjects were greeted by the experimenter and asked to take one of six seats arranged in a small circle and facing each other. It was prearranged 52
that one of the confederates would already be sitting in one
of the seats in both influence conditions. This was done
mainly to avoid any perception on the subjects' part that
confederates had any prior contact with each other should
they have been seen entering the laboratory together. In
the pilot study, a rectangular table was provided to seat
all six experimental participants. This proved inadequate
for two reasons. First, some subjects had difficulty
getting in and out of chairs due to the limited space
available in the laboratory. Second, during the
administration of dependent measures, subjects had a
tendency to scan each others' responses as they all used the
table for workspace. For these reasons, the standard type
of individual desk chairs were used to maximize subject comfort and independent responses.
On one side of the circle of six desk chairs was a table, long enough to accommodate six packets of the paper and pencil measures for all experimental participants. It was considered both impractical and potentially distracting to present subjects with a complete dependent measure packet at the beginning of the study. Instead, the principal investigator distributed each measure to each participant at the apprqpriate time. All measures were previously identified by a numeric code to avoid any possible misplacement. 53
At this point, subjects were asked to sign consent
forms specifically designed for the study (see Appendix B).
They were reassured both in writing and orally that their responses to all measures would be completely confidential.
When consent forms had been signed and returned, the investigator began the instructions for the experiment, delivered precisely according to a verbal protocol that was used for each experimental session (see Appendix C). While this could be interpreted as a somewhat impersonal, mechanical procedure, greater consideration was given to maintaining essentially identical instructions for each session, especially considering the frequent and extensive contact the investigator had with participants during the sessions.
Subjects were given a brief introduction to the major tasks of the experiment, following which the
"Attitudes Toward Thinking" instrument (Need for Cognition measure) was distributed. The experimenter read aloud instructions for completing the instrument and presented a sample item, "I enjoy fishing", to which a sample response of "slight agreement" was marked with an "X" on a dummy form shown to each subject. Subjects were given five to six minutes to complete the assessment and reminded to turn their papers (for this as well as all paper and pencil measures) over when finished. This duration was determined 54 by pretesting in the pilot study. In fact, all subjects
finished within five minutes.
After the need for cognition measures were collected, the investigator continued, describing the nature of the tuition hike decision judgment task. This form was distributed, completed, and turned face down. During collection, the forms were perused while the experimenter commented to subjects in both conditions that it appeared as though most subjects had marked their "X" toward the
"disagree" (against the notion of banning students from participating in tuition hike decision making) end of the scale. This was done mainly to alleviate suspicions subjects may have had about the purpose of collecting attitudinal data.
The experimenter continued by preparing participants for the discussion segments to follow. Subjects were told to discuss the relevant issue at hand for approximately five minutes. It was noted that they might feel somewhat unsure of how to begin, but that there was no doubt that each one probably had something important to say about the issue.
The experimenter explained that he would not be physically present during the discussions so his presence would not interfere with the subjects' participation. However, subjects were told that their comments would be audiotaped for later analysis and a microphone placed in a corner of 55
the room was pointed out to them. There was a dual purpose
for this instruction. First, it was decided that subjects
would be more likely to take the experimenter's request for
social discourse seriously if they knew that their oral
statements were being recorded. Second, gross measures of
subject versus confederate comments could be assessed by a
frequency count at a later time from audiotapes.
The experimenter excused himself from the room and
walked behind a partition. The procedure for confederate
commentary was arranged such that regardless of which
confederate in a specific role-category was scheduled to
speak out first, one of them would begin the discussion.
This was done simply to ensure early discussion uniformity.
In this manner, all discussions began with one of the
confederate's comments. The discussion was scheduled for
five minutes at the end of which the experimenter returned
from behind the partition and announced that time was up.
The first of three series of dependent measures per
discussion segment was distributed. This began with passing
out the first Idea Space Page. Instructions at the top of
the page were read out loud as participants were asked to
read them to themselves. Before beginning the task, the
experimenter presented two examples of recorded ideas in adjacent idea spaces based on a fictitious discussion question of whether or not students should be required to 56
take classes on Saturday mornings. This issue was selected
for an example because it had received one of the highest
ratings of relevancy after the tuition hike item on the
original measures pre-test. Participants were then given
two and a half minutes to work on the idea space page and
stopped when time was up (there was only one instance in
which a subject had filled in every space on the page).
Instructions at the bottom of the Idea Space Page were then
read. Subjects were once again asked to consider the
Saturday morning classes example, this time with full
explanations of the codings which appeared in the two
smaller boxes, or columns, in the upper left hand corners of
each of the two recorded idea examples.
After making their appropriate notations, the pages
were collected and the first Questions Page was distributed.
Subjects were asked to complete all five questions on the
page as honestly as they could and were reminded to refer,
in their responses, only to the specific discussion segment
just completed. When all subjects finished this task, they were instructed once again to prepare for another five minute discussion. The same basic procedure was followed
for both the second and third discussion segments, as well as the dependent measures distributed for subject completion. 57
When the third Questions Page was returned,
participants were once again asked to respond to the Tuition
Hike Decision Form. Instructions for this form were
identical to the first. When these forms were collected,
the experimenter commented to subjects in both conditions
that there appeared to be a slight shift of opinion from the
"disagree" toward the "agree" end of the scale. This
statement was made to alleviate any undue suspicion that
might have arisen from subjects curious about responding to
the same questions both before and after the expression of highly opinionated comments in the discussions. It was
fully expected that subjects would interpret this as an experiment in attitude change. Therefore it only made sense
to accommodate their awareness which should not have a direct bearing on the study's working hypotheses.
Before debriefing, participants were asked to respond to two open-ended questions designed to assess any possible bias or awareness of the true purpose of the study.
When this sheet was completed and returned, subjects were then told about some aspects of the experiments, including testing their willingness to change their viewpoints as well as measuring the potential relationship between how much they liked to think about various things and their responses to the discussions over time. Confederate confidentiality was maintained to protect the true nature of the experiment. 58
Subjects were told that when all experimental sessions had
been conducted, they could learn more about the results of
the study if they wrote their name and address down a piece
of lined paper which was then circulated for that purpose.
Subjects were thanked for their participation and reminded not to discuss details of the experiment with friends or acquaintances as their behavior, as potential subjects, could be seriously affected.
As the experimenter opened the door of the laboratory to allow subjects to exit, the organizational representative confederate who was quietly waiting outside now approached the entrance to the lab. The confederate was deliberately dressed in semi-formal attire to reinforce the notion that the organization represented had no affiliation with either the Department of Psychology or The American
University. The experimenter introduced the confederate and gave an explanation for the appearance. The confederate entered the lab, explained the purpose of the visit, and introduced the "Students for Fair Tuition" organization.
Subjects were told that the organization opposed direct student involvement in setting official tuition policy, but did support alternate means (similar to those raised by the confederates during the discussion sessions) allowing students to express their opinions. After this brief introduction, the confederate distributed flyers. Subjects 59 who were interested in learning more about the organization were asked in the flyers to write down their names and addresses and return the flyer in the self-addressed envelope provided. To increase the authenticity and plausibility of the organization's separate existence, the organization's "official" stamp was clearly visible along with a real post office box address. The confederate thanked subjects for their consideration and left. All participants, including confederates, then exited.
Bach experimental session, including the contribution by the organizational representative confederate, lasted no more than 55 minutes. Subjects who had left their addresses with the experimenter did receive a detailed explanation of the true hypotheses of the study and preliminary results from early analysis of the data (see
Appendix D). CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Overview
Thirty-two experimental sessions were completed. In
keeping with running thirty sessions as originally proposed,
one majority social influence session and one minority
session were randomly selected for elimination thus leaving
thirty sessions (twenty majority and ten minority sessions)
prepared for data coding and analysis.
Analyses of each of the measures in the study are
reported in the general sequence as presented to the
subjects during the actual experiment. Results of the Need
for Cognition individual difference measure are reported
first, followed by the three Tuition Hike Decision Form questions administered twice, the Idea Space Page recordings and subject ratings administered three times, the Questions
Page questions administered three times, the two Debriefing questions, and returns of the Students for Fair Tuition
flyer. In each case, omnibus analyses for the dependent measures are reported followed by closer examination of significant and marginal main effects and interactions.
Analyses bearing upon the three major groupings of
60 61
hypotheses are evident throughout, but elaboration and
explanation of these results are addressed in the
Discussion. One final group of analyses comparing a subset
of minority and majority subjects who changed their opinions
on the first Tuition Hike Decision Form question is also
reported.
Reliability Test for Confederate Comments Audio Recordings
Analyses were conducted to determine whether or not
the number of confederate comments differed between majority and minority influence conditions. Such a test poses two major questions for consideration. First, do the raters generally agree with each other that confederates provided an equivalent number of comments per experimental session?
Second, do raters agree with each other that confederates provided an equivalent number of comments in the majority and minority conditions?
Twenty-nine out of thirty-two taped sessions were recovered, but many of these were difficult to decipher due to the poor acoustics of the laboratory setting and had to be dropped from the analysis. Two raters were selected to review and record the number of confederate statements made during each of the three discussion sessions for each experimental session, seventeen in all (nine minority and eight majority sessions). While raters could probably 62
distinguish between which sessions were "minority" and which
were "majority", they remained blind to the hypotheses.
To answer the first question, a Spearman Rho (Rs)
rank-order correlation coefficient was selected for
comparing the two raters. Accurate identification and
counting of tape-recorded comments could pose some difficulty to raters. For example, confederates in both
influence group conditions uttered more than the required
twelve comments per experimental session, averaging more than thirty statements. This was anticipated because it was assumed that subjects would be curious about the opinions voiced by confederates and ask them to elaborate on their positions. While counting confederates' memorized phrases would be relatively easy, raters would probably have greater difficulty distinguishing one elaborated comment from another. The decision to use Spearman Rho helps to alleviate this concern because it compares the raters' rank- ordering rather than the magnitude (as the Pearson correlation coefficient does) of each experimental session's total number of comments (Loether & McTavish, 1974;
Marascuilo & McSweeney, 1984). A significant ^ indicates agreement between raters in terms of the relative number of comments made by confederates per session.
Accordingly, agreement between raters was found for their rankings of the total number of comments per 63
experimental session, Re/15)=.83, p<.05. Further support
for agreement was obtained from an omnibus ANOVA collapsed
across the repeated measure which showed no main effect for
raters, F(l,15)=3.63, NS.
In response to the second question on reliability,
Spearman Rho tests indicated agreement between raters for
rank-ordering comments made by confederates during minority,
Rs{7)=.69, 2<.05, and majority, Ra/6)=.87, p<.05)
experimental sessions. However, when the number of comments
per experimental session were averaged across raters and
compared between majority (M = 37.62) and minority (M =
31.28) influence groups, more comments were attributed to
majority sessions, t(15)=2.82, p<05. The two raters
disagreed about the number of confederate minority comments
produced per experimental session (M = 33.40, M = 28.60),
t(8)=4.17 , g<.01. One rater identified more confederate majority (M = 37.78) than minority (M = 28.60) comments made per experimental session, t(15)=3.35, g<.05, while the other
rater obtained a trend close to significance between confederate majority (M = 38.75) and minority (M = 33.40) comments _t(15)=2.04, g<.06.
In short, raters generally agreed that there were more confederate comments made in the majority sessions than in the minority sessions. The extent to which these findings affect the results of the social influence manipulation are considered in the Discussion. 64
Need for Cognition
During the coding phase of data analysis, a nine-
point template (1, the lowest need for cognition value; 9,
the highest possible value; and 5 in the center) was used to
assess the degree of need for cognition for all eighteen
statement responses. The entire range of scores was divided
into thirds to reflect subjects with high, moderate and low
levels of the need for cognition. Table 3 contains means
for each of these cognition levels by influence group.
TABLE 3
NEED FOR COGNITION CELL MEANS
HiMin MdMin LoMin HiMaj MdMaj LoMaj a = 15 13 12 12 13 15 M = 7.27 6.06 4.58 7.02 5.96 4.98
Note: HiMin = High Need for Cognition, Minority Influence MdMin = Moderate Need for Cognition, Minority Influence LoMin = Low Need for Cognition, Minority Influence HiMaj = High Need for Cognition, Majority Influence MdMaj = Moderate Need for Cognition, Majority Influence LoMaj = Low Need for Cognition, Majority Influence
Subjects in the present study yielded an overall mean of
5.98. While this sample might suggest a slight bias toward
the higher end of the need for cognition scale, the average
falls nearly half-way between the sample for university
faculty members and blue-collar workers reported by Cacioppo
Si Petty (1982). Level of need for cognition was determined 65
by cut-off scores essentially coinciding with the 33rd
(below 5.56 was low need for cognition) and the 66th (below
6.38 was moderate need for cognition and above was high need
for cognition) percentiles on the Need for Cognition scale.
One potential problem that arose was the inability
to control for the distribution of high, moderate and low
need for cognition subjects from one experimental session to
another. Theoretically, one might expect a random dispersal
based purely on chance. However, it would seem more likely
that at least some groups would have an "imbalance" of too many highs, moderates or lows. Most groups turned out to be cognitively "heterogeneous". Only one minority influence group (out of ten) and five majority influence groups (out of twenty) contained subjects who all had the same level of need for cognition.
Tuition Hike Decision Form
The first, and most important, question of the
Tuition Hike Decision Form directly addressed the issue of banning student participation in the formal decision-making process regarding tuition hikes. Means for all experimental conditions for this first question are reported in Table 4.
An overall t-test revealed that subjects shifted their opinions toward greater agreement with a tuition hike decision making ban, t(79)=5.75, g<.001). Results of a two- 66
TABLE 4
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR ALL CONDITIONS AND CELLS OF THE TUITION HIKE DECISION FORM
1st Query: Should Students Be Kept Out Of Decision Making?
Time 1 Time 2 Overall 2.23(1.52) 3.34(2.13) Majority 2.67(1.60) 4.34(2.05) Minority 1.78(1.30) 2.34(1.72)
High NCog 1.67(0.98) 2.56(2.08) Mod NCog 2.45(1.73) 3.75(2.15) Low NCog 2.57(1.64) 3.74(2.02)
HiMin 1.34(0.62) 1.91(1.90) MdMin 1.94(1.35) 2.35(1.46) LoMin 2.17(1.75) 2.88(1.73)
HiMaj 2.09(1.20) 3.67(2.09) MdMaj 2.97(1.95) 5.15(1.81) LoMaj 2.89(1.52) 4.42(2.02)
2nd Query: How Do You Think Most Students Will Vote?
Time 1 Time 2 Overall 2.67(1.73) 3.79(1.80) Majority 2.78(1.83) 4.68(1.70) Minority 2.56(1.65) 2.90(1.42)
High NCog 2.33(1.69) 3.59(1.71) Mod NCog 2.71(1.70) 3.57(1.86) Low NCog 2.97(1.81) 4.22(1.82)
HiMin 1.91(1.28) 2.85(1.25) MdMin 2.58(1.60) 2.41(0.76) LoMin 3.35(1.85) 3.51(1.97)
HiMaj 2.86(2.02) 4.51(1.80) MdMaj 2.83(1.84) 4.72(1.93) LoMaj 2.67(1.78) 4.79(1.52)
3rd Query: How Confident Are You About 2nd Query Vote?
Time 1 Time 2 Overall 5.58(0.91) 5.27(1.09) Majority 5.62(0.70) 5.38(1.15) Minority 5.54(1.10) 5.16(1.25) 67
Table 2— continued
High NCog 5.86(0.55) 5.07(1.06) Mod NCog 5.38(1.15) 5.49(0.99) Low NCog 5.49(0.92) 5.26(1.21)
HiMin 5.95(0.61) 4.81(1.28) MdMin 5.00(1.47) 5.55(0.89) LoMin 5.58(0.96) 5.18(1.51)
HiMaj 5.75(0.46) 5.39(0.62) MdMaj 5.72(0.59) 5.42(1.11) LoMaj 5.42(0.90) 5.33(0.96)
Note: standard deviations are in parentheses
way repeated measure ANOVA (influence group by need for cognition) produced a trend in favor of greater change under majority influence from pre- to post-test, F(l,79)=3.37, g<.07. The reason for a trend, instead of significance at criterion, could have been due to the fact that tuition hike decision judgments were different between majority and minority subjects to begin with. Indeed, a t-test comparing first tuition hike decision judgments between minority (M =
1.78) and majority (M = 2.67) influence groups was significant, t(79)=2.70, g<.05. Therefore, an analysis of covariance was conducted to partial out this possible confound and statistically control for other potentially interfering sources of "noise", by covarying the pre-test judgment with the post-test judgment (Edwards, 1972; Kirk,
1968; and Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). 68
Results indicated that subjects' responses on the
pre-test tuition hike decision did influence the post-test,
F(l,79) = 17.96, £<.0001. However, when partialled out,
majority subjects still clearly shifted their opinion more
so than their minority counterparts, F(l,79)=13.88, g<.0001.
Despite the fact that a cursory view of the data in Table 4
suggests that subjects with a high need for cognition appear
to be among the most rigid in their initial and subsequent
judgments in response to this question, neither need for cognition, nor a need for cognition by influence group
interaction approached a level of significance when the covariate was controlled.
Analyses were conducted on the second tuition hike decision question, which asked subjects to consider how other students would vote. An omnibus two-way ANOVA (need for cognition by influence group) for repeated measures produced a main effect for influence group, F(l,79)=11.47, g<.001. That is, majority influence subjects were more likely than minority influence subjects to indicate that other students would shift their vote toward the ban from pre to post-test. Results of a t-test between majority and minority influence groups on the first inquiry were negligible, t(79)=1.23, g<.53. The effect for need for cognition was negligible, F(2,79)=1.41, g<.25, as was a need for cognition by influence group interaction, F(2,79)=1.47, 69
g<.23. In short, these results provide support for the
notion that after exposure to persuasion, more majority
versus minority influence subjects were likely to indicate
that other students would vote for the decision ban.
The third tuition hike decision question asked
subjects how confident they were in their judgments of their
fellow students' behavior. In fact, no differences in level
of confidence were found.
Idea Space Pages
Data Categories and Ratings
It will be recalled that the Idea Space Pages were constructed and employed to tap into the amount and nature of idea production as affected by influence group, need for cognition and change over time from the first through the third discussion sessions. Each page contained ample space
for a brief written description of the idea as well as self- ratings of the ideas. These ratings were distinguished in two respects. First, ideas were recorded for having been publicly expressed out loud during the discussion
(designated, "L"), or kept privately to oneself ("K").
Second, ideas were rated according to whether or not they supported ("S"), opposed ("0"), or were neutral to ("N") banning student participation in the tuition hike decision making process. Thus each idea received a rating from each 70
of these two basic categories resulting in six possible
paired ratings.
Two coders blind to the working hypotheses of the
study were employed to transcribe and count the number of
subjects' Idea Space Page remarks according to the six
possible paired ratings (LS, LO, LN, KS, KO, KN) each
subject used during the course of the experiment. For less
than ten percent of the remarks, ratings were sufficiently
ambiguous to warrant judgments on the part of the coders.
For instance, when subjects' ratings appeared to be
"opposite" of what would be deemed logical, or simply misidentified as "neutral" when the remark was clearly
supportive or opposed to the tuition hike decision ban, both coders' ratings were solicited separately, in isolation, and
then compared. Of all 1382 comments transcribed, only ten
failed to achieve coder consensus and require a third coder's rating. When this occurred, the final rating was decided by majority rule.
Omnibus Analyses
Table 5 presents the average number of cognitions recorded by subjects by all experimental conditions and Idea
Space Page category ratings.
A two-way analysis of variance (influence group by need for cognition) with repeated measures (discussion group 71
TABLE 5
MEAN IDEA SPACE COGNITION RATINGS PER EXPERIMENTAL SESSION BY ALL EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
High Mod Low Disc Disc Disc Maj Min NCog NCog NCog 1 2 3
LS 6.66 5.25 6.85 6.23 4.77 2.10 1.94 1.91 LO 2.62 4.86 5.07 3.73 2.41 1.40 1.40 0.94 LN 2.86 3.94 3.59 3.65 2.96 1.10 1.20 1.10
KS 1.21 0.88 0.56 1.19 1.37 0.36 0.25 0.42 KO 1.07 1.23 1.15 1.04 1.26 0.50 0.31 0.34 KN 1.84 2.15 1.30 1.34 3.34 0.81 0.59 0.60
L 12.14 14.05 15.51 13.61 10.14 4.60 4.54 3.95 K 4.12 4.26 3.01 3.57 5.97 1.67 1.15 1.36 S 7.87 6.13 7.41 7.42 6.14 2.46 2.19 2.33 0 3.69 6.09 6.22 4.77 3.67 1.90 1.71 1.28 N 4.70 6.09 4.89 4.99 6.30 1.91 1.79 1.70
T 16.26 18.31 18.52 17.18 16.11 6.27 5.69 5.31
Note: higher numbers indicate greater idea production
Min = minority source of influence Maj = majority source of influence High NCog = high need for cognition Mod NCog = moderate need for cognition Low NCog = Low need for cognition L = cognitions recorded as public, or "outloud" K = cognitions recorded as private, or "kept to self" S = cognitions recorded as supporting the decision ban O = cognitions recorded as opposing the decision ban N = cognitions recorded as neutral to the decision ban T = total average number of cognitions per subject
sessions) on the total number of cognitions per level of variable revealed a trend for influence group, F(l,79)=3.03,
£<•08, and significance for discussion group session,
F=(2,79)=14.18, £<.0001. A cursory look at the totals for 72
the average number of cognitions recorded per subject for
each group discussion session in Table 5 suggests that the
number of thoughts recorded decreased over time. The ANOVA
supports this interpretation. Differences between first and
second discussion sessions were significant, F(l,79)=8.53,
£<.005. Other differences between discussion sessions were
negligible. No significant interactions appeared.
Attempts to conduct further parametric tests became problematic when stem and leaf analyses revealed strongly skewed distributions of cognition ratings for data not aggregated at the level of main effects. Most scores accrued in the lower frequencies (e.g., one or two recorded ideas for a paired rating). Friedman nonparametric analyses, which specifically examine the effects of independent variables on rank-orderings of data and not their magnitudes, were conducted for all categories of Idea
Space Page cognitions. Nonparametric tests are credible and preferable substitutes for parametric analyses when the assumption that one can produce normal sampling distributions from a parent population is violated.
However, the most important consideration in selecting nonparametric tests concerns the ability to avoid a Type II error, i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false. Compared to an ANOVA, the non-parametric Friedman test suffers a very minimal loss of power if the sample is 73
normal and actually is more efficient when the
distribution's variability violates normality (Marascuilo &
McSweeney, 1984).
Tables 9 through 14 display mean ranks and results
of two-way (need for cognition by influence group) Friedman
statistics both with and without the repeated measure
(discussion group sessions) for Idea Space Page cognitions.
Mean ranks were determined by summing the frequency of the
ratings for each level combination of the two independent
variables and dividing by the number of ranks within the
combination or "cell". Since the two-way Friedman test is a
substitute for the classic two-way ANOVA, a randomized block design is produced. A block is based on one of the
independent variables allowing a test of significance (and post-hoc analyses) for the other independent variable.
However, because the data are ranked within blocks, simultaneous tests of both variables are not possible. A separate series of tests, forming blocks of ranked data on both variables were conducted indicated by the influence group series of Friedman tests (Tables 9, 10 and 11) and the need for cognition series of Friedman tests (Tables 12, 13 and 14).
While the blocking of ranked data precludes direct analysis of interactions between the main effects and among all variables including the repeated measure, subsequent 74
post-hoc Kruskal-Wallis (nonparametric substitute for the
classic one-way ANOVA, indicated by " H") and comparison
tests (indicated by " w") do allow some interpretation and
suggestion of interactions as discussed below. Tables 6, 7
and 8, shown here, summarize mean ranks for the combination
of need for cognition by influence group for single and
paired categories of the Idea Space Pages.
TABLE 6
MEAN RANKS FOR PAIRED AND SINGLE CATEGORIES OF IDEA SPACE PAGE COGNITIONS BY INFLUENCE GROUP AND NEED FOR COGNITION ACROSS ALL DISCUSSION SESSIONS
HiMin MdMin LoMin HiMaj MdMaj LoMaj
LS 43.70 35.42 30.50 44.79 48.69 39.20 LO 54.27 43.62 40.92 39.29 38.89 26.03 LN 45.03 47.69 45.29 41.33 34.62 30.30
KS 34.97 42.69 42.50 30.58 43.81 47.57 KO 45.53 39.42 46.12 40.75 38.00 33.87 KN 34.53 39.35 53.21 38.25 33.69 45.03
L 58.07 42.31 29.71 42.04 44.58 25.23 K 35.53 38.85 50.71 29.12 41.35 47.53 S 44.60 35.81 29.58 42.25 46.62 42.50 0 53.80 42.12 42.96 38.92 39.23 26.20 N 39.70 44.54 51.25 37.58 33.04 38.00
Note ; higher ranks indicate greater idea production
These data are organized into six "cells" reflecting two levels of influence group and three levels of the need for cognition. The three tables are particularly relevant for post-hoc analyses. 75 TABLE 7
MEAN RANKS OF SINGLE CATEGORIES OF IDEA SPACE PAGE COGNITIONS BY INFLUENCE GROUP AND NEED FOR COGNITION FOR ALL THREE DISCUSSION SESSIONS
HiMin MdMin LoMin HiMaj MdMaj LoMaj
LI 51.57 34.35 31.88 44.33 50.19 30.20 L2 55.17 42.12 34.21 42.46 42.19 26.43 L3 61.37 37.19 27.50 35.79 44.69 33.40
K1 39.03 40.27 50.17 30.67 41.00 41.87 K2 39.60 37.12 43.25 32.42 42.88 46.88 K3 30.03 36.38 48.12 39.71 45.15 45.03
SI 38.27 33.46 34.58 43.67 51.62 41.40 S2 44.73 40.12 28.67 40.75 45.85 41.23 S3 48.23 32.69 32.71 39.46 43.69 43.50
01 46.67 41.62 44.29 36.88 40.92 28.87 02 53.17 44.46 41.88 39.25 37.85 26.30 03 49.83 43.38 38.62 36.38 37.96 35.67
N1 43.17 49.62 46.50 31.92 32.77 38.70 N2 38.07 41.23 49.33 46.46 33.73 36.33 N3 38.50 43.08 51.08 39.33 37.15 35.63
Note: higher ranks indicate greater idea production
Because of the complexity of the Idea Space Page cognition analyses, main effects of influence group and need for cognition are presented separately, first by single and then by paired categories of cognition ratings, along with any significant results from the repeated measure.
Generally, moderate need for cognition mean ranks fell between those for high and low need for cognition and did not differ significantly from either one. The few exceptions are indicated below. 76
TABLE 8
MEAN RANKS OF PAIRED CATEGORIES OF IDEA SPACE PAGE COGNITIONS BY INFLUENCE GROUP AND NEED FOR COGNITION FOR ALL THREE DISCUSSION SESSIONS
HiMin MdMin LoMin HiMaj MdMaj LoMaj
LSI 38.20 32.85 33.92 44.96 52.50 40.73 LS2 45.03 38.88 30.62 41.42 46.50 39.33 LS3 50.47 34.54 32.00 40.54 41.31 41.77
LOI 50.80 42.69 41.83 38.42 40.42 28.97 L02 52.40 45.42 41.46 39.54 37.08 27.27 L03 51.70 43.15 39.17 37.96 38.31 32.00
LNl 44.10 48.92 41.50 34.75 37.23 36.23 LN2 41.87 43.88 45.71 48.29 33.35 32.03 LN3 40.13 45.88 41.96 40.67 42.08 33.53
KSl 37.83 41.81 45.12 32.62 41.81 43.50 KS2 39.80 41.27 34.50 37.58 40.19 47.93 KS3 33.73 37.19 44.67 37.88 46.23 43.93
KOI 42.50 38.42 47.67 38.71 41.19 35.40 K02 43.87 40.92 42.56 39.17 41.46 35.40 KO 3 37.87 41.73 39.21 39.21 43.89 41.20
KNl 36.90 45.62 51.33 33.42 32.23 43.80 KN2 32.13 34.58 50.42 39.33 44.15 44.17 KN3 38.80 35.38 52.00 42.88 29.15 45.37
Note : higher ran ks indicate greater idea production
All signi ficant effects are reported. If a given
level of a variable goes unment ioned for any given Idea
Space Page category, it is because there was no significant effect observed.
Where the omnibus analyses produced significant main effects or particular groupings appeared clearly different. 77
post-hoc tests illuminating the sources of variance or
suggesting possible interactions were conducted. A summary
of the Idea Space Page cognition nonparametric analyses
completes this section of the Results. Important findings
will then be reviewed and interpreted in the Discussion in
light of their impact on the hypotheses of the study, and
their implications for social influence research.
Main Effects and Post-Hoc Tests for the Between- Subjects Variables
Tables 9, 10 and 11 present single and paired category mean ranks and Friedman tests of significance for
influence group across all discussion sessions and per discussion session.
Among the single category ratings, majority influence produced marginally more publicly expressed (L) ideas, but only after the second discussion, X^(l)=3.02,
£<.10. No differences were observed for the category of privately held (K) ideas. Majority influence produced more supporting (S) ban statements than minority influence but only after the first discussion session, X^(l)=4.14, £<.05.
Majority influence also produced more (S) comments than minority influence among subjects with a moderate need for cognition, H(l)=3.87, £<.05.
On the other hand, minority influence yielded significantly more opposing (0) ban comments than majority 78
TABLE 9
MEAN RANKS AND FRIEDMAN TESTS FOR SINGLE AND PAIRED IDEA SPACE PAGE COGNITIONS BY INFLUENCE GROUP ACROSS ALL DISCUSSION SESSIONS
Minority Majority Friedman X
LS 12.42 15.25 2.99** LO 15.88 11.79 5.59*** LN 15.58 12.12 4.70**
KS 13.60 14.08 .45 KO 14.85 12.82 1.71 KN 14.32 13.35 .69
L 14.91 12.76 1.88 K 14.41 13.26 .81 S 12.54 15.14 2.58 0 15.74 11.94 5.08*** N 15.14 12.54 2.58 df = 1 *p<.10 **£<.05 ***£<.025 +£<.01 ++p<.005
Note: higher ranks indicate greater idea production
influence, X=(l)=5.08, £<.025. This was true only for subjects with a low need for cognition, H(l)=3.47, £<.10.
Further, among subjects with a low need for cognition, minority influence produced marginally more opposing (0) comments than majority influence after the first, H(l)=3.74,
£<.06, and second, H(l)=2.77, £<.10, but not the third discussion session. Lastly, minority influence produced 79
TABLE 10
MEAN RANKS AND FRIEDMAN TESTS FOR SINGLE IDEA SPACE PAGE COGNITIONS BY INFLUENCE GROUP FOR ,ALL THREE DISCUSSION SESSIONS
Minority Majority Friedman X
LI 13.56 14.11 .48 L2 15.26 12.41 3.02* L3 14.41 13.26 .81
K1 14.78 12.90 1.52 K2 13.68 14.00 .41 K3 12.86 14.81 1.62
SI 12.14 15.54 4.14** S2 13.05 14.62 1.19 S3 12.90 14.78 1.52
01 15.48 12.20 3.87** 02 15.95 11.72 6.19*** 03 15.08 12.60 2.37
N1 15.71 11.96 4.96** N2 14.48 13.19 .69 N3 14.81 12.86 1.62
df = l *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.025 +£<.01 ++£<.005
Note; higher ranks indicate greater idea production
more neutral (N) thoughts, but only after the first discussion session, X*(l)=4.96, £<.05.
Among the paired category ratings, majority
influence produced marginally more public, supporting (LS) comments, X^(l)=2.99, £<.10. This was significant after the 80
TABLE 11
MEAN RANKS AND FRIEDMAN TESTS FOR PAIRED IDEA SPACE PAGE COGNITIONS BY INFLUENCE GROUP FOR ,ALL THREE DISCUSSION SESSIONS
Minority Majority Friedman X
LSI 12.01 15.66 4.71** LS2 13.15 14.52 .99 LS3 13.35 14.35 .72
LOI 15.40 12.28 3.56* L02 15.84 11.84 5.59+ L03 15.36 12.31 3.41*
LNl 15.34 12.34 3.31* LN2 14.76 12.91 1.49 LN3 14.44 13.24 .85
KSl 14.18 13.50 .53 KS2 13.26 14.41 .81 KS3 13.09 14.59 1.11
KOI 14.59 13.09 1.11 KO 2 14.46 13.21 .89 KO 3 13.54 14.14 .49
KNl 15.10 12.58 2.45 KN2 13.18 14.50 .95 KN3 14.34 13.34 .70 df = l *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.025 +p<.01 ++£< .005
Note: higher ranks indicate greater idea production
first discussion session only, X^(l)=4.71, £<.05. Majority influence also produced more (LS) comments than minority influence among subjects with a moderate need for cognition only, H(l)=4.61, £<.05. 81
Minority influence yielded more public, opposing
(LO) ban ideas X*(l)=5.59, £<.025, than majority influence.
This was marginally significant whether subjects had a low,
H(l)=3.03, £<.10, or high, H(l)=3.29, £<.10, need for cognition. Minority influence also yielded more (LO) statements than majority influence marginally after the
first, X M D = 3 . 5 6 , £<.08, and third, XMl)=3.41, £<.09, but significantly after the second, X^(l)=5.59, £<.025, discussion session. Further, minority influence produced more public, neutral (LN) ideas than majority influence,
X*(l)=4.70, £<.05. This result was marginally significant among subjects with a low need for cognition, H(l)=3.11,
£<.10.
Tables 12, 13 and 14 present single and paired category mean ranks and Friedman tests of significance for need for cognition across all discussion sessions and per discussion session.
Among single category ratings, significant omnibus need for cognition differences emerged for publicly expressed (L) comments, XM2)=14.89, £<.005, which held true either under majority, H(2)=7.29, £<.03, or minority,
H(2)=12.27, £<.005, influence. Compared to low need for cognition, more (L) comments were produced by high, w(2)=12.00, £<.005, and moderate, w(2)=8.11, £<.05, need for cognition subjects. The omnibus results for public (L) 82 TABLE 12
MEAN RANKS AND FRIEDMAN TESTS FOR SINGLE AND PAIRED IDEA SPACE PAGE COGNITIONS BY NEED FOR COGNITION ACROSS ALL DISCUSSION SESSIONS
High NCog Moderate NCog Low NCog Friedman X
LS 22.57 21.35 17.61 2.74 LO 24.20 21.00 16.31 6.48** LN 21.80 . 21.02 18.70 1.21
KS 16.78 21.85 22.93 4.22 KO 22.02 19.29 20.15 1.44 KN 18.37 18.42 24.63 6.00**
L 25.81 21.92 13.81 14.89++ K 16.52 20.35 24.63 6.96** S 22.19 21.02 18.31 1.75 0 23.94 20.63 16.93 5.22* N 19.55 19.54 22.37 1.66 df = 2 *p< .10 **£< .05 ***£< .025 +£< .01 + + P< .005
Note; higher ranks indicate greater idea production
comments held true after the first, X*(2)=8.02, £<.05, second, X*(2)=9.29, £<.01, and third, X*(2)=9.00, £<.02, discussion sessions. Omnibus differences were also found for private (K) ideas, X*(2)=6.96, £<.05, with more produced by low than high, w(2)=8.11, £<.05, need for cognition subjects. No significant results were obtained for supporting (S) or neutral (N) ban ideas, but an omnibus 83 TABLE 13
MEAN RANKS AND FRIEDMAN TESTS FOR SINGLE IDEA SPACE PAGE COGNITIONS BY NEED FOR COGNITION FOR ALL THREE DISCUSSION SESSIONS
High NCog Moderate NCog Low Ncog Friedman X
LI 24.41 21.50 15.63 8.02** L2 24.91 21.21 15.41 9.29+ L3 25.15 20.52 15.83 9.00***
K1 17.83 20.50 23.17 3.17 K2 18.39 20.23 24.87 2.43 K3 17.46 20.79 23.26 3.03
SI 20.96 21.48 19.09 .66 S2 21.84 21.77 17.87 1.87 S3 22.52 19.35 19.59 1.89
01 22.33 20.81 18.37 1.67 02 23.50 20.94 17.07 4.38 03 22.20 20.50 18.80 1.49
N1 19.37 20.65 21.48 .73 N2 21.13 19.06 21.26 1.33 N3 19.56 20.37 21.57 .78 df = 2 *p<.10 **£<.05 ***£<.025 +p<.01 ++£<.005
Note: higher ranks indicate greater idea production
trend was found for opposing (0) ban comments, XM2)=5.22,
£<.10, with high versus low need for cognition subjects recording marginally more, w(2)=7.01, £<.10, ideas.
Discussion session had no effect here. 84 TABLE 14
MEAN RANKS AND FRIEDMAN TESTS FOR PAIRED IDEA SPACE PAGE COGNITIONS BY NEED FOR COGNITION FOR ALL THREE DISCUSSION SESSIONS
High NCog Moderate NCog Low NCog Friedman
LSI 21.31 21.62 18.61 1.08 LS2 22.02 21.60 17.93 2.02 LS3 23.24 19.21 19.00 2.96
LOI 22.85 21.02 17.65 2.96 L02 23.39 20.94 17.19 4.10 L03 23.17 20.44 17.84 3.13
LNl 20.11 21.77 19.67 .42 LN2 22.59 19.58 19.30 1.92 LN3 20.37 22.25 18.94 .87
KSl 17.98 21.15 22.37 2.20 KS2 19.72 20.52 21.26 . 56 KS3 18.06 21.08 22.39 2.13
KOI 20.56 19.98 20.94 .57 KO 2 21.06 20.83 19.63 .46 K03 19.54 21.65 20.35 .42
KNl 17.74 19.73 24.00 4.64* KN2 18.00 19.90 23.57 3.71 KN3 20.50 16.37 24.48 7.88*** df = 2 *p< .10 **n< .05 ***P< .025 +p< .01 + +£< .005
Note : higher ranks indicate greater idea product ion
Among paired categories, no differences appeared for public, supporting (LS) ideas, but omnibus differences were 85
found for public, opposing (LO) cognitions, X^(2)=6.48,
£<.05. Post-hoc analysis indicated a trend for more (LO)
ideas produced by high than low need for cognition subjects,
w(2)=7.89, £<.10. No differences of any kind emerged for
the categories of public, neutral (LN), private, supporting
(KS), or private, opposing (KO) ideas by need for cognition.
One other significant omnibus difference was revealed for private, neutral (KN) statements, XM2)=6.00, £<.05.
Compared to high and moderate need for cognition levels, low need for cognition subjects produced marginally more (KN)
ideas after the first discussion session, X*(2)=4.64, £<.10, and significantly more ideas after the third discussion session, X=(2)=7.88, £<.025. Also, low need for cognition subjects produced marginally more (KN) thoughts under minority versus majority influence, H(2)=4.62, £<.10.
Overall, relatively few effects due to influence group, need for cognition or discussion session emerged from the idea space page cognition nonparametric analyses. Of those main effects that appeared, minority influence produced significantly more public (L) and neutral (N) thoughts after the first and second discussion sessions respectively, and significantly more opposing (0), public, opposing (LO) and public, neutral (LN) ideas across discussions than majority influence, though these significant differences actually occurred after the first 86
two discussion sessions. Majority influence produced
significantly more supporting (S) and public, supporting
(LS) ban ideas than minority influence after the first
discussion only.
High need for cognition produced significantly more
public (L) and public, opposing (LO) ideas across all
discussions and marginally more opposing (0) ban thoughts,
than low need for cognition. Low need for cognition yielded
significantly more private (K) and private, neutral (KN)
thoughts across all discussion sessions, but particularly more (KN) ideas after the third discussion session, compared to high need for cognition.
While interactions are not explicitly tested, they are implied by the post-hoc comparisons and Kruskal-Wallis tests. They indicate that under minority influence, it is the low rather than the high need for cognition subjects that produced marginally more opposing (0) and public, opposing (LO) cognitions. Low need for cognition subjects also yielded more private, neutral (KN) thoughts under minority influence, compared to high need for cognition.
Under majority influence, subjects with a moderate versus either high or low need for cognition produced significantly more supporting (S) and public, supporting (LS) thoughts. 87
Questions Page
After completion of the Idea Space Page, each
subject answered five questions designed to assess their
effort and extent of discussion commentary recall. For each
question in succession, omnibus analyses and main effects
for between-subjects and the repeated measure are addressed
first, followed by examination of potentially significant
interactions.
The first two questions queried the subject about
how hard she was trying to think and the amount of effort
she exerted toward thinking about the issue. Summaries of
these data for all relevant independent variables are presented in Tables 15 and 16.
A large correlation, £{79)=.89, p<.05, between these
two questions justified combining them for analysis. The omnibus two-way (influence group by need for cognition)
ANOVA with repeated measures (discussion sessions) revealed main effects for the need for cognition, F(2,79)=4.40,
2<.01, and group discussion sessions, F(2,79)=8.51, p<.0003.
Post-hoc tests for the combination of the first two questions indicated that high versus low need for cognition produced more effortful thinking, F(l,79)=8.68, p<.004.
Mean effort scores for moderate need for cognition subjects fell between the other two cognition groups but did not significantly differ from either one. Further analysis 88 TABLE 15
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR QUESTION 1; TO WHAT EXTENT WERE YOU TRYING HARD TO THINK ABOUT THIS ISSUE?
Discussion 1 Discussion 2 Discussion 3
Overall 4.11 (1.36) 4.64 (1.22) 4.75 (1.67) Majority 4.23 (1.40) 4.66 (1.32) 4.65 (1.18) Minority 3.99 (1.34) 4.62 (1.14) 4.84 (1.68)
High NCog 4.48 (1.42) 4.91 (1.10) 5.25 (1.14) Mod NCog 3.97 (1.22) 4.68 (1.13) 4.96 (1.33) Low NCog 3.87 (1.41) 4.33 (1.39) 4.04 (2.17)
HiMin 4.46 (1.37) 4.86 (1.03) 5.49 (1.12) MdMin 4.08 (0.75) 4.65 (1.08) 4.70 (1.50) LoMin 3.32 (1.59) 4.31 (1.35) 4.18 (2.22)
HiMaj 4.51 (1.54) 4.98 (1.22) 4.94 (1.14) MdMaj 3.87 (1.59) 4.72 (1.23) 5.22 (1.12) LoMaj 4.32 (1.10) 4.35 (1.47) 3.93 (2.19)
Note; standard deviations are indicated in parentheses; higher means indicate greater effort
revealed that under minority influence, high need for cognition produced more effort than low need for cognition
F(l,79)=5.06, 2<.03. This effect was significant for the
first, F(l,79)=4.33, p<.04, and third, F(l,79)=9.12, p<.003, but marginal for the second, F(l,79)=3.35, p<.07, discussion session.
The third question asked subjects to indicate how many questions each recalled posing to other group members during each discussion session. Table 17 presents summarized data for all relevant variables in response to this question. 89 TABLE 16
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR QUESTION 2; HOW MUCH EFFORT DID YOU PUT INTO THINKING ABOUT THIS ISSUE?
Discussion 1 Discussion 2 Discussion 3
Overall 4.34 (1.14) 4.88 (1.31) 4.74 (1.73) Majority 4.44 (1.28) 4.92 (1.29) 4.62 (1.79) Minority 4.24 (0.98) 4.84 (1.33) 4.87 (1.69)
High NCog 4.66 (0.86) 5.17 (1.14) 5.42 (1.16) Mod NCog 4.27 (1.21) 5.08 (2.50) 4.84 (1.34) Low NCog 4.09 (1.27) 4.39 (1.53) 3.98 (2.23)
HiMin 4.67 (0.79) 5.03 (1.16) 5.56 (1.22) MdMin 4.07 (0.97) 5.16 (1.25) 4.83 (1.51) LoMin 3.89 (1.07) 4.24 (1.52) 4.05 (2.10)
HiMaj 4.65 (0.96) 5.36 (1.12) 5.24 (1.12) MdMa j 4.46 (1.41) 5.01 (0.96) 4.85 (1.21) LoMaj 4.25 (1.42) 4.51 (1.59) 3.92 (2.40)
Note; standard deviations are indicated in parentheses; higher means indicate greater effort
The omnibus two-way (influence group by need for
cognition) ANOVA with repeated measures (discussion session)
revealed a significant main effect only for the need for cognition, F(2,79)=5.11, g<.008. High need for cognition
subjects reported producing more questions compared to low need for cognition, F(l,79)=10.20, p<.002, with moderate need for cognition again yielding no significant difference from either of the other two cognition levels. Also indicated was a significant three-way interaction among influence group, need for cognition and discussion session. 90 TABLE 17
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR QUESTION 3; HOW MANY QUESTIONS DO YOU THINK YOU POSED TO OTHER GROUP MEMBERS DURING THIS DISCUSSION PERIOD?
Discussion 1 Discussion 2 Discussion 3
Overall 2.40 (1.63) 2.61 (1.89) 2.52 (1.93) Majority 2.12 (1.36) 2.40 (1.60) 2.12 (1.44) Minority 2.72 (1.83) 2.82 (2.14) 2.92 (2.67)
High NCog 3.15 (1.79) 3.33 (2.02) 3.11 (2.03) Mod NCog 2.70 (1.40) 2.50 (1.73) 2.69 (1.87) Low NCog 1.85 (1.43) 2.00 (1.71) 1.78 (1.69)
HiMin 3.67 (2.06) 3.20 (2.31) 3.60 (2.41) MdMin 2.77 (1.40) 3.07 (2.10) 3.00 (2.24) LoMin 1.50 (1.17) 2.08 (1.93) 2.00 (1.95)
HiMaj 2.50 (1.17) 3.50 (1.68) 2.50 (1.24) MdMaj 1.77 (1.24) 1.92 (1.04) 2.38 (1.45) LoMaj 2.13 (1.60) 1.93 (1.58) 1.60 (1.50)
Note: standard deviations are indicated in parentheses; higher means indicate more questions posed
F(4,79)=2.43, p<.05. Figure 1 presents the mean number of questions posed for each of the six possible combinations of
influence group and need for cognition categories for each discussion session.
Three-way interactions are typically difficult to
interpret. One way to search for the sources of variance indicated by the significant three-way interaction called for a series of three two-way ANOVA (influence group by need for cognition) performed separately for each discussion 91
4.0
3.5 HiNCog
3.0
■Sm 2 2.5 HiNCog HiNCog MdNCog LoNCog I LoNCog (M O MdNCog B MdNCog z 1.5 LoNCog
1.0
0.5
Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority
Discussion 1 Discussion 2 Discussion 3
Fig. 1. Mean Number of Questions Posed for Each of the Six Possible Combinations of Influence Group and Need for Cognition Categories for Each Discussion
session. A need for cognition main effect reached
significance for the first, F(2/79)=5.21, £<.007, second,
P(2,79)=3.67, £<.03, and third, F(2,79)=3.61, £<.03, 92
discussion sessions. Post-hoc mean comparisons among the
three need for cognition levels indicated that high need for
cognition subjects posed significantly more questions than
low and moderate levels together after the first,
F(l,79)=8.46, £<.005, and second, F (1,79)=6.37, £<.01
discussions, and produced a trend in the same direction
after the third discussion session, F(l,79)=3.29, £<.07.
High need for cognition also produced significantly more
posed questions than low need for cognition after the first,
F{1,79)=9.44, £<.003, second, F(l,79)=7.19, £<.009, and
third, F(l,79)=5.99, £<.02, discussion sessions.
Though influence group never reached criterion, it
did produce a trend after the third discussion,
F{1,79)=2.84, £<.09. This, coupled with one two-way
(influence group by need for cognition) interaction which
registered close to significance after the first discussion,
F(2,79)=2.90, £<.06, justified further post-hoc analysis of
an influence group effect collapsed on the need for
cognition variable. The only significant finding was that
minority versus majority influence produced more questions after the first discussion session, F(l,79)=4.00, £<.05.
Despite an apparent influence group effect among moderate need for cognition subjects upon observation of Figure 1, minority influence produced only marginally more queries after the first, F(l,79)=2.87, £<.09, and third. 93
F(l,79)=2.59, £<.11, discussion sessions, compared to
majority influence.
The fourth question asked subjects to indicate how
many statements they thought all group members, including
themselves, had made in support of the tuition hike decision
making ban for each discussion session. Table 18 provides
summarized data for all relevant variables in response to
this question.
TABLE 18
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR QUESTION 4; HOW MANY SUPPORTING STATEMENTS DO YOU THINK WERE MADE BY ALL GROUP MEMBERS?
Discussion 1 Discussion 2 Discussion 3
Overall 4.63 (3.76) 4.95 (3.13) 4.66 (2.93) Majority 4.63 (3.24) 5.20 (3.46) 4.78 (2.80) Minority 4.62 (4.26) 4.70 (2.78) 4.55 (3.09)
High NCog 5.12 (4.04) 4.59 (3.35) 4.37 (3.08) Mod NCog 3.38 (3.15) 4.42 (2.53) 4.69 (1.22) Low NCog 5.33 (3.85) 5.81 (3.33) 4.93 (2.95)
HiMin 4.40 (4.03) 3.87 (2.90) 4.00 (3.25) MdMin 2.46 (3.02) 4.38 (2.43) 4,31 (2.93) LoMin 7.25 (4.54) 6.08 (2.64) 5.50 (3.09)
HiMaj 6.02 (4.03) 5.50 (3.78) 4.83 (2.92) MdMaj 4.31 (3.12) 4.46 (2.73) 5.08 (2.81) LoMaj 3.80 (2.39) 5.60 (3.87) 4.47 (2.85)
Note; standard deviations are indicated in parentheses; higher means indicate more supporting statements recalled 94
There were no significant main effects, but a
marginally significant two-way interaction between need for
cognition and social influence, F(2,79)=2.55, £<.08, and a
marginally significant three-way interaction including the
repeated measure, F(4,79)=2.10, £<.08, were obtained.
Under minority influence, low versus high need for
cognition subjects reported more group supporting ban
statements, F(l,79)=4.63, £<.03. These differences appear
after the first, F (4,79)=4.27, £<.04, and marginally after
the second, F(4,79)=3.36, £<.07, but definitely not after
the third, F (4,79)=1.17, NS, discussion session. Also
noteworthy is the pattern among low need for
cognition/majority influence subjects who displayed a peak
number of supporting ban ideas after the second discussion
session approaching significance compared to the first,
F(l,79)=3.95, £<.07, session.
The fifth and final question asked subjects to
indicate how many statements they thought all group members,
including themselves, had made in opposition to the tuition
hike decision making ban for each discussion session. These
summarized data may be seen in Table 19.
The only main effect that emerged from the omnibus
two-way repeated measure ANOVA (influence group by need for cognition) was for influence group, F(l,79)=16.97, £<.0001.
Minority subjects reported more opposing ban statements than 95 TABLE 19
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR QUESTION 5; HOW MANY OPPOSING STATEMENTS DO YOU THINK WERE MADE BY ALL GROUP MEMBERS?
Discussion 1 Discussion 2 Discussion 3
Overall 3.82 (3.39) 3.45 (3.24) .3.29 (3.12) Majority 2.86 (2.51) 2.12 (1.68) 2.08 (2.22) Minority 4.78 (3.89) 4.78 (3.85) 4.50 (3.43)
High NCog 3.97 (2.73) 3.81 (3.82) 3.78 (3.65) Mod NCog 4.31 (4.43) 3.88 (3.46) 3.27 (3.16) Low NCog 3.19 (2.82) 2.67 (2.20) 2.81 (2.48)
HiMin 4.53 (2.67) 4.73 (4.71) 4.60 (3.83) MdMin 5.62 (5.35) 5.54 (3.89) 4.92 (3.59) LoMin 4.17 (3.46) 4.00 (2.56) 3.92 (2.87)
HiMaj 3.28 (2.77) 2.67 (1.92) 2.75 (3.28) MdMaj 3.00 (2.92) 2.23 (1.96) 1.62 (1.39) LoMaj 2.40 (1.96) 1.60 (1.06) 1.93 (1.75)
Note; standard deviations are indicated in parentheses; higher means indicate more opposing statements recalled
majority subjects possibly because they were exposed to more people with views in accord with their own, i.e., against the tuition hike decision making ban, or possibly because confederates did speak somewhat less during the minority influence discussion sessions as raters had suggested.
Debriefing
Subjects were asked to respond to two questions after completion of all dependent measures except the
Students for Fair Tuition flyer. The first question asked 96
subjects to indicate what they thought concerning the nature
of the experiment. Practically all participants responded
to this question by commenting on the attitude change nature
of the study. No subject, however, indicated any awareness
or suspicion of the use of confederates, or any hypothesis
relevant information that might have influenced her
responses during the course of the experiment.
The second question tapped liked versus disliked
aspects of the study. No differences approaching
significance were found, regardless of condition or cell.
Fifty-seven subjects reported liking the experiment with
twenty-three dissenting. This pattern of response did not
differ significantly from one cell or condition to another.
Most disparaging debriefing comments were directed toward
the briefness of the three discussion periods. Some
subjects complained that the entire experimental session was
too short.
Flyer
A total of sixteen flyers were returned from among
the eighty subjects who had initially received them. This
represented a twenty percent return rate. Chi Square analysis of returned flyers indicated significant differences for frequencies between minority and majority
influence, X/(l)=20.55, £<.0001, and among all six cell 97
combinations of influence group by need for cognition,
XM5)=12.30, £<.03.
However, chi square loses its potency as a reliable
predictor of effects when any of the tested cells contain
less than five cases. Accordingly, Freeman (1987)
recommends using a non-zero correlation test which, though
less powerful as an omnibus analysis than chi square, does allow for subsequent contrast tests if shown to be
significant. The non-zero correlation produced a quantity close enough to significance, r(l)=3.59, £<.058, to warrant post-hoc statistical analysis. Subjects under minority versus majority influence returned more flyers, xMl)=9.98,
£<.001. Moreover, half of the returned flyers fell into the high need for cognition/minority influence cell which consequently produced a significant contrast compared to all other cells, XMl)=4.55, £<.03. In short, most returned flyers came from subjects under minority influence and among those, most were from subjects with a high need for cognition.
Influence Group and Attitude Change
One final series of analyses was conducted in order to test Petty & Cacioppo's (1986) expectation that subjects might change their opinions for different reasons depending upon their exposure to central (majority influence) or 98
peripheral (minority influence) routes of persuasion. Of
the nineteen minority influence subjects who indicated a
change on first Tuition Hike Decision Form question toward
the confederate's position, four were dropped since their
opinion shift was only a tenth of a point. Fifteen
remaining minority influence subjects were closely matched
on Need for Cognition scores with fifteen majority influence
subjects. A t-test for need for cognition revealed no
differences between these two groups, t(14)=.14 NS. A t-
test for attitude change on the first Tuition Hike Decision
Form question also yielded no differences between minority
and majority subjects, ;t(14) = .012 NS.
Similar to findings reported earlier on the second
Tuition Hike Decision Form question, majority subjects
compared to minority subjects were more likely to indicate
that other students would shift their vote toward the ban
from pre- to post-test, P(l,14)=8.68, £<.006. No
differences were obtained on the third Tuition Hike Decision
Form question.
No significant differences emerged from the Idea
Space Page data, but two trends did surface. Minority
subjects amassed marginally more private, opposed comments across all discussions than their majority counterparts,
F (1,14)=3.47, £<.07. Also majority subjects reported marginally more public, supporting statements after the 99
first discussion only compared to minority subjects,
F(l,14)=3.07, £<.09.
No differences were found between this subset of minority and majority subjects on questions one through four on the Questions Page. The fifth and last question did reveal a significant difference in that minority subjects recalled more opposing comments in their discussion sessions compared to majority subjects, F (1,14)=5.51, £<.03.
The last analysis in this group compared flyer returns between minority and majority subjects. Again, similar to flyer results reported earlier, minority subjects who changed their opinions returned more flyers than their majority counterparts, xMl)=4.83, £<.03. CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Individual and group differences in persuasion were
examined in this experiment. The strength of each of these
independent variables was measured with respect to (1)
attitude change on a relevant issue; (2) the production and
recall of ideas; (3) the amount of effort exerted in
thinking about the discussion issue; and (4) the degree to
which each had an immediate or delayed impact upon these
dependent measures. Examination of the results in light of
the hypotheses of the study, cautionary notes with regard to measures employed and data collection, implications for
future research, and applications beyond the laboratory in
social influence and group behavior are discussed below.
Predicted Effects of Minority and Majority Influence Groups
As expected, subjects exposed to majority versus minority influence were more likely to shift their beliefs toward a more rigid, anti-student position on the tuition hike decision ban and were more likely to believe that other students would shift their original judgment as they themselves had. The most plausible explanation for this
100 101
attitude change is the pressure to conform to majority
expressed opinion, which is well documented in the
literature (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Allen, 1965).
Though minority influence was expected to produce
more issue-relevant cognitions than majority influence as
recorded on the idea space pages, there were no overall
differences in the total number of cognitions produced. As
reported in Table 4, the difference between the average
number of ideas recorded for an entire experimental session
for minority (M = 18.31) and majority (M = 16.26) influence
subjects was in the predicted direction, but not
significant. When the neutral category is omitted, this distinction between minority (M = 12.22) and majority (M =
11.56) influence is even less evident. Given the possibility of individual differences in response time to
idea production, influence group effects for issue-relevant versus issue-irrelevant ideas might have emerged if subjects had been offered more time per discussion session to record their ideas than the allotted two and one-half minutes.
On the other hand, influence group effects did emerge between supporting and opposing issue-relevant ideas.
Majority subjects recorded more supporting tuition ban statements (N = 314) than minority subjects (N = 245) in the predicted direction, but this result was not significant.
No specific hypothesis was made regarding influence group 102
differences in the number of opposing statements made.
However, that minority influence produced significantly more
opposing statements than majority influence is not very
surprising. Minorities may encourage subjects to think more
directly about the content of persuasive messages, which
produce counterarguments, i.e., more opposing (anti-ban)
ideas. On the other hand, four subjects in a group of six
may be more willing to challenge a position counter to their
own, and do so publicly, compared to two subjects in a
group.
Minority influence was expected to yield more
privately held ideas than majority influence. One test of
this hypothesis is a check on the average number of ideas
rated as "Kept-to-Self" (K) which, according to the data in
Tables 5 and 9 are in the predicted direction but not
significant.
No support was obtained for the prediction that minority influence would encourage subjects to exert greater cognitive effort either for the first or second questions.
In fact, average effort scores across all experimental conditions fell generally close to the "somewhat hard" label on the first questions and the "some" label on the second question. It could be argued that on the first question, the distance between "not hard at all" and "somewhat hard" is psychologically greater than "somewhat hard" and 103
"extremely hard", thus clouding the ability to measure
subjects' effort scores accurately. However, these effort
questions have been successfully employed elsewhere
(Cacioppo, et al., 1983). Another possible explanation is
that the topic of raising college tuition did not elicit
subject interest. This, too, seems unlikely considering the
fact that tuition hikes emerged as the most relevant and
among those pilot tested here and in previous research
(Rhine & Severence, 1970). Perhaps students did not see
their own participation in the discussions as being
particularly relevant. The addition of a question addressing this point in the debriefing segment of the
experiment could shed light on this issue. One other possibility, as in the case of idea production, is that
three five-minute discussion sessions do not provide enough
time for a minority source of influence to encourage effortful thinking on this issue.
It was further hypothesized that minority influence would have a greater delayed effect than majority influence.
There were two ways to test this prediction. First, minority influence should have induced subjects to produce more ideas and exert greater cognitive effort compared to majority influence after the second and third discussion sessions. Results in Table 5, however, revealed a general pattern of fewer cognitions progressively from the first to 104
the second and third discussion sessions. Nor was there
significant evidence that subjects tried harder as time
passed. This might be interpreted as a matter of fatigue or
boredom with the repetitiveness of instructions and content
area of the comments expressed during the discussions.
The second, and more empirically convincing, way of
assessing delayed impact of group influence is by analyzing
return rates of the Students for Fair Tuition flyers. As
results indicated, subjects under minority influence were
more likely to return the flyers than those under majority
influence. This higher return rate may reveal a greater
willingness to seek out more information about the
discussion topic and the "sponsoring" organization some time
after conclusion of the experimental session despite the
fact that minority versus majority subjects were not persuaded overtly to change their attitudes toward the discussion issue. Consistent with this, it is not clear whether minority influence subjects who returned flyers
intended to support or oppose the organization. That subjects could return the flyers in relative privacy and not
in the immediate presence of other experimental group members suggests that they either responded to a minority influence in a more private fashion or required more time to think about the issue before responding compared to majority influence subjects. 105
Predicted Effects of the Need for Cognition
No general predictions were made for need for
cognition as far as attitude change measures were concerned.
Nor were there any specific expectations for those with a moderate need for cognition, except that their responses
would fall in between high and low need for cognition
subjects. Results indicated that the lower the need for cognition, the more likely subjects were to shift their views (and believe that others would change their beliefs in a similar fashion) toward a more anti-student position regarding the tuition hike decision ban.
On the other hand, high need for cognition students should generally produce more issue-relevant cognitions on the Idea Space Pages because thinking a lot about a serious and salient topic such as raising tuition is consistent with their expressed interest to think about relevant issues as measured by the Need for Cognition construct. Analyses for interval data in Table 5 and ordinal data in Tables 12, 13 and 14 indicated mixed results. The hypothesis received partial support in that high need for cognition subjects did record marginally more opposing statements, while low need for cognition subjects had a tendency to produce more neutral comments. It is possible that subjects had difficulty recording their thoughts on paper even if they did think about the issue with great effort. No attempt was 106 made to analyze the content of these comments - i.e., high
need for cognition subjects might have produced more coherent or reflective thoughts - since the amount of
response time and idea space available to students after each discussion session was limited.
However, since high need for cognition subjects produced more public (L) comments and low need for cognition subjects recorded more private (K) thoughts, high need for cognition may be related to expressiveness (Cacioppo, et al., 1983). That low need for cognition subjects produced marginally more private, supporting (KS) ban ideas suggests that they may be less overtly expressive when thinking about ideas that are contrary (i.e., supporting the confederates' position limiting student involvement in tuition hike decision making) to their attitude.
Unlike Cacioppo's et al. (1983) findings, high need for cognition subjects did not recall more issue-relevant comments than low need for cognition subjects. However, they did produce more questions than their low need for cognition counterparts. They also indicated that they had exerted more effortful thinking about the discussion topic than either moderate or low need for cognition subjects.
The recall question might have required subjects,to try to remember too many separate sources of group behavior during the discussions, thus confounding their responses, whereas 107
the inquiry about question posing asks a subject to
recollect only her own behavior.
The last prediction in this group of hypotheses
concerns immediate versus delayed impact of response on the
production of ideas and amount of effort exerted. With
respect to the production of ideas, need for cognition by
itself did not generally interact with change over time, nor
was it expected to. Need for cognition is conceptualized as
an enduring personality attribute and its effects should be
independent of minute changes in time from one brief discussion session to another. However, there was evidence to indicate that low need for cognition produced more private, neutral (KN) thoughts than high need for cognition significantly after the first, marginally, after the second, and nonsignificantly after the third discussion session.
Also, high need for cognition subjects returned more flyers than moderate or low need for cognition subjects, reflecting a response after a substantial delay in time.
Unfortunately, since the total number of returns was relatively small, this difference did not reach significance.
Predicted Influence Group X Need for Cognition Interactions
It will be recalled that the predicted interaction between influence group and need for cognition could be 108 expected to take one of two possible routes. Either majority or minority influence would maximize differences between subjects with a high or low need for cognition. If the topic of keeping students out of a tuition hike decision making process was powerful enough to engage their attention for discussion, but not so powerful as to create ceiling effects which could mask individual differences, then minimizing their need to think about the issue (majority influence) should allow individual differences in the need for cognition to emerge. If genuine interest among students is minimal (i.e., even high need for cognition students really do not "care"), then it would require a strong persuasion group manipulation like minority influence to maximize those individual differences.
There were no significant interactions among all three Tuition Hike Decision questions.
Friedman nonparametric analyses of Idea Space Page cognition data prevented direct testing of potential influence group by need for cognition interactions, but post-hoc comparisons do provide opportunities for indirect analysis. Results from both single and paired category ratings from the Idea Space Pages suggest that neither majority nor minority influence maximized differences between high and low need for cognition across all category ratings. Among the post-hoc analyses blocked on the need 109
for cognition, only one relevant and possible interaction
was obtained across all discussions and it was marginal.
Under minority influence, low need for cognition subjects
recorded more private, neutral (KN) comments than either
moderate or high need for cognition subjects. One
explanation may be that exposure to a minority influence,
which is hypothesized to encourage greater attention to
substantive information than majority influence, creates
more thinking, but in a non-specific direction among persons
with a low need for cognition. Since subjects are asked to
discuss information relevant to the topic, these vague ideas
remain unspoken.
Minority influence also maximized differences among
need for cognition levels after the third discussion session
significantly for public (L), and marginally for public,
supporting (LS) comments. In each case, high need for
cognition produced the most ideas. While the data are not
overwhelming, and the comparisons between influence groups
are made within and not between discussion sessions, they
still suggest that a minority source of influence can maximize individual need for cognition differences among
some Idea Space Page cognition categories. It seems
reasonable to conclude that more explicit individual differences would surface given a stronger distinction between minority and majority influence. 110
A different picture emerges by examining the data
obtained from the series of analyses blocked on the
influence group variable. The most consistent finding in
this regard was that among low need for cognition subjects,
minority influence produced marginally more opposing (O) and
public, opposing (LO) comments than majority influence. The
suggestion here is that some low need for cognition subjects
can be induced to produce some thoughts that are issue
relevant, but only against the direction of the persuasive
attempt. On the other hand, high need for cognition
subjects under minority influence may have either been so
bored that they could not be encouraged to talk out loud, or
too engaged in such "deep" thought that they required more
time to respond during the discussion sessions.
Examination of the influence group blocked analyses
within moderate and high need for cognition levels suggest an even more complex view. Subjects with a high need for cognition and an inducement to focus their thinking on issue content (minority influence) were induced to produce more
ideas publicly (L) only after the third discussion session.
Unexpectedly, moderate versus high or low need for cognition subjects under majority influence yielded marginally more public (L) ideas after the first discussion session and significantly more public, supporting (LS) ideas after the third discussion session. It is not clear why this might Ill
have occurred. In one way, the distinction between moderate and low need for cognition may be minimal. Moderates may be practically indistinguishable from low need for cognition subjects who are just as susceptible to changing their attitude toward a more anti-student point of view. At another level, the data here suggest that subjects with a moderate need for cognition differ from those with a low need for cognition because they are more willing to speak openly about their support for the confederate position.
Minority versus majority influence produced some other need for cognition differences. Under minority influence, high need for cognition subjects exerted greater effort and posed more questions than low need for cognition subjects. Also, one interpretation of the three-way interaction depicted in Figure 1 provides some further evidence for minority influence maximizing individual differences, particularly after the first and negligibly after the third, discussion sessions. It is not clear why this would not be the case during the second discussion.
Another possibility is that this interaction is essentially an anomaly or statistical artifact.
Under minority influence, high and moderate need for cognition subjects compared to those with a low need for cognition reported that other group members made fewer supporting tuition ban comments. Curiously, low need for 112
cognition subjects under minority influence reported the
highest number of supporting ban ideas voiced, especially
after the first discussion session. To these subjects who
care little for effortful and thoughtful deliberation,
exposure to a minority source might be initially arousing as
a novel stimulus, but the interest soon subsides. Without
actual tape recorded comments, there is no way to know which
subjects were more accurate than others in recalling what
other group members said.
The opposing ban comments dependent variable yielded
no such interesting results. No interactions with the
repeated measure were obtained.
Finally, an unexpected interaction was obtained from
the flyer returns. Subjects with a high need for cognition
under minority influence were more likely to return flyers
than subjects under any other combination of conditions. It
seems both of these conditions are necessary to produce a
sustained interest in the issue to the extent that subjects
seek more information about tuition decisions, even though the reasons they pursue this interest remain unclear.
General Discussion
Group Differences
While offering only a modest test of Latane's (1981) social impact theory and Moscovici's conformity/conversion 113 model of majority/minority influence differences, the results of the present study provide limited support for a minority's disproportionate influence upon individual judgment in a group setting (Moscovici, et al., 1969; Nemeth
& Wachtler, 1974; Maass & Clark, 1984; and Kruglanski &
Mackie, 1990). This does not imply that the social impact position of influence is without merit. Rather, differences between the two theoretical positions may be delineated in terms of social situation and selection of appropriate dependent measures. For example, the social impact approach to group influence may be more successful in predicting behaviors that are affected by aggregates and crowds than by interactive persons in socially functioning groups.
"Conversion," in Moscovici's terminology, may be more likely to occur in situations where subjects are more directly exposed to beliefs and opinions espoused by a clearly identifiable source of influence. Consequently, minority influence research employs dependent measures that utilize on-going, interactive modes of expression among subjects
(Maass & Clark, 1984), while social impact research relies more heavily on measures that need only a single exposure to an unwary target (Latane, 1981).
In the present study, subjects exposed to a minority point of view recorded marginally more total ideas, and more opposing, publicly opposing, and publicly neutral ideas in 114
response to whether or not students should be a part of a
tuition hike decision making process. A minority source of
influence also encouraged subjects to recall generating more
questions after the first discussion session, to recall
other group members making more opposing ban comments during
the discussion sessions, and to return more flyers
requesting more information about an organization supporting
the decision ban. Minority influence did not generally change subjects' attitudes regarding the tuition decision making ban, did not result in more issue-relevant or privately expressed comments produced during discussions, and did not encourage subjects to think harder than their majority influence counterparts.
For its part, the majority influence group generally persuaded more subjects to change their opinion toward a more favorable view of the ban, convinced them that other students would share this favorable position, and generated more ideas in support of the majority position immediately after the first discussion session.
It would appear that these differences could be explained partly by Moscovici & Personnaz's (1980) contention that a minority influence achieves results in the persuasion process by converting, not conforming as in response to a majority source of influence, other group members to the minority view. In their efforts to explain 115
the minority's novel position on a topic, other group
members should think more and think harder about the message
itself, paving the way for attitude change in the minority's
direction. Parenthetically, Petty & Cacioppo's (1986) dual-
track theory of persuasion predicted that subjects exposed
to a minority view would attend to message content,
resulting in more cognitive output. This theory did not
receive substantial support, though minority subjects produced more ideas and questions in the predicted direction compared to majority subjects. Finally, in accord with both theoretical approaches, conforming pressure from a majority did sway more subjects' "public" opinions, both in terms of attitude change and production of statements in support of the confederate position. These findings coincide with the bulk of literature on conforming behavior (Myers, 1990).
However, some unexpected results that distinguished minority from majority influence effects require further comment. The first consideration is why subjects under minority influence produced more opposing ideas and openly expressed them during the discussion session, compared to majority influence subjects. A plausible explanation is that minority influence creates the right conditions for
"reactance," a phenomenon long recognized by attitude change researchers, whereby subjects whose personal autonomy or freedom is threatened by exposure to opinions challenging 116
their own, seek to redress the perceived loss by confronting
the source of persuasion and producing self-supporting
counterarguments (Brehm, 1966, 1972; Petty & Cacioppo,
1981). Subjects faced with the prospect of losing the
freedom to take part in a tuition hike decision making process would naturally respond in a negative fashion.
Also, as a majority in a minority influence group, subjects may be more willing to publicly challenge the minority position.
Another reason why minority influence subjects may have seemed so reactive is that they were exposed to confederates who, despite training, employed the "wrong" behavioral style. Unless confederates clearly demonstrated their position with a consistent, confident and somewhat flexible voicing of alternatives to direct decision making, subjects may have paid more attention to confederates' manner and appearance (Lee & Ofshe, 1981). Nemeth (1983) pointed out that behavioral style is essential if minorities are to appear as legitimate representatives of their position and be taken seriously.
A second problem is why minority influence produced neither significantly more total ideas nor more issue relevant ideas than majority influence. One explanation of these findings may be bound to the nature of repeatedly exposing subjects to the sources of persuasion. Cacioppo 117
and Petty (1979) exposed students once, three or five
separate times to the proposition that university spending
increase with part of that expenditure funded by raising
tuition. Three exposures to the argument maximized the
number of supporting cognitive responses and minimized the
number of counterthoughts, with five exposures producing
counterattitudinal arguments in subjects. Like the present
study, however, the researchers admitted that increased
exposure was confounded with time, making it difficult to
determine which factor was responsible for the results.
Also, Cacioppo and Petty presented their issue to subjects
one time in a taped message per exposure, while the present experiment "constantly" confronted subjects with thought provoking information by engaging them in active discussion during each discussion session. It is possible, then, that either repeated exposure or length of exposure induced too many counterarguments and ultimately masked real potential differences between minority and majority influence.
Increasing subjects' actual time to think about the issue during the discussion or increasing the recording available after the discussion, while controlling for exposure frequency should alleviate this problem (Davis, Stasson,
Ono, St Zimmerman, 1988).
A more pernicious explanation, is that females in this study were burdened with the knowledge that women do 118
not have a long tradition in authoritative decision making
in university administrative matters. That is, confederates
not only had to take the unpopular position that student
decisions regarding tuition hikes should be curtailed, but
they also may have had to battle the prevailing stereotype
that women are unprepared for participating in money-
related, business-oriented decisions (Tavris & Offir, 1977).
Such a strong cultural belief may have masked true influence group differences. A discussion issue that minimizes
incorporation of imposed social myths would control for this potential confound.
An attribution approach to this second concern is the possibility that confederates were viewed as a distinct minority, but for the wrong reasons. Recent evidence suggests that even a trivial definition of what constitutes a minority in a group can influence other group members' behavior (Martin, 1988c). Thus, similar to the explanation proposed for an increased number of opposing ideas under minority influence, it may have been confederates' status characteristics, rather than their appropriate behavioral style, that prevented an overall increase in the production of issue-relevant ideas.
It is also possible that the prediction that minority influence would result in the production of more issue-relevant thinking is simply incorrect. Subjects may 119
be induced to think more, but that does not necessarily mean
that they will produce more coherently expressed ideas
relevant to a given topic. They may also need to
participate in a group that is designed to participate in
discussion toward a goal or end-point, a task not tested in
this study. An experimental manipulation that can more
precisely measure task-relevant thinking could shed light on
these concerns.
A third problem is why minority influence failed to
induce subjects to record more private ideas.
Traditionally, investigators have directly manipulated
public and private conditions in minority influence research
(e.g., Maass & Clark, 1983). Subjects in this study were
asked to determine for themselves whether their ideas were
public or private. They may not accurately distinguish
which ideas were kept to themselves and which were uttered out loud, in which case a possible remedy would be a comparison of self-ratings with audio-recorded verbal
statements. Then too, it may be socially desirable to minimize the number of privately generated ideas when one is asked to actively take part in a group discussion. The data did show that far fewer private than public ideas were recorded for all conditions, perhaps too few to reveal between-subjects differences. 120
One cautionary note for the present study concerns
how majority and minority influences may have been obscured
by confederates in two respects. First, while assistants
performed an admirable job repeating their programmed
comments from one experiment to another, responses to
subject commentary and to questions posed to them challenged
their ability to stick to the prescribed experimental format
and generate an equivalent number of statements regardless
of the influence group condition. Second, raters who later
catalogued confederate statements from the surviving audio
tapes may have been more likely to count statements made by
different confederates as essentially discrete, while being
more cautious in identifying separate comments made by the
same confederate. This artificial distinction could lead to
the questionable conclusion that more comments were made by
confederates in the majority condition. In addition, the
overall quality of the tapes was fair to poor. Despite a prime location for placement of the microphone near the discussants, acoustics at the Social Behavior Lab were
substandard. Many comments for some of the discussion
sessions were so indiscernible that some experimental groups had to be dropped from the analyses.
Earlier inter-rater reliability tests suggested the possibility that confederates in the majority condition might have spoken somewhat more frequently than in the 121
minority condition. Though minority influence subjects
recalled about as many supporting (N = 555) as opposing (N =
562) ideas made by all discussion group members, there is no
way to distinguish confederate from total group comments as
recalled by the subjects. Thus, the possibility of slight
differences between confederate participation in majority
and minority influence groups cannot be eliminated or
ignored. More careful training in the beginning and
periodically throughout the the conduct of the experiment
would help control for this nuisance variable.
A last consideration is the fact that subjects under
minority influence apparently exerted no more effort in
thinking about the issue than those under majority
influence. Nemeth (1986) argued that when people are
presented with a minority view, they are "stimulated" to
think in varied and creative (similar to Cacioppo's et al.,
1986, central persuasive track) ways not possible when pressed to comply under the influence of a majority. It is possible that exposure to the Need for Cognition instrument prior to the discussion sessions stimulated all subjects to think hard enough to mask real differences due to source of
influence. It is also conceivable that the importance of presenting oneself as a hard thinking subject in a group experiment obscures these same potential influence differences. 122
Individual Differences
The need for cognition construct was chosen as an
individual difference variable because it provided
alternative opportunities to examine differences between
minority and majority influence. First, on its own merit,
it was found that subjects with a high need for cognition
produced marginally more opposing ban ideas, expressed more
ideas publicly, and exerted greater cognitive effort than
low need for cognition subjects, all in accord with the
hypotheses of the study. Further, as predicted, low need
for cognition subjects shifted their attitudes most toward
the confederate position, produced significantly more
private and private, neutral ideas, as well as marginally
more neutral and private, supporting ideas.
The failure to obtain evidence in support of high
need for cognition subjects registering and recalling more
issue-relevant thoughts deserves special comment. Similar
to lack of results for subjects under minority influence,
high need for cognition subjects might have been overexposed
or simply grown tired of the cognitive response task.
Another possibility is that subjects with a high need for
cognition may produce more thoughts, but the way in which
they transfer those thoughts onto paper do not lend
themselves to simple tallying. It is not merely a matter of differences in verbal ability, for the evidence weakly 123
favors high need for cognition subjects with superior verbal
skills (Cacioppo, et al., 1983). Again, like those under
minority influence, high need for cognition subjects may
require more time to bring their strong analytic preference
to bear compared to subjects with other need for cognition
levels. It may also be difficult methodologically, for
example, to create measures that clearly distinguish an
idea, or discrete cognitive chunk of knowledge, from a
continuous stream of the subject's thinking process.
Refinement of the Idea Space Page instrument or alternative
forms of cognitive assessment are necessary to address this
concern.
The second reason for selecting the need for
cognition for persuasion research was to examine possible
interactions between it and source of social influence.
Kruglanski & Mackie (1990) note the paucity of evidence demonstrating interactions between individual difference variables and minority influence. The hypothesis that minority influence maximizes individual differences on need
for cognition in the present study did receive some support.
Especially intriguing was the finding that on the delayed behavioral measure, flyer returns, half of all of the responses fell into one cell, subjects with a high need for cognition under minority influence. This would seem to suggest that minority influence and a predisposition to 124
think with effort are both necessary to induce subjects to
act after the fact. Of course, those who seek more
knowledge are clearly not the subjects who were most
"persuaded" to change their opinion; low need for cognition
subjects and those under majority influence.
The persistence of this effect, though, is
problematic. According to Boninger, Brock, Cook, Cruder, &
Romer (1990), people who are told they will passively
passively receive future information, lack development of a
slightly more complex cognitive structure required to retain
new interest after exposure to an influence source. Persons
directed to transmit actively the relevant information to
others, however, do enrich their cognitive organization as
they rehearse what it is they must communicate. In other
words, more flyers might have been returned by subjects in
the present study if they had expected to disseminate
knowledge about restricting student tuition hike decision
making. If enduring attitude change is predicated, at least
in part, upon the future consequences of active behavior,
then Petty & Cacioppo's dual-track theory of persuasion may
require some revision.
The importance of combining a situational and an
individual difference variable constitutes the third purpose
for choosing the need for cognition in the present study.
Quite recently, the American Psychologist (Vol 53, No. 6, 125
1987) devoted an entire issue to the interaction of
individual characteristics and situational variables in
explaining social behavior. At least among social
psychologists, the need to integrate these two research
traditions is a matter of improving the predictability of
behaviors from one situation to another. Mischel (1973)
some years ago called for shifting the research emphasis
from elucidating externally controlled sources of behavior
to understanding the contribution of the individual's
cognitive ability to mediate such situational effects. If
the need for cognition represents one such strategy in
persuasion research, then further exploration in minority
influence should include, at least in part, the continued
examination of individual intentions and expectations as
they affect responses to persuasive appeals.
Implications for Future Research and Applied Settings
Mounting empirical evidence in favor of a unique
minority influence in groups is stimulating interest among
behavioral scientists. American social psychology, with a
few exceptions, historically supported the conforming, or
"normative" side of social influence research. Seeing the
individual as a weak pawn succumbing to the overwhelming power of the group, has kept to a minimum empirical efforts
in the study of group behavior (Steiner, 1974). Only 126
recently have some American social psychologists indicated a
willingness to join their European counterparts by
investigating more "informational" aspects of group
influence and the relative contributions of minority and
majority influence in groups.
For example, one current theoretical thrust
receiving greater scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic is
Tajfel's (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) concept of
"social identity." The theory predicts that individuals
identify with similar others because it boosts the
individual's self-esteem. Consequently, individuals are
expected to make intergroup comparisons which favor their
own group (Ng & Cram, 1988). Group membership should be
more salient to minorities than majorities, since the
formers' self-esteem would be bound to more intense and
enduring support of the minority position (Martin, 1988a;
1988b). In fact, Kelly (1990) found that minority members make stronger intergroup comparisons and may feel more confident to communicate their beliefs to the majority.
This field of group behavior also holds promise for conceptualizing leadership as a special case of minority
influence. While researchers have generally regarded minority members as having individually equal strength and status with their majority counterparts in a group, it is clear that a leader commands more power and attention then 127
other group members. Papastamou (1985) noted that a
majority can be influenced more by a single minority leader
than a larger leaderless minority group. Lortie-Lussier
(Lortie-Lussier, 1987; Lortie-Lussier, Lemieux, & Godbout,
1989) provided support for integrating Moscovici's (1980)
conversion hypothesis and Hollander's (1958) social exchange
approach under conditions of "innovation" in the group.
That is, when a leader has to implement a change in
normative behavior in the group, minority leaders received
attributions of assurance and determination (supporting
Moscovici's conversion premise), while majority leaders lost credit and power in the view of their followers (supporting
Hollander's idiosyncratic credit hypothesis). Bray and his colleagues (Bray, Johnson, & Chilstrom, 1982) caution that under stable conditions, a single leader extolling a minority view may be less effective than one who begins with the majority and then shifts to the "other" side as
Hollander (1964) had predicted. Deviance, whether under the guise of leadership or not, can be soundly rejected when rigid group norms are severely violated (Schacter, 1951; and
Miller Sc Anderson, 1979).
The idea of investigating and actually measuring cognitive processes is indicative of the kind of research currently in vogue in the field of social influence. Many social psychologists now accept the mediating role that 128
cognition probably plays in the way people respond to
persuasive communication (e.g.. Petty & Cacioppo, 1981;
Kihlstrom, 1987). Efforts to understand covert thought
processes in social influence have ranged from elaborate
inference of internal states (Festinger, 1957) to modern
computer simulations (Stasser, 1988). Again, the leadership
field may provide fertile ground for a merger of cognitive and social variables in minority influence research.
Fiedler's (1990) current leadership studies have pointed to the combination of an individual's "cognitive resources",
including practical intelligence and real world experience with group interaction, with external variables, including leader-group relations and environmental stress, all of which are vital in predicting different styles of successful leadership. If social psychologists wish to learn more about the conditions by which minorities and majorities exert influence in organizations or the political arena, they would do well to study individual as well as group factors. APPENDIX A
RELEVANT ISSUES PRE-TEST
129 130
CONSENT FORM
Your participation in the brief study today will consist of responding to two questionnaires. One will be a list of issues of potential concern to university students like yourself. The other will include a fictional profile of a student facing disciplinary actions by a university and your judgments concerning those actions. Thus the main purpose of this study is to examine current student perceptions of issues relevant to them in the university community. These questionnaires together should only take a few minutes to complete. When all questions are completed and returned, you will have an opportunity to discuss them and raise questions about them.
Consent Agreement
I have read the above statement and am consenting to participate in this study of my own volition. I understand that I am free to discontinue my participation at any time without recrimination. I understand that if I am dissatisfied with any aspect of this study at any time, I may report grievances anonymously to Steve Kronheim at (202) 885-1730, and/or the Chair of the American University Institutional Review Board, Dr. Peter Jaszi (202) 885-2638, and/or the Chair of the Psychology Department Human Subjects Committee, Dr. Brian Yates at (202) 885-1727. I also understand that all materials used in this study are confidential (my name will be stored in a locked place separate from other information collected in this study). One copy of this consent form is for the participant.
Signed: ______Date: 1 3 1
Aesrican_yniys[§it%_Issues_Li5t
Below you will find a list of important issues that already are or could conceivably be in the near future, hot topics of concern to students at American University. Please indicate the relevancy (how much you would personally be affected) of these issues by rank ordering then from most (assign the number "1') to least (assign the number *18*) relevant in the space provided, under ranking. Remember, you are being asked to indicate how imBSCÈÊOt these issues are to you. Then, after you have ranked the 18 items, judge how imporetant each is on a 7-point scale, where 7 is very important and 1 is not at all inporant. You may have ties on this scale. Place your judgment in the column under rating.
Banking Rating
Restricting the use of computer facilities in favor of graduate students and seniors.
Expelling student for any illegal alcohol or drug usage.
Selling contraceptives (condoms) in all university dormitories. Eliminating student evaluations of college courses.
Raising the drinking age to 21 on campus.
Increasing the number of required courses in your college (CAS, e t c . ).
Scheduling classes on Saturdays.
Instituting a dress code.
Conducting a voluntary prayer period for the first 2 minutes of each class.
Admitting students to the university on the basis of a racial/ethnic quota.
Enacting mandatory AIDS testing as a part of the physical exam requirement for admission.
Doubling the current fines for parking violations.
Reducing the number of hours that the library is open.
Abolishing all fast food franchises in Mary Sraydon Center.
Opening athletic facilities to community residents who reside near the university.
Preventing all fraternities and sororities from recruiting in dormitories.
Enacting sign-in visitation policies in dormitories. Raising the cost of tuition by 5%. 132
Below is a fictional, but possible, item one could read about in a university newspaper. Allerican University Tribune, February 12, 1909
Janet Greene became the first student expelled from Allerican University yesterday when she refused to submit to mandatory testing for the AIDS virus. Greene, 19, hao been evicted from her campus dormitory room nearly one month ago, pending final decision from the school's administrative board. Her expulsion reflects a recent policy "initiative" d e e m e d necessary by the board of trustees and the university's president, Robert Stone. "This is a private school and is subject to the rules and regulations of the board of trustees," Stone said when interviewed at the time of the policy announcement last August. "Our procedure merely follows recommendations of the National Commission on AIDS testing. All students, both new and presently attending, must comply with testing as a part of their physical health examination for admission to this school. Those who refuse are subject to immediate dismissal. The campus population must be protected from those who, conceivably, take part in irresponsible and perhaps even immoral sexual behavior," he added. Greene could not be reached for comment.
After reading the above account carefully, please answer all of the following questions as honestly as you can.
1. VOTE; Is the school's policy fair? Indicate your response with an "X" in the space provided.
YES NO DON'T KNOW ___
2. How do you think most students will vote? Indicate your response by marking an "X" somewhere on the line that corresponds with your answer.
FOR AGAINST
100% 75% 50/50 75% 100%
3. How confident are you that most students will vote the way you say they will? Indicate your response by marking an "X" somewhere on the line that corresponds with your answer.
ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT SOMEWHAT NEUTRAL SOMEWHAT NOT ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT CONFIDENT NOT CONFIDENT CONFIDENT NOT CONFIDENT APPENDIX B
INSTRUMENTS
133 134
CONSENT FORM
Your participation in the study today will consist of taking part in brief discussions of an important, topical issue facing all members of the academic community. You will be asked to respond to some general questions related to how much you like to think about various things. After each brief discussion, you will also be asked to respond to questions directly related to the discussion's topical issue. The main purpose of this study, then, is to examine the relationship between what students think about in general and what specific ideas they have pertaining to the discussion topic. The entire procedure will take approximately 1 hour to complete. At the conclusion of this study, you will learn more about the nature of the research. Because other subjects may still take part in the study, we cannot discuss results or disclose detailed infor mation at this time. But you will receive a complete summary of the study once idl data has been collected. Should you have any other questions or concerns at that time, you are encouraged to contact any one of the individuals listed below.
Consent Agreement
I have read the above statement and am consenting to participate in this study of my own volition. I understand that I am free to discontinue my participation at any time without recrimination. I understand that if I am dissatisfied with any aspect of this study at any time, I may report grievances anonymously to Steve Kronheim at (202) 885-1730, and/or the Chair of the American University Institutional Review Board, Or. Peter Jaszi (202) 885-2638, and/or the Chair of the Psychology Department Human Subjects Committee, Dr. Brian Yates at (202) 885-1727. 1 also understand that all materials used in this study are confidential (my name will be stored in a locked place separate from other information collected in this study). One copy of this consent form is for the participant.
Signed:
Date; PLEASE NOTE
Copyrighted materials in this document have not been filmed at the request of the author. They are available for consultation, however, in the author’s university library.
Attitudes Toward Thinking 135
University Microfilms International 136
TUITION HIKE DECISION
One of the issues that concerns all members of the university community is the rising cost of a college education. IVaditionally, students have had a very limited role in affecting decisions about tuition hikes. Clearly, they have to bear the brunt of these payments. Given this situation, please indicate your position on this matter by responding to the statements below:
1. Should students be kept out of the formal decision making process regarding tuition hikes? Indicate your response by marking an "X" somewhere on the line that corresponds with your answer.
absolutely agree slightly neutral slightly disagree absolutely agree agree disagree disagree
2. How do you think most students will vote? Indicate your response by marking an ”X” somewhere on the line that corresponds with your answer.
absolutely agree slightly neutral slightly disagree absolutely agree agree disagree disagree
3. How confident are you that most students will vote the way you say they will? Indicate your response by marking an ”X” somewhere on the line that corresponds with your answer.
absolutely confident somewhat neutral somewhat not confident absolutely confident confident not confident not confident 137
IDEA SPACE PAGE (1)
Below you will find 12 equally spaced large boxes. Please list each and every thought or idea you had relevant to this 1st discussion period, one thought per large box. Do not concern yourself with the smaller boxes just yet. The thoughts you list can be those expressed in the discussion as well as those that merely crossed your mind. Detail is not that important; list as many separate thoughts as you can. Be as thorough as possible. There are no wrong or tight answers. You will have 2-3 minutes to list your ideas.
Ist2nd latZnd lst2nd
When your experimenter announces that your time is up, please indicate in the 1st column along the left margin of each box whether the idea you wrote was SAID OUT LOUD (by writing the capital letter ”L”) during this 1st discussion or KEPT TO YOURSELF (by writing the capital letter "K").
When you have done this for each idea, please indicate in the 2nd column along the left margin of each box whether the idea you wrote SUPPORTED (by writing the capital letter "S"), OPPOSED (by writing the capital letter "O”) or was NEUTRAL (by writing the capital letter ”N”) to banning student participation in tuition hike decision making. 138
QUESTIONS PAGE (1)
1. To what extent were you trying bard to think about this issue during this 1st discussion? (Mark an ”X" anywhere along the line that corresponds to your answer.)
not hard at all somewhat hard extremely hard
2. How much effort did you put into thinking about this issue? (Mark an "X" anywhere along the line that corresponds to your answer.)
not much at all some very much
3. About how many questions do you think you posed to other group members during this 1st discussion period (give your best estimate)? (Circle the number that corresponds to your smswer.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15+
4, About how many statements, SUPPORTING the banning of student participation in formal tuition hike decision making, do you think were made by all group members, including yourself, during this 1st discussion period (give your best estimate)? (Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20+
5. About how many statements, OPPOSING the banning of student participation in formal tuition hike decision making, do you think were made by all group members, including yourself, during this 1st discussion period (give your best estimate)? (Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20+ 139
IDEA SPACE PAGE (2)
Below you will find 12 equally spaced large boxes. Please list each and every thought or idea you had relevant to this 1st discussion period, one thought per large box. Do not concern yourself with the smaller boxes just yet. The thoughts you list can be those expressed in the discussion as well as those that merely crossed your mind. Detail is not that important; list as many separate thoughts as you can. Be as thorough as possible. There are no wrong or right answers. You will have 2-3 minutes to list your ideas.
Ist2nd lst2nd IstZnd
11 11 ■ ■ _U
1 1 1
J_
_L 1
When your experimenter announces that your time is up, please indicate in the 1st column along the left margin of each box whether the idea you wrote was SAID OUT LOUD (by writing the capital letter ”L”) during this 1st discussion or KEPT TO YOURSELF (by writing the capital letter "K”).
When you have done this for each idea, please indicate in the 2nd column along the left margin of each box whether the idea you wrote SUPPORTED (by writing the capital letter ”S”), OPPOSED (by writing the capital letter ”0") or was NEUTRAL (by writing the capital letter "N”) to banning student participation in tuition hike decision making. 140
QUESTIONS PAGE (2)
1. To what extent were you trying hard to think about this issue during this 2nd discussion? (Mark an ”X” anywhere along the line that corresponds to your answer.)
not hard at all somewhat hard extremely hard
2. How much effort did you put into thinking about this issue? (Mark an ”X” anywhere along the line that corresponds to your answer.)
not much at all some very much
3. About how many questions do you think you posed to other group members during this 2nd discussion period (give your best estimate)? (Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15+
4. About how many statements, SUPPORTING the banning of student participation in formal tuition hike decision making, do you think were made by all group members, including yourself, during this 2nd discussion period (give your best estimate)? (Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20+
5. About how many statements, OPPOSING the banning of student participation in formal tuition hike decision making, do you think were made by all group members, including yourself, during this 2nd discus sion period (give your best estimate)? (Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20+ 141
IDEA SPACE PAGE (3)
Below you will find 12 equally spaced large boxes. Please list each and every thought or idea you had relevant to this 1st discussion period, one thought per large box. Do not concern yourself with the smaller boxes just yet. The thoughts you list can be those expressed in the discussion as well as those that merely crossed your mind. Detail is not that important; list as many separate thoughts as you can. Be as thorough as possible. There are no wrong or right answers. You will have 2-3 minutes to list your ideas.
Ist2nd lst2nd lst2nd
When your experimenter announces that your time is up, please indicate in the 1st column along the left margin of each box whether the idea you wrote was SAID OUT LOUD (by writing the capital letter ”L") during this 1st discussion or KEPT TO YOURSELF (by writing the capital letter "K”).
When you have done this for each idea, please indicate in the 2nd column along the left margin of each box whether the idea you wrote SUPPORTED (by writing the capital letter "S"), OPPOSED (by writing the capital letter ”0 ”) or was NEUTRAL (by writing the capital letter ”N”) to banning student participation in tuition hike decision making. 142
QUESTIONS PAGE (3)
1. To what extent were you trying hard to think about this issue during this 3rd discussion? (Mark an ”X" anywhere along the line that corresponds to your answer.)
not hard at all somewhat hard extremely hard
2. How much eUbrt did you put into thinking about this issue? (Mark an ”X” anywhere along the line that corresponds to your answer.)
not much at all some very much
3. About how many questions do you think you posed to other group members during this 3rd discussion period (give your best estimate)? (Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15+
4. About how many statements, SUPPORTING the banning of student participation in formal tuition hike decision making, do you think were made by all group members, including yourself, during this 3rd discussion period (give your best estimate)? (Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20+
5. About how many statements, OPPOSING the banning of student participation in formal tuition hike decision making, do you think were made by all group members, including yourself, during this 3rd discussion period (give your best estimate)? (Circle the number that corresponds to your answer.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20+ 143
TUITION HIKE DECISION
One of the issues that concerns all members of the university community is the rising cost of a college education. Tkaditionally, students have had a very limited role in affecting decisions about tuition hikes. Clearly, they have to bear the brunt of these payments. Given this situation, please indicate your position on this matter by responding to the statements below:
1. Should students be kept out of the formal decision making process regarding tuition hikes? Indicate your response by marking an ”X” somewhere on the line that corresponds with your answer.
absolutely agree slightly neutral slightly dir-zree absolutely agree agree disagree disagree
2. How do you think most students will vote? Indicate your response by marking an ”X” somewhere on the line that corresponds with your answer.
absolutely agree slightly neutral slightly disagree absolutely agree agree disagree disagree
3. How confident are you that most students will vote the way you say they will? Indicate your response by marking an "X" somewhere on the line that corresponds with your answer.
absolutely confident somewhat neutral somewhat not confident absolutely confident confident not confident not confident 144
1. What did you think this experiment was about?
2. What did you like or dislike about this experiment? 145
STUDENTS FOR FAIR TUITION
Students for Fair Tuition* is a college based organization dedicated to maintaining affordable higher education for all. While supporting actions that keep the expense of college reasonable, we believe that the student's role in the decision making process is limited and should not be a part of the formal tuition hike decision itself. We encourage students to use other means to express their views. If you are interested in learning more about our organization, simply complete the form below and return this brochure in the self-addressed stamped envelope provided.
«Students for Fair Tuition is a non-profit organization, not affiliated with American University.
Name:
Address: APPENDIX C
PROCEDURAL PROTOCOL
146 147
1. Subjects arrive at Social Behavioral Laboratory
entrance. One confederate is already seated, one
confederate arrives with the other subjects.
Experimenter: "Hello. I will be conducting your experiment
today in small group behavior. Please quietly take a seat
and we will begin shortly."
2. All participants are present and seated.
Experimenter: "I am now passing out two copies of Consent
Forms to each of you for this experiment."
Consent Forms are distributed.
Experimenter: "Please read the Consent Form carefully, sign
it, and put today's date on the lines provided. When you
are done, return it to me. The extra copy is provided for
your own records."
3. All participants have signed and returned Consent Forms.
Experimenter: "Today you will be taking part in a series of
brief discussions on a topic of interest to all members of
the academic community. You will be asked to complete a few
questions related to the topic before, during, and after
these discussions. You will also be asked to answer some questions related to your general interest in thinking about 148
various things. There are no right or wrong answeres for
any of these questions. We want you to be as honest in your
responses as you can. Remember, your answers are completely
confidential."
Experimenter; "The entire experiment should take
approximately one hour. Before we begin, do you have any
questions?"
4. The Attitudes Toward Thinking questionnaire (Need for
Cognition) is introduced and distributed.
Experimenter; "OK, before we begin the actual brief
discussion periods, we wish to learn about how much you like
to think about various things. General interests that
students have probably affect, in turn, their concerns for more specific university issues. Therefore, your responses
to this general questionnaire will help us establish some
basic understanding about what interests you."
Questionnaire is passed out.
Experimenter: "Please read the directions carefully as I read them out loud."
Directions at top of Attitudes Toward Thinking questionnaire read. 149
Experimenter: "Let me give you an example. Let's say that
the first statement on the questionnaire read, 'I enjoy
fishing.' If you enjoy fishing just a little bit, your
response could be, 'slight agreement,' and you would make your 'X' on or near the space on the line which corresponds with the designated phrase, 'slight agreement'."
Experimenter: "When you done, turn the questionnaire over and I will collect it. Any questions? OK, you may begin."
When the last Attitudes Toward Thinking questionnaire is turned over, experimenter collects them.
5. First Tuition Hike Decision form is introduced.
Experimenter: "Let's continue. We've begun taking a serious look at the kinds of university issues that concern undergraduate students such as yourselves. One topic that often surfaces is the cost of going to college. Tuition always seems to increase. We thought one good avenue to explore is students' ideas regarding who should make the important decisions in determining how much tuition should be at a school like American University. So today you will get a chance to discuss this topic."
Experimenter: "For example, consider the following issue."
Tuition Hike Decision Forms are distributed. 150
Experimenter: "Please read the directions carefully as I
read them out loud."
Directions at top of Tuition Hike Decision Form are read.
Experimenter: "OK, when you are done answering the
questions, please turn the Tuition Hike Decision form over
and I collect it. Any questions? OK, you may begin."
When the last Tuition Hike Decision Form is turned over,
experimenter collects them. Experimenter pages through
forms.
Experimenter: "OK, I'm just taking a quick look at these
results. It seems that most people (in the majority
condition) responded to the issue toward the 'disagree' end
of the scale (if participants in minoirty condition, then
told that most subjects indicated response on the 'agree'
end of the scale)."
6. First Discussion Session is introduced.
Experimenter: "OK, now we're ready to begin the first of three discussions on the specific university issue you just considered. That is, we would like you to take a few minutes to discuss among yourselves, whether or not college students should be kept out of the formal decision making process regarding tuition hikes. Feel free to speak your 151
mind. Raise any points you believe to be pertinent to the
issue. While you may feel a little uncertain about speaking
to other group members. I'm sure you'll get the hang of it
right away. I bet each of you has some ideas you can
share."
Experimenter: "I will move to the other room (separated by a partition) so my presence won't disturb your discussion.
Your comments will be recorded to give us the opportunity to examine them more carefully. Your discussion remains absolutely confidential. You will not be video-taped."
Experimenter: "You'll have about four to six minutes for discussion. When I return, we'll continue with some questions and the repeat the process a couple of more times.
Any questions? OK, when I leave the room, you may begin."
Experimenter leaves room.
First Discussion Confederate Comments are spoken in the following order:
What Students Can Do (Category A): "Well, our parents could write letters expressing their opinions to the tuition committee."
What Students Cannot Do (Category B): "As students, we don't have any real power in making university decisions, so why bother here?" 152
Students with Decision Making Power (Category C): "If we did have power, we could be attracting all of the power- crazy students with extreme ideas who would turn off everybody else."
General Economics (Category D); "Students wouldn't have to worry about tuition hikes if there was another tuition payment plan available— like an installment plan averaged out over four years of school.
7. First Idea Space Page is introduced. Experimenter returns from behind the partition.
Experimenter; OK, time for the first discussion is up. Now
I have some questions I would like you to respond to.
First, we are interested in finding out about the ideas you had during the course of this first discussion."
First Idea Space Pages are distributed.
Experimenter; "Please read the directions at the top of the
Idea Space Page carefully as I read them out loud."
Experimenter reads directions.
Experimenter: "Let me give you an example. Let's say that the discussion topic was whether or not students should be 153
required to attend Saturday morning classes. In the large
box on the Idea Space Page, an idea you might have had and
wrote here could be, 'more flexible schedule', or 'miss
Saturday morning cartoons.'"
Experimenter: "When time is up, we will concern ourselves
with the smaller boxes in the upper left-hand corners of each large box. Any questions? OK, you may begin."
Two and a half minutes have passed.
Experimenter: "OK, time is up. Now please read the directions at the bottom of the Idea Space Page carefully as
I read them out loud."
Experimenter reads directions.
"Let me give you an example. Let's say that the discussion topic was, again, whether or not students should be required to attend Saturday morning classes. (Experimenter points to example in one Idea Space Page box) If you wrote, 'more flexible schedule' in the large box, but the idea had not been said out loud during this first discussion, then in the small box under the column labeled, '1st,' you would write the letter, 'K' (indicated in example). Also, since your idea generally supports the discussion topic, then in the small box under the column labeled, '2nd,' you would then write the letter, 'S' (also indicate in example)." 154
Experimenter; "Any questions? Please make these notations
for each idea. When you are done, turn the Idea Space Page
over and I will collect it. OK, you may begin."
When the last Idea Space Page is turned over, experimenter
collects them.
8. First Questions Page is introduced and distributed.
Experimenter: "Please read each of the five questions on
this page and answer them as honestly as you can. Remember,
these questions refer to this first discussion only. Any
questions? When you are done, turn the page over and I will
collect it. OK, you may begin."
When the last Questions Page is turned over, experimenter
collects them.
9. Second Discussion Session is introduced.
Experimenter: "OK, we're ready to begin the second of three
discussions. The topic remains the same: whether or not
college students should be kept out of the formal decision making process regarding tuition hikes. Again, feel free to
speak your mind and raise any points you believe are pertinent to the issue. While I am gone, you will have another four to six minutes of discussion and when I return. 155
we'll continue with our Idea Space Page and Questions Page.
Any questions? OK, when I leave the room, you may begin."
Experimenter leaves room.
Second Discussion Confederate Comments are spoken in the
following order;
What Students Cannot Do (Category B): "Most of us probably
shouldn't have a say in who decides about tuition because we
don't pay for it."
Students with Decision Making Power (Category C): "If we
had our way, we would probably lower tuition and that would
mean less money for the library, career center, computer
center, upkeep on buildings, and utilities."
General Economics (Category D); "I don't want to sound too harsh, but if students don't like how much is costs to go to
school, they can go somewhere else. After all, car buyers can't tell General Motors how much their cars should cost."
What Students Can Do (Category A): "Our parents could use their influence or connections with a member of the tuition committee to raise issues to the chairperson or other members." 156
10. Second Idea Space Page is introduced. Experimenter
returns from behind partition.
Experimenter: "OK, time for the second discussion is up.
Here is the second Idea Space Page."
Second Idea Space Page is distributed.
Experimenter: "As a reminder, please read the directions at
the top of the Idea Space Page carefully. When time is up,
we'll concern ourselves with the smaller boxes in the upper
left-hand corners of each large box. Any questions? OK,
you may begin."
Two and a half minutes have passed.
Experimenter: "Time is up. Now please read the directions
at the bottom of the Idea Space Page carefully. Please make
your notations for each idea. When you are done, turn the
Idea Space Page over and I will collect it. Any questions?
OK, you may begin."
When the last Idea Space Page is turned over, experimenter
collects them.
11. Second Questions Page is introduced and distributed.
Experimenter: "Please read each of the five quesions on
this page carefully and answer them as honestly as you can. 157
Remember, these questions refer to this second discussion
only. When you are done, turn the page over and I will
collect it. Any questions? OK, you may begin."
When the last Questions Page is turned over, experimenter
collects them.
12. Third Discussion Session is introduced.
Experimenter; "OK, we're ready to begin the third and final
discussion. You will continue to cover the topic of whether
or not college students should be kept out of the formal decision making process regarding tuition hikes. Again,
feel free to speak your mind and raise any points you believe are pertinent to the issue. While I am gone, you will have another four to six minutes of discussion and when
I return, we'll continue with our Idea Space Page and
Questions Page. Any questions? OK, when I leave the room, you may begin."
Experimenter leaves room.
Third Discussion Confederate Comments are spoken in the following order;
Students with Decision Making Power (Category C): "Let's say that students did have formal decision making power. If we could and did decide to lower tuition, we'd end up with poorer teachers and a lousier education." 158
What Students Can Do (Category A): "You know, we don't need
to be on the tuition committee; we could advertise our
concerns and write to the school newspaper."
General Economics (Category D); "Look, you're a student,
and if you want to attend a particular school, you'll find a
way to pay for it no matter what it costs."
What Students Cannot Do (Category B); "Hmmm, we don't have
access to all the information that administrators have in
order to make an informed opinion."
13. Third Idea Space Page is introduced. Experimenter
returns from behind partition.
Experimenter; "OK, time for the third discussion is up.
Here is the third Idea Space Page."
Third Idea Space Page is distributed.
Experimenter; "As a reminder, please read the directions at
the top of the Idea Space Page carefully. When time is up,
we'll concern ourselves with the smaller boxes in the upper
left-hand corners of each large box. Any questions? OK, you may begin."
Two and a half minutes pass. 159
Experimenter; "OK, time is up. Now please read the
directions at the bottom of the Idea Space Page carefully.
Please make your notations for each idea. When you are
done, turn the Idea Space Page over and I will collect it.
Any questions? OK, you may begin."
When the last Idea Space Page is turned over, experimenter
collects them.
14. Third Questions Page is introduced and distributed.
Experimenter; "Please read each of the five questions
carefully on this page and answer them as honestly as you
can. Remember, these questions refer to this third
discussion only. When you are done, turn the page over and
I will collect it. Any questions? OK, you may begin."
When the last Questions Page is turned over, experimenter collects them.
15. Second Tuition Hike Decision form is introduced.
Experimenter; "Now that you've had a chance to discuss this university issue, we'd like you to once again respond to the
Tuition Hike Decision Form."
Second Tuition Hike Decision form is distributed. 160
Experimenter; "Please read the directions carefully. When
you are done turn the Tuition Hike Decision Form over and I
will collect it. Any questions? OK, you may begin."
When the last Tuition Hike Decision form is turned over,
experimenter collects them. Experimenter pages through
forms.
Experimenter; "OK, I'm just taking a quick look at these
results. It seems that most people (regardless of influence
group condition) indicated some change from the 'disagree'
toward the 'agree' end of the scale."
16. Debriefing Questions introduced.
Experimenter; "OK, before we finish up today, I wanted to
ask you a couple of questions concerning your thoughts about
this experiment."
Debriefing questions are distributed.
Experimenter; "Please read these questions carefully and
answer them as honestly as you can. I'll give you just a
few minutes for your comments. When you are done, turn the page over and I will collect it. Any questions? OK, you may begin." 161
When the last Debriefing Questions page is turned over,
experimenter collects them.
17. Oral debriefing is conducted.
Experimenter: "OK, let me tell you a bit more about today's
experiment. As you may have guessed, we were interested in
learning about you thoughts and ideas regarding the topic of
tuition hike decisions and how talking about them in a
discussion might change your initial judgment or opinion.
We also thought that your attitudes and effort might change
over time— thus we asked you to take part in three separate
discussions and fill out the corresponding number of forms.
"On the Idea Space Pages and the Questions Pages, we asked
you to indicate the number of thoughts you had and the
number of statements you recalled other group members making. We are hypothesizing, in part, that people who are more thoughful and recall more information, are more likely
to change their initial attitude.
"Finally, the very first form you completed took a look at your general interest in thinking about things. We hope to compare those results with your discussion participation to see if those people who prefer thoughtful activities are more or less likely to change their attitude. 162
"I want to thank you for your participation and remind you
that each of you will receive a complete summary of these
experimental findings if you put your name and address of
the sheet I am now circulating around the room."
Address sheet is circulated around the room.
Experimenter: "I also want to remind you that it is
extremely important not to dicuss the details of this
research among your friends or acquaintences. We are still collecting information and, as you can imagine, if word got out about the nature of the study, it could have a serious effect on how other potential subjects would respond in the discussion and on the forms. We are very grateful for your understanding and cooperation in this matter."
Experimenter opens door of lab as confederate is waiting just outside.
Experimenter: "Oh, before you go, I see that (confederate's name) who represents a college organization would like to talk to you for a minute."
18. Students for Fair Tuition organization introduction.
Confederate: "Hello, my name is (confederate's name) and I represent the Students for Fair Tuition organization. I got word through the Psychology Department that Mr. Kronheim was 163
conducting research pretty relevant to our cause, so I got
permission from him to talk to you for just a minute.
"Students for Fair Tuition is a group of people, like
yourselves, dedicated to maintaining affordable higher
education for all. We are in the process of contacting
various universities to see who might be interested in
learning more about our goals and activities.
"I only have a minute, so I would like to give each of you a
copy of a flyer which includes the name of our organization
and a place for you to indicate whether or not you would
like to learn more about us. We need your responses as soon
as possible so a self-addressed stamped envelope is included
for your convenience."
Confederate distributes Students for Fair Tuition flyers and
envelopes.
Confederate; "Thanks for your time.°
Confederate leaves. Participants leave.
Experimenter; "Thank you for coming today." APPENDIX D
FINAL DEBRIEFING
164 165
Experiment 6: Group and Individual Differences in Minority Influence
Dear Participant,
Below is a brief summary of experimental research in which you were a subject. Your contribution was significant and helped advance the scientific study of social influence processes. Should you wish to learn more about the nature of the study, please feel free to contact the principal investigator (Steve Kronheim) or faculty advisor (Tony Ahrens) c/o the psychology department at American University.
Sincerely,
IN WHAT EXPERIMENT DID I PARTICIPATE?
You participated in a study conducted in the Social Behavior Lab during Spring or Fall 1988, or Spring 1989. You were in a group of 6 persons and asked to complete a number of questionnaires before, during, and after three discussions. First, you responded to a general questionnaire examining how much you like to think about various things. Second, you indicated your position concerning the following topic: "Should students be banned from making formal decisions about tuition hikes?" You also answered questions about how you thought other students would vote and what your level of confidence was for your decision. Third, you took part in a series of three 5-minute discussions covering the tuition hike issue. After each discussion, you indicated the number of relevant ideas you had and coded them in two ways: 1) whether they were verbalized or kept to yourself during each discussion and, 2) whether th-.v- supported, were neutral to, or opposed the issue. You also responded to questions concerning how hard you were thinking about the issue and how well you could recall the number of statements all group members made. Finally, you once more indicated your position on the tuition hike issue and left your address if you were interested in learning more about the results of this study.
WHAT WAS THIS EXPERIMENT REALLY ABOUT?
Most subjects correctly noted in the debriefing questions that this was an experiment about persuasion in small groups. However, under investigation were two very important concepts that have received some study in recent years. We were first interested in finding out whether or not subjects would respond differently (if they changed their opinion, produced more relevant ideas, etc.) if exposed to a majority or minority of group members espousing opinions contrary to their own. Thus, you were randomly assigned to either one of these groups in which the other "subjects" (4 persons if majority, 2 persons if minority) were actually trained by the experimenter. Second, there is some evidence that individuals differ on the extent to which they prefer thinking about various things ("need for cognition"). By putting these two variables together, we might obtain a clearer picture of how the persuasion process works.
WHAT ARE THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT?
As expected, subjects in the majority condition tended to conform somewhat to 4 persons advocating an opposing position and shifted their tuition hike decisions toward the majority view. The minority condition showed a weaker effect in the same direction. Also, the lower the need for cognition, the more subjects changed their attitude. Perhaps those who think "harder" solidify their position and are less willing to be influenced. There were no differences in level of confidence for any of the main conditions. Early results on the idea space pages show subtle effects. There are few significant findings over time (from first to last discussions), but more overall ideas were said out loud in support of the ban, particularly by subjects with a higher need for cognition or exposed to a majority source (one interesting exception is discussed below). It came as no surprise that most subjects reported that they were trying harder in subsequent as opposed to initial discussions. Most also indicated that they eiyoyed the experiment regardless of the condition they were in. 166
One final point should be addressed. You will recall that at the end of the experiment, a representative of the "Students for Fair Tuition” organization asked you to return a fiyer with your name and address if you were interested in learning more about their activities; this in spite of the fact that the fiyer clearly stated that the organization supported banning students from formal decision making in tuition hikes. In fact, the rep was another trained experimenter assistant. We hypothesized that subjects in the minority condition would demonstrate a "delayed" persuasion effect. Exposure to a minority source might cause subjects to focus more on the topic of discussion rather than be influenced by the number of group members disagreeing with them. After all, why would those 2 people have such a different opinion? Thus, unlike those who more quickly and publicly conform to majority opinion, subjects in the minority groups might require more time to think about the issue and want more relevant information. This is exactly what happened. More fiyers were returned by subjects in the minority groups. However, it was actually those subjects with a high need for cognition in minority groups who exhibited this delayed effect the most. W hat makes this finding so fascinating is that high need for cognition subjects changed their tuition hike decisions least! Moreover, this same special group of subjects increased their "smd-out-loud” idea production in support of the ban &om one discussion to the next.
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