The Beginning of the Cold War
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1943 Tehran Conference
O N F C E R N E A N R C H E E T T E E H C R N A E N R E C F O N Europe in December 1943 Tehran Territories – owned, occupied, controlled by: Axis Western Allies Soviet Union conference Neutral countries 28 November – Moscow SOVIET UNION UNITED Berlin KINGDOM 1 December NAZI 1943 GERMANY ITALY Tehran IRAN The first meeting between the Big Three took place at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, Iran. Iran had been occupied by the UK and USSR since 1941. Joseph Stalin selected and insisted on the location. The conference was codenamed Eureka. After the conference, the Big Three issued two public statements: “Declaration of the Three Powers” and “Declaration on Iran”. They also signed a confidential document concerning military actions. World map in December 1943 © Institute of European Network Remembrance and Solidarity. This infographic may be downloaded and printed be downloaded may infographic This Network Remembrance and Solidarity. © Institute of European purposes. https://hi-storylessons.eu educational and not-for-profit only for (citing its source) in unchanged form 22–26 November Circumstances First Cairo Conference – Chiang Kai-shek (leader of the Republic of China), Churchill and Roosevelt 194314-24 January 23 August discuss the fight against Japan Casablanca Conference (Churchill, Soviet victory over Germany at the until unconditional surrender and Roosevelt and Charles de Gaulle) Battle of Kursk. The Red Army’s the reclaiming of seized territories. – where the leaders resolved offensive begins on the Eastern to continue fighting until an Front. unconditional surrender (without 194114 August any guarantees to the defeated F.D. -
Title of Thesis: ABSTRACT CLASSIFYING BIAS
ABSTRACT Title of Thesis: CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis Directed By: Dr. David Zajic, Ph.D. Our project extends previous algorithmic approaches to finding bias in large text corpora. We used multilingual topic modeling to examine language-specific bias in the English, Spanish, and Russian versions of Wikipedia. In particular, we placed Spanish articles discussing the Cold War on a Russian-English viewpoint spectrum based on similarity in topic distribution. We then crowdsourced human annotations of Spanish Wikipedia articles for comparison to the topic model. Our hypothesis was that human annotators and topic modeling algorithms would provide correlated results for bias. However, that was not the case. Our annotators indicated that humans were more perceptive of sentiment in article text than topic distribution, which suggests that our classifier provides a different perspective on a text’s bias. CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Gemstone Honors Program, University of Maryland, 2018 Advisory Committee: Dr. David Zajic, Chair Dr. Brian Butler Dr. Marine Carpuat Dr. Melanie Kill Dr. Philip Resnik Mr. Ed Summers © Copyright by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang 2018 Acknowledgements We would like to express our sincerest gratitude to our mentor, Dr. -
The Consideration of the Yalta Conference As an Executive Agreement
University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Student Work 8-1-1973 The consideration of the Yalta Conference as an executive agreement John Brayman University of Nebraska at Omaha Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork Recommended Citation Brayman, John, "The consideration of the Yalta Conference as an executive agreement" (1973). Student Work. 372. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/372 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE AS AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT A Thesis Presented to the Department of History and the Faculty of the Graduate College University of Nebraska at Omaha In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts John Brayman August, 1973 UMI Number: EP73010 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI EP73010 Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 THESIS ACCEPTANCE Accepted for fee facility of The Graduate College of fee University of Nebraska at Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts, Graduate Committee: Name Departmin Chairman THE CONSITERATION GP :THS YALTA CONFERENCE AS AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT : The story of the Yalta Conference is a complex and a difficult one. -
The Atlantic Charter (1941). Source: Samuel Rosenman (Ed.), Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D
THE ATLANTIC CHARTER (1941). SOURCE: SAMUEL ROSENMAN (ED.), PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, VOL. 10, 1938-1950, 314 The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known cer- tain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world. First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forci- bly deprived of them; Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security; Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want; Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance; Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. -
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin: the Role of the Personal Factor in Success and Failure of the Grand Alliance
Geoffrey Roberts Professor of Irish history at the national University of CORK, member of the Royal historical society, senior research fellow Nobel Institute Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin: The Role of the Personal Factor in Success and Failure of the Grand Alliance Introduction It is often said that Grand Alliance was forced into existence by Hitler and fell apart as soon as Nazi Germany was defeated. But neither the formation of the Grand Alliance nor its collapse was inevitable. Both were the result of personal choices by the leaders of the alliance. Without Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin there would have been no Grand Alliance against Hitler in the sense that we understand that term today.60 Hitler posed a dire existential threat to both Britain and the Soviet Union, and to the United States the prospect of perpetual conflict. Britain had been at war with Germany since September 1939 and it is not surprising that the three states formed a military coalition when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 and then, in December, declared war on the United States. But the Grand Alliance that developed during the war was much more than a military coalition of convenience; it was a far-reaching political, economic and ideological collaboration. At the heart of this collaboration were the personal roles, outlooks and interactions of the three heads of state. Without the personal alliance of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin – the Big Three as they became known during the war - the Grand Alliance would have been stillborn or would 60 “Grand Alliance” is the term commonly used in the west to describe the anti-Hitler coalition of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. -
Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies
YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES Matthew M. Grossberg Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of History, Indiana University August 2015 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee ______________________________ Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair ______________________________ Michael Snodgrass, Ph. D. ______________________________ Monroe Little, Ph. D. ii ©2015 Matthew M. Grossberg iii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many of the History Department at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and sincerely acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following: Dr. Anita Morgan, Dr. Nancy Robertson, and Dr. Eric Lindseth who rekindled my love of history and provided me the push I needed to embark on this project. Dr. Elizabeth Monroe and Dr. Robert Barrows for being confidants I could always turn to when this project became overwhelming. Special recognition goes to my committee Dr. Monroe Little and Dr. Michael Snodgrass. Both men provided me assistance upon and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Snodgrass patiently worked with me throughout my time at IUPUI, helping my writing progress immensely. Dr. Little came in at the last minute, saving me from a fate worse than death, another six months of grad school. Most importantly, all credit is due Dr. -
Yalta Conference, 1945
Yalta Conference, 1945 DIRECTOR CRISIS MANAGER MODERATOR Roberto Fusciardi Lucy Faria Leila Farrow CRISIS ANALYSTS Tammy Cheng Sheldon Stern Rachel DeGasperis Maeve Redmond UTMUN 2020 Yalta Conference, 1945 Contents Content Disclaimer 2 UTMUN Policies 3 Equity Concerns and Accessibility Needs 3 A Letter from Your Director 4 Background 5 The War 5 Previous Conferences 7 Setting 10 Topics 11 Germany 11 Poland 11 Japan 12 Eastern Europe 12 The United Nations 13 Points to Remember 15 Allies and Loyalty 15 War and Diplomacy 15 Leaders and Subordinates 15 Characters 15 Bibliography 16 1 UTMUN 2020 Yalta Conference, 1945 Content Disclaimer At its core, Model United Nations (MUN) is a simulatory exercise of diplomatically embodying, presenting, hearing, dissecting, and negotiating various perspectives in debate. Such an exercise offers opportunities for delegates to meaningfully explore possibilities for conflict resolution on various issues and their complex, even controversial dimensions – which, we recognize, may be emotionally and intellectually challenging to engage with. As UTMUN seeks to provide an enriching educational experience that facilitates understanding of the real-world implications of issues, our committees’ contents may necessarily involve sensitive or controversial subject matter strictly for academic purposes. We ask for delegates to be respectful, professional, tactful, and diplomatic when engaging with all committee content, representing their assigned country’s or character’s position, communicating with staff and other delegates, and responding to opposing viewpoints. The below content warning is meant to warn you of potentially sensitive or triggering topics that are present in the formal content of this background guide, as well as content that may appear in other aspects of committee (e.g., debate, crisis updates, directives), so that you can either prepare yourself before reading this background guide or opt-out of reading it entirely: Some of the content discussed in this guide and this committee deals with sensitive subject matter. -
World War II
World War II 1. What position did George Marshall hold during World War II? A. Commanding General of the Pacific B. Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army C. Army Field Marshall of Bataan D. Supreme Officer of European Operations 2. Which of the following best explains why President Harry S. Truman decided to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II? A. He wanted the war to last as long as possible. B. He wanted to wait for the USSR to join the war. C. He wanted Germany to surrender unconditionally. D. He wanted to avoid an American invasion of Japan. 3. What impact did the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor have on World War II? A. Italy surrendered and united with the Allies. B. The Pacific Charter was organized against Japan. C. Japan surrendered to the Allies the following day. D. It pulled the United States into World War II. 4. The picture above is an iconic image from World War II and symbolizes which of the following? A. the women who ferried supplies into combat areas during the war B. the millions of women who joined the workforce in heavy industry C. the important work done by Red Cross nurses during World War II D. the women who joined the armed forces in combat roles Battle of the Bulge The Battle of the Bulge, initially known as the Ardennes Offensive, began on December 16, 1944. Hitler believed that the coalition between Britain, France, and the United States in the western region of Europe was not very powerful and that a major defeat by the Germans would break up the Allied forces. -
The Entry of Turkey Into World War Ii
THE ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO WORLD WAR II by HARRY N. HOWARD * During World War II the Turkish Republic, as was natural in view of its strategic position at the international crossroads, was of great interest to both the Axis powers and the nations against them, including the United States. A nonbelligerent ally of Great Britain and France, based on the preliminary agreements of May-June 1939 and the treaty of October I g, 1939, as the war moved down through the Balkan Peninsula during 1940-1941, there was much with the attitude of Turkey, particularly after Italian entry into the struggle in June 1940 and the attack on Greece on October 28, 1940, and the advance of German forces into Rumania and then Bulgaria, with the ultimate Nazi aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece on April 5-6, 1941. During January-February 1941 President Roosevelt sent Col. William J. Donovan to this troubled region to stimulate resis- tance to the Nazis, and Turkey and the United States seemed in basic agreement to the outlook toward the war. But Turkey remained a nonbelligerent substantially until the end of the war, although Ame- rican entry into the conflict on December 7, 1941, without doubt, had a very positive influence in Ankara, and the defense of Turkey was declared vital to that of the United States under the Lend-Lease Act. * Harry N. Howard is Professor of Middle East Studies, The School of Inter- national Service, The American University, Washington, D. C., and a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer. He is the author, inter alia, of 7-he Partition of Turkey (1931), The Problem of the Turkish Straits (1947), and The King-Crane Commission (1963). -
Between the Wars and World War Two Chapter Outline
www.ck12.org CHAPTER 5 Between the Wars and World War Two Chapter Outline 5.1 WILSON DESIRES "A JUST PEACE" 5.2 RISE OF FASCISM AND TOTALITARIANISM IN EUROPE 5.3 ISOLATIONISM 5.4 ROOSEVELT’S RESPONSE TO A TROUBLED WORLD 5.5 ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR PROPELS THE UNITED STATES INTO WORLD WAR II 5.6 COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN WORLD WAR II AND MAJOR THEATERS OF WORLD WAR II 5.7 WARTIME STRATEGY 5.8 INDIVIDUAL SACRIFICES WERE MADE BY MANY 5.9 IMPORTANT INDIVIDUALS OF WORLD WAR II 5.10 JAPANESE AMERICANS OUTCASTED IN WAKE OF PEARL HARBOR 5.11 WOMEN ANSWER THE CALL AT HOME AND ABROAD 5.12 WORLD WAR II AND AFRICAN AMERICANS 5.13 WORLD WAR II AT HOME 5.14 MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DURING WWII 5.15 TENNESSEE’S IMPACT ON WORLD WAR II 5.16 MANHATTAN PROJECT 5.17 AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE HOLOCAUST 5.18 YALTA AND POTSDAM CONFERENCES 5.19 FORMATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND CORDELL HULL 5.20 REFERENCES Students analyze the inter-war years and America’s participation in World War II. US.54 ... Examine the impact of American actions in foreign policy in the 1920’s, including the refusal to join the League of Nations, the Washington Disarmament Conference, and the Kellogg Brand Pact. (H, P) US.55 ... Gather relevant information from multiple sources to explain the reasons for and consequences of American actions in foreign policy during the 1930’s, including the Hoover Stimson Note, the Johnson Debt Default Act, and the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1937, and 1939. -
What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War II
A Thesis entitled “Uncle Joe”: What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War II by Kimberly Hupp A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of The Masters of Liberal Studies ______________________________ Advisor: Dr. Michael Jakobson ______________________________ College of Graduate Studies University of Toledo May 2009 1 2 An Abstract of “Uncle Joe”: What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War II by Kimberly Hupp A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of The Master of Liberal Studies University of Toledo May 2009 A thesis presented on the American public opinion of Josef Stalin before and after World War II beginning with how Russia and Stalin was portrayed in the media before the war began, covering how opinions shifted with major events such as the famine, collectivization, the Great Terror, wartime conferences, the Cold War and McCarthyism. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ................................................................................................................ii Table of Contents................................................................................................iii Acknowledgements .............................................................................................v List of Figures……………………………………………………………….vii List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………… .viii Introduction......................................................................................................... -
Abrief History
A BRIEF HISTORY OF RUSSIA i-xxiv_BH-Russia_fm.indd i 5/7/08 4:03:06 PM i-xxiv_BH-Russia_fm.indd ii 5/7/08 4:03:06 PM A BRIEF HISTORY OF RUSSIA MICHAEL KORT Boston University i-xxiv_BH-Russia_fm.indd iii 5/7/08 4:03:06 PM A Brief History of Russia Copyright © 2008 by Michael Kort The author has made every effort to clear permissions for material excerpted in this book. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher. For information contact: Facts On File, Inc. An imprint of Infobase Publishing 132 West 31st Street New York NY 10001 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kort, Michael, 1944– A brief history of Russia / Michael Kort. p. cm.—(Brief history) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8160-7112-8 ISBN-10: 0-8160-7112-8 1. Russia—History. 2. Soviet Union—History. I. Title. DK40.K687 2007 947—dc22 2007032723 The author and Facts On File have made every effort to contact copyright holders. The publisher will be glad to rectify, in future editions, any errors or omissions brought to their notice. We thank the following presses for permission to reproduce the material listed. Oxford University Press, London, for permission to reprint portions of Mikhail Speransky’s 1802 memorandum to Alexander I from The Russia Empire, 1801–1917 (1967) by Hugh Seton-Watson.