THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
Aspectus and Affectus in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Faculty of the
School of Theology and Religious Studies
Of The Catholic University of America
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
©
Copyright
All Rights Reserved
By
Brett W. Smith
Washington, D.C.
2018
Aspectus and Affectus in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste
Brett W. Smith, Ph.D.
Director: Joshua Benson, Ph.D.
This study offers the first full historical and systematic exposition of the aspectus/affectus
distinction in the thought of Robert Grosseteste (c.1168-1253). Grosseteste used aspectus
(vision) to name the cognitive power of the soul and affectus (feeling or desire) for the appetitive
power.
This study finds that the aspectus/affectus distinction is an important key to
understanding a web of interrelated themes in Grosseteste’s thought. Not only are the doctrines
accompanying these terms fundamental to his psychology, but they also have important
connections to his metaphysics, his doctrine of salvation, his view of spiritual formation, and his
theory of knowledge. The study finds that three themes consistently accompany Grosseteste’s
use of this distinction: the priority of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the
inseparability of knowledge and love. The priority of the aspectus describes Grosseteste’s belief
that knowledge (or perception and judgment) must come before love or desire, at least logically.
The primacy of the affectus refers to the ability of the affectus either to contract or to expand the
range of things knowable to the aspectus, as well as its prerogative to govern the operation of the
aspectus. The inseparability of knowledge and love describes the dynamic between aspectus and
affectus according to which the powers are mutually dependent in performing their proper actions.
The study contains two parts, in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. The first part, containing chapters one and two, provides the context in which one can understand
Grosseteste’s use of aspectus and affectus. Chapter one provides an overview of relevant secondary literature, and chapter two investigates the sources of Grosseteste’s thought related to aspectus and affectus. Part two explains the meaning and significance of the aspectus/affectus distinction, and it is divided into two sections. The first section, encompassing chapters three, four, and five, treats primarily the meaning of the distinction but also addresses questions of development and consistency through the course of Grosseteste’s career. The second section of the second part contains chapters six through eight and explores the significance of aspectus and affectus to diverse areas of Grosseteste’s thought.
This dissertation by Brett W. Smith fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in
Historical Theology approved by Joshua Benson, Ph.D., as Director, and by Mark Clark, Ph.D., and John Grabowski, Ph.D., as Readers.
______
Joshua Benson, Ph.D., Director
______
Mark Clark, Ph.D., Reader
______
John Grabowski, Ph.D., Reader
ii
To Melissa, who shares equally in this achievement.
iii
“Ipse amor est ipsa veritatis noticia.”
Love itself is the very knowledge of truth.
--Robert Grossteste, Dictum 91
“Tantum autem amatur, quantum fide aut intelligentia comprehenditur.”
But [the Trinity] is loved to the degree that It is comprehended by faith or understanding.
-- Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.4.1
iv Table of Contents
List of Tables not in Appendices………………………………………………………………...vii
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………..viii
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….1
Part 1: The Aspectus/Affectus Distinction in Context
Ch. 1: The Secondary Literature………………………………………………....32
Ch. 2: Sources of the Aspectus/Affectus Distinction……………………………..55
Appendix 2: A textual comparison showing that Philip the Chancellor does not attribute the De Spiritu et Anima to Isaac of Stella……………………...…..100
Part 2: The Meaning and Significance of the Aspectus/Affectus Distinction
Section 1: Aspectus and Affectus as the Basic Powers of the Rational Soul
Ch. 3: A “Theme Song of His Life”: The endurance and basic meaning of the Aspectus/Affectus distinction…………………………………………...………102
Appendix 3A: Is there freedom in the De Artibus Liberalibus ?...... 143
Appendix 3B: The occurrence of aspectus and affectus in Dictum 100 according to five manuscripts………………………...……………………...147
Appendix 3C: Working edition of an important passage in Dictum 71 ……..149
Appendix 3D: Working edition of an important passage in Dictum 51 ……..152
Appendix 3E: Aspectus, Affectus, and Related Concepts Chronologically Considered………………………………………………………………...…152
Ch. 4: Questions of Consistency and Continuity……………………………….154
Appendix 4A: Grosseteste’s schemata of the rational soul………………….194
Appendix 4B: Schema of the soul in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat displayed in four charts……………………………………………………………………195
Ch. 5: The Metaphysical Questions…………………………………………….198
Appendix 5A: Working edition of Dictum 32 ……………………………….255
Appendix 5B: Working edition of a sentence in Dictum 36 ………………...256 v Section 2: The Influence of Aspectus and Affectus in Grosseteste’s Theology and Philosophy
Ch. 6: Aspectus and Affectus in Grosseteste’s Doctrine of Salvation…………..258
Ch. 7: Aspectus, Affectus and Grosseteste’s Doctrine of Reforming the Divine Image in Man…………………………………………………………………...281
Appendix 7: The Problem of the Disordered Affectus ………………………310
Ch. 8: Aspectus and Affectus in Grosseteste’s Epistemology…………………..315
Appendix 8A: Some texts in Grosseteste that suggest a degree of special illumination in this life………………………………………………………364
Appendix 8B: Working edition and translation of the conformity account in Dictum 91 ……………………………………………………………………366
Conclusion………………………………………...……………………………………………372
List of Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………………...390
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………391
vi List of Tables not in Appendices
Works of Robert Grosseteste……………………………………………………………………………………..9-10
The Representative Basis of this Study Across the Time Periods and Genres of Grosseteste’s Works…………………………………………………………………………………………….13
vii Acknowledgments
Any project of this magnitude and scope is necessarily collaborative. While I owe a general debt of gratitude to all of my professors and colleagues at the Catholic University of
America and to the broader circle of scholars working on Robert Grosseteste, including the investigators of the Ordered Universe Project, a few individuals (at least) merit special mention.
My director, Joshua Benson, and my readers, John Grabowski and Mark Clark, have been great.
Their suggestions and questions have significantly improved the quality of this study. Dr.
Benson, in particular, has been a wonderful director. I actually enjoyed writing this thing, and that is thanks in large part to him. I also owe Dr. Benson thanks for having sparked my interest in Grosseteste. Neil Lewis has looked at parts of the study and offered helpful and generous feedback at various points. In fact, significant sections are deeply indebted to his input, as I indicate in the footnotes. Others who have shared helpful information in response to my queries include Joseph Goering, F.A.C. Mantello, James Ginther, Andrew Whitmore, and Andrew Cuff.
I am further indebted to Dr. Mantello for teaching me the paleographical skills without which this study would have been quite impoverished. Finally, Adrian Walker and Zachary Keith generously checked some of my Italian translations and interpretations. Any mistakes, of course, are purely my own.
viii Introduction
Robert Grosseteste (c.1168-1253) was the first lecturer in the Franciscan studium at
Oxford (c.1229-1235) and later the bishop of Lincoln (1235-1253), a very large and important diocese in England. He was a polymath. In the first half of the thirteenth century, he was the only individual, as far as we know, who was both a serious theologian and a competent translator from Greek into Latin. He wrote about the origin of the universe and advanced scientific knowledge concerning the nature of the rainbow. He commented on Aristotle and on Scripture.
He lectured, preached, translated, and wrote over a span of forty years (and probably more) during his long and active life.
Scholars who study Robert Grosseteste are well aware of the fact that he liked to use the terms aspectus (lit. “vision”) and affectus (lit. “desire” or “affection”) in reference to the soul. 1
Beyond this basic observation scholars have scarcely investigated the meaning Grosseteste
attaches to these terms, and the summaries they have offered have not provided a conclusive
synthesis of what the aspectus/affectus distinction really means for Grosseteste. All accounts
agree, however, that it is important. 2 A study of aspectus and affectus is indispensable, therefore,
for reaching a greater understanding of Grosseteste’s theological anthropology, which in turn
undergirds his highly significant pastoral writings3 and influences later thinkers. 4 I offer the
present study in response to this need.
1 This awareness is manifest in the title of the volume Aspectus et Affectus: Essays and Editions in Grosseteste and Medieval Intellectual Life in Honor of Richard C. Dales, ed. Gunar Freibergs (New York: AMS Press, 1993). Even in this volume, however, only the introduction by Richard Southern actually deals with the aspectus/affectus distinction (“Richard Dales and the Editing of Robert Grosseteste,” 3-14). 2 See chapter 1 for discussion of these studies. 3 This is evident in his use of aspectus and affectus in the letters he wrote as bishop, in addition to its appearance in his other pastoral writings. See for example Templum Dei 21.3 , where Grosseteste locates (using the ablative case) a twofold contemplation in the aspectus and the affectus (Robert Grosseteste, Templum Dei, ed. Joseph Goering and F.A.C. Mantello [Toronto, PIMS, 1984], 66); W. A. Pantin has observed that Grosseteste as bishop was careful to 1 2
In order to introduce this study, I will do four things. First, I will give a brief overview of
Grosseteste’s life, as far as it is known. Such a biography is necessary in part because
Grosseteste is not a widely known figure and in part because aspects of the chronology of his life have a bearing on my argument in chapter three. After his life, I will discuss the corpus of his works as it relates to the present study. Thirdly, I will introduce the aspectus/affectus distinction.
Finally, I will summarize the goal and structure of the entire study.
The Life of Robert Grosseteste
Much about Robert Grosseteste’s life is still debated or uncertain. I will begin with an account of the dates and facts that are broadly accepted. Then I will discuss the period of uncertainty. 5
apply his learning to pastoral and political problems: “There was nothing of the escapist or introvert about a schoolman like Grosseteste; he was agonizedly aware of contemporary society, and convinced that his doctrine could be applied to it. He was prepared to apply a suitable dose of scripture allegory, or Aristotle, or cosmology, or the pseudo-Denis to almost any problem.” (William Abel Pantin, “Grosseteste’s Relations with the Papacy and the Crown,” in Robert Grosseteste: Scholar and Bishop, ed. D. A. Callus [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955], 178). 4 See the discussion of D.A. Callus on aspectus and affectus in chapter 1. Callus identifies specific thinkers influenced by Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction. 5 For a concise overview of the basic facts and options for reconstructing Grosseteste’s life, see Neil Lewis, “Robert Grosseteste,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2013 Edition)
3
Robert Grosseteste was probably born to a poor family in Suffolk around 1168-1170.
Little is known about his early life, but it appears that he spoke Anglo-Norman for his first language. He was a “master” at the household of the bishop of Lincoln by 1192. 6 He was for some time associated with the household of the bishop of Hereford. Some time before 1198, when the household disbanded, Gerard of Wales praised him to the bishop, William de Vere, as one learned in the Liberal Arts, Law, and Medicine.
The next event on which all can agree is that Robert Grosseteste received a benefice in
England in 1225 and another in 1229. He wrote a letter to Adam of Oxford (or “Rufus,” or “of
Exeter”) in response to a question around 1225-1228. He began teaching in the Franciscan studium at Oxford in about 1229. He retained that position until he was elevated to the bishopric of Lincoln in 1235. From 1235 until his death in 1253 he was the bishop of Lincoln, which was probably the largest diocese in England. His life during this last period is well-documented. 7
The time of uncertainty, that is, the period in which no one knows for sure where Robert
Grosseteste was or what he was doing, runs from about 1198 to about 1229, when Robert was about 30-60 years old. Every source I have seen assumes that he would have sojourned in century to 1953, see James McEvoy, “Robertus Grossatesta Lincolniensis: An Essay in Historiography, Medieval and Modern,” in Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition, ed. Maura O’Carroll (Rome: Instituto Storico Dei Cappuccini, 2003) , 21-99. McEvoy’s essay traces the history of Grosseteste historiography in three strands: Franciscan, Baconian (i.e., scientific and philological), and English. 6 Richard Southern, Robert Grosseteste, second edition, lvii. 7 See Philippa M. Hoskin, ed. Robert Grosseteste as Bishop of Lincoln: The Episcopal Rolls, 1235-1253 (Suffolk, UK, Rochester, NY: Lincoln Record Society, 2015). See also Angelo Silvestri, Power, Politics and Episcopal Authority: The Bishops of Cremona and Lincoln in the Middle Ages (1066-1340) (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015). Silvestri gives Grosseteste a very important place in the history of the bishops of Lincoln: “…in one way he performed in England the same role performed by St Francis of Assisi in Italy. Grosseteste constituted the watershed between two different ways of thinking and between two different ways of acting” [i.e., religious compromise with politics versus a division between religious and political values] ( Power, Politics, and Episcopal Authority, 268-269). He suggests that Grosseteste’s legacy of keeping the bishop focused on moral and religious matters rather than politics was a significant factor helping the subsequent bishops of Lincoln to retain religious power, while the more politically compromising bishops of Cremona lost most of their power (Ibid., 272).
4
France at least during the interdict of 1208-1214, but what he did while there is anyone’s guess. 8
Apart from this, there is some data, but it admits of multiple interpretations. There was a Robert
Grosseteste occasionally witnessing documents in the area of Hereford, but there was also a
Robert Grosseteste marrying and raising at least three children in Paris. Both have plausible claims to being our Robert. Hereford was Robert’s old home, so it would make sense for him to return and settle there, or to visit on occasion. On the other hand, the Parisian Robert was evidently a friend of William of Auvergne, 9 as was our Robert. 10 So, the two named Robert
Grosseteste could be relatives, which would explain how they both happen to know William of
Auvergne, or they could be the same man.
There are three major views that compete to explain where Grosseteste was and what he was doing from 1198 to 1229. 11 Daniel Callus thought that Grosseteste taught the arts at Oxford
before the interdict, studied theology at Paris from 1209-1214, and then taught theology at
Oxford. Richard Southern then argued that Grosseteste was employed in provincial
administration in the area of Hereford before and after the interdict and did not study theology
during his five-year sojourn in France. He then began teaching theology at Oxford in the mid-
1220s while more or less educating himself in theology. Most recently, Joseph Goering argued
8 Pope Innocent III placed England and Wales under interdict from 1208-1214. There was also a suspension of scholars in Oxford from 1209-1214. For an overview of the basic facts of the interdict, see Christopher Robert Cheney, “King John and the Papal Interdict,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 31, 2 (1948): 295-301. 9 William was a witness on the cartulary that connects Robert Grosseteste with the Parisian family. See N.M. Schulman, “Husband, Father, Bishop?: Grosseteste in Paris,“ Speculum 72 (1997): 338. 10 In Letter 78 Grosseteste refers to William as his dear friend. See discussion in Schulman, “Husband, Father, Bishop,” 337. 11 Lewis, “Robert Grosseteste,” n.p. The summary I give here is based partly on Lewis and partly on my general reading. See also Callus, “Oxford Career,” 42-72; Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 1-69; Southern, Robert Grosseteste ; Joseph W. Goering, “When and Where,” 17-51.
5 that Grosseteste taught the arts, perhaps in Hereford, perhaps elsewhere, before and after the interdict. He did not study theology during the interdict, but he did eventually study theology in
Paris, in the mid-1220s. Then in the late 1220s he taught the arts at Oxford.
An additional view many have accepted is that, whatever Grosseteste was doing before
1229, he was not a master in theology, but he only incepted as a master at Oxford either just before or at the time when Agnellus of Pisa hired him to teach the Franciscans in about 1229. 12
This is the view of James Ginther. 13 Ginther points out that the new and small group of
Franciscans in England would not have been able to attract a famous master in theology to teach them, so Grosseteste was more likely “an outsider.” He claims, “There is no evidence that they chose him because of his well-known reputation as a regent master; historians have only inferred this fact.” 14
This is not the place to attempt a full reconstruction of Grosseteste’s life. I should explain, however, why I do not find Ginther’s argument conclusive, since the question will surface in connection with Grosseteste’s inception sermon ( Dictum 19 ) in chapter three. First,
Adam of Oxford asked Grosseteste’s opinion on a doctrinally hot topic—whether God was the
12 On the establishment of the Franciscan studium at Oxford, see Michael Robson, The Franciscans in the Middle Ages (Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell Press, 2006), 61-62. On page 62, Robson refers to Grosseteste as “one of the luminaries of Oxford” before his engagement with the Franciscans and refers to Agnellus’s invitation to him as “audacious.” Neslihan Şenocak assumes a similar scenario, stating that Grosseteste was “a famous regent master in theology at the University of Oxford” before he began to teach the Franciscans in their own studium (Neslihan Şenocak, The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order, 1209-1310 [Ithaca, NY, London: Cornell University Press, 2012], 59) . 13 James R. Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 3-5. 14 Ginther, Sacred Page, 4. As one can see in note 12 above, some went on inferring this fact after Ginther published his book.
6 first form of all things—between 1225 and 1228, 15 before he was a master in theology, on
Ginther’s construction. Now, Adam was a master himself, perhaps a master of arts. If he were to ask an opinion of someone else, he probably would have asked someone he considered more qualified than himself. Pope Honorius III had condemned a version of the statement in question in 1225, and this condemnation circulated in France and England. 16 Thus, it appears that the
statement was potentially problematic on theological grounds. This supposition receives at least
some support from the almost defensive manner in which Grosseteste begins his apology for the
statement by appealing to “the great authority of the great Augustine.” 17 It would make more sense for Adam to ask a master of theology about such a matter, rather than a master of arts.
Additional evidence in support of the idea that Grosseteste had a theological reputation at
Oxford appears in the very words that tell us the Franciscans hired him. We are told not merely that they hired him but that Agnellus “procured ( impetravit ) from Master Robert Grosseteste of
holy memory that he should read to the brothers there.” 18 That sounds to me like it was a
significant achievement to get him. While it is possible that the significance of the acquisition
was not known until later, we should not simply assume that such is the case. It remains a real
15 This is the date range given by Mantello and Goering in Robert Grosseteste, The Letters of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, translated with introduction and annotation by F.A.C. Mantello and Joseph Goering (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 35. 16 See Mantello and Goering, Letters, 35-36. 17 Robert Grosseteste, Letter 1 (ed. Henry Richards Luard, in Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Quondam Lincolniensis Epistolae, Rolls Series [London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1861], 1-2): “Si autem quaeras quid me moveat ad sentiendum Deum esse formam et formam omnium, respondeo, magna magni Augustini auctoritas.” 18 Thomas of Eccleston, Fratris Thomae vulgo dicti de Eccleston Tractatus de Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam, ed. A.G. Little (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1951), 48: “Ampliato loco, ubi principale studium florebat in Anglia, et ubi universitas scholarium convenire consuevit, fecit frater Agnellus scholam satis honestam aedificari in loco fratrum, et impetravit a sanctae memoriae magistro Roberto Grosseteste, ut legeret ibi fratribus. Sub quo inaestimabiliter infra breve tempus tam in quaestionibus quam praedicationi congruis subtilibus moralitatibus profecerunt.”
7 possibility that the acquisition was significant because Grosseteste generously chose (initially) to take on the Franciscan studium even though he was already busy as a regent master in theology.
I am not arguing that Grosseteste positively was a master in theology before he began to teach the Franciscans. I am only suggesting that Ginther has not established the contrary.
I will summarize what I take to be the state of the question concerning when and where
Grosseteste began to teach theology. I follow Goering’s hypothesis that Grosseteste studied in
Paris in the mid-1220s. Perhaps he was an official student, perhaps not. He probably incepted as a master in theology at some point, since he appears to have an inception sermon. 19 This
inception likely occurred either at Paris or at Oxford somewhere between about 1225 and 1229.
In any case, he performed the tasks normally associated with a master—reading, disputing, and
preaching—at least at the Franciscan studium from about 1229 to 1235. 20 If he incepted sooner,
then he also began these tasks sooner, for either the University of Paris or the University of
Oxford (or both in succession). 21
As for the rest of the period of uncertainty, running from 1198 to the mid-1220s, exactly where Grosseteste was and what he was doing remains hard to say. I think we can say that
Grosseteste taught the arts before the interdict, perhaps in the area of Hereford. 22 This could
19 See the discussion of Dictum 19 in chapter 3. 20 James Ginther has found evidence of these three tasks in the corpus of Grosseteste’s extant works. See Ginther, Sacred Page , 13-20 and James Ginther, “The Super Psalterium in Context,” in Editing Robert Grosseteste: Papers Given at the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, University of Toronto, 3-4 November, 2000, ed. Evelyn A. Mackie and Joseph Goering (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2003), 48. 21 The precise relationship between the Franciscan studium at Oxford and the university itself remains uncertain, so the mere fact that he performed the tasks of a master for the Franciscans does not constitute proof that he was a master of the sacred page in the eyes of the university. This fact must be established on other grounds, such as the existence of an inception sermon. 22 See the discussion of De Artibus Liberalibus in chapter 3.
8 have concluded by 1198, if Grosseteste went to France at that time, or it could have continued until interrupted by the interdict in 1208 or the suspension of scholars that followed in 1209.
Beyond this basic data, the details of his life before the mid-1220s are not very important to the present study.
The Works of Robert Grosseteste
This is not the place for a comprehensive review of all Grosseteste’s extant works, and
others have performed this task recently enough. 23 For most of Grosseteste’s works that I have
consulted in this study, I will introduce each work when I first make important use of it in my
argument. Here I will simply list all of Grosseteste’s extant works to give an idea of the breadth
of his corpus. 24 Alternative titles appear in parentheses. Works of questionable authenticity
appear with a (?). Scientific works accepted by James McEvoy 25 but later marked as spurious by
Cecilia Panti 26 appear with a (†).
23 The most recent overview of all Grosseteste’s extant works may be found in James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), passim. There is a more recent listing of works given by Stephen Hildebrand in his Introduction to Robert Grosseteste, On The Cessation of the Laws, trans. Stephen Hildebrand (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 10-13, but Hildebrand’s list is not exhaustive. 24 To compile this list, I began with the list prepared by James Ginther available at www.grosseteste.org, and then I supplemented and changed it by consulting various other sources. I also changed some names to match my usage in this dissertation. There may be still other minor works that have escaped my attention, but I have at least aimed at comprehensiveness. The only truly comprehensive list may be found in Samuel Harrison Thomson, The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940) , vii-xv. Since a good number of the works Thomson confidently ascribes to Grosseteste have subsequently been rejected just as confidently by later scholars, I have decided not to include works here on Thomson’s authority alone. Nevertheless, it is possible that Thomson’s list includes some genuine works that have simply not received attention since his time. 25 See James McEvoy, “The Chronology of Robert Grosseteste’s Writings on Nature and Natural Philosophy,” Speculum 58 (1983), 655. This study, along with several others on Robert Grosseteste, may also be found reprinted in James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, Exegete and Philosopher, CS 446 (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1994). 26 See Cecilia Panti, ”Robert Grosseteste and Adam of Exeter’s Physics of Light: Remarks on the Transmission, Authenticity, and Chronology of Grosseteste’s Scientific Opuscula,” in Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies, edited by John Flood, James R. Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering, Papers in Medieval Studies 24 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2003), 185.
9
Biblical Theological Theological Anglo-Norman Pastoral Commentaries Commentaries Works Works Works
Hexaëmeron Expositio De Cessatione The Castle of Love Meditaciones Canonis Legalium De Decem Missae Confessioun (?) Quoniam Mandatis De Universi Cogitatio commentaries Complecione Statuta Familiae Super on the Pseudo- Deus Est Psalterium Dionysian De Dotibus Reulles (?) corpus Perambulavit Expositio in two prayers in Judas (?) epistolam Sancti Lambeth Palace 27 Pauli ad 499 (?) De Penitencia Galatas David The Marriage of the Glossarum in Nine Daughters of Notus In Sancti Pauli the Devil Iudea Deus Epistolas (confessional fragmenta formula) (Glosses on the Pauline Templum Dei Epistles) a set of Lecturae in Episcopal Epistolam Ad statutes Romanos (?) Translations Philosophical Philosophical Scientific Other from Greek Commentaries Works Opuscula Works
The Testaments Commentary De Anima (?) Calendarium (†) Conferences of the Twelve on the Physics Patriarchs (Commentarius De Artibus Computus I (†) Dicta in VIII Libros Liberalibus selections from Physicorum (DAL) Computus Documents the Suda Aristotelis) Correctorius presented at De Finitate the Papal The Pseudo- Motus et Computus Minor curia (Lyons, Dionysian Temporis (Computus II) (†) 1250) Corpus (with Greek scholia) De Calore Solis (†)
27 I accept the manuscript’s claim that Grosseteste used to say these prayers regularly, but whether he wrote them himself is another question.
10
Translations Philosophical Philosophical Scientific Other from Greek Commentaries Works Opuscula Works (continued) (continued) (continued) (continued) (continued)
The comments on De Forma Prima De Colore Letters Nicomachean The Omnium (Letter Ethics of Nicomachean 1) De Cometis Sermons Aristotle (with Ethics of Greek Aristotle De Intelligenciis De Differenciis Tabula commentaries) (Letter 1) Localibus Commentary De Libero The De Caelo on the De Generacione Arbitrio (in two of Aristotle Posterior Sonorum recensions) Analytics De Generacione De (CPA) De Luce Laudabilibus (Commentarius Stellarum (†) Bonis (a in Libros De Motu De Accessu et fragment of the Analyticorum Corporali et Recessu Maris Eudemian Posteriorum Luce (De Fluxu et Ethics ?) Aristotelis) De Ordine Refluxu Maris) (†) a work on the paraphrase on Emanandi De Impressionibus passions by the Prior Causatorum a Aeris (†) Pseudo- Analytics (?) Deo Aristotle Quod homo sit De Impressionibus six minor works minor mundus Elementorum of John (?) De Iride Damascene De Potentia et Actu De Lineis, Angulis a re-translation et Figuris of John De Scientia Dei Damascene’s De Motu De Statu De Fide Supercaelestium Orthodoxa Causarum De Subsistentia De Natura The Ignatian Locorum Epistles (?) Rei De Veritate De Operacionibus Solis De Veritate Proposicionis De Sphaera
11
Special challenges in Grosseteste’s corpus. From this chart one can see that Grosseteste wrote on all manner of topics across nearly every genre available to him. In addition to the sheer scope of Grosseteste’s oeuvre, there is a special challenge for any scholar who would study
Robert Grosseteste’s doctrine of the soul. James McEvoy explains:
The vast corpus of Grosseteste’s writings includes no treatise on human nature or on the soul, with the result that his ideas on these matters have to be drawn together from the four corners of his works and from a great variety of distinct literary genres, including scriptural commentaries, letters, sermons and the Dicta. 28
While McEvoy’s remark pertained to Grosseteste’s theory of human nature in general, it is certainly applicable to the aspectus/affectus distinction. The task of producing a comprehensive study of this topic has hitherto been daunting. Not only are Grosseteste’s teachings on the powers of the soul unwieldy due to their scattered and often occasional or even incidental existence among his works, but also many of Grosseteste’s works were until fairly recently (and some remain) unedited. Furthermore, some of the edited works either have not been edited well or have lacked sufficient indices or electronic availability to make searching them practicable.
Recent developments have mitigated these challenges enough to make the present study possible. Works have been edited, or at least transcribed, and many of them were available in searchable form online while I was doing most of my research. 29 I believe that I have been able
to consult enough of Grosseteste’s corpus to say that my research probably is representative of
his corpus as a whole. It is possible that further editing and study of Grosseteste’s works will
alter some of my particular conclusions, especially those that I make only tentatively. I doubt
28 James McEvoy, “Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Human Nature with the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat .” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 47 (1980): 141. 29 James Ginther’s www.grosseteste.com, in particular, was very useful. That domain now has a very different owner, and Ginther’s site is www.grosseteste.org. The new site does not function at present.
12 that any future discoveries will overturn the main lines of my exposition, especially the general exposition of chapter three.
Since my goal in this study is to treat Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction in a way that reliably represents his entire corpus of extant works, I should give some account of how I will do this. I shall meet this goal not by actually discussing every occurrence of aspectus and affectus but by presenting representative material from most genres and from all periods of his works. This material will not be limited to the mere use of certain terms but will also include the concepts related to aspectus and affectus, even from passages that do not mention the terms. 30
The following chart summarizes how I will do this. 31 The chart is not exhaustive, and the
assignment of works to Early Period 2 or the Magisterial Period is not in all cases definitive,
since the division between the periods is uncertain.
30 For the rationale behind this decision, see chapter 3. In brief, I will show that all discussions of knowledge and love have a bearing on the aspectus/affectus doctrine because knowledge and love are the proper actions of the aspectus and the affectus, respectively. 31 Not all significant uses indicated here pertain directly to aspectus and affectus. Some of them pertain to Grosseteste’s doctrines in a way that indirectly enables greater understanding of aspectus and affectus. For example, the De Statu Causarum is important primarily for its metaphysical doctrine of the soul, but one must understand this doctrine in order to understand the relationship of the soul to its powers, including aspectus and affectus. I should also note that, although I do not make much significant use of Grosseteste’s commentaries on the Pseudo-Dionysius directly, I do offer a detailed study of the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat in chapter 4. This work shows what Grosseteste took away from the Pseudo-Dionysius in reference to human nature.
13
Time Period Genre Work(s) or Collection(s) Significant use in chapter(s) Early Period 1 (c.1209 or earlier) Philosophical Works De Artibus Liberalibus 2, 3
Early Period 2 Philosophical Commentaries Commentary on the Posterior Analytics 2, 5, 8 (1220- Philosophical Works De Statu Causarum 5 1225/1229) Scientific opuscula De Motu Supercaelestium 5 Glosses on the Pauline Epistles 6 Super Psalterium 1, 2, 3, 5, 6
Biblical Commentaries Expositio in epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas 6
Magisterial Hexaëmeron 4, 5, 7, 8 Period Theological Works De Cessatione Legalium 5 (1225/1229- Philosophical Commentaries Commentary on the Physics 8 8 1235) De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda) 5, 8 Philosophical Works De Veritate 8 Letters 5 Other Works Sermons 1, 2, 3 Dicta 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 Theological Commentaries Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy 1 Episcopal Pastoral Works Deus Est 5 Period Conferences 4, 5, 8 (1235-1253) Letters 3 Other Works Dicta 3
Underrepresented works. There are texts in the corpus Grossetestianum that are not as
accessible as one would like. The Super Psalterium, which is Grosseteste’s commentary on
Psalms 1-100, has not been critically edited. Yet, parts of the work have appeared in different
forms, and that which is available and searchable from the work suggests that the
14 aspectus/affectus distinction likely occurs frequently in the rest of the work that waits in the
manuscripts for further study. Specifically, Elizabeth Streitz has edited his comments on Psalms
1-36, 32 and James Ginther has transcribed the sections about Psalm 86 and Psalm 100. 33 In addition, there is a large amount of material common to the Super Psalterium and the Dicta, 34
which one can consult through the Goering-Westermann transcription of the Dicta. 35 I will take these portions of the Super Psalterium into account, but there is doubtless more interesting
material in the remainder of the commentary. I believe it is safe, however, to suppose that the
material available is representative of what may yet be discovered in the rest of the lengthy work.
The other portion of Grosseteste’s corpus that is not readily available for consideration is
his sermon collection. The majority of his sermons have not been edited. Several sermons have
been edited piecemeal, however, and quite a number of them also appear among the Dicta. 36
Thus, in this case too, I think the material available is likely to be representative of that which remains hidden. Time will tell.
Excluded but relevant works. Another challenge in Grosseteste’s corpus is discerning precisely where it stops. I have elected not to use disputed works for reconstructing
32 Elizabeth M. Streitz, “Robert Grosseteste: Commentarius in Psalmos, I -XXXVI” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1996). 33 Ginther transcribed both the section on Psalm 86 and the section on Psalm 100. Both texts were formerly available at www.grosseteste.com. Ginther also printed his transcription of Super Psalterium 100 in Ginther, Sacred Page, 193-211. In this study I will cite Ginther’s transcription of Super Psalterium 100 as it is printed in Sacred Page. One can find some generous quotations from Super Psalterium 86 in the footnotes of James Ginther, “The Super Psalterium of Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1170-1253): A Scholastic Psalms Commentary as a Source for Medieval Ecclesiology” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1995), 186-221. 34 For a chart that shows this correspondence see Joseph W. Goering, “Robert Grosseteste’s Dicta: The State of the Question,” in Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies, ed. John Flood, James R. Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering (Toronto: PIMS, 2013), 84-86. 35 I will discuss this transcription below. 36 For editions of sermons not in the Dicta, see the Bibliography. For sermons in the Dicta see Goering, “ Dicta ,” 78-83 or Thomson, Writings, 216-232. Both sources identify which dicta are sermons.
15
Grosseteste’s doctrine, for obvious reasons. Yet there are two works worthy of some discussion even though I have not used them as sources for studying Robert Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction. One is a set of lecture notes on Romans 5-16, and the other is a collection of questions on the soul. Both of these works have at some time been attributed to Robert
Grosseteste, but neither of them is accepted by the majority of Grosseteste scholars today.
The lectures on Romans are relevant to this study because the aspectus/affectus distinction appears about thirteen times throughout the work. 37 My initial impression of the passages using aspectus and affectus is that their author has a definite connection to Robert
Grosseteste. He may be a teacher or a student of Grosseteste’s, or he may be Grosseteste himself. The peculiarities of the text and script seem to rule out the teacher option. The text seems to have been written in Paris, since it cites scripture using the chapter and letter method of the Paris Bible. Also, it appears to represent the cursory lectures of a biblical bachelor. 38 The
lectures, then, would be those of a biblical bachelor at Paris. Yet the only extant manuscript was
copied in England in the second quarter of the thirteenth century. 39 If Grosseteste did study at
Paris, it would by all accounts have been after 1209, and therefore after he wrote the De Artibus
Liberalibus, which uses aspectus and affectus. It seems unlikely that Grosseteste developed his
aspectus/affectus distinction only to cross the water a few years later and find a Parisian biblical bachelor who had independently developed the same distinction.
37 This work has been edited. Elwood E. Mather, III, “ Lecturae in Epistolam ad Romanos V-XVI Roberto Grosseteste Adscriptae,” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1987). Mather’s opinion is that the work may be authentic, but he refrains from any positive pronouncement. 38 See Ginther, Sacred Page, 16 . 39 Mather, Introduction to “ Lecturae ,” vii.
16
The student option, on the other hand, is impossible to rule out completely, since
Grosseteste conceivably could have ruled in theology at Paris in the mid-to-late 1220s. This would allow time for one of his students to read as a biblical bachelor and then take his lectures with him to England. But it remains to be explained why the hypothetical student moved to
England and found his lectures in demand so quickly. On this point, our current information favors Grosseteste himself as the author, since his own migration back to England would provide just the sort of explanation needed. He would have simply brought his old notes (or a report of his lectures) with him. Then, when he began to gain notoriety, someone may have wanted a copy.
I offer these observations as purely preliminary. I view the authorship of the lectures on
Romans as an open question. I have not even raised the main issues. My intention here is only to identify this work as certainly relevant to Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine in some way. It may represent his doctrine directly, or it may represent the early reception of his doctrine. I hope to return to this work in the future and address the question of authorship in a thorough way.
Now I turn to the questions on the soul, commonly referred to as the De Anima. James
Ginther has suggested, tentatively, that Grosseteste attended the disputations of Philip the
Chancellor in the 1220s at Paris. These disputations became the basis of the Summa de Bono, and what we have in the De Anima is a report ( reportatio ) of some of these disputations. 40 As
such, Ginther considers the content of the De Anima to belong to Philip rather than to Robert.
40 Ginther, Sacred Page, 17-18.
17
There is no doubt that the work depends on the Summa de Bono, although whether the author/compiler had before him the final text of the Summa or some earlier form is another question. Previous authors tended to deny any connection to Grosseteste on the grounds that
Grosseteste was too advanced in his scholarship by the time Philip finished the Summa de Bono
to write such a derivative work. 41 This was previously thought to be c.1230, but the editor has advanced the date to 1225-1228. If Grosseteste did study in Paris in the mid-1220s, as Goering has suggested, it would make perfect sense that he should produce a derivative work from
Philip’s recent material. It could have been his way of studying Philip’s questions on the soul and preserving the salient points for future reference.
After examining the essential literature on the authorship question, 42 I have concluded
that the work cannot be a reportatio. Stemming from Keeler’s lack of clarity on this matter, there
has been great confusion in the literature. Keeler articulated the thesis that the work was a
reportatio of lectures that Philip the Chancellor had made at Paris years before editing the
material considerably to produce the Summa de Bono. 43 In the course of the argument, however, it becomes clear that what Keeler really meant to say was that Grosseteste had before him a
41 The locus classicus for this view is Daniel Callus, “Philip the Chancellor and the De Anima ascribed to Robert Grosseteste,” Medieval and Renaissance Studies 1, 1 (1943): 127: “It is most unlikely that an independent and powerful thinker like Grosseteste, in the heyday of his life, should have been the author of so mediocre a compilation.” 42 See S. Harrison Thomson, “The De Anima of Robert Grosseteste,” The New Scholasticism 7 (1933): 201-221; Leo Keeler, “The Dependence of R. Grosseteste’s De Anima on the Summa of Philip the Chancellor,” The New Scholasticism 11, 3 (1937): 197-219; Daniel Callus, “Philip the Chancellor and the De Anima ascribed to Robert Grosseteste,” Medieval and Renaissance Studies 1, 1 (1943): 105-127. 43 Keeler, “Dependence,” 197: “The explanation I shall propose is that the first mentioned treatise [the De Anima ] is a reportatio of lectures given by Philip at the University of Paris some years before the final composition of his great Summa into which those lectures, after a certain amount of revision, were incorporated; and that the reportatio was probably made by Robert Grosseteste, while studying at Paris, about the years 1208-1210.”
18 reportatio of Philip’s lectures 44 which he often paraphrased or abbreviated, and to which he
sometimes added. 45 To say the work is derived from a reportatio is very different from saying it
is the reportatio itself. Much of Callus’s argument against Keeler was against the stated thesis,
and not against Keeler’s actual position. 46
Thomson gladly accepted Keeler’s theory and in The Writings of Robert Grosseteste
reproduced it in the originally stated form: that the work was a reportatio (rather than copied and
adapted from one). 47 At the same time, he took certain observations Keeler had made—about how the more Augustinian parts of the De Anima do not appear in the Summa—to mean that
Grosseteste had contributed a considerable amount of Augustinian material to the work.
Therefore it is clear that Thomson also did not think the work to be strictly a reportatio, but a work based upon a reportatio . If Keeler, Callus, and Thomson had understood one another correctly, differences would have remained, but all would have agreed that the De Anima is not, properly speaking, a reportatio.
Thomson based his original argument in favor of authenticity on paleographical evidence, including the ascription of the work to Grosseteste in an English hand of the middle third of the thirteenth century. 48 Combined with the new dating of the Summa de Bono and the idea that
Grosseteste was in Paris in the mid-1220s, this ascription again begins to seem credible. With
44 Keeler, “Dependence,” 215: “Hence the conclusion that the author of GR [the De Anima ] did not have before him Philip’s Summa, but a part of it in a more primitive form.” 45 Keeler, “Dependence,” 217: “Furthermore, the work is that of a man who possessed both intelligence and learning. The concise statements of Philip’s longer arguments are clear and to the point, and texts are sometimes adduced which do not appear in the Summa. ” 46 That is, Callus’s argument in “Philip the Chancellor,” cited above. 47 Thomson, Writings , 90. 48 Thomson, “ De Anima, ” 201-208, esp. 206.
19 the recognition that the work is not a reportatio but a work derived either from a reportatio or from the finished Summa de Bono itself, its authenticity would make it relevant to Grosseteste’s
doctrine of the soul. One would have to handle it with care, recognizing the difference between
a derivative work and an original one, but it would be a great witness to what Grosseteste knew
at that time and a fair witness to what he likely thought.
While a study concerned with Grosseteste’s doctrine of the soul would have been
deficient without some comment on the De Anima, it is not my intention to settle the question of
authorship here. I do plan to revisit the question with a view to arriving at a reliable conclusion
in the near future. For now, I will treat the work as dubious. In this study I will adduce it as
relevant background information, but with the methodological assumption that it is not from the
pen of Grosseteste. If it does prove to be authentic, my initial sense is that this would tend to
support rather than undermine the view of Grosseteste’s thought that I will construct.
The Dicta. There is one work, or collection of works, that I need to introduce in some
detail here. One of Grosseteste’s longest works, and one that uses aspectus and affectus
numerous times, is the Dicta Theologica (or Dicta ).
In his article “Robert Grosseteste’s Dicta: The State of the Question,” Joseph Goering
argues that the Dicta represent the lecture notes Grosseteste used while teaching the Franciscans
during the1-2 year period around 1230, with the exception of some of the sermons that are
evidently from his episcopal period after 1235. He fixes the earliest possible date of compilation
to 1238. 49
49 Joseph W. Goering, “Robert Grosseteste’s Dicta: The State of the Question,” in Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies, ed. John Flood, James R. Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering (Toronto: PIMS, 2013), 69-70.
20
While I accept what he says about the date of compilation, I have two reservations about the other part of Goering’s hypothesis. The first is that the Dicta do not seem to me to cover the right material to represent the full range of Grosseteste’s teaching activity. 50 They may represent or even include all of his notes on the Psalms from that period, as the nearly complete overlap between 1/3 of the Dicta and the first part of the Super Psalterium would suggest.51 Yet they do not seem to offer comparable coverage of other biblical books on which he also must have lectured. 52
My second reservation is that the material after c. 1230 but before 1238 is conspicuous by its absence, if it really is absent. It is virtually certain that Grosseteste remained active in the schools until 1235, 53 so it would seem strange that one given to writing notes to aid his memory would either select only two years of old notes and pass by the more recent ones or abruptly stop writing down notes for the last three years of his teaching.
50 Goering does not claim explicitly that the Dicta are representative of all Grosseteste’s lecture notes from this time, but he assumes as much in order to draw the following inference: “If it is true, moreover, that the Dicta represent Grosseteste’s teaching during only one or two academic years around the year 1230, and if the 147 dicta may be taken to represent a fair cross section of Grosseteste’s actual teachings in the schools during those years, then we might also conclude that about one-third of his time was spent in expounding the Psalms, and two-thirds in preaching, disputing, and lecturing on other texts” (Goering, “ Dicta,” 72). 51 See Goering, “ Dicta,” 71-72. 52 James Ginther proposes that Grosseteste lectured on the Pauline Epistles (especially Galatians), Ecclesiasticus, Genesis, Isaiah, Daniel, and the Psalms as a master of the sacred page between 1229/30 and 1235 (Ginther, “The Super Psalterium in Context,” 48). 53 Both Thomas of Eccleston and the Lanercost Chronicle say Grosseteste taught the Franciscans until he became bishop in 1235. Thomas writes, “ Ipso igitur ab cathedra magistrali in cathedram pontificalem providentia divina translato… ” (Thomas of Eccleston, Fratris Thomae vulgo dicti de Eccleston Tractatus de Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam, ed. A.G. Little [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1951], 48). The Lanercost Chrionicle, after dating his episcopal consecration to 1235 on page 43, states, “ Vir ille primus cathedram scholarum fratrum Minorum rexit Oxoniae, unde et assumptus fuit ad cathedram praelatiae. ” ( Chronicon de Lanercost:1201- 1346, ed. Joseph Stevenson [Edinburgh: Impressum Edinburgi, 1839], 45); See also Callus, “Grosseteste as Scholar,” 11 ; Ginther, “Super Psalterium in Context,” 48 ; Southern, Robert Grosseteste, 75, 170.
21
It is true that Grosseteste probably ceased teaching non-Franciscans by the end of 1232, 54 and one could see the change of venue from the main school to the Franciscan studium as an
explanation for the change in note-taking practice. Perhaps there was no one to report in the
Franciscan studium. This hypothesis would be reasonable if not for the fact that the Dicta represent Grosseteste’s own notes, not those of classroom stenographers, as the colophon to the collection indicates. 55 Since it was Grosseteste’s practice to write down his own thoughts he
wished to remember, and since the Dicta are evidence that he had much to remember when teaching theology, it is reasonable to suppose that he kept writing theological notes until 1235, and perhaps even to the end of his days. 56
The explanation of the colophon’s phrase “ in scholis ” may simply be that the majority of the notes he has selected for publication belong to that period. It is not necessary to infer that they must all belong to that period. The sermons included from the episcopal period require this interpretation anyway. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent some non-sermon Dicta from being
later as well. Extending the time of composition in this way would remove the difficulty about
the notes not representing the breadth of his teaching, since on this hypothesis Grosseteste would
54 See Southern, Robert Grosseteste, 112; In contrast to Southern, both Goering and Ginther think Grosseteste did not teach theology at Oxford before teaching in the Franciscan studium (Ginther, Sacred Page, 3-5; Joseph Goering, “When and Where did Grosseteste Study Theology?” in Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship, ed. James McEvoy [Turnhout: Brepols, 1995], 43-44). For Goering, therefore, this hypothesis would not be an option. I mention this possible hypothesis only because sometimes I am inclined to agree with Southern that Grosseteste did teach theology at Oxford before he agreed to teach the Franciscans. 55 Grosseteste, Dicta colophon (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.121rb): “ In hoc libello sunt capitula 147, quorum quedam sunt brevia verba que dum in scolis morabar scripsi breviter et incomposito sermone ad memoriam .” Unless otherwise noted, for citations of Bodley 798, I am utilizing the transcription begun by Edwin Westermann and completed by Joseph Goering formerly available on the Electronic Grosseteste at http://grosseteste.com/dicta.htm. 56 It is possible that Grosseteste switched entirely to writing his notes in books instead of on leaves of parchment at some point, maybe 1232. If that is so, Goering’s hypothesis becomes more plausible, since there would be an explanation for the years of missing notes. I would like to see more evidence before making this supposition, however.
22 have selected some notes for publication and rejected others. 57 Indeed, it seems quite likely that
Grosseteste selected only some of his notes for publication in the Dicta , for we already know that he selected only some of his sermons for inclusion .58
Thus, if I am correct, most of the Dicta come from his time as a master of theology in the
schools (c.1225/1229-1235), but some of them may be a little later, or even earlier, than that
period, including the Dicta that are notes and not sermons. Probably none of them are later than
c.1240. By that time Grosseteste was beginning to use a lot more language of the Pseudo-
Dionysius, whom he was actively translating between 1239 and 1243. 59 I have not noticed much
57 Goering’s main argument—that the lack of overlap between the Super Psalterium and the Dicta from Psalm 65- 100 proves Grosseteste had ceased collecting dicta by the time he was writing that part of the commentary—still needs to be addressed (see Goering, “ Dicta,” 71). I would tentatively suggest that Grosseteste may simply have switched his medium for commenting around 1232. Then, because his comments on Psalms 65-100 were in a book and not in his personal pile of notes, he simply did not have time to go through the commentary and copy out the highlights. All he had to do with the loose notes, on the other hand, was pick his favorites and take them to the scriptorium. This may also explain why the Dicta do not represent his teaching responsibilities evenly. His notes on Paul, for example, probably were written in a book rather than on loose sheets of parchment. 58 For example, he wrote Tota Pulchra Es in about 1230, but it is not included among the dicta (Servus of St. Anthonis [Servus Gieben], “Robert Grosseteste and the Immaculate Conception. With the Text of the Sermon Tota Pulchra Es. ” Collectanea Franciscana 28 [1958]: 218, 221). See also the sermons found in Durham, Cathedral Library, MS A.III.12, which all likely date to the period around 1231. On the dating see Suzanne Paul, “An Edition and Study of Selected Sermons of Robert Grosseteste,” vol. 1 (Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 2002), 20-21. This manuscript contains a collection of sermons and notes by Grosseteste that seems similar in general conception to the later Dicta collection. In fact, the two collections have much material in common, with around 30 of the Dicta represented in some way in the earlier collection. (I counted 26 in Goering, “ Dicta, ” 78-83, though I could have missed some. Thomson, Writings, says at least 33 of the Dicta are found in the Durham ms. Paul, “Selected Sermons,” vol. 1, 32, addressing the question from the opposite angle, says 30 of the 75 items in the Durham ms are also part of the Dicta collection.) The sermons from this manuscript have been edited in Suzanne Paul, “An Edition and Study of Selected Sermons of Robert Grosseteste,” vol. 2 (Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 2002). Paul left aside one sermon in the collection because it had already been edited: Qui Manet in Caritate, ed. Edward B. King, “Durham Cathedral MS A. III. 12 and the Corpus of Grosseteste's Homiletical Works,” in Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship, ed. James McEvoy, 277-288 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995). Out of the 23 pieces Paul identified as sermons, she only found two to correspond to the 27 sermons that appear in the Dicta (“Selected Sermons,” vol. 1, 32) . 59 On this feature of Grosseteste’s writings from 1239-1243, see McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 138. On the dating of the Pseudo-Dionysian translations and commentaries see D.A. Callus, "The Date of Grosseteste’s Translations and Commentaries on the Pseudo-Dionysius and the ‘Nicomachean Ethics,’” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 14 (1947): 186-210.
23 of this language in the Dicta, so it is probable that he published the collection no later than c.
1240. 60
I also should give some explanation concerning two manuscripts of the Dicta that I will consult in this study. Goering’s “state of the question” on the Dicta remains, to my knowledge,
the most recent attempt at identifying all the extant manuscripts of the Dicta. Goering adds four
manuscript copies to those listed by Thomson 61 for a total of 36. 62 To this total one can add two
additional copies of the collection, each of which survives only in part. The manuscript
Wroclaw (Breslau), University Library of Wroclaw, I.F.567, which was produced in 1415,
contains Dicta 1-15 and the first few lines of Dictum 16 on folios 1r-11v. 63
The manuscript London, British Library, Lansdowne 458 is known for its collection of
Grosseteste’s sermons, but before the sermons there is a copy of the Dicta on folios 62r-117r. 64
This copy begins abruptly in the middle of Dictum 35 but then continues as a complete collection through number 147. It is followed by both the shorter and the longer versions of the table of contents. The main text of the Dicta is in a nice English book hand. The sermons that follow the
Dicta are in another hand (or hands). According to Ellis and Douce, the codex contains portions
60 We must await a full critical edition of the Dicta to confirm or overturn this impression. 61 See Thomson, Writings, 215-216. Note that Goering does not include in his count all of the manuscripts Thomson lists as relevant. For example, Thomson lists several that contain only the table of contents or the index. 62 Goering, “Dicta,” 76. 63 A digital facsimile of the codex is available at www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl, where the online catalogue dates it to 1415. 64 Although previous lists of the Dicta manuscripts have not included Lansdowne 458, I am not the first person to notice that the Dicta are there. Among recent authors, several have observed this fact in passing: Siegfried Wenzel, “Robert Grosseteste's Treatise on Confession, Deus est,” Franciscan Studies 30 (1970): 227; Servus Gieben, “Robert Grosseteste at the Papal Curia, Lyons 1250: Edition of the Documents,” Collectanea Franciscana 41 (1971): 346; F.A.C. Mantello and Joseph Goering, “ In Libro Numerorum Scriptum est de Levitis : Robert Grosseteste on Clerical Orders,” Mediaeval Studies 75 (2013): 18.
24 belonging to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 65 The most recent date estimate for the portion containing the Grosseteste materials (folios 62r-180v) is the second half of the fourteenth century. 66 This puts the Lansdowne copy in the older half of the Dicta manuscripts, 67 and only four manuscripts of the actual collection appear to be older. They date to the mid-fourteenth century. 68
Finally, I should explain my potentially confusing use of the Goering-Westermann transcription of the Dicta. In 1942, Edwin Westermann edited Dicta nos. 1-50 on the basis of
Bodley 798. 69 Sometime in the decades to follow, Westermann finished a hand-written transcription of Bodley 798. Before his death, he entrusted this transcription to Joseph Goering, and Goering promised to publish the transcription in some way. This transcription, which
Goering cleaned up and prepared for publication, was available at www.grosseteste.com during the majority of the time I was conducting my research. 70 In electronic form, the transcription has
no page numbers that one could cite as one normally cites an edition. It has only the folio
65 Henry Ellis and Francis Douce, A Catalogue of the Lansdowne Manuscripts in the British Museum (London, 1819), pt.2, 126. 66 Mantello and Goering, “ In Libro Numerorum,” 18. 67 Thomson, Writings, 214-216, dates three Dicta manuscripts to the thirteenth century, three to the mid-fourteenth century, eleven to the second half of the fourteenth century, twenty-one to the fifteenth century, and one to ca. 1500. 68 Thomson, Writings, 215, dates the following manuscripts of the Dicta collection to the mid-14 th century: London, British Library, MS Cotton Otho D.X; Lincoln, Cathedral Library, MS 202; Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5. Also, though he fails to include it in his list of Dicta mss, Thomson, Writings, 11, dates the entirety of London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V to the mid-14 th century. On page 11, Thomson does know that the Dicta collection is part of this manuscript. The three oldest Dicta manuscripts are sermon collections or copies of the Super Psalterium that include many of the Dicta . Thomson, Writings, 214-215, dates the following collections of this kind to the thirteenth century: Durham, Cathedral Library, MS A.III.12; London, British Library, MS Royal 7.D.XV; Cambridge, Trinity College, MS B.15.38. Goering, “Dicta, ” 75-76, mentions these manuscripts but excludes them from his count because they are not copies of the actual collection Grosseteste published. 69 See Edwin Jergen Westermann, “An Edition, with Introduction and notes of ‘Dicta’ I-L of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253” (PhD diss., University of Colorado at Boulder, 1942). 70 After the website ceased to operate, Joe Goering kindly provided me with an electronic copy of the transcription in a Microsoft Word document.
25 numbers of Bodley 798. For this reason, I will in this study cite the Goering-Westermann transcription simply as Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798. I do have an electronic facsimile of Bodley 798, and I have consulted it as needed. In places where my citation refers to the facsimile of the actual manuscript rather than to the transcription, I will indicate this clearly, usually in the footnotes. If there is no special indication, the reader should assume that references to Bodley 798 are to the Goering-Westermann transcription.
Aspectus and Affectus
Now that I have finished describing Grosseteste’s works as they relate to this study, I will introduce the aspectus/affectus distinction. James McEvoy observed that this was a “theme song” of Robert Grosseteste’s life. 71 I quite agree. I have found that Grosseteste returns to aspectus and affectus again and again throughout his career. This division of the soul into reason or vision ( aspectus ) and will or affect ( affectus ) reflects Grosseteste’s most deeply-held opinions about the nature of the human soul. It is a cognitive/appetitive distinction. The aspectus is the
power of the rational soul responsible for all intellectual perception and knowledge, and the
affectus is the power of the rational soul responsible for volition and desire, or love. Grosseteste
would say that the soul has two “parts,” the aspectus and the affectus (or he would just assume
that his readers know this), and then he would explain how aspectus and affectus, reason and will or emotion, relate to one another.
Although Grosseteste uses the terms aspectus and affectus with some fluidity from one text to the next, I have identified three general themes to describe Grosseteste’s view of the soul in connection with these terms. First, there is a priority of the aspectus. As he says in Dictum
71 James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 78.
26
19, which is probably his inception sermon as a master in the schools, “nichil…amatur nisi prius cognoscatur ” (nothing is loved unless it is first known).72 Then there is a primacy of the affectus inasmuch as it can limit or improve the functioning of the aspectus. He says the reason Aristotle
could not know that the world is not eternal was that the philosopher’s affectus was stuck on earthly, temporal things. Since the aspectus cannot reach higher than the affectus, as he says in his Commentary on the Physics, Aristotle’s aspectus was not capable of reaching the concept of simple, timeless eternity. 73 On the other hand, the aspectus of one whose affectus is purified
from disordered attachments to temporal things can, by the power of God, ascend to contemplate
the eternal reasons in God, free from all phantasms based upon the created world. 74 Thirdly,
there is the inseparability of knowledge and love. With the exception of the initial moment of
perception, knowledge, the proper action of the aspectus, and love, the proper action of the affectus, always occur in tandem. He even goes as far as to say in Dictum 91 that ultimately the
72 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §16 (ed. James Ginther, “Natural Philosophy and Theology at Oxford in the Early Thirteenth Century: An Edition and Study of Robert Grosseteste’s Inception Sermon [ Dictum 19],” Medieval Sermon Studies 44 [2000]:130; trans. mine). 73 Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Physics., book 8 (ed. Richard Dales, Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Lincolniensis Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis [Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1963], 147): “ Necesse fuit philosophos in hunc errorem incidere, quia ab errore de perpetuitate et infinitate motus et temporis ex parte ante et ex parte post nullus potest scientifice liberari, nisi qui potest simplicitatem eternitatis intelligere; sed cum mentis aspectus, vel intelligencia, non possit superius ascendere quam ascendat eius affectus vel appetitus. ” Future references to this edition will be according to the following convention: (Dales, page number). 74 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 1.8.5 (ed. Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben [London: Oxford University Press, 1982], 61): “Unde et huius erroris purgacio non potest esse nisi per hoc quod mentis affectus purgetur ab amore temporalium, ut mentis aspectus immunis a fantasmatibus possit transcendere tempus et intelligere simplicem eternitatem… ” ; Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 224-225):”In genere autem huius exempli ultimi, memorie videlicet gignentis et sue genite similitudinis et amoris copulantis, vicinissimum exemplum Dei trinitatis est memoria, intelligentia et amor in suprema facie racionis, qua sola vi suprema Deus Trinitas sine nubulo fantasmatum, et non per corporeum instrumentum memoratur, intelligitur et diligitur … Et ita secundum hanc supremam virtutem unam et simplicem dicto modo memorantem, intelligentem et diligentem, est homo summa similitudo et per hoc imago unius Dei Trinitatis.”
27 love of God is the knowledge of truth. 75 I will have much more to say about aspectus and
affectus in due course, but this summary may suffice to show that Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine is fascinating and worthy of scholarly attention.
The Goal and Structure of This Study
The goal of this study is twofold. I aim to explain what Grosseteste means by aspectus
and affectus, as well as the special relationship he sees between these two powers, or “parts,” of
the soul. I also intend to ascertain and illustrate the profound importance of Grosseteste’s
aspectus/affectus doctrine in various areas of his thought, as well as throughout his career.
Through accomplishing these objectives I will show that the aspectus/affectus distinction is a key to understanding several interrelated themes in Grosseteste’s thought—psychological, metaphysical, soteriological, spiritual, and epistemological.
This study will consist of eight chapters, in addition to the introduction and conclusion.
These chapters will be divided into two parts. The first part, consisting of the introduction through chapter 2, will provide the background information pertaining to aspectus and affectus in
the writings of Robert Grosseteste. In chapter one, I will review the secondary literature on
Robert Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction. Because the amount of secondary literature
on this topic is small, I will also utilize selected studies that provide important background
information on topics related to Grosseteste’s doctrine of aspectus and affectus. In chapter two, I will discuss some important precursors to Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction, including
the intellectus/affectus distinction in Bernard of Clairvaux and the Isaac of Stella’s
75 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.69vb): “Est igitur dilectio plena tocius veritatis magistra; immo ipse amor est ipsa veritatis noticia.”
28 sensus/affectus distinction as taken up in the De Spiritu et Anima . The goal of this chapter will be to identify some of the sources that may have inspired Grosseteste to develop his aspectus/affectus distinction.
The second part, in which I will pursue the primary goal of this study, will consist of two sections. The first section will present the meaning of Robert Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction. The objective throughout this section will be to arrive at a broad and deep understanding of what the English polymath means when he uses the terms aspectus and affectus and to grasp how important this doctrine is to him as a thinker in general. In chapter three I will pursue two goals simultaneously. I will give a basic chronological overview of Grosseteste’s use of the paired terms, and I will explain the basic concepts that consistently accompany the use of these terms in Grosseteste’s corpus—the priority of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the inseparability of knowledge and love. While chapter three will provide the essential overview, chapters four and five will address questions raised by the content of chapter three and delve deeper into Grosseteste’s thought on these matters.
In chapter four I will address questions of consistency and continuity. While I will have settled general question of continuity in the chronological aspect of chapter three, I will treat particular questions in chapter four. Grosseteste often used terms other than aspectus and affectus to describe similar powers of the rational soul, sometimes even within the same work.
In addition, he did not use the terms as a pair in his most mature and definitive treatment of the soul’s powers, the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat (c.1243) . The goal of chapter four will be to determine whether or to what extent this data signals inconsistency or deliberate changes in
Grosseteste’s psychological views.
29
In chapter five I will address the most important metaphysical questions raised by the content of chapters three and four. One wants to know what metaphysical assumptions or intuitions give rise to the varied and fascinating ideas Grosseteste presents on the soul and its powers, and especially on aspectus and affectus . The goal of this chapter will be to say what I can concerning Grosseteste’s beliefs about the metaphysical structure of the soul, to the extent required for grasping the full import of aspectus and affectus. I will pursue this goal through
seeking to answer questions that Grosseteste, given his historical context, plausibly could have
answered and (I hope) would have answered in the ways that I will suggest. The first question
concerns the relationship of the soul to its powers, and of the powers to one another, and the
second seeks a rationale for the inseparable operation of aspectus and affectus in Grosseteste’s
thought.
With the meaning of aspectus and affectus established, the second section of the second
part will present the significance of Robert Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction in his thought. The general significance of the concepts related to aspectus and affectus throughout the
duration of his career will have been established in the first section. The second section will
illustrate this significance in different areas of his thought. It will also develop and illustrate
each of the three basic concepts that accompany aspectus and affectus—the priority of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the inseparability of knowledge and love. In chapter six I will explore aspectus and affectus in Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation and develop the inseparability of knowledge and love. In chapter seven I will treat the cognitive and appetitive powers in Grosseteste’s vision for the reformation of the divine image in the human individual.
This will provide a way of developing the priority of the aspectus. In chapter eight I will
30 examine aspectus and affectus in aspects of Grosseteste’s epistemology and develop the primacy of the affectus.
I will end the study with a concise summary of my findings and some suggestions for future research directions in the conclusion.
Part 1: The Aspectus/Affectus Distinction in Context
31 Chapter 1: The Secondary Literature
In this chapter I will give an overview of the secondary literature on Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction. If I were to limit the scope of investigation to books and articles
written specifically about Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction, there would be no literature
to review. On the other hand, if I reviewed all the literature on every topic that pertains in some
way to Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine, the material would be too much and too diverse
to manage. I would have to review works pertaining to his theological anthropology, his
psychology, his doctrine of free will, his theory of illumination, his soteriology, his metaphysics,
and his mystical theology. The aspectus/affectus distinction cuts across the various areas and
periods of his thought, not to mention the genres of his works.
In light of this situation, I have chosen the approach that I think will be the most
accessible to those who would make use of my research. In the present chapter, I will survey the
discussions of aspectus and affectus that I have found in the secondary literature. Although there
are no books or articles exclusively about aspectus and affectus , several authors have addressed
the topic in passing. Because these discussions appear in works dedicated to different or broader
topics, I cannot presume to have found every discussion that exists. 1 On the other hand, the
1 This may be an appropriate place to mention the major bibliographies. I have consulted the following bibliographies of literature pertaining to Robert Grosseteste, among others. In two articles, Servus Gieben offered an exhaustive bibliography on Grosseteste from 1473-1991; Servus Gieben, “Bibliographia Universa Roberti Grosseteste ab an. 1473 ad an. 1969 ,” Collectanea Franciscana 39 (1969): 362-418; and Servus Gieben, “Robertus Grosseteste: Bibliographia 1970-1991,” in Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship, ed. James McEvoy, Instrumenta Patristica XXVII (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 415-431. The Electronic Grosseteste is said to have boasted an exhaustive bibliography up to 2003, but at its new location it does not function: James Ginther, et. al. “Bibliography,” in The Electronic Grosseteste website, previously
Grosseteste, that form some important part in the development of the literature on aspectus and affectus.
I will discuss the other literature—that pertaining to each area of Grosseteste’s thought to
which he applies aspectus, affectus, and related concepts—in due course. Rather than gathering
such diverse material into one chapter, I have decided to address the relevant studies as the topics
arise in the chapters to follow. This will include in-depth interaction with some of the works
treated briefly here, where those works illumine the subject at hand. For example, rather than
presenting James McEvoy’s exposition of Grosseteste’s theory of human nature in Ecclesia
Sancta Celebrat here and then expecting the reader to remember it when I offer my own
exposition of the same text in chapter four, I have elected to interact with McEvoy’s study in
chapter four, concurrently with the presentation of my own exposition. Again, rather than
discussing James Ginther’s view of Grosseteste’s soteriology here and then waiting until chapter
six to show how this connects with aspectus and affectus, I have chosen to present Ginther’s
research in chapter six, right before I show the relevance of aspectus and affectus in
Grosseteste’s soteriology. The portion of the same book, Master of the Sacred Page, that
discusses aspectus and affectus, will make its appearance in the present chapter. Naturally, the
subsequent chapters will also include interactions with secondary literature not mentioned in the
present chapter.
From the literature on aspectus and affectus in the writings of Robert Grosseteste, one
can learn three lessons which my research will also confirm. One is that the aspectus/affectus
34 distinction is important to Grosseteste. Another is that he uses the pair of terms over a long portion of his life in a way that is fairly consistent. The third lesson is that Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction is conceptually rich and therefore important for understanding the richness of his thought and his possible legacy. He uses the terms to explain some of his most noteworthy ideas, and he does so in a way that can bear systematic exposition. In the introduction I have presented the themes that I will use to explain the meaning and significance of Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction: the priority of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the inseparability of knowledge and love. While earlier authors could not use phrases that I have since devised, some of them adumbrated the concepts.
Combined with Robert Grosseteste’s importance to multiple strands of intellectual
history, these three lessons indicate that Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction is worthy of a
full historical and systematic study. Since no scholar has attempted such a study in the past,
there is a significant gap in the study of Robert Grosseteste and in the intellectual history of the
thirteenth century. I offer the present study to fill this gap.
The Literature on Aspectus and Affectus
Ludwig Baur. The modern study of Robert Grosseteste began in 1912 with the publication of Ludwig Baur’s Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von
Lincoln. In the Prolegomena to this edition of Grosseteste’s philosophical works, Baur
demonstrates an understanding of the importance and distinctiveness of the aspectus/affectus
distinction in Grosseteste’s thought. His understanding appears in the strikingly brief way he
argues for the authenticity of the De Artibus Liberalibus : “There is no ground for questioning the
genuineness of this work. Grosseteste turns to the distinction between aspectus mentis and
35 mentis affectus again and again.” 2 When introducing the De Ordine Emanandi Causatorum a
Deo, another work in which Grosseteste uses aspectus and affectus, Baur mentions that the need
of the affectus to be free from the love of temporal things is a common theme in Grosseteste’s
thought. 3
Baur also mentions aspectus and affectus briefly in his monograph on Grosseteste’s philosophy. 4 While discussing how the Liberal Arts correct human errors, he describes the role of the Trivium in the De Artibus Liberalibus (c.1209 or earlier) , including the ways grammar, logic, and rhetoric assist aspectus and affectus. He explains that first the mind (= aspectus
mentis ) looks at something and judges whether it is harmful or beneficial. Then the affect
(= affectus mentis ) urges us either to lay hold of the beneficial or to flee the harmful. For the
correction of error, grammar informs the aspectus rightly and further teaches how to use words
correctly to inform others. Logic investigates the truth or falsehood of propositions. Rhetoric
primarily moves the affect (= affectus mentis ). Baur says the illustrations Grosseteste uses for
rhetoric in the De Artibus Liberalibus (specifically, the staff of Mercury and the Lyre of
Orpheus) are drawn from Macrobius. 5 He later mentions that rhetoric has a special connection with ethics. Ethics provides the content of moral probity; rhetoric provides the persuasion. 6
2 Ludwig Baur, Prolegomena to Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln (Münster: Aschendorff, 1912), 57* (trans. mine): „ Die Echtheit der Schrift anzuzweifeln liegt kein Grund vor. Die Unterscheidung von „aspectus mentis“ und „mentis affectus“ kehrt bei Grosseteste häufig wieder .“ 3 Baur, Prolegomena, 107*: „ Die Betonung der Notwendigkeit, den affectus von der Liebe zu den temporalia wegzuwenden, um zu dieser Einsicht zu kommen, verbindet diese Schrift mit oft wiederholten Gedankengängen Grossetestes. “ 4 Ludwig Baur, Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste Bischofs von Lincoln († 1253) (Münster: Aschendorff, 1917), 11-16. 5 Baur, Philosophie, 14. Baur does not here identify the specific passage in Macrobius. 6 Baur, Philosophie, 22.
36
While Baur makes some interesting comparisons between Grosseteste’s treatment of the
Trivium and the same topic as found in authors that precede and follow him, his remarks on aspectus and affectus are little more than a paraphrase of the material found in De Artibus
Liberalibus. 7
Dorothea Sharp. An early English foray into Grosseteste’s psychology appears in
Dorothea Sharp’s monograph, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century .8
Sharp does not discuss aspectus and affectus explicitly, but she does treat these powers briefly
under the names of reason and will. I do not consider it essential to summarize here all
treatments of reason and will in the secondary literature on Grosseteste, but Sharp merits a place
in this overview of the literature on aspectus and affectus because she raises and answers a
question that is important in the study of Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction. She writes,
“How reason and will are to be distinguished in the soul, or how they can exist together with the
sensitive and vegetative faculties, we are not told.” Her answer to this question, based upon
Grosseteste’s use of memory, intellect, and will in the Hexaëmeron 9 and the indications of
“scattered passages” is that the powers are identical with the substance of the soul and that they
are regarded as modes of action rather than as parts or accidents. 10 I will argue to the same conclusion in chapter five, supplying the “scattered passages.” Concerning the relationship of the rational powers to the irrational, she mentions his statement in the De Libero Arbitrio to the effect that rational powers bear on opposites, while opposite irrational actions identify distinct
7 For discussion of this work, see chapter 3. 8 Dorothea E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), 27-38. The monograph originally appeared in 1930. 9 I will discuss Grosseteste’s use of this image of the Trinity in man in chapters 4 and 5. 10 Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 36-37.
37 irrational powers. 11 She also highlights the text in the De Motu Super Caelestium in which sense
and intellect are distinguished by their differing objects. 12
D. Odon Lottin . In the first volume of his landmark study on the psychological and moral thought of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Lottin does not discuss the aspectus/affectus distinction as such, but he nevertheless contributes an important part to the story of aspectus and affectus in the secondary literature. In his survey of thirteenth-century discussions of free will,
Lottin mentions Grosseteste a number of times, including a brief discussion of his theory of free will 13 and references to his influence on Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus. 14 The discussion
of Grosseteste’s theory of free will culminates at the passage of the De Libero Arbirtio in which
Grosseteste compares aspectus, or ratio, and affectus, or voluntas, to the light and heat of a ray
of light. 15 Lottin says that, for Grosseteste, free choice is the single source of the faculties of
reason and will. 16 The sense he gives to this doctrine is that acts of judgment and of choice proceed from the same principle. 17 His treatment of Grosseteste is brief, but he treats the
Sentence commentary of Richard Rufus in more detail, giving lengthy quotations in which Rufus
11 Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 37. See Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda), cap. 8 (ed. Baur, Die Philosophischen Werke, 182). This distinction between rational and irrational powers probably only pertains to the enumeration of powers, not to their coexistence or metaphysical relationship. 12 Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 37. See Robert Grosseteste, De Motu Supercaelestium (ed. Cecilia Panti, Moti, Virtù e Motori Celesti nella Cosmologia di Roberto Grossatesta: Studio ed edizione dei trattati De Sphera, De Cometis, De Motu Supercelestium [Firenze : SISMEL, 2001], 332). I will discuss this text in chapter 5. 13 D. Odon Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XII e et XIII e Siècles, vol. 1 : Problèmes de Psychologie (Louvain, Belgium : Abbaye du Mont César, 1942), 183-185. 14 See Lottin, Psychologie, 183-197. 15 Lottin, Psychologie, 184-185. The passage in the de Libero Arbitrio is Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda), cap. 17 (ed. Baur, Die Philosophischen Werke, 228). I will discuss this passage in chapter 5. 16 Lottin, Psychologie, 184: « Un problème se pose: ces facultés entrent dans la définition du libre arbitre. Comment celui-ci peut-il être un ? Il est un, répond Robert, parce qu’il est la source unique de ces deux facultés. » 17 Lottin, Psychologie, 184: « Pour qu’un acte libre existe, il ne suffit pas qu’une faculté juge et qu’une autre faculté choisisse, c’est d’un même principe que doivent procéder ces deux actes. »
38 quotes the text from Grosseteste and also uses aspectus and affectus on his own .18 Apart from
these quotations, this portion of Rufus’ commentary is only accessible in manuscript form.
D.A. Callus. D. A. Callus, one of the greatest Grosseteste scholars from the first two-
thirds of the twentieth century, devotes two pages to the aspectus/affectus distinction in his
article “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar.” 19 Into these two pages he packs an incredible amount of information. Regarding the phrase mentis aspectus et affectus, Callus observes,
Now Grosseteste was so fond of dwelling on this expression that we find it almost everywhere, in the commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and on the Physics, in the Hexaemeron, in his letters, sermons, and Dicta ; he was never tired of bringing it in wherever he could, in season and out of season. 20
Callus gives only a brief description of what the aspectus and affectus are for Grosseteste. He says that the aspectus needs to be enlightened and the affectus rectified. 21 He notices that the aspectus cannot be free from error unless the affectus is freed from the love of earthly things.
This is an important aspect of the primacy of the affectus . Callus finds the reason for this connection between aspectus and affectus in Grosseteste’s statement, which appears in the
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics 1.14, that aspectus and affectus “are not divided from each other, for the aspectus only reaches that which is reached by love and affection.” 22 He
18 See Lottin, Psychologie, 190-192, 194-197. 19 Daniel A. Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” in Robert Grosseteste: Scholar and Bishop, ed. D. A. Callus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 21-22. 20 Ibid., 21. 21 I will discuss this group of ideas in chapter 3. 22 This is Callus’ paraphrase from Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 21. I will discuss this text in chapter 5 and in chapter 8.
39 suggests that the sources of Grosseteste’s idea are Augustine’s Soliloquies and the pseudo-
Augustinian De Spiritu et Anima. 23
In the passage of the Soliloquies that Callus cites , Reason says to Augustine that it, ratio, is the vision ( aspectus ) of the soul. Reason says that three things are needed for the soul: that it
have healthy eyes, that it look ( aspiciat ), and that it see ( videat ). The mind must be purged of the
desires of the things of mortals to have healthy eyes. In order to see when it looks, it also must
have faith, hope, and love. What it is trying to see is God. Seeing God ( visio dei ) is the purpose
(finis ) of the mind’s vision ( aspectus ). 24
In the passages Callus cites from the De Spiritu et Anima, again ratio is said to be the
aspectus of the soul or mind. In one passage, the soul ( animus ), if illumined ( illustratus ) by
wisdom, knows itself. If, however, the soul is lulled to sleep by corporeal passions, it forgets
what it was. The soul is called rational when ascending per puram intelligentiam. 25 In the other passage , three things are necessary for the soul (anima ). The first is that it have healthy eyes, that is, eyes purged of the desires of the things of mortals. The second is that it look ( aspiciat ) at
23 The specific passages he cites are Soliloquies 1.6 (PL 32:875-876), and De Spiritu et Anima 10 (PL 40:781, 785). 24 Augustine, Soliloquies (Soliloquiorum Libri Duo ) 1.6.12-13 (CSEL 89:19-21): “Nam mentes quasi sui sunt sensus animis; disciplinarum autem quaeque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole illustrantur, ut videri possint, veluti terra est atque terrena omnia. Deus autem est ipse qui illustrat. Ego autem ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus. Non enim hoc est habere oculos quod aspicere aut item hoc est aspicere quod videre. Ergo animae tribus quibusdam rebus opus est: ut oculos habeat, quibus iam bene uti possit, ut aspiciat, ut videat. Oculi sani mens est ab omni labe corporis pura, id est a cupiditatibus rerum mortalium iam remota atque purgata. … Aspectus animae ratio est. Sed quia non sequitur ut omnis qui aspicit videat, aspectus rectus atque perfectus, id est, quem visio sequitur, virtus vocatur; est enim virtus vel recta vel perfecta ratio. Sed et ipse aspectus quamvis iam sanos oculos convertere in lucem non potest, nisi tria illa permaneant: fides, qua credatur ita se rem habere, ad quam convertendus aspectus est, ut visa faciat beatum; spes qua cum bene aspexerit, se visurum esse praesumat; caritas, qua videre perfruique desideret. Iam aspectum sequitur ipsa visio dei, qui est finis aspectus; non quod iam non sit, sed quod nihil amplius habeat, quo se intendat. Et haec est vere perfecta virtus, ratio perveniens ad finem suum, quam beata vita consequitur.” 25 De Spiritu et Anima 1 (PL 40:781); cf. Robert Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium I iv 1 and Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (CPA) 1.7 and 1.14 (ed. Pietro Rossi, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros [Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981], 139-140 and 213).
40
God in the light of contemplation. The third is that it see ( videat ) great joys in the vision of God.
“Health makes it free from care, vision ( aspectus ) makes it upright, seeing ( visio ) makes it blessed.” 26 Seeing God ( visio dei ) is the purpose ( finis ) of the mind’s vision ( aspectus ). 27
It is clear that these texts from Augustine and pseudo-Augustine contain the same general
idea that Grosseteste has accepted. The love of temporal things is a hindrance to seeing God,
who is truth itself. Callus is probably right to say that Robert is operating in the tradition
represented by these texts, as I shall argue in the next chapter. Precisely how Grosseteste
conceives of the process by which the desire for temporal things drags down the aspectus is
another question, one which cannot be answered simply by identifying these sources. 28
It is also clear that the second text from the De Spiritu et Anima depends in some way upon the text from Augustine. The “three things” needed for the soul had been repeated in the centuries between Augustine and the compilation of the De Spiritu et Anima. 29 The author/compiler of the De Spiritu et Anima is either summarizing the text from Augustine
26 De Spiritu et Anima 10 (PL 40:785 ; partial trans. mine) : “Dicitur spiritus mens rationalis, ubi est quaedam scintilla tanquam oculus animae, ad quem pertinet imago et cognitio Dei. Oculus animae est mens ab omni corporis labe pura, mentis aspectus est ratio, intellectus visio. Tria haec omni animae necessaria sunt: ut sanos oculos habeat, ut aspiciat, ut videat. Sanos oculos habet, cum a mortalium cupiditatibus est purgata atque remota. Aspicit, cum in Dei lumine contemplationis oculos figit. Videt, cum in illa contemplatione conspicit quanta sint gaudia, quanta laetitia, quanta securitas, quanta serenitas, et quanta jucunditas. Sanitas facit illam securam, aspectus rectam, visio beatam. Cum enim fuerit ab omni faece libera maculisque diluta, tunc se denique in se ipsa libentissime tenet, et nihil sibi metuit, aut ulla sua culpa quidquam angitur: et tunc ingenti quadam et incredibili fiducia pergit in Deum, id est, in ipsam contemplationem veritatis …” 27 De Spiritu et Anima 10 (PL 40:785) : “… aspectum siquidem rectum sequitur ipsa visio Dei, qui est finis aspectus.” 28 I will address this question in chapter 8. The discussion in chapter 5 of why aspectus and affectus act together is also relevant to this question. 29 I have found two such texts so far. There may be others. Ratherius Veroniensis (Leodiensis siue Lobiensis), Notae autographicae in ms. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 149/1195 8, note 41 (ed. François Dolbeau, « Ratheriana III. Notes sur la culture patristique de Rathier, » Sacris Erudiri 29 [1986]: 183); William of Saint-Thierry (Guillelmus de Sancto Theodorico), The Mirror of Faith (Speculum Fidei ) 3 (CCCM 89A: 82). A translation of the latter text is available: William of Saint Thierry, The Mirror of Faith, trans. Thomas X. Davis, Cistercian Fathers Series 15 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1979).
41 directly or quoting/paraphrasing some other source (or succession of sources) that ultimately depends upon Augustine.
Callus sees strong continuity in Grosseteste’s use of aspectus and affectus. Right after describing the inseparable activity of aspectus and affectus, which I have quoted above, Callus concludes, “Evidently this corresponds perfectly well with the theme of the De Artibus
Liberalibus. Such persistent use seems to argue to a single author of the On the Liberal Arts and other authentic writings.” 30 In light of the sources Callus identifies for Grosseteste’s doctrine, his remarks seem to reflect the view that Grosseteste was already familiar with either the
Soliloquies or some source dependent on the Soliloquies, such as the De Spiritu et Anima, when he first developed the aspectus/affectus distinction and wrote the De Artibus Liberalibus. He does not state this explicitly, however.
Callus also briefly treats the reception of aspectus and affectus . He sees Grosseteste’s influence with this pair of terms on Richard Fishacre, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, and Robert
Kilwardby. 31 He notices that Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus both use the terms in their commentaries on the Sentences. 32 Both authors discuss Grosseteste’s equation in De Libero
30 Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 21-22. 31 Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 22. 32 Richard Fishacre, In Sent. (Oxford, Balliol College, MS 57, fol.4va and fol. 128va), quoted in Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 22, n.1 and 30, n. 1; Richard Rufus of Cornwall, In Sent. (Oxford, Balliol College, MS 62, fols. 160vb-162rb), cited in Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 22, n.1 and 30, n. 2. Parts of Fishacre’s commentary that deal with the soul have since been edited in Raymond James Long, “The Problem of the Soul in Richard Fishacre’s Commentary on the Sentences,” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1968). See in particular pages *19-*20, *26-*29 and *112-*114. Long has also published an edition of Fishacre’s entire commentary on book 2 of the Sentences. Richard Fishacre , In Secundum Librum Sententiarum, Part 1 : Prol., Dist. 1-20 ,ed. R. James Long (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2008); Richard Fishacre , In Secundum Librum Sententiarum, Part 2: Dist. 21 – 44, Appendices , ed. R. James Long (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011). This may be an appropriate place to add that Richard Rufus also uses the aspectus/affectus distinction in his Scriptum Super Metaphysicam bk. 12, Dist. 2 (ed. Timothy Noone, “An Edition
42
Arbitrio of aspectus with ratio and affectus with voluntas .33 Robert Kilwardby uses the terms in
his De Natura Theologiae 34 and De Ortu Scientiarum. According to Callus, the latter work is
based upon the aspectus/affectus distinction. 35
Servus Gieben. A few years after Callus published his general overview of Grosseteste’s thought, Servus Gieben (of St. Anthonis) wrote a short piece in Italian that delved into
Grosseteste’s doctrine of the powers of the soul in more detail. 36 Richard Dales summarizes
Gieben’s study concisely:
[T]he soul has the power naturally to know all things and to direct its actions properly so that it might even attain a vision of God, although in most men this capacity is lulled or impeded by the corruption of the flesh or by a disorderly passion; and in any case the natural powers by themselves can go astray, fall into error, and do what is contrary to their nature, so that they must be perfected by grace. 37
Gieben’s study does not refer to aspectus and affectus explicitly . This may be due to the fact that his study is based upon two episcopal sermons, the Ex Rerum Initiatarum and the Ecclesia
Sancta Celebrat, which do not use aspectus and affectus as a pair. What makes Gieben’s study a part of the secondary literature on aspectus and affectus is his recognition of three points, two of and Study of the Scriptum Super Metaphysicam , bk. 12, dist. 2: A Work Attributed to Richard Rufus of Cornwall,” [PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1987], 208). 33 See Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 29-30. 34 Robert Kilwardby De Natura Theologiae (ed. Fridericus Stegmüller, Opuscula et Textus Historiam Ecclesiae elusque Vitam atque Doctrinam Illustrantia; Series Scholastica 17 [Münster: Aschendorff, 1935], 8 and 34), cited in Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 22, n.1. 35 Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 22, n. 1. Since Callus’ day, a critical edition of the De Ortu has appeared: Robert Kilwardby, De Ortu Scientiarum, ed. Albert G. Judy, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi IV (Oxford : The British Academy and The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1976). 36 Servus Gieben [of St. Anthonis], “Le potenze naturali dell'anima umana secondo alcuni testi inediti di Roberto Grossatesta,” in L’Homme et son destin, d’après les penseurs du Moyen Age. Actes du Premier Congrès international de philosophie médiévale, 437-443 (Louvain : Nauwelaerts, 1960). 37 Richard Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995), 39. Even though Dales’ study of the rational soul includes a section on Robert Grosseteste on pages 37-46, Dales’ subject matter overlaps surprisingly little with that of the present study. I will interact with his study in chapter 5, however.
43 which appear in Dales’ summary. The first is the primacy of the affectus. What one loves with the affectus (referred to as “passion” above) can limit (or expand) what one can know with the aspectus. The second point Gieben recognizes is that grace perfects the natural powers, which includes the perfection of the powers for knowledge and passion, aspectus and affectus . I will discuss this in chapters three and four. 38
Another idea pertaining to aspectus and affectus Gieben highlights is that human nature
ultimately has one, all-encompassing power. He paraphrases Grosseteste’s doctrine as saying
that human life is “one dynamic power ( una potenza dinamica )” that apprehends, desires, and
moves to possess what it recognizes as delightful to its own nature. 39 This interpretation could support the idea, which I will develop in chapter five, that aspectus and affectus, the powers of
apprehension and desire, are not distinct accidents of the soul for Grosseteste. Rather, each is
identical with the substance of the soul, which is the immediate principle of all its actions.
Pietro Rossi. In the introduction to his critical edition of Grosseteste’s Commentary on
the Posterior Analytics (1220-1230), Pietro Rossi gives a summary of the contents of the commentary. In a single paragraph, he explains aspectus and affectus in connection with demonstrative science, which is the topic at hand when the pair of terms appears in the commentary itself. He refers to aspectus and affectus as “two areas or potentialities of human
38 It is worth noticing that Gieben anticipates some of the findings which would later appear in James McEvoy, “Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Human Nature with the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat .” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 47 (1980): 131-187. I will interact with this article in chapter 4. 39 Gieben, “Le potenze naturali,” 439: “…cioè come una potenza dinamica che si realizza e si perfeziona nella sua operazione, una potenza che s’impossessa dell’ogetto nella cognizione, ne appetisce la bontà e muove tutto per avere ciò che nell’atto di conoscere ha riconosciuto dilettevole per la propria natura.”
44 nature ( due zone o potenzialità della natura umana ).” 40 He does not further describe the affectus, except by saying that its influence is strengthened by the condition of the human body.
He says the aspectus is “cognitive potency characterizable as light-vision ( potenzialità
conoscitiva caratterizzabile come luce-visione ).” The influence of the affectus in the embodied
state, he says, is what prevents the autonomous activity of the intellect. Such autonomous
activity will be possible, he thinks, when the soul is free of the body. 41 While Rossi’s comments could perhaps be justified by reading the Commentary in the Posterior Analytics in a particular way, I think he misunderstands the relationship of aspectus and affectus. For Grosseteste, the
aspectus of a disembodied soul is not autonomous but retains its inextricable link with the
affectus . 42
James McEvoy. One of the greatest Grosseteste scholars of the later twentieth century,
James McEvoy, briefly mentions the aspectus/affectus distinction six times in his 500-page book,
The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste. 43 In his later overview of Grosseteste’s thought as a
40 Pietro Rossi, “Introduzione,” in Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros, ed. Pietro Rossi (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981), 23: “È possibile comunque prendere le mosse, nell’analisi del problema della formazione e della natura degli universali, che sono i principi della scienza dimostrativa, dalla concezione delle facoltà conoscitive dell'uomo, o meglio dal rapporto dialettico fra due zone o potenzialità della natura umana, che Roberto chiama affectus et aspectus mentis .” 41 Pietro Rossi, “Introduzione,” 23: “L' affectus mentis, il cui influsso è rafforzato dalla particolare situazione in cui viene a trovarsi l'uomo condizionato dal corpo, fa sì che l' aspectus mentis, che si può dire potenzialità conoscitiva caratterizzabile come luce-visione, sia condizionato in modo tale da non rendere possibile un’attività autonoma dell'intelletto, quale potrà manifestarsi quando l'uomo sarà libero dal corpo.” 42 For discussion of the link between aspectus and affectus , see chapter 5. I will give my primary exposition of the relevant passage in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics in chapter 8, where I will also discuss the significance of the body to aspectus and affectus . 43 James McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 107, 135, 138, 257-258, 331.
45 whole, written for the Great Medieval Thinkers series, it surfaces four times. 44 Since both works seem to hold a common point of view, I will discuss both together. In one passage he says that the aspectus/affectus distinction expresses “the unity of intellect and will” in Grosseteste’s
thought. 45 This perhaps adumbrates the inseparability of knowledge and love. In another passage he glosses aspectus as the soul’s “capacity to understand” and the affectus as its
“loves.” 46 In some passages he does little more than paraphrase significant occurrences of the
terms, most of which have already surfaced in this survey. In other passages, he makes
important observations concerning aspectus and affectus . His overall assessment concurs with that of Callus. He says that for Grosseteste the relationship between the aspectus and the affectus is “one of his deepest convictions” 47 and even “a theme song of his life.” 48
One important observation McEvoy makes is that “love shapes and extends the intellectual horizon.” 49 Here he has noticed part of the primacy of the affectus. He also sees that
aspectus and affectus are closely connected to Augustinian ordered love. He summarizes:
“Grosseteste appeals to the priority of love within the intellectual life in a multiplicity of
contexts, using his own aspectus/affectus distinction in ways that reveal the pervasive influence upon him of St. Augustine’s ideal of amor ordinatus. ”50
44 James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), 78, 84, 136, 168. 45 McEvoy, Philosophy, 107. 46 Ibid., 331. Similarly, in Robert Grosseteste, 78 and 84, McEvoy glosses aspectus and affectus as “intelligence” and “will” when discussing De Artibus Liberalibus and as “capacity to understand” and “loves” when discussing the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics . 47 McEvoy, Philosophy, 331. 48 McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 78. 49 McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 136. 50 McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 136.
46
An even more important observation McEvoy makes, if indeed he makes it, is one that he
states tacitly. He applies the doctrine of aspectus and affectus to passages where the pair of
terms is not explicitly invoked. First, he applies it to Grosseteste’s angelology. McEvoy notices
a passage in the Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy 51 in which Grosseteste ascribes to angels the faculties of knowledge and love. McEvoy explains angelic intellection thus: “we can think of it as a reciprocal motion of aspectus and affectus, that is to say, of the willed urge to conformity with God sustaining and being renewed by contemplation, in an unceasing circulation that is nothing other than their capacity to receive the influence that comes from above.” 52 Then he applies aspectus and affectus to the illuminative stage of the Pseudo-
Dionysian purgation-illumination-perfection: “It [i.e., illumination] is a light which, as regards
homo viator, touches and transforms, not the intellect alone, but the entire mens, in both thought
and action, and in aspectus and affectus alike.”53 By expanding the use of the aspectus/affectus
51 I will quote below the edition of Grosseteste’s commentary that McEvoy quotes, since it is important that the precise quotations he uses do not contain aspectus and affectus. There is, however, a newer edition available. Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy, edited by Declan Lawell, James McEvoy, and James McQuade in Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Lincolniensis Versio Caelestis Hierarchiae Pseudo-Dionysii Areopagitae Cum Scholiis Ex Graeco Sumptis Necnon Commentariis Notulisque Eiusdem Lincolniensis. CCCM 268 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015). 52 McEvoy, Philosophy, 135. His textual basis is Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy (ed. James S. McQuade, “Robert Grosseteste's Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,” [PhD diss., Queen’s University, Belfast, 1961], 182-183, quoted in McEvoy, Philosophy, 135 n.31): “Sunt itaque caelestes spiritus naturaliter ex libero arbitrio conantes in conformitatem ad dei imitativum, et ex conatu aspicientes et ex aspectu iterum conantes, nec est cessatio huius circulationis; et est haec circulatio aptitudo ad suscipiendum divinas influentias gratuitorum donorum, quibus susceptis couniuntur deo, et in fortitudine amoris iam formati ex donis susceptis ad datorem inflexibiliter extenduntur, et extenti semper suscipiunt, et secundum suscepta ordinati totam ut dictum est vitam habent et ducunt intellectualem. ” This cyclical dynamic between knowledge and will or love in angels is an interesting parallel to the cycle represented by “Ezekiel’s Wheels” including knowledge, love, and good works in human life. I will discuss this latter cycle in chapters 3 and 5. The profound significance of conformity to God in Grosseteste’s thought will also come up for discussion in chapter 5. 53 McEvoy, Philosophy, 138. His textual basis is Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy (ed. McQuade, Celestial Hierarchy, 141, quoted in McEvoy, Philosophy, 138 n.38): “ Illuminari autem est per virtutes et scientias, vel simpliciter per virtutes, quia sub nomine virtutis generaliter dictae ad activas et speculativas comprehenditur omnis cognitio artis et scientiae ad suum finem optimum directa .” To understand how McEvoy
47 distinction from merely a tool used to explain the passages where the terms appear to a way of identifying consistent categories in Grosseteste’s thought, McEvoy may anticipate the method of the present study.
Yet I am not certain whether McEvoy expanded the application of aspectus and affectus intentionally. Grosseteste himself does apply aspectus and affectus to angels 54 and to the
Pseudo-Dionysian stages of both purgation and illumination 55 in the Commentary on the
Celestial Hierarchy—only not in the precise passages McEvoy quotes . It is possible that
McEvoy only chose to use the terms because Grosseteste uses them in the same way within the
commentary.
In any case, McEvoy does not consistently use aspectus and affectus to discuss cognition
and will or appetite in Grosseteste’s thought. When giving his magisterial exposition of the soul
and its powers in Grosseteste, he drops aspectus and affectus completely. Noting the diversity
and complexity of Grosseteste’s material on the soul, he decides to organize and present this
material in light of the mature expression of Robert’s anthropology in the episcopal sermon
takes a text about active and speculative matters and sees the affective included, one need only realize how, for Grosseteste, deeds are an extension and expression of the love found in the affectus. See my discussion of Dictum 19 in chapter 3. 54 Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy 5.2 (CCCM 268:115). 55 Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy 3.7, 7.1, and 7.5 (CCCM 268: 84, 130, and 145).
48
Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat. 56 He treats the complex and eclectic schema found in that sermon as the true schema for Grosseteste, towards which all of his earlier works were developing. 57
There are merits to McEvoy’s approach, and on the whole I do not dispute the accuracy
of his presentation. Nevertheless, his mode of presentation results in a heavy emphasis on what
Grosseteste borrowed and adapted from the De Spiritu et Anima (thinking it was by Augustine) 58 and the Pseudo-Dionysius, while the enduring strains and emphases of Grosseteste’s distinctive vision of the soul are relatively muted. For example, McEvoy acknowledges that in Ecclesia
Sancta Celebrat “Grosseteste saw in the contemplative life the union of two factors, illuminative
knowledge and love,” and that this occurs in the highest power of the soul, which Grosseteste
there calls sapientia or intelligentia. 59 Understood in light of Grosseteste’s identification of the aspectus as the locus of illumination, the affectus as the locus of love, and the perfection of the
aspectus and affectus together as sapientia, 60 it is very probable that the view of the soul
Grosseteste had been accustomed to describe in terms of aspectus and affectus was still in his
56 James McEvoy, Philosophy , 300: “In view of the complexity of the evidence and the need to balance systematic exposition against attention to Grosseteste’s sources and evolution, the following method of treatment has been adopted. The discussion follows the systematic scheme of the rational powers adopted in the sermon, Ecclesia Sancta, perhaps the latest and certainly the most self-conscious treatment accorded by Grosseteste to the problem area. The evidence we have been able to assemble concerning the evolution and derivation of the ideas will be built into our remarks on each of the powers discussed.” 57 McEvoy traces this development in Philosophy, 300-319. 58 Marie-Dominique Chenu, La Théologie au Douzième Siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), 298, explains that the De Spiritu et Anima, which he attributes to Alcher of Clairvaux, due to mistakenly bearing Augustine’s name, became “le manifeste de la noétique augustinienne.” 59 James McEvoy, “Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Human Nature With the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat ,” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 47 (1980): 160. This Article is reprinted with the same pagination in James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, Exegete and Philosopher (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994). Cf. Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §33 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 184). 60 See discussion in chapter 3.
49 mind when he prepared Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, even though the terms are absent (as a pair) .61
Yet, because Grosseteste in the same work creates a composite schema borrowed from the De
Spiritu et Anima and other sources to describe the natural capacity of the human soul to know all things, McEvoy focuses entirely on the new schema, which does not mention aspectus or
affectus. 62
The present study takes a somewhat different approach. I want to know: what is the fundamental structure, if there is one, that survives Grosseteste’s appropriation of different psychic schemata? What is his own view that leads him to select and interpret his authorities in the ways he does? To address these questions, I naturally use texts from all stages of his career and emphasize themes that recur in several different works. These recurring themes reveal what is distinctly Grosseteste’s thought over against the schemata he borrows and adapts at various times for various purposes. 63 The division of the soul into powers that correspond, whether
implicitly or explicitly, to the aspectus and the affectus is just such an enduring feature in the
great Englishman’s thought. For this reason, I believe this study of aspectus, affectus, and the
themes that consistently accompany these terms, while narrow in scope, will provide access to
the deepest parts of Grosseteste’s vision of the human creature and its relation to God.
Finally, it is perhaps also worth observing that McEvoy tacitly assumes strong continuity
in Grosseteste’s use of aspectus and affectus. He glosses affectus in the De Artibus Liberalibus
as “will,” even though that earliest of Grosseteste’s works does not yet explicitly use this
61 See discussion in chapter 4. 62 See quotation in note 56 above. 63 See the section on the Hexaëmeron in chapter 4 below for some examples of such borrowing.
50 language. 64 He also finds the power of the affectus to limit the aspectus in the De Artibus
Liberalibus. This primacy of the affectus , however, seems to be a later development in
Grosseteste’s thought. 65
Richard Southern. Richard Southern, the great scholar of medieval intellectual history, addresses the aspectus/affectus distinction both in his monograph on Grosseteste 66 and in an
article partly dedicated to the topic. 67 The article spends five pages dealing with aspectus and
affectus in the context of Grosseteste’s arguments against the eternity of the world. 68 In the early
De Artibus Liberalibus, Southern sees Grosseteste as advocating “a movement from aspectus to
affectus” in which the aspectus is “the elementary stage of knowledge,” and the affectus is “the
mature consideration which makes knowledge useful for living.”69 In the Commentary on the
Posterior Analytics, Southern sees them as “mutually supporting faculties of the mind.” On another occasion (in his monograph), Southern identifies aspectus with cognitio and affectus
64 McEvoy, Philosophy, 257. See my discussion of the De Artibus Liberalibus in chapter 3. 65 The De Artibus Liberalibus does not positively deny this doctrine, but neither does it clearly state it. See the discussion in chapter 3. The close cooperation of moral science and rhetoric in the De Artibus Liberalibus (Baur, Die Philosophischen Werke , 4), inasmuch as they would apply to aspectus and affectus, respectively, could perhaps justify McEvoy’s view in part, but the way he states his view sounds like a restatement of Callus, with the texts other than De Artibus Liberalibus omitted, rather than anything actually based on the De Artibus Liberalibus. McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 78: “Grosseteste distinguishes between the affectus and aspectus of the soul, or its will and intelligence, claiming that we cannot purify the latter from error so long as the former is wrongly inclined.” This statement appears in his explanation of the De Artibus Liberalibus. 66 .Richard Southern, Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 67 Richard Southern, “Richard Dales and the Editing of Robert Grosseteste,” in Aspectus et Affectus: Essays and Editions in Grosseteste and Medieval Intellectual Life in Honor of Richard C. Dales, ed. Gunar Freibergs (New York: AMS Press, 1993) , 3-14. 68 Southern, “Richard Dales,” 8-12. 69 Southern,”Richard Dales,” 12. Cf. similar descriptions in Southern, Robert Grosseteste, 44-45, 206; See my interpretation of De Artibus Liberalibus in chapter 3.
51 with amor and speaks of the need to move from cognitio to amor. 70 Though his descriptions are not always precise, Southern has touched upon an important point. There is a sense in which the aspectus works prior to the affectus, as I will show in chapter three.
Although Southern’s interpretation of Grosseteste’s theory of knowledge may involve greater change over time than I would be inclined to grant, 71 he notices that Grosseteste’s
predilection for using aspectus and affectus remained relatively stable. He sees Grosseteste as
adding to his argument against the eternity of the world over time as he gradually moves from a
focus on inductive knowledge to a focus on illumination, but he sees Grosseteste’s treatment of
aspectus and affectus as “a link between the two main phases of his intellectual career.” 72
James Ginther. The chief contemporary authority on Grosseteste’s theology, James
Ginther, gives this “most famous aspect” of Grosseteste’s psychology a four-page discussion in his Master of the Sacred Page. 73 He identifies patristic and medieval authors that had used either aspectus or affectus in ways similar to Grosseteste’s usage, 74 but he concludes that
“Grosseteste’s contribution to the semantic history of these two terms lies in bringing these two
phrases together.” 75 He says the aspectus refers to a person’s ability to reason and the affectus to
70 See Southern, Robert Grosseteste, 206. 71 I will discuss Grosseteste’s theory of illumination in chapter 8. 72 Southern, “Richard Dales,” 9. See also ibid., 12. 73 James Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 54-57. The quotation is from p. 54; See also ibid., 62-63, 103, 199. 74 Ginther, Sacred Page, 54, credits Augustine ( Soliloqiues 1.6) with coining aspectus animae. He says that both Augustine and many others used the term affectus mentis. He gives the examples of Cassiodorus, Paschasius Radbertus, Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Lombard, and Allan of Lille. For the specific citations, see Ginther, Sacred Page, 78 n.9. 75 Ginther, Sacred Page, 55. It is important to notice that Ginther is referring to the phrases aspectus mentis (or animae ) and affectus mentis (or animae ). Ginther is not claiming that Grosseteste invented the aspectus/affectus word play. See chapter 2 for further discussion.
52
“desire” or “will.” He notices that the aspectus is both receptive and discursive—it both sees and
judges. The former operation includes the apperception of sense data through imagination and
intelligentia, although it is not limited to this. As for the relation between these powers, Ginther sees in Grosseteste “a reflexivity between knowledge and will.” 76 He identifies the inseparability of truth and the good as the reason for the inseparability of knowledge and love: “To know truth required that both the mind’s gaze and its desire be directed towards truth and the good, that is
God himself.” 77
He explains that the aspectus needs to be illumined and the affectus set in accord with justice. If the will or affectus is in accord with justice , one has greater opportunity to know God.
This is an important aspect of the primacy of the affectus . On the other hand, one has to know
God in order to set one’s will in accord with justice. This reflects the priority of the aspectus.
Once one knows truth/God and the mind’s will and desires are ordered to justice/God’s will, the result will be good works. 78 The relationship of aspectus and affectus underscores the importance of preaching and theology, since both of these activities can correct both aspectus and affectus. 79
Conclusion
From this survey, three points emerge clearly. The first is that the aspectus/affectus
distinction was very important to Grosseteste. One should expect, therefore, to find some
consistency and thoughtfulness in the way Grosseteste uses the terms. One may also hope to
find them in doctrinally significant places, touching on a range of issues.
76 Ginther, Sacred Page, 56. 77 Ginther, Sacred Page, 56. For discussion of Ginther’s view, see chapter 5. 78 Ibid. Here Ginther is following Dictum 19, which I will discuss in chapter 3. 79 Ginther, Sacred Page, 56-57.
53
The second point that emerges clearly from this survey is related to the first. Several scholars have observed that Grosseteste not only uses aspectus and affectus over a stretch of
time, but also that he is fairly consistent in the way he uses the terms. This fact calls for an
investigation into what Grosseteste means by these terms and what they really represent in his
view of the soul and its life.
The third point is that the aspectus/affectus distinction is conceptually rich. Though not,
of course, using my terms, earlier scholars have identified, in some degree, all three of the major
themes I will discuss in chapters three and four: the priority of the aspectus (Southern, Ginther),
the primacy of the affectus (Callus, Gieben, McEvoy, Ginther), and the inseparability of
knowledge and love (McEvoy, Ginther). 80 Grosseteste uses aspectus and affectus in complex,
interconnected ways. While several scholars have made insightful observations about Robert
Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction, the variety of their observations shows the need to
devote to this topic a full systematic and historical study.
All of these lessons from the secondary literature indicate that Grosseteste’s
aspectus/affectus distinction is very important, although it has remained largely unstudied. In the
past, no scholar has attempted to give a complete account of Grosseteste’s usage and doctrine
connected with this pair of terms. Yet the need for such an account is obvious, and the insight to
be gained is great. Because Grosseteste uses aspectus and affectus “in season and out of season,”
as Callus says, 81 a study of the terms and the concepts connected with them can provide a cross-
section of his thought—anthropological, metaphysical, soteriological, mystical, and
80 If one reads him carefully, one can see all three themes in Ginther’s exposition. Of course, he does not clearly distinguish them or discuss them at any length. 81 See the discussion of D. A. Callus above.
54 epistemological. I believe the present study will thus constitute a major step forward in the overall scholarly understanding of Grosseteste as a thinker. It will also set the stage for a future study of his influence on subsequent thinkers who use aspectus and affectus in similar ways .
Now that the review of the literature on aspectus and affectus is complete , one more essential exercise remains in the task of preparing to understand aspectus and affectus in their proper context. I will in the next chapter discuss the sources of Robert Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction.
Chapter 2: Sources of the Aspectus/Affectus Distinction
The story of Robert Grosseteste’s sources for his doctrine of the soul could easily occupy a book all its own, or a series of books. It would have to be a history of psychology in the West, as well as the near East (for his Islamic sources). Here I can only treat such sources as are necessary for understanding Grosseteste’s use of aspectus and affectus in reference to the soul. I will orient the investigation around two questions. The first question is: What is the origin of the aspectus/affectus distinction? This question pertains both to the wordplay and to the use of the paired terms to name the cognitive and appetitive powers of the soul. The second question is: from where does Robert Grosseteste get the doctrine that he associates with aspectus and affectus ? The answer to this question is related to that of the first, but they are not identical. I will address these two questions in order.
Before I address these questions, I should explain my approach to them. The event of most importance for the first question is Grosseteste’s production of the De Artibus Liberalibus, which I will discuss at length in the next chapter. This is his earliest work using aspectus and affectus. He wrote the tract sometime after becoming a master of the liberal arts, which could not have occurred earlier than about 1193. He would have been no older than about twenty-five in that year. To avoid the illusion of precision where there is none, I will treat the terminus post quem as c.1195. The scholarly consensus is that he wrote the book before 1209, at which time he would have left England (if he was there) for a sojourn in France during the interdict of 1208-
1214.1 Since Grosseteste already had the idea of using aspectus and affectus to name the
1 The interdict was accompanied by a suspension of the schools in Oxford from 1209-1214. For more information on the context of the De Artibus Liberalibus, see the discussion in chapter 3. 55 56 cognitive and appetitive powers of the soul by the time he wrote the De Artibus Liberalibus, only
texts written before that time could be sources for the basic development of the distinction.
Among the sources that pass the first test, one should assign greater potential importance
to texts that Grosseteste is more likely to have read before writing the De Artibus Liberalibus. If
Grosseteste uses a text later in life that includes aspectus and affectus, such as Ambrose’s
Hexaëmeron, this later usage does not constitute good evidence that our author first found the
terms in that source unless there is also good reason to think that Grosseteste read the work
before writing his De Artibus Liberalibus. Grosseteste was a young master of arts, who was also
proficient in law and medicine. He makes heavy use of Augustine and shows a strong interest in
science in the De Artibus Liberalibus. Therefore, texts by Augustine or texts dealing with the
Liberal Arts, law, medicine, or other scientific topics will be the most likely sources of his
aspectus/affectus distinction.
Similarly, when considering how closely earlier uses of aspectus and affectus correspond
to Grosseteste’s distinction, it is only the doctrine of the De Artibus Liberalibus that concerns us.
Later developments in Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine are likely to reflect later reading,
but the first question is only concerned with his initial formulation of the distinction. As I will
explain in chapter three, Grosseteste’s doctrine in the De Artibus Liberalibus is that the aspectus
of the mind or soul is the rational power. The affectus includes both the positive and the
negative appetites, which he refers to as concupiscible and irascible. The aspectus first perceives an object of cognition and judges it as fitting or harmful. The affectus then, if working properly, embraces what is fitting or flees what is harmful to the degree that the aspectus has judged appropriate. If there were a text earlier than the De Artibus Liberalibus that explained aspectus
57 and affectus in this way, it probably would be Grosseteste’s source or would be related to his source in some way. I have not found such a source, so there is at present no easy answer to the first question, that of where exactly our author got this distinction. It is possible that he was original in his choice to invest the paired terms with the particular meanings he gives them.
The second question, since it looks to doctrinal content more generally, is concerned with sources Grosseteste used throughout his career to develop his thoughts on aspectus and affectus.
The second question is not concerned primarily with the words aspectus and affectus, but with the ideas about the soul and its powers of cognition and appetite that Grosseteste adopted. Of course, it would not have been surprising if Grosseteste had gotten his terms and his doctrine from the same source, but the reality of the situation may not be that simple. It seems that we have to look to the Augustinian tradition as represented by Cistercian works like the De Spiritu et
Anima to find the source of the doctrine to which Grosseteste attached the terms aspectus and affectus.
The Origins of the Aspectus/Affectus Distinction
I turn now to the first question: where did Grosseteste get the aspectus/affectus distinction? As a play on words, one could never hope to identify the first person who thought of using aspectus and affectus. I can present some relevant information, however. A search of the
Brepols Latin databases for any forms of aspectus or affectus used in the same sentence found zero results in the authors of antiquity, twenty-four in the age of the Church Fathers (AD 200-
735), and 153 in the Middle Ages (736-1500). In this latter group, 58 occurrences are in texts that likely were written before Grosseteste wrote the De Artibus Liberalibus (c.1195-1209), and the remaining 95 appear in texts written by Grosseteste, his younger contemporaries, or later
58 authors. Not all occurrences are actually instances of wordplay. In many cases it is difficult to judge whether the proximity of the terms was purposeful or coincidental. Many potentially relevant texts, moreover, remain unavailable for database searches. Still, among the texts readily available there are enough cases where wordplay clearly is intended that I can make some basic observations. 2
I will now survey some important appearances of aspectus and affectus in authors active before Robert Grosseteste. The purpose of this survey is to give some impression of the late twelfth-century milieu in which our author likely found his beloved terms. I will begin with patristic authors that could have been known, whether directly or in quotation, in the late twelfth century, and then I will progress chronologically.
Ambrose. The earliest Latin author with an aspectus/affectus distinction I have found is
Ambrose of Milan. In his Hexaëmeron, Ambrose observes that irrational beasts can all look at the sky, but they do not know what they are seeing. “The book is seen ( aspectus) by all, but only in man is affectus the interpreter of the things which he sees.” 3 In his exposition of Psalm 118,
2 I have not limited myself to the Brepols databases in the survey below. A search for forms beginning with “affectu” and “aspectu” within twenty words of one another among the medieval authors in the Patrologia Latina database returned 113 hits in 90 entries. Many of these authors could conceivably be sources Grosseteste knew. My impression from reviewing the results is that in most cases of this kind the words appear together accidentally or in a play on words that has a very different meaning from Grosseteste’s meaning. Most often the form of aspectus refers only to sensory vision or appearance and not to a power of the soul. While my review of the PL results was qualitative and general, I did look at every individual result from the Brepols databases, for the authors that likely precede Grosseteste. Thus, the survey below reflects the Brepols results more than the PL results, although it includes some results that are unique to the PL search. 3 Ambrose of Milan ( Ambrosius Mediolanensis ), Exameron, day 6, ch. 9, par. 67 (CSEL 32, 1:255; trans. mine): “…omnibus est liber aspectus, sed soli inest homini eorum quae aspiciat affectus interpres.”
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Ambrose writes, “Indeed, when we direct our eyes toward some things, we avert them, as if we judge to be unworthy of sight ( aspectu ) that which we hate with our emotion ( affectu ).” 4
Augustine. Augustine, once a disciple of Ambrose, also uses aspectus and affectus as a
play on words. Two passages in particular would become commonplaces in medieval
quotations. It is worth noticing that both of these passages, like those in Ambrose, deal with the
relationship of physical vision to human emotions.
One of Augustine’s commonplaces originates in his Tractates on John. In chapter 16,
where Jesus observes that the news of his departure has filled his disciples with sadnesss,
Augustine explains that “human affectus was sad because carnal vision ( aspectus ) was deprived.” 5 This fortunate passage would reappear in Bede’s exposition of John 6 and in Thomas
Aquinas’ Catena Aurea. 7 Smaragdus of St. Michael (c.760 – c.840) preserves a short version of the passage in Divi Augustini Dicta de Coena Domini . After quoting the line from the Gospel, it skips
4 Ambrose of Milan, Expositio psalmi cxviii 17.13 (CSEL 62:383; trans. mine): “ Denique oculos nostros, cum in aliquem movemur, avertimus, quasi indignum eum aspectu iudicemus quem oderimus affectu .” See also Ambrose of Milan, De Noe 31.116 (CSEL 32, 1:491); Exameron, day 6, ch. 8, par. 44 (CSEL 32, 1:235). 5 Augustine, In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus CXXIV, tr. 94, par. 4 (PL 35:1868; partial trans. mine): “ Sed quia haec locutus sum vobis, inquit, tristitia implevit cor vestrum. Videbat utique quid illa sua verba in eorum cordibus agerent: spiritualem quippe nondum interius habentes consolationem, quam per Spiritum sanctum fuerant habituri, id quod exterius in Christo videbant, amittere metuebant; et quia se amissuros esse illum vera denuntiantem dubitare non poterant, contristabatur humanus affectus, quia carnalis desolabatur aspectus.” 6 Beda Veneralibis, In S. Joannis Evangelium Expositio 16 (PL 92:854): “ Sed quia haec locutus sum vobis, inquit, tristitia implevit cor vestrum. Videbat itaque quid illa sua verba in eorum cordibus agerent. Spiritualem quippe nondum habentes interius consolationem, quam per Spiritum sanctum fuerant habituri, id quod exterius in Christo videbant, amittere metuebant; et quia se amissuros esse, illo vera denuntiante, dubitare non poterant, contristabatur humanus affectus, quia carnis desolabatur aspectus.” 7 Thomas Aquinas, Catena Aurea in Iohannem 16, lect. 2 (ed. P. Angelici Guarienti, Catena Aurea in quattuor evangelia, vol. 2 [Taurini: Marietti, 1953], 538): “Videbat autem dominus quid sua verba in eorum cordibus agerent: spiritualem quippe nondum interius habentes consolationem quam per spiritum sanctum fuerant habituri, id quod exterius in Christo videbant, amittere metuebant; et quia se amissuros esse, illo vera denuntiante, dubitare non poterant, contristabatur humanus affectus, quia carnalis desolabatur aspectus; unde sequitur sed quia haec locutus sum vobis, tristitia implevit cor vestrum.”
60 straight to the line containing aspectus and affectus .8 The conciseness of this passage may have have increased the probability of later authors noticing the wordplay and repeating it. It is possible that Grosseteste could have come across this quotation somewhere, even as a young scholar of arts and sciences.
Augustine’s other commonplace occurs at least twice in his own works. In both Letter
211 and the “ Regula Tertia ,” he says that women desire and are desired by touch ( tactu ), by emotion ( affectu ), and by sight ( aspectu ). 9 This logion would find its way into at least one
religious rule (regula ) written after Augustine’s time, 10 and it may well appear in others.
Augustine’s happy turn of phrase also had the remarkable luck of landing in Gratian’s
Decretum. 11 Perhaps Grosseteste first came across the wordplay in his legal studies. It also
appears in a topical compilation of quotations produced in 1197 by Gerald of Wales. 12 Gerald is
believed to have been living in the area of Lincoln at that time, and we happen to know that he
was personally acquainted with Robert Grosseteste. Sometime before 1198, Gerald wrote a
letter commending the young Grosseteste to the bishop of Hereford as one learned in the Liberal
8 Smaragdus of St. Michael, Divi Augustini Dicta de Coena Domini (PL 102:214): “ Sed quia haec locutus sum vobis, tristitia implevit cor vestrum . Contristabatur humanus affectus, quia carnalis desolabatur aspectus.” 9 Augustine, Letter 211, par. 10 (CSEL 57:363): “Nec tactu solo sed affectu quoque et aspectu appetitur et appetit femina.” Augustine, Regula Tertia vel Praeceptum (ed. Luc Verheijen, in La Règle de Saint Augustin , vol. 1 [Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1967], 424 ): “Nec solo tactu et affectu, sed aspectu quoque, adpetitur et adpetit concupiscentia feminarum.” 10 Eugippius, Regula 1.74 (CSEL 87:9): “Nec solo tactu et affectu, sed aspectu quoque, adpetitur et adpetit concupiscentia
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Arts, Law, and Medicine. 13 It is possible that Grosseteste read aspectus and affectus in Gerald’s compilation, or in the source Gerald used to obtain the quotation.
From what we have seen so far, the aspectus/affectus wordplay among the fathers was
used to discuss the relationship between physical vision and automatic emotional response. A
number of medieval authors would follow this pattern, even outside direct quotations or
paraphrases. 14 While all of this is related to Grosseteste’s conception of aspectus and affectus in
the De Artibus Liberalibus, it is not the same. For Grosseteste, aspectus will include not only physical sight but also, and more properly, intellectual vision, or reason. Augustine could use aspectus to refer to the cognitive power of the soul, but he did not pair it with affectus when it
had this meaning. With affectus, aspectus referred specifically to physical sight. The meaning of the aspectus/affectus distinction that the tradition gets from Augustine’s actual use of the paired terms is thus distinct from Grosseteste’s meaning.
Isidore of Seville. The earliest author I have found who actually brings together aspectus
mentis and affectus mentis is Isidore of Seville (c.560-636). It was not a major theme in his
thought, appearing clearly only one time that I have found. 15 In book two of his Sentences, he
writes:
13 Gerald of Wales, Letter 18 (Ed. Brewer, Opera vol. 1 [1861], 249). For discussion see Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 4. 14 See Mythographi Vaticani 1.226 (CCSL 91C); Lambertus Tuitiensis, Miracula Herberti Coloniensis (MGH SS 15: 1247); Peter the Venerable, Letter 58 (ed. Giles Constable, The Letters of Peter the Venerable, vol. 1, Harvard Historical Studies 78 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967], 187); Hildegard of Bingen, Letter 157 (CCCM 91A: 351); Peter of Celle, Letters, book 2, letter 93 (PL 202: 541); Adamus Scottus, De Quadripartito Exercitio Cellae (PL 153:818, where the work is attributed to a second Guigo the Carthusian); I will refer to some additional texts below. 15 There is a second possible occurrence, but even if the text does correctly read aspectus and affectus, it follows the Augustinian usage of physical vision leading to an emotional response. See Isidore of Seville, Synonyma 2.16 (CCSL 111B: 74).
62
A change of location is sometimes helpful to converts for the health of the soul. For frequently, when location is changed, the affectus mentis (disposition of the mind) is also changed. For, furthermore, it is appropriate to be plucked out bodily, where someone has devoted themselves to allurements, since the location where someone lived perversely places in the aspectus mentis (vision of the mind) what he always thought or did there. 16
While the terms appear in separate sentences, at least for the editor, it does seem that Isidore has
brought them together intentionally. More importantly, Isidore clearly has the idea that there is a
meaningful connection between the aspectus and affectus of the mind. The implication of his
advice is that the things we think about affect the way we feel and act. This is rudimentary
compared to Grosseteste’s doctrine, but it bears a general similarity. We are now dealing with
some species of cognitive/appetitive distinction that can be attached to aspectus and affectus and
that concerns the mind specifically .
One need not speculate whether Grosseteste would have come across Isidore’s
aspectus/affectus distinction directly, for a single passage of little sophistication would not be likely to inspire Grosseteste’s psychology all by itself, even if he did happen across it. It will suffice at present to observe that Grosseteste was not the first person to talk about the aspectus
and the affectus of the mind as a pair.
The Sacramentary Tradition . In the eighth and ninth centuries, one can find a prayer for
the ordination of a deacon in which aspectus and affectus appear in a clear play on words:
Lord, giver of sacred hope, of faith, of grace, and of progress, who by the appointed ministries of angels everywhere in heaven and on earth, through all the elements of your will, are pouring out love ( affectum ), also, concerning this your servant ______( illum ),
16 Isidore of Seville Sententiae 2.10.7 (CCSL 111: 114; trans. mine): “Valet interdum conuersis pro animae salute mutatio loci. Plerumque enim, dum mutatur locus, mutatur et mentis affectus. Congruum est enim inde etiam corporaliter euelli, ubi quisque inlecebris deseruiuit; nam locus ubi praue quisque uixit, hoc in aspectu mentis opponit quod semper ibi uel cogitauit uel gessit.”
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deign in a special way to illumine his gaze ( aspectum ) so that, unencumbered in your services at the holy altars, your minister might grow pure.17
The prayer goes on to refer to the example of St. Stephen, which is why I suppose that “gaze” is the meaning of aspectus intended. The idea seems to be that the deacon is purified by his spiritual vision of God, as when Stephen looked into heaven and saw the glory of God. 18 It is possible, however, that the glowing of Stephen’s face is in view. 19 If that is the case, the proper
translation of aspectus would be “face.” This prayer, in slightly different forms, appears in at
least four Christian sacramentaries of the eighth and ninth centuries. 20
In this text, the play on words has nothing to do with dividing powers of the soul. It is a
nice illustration, however, of how aspectus and affectus can appear together on purpose without
having any particular significance. For the sake of brevity, I am omitting other such appearances
from the present survey.21
17 Liber Sacramentorum Augustodunensis, rubric 1547 (CCSL 159B:185 ; trans. mine) : “Domine sanctae spei fidei gratiae et profectuum munerator qui in caelestibus et terrenis angelorum ministeriis ubique dispositis per omnia elimenta uoluntatis tuae defundens affectum hunc quoque famulum tuum illum speciali dignare inlustrare aspectum ut tuis obsequiis expeditus sanctis altaribus minister tuus purus adcrescat.” 18 See Acts 7:55. 19 See Acts 6:15, where Stephen’s face is said to have shone like that of an angel. 20 In addition to the Sacramentary of Autun, quoted above, the prayer appears in Liber Sacramentorum Engolismensis, rubric 2085 (CCSL 159C: 319); Liber Sacramentorum Gelonensis, rubric 2528 (CCSL 159); Collectarium-Pontificale Baturichi Ratisbonensis Episcopi, formula 472 (ed. Franz Unterkircher, Spicilegium Friburgense 8 [Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1962], 104). Due to differences between the texts, they do not all have the same meaning, but they clearly stem from a common source. 21 See Vita Leonis IX (Die Touler Vita) 1.3 (ed. H.-G. Krause, Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum 70 [Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1999], 92); Peter of Celle, Sermon 69 (PL 202: 854); Rituale Monasterii Biburgensis sect. 15, form. 144 (ed. W. von Arx, Spicilegium Friburgense 14 [Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1970], 197).
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Anselm of Canterbury. One of Grosseteste’s trusted authorities, Anselm of Canterbury uses aspectus with affectus three times in his oeuvre :22 twice among his letters and once in a prayer/meditation. In Letter 2 he uses aspectus to refer to seeing someone physically, and
affectus refers to desire or feeling, in line with the common Augustinian quotations. 23 In Oratio
12, affectus refers to the soul’s feeling or desire, and aspectus refers to God’s vision of the soul. 24
In Letter 10, affectus refers to a feeling given by God to the pilgrim on earth, with a view to restoring the mind, while aspectus refers to the vision of God in heaven. 25 In this last text we see the Augustinian concept of the inner vision of the soul by which one can see God in beatitude.26
While Anselm strikes a definite chord of resonance with Grosseteste and the whole Augustinian tradition, none of these texts actually uses aspectus and affectus as a pair of terms to name the soul’s powers of cognition and appetite.
William of St.-Thierry. When we reach the Cistercian authors, we find a great emphasis
on the role of affectus in the spiritual life. 27 Along with this we sometimes find an
22 The standard edition of Anselm’s works is still S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1938, 1946). 23 Anselm, Letter 2 (Opera Omnia 3:99): “Cum enim primum vestra reverenda fraternitas parvitati meae se notam fecit per suam praesentiam, sic eam sibi anima mea caritatis amplexu alte impressit astringendo, ut eius imaginem in se perspicuam exprimeret diligendo, per quam vos semper praesentes tenet etiam absistendo. Unde licet rarus sit aspectus, non tamen rarus, sed continuus est affectus.” 24 Anselm, Oratio 12 (Opera Omnia 3:48): “Age ergo, domine, vide necessitatem meam, immo ecce vides eam. Anima, anima mea, collige totum affectum tuum et ingere te in aspectum eius. Inclama, ingemina intimo affectu in conspectu eius: 'Vides me'.” 25 Anselm, Letter 10 (Opera Omnia 3:113): “Quam devotionem opto et oro, ut omnipotens deus sic in vobis conservet et nutriat, ut mentem vestram in terris suo dulcissimo affectu et in caelis suo beato aspectu reficiat.” 26 For this usage of aspectus in Augustine, see Soliloquies 1.6. I have discussed this text in chapter 1 and will discuss a different passage from the Soliloqiuies below. 27 See Damien Boquet, L’ordre de l’affect au Moyen Ȃge: Autour de l’anthropologie affective d’Aelred de Rievaulx (Caen, France: Publications du CRAHM, 2005). Boquet traces the history of affectus and affectio from antiquity to the twelfth century Cistercians on pages 29-114. He explains aspects of the Cistercian view of affect on pages 115- 220. He discusses Aelred of Rievaulx’s definitions of affectus and affectio on page 16.
65 aspectus/affectus distinction. An older contemporary of Bernard of Clairvaux, William of St.-
Thierry became a Cistercian in his later years. He held substantial correspondence with Bernard
through letter writing. William strongly emphasized the importance of affectus in his writings, 28 holding that love can confer a special knowledge of God. 29 Around 1138, William wrote a
commentary on the Song of Songs. In one passage he pairs affectus with aspectus: “At the same
time note … that in prayer the highest affectus of which humans are capable has directed the
vision ( aspectus ) towards the light of the face of God.” 30 In this case, the feeling or desire of the soul and its inner vision do constitute an aspectus/affectus distinction generally similar to that which Grosseteste will unfold in his works around 1220-1230. 31 In the earlier De Artibus
Liberalibus, however, Grosseteste is not concerned directly with the vision of God and gives no
indication that the affectus directs the aspectus.
Bernard of Clairvaux. Bernard uses the aspectus/affectus wordplay several times. It does
not appear to have been any more technical for him than it was for Augustine. Most of the time
28 Denis Cazes, La Théologie Sapientielle de Guillaume de Saint Thierry, Studia Anselmiana 148 (Roma: Pontificio Ateneo Sant’Anselmo, 2009), 17, refers to affectus as one of William’s most essential expressions for explaining the relationship of the soul to God: « Nombre d'expressions parmi les plus essentielles, retenues par Guillaume pour traduire ce colloque intime entre l'âme et Dieu qu'il appelle de tous ses voeux, comme celle d' affectus , font naufrage avec la barque de la théologie abélardienne sur laquelle elles ont pris place bien malgré elles... » 29 For a concise discussion of his complex use of this term, see Thomas X. Davis, Appendix to William of Saint Thierry, The Mirror of Faith, trans. Thomas X. Davis, introduction by E. Rozanne Elder, Cistercian Fathers Series 15 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1979), 93-95. It was Davis’ refusal to translate affectus that inspired me to leave aspectus and affectus untranslated in the present study. William’s general view, which seems to have been shared by many who liked to say that amor ipse intellectus est obviously resonates with Grosseteste’s view of love as knowledge articulated in Dictum 91. See my discussions of this text in chapters 5 and 8. 30 William of St.-Thierry, Expositio Super Cantica Canticorum 5.36 (CCCM 87: 37; partial trans. mine): “Simul etiam nota in petitione osculi, supremum in oratione humanae possibilitatis affectum in lumen illud uultus Dei suum | direxisse aspectum; sed reuerberante caritatis illius claritate, mox ad ea quae communiora sunt reflexum, et in eis semetipsum exercentem, cum dicit: Quia meliora sunt ubera tua uino, fragrantia unguentis optimis.” 31 I will trace the development of Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine in chapters 3 and 4.
66 aspectus refers to physical vision and affectus to emotions or desire. 32 In one such passage, the
aspectus that can look up at the stars (reminiscent of Ambrose’s Hexaëmeron passage) is actually
distinguished from both the inner senses ( sensus ) and the desires ( affectus ), which are stuck on
earthly things. 33 There is at least one passage, however, in which Bernard refers to inner aspectus and affectus, which is like the single occurrence in William of St.-Thierry. This appears
in the De Consideratione written for Pope Eugenius III around 1148-1153. 34 Even here, one
does not quite recognize young Grosseteste’s meaning, for the aspectus of the De Artibus
Liberalibus is not called an inner vision (as though distinct from outer vision). It encompasses
intellectual perception and judgment in general. For this kind of meaning, Bernard prefers to
speak of intellectus and affectus, to which I will return below.
Other Cistercian Authors. Aelred of Rievaulx 35 uses the aspectus/affectus wordplay on
several occasions, but in every instance that I have found, he is either referring to physical
32 See Bernard of Clairvaux, Apology to William 28, in Sancti Bernardi Opera, vol. 3, ed. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais (Rome: Cistercian Editions, 1963), 104; Sermones de Diversis no. 61, par. 1 ( Opera 6,1:293); Sermones Super Cantica Canticorum, no. 24, par. 6 ( Opera 1:157) 33 Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones Super Cantica Canticorum, no. 24, par. 6 ( Opera 1:157): “Perversa res est et foeda, luteum vas, quod est corpus de terra, oculos habere sursum, caelos libere suspicere caelorum que luminaribus oblectare aspectus , spiritualem vero caelestem creaturam suos e contrario oculos, id est internos sensus atque affectus , trahere in terram deorsum, et quae debuit nutriri in croceis, haerere luto, tamquam unam de suibus, amplexari que stercora.” 34 Bernard of Clairvaux, De Consideratione 5.12 ( Opera 3 :476) : “Quomodo quem nostris loquimur verbis, in sua reconditus maiestate, nostros penitus et aspectus effugit, et affectus?” 35 For a quick introduction to Aelred’s psychology, see C.H. Talbot, Introduction to Aelred of Rievaulx, Dialogue on the Soul, trans. with an introduction by C.H. Talbot, Cistercian Fathers Series 22 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1981), 11-16, where Talbot summarizes the content of Aelred’s De Anima. Talbot also gives a concise summary of Cistercian psychology on pages 9-10. In the general Cistercian summary, he highlights in particular the Cistercian beliefs that the soul operates in a way analogous to the operation of the Divine Nature and that the image of the Trinity in the soul is of paramount importance. Grosseteste shares these sentiments, as I will discuss in chapter 5.
67 sight/appearance and the emotions that result from seeing, 36 similar to the patristic usage, or he is making some other play on words that does not approximate Grosseteste’s doctrine. For example, on two occacions he refers to the appearance and disposition of the same person. 37 It is worth noticing that several of Aelred’s uses of aspectus and affectus appear in sermons. This confirms what one would naturally expect: among Latin speakers, aspectus and affectus, as a
play on words, was in the air. In principle, anyone who had connections with religious circles
could have picked it up and used it. Still, the distinction did not bear the precise meaning that
the young Grosseteste would give it.
Two additional Cistercians who use aspectus and affectus are Guerric of Igny and John of
Forde. Guerric of Igny uses aspectus and affectus as referring to physical sight and emotions. 38
John of Forde uses the pair on one occasion in his sermons that were intended to complete
Bernard’s sermons on the Song of Songs. 39 Here he seems close to Grosseteste’s basic meaning, but there is still nothing about the aspectus judging and the affectus embracing or fleeing. Since
John of Forde died in 1214, and this is the terminus ad quem of his sermons, it is difficult to know whether he wrote this sermon before or after Grosseteste wrote the De Artibus Liberalibus.
Peter Lombard. In the biblical commentary tradition, Peter Lombard, on at least one occasion, uses aspectus and affectus to explain the apostle Paul. 40 His usage reflects the common device in which aspectus refers to physical sight and affectus refers to emotion. I
36 See Aelred of Rievaulx, De Iesu Puero Duodenni 1 (CCCM 1); De Speculo Caritatis 3.15, 3.28 (CCCM 1); and perhaps Collectio Dunelmensis, Sermon 74, par. 13 (CCCM 2B: 250). 37 See Aelred of Rievaulx, Collectio Claraeuallensis prima, Sermon 20, par. 30 (CCCM 2A: 162); Collectio Radingensis, Sermon 156, par. 23 (CCCM 2C: 464). 38 Guerric of Igny, Sermones in Nativitate Domini no. 3 (SChr. 166: 196). 39 John of Forde, Super Extremam Partem Cantici Canticorum Sermones CXX, no. 75 (CCCM 18). 40 Peter Lombard, Collectanea in Omnes Pauli Apostoli Epistolas, I ad Thessalonicenses 2:9 (PL 192: 295).
68 highlight it here only because the Lombard’s biblical commentaries were very influential, often finding their way into important versions of the Gloss. Here, then, is another way Grosseteste could have come across the pair of terms.
Arnulf of Lisieux . Arnulf of Lisieux (d.1184), in his Invectiva in Girardum, writes the following:
What greater blindness can there be than to hope for victory against the world where no help of God goes before and the small help of man follows after? You cannot deny that you incur the guilt of falsehood and inconstancy at the same time, O slippery deserter, faithless protector, now of these, now of those factions, whose divided gaze signifies duplicitous ways in all his deeds, and whose double vision ( aspectus ) reveals the two- faced affections ( affectus ) of the mind. For just as a certain unnatural enormity has twisted your corporeal eyes so that the discordant things astonishingly cannot come together to see the same thing, so also the eyes of the mind, namely, reason and feeling (affectus ), are at variance. 41
This passage is of particular interest because it includes both an aspectus/affectus
distinction and a cognitive/appetitive distinction, but only affectus belongs to both. The aspectus here is simply physical vision, considered as distinct from the vision of the mind, which it illustrates. The cognitive power is ratio . In calling ratio and affectus the two eyes of the mind, I do not think he means to say that both reason and affect are perceptive. He probably just calls them eyes of the mind because the lazy eye of his unfortunate opponent required that the two parts of the mind involved in decisions be characterized as “eyes.”
41 Arnulf of Lisieux (Arnulfus Sagiensis), Invectiva In Girardum 7 (MGH SS 12: 718; trans. mine): “Quae maior coecitas, quam ubi nullum Dei praecedit, exile hominis succedit auxilium, contra universitatem sperare victoriam? Non potes negare, quin falsi crimen et inconstantiae simul incurreris, levissime transfuga, modo harum modo illarum partium malefidus assertor, cuius in singulis operibus duplices vias duplex signat intuitus, et affectus mentis ancipites ambiguus manifestat aspectus . Sicut enim corporales oculos tuos innaturalis quaedam distorsit enormitas, ut ad idem contuendum mirabili nequeant discordia convenire, sic et mentis oculi dissident, ratio scilicet et affectus.”
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Of the texts surveyed so far, some treat aspectus as physical vision, and others treat it as inner or spiritual vision. None that certainly predate Grosseteste, however, treat it as equivalent to the rational power in general (to include inner and outer perception) when they pair it with affectus, and no source I have found at all says that aspectus perceives and judges, after which
affectus embraces or flees.
In the end, it is impossible to say, based upon the texts readily available, where exactly
Grosseteste got his aspectus/affectus distinction. He could have encountered the pair of terms in
any number of ways, and I assume that he did encounter it. Most of the time, and possibly all of
the time, he would have found the terms used differently from the way he would use them, once
he put stylus to parchment. He was not original in his idea to apply the wordplay to the vision
and affect of the mind, but we cannot say for certain that he knew others had done this before
him. We have no record of what he read before the De Artibus Liberalibus, other than the texts
on which it directly depends. 42 We can only guess. Even if we suppose he read all of the texts
surveyed above, we still are at a loss to explain why Grosseteste takes this distinction and loads it
with the precise meaning we find in the De Artibus Liberalibus. For this investigation, we must
broaden our net to encompass texts that do not use the terms as a pair.
The Doctrinal Sources of Grosseteste’s Aspectus/Affectus Distinction
It is now time to address the second question under investigation in this chapter: what are the doctrinal sources of Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction? 43 Among twelfth century
42 I am hopeful that the new critical edition under production from the Ordered Universe Project will help us to identify these sources. I will discuss one possible source below. 43 It is important to note that I am not discussing Grosseteste’s psychological sources in general. For such a catalogue, see McEvoy, Philosophy, 234-238. McEvoy also gives a nice overview of several works in which one can find Grosseteste’s psychological views on pages 229-234.
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Christian authors it was not unusual to divide the powers of the soul into two basic categories, one cognitive, and the other appetitive. Hugh of St. Victor wrote of cognitio and affectus. 44
Richard of St.Victor had ratio and affectio. 45 Bernard of Clairvaux liked intellectus and
affectus. 46 Isaac of Stella used sensus and affectus .47 Bernard McGinn, discussing Isaac’s
sensus/affectus distinction, notes the similar distinctions in Isaac’s contemporaries and observes,
“This division is so general that investigators of Isaac’s theory of man have come up with very
different theories concerning its origin.” 48 Following McGinn’s example, I am not going to try to trace the doctrine any further back than the twelfth century.
The broad use of a basic cognitive/appetitive distinction in the twelfth century calls for a word of caution. Although I will suggest that Isaac’s doctrine as repeated in the De Spiritu et
Anima is the most likely source of Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction, it is impossible to
know for sure. He could have read other texts containing similar ideas. Nevertheless, all of the
authors just mentioned could be considered part of the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition which the
44 Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis 1.10.3 (PL 176: 331): “ Duo sunt in quibus fides constat: cognitio et affectus , id est constantia vel firmitas credendi. In altero constat quia ipsa illud est; in altero constat quia ipsa in illo est. In affectu enim substantia fidei invenitur; in cognitione, materia. Aliud enim est fides qua creditur; et aliud quod fide creditur. In affectu invenitur fides; in cognitione id quod fide creditur. Propterea fides in affectu habet substantiam, quia affectus ipse fides est; in cognitione habet materiam, quia de illo et ad illud quod in cognitione est, fides est. Credere igitur in affectu est, quod vero creditur in cognitione est .” The discussion continues through chapter 4. See also Sacr. 1.3.13 (PL 176: 220). 45 Richard of St. Victor, Benjamin Minor 3 (SChr 419: 96): “Omni spiritui rationali gemina quaedam uis data est ab illo Patre luminum, a quo est omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum. Una est ratio, altera est affectio; ratio qua discernamus, affectio qua diligamus; ratio ad ueritatem, affectio ad uirtutem.” The discussion continues through chapters 4 and 5. 46 Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Ascensione Domini, no. 3, 2 ( Opera 5: 132): “Duo ergo sunt quae in nobis purganda sunt, intellectus et affectus: intellectus, ut noverit; affectus, ut velit.” 47 Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum (PL 194: 1887): “Quaecunque ergo aliquo sensu percipit, protinus in concupiscibilitatis quasi salsamentum intingit, ut illi sapiat, et quasi per saporem placeat, aut displiceat. Sunt igitur in anima, et sunt id quod anima, naturalis sensus cognoscens omnia, ac dijudicans inter omnia, et naturalis affectus, per quem suo ordine et gradu diligat omnia.” 48 Bernard McGinn, Introduction to Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology, ed. Bernard McGinn, Cistercian Fathers Series 24 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 53, n.213.
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De Spiritu et Anima represents. The Victorines were not Cistercians, but Hugh is quoted or paraphrased copiously in the De Spiritu et Anima. In the way I am speaking of the tradition, it includes not only Cistercians but also others who substantially agreed with the Cistercians in their view of the soul. The thesis I wish to argue concerning the source of Grosseteste’s cognitive/appetitive doctrine is that it likely derives from this Augustinian/Cistercian tradition, of which the De Spiritu et Anima is a privileged representative.
I will begin by discussing the doctrinal source of the De Artibus Liberalibus, since that point is closely related to the foregoing discussion. Then I will present the important sources that Grosseteste clearly identifies later in his career. His doctrine seems to take its initial inspiration from either the De Spiritu et Anima or some text with very similar content and terminology. His later thought on aspectus and affectus always remains in the tradition of the De
Spiritu et Anima, but other important sources of the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition that bear on aspectus and affectus include the Bible, Augustine, and Bernard of Clairvaux. 49
The De Spiritu et Anima tradition. Given the importance of the De Spiritu et Anima to my interpretation of Robert Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine, a few words of introduction are in order. 50 This work is primarily a compilation of various sources in the Augustinian tradition
49 I do not mean to suggest that these are the only relevant sources. I will mention others in later chapters. I have chosen these three because they meet three conditions. They are important sources in the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition. They are sources Grosseteste uses in many works for many purposes, suggesting that he allows them to shape his thoughts. They are also sources that seem to contribute important content to Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine. It may be that other sources deserve mention here as well, but at least these three additional sources must be mentioned. 50 For a more complete introduction, see McGinn, Introduction, 63-74.
72 of reflection upon the soul and its relation to the body.51 The inspiration for discussing the soul
(amima ) and the spirit ( spiritus ) as distinguishable concepts stems originally from passages in the New Testament, especially 1 Thessalonians 5:23,52 with its triad of body, soul, and spirit, and
Hebrews 4:12, with its reference to dividing soul from spirit. 53
Some of the authorities quoted or paraphrased in the De Spiritu et Anima , never or
seldom with attribution, include Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, Gennadius of Marseilles, and
Hugh of St. Victor. The main doctrines that pertain to aspectus and affectus are quoted or
paraphrased from the Cistercian Isaac of Stella’s Epistola ad Alcherum (Epistola de Anima ).54
The compiler shows an interest in the soul, of course, but also in such statements about anatomy
and physiology as were available in traditional Christian sources. For example, the compiler lifts
several passages out of Augustine’s De Genesi ad Litteram in which Augustine mentions
physiological doctrines .
Thirteenth century authors knew the work under different titles, but the two most
common titles seem to be De Spiritu et Anima and De Differentia Animae et Spiritus. Some
51 In fact, it may have had as many as three different compilers responsible for chapters 1-33, 34-50, and 51-65, respectively. See McGinn, Introduction, 64. Most, or perhaps all, of the passages relevant to Grosseteste appear in the first two sections. 52 1 Thess. 5:23 (Vulg.): “Ipse autem Deus pacis sanctificet vos per omnia et integer spiritus vester, et anima, et corpus, sine querella in adventu Domini nostri Iesu Christi servetur. ” Unless otherwise noted, biblical quotations with the designation “Vulg.” are from Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam versionem, fourth revised edition, ed. Robert Weber (Stuttgart: Deutsch Bibelgesellschaft, 1969, 1994). Since Weber’s edition uses line division instead of conventional punctuation, I have added capitalization and punctuation to all quotations, generally following suggestions found in text of the Clementine Vulgate ( Biblia Sacra Vulgatæ editionis, Sixti V Pontificis Maximi jussu recognita et edita [Roma: Typographis Vaticanis, 1598]) as presented by The Clementine Vulgate Project. http://vulsearch.sourceforge.net/index.html. 53 Hebrews 4:12 (Vulg.): “ Vivus est enim Dei sermo, et efficax et penetrabilior omni gladio ancipiti : et pertingens usque ad divisionem animae ac spiritus : conpagum quoque et medullarum, et discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis.” 54 For an overview of the content of this letter, see McGinn, Introduction, 47-63. For a study of Isaac’s theological anthropology, see Bernard McGinn, The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella, Cistercian Studies Series 15 (Washington, DC: Cistercian Publications, 1972), esp. 103-227.
73 authors or scribes confused it with the De Differentia Animae et Spiritus attributed to Costa Ben
Luca, or with Isaac’s Epistola ad Alcherum. 55 Many authors in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, including Robert Grosseteste, attributed the De Spiritu et Anima to
Augustine. 56 Although this attribution is impossible, due to the late quotations throughout the work, the question of true authorship is difficult. Traditionally, modern scholars have attributed the compilation to Alcher of Clairvaux. Raciti argued that this was highly unlikely and suggested Peter Comestor, writing in a Victorine context, as an alternative. 57 McGinn concurs with Raciti that Alcher is not the author, but he is not convinced that Comestor compiled it either. He states, “It seems impossible at this juncture to make a definitive judgment about the authorship of the text, or even whether we are dealing with a text of Cistercian origin or only one heavily influenced by Cistercian speculation on man.” 58 Nevertheless, he concludes, “The very shaky evidence we have seems to suggest production in Cistercian circles some time after
1170.” 59
55 Thomas of York, for example, cites Costa Ben Luca’s work under the title De Spiritu et Anima and shortly thereafter attributes the same work to Isaac, using the title De Differentia Animae et Spiritus,. See Thomas of York Sapientiale book 7 (ed. Paul Michael Byrne, “The Doctrine of the Soul in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York: Study and Text,” vol. 2. [PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1955], 252-254). In the latter passage, either Thomas or a scribe appears to have confused Costa Ben Luca’s work either with the De Spiritu et Anima, attributing it to Isaac, or with Isaac’s Epistola ad Alcherum, calling it De Differentia Animae et Spiritus. For discussion of the work by Costa Ben Luca, see Byrne, “Doctrine of the Soul,” vol. 1, 32-36. For discussion of this passage in Thomas of York, see Byrne, “Doctrine of the Soul,” vol. 3, 91-92 n.62. My own comments are based upon Byrne’s observations. 56 See for example Robert Grosseteste , De Cessatione Legalium 3.1.22. Marie-Dominique Chenu, La Théologie au Douzième Siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), 298, says that the De Spiritu et Anima was “le manifeste de la noétique augustinienne,” due to its false attribution to Augustine. 57 Gaetano Raciti, “L’Autore del ‘De spiritu et anima,’” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 53, 5 (1961) : 385-401. Raciti, Ibid., 401, believes his conjecture to be “molto probabile, ” but he admits that a definitive answer awaits a new critical edition of the De Spiritu et Anima and several closely related texts. The edition by D. Coustant in the PL is the most recent (PL 40:779-832). 58 McGinn, Introduction, 67. 59 Ibid.
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McGinn notes that among thirteenth century authors who knew the work was not by
Augustine, “The tradition of Cistercian authorship is the one constant.” 60 He makes specific
reference to Raciti’s article, pages 390-392. Here one finds that Albert the Great, 61 Thomas
Aquinas, 62 and Philip the Chancellor all attributed the work, or appeared to attribute the work, to
a Cistercian compiler.
The case of Philip is particularly interesting. Raciti and McGinn did not have access to
the full critical edition of Philip’s Summa de Bono. Now it is possible to assess more precisely
Philip’s view of the De Spiritu et Anima. Most of the time Philip simply attributes the work,
under the title De anima et spiritu, to Augustine, without qualification. 63 On two occasions,
however, Philip quotes from Isaac of Stella’s Epistola ad Alcherum, referring the quotation to
“Ysaac in libro De anima et spiritu secundum Augustinum ,” 64 and, a few pages later, to “ Ysaac
in libro De anima et spiritu.” 65 On the first occasion, Philip quotes a long passage that appears
60 McGinn, Introduction, 67, n.273. 61 See Albert the Great, In I Sent., D. VIII, a. 25, ad 2. 62 See Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent ., D. XLIV, q. 4, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 12. 63 See for example Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono “De Bono Nature” IV q.1 (ed. Nicolai Wicki, Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de Bono, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta volume 2, 2 parts [Berne: Editions A. Francke SA, 1985], 156); Summa de Bono “De Bono Nature” IV q.2 (ed. Wicki, 197)-though this citation does not mention the title; Summa de Bono “De Bono Gratiae,” in homine, II q.1 (ed. Wicki, 525, 527, and 540); Summa de Bono “De Bono Gratiae,” in homine, C, I q.1 (ed. Wicki, 757); Summa de Bono “De Bono Gratiae,” in homine, C, I q.2 (ed. Wicki, 772). The quotation found on Wicki 525 and 540 is common to the De Spiritu et Anima and Isaac’ s Epistola. In both places, Philip attributes the work De anima et spiritu to Augustine and it appears that Philip is quoting from the De Spiritu et Anima and not from Isaac directly. This is all the more significant because the definition of virtue quoted is from the passage mentioned below, where Philip knowingly quotes from Isaac instead. When he quotes the definition from Isaac, he attributes it to Isaac, and when he quotes it from the De Spiritu et Anima, he attributes it to Augustine. It seems that Philip had both texts and considered one to be by Augustine and the other to be by Isaac, though based upon Augustine. In addition to the texts cited here, I have consulted all the passages listed in the index to the critical edition as citing the De Spiritu et Anima. The only passages in which Philip names Isaac of Stella as his source are the two discussed in the main text. 64 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono “De Bono Gratiae,” in homine, C q.1 (ed. Wicki, 748). 65 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono “De Bono Gratiae,” in homine, C q.2 (ed. Wicki, 751).
75 in both Isaac’s letter and the De Spiritu et Anima. 66 However, it appears that he is quoting it
from Isaac’s letter and not from the De Spiritu et Anima. 67 On the second occasion, the quotation only occurs in Isaac’s letter, and not in the De Spiritu et Anima. 68 It seems to me the simplest explanation of this data is that Philip knew Isaac’s letter was not the De Spiritu et
Anima but a closely related document. Since he was confident, it seems, that the De Spiritu et
Anima was legitimately a work of Augustine, he assumed that Isaac’s letter was either a partial
commentary on the De Spiritu et Anima or a derivative work based upon the De Spiritu et
Anima. 69 If Philip did not compare the texts carefully, either option may have seemed plausible.
Even without Philip’s attribution of the De Spiritu et Anima to a Cistercian, it remains
the case that the early authors who knew the work was not authentic also believed that it came
from some Cistercian source. Since the contents of the work are consistent with this supposition,
it seems to me that McGinn’s conclusion is warranted. It is still more likely than not that the
work comes from a Cistercian source.
The question of authorship aside, McGinn considers the De Spiritu et Anima to be
representative of Cistercian anthropology due to several themes that it holds in common with
other Cistercian writings. 70 One of these is the identity of the soul with its powers. 71 Others include the mysticism of introversion, an emphasis on the (variously named) highest power of
66 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono “De Bono Gratiae,” in homine, C q.1 (ed. Wicki, 748-749). 67 See Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum (Epistola de Anima ) (PL 194: 1878D-1879A) and De Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40: 782). For a comparison of the quotation in the three sources in parallel columns, see Appendix 2. 68 See Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum (PL 194: 1879B). 69 Selective extractions or paraphrases were very common in Philip’s day, as the multiple works derived from the Summa de Bono attest. 70 McGinn, Introduction, 72-74. 71 See McGinn, Introduction, 69.
76 the soul, and the theme of self-knowledge. 72 McGinn remarks, “Almost all of the major themes of Cistercian mysticism appear at one time or another.” 73 Of particular interest for the current investigation, the work shares with William of St.-Thierry, Isaac of Stella, and the young
Grosseteste its interest in the theory of vital spirits and in medicine. 74 Also, although McGinn does not note this as a Cistercian feature, the work includes both Augustinian illumination and a vaguely Aristotelian account of abstraction, 75 a feature which, as we shall see in chapter eight,
characterizes Grosseteste’s epistemology as well.
I believe it is safe to follow McGinn in treating the De Spiritu et Anima as a document
that represents the Cistercian tradition of psychology. I would add that it is the best work to use
for this purpose because it not only represents Cistercian themes but also was very popular. At
least sixty manuscripts of the work have survived in England alone. 76 Also, as just mentioned,
Philip’s very influential Summa de Bono quotes from the text by name multiple times, attributing
it to Augustine. 77 The popularity of the De Spiritu et Anima suggests that it not only represented
but also propagated and helped define the Cistercian tradition, which, after all, was not trying to
be anything other than Augustinian. Hereafter, when I refer to the Augustinian/Cistercian
tradition, I will treat the De Spiritu et Anima as a privileged representative of this tradition.
72 McGinn, Introduction, 73-74. 73 McGinn, Introduction, 74. 74 McGinn, Introduction, 73. McGinn does not mention Grosseteste. That is my addition. SeeRobert Grosseteste, De Artibus Liberalibus (Baur, 4-7). 75 McGinn, Introduction, 74, where he cites De Spiritu et Anima 11-12 (PL 40:786-788). Aristotelian abstraction, when used in this general way, refers to an account of knowledge in which universal ideas are derived from semsory knowledge through an intellective process. 76 McGinn, Introduction, 70. 77 It was previously common to state that Philip attributed the work to Isaac, but this is not correct, as I have explained above.
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The content of the De Spiritu et Anima is generally Augustinian, but one must note that it
is also diverse. The compiler makes no attempt to reconcile alternative definitions of terms or
schemata of the soul’s powers. This may be owing to the fact that the compiler believed the soul
was actually identical with all of the powers anyway, but it could equally be due to the tendency
to assume that all authorities must ultimately agree, somehow.
Now it is time to examine the possible influence of the De Spiritu et Anima on
Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine. I must pass over in silence the other ways in which this
work influences Grosseteste’s thoughts about the soul. I will only mention a few important facts.
Grosseteste appears to quote the De Spiritu et Anima in Letter 1 (1225-1228) and in the
Hexaëmeron. 78 He clearly quotes it in the De Cessatione Legalium. 79 The work also appears in the Tabula, Grosseteste’s topical indexing system of authorities composed c. 1230. 80 He uses the title De Differencia Spiritus et Anime, but this appears to be the title under which he knew the De
Spiritu et Anima. 81 I will discuss the influence of the work on the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat
78 Robert Grosseteste, Letter 1 (Baur, 114): “ Sicuti Deus unus semper ubique totus est, omnia vivificans, movens et gubernans, sic anima in suo corpore ubique tota viget, vivificans, gubernans et movens illud. ” This could be Pseudo-Ambrose, De dignitate conditionis humanae 2 (PL 17:1015) or De Spiritu et Anima 35 (PL 40:805). The actual words quoted do not in this case determine the question. In the Hexaëmeron, our author quotes the same passage and attributes it to Augustine ( Hexaëmeron 8.7.1 [ed. Dales and Gieben, 228-229]). This would seem to be an indication that in the Hexaëmeron he is using the De Spiritu et Anima. If that is the case, it is likely that the quotation in Letter 1, likewise, is from the De Spiritu et Anima, rather than from Pseudo-Ambrose. Grosseteste quotes another passage from the De Spiritu et Anima in Hexaëmeron 8.11.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 232). There, too, he says he is quoting Augustine, though Pseudo-Ambrose is again a possibility (see PL 17:1015). Unfortunately, the portion of the De Spiritu et Anima in question appears to have circulated in a number of forms, so it is also possible that Grosseteste had De Spiritu et Anima 35, or its equivalent, as a free-standing treatise that was wrongly attributed to Augustine. For this reason, one cannot be certain that he is quoting the De Spiritu et Anima in these passages. He also may allude to the De Spiritu et Anima in Hexaëmeron 2.10.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 98). 79 Robert Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium 3.1.22 (ed. Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VII [Oxford, London: The British Academy, 1986], 128). 80 Robert Grosseteste, Tabula (ed. Philipp W. Rosemann, in Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , ed. James McEvoy, CCCM 130 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1995], 271, 284.)
78 below. James McEvoy has recognized the Cistercian compilation as a source of Grosseteste’s psychology, but he does not mention any use of the work earlier than the 1220s, when
Grosseteste likely used it in writing his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics .82
I will limit the present discussion to the doctrines in the De Spiritu et Anima, and to the
passages containing those doctrines, that are relevant to Grosseteste’s doctrine of aspectus and affectus and have not already appeared in chapter one. These passages are themselves quotations
or paraphrases of other works, most importantly Isaac of Stella’s Epistola ad Alcherum. When discussing the influence of the De Spiritu et Anima on the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, McEvoy
assumes Grosseteste does not use Isaac directly partly on the grounds that knowing Isaac’s letter
would have alerted him to the authorship problem with the De Spiritu et Anima. 83 As we have seen in the case of Philip the Chancellor, however, direct knowledge of the letter was not necessarily sufficient to create serious doubt about the authenticity of the De Spiritu et Anima. It
is rather the popularity and authority of the De Spiritu et Anima that make it a more likely direct
source for Grosseteste. I will return to this point below.
81 See for example Robert Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium 3.1.22 (ed. Dales and King, 128), where he quotes De Spiritu et Anima 9 (PL 40:785) under the title De Differencia Anime et Spiritus. 82 See McEvoy, Philosophy, 237. McEvoy is probably thinking of Grosseteste’s adoption of the graded rational powers found in Isaac, in the De Spiritu et Anima, and in the CPA. I will discuss this below. 83 McEvoy, Philosophy, 302. McEvoy also states that there is no other evidence indicating that Grosseteste knew Isaac’s letter. It is worth mentioning that the second paragraph of Isaac’s letter (PL 194: 1875-1876) bears a general similarity to Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (CPA) 1.14 (ed. Pietro Rossi, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros [Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981], 215-216), yet does not appear in the De Spiritu et Anima. It seems to me, however, the similarity between De Spiritu et Anima 1, 9, and 10 and CPA 1.14 is at least as great as the similarity between Isaac’s unique second paragraph and CPA 1.14, and all these passages treat the same general topic. It is not necessary to posit that Grosseteste knew Isaac’s letter. He could have found the main points for his discussion in the commentary in the De Spiritu et Anima. Furthermore, I am not aware of any place where Grosseteste clearly quotes Isaac rather than the De Spiritu et Anima, while he does quote from chapter 9 of the De Spiritu et Anima with clear attribution in Cess. Leg. 3.1.22 (ed. Dales and King, 128).
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I will begin my argument for the influence of the De Spiritu et Anima (or the tradition it represents) on the young Grosseteste where the De Artibus Liberalibus begins—with the problems of ignorance and concupiscence. 84 Augustine had taught that two results of the fall
which endure after baptism are ignorance in the mind and concupiscence in the flesh.
Grosseteste mentions only ignorance by name, but it is clear that concupiscence is behind the
lack of moderation that he sees in the affectus. That Grosseteste would attach these two causes
of error to the cognitive and appetitive powers of the soul does not need any explanation. It was
the obvious thing to do for one with such a division of the soul’s powers. The aspectus is subject to ignorance and so needs instruction from grammar and logic to judge rightly what is to be sought or fled. Right judgment is necessary but not sufficient for right movement of the affectus in desiring or fleeing . The affectus is subject to concupiscence and so also needs persuasion through rhetoric to respond to the judgments of the aspectus .85
Although Grosseteste could have learned of ignorance and concupiscence from many
Christian sources, there is a passage in the De Spiritu et Anima that shares three important features with Grosseteste’s treatment of ignorance and concupiscence in the De Artibus
Liberalibus. Taken from Gennadius of Marseilles, 86 chapter 48 explains that the first man had
perfect scientia ,87 but all who inherit corrupted humanity must be taught to discern correctly. 88
84 Robert Grosseteste, De Artibus Liberalibus (Baur, 1) : “In operibus humanis triplici de causa ingerit se error et imperfectio: quia mens obtenebratur per ignorantiam et quia eius affectus citra debitum sistit, vel ultra progreditur per immoderantiam et quia virtutes motivae corporis instrumenta debilia sunt et imperfecta per carnis corruptelam. — In quo autem opere incipit error et imperfectio, necessarium est regimen et adjutorium, quibus purgetur error et suppleatur defectus.” 85 I will explain these matters further in chapter 3. 86 See Gennadius of Marseilles, Liber de Dogmatibus Ecclesiastibus 14-18. 87 Incidentally, this is presupposed in Grosseteste’s CPA 1.14, but any number of sources would have suggested this.
80
This easily could lead to Grosseteste’s idea that the arts of grammar and logic can correct the ability of the aspectus to make right judgments. 89 The second feature these texts share is that
they both speak of ignorantia and wrong movements associated with the corrupt flesh ( carnis ),
but neither mentions concupiscentia explicitly. At the same time, both texts have a notion of concupiscence considered as disordered desire. For our compiler in this passage, it is contained in the flesh as distinct from the soul. 90 Grosseteste, in contrast, distinguishes between wrong movements of the body, which he associates with weakness, and the problem of immoderation in the affectus mentis . Only the latter is disordered desire. If he combined a position that
considered concupiscence to be in the flesh of the body with a cognitive/appetitive division of
the soul in which there is no distinct sensitive soul, 91 the natural development would be to place concupiscence in the affectus of the soul or mind and to treat the body as corrupt in some other way that is reflected in the affectus , as he in fact does. 92 The third similarity is that both texts
88 De Spiritu et Anima 48 (PL 40:815): “Quod per primum hominem, qui ante corruptionem humanitatis, ex quo fuit, perfecte habuit scientiam humanam, probari potest. Sed modo corrupta humanitate, ex quo conjungitur corruptioni, corrumpitur. Nec proprietates suas potest exercere, donec usu et experientia et alicujus doctrina incitata incipit discernere... ” 89 See Robert Grossetestte, De Artibus Liberalibus (Baur, 1-2): “Aspectum grammatica recte informat. Recte informatum quale sit logica sine errore dijudicat. Ut judicatum quale sit moderate fugiat affectus vel appetat, rhetorica persuadet. ” Officium namque grammaticae est recte intelligere et recte intellecta recte enuntiando apud alterum recte formare. Officium vero logicae est, quod recte formatum est in intellectu, secundum tripartitam rationem sui quale sit judicare et discutare. Rhetorica vero, licet eius officium sit ex dialecticis et propriis locis argumenta probationis elicere, quod maxime intendit, est affectum movere. Estque in eius potestate, affectum animosque torpentes excitare, effrenos modificare, timidos animare, truces mitigare… Mentis ergo aspectum et affectum hae tres virtutes rectificant et ad perfectionem perducunt.” 90 De Spiritu et Anima 48 (PL 40:815): “Cum enim ad hoc sit anima data, ut illicitos carnis motus corrigat, ignorantia illius contingunt vel negligentia.” 91 He seems not to have a rational/sensitive/vegetative division until after writing the De Artibus Liberalibus. See chapter 3. Concerning the reflection of the body’s imperfection in the affectus, see Robert Grosseteste, De Artibus Liberalibus [Baur, 5, line 4]: “anima sequatur corpus in suis passionibus.” 92 The fact that young Grosseteste moves concupiscence, in a manner of speaking, from the body to the soul may explain the awkward carnis affectus that is paired with aspectus in the later Dictum 3 (Oxford, Bodleian Library,
81 give priority to the cognitive aspect of the soul inasmuch as the correction of ignorance is treated as a prerequisite for the correction of concupiscence.93 These three similarities are not great
enough to argue for direct influence based on this passage alone, but it does appear that both
texts belong to the same tradition of reflection upon Augustine’s doctrines of the soul and the
body.
The next passage to consider as a possible source of the De Artibus Liberalibus is De
Spiritu et Anima chapter four. Following Isaac of Stella, 94 our compiler states the following:
Through rationality it is fit to be illumined to know things below itself, above itself, in itself, and next to itself. It knows God above itself, itself in itself, angels next to itself, and whatever is contained under heaven below itself. Through concupiscibility and
MS Bodley 798, fol. 4v): “ In hac autem mortalitate, dum ‘corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam,’ [Sap. 9:15] et carnis affectus obnubilat mentis aspectum, non possumus revelata facie, sicut faciunt angeli, ineffabilem pulcritudinem Trinitatis contemplari .” I have checked this text against London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol. 106r and London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol. 7v. Among other differences, Royal 7.E.II reads gravis where the other two manuscripts have carnis. While the gravis reading would be more in accord with Grosseteste’s normal usage, carnis as the more difficult reading and the reading of the better manuscripts is to be preferred, until a true edition can be made. Assuming, then, that carnis is correct, here affectus is synonymous with concupiscence. When paired with aspectus, Grosseteste consistently places affectus in the soul rather than the body, and, after he has the sensitive soul, in the rational rather than the sensitive soul. But his early thought places concupiscence in the affectus, as I have explained. Precisely because he places concupiscence in the affectus, the tradition of saying concupiscentia carnis makes it easy for him to slip and say carnis affectus, even though what he ultimately means is that the affectus mentis follows the corrupt body in its passions. (See the quotation in the above note.) The body is passive in this picture, and the desire is in the soul or mind. If Dictum 3, like most dicta, dates to the magisterial period (c.1225/1229-1235), this slip would reflect a momentary throwback to Grosseteste’s early thought. In his considered magisterial thought, Grosseteste distinguishes two kinds of concupiscence: that of the flesh, which belongs to the sensitive powers, and that of the spirit, which belongs to the rational powers. The concupiscence of the spirit is the one that corresponds to Grosseteste’s normal notion of the affectus mentis, so one would not expect him to say carnis affectus along with aspectus. For his magisterial doctrine of the two kinds of concupiscence, see Robert Grosseteste, De Decem Mandatis. 9.2-9.7 (ed. Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi X [Oxford, New York: The British Academy, 1987], 85-88). 93 De Spiritu et Anima 48 (PL 40:815): “Cum enim ad hoc sit anima data, ut illicitos carnis motus corrigat, ignorantia illius contingunt vel negligentia.” 94 See Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum (PL 194: 1878): “itaque per rationabilitatem habilis naturae est anima illuminari ad aliquid, vel infra se, vel etiam in se, et juxta se cognoscendum, per concupiscibilitatem vero et irascibilitatem affici ad aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum, amandum vel odiendum. De rationabilitate igitur omnis oritur animae sensus; de aliis omnis affectus.”
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irascibility it is fit to be moved to desire or to flee things, to love or to hate. And so, from rationality arises every sensus of the soul, and from the others every affectus. 95
Isaac has combined two traditional approaches to the soul. He has sensus and affectus, which I have mentioned above. He superimposes these two powers on the other traditional framework, the rational/irascible/concupiscible division. 96 Grosseteste will make precisely the
same move in the De Artibus Liberalibus, except that he will use aspectus instead of sensus.
Inasmuch as the line about ratio being the aspectus of the soul or the mind occurs more than
once in reasonably near proximity to this passage, it is possible that the replacement of sensus
with aspectus could have occurred to him while reading this very compilation. 97 The occurrence
of mentis aspectus in chapter eleven would have been particularly conducive to this idea, since
there ratio as the mentis aspectus is said to discern good and bad. 98
There is another very important similarity between this text and Grosseteste’s. Isaac
assigns appetite or desire to the concupiscible appetite and flight to the irascible. Not all authors
using the irascible power attach flight to it. For the compiler of the last part of the De Spiritu et
Anima, 99 the concupiscible is responsible for both desire and aversion, while the irascible has
95 De Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40:781-782): “Per rationalitatem habilis est illuminari ad aliquid cognoscendum infra se et supra se, in se et iuxta se. Cognoscit siquidem Deum supra se, et se in se, et angelum iuxta se, et quidquid coeli ambitu continetur infra se. Per concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem habilis est affici ad aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum, amandum vel odiendum : et ideo de rationalitate omnis sensus oritur animae, de aliis omnis affectus.” 96 The 3-part division may originate with Plato (see Republic IV 439-442 and Timaeus 69C-70D). According to Bernard McGinn, it appears in such Christian thinkers as Tertullian, Origen, Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Aelred of Rievaulx, in addition to Isaac of Stella (Introduction, 41 n.183). 97 The equation of ratio with animi aspectus occurs in chapter 1 (PL 40:781), and ratio is said to be the mentis aspectus in chapter 11 (PL 40:786). 98 De Spiritu et Anima 11 (PL 40 :786) : “Ratio siquidem est mentis aspectus quo bonum et malum discernit, virtutes eligit, Deumque diligit.” 99 Chapters 51-65 may be the work of a different and later compiler than the person responsible for earlier part or parts of the treatise. See McGinn, Three Treatises, 260 n.122.
83 power over joy and anger. 100 Aquinas would also have desire and aversion in the concupiscible, though he would reserve the irascible for overcoming opposition. 101
In chapter seven of the De Spiritu et Anima we get from Isaac some more content
attached to sensus and affectus, and this brings his psychology even closer to what we will find
in the De Artibus Liberalibus. 102 He assigns to sensus not only all cognition but also all judgment concerning the degree of love owed to each being. Affectus, for its part, carries out that
ordered love. This is much like Grosseteste’s view in the De Artibus Liberalibus, 103 except that
Grosseteste retains both desire and flight for affectus, as in chapter four of the De Spiritu et
Anima. As I will explain below, chapter seven also serves as a major doctrinal source for the
100 De Spiritu et Anima 65 (PL 40:829): “Constat enim animarum esse triplicem naturam. Unde et sapientes mundi hujus animam humanam rationalem, concupiscibilem, et irascibilem esse tradiderunt: quam triplicem vim animae, ipsa quoque natura et quotidiana experimenta nos docent. Porro quemadmodum circa rationale nostrum et scientia et ignorantia constant, tanquam habitus et privatio: sic et circa concupiscibile, desiderium et contemptus; et circa id quod dicitur irascibile, laetitia pariter et ira versantur.” 101 Thomas Aquinas , Summa Theologiae I, q. 81, a. 2, corpus (ed. the Leonine Commission, 1:623; emphasis original): “quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem, necesse est, quod in parte sensitiva sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una , per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea, quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva : et haec dicitur concupiscibilis . Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae convenientia impugnat, et nocumenta inferunt: et haec vis vocatur irascibilis .” The complete information for the Leonine text of the Summa that I am using is: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, edited by the Leonine Commission, Divi Thomae Aquinatis Ordinis Praedicatorum Doctoris Angelici A Leone XIII P. M. Gloriose Regnante Catholicarum Scholarum Patroni Coelestis Renunciati Summa Theologica ad Emendatiores Editiones Impressa et Accuratissime Recognita, 4 volumes (Rome: Typographia Senatus, 1886-1887). 102 De Spiritu et Anima 7 (PL 40:784): "Capax est omnium anima, quia per rationalitatem ad cognitionem, et per concupiscibilitatem ad dilectionem universitatis capax invenitur. Sunt enim duo in anima, et sunt id quod anima, scilicet naturalis sensus cognoscens omnia et dijudicans inter omnia; et naturalis affectus, quo suo ordine et gradu anima diligat omnia. Verumtamen facultates et quasi instrumenta cognoscendi et diligendi habet ex natura; cognitionem tamen veritatis et ordinem dilectionis nequaquam habet nisi ex gratia. Facta siquidem a Deo mens rationalis, sicut ejus imaginem suscepit, ita cognitionem et amorem.” Cf. Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum (PL 194:1887). See also De Spiritu et Anima 46 (PL 40:813-814). 103 Grosseteste will not explicitly invoke Augustinian ordered love until after the De Artibus Liberalibus, but it is doctrinally present in his assumption the there is a proper degree to which any given thing should be sought or fled. That there is such a right degree is assumed in Grosseteste’s statement, quoted above, that the error proper to the affectus is falling short of or going beyond what is required.
84 episcopal Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, Grosseteste’s most complete treatment of the powers of the soul.
In summary, the De Spiritu et Anima uses both aspectus and affectus (though not as a pair) in its early chapters with approximately the same meanings they will bear in the De Artibus
Liberalibus. The text further contains the cognitive/appetitive division of sensus and affectus superimposed upon the rational/irascible/concupiscible division in the same way as Grosseteste will later use aspectus and affectus. There is the sensus, responsible for both sense perception and intellectual vision, that perceives and judges, and the affectus that desires or flees. The
similarities go all the way down to the specific function of irascibility and the idea that there is a proper degree to which each thing should be loved or desired. From these similarities, it seems reasonable to judge that the De Spiritu et Anima represents the school of psychological thought from which Grosseteste drew the doctrine of his aspectus/affectus distinction.
The question of whether Grosseteste directly read the De Spiritu et Anima before writing the De Artibus Liberalibus is more difficult. While the conceptual similarity is striking, I have
not found any evidence that could prove direct textual dependence. It is possible that
Grosseteste’s proximate source was simply another text in the same psychological milieu, such
as Isaac’s original letter, 104 or some work derived from Isaac, from the De Spiritu, or from another as yet unknown source common to all three.
Still, there are reasons to suggest that the De Spiritu et Anima is more likely than any other currently known text to be a direct source of Grosseteste’s early psychology. It was a
104 The fact that Philip the Chancellor knew and used both Isaac’s letter and the De Spiritu et Anima renders it plausible that Grosseteste could have done so as well.
85 popular text in England, where Grosseteste likely received his education in the arts, law, and medicine. Further, three features of the text make it just the sort of work the young Grosseteste would have read. It is Augustinian in outlook. It concerns the soul and how the soul may be improved, and it contains information about physiology. These three features are also features of the De Artibus Liberalibus. In addition, for Grosseteste the De Spiritu et Anima enjoyed the prestige of being written by Augustine himself. Grosseteste was the kind of person who would have read a book by Augustine about the soul and the body, and the De Spiritu et Anima may have been the most likely choice in this category. 105 One last point in favor of positing an early reading of the De Spiritu et Anima is the fact that this text clearly informs his doctrine in later texts on similar subjects, as will appear below. Other considerations being equal, it is better to
posit a common source for both the later and the early doctrine than to posit an additional early
source where there is no need. Therefore, although one cannot be sure whether Grosseteste read
it before writing the De Artibus Liberalibus, the De Spiritu et Anima is at present the best source
available to inform us about the origins of Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine.
It is also probable that Grosseteste used the De Spiritu et Anima when writing the
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (c.1220-1230). I have already mentioned the similarities
between De Spiritu et Anima 1 and 10 and Commentary on the Posterior Analytics 1.14 in
chapter one. Here I will adduce two further considerations.
105 We know the young Grosseteste was interested in Augustine due to the influence of Augustine’s De Musica on the De Artibus Liberalibus. McEvoy, Philosophy, 230, discusses this influence.
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Chapter nine of the De Spiritu et Anima contains similar ideas to chapters one and ten.
Relying on Gennadius of Marseilles and Hugh of St. Victor, 106 the chapter discusses the inner and outer senses of the soul. The inner sense is for knowing God, but it is as it were asleep while the exterior sense is in use, for then one is taken by the pleasantness of exterior goods. When the outer sense is mortified, the inner sense is free. 107 This is similar to the idea in Grosseteste’s commentary that man naturally is capable of knowing God directly but cannot do so now, due to the love and phantasms of corporeal things. One who is free of these things or free of the body can know God in this way. 108 Reason is asleep and needs to be awakened, although
Grosseteste’s method for awakening it, receiving vestiges of the divine light through the senses,
seems to be a combination of Aristotelian abstraction with Augustinian illumination.
Nevertheless, the general solution to the problem of not knowing God directly—that one must be
free from the love of corporeal things—seems to be common to both the De Spititu et Anima and the commentary. 109
106 See Gennadius of Marseilles, Liber de Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis 19 and Hugh of St. Victor, Commentarius in Lucam 1, 47. 107 De Spiritu et Anima 9 (PL 40: 785): “Nam cum exterior sensus carnalis bono suo utitur, interior sensus mentis quasi obdormit. Non enim cognoscit bona interioris sensus, qui jucunditate bonorum exteriorum capitur. Nam qui in carne vivit, in carne sentit, et dolores carnis fugit in quantum potest, vulnera autem animae prorsus ignorat, nec medicinam quaerit in eis. Cum autem mortuus fuerit sensus animae, quo vivit in carne, tunc vivificari incipiet sensus ille, quo sentit semetipsum, et tunc sciet dolores suos, et sentire incipiet vulnera sua tanto gravius quanto propius.” 108 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (ed. Rossi, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros [Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981], 213; my alteration underlined according to note 113 below): “Et similiter si pars suprema anime humane, que vocatur intelligentia et que non est actus alicuius corporis…non esset mole corporis corrupti obnubilata et aggravata, ipsa per irradiationem acceptam a lumine superiori haberet completam scientiam absque sensus adminiculo, sicut habebit cum anima erit exuta a corpore et sicut forte habent aliqui penitus absoluti ab amore et phantasmatibus rerum corporalium.” Future references to Rossi’s edition will use the following convention: (Rossi, page number). 109 See Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 215-216).
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McEvoy sees the influence of the De Spiritu et Anima on the Commentary on the
Posterior Analytics in Grosseteste’s adoption of the graded rational powers .110 For Isaac, and the
De Spiritu et Anima repeating him, the cognitive power, called rationalitas or sensus, is divided into five constituent powers—sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, and intelligentia. 111 The powers form a hierarchy, with the lowest responsible for sense perception, ratio for abstraction, and the highest, intelligentia, for knowing God directly. 112 In the Commentary on the Posterior
Analytics , Grosseteste uses sensus, ratio, intellectus, and intelligentia , maintaining the same
basic order of gradation. 113 He has sensus for apprehending singulars, 114 ratio for knowledge
110 McEvoy, Philosophy, 303-304. McEvoy refers to scientia, intellectus, and intelligentia . Whether he meant to write ratio instead of scientia I cannot tell. His citation of the text refers to a manuscript, since he did not yet have the critical edition. Consequently, I was not able to check his citation of the CPA. Instead, I confirmed his observation by finding the sensus/ratio/intellectus/intelligentia gradation. 111 For example, De Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40 :782) : " Dicitur namque sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia. Et haec omnia in anima, nihil aliud sunt quam ipsa…” This repeats Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum (PL 194:1879-1880). 112 De Spiritu et Anima 11 (PL 40: 786-787); Cf. Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum (PL 194:1880-1888). 113 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 212-216). To get intelligentia I am following the variant reading in Rossi’s apparatus for line 229 on page 213. Two contextual clues indicate that intelligentia is to be read instead of intellectiva. In this passage, Grosseteste is giving counter-examples to Aristotle’s claim that the loss of a sense results in the loss of all science that would arise from that sense . In the immediate context, he has just said that intelligentiae, by which he appears to mean angels, know God and all science in Him without any need for senses. Then he says, as I would have it, “Et similiter si pars suprema anime humane, que vocatur intelligentia et que non est actus alicuius corporis…non esset mole corporis corrupti obnubilata et aggravata… ” then it too would have complete science without any need of senses. His point seems to be that this highest human power would have knowledge just like the angels if not for the fallen body. The word similiter is a clear cue to the fact that he is drawing a close comparison between humans and angels. Since Grosseteste does not normally refer to angels as intelligentiae, it seems that he has chosen to use this word for angels to emphasize both their special cognitive power and the fact that humans, since they each have an intelligentia, could also exercise this power if not for the body. Grosseteste’s choice of intelligentiae to refer to angels, therefore, makes more sense if we follow the variant reading and give the human person an intelligentia instead of an intellectiva. In addition, the fact that Grosseteste says the power “is called” what it is, instead of simply naming it, makes more sense if one sees the reason for doing so in the fact that he has just used the same word to refer to angels. The second contextual clue that suggests the reading intelligentia is that he uses intellectus one page earlier to refer to a power of a lower order, dealing with universals arrived at by induction, rather than having all science in the divine light. If that is what he thinks the intellectus is, it is not likely he would posit intellectiva as a higher power. In terms of manuscript evidence, Rossi reports that intelligentia is the reading of Oxford, Balliol College, MS 173/A (Oa ). This is one of the three oldest manuscripts of the CPA (out of 32) , dating to the last quarter of the thirteenth century (Rossi, “Introduzione,” 32-36). Rossi
88 through abstraction, 115 intellectus knowing universals through induction, 116 and intelligentia as the highest power for knowing all things in the light from above. 117 It is not entirely clear whether he means to rank intellectus above ratio, or whether he even has a clear distinction
between them, since he also says that ratio can know universals. 118 Nevertheless, the basic
outlook appears to be the inspired by either the De Spiritu et Anima or some work containing the
same hierarchy .
These two separate lines of evidence, which I add to those already brought forth from
Callus in chapter one, both point to the De Spiritu et Anima as a likely inspiration for the vitally significant aspectus/affectus passage in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (1.14). It is therefore likely that Grosseteste got his ideas about the body dragging down the mind through the love of temporal things, as well as the basic solution to this problem, from the De Spiritu et
Anima, or at least the tradition it represents.
Now that I have shown how the tradition represented by the De Spiritu et Anima inspired the theological and philosophical content of Grosseteste’s terms aspectus and affectus from the
discusses this manuscript on pages 40-41 and 87 of his “Introduzione.” It is the older of two witnesses to its manuscript family, both of which were used in the edition. 114 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 212) : “…cum sensus sit singularium apprehensivus…” 115 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 214) : “Ratio vero expergefacta dividit colorem a magnitudine et figuram a corpore et iterum figuram et magnitudinem a corporis substantia, et ita per divisionem et abstractionem pervenit in cognitionem corporis substantie deferentis magnitudinem et figuram et colorem.” 116 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 212) : “…deficiente inductione accepta ab illis singularibus deficit apud intellectum cognitio universalis eorum singularium, quia ipsum universale non est acceptum nisi per inductionem.” 117 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 213; my alteration underlined according to note 113 above) : “Et similiter si pars suprema anime humane, que vocatur intelligentia et que non est actus alicuius corporis…non esset mole corporis corrupti obnubilata et aggravata, ipsa per irradiationem acceptam a lumine superiori haberet completam scientiam absque sensus adminiculo…” 118 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 214) : “Verumtamen non novit ratio hoc esse actu universale nisi postquam a multis singularibus hanc fecerit abstractionem et occurrerit ei unum et idem secundum iudicium suum in multis singularibus repertum.”
89 very beginning of Grosseteste’s scholarly career (c.1195-1209), and continued to form his more mature thoughts on aspectus and affectus in the chronological middle of his career (c.1220-
1230), I will next show how the De Spiritu et Anima itself inspired his most mature view of the
soul found in the sermon Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat (1242-1244) .
James McEvoy has already shown that Grosseteste used the De Spiritu et Anima as a proximate source for his Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat. 119 As with the Commentary on the Posterior
Analytics, McEvoy’s evidence was Grosseteste’s adoption of the hierarchy of rational powers.
This adoption is thorough and much clearer than what one finds in the Commentary on the
Posterior Analytics. I will not repeat McEvoy’s argument here. Rather, I will show some other fundamental similarities between the two works. Taking it as given that the mature Grosseteste knows the De Spiritu et Anima well, the logical conclusion to draw from such similarities is that the earlier work (and perhaps others in the same tradition) inspired these features in the later work. Although there are numerous points of contact between Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat and the
De Spiritu et Anima, 120 I will focus my comparison through the lens of chapter seven of the
Cistercian compilation, which I have discussed above and now quote in full:
The soul is capable of all things because through rationality it is capable of knowing all things and through concupiscibility it is capable of loving all things. For there are two things in the soul, and they are what the soul is, namely, natural sense ( sensus ) which knows all things and judges between all things, and natural affectus (sg.), by which the soul loves all things in their own order and grade. Nevertheless, the faculties and as it were instruments of knowing and loving it has from nature, whereas the knowledge of truth and the order of love it has by no means except from grace. Since the rational mind has been made by God, just as it has received His image, so it has received (faculties of)
119 James McEvoy, “Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Human Nature with the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat ,” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 47 (1980): 145-146. 120 For some additional points of contact, see the footnotes to the section on Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat in chapter 4.
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knowledge and love. For the vessels which the creator Wisdom forms that they may be, the helper grace fills that they may not be empty, if it finds the worker active. 121
Here one can see three major features of Grosseteste’s mature view of the soul. 122 First,
there is the ideal of knowing and loving all things in a graded order (presumably following the
hierarchy of being). Second, there is a basic cognitive/appetitive distinction that applies to all
grades of knowledge and love. Third, there is a clear nature/grace distinction in which the
natural capacity for knowing and loving all things (including God) requires grace for its full
operation. These features are prominent themes in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, which even has
a separate section for discussing how grace perfects the powers . It is as though Grosseteste has
taken this chapter from the De Spiritu et Anima and expanded and embellished it to create his
most mature doctrine of the soul.
To conclude this section, it appears that Grosseteste’s fundamental view of the powers of
the soul was always close to that which the De Spiritu et Anima articulates. 123 Through the first
four decades of the thirteenth century, he had a cognitive/appetitive distinction in which the
operations of the powers seem to reflect views that appear in the De Spiritu et Anima. On this
121 De Spiritu et Anima 7 (PL 40:784; trans. mine): " Capax est omnium anima, quia per rationalitatem ad cognitionem, et per concupiscibilitatem ad dilectionem universitatis capax invenitur. Sunt enim duo in anima, et sunt id quod anima, scilicet naturalis sensus cognoscens omnia et dijudicans inter omnia; et naturalis affectus, quo suo ordine et gradu anima diligat omnia. Verumtamen facultates et quasi instrumenta cognoscendi et diligendi habet ex natura; cognitionem tamen veritatis et ordinem dilectionis nequaquam habet nisi ex gratia. Facta siquidem a Deo mens rationalis, sicut ejus imaginem suscepit, ita cognitionem et amorem. Vasa namque quae creatrix Sapientia format ut sint, adjutrix gratia replet ne vacua sint, si strenuum operarium invenerit .” Cf. Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum (PL 194:1887), which the compiler quotes almost verbatim. Interestingly, the possibly Pelagian sounding condition tacked onto the end is not in the passage as it appears in Isaac’s letter. This may be a small hint about the tendency of the compiler of the De Spiritu et Anima. 122 I will give a detailed exposition of the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat in chapter 4. To avoid redundancy, I will simply summarize here. 123 This is not to say that the De Spiritu et Anima actually presents just one consistent view of the soul. It does not. Nevertheless, the elements that Grosseteste uses from it (usually based in Augustine or Isaac of Stella) do present a generally coherent view of the soul.
91 particular matter, Grosseteste did not change his mind in any fundamental way. 124 From this
loyal adherence to the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition of psychology one can draw an important
conclusion. If some passages in Grosseteste seem ambiguous on the doctrine of the soul, the best
way to read them, generally speaking, will be the way that allows Grosseteste to remain in basic
agreement with the De Spiritu et Anima. Concerning aspectus and affectus specifically , one can
say that, wherever he may first have found the terms, Robert Grosseteste seems always to have
drawn his basic doctrine connected with the terms from the well of Augustine, as received in the
Cistercian tradition. 125
The De Spiritu et Anima is not the only source in the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition that
influences Grosseteste’s doctrine of aspectus and affectus. I will conclude this chapter by
discussing three others. My purpose in providing this information is to fill out the picture of
Grosseteste’s reception of traditional Augustinian psychology as it relates to aspectus and affectus .
The Bible. While the Bible is not properly an Augustinian text, it is nonetheless a vital part of the Augustinian traditon. In terms of the sheer number of times Grosseteste quotes or alludes to the Bible when teaching about the soul, it is certainly a major source for Grosseteste.
His mind traffics in biblical language, especially in his sermons. One could say that the words of the Bible are the matrix in which nearly all his thought is born. Often Grosseteste cites verses on the soul merely for illustration. There are times, however, when it really does seem that
124 I will discuss some developments in his doctrine as they appear in chapters 3 and 4. 125 This is not to say there were no outside influences. There were. I will discuss the influence of Avicenna and Aristotle in chapter 4.
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Grosseteste is using Scripture as a source in the sense that it contributes something to his view of the soul, or at least lends real support to his conclusions.
It would be virtually impossible to gather and analyze all of the Scriptural texts that influence Grosseteste’s doctrine of the soul, but all I intend to do at present is to show that the
Bible is in fact a significant source of Grosseteste’s psychology. A few examples from Dictum
91 should suffice to make this point. In a passage that I consider to be highly important in
Grosseteste’s teaching on the primacy of the affectus ,126 he supports his doctrine that loving God
can teach one all knowledge in part by quoting three classic verses from the Johannine corpus
about how the Holy Spirit teaches Christians “all truth.” 127 Since Grosseteste obviously believes
that Christian charity is the work of the Holy Spirit, it really does seem natural for him to draw
from the Johannine texts the idea that Christian love in some way teaches knowledge.
Similarly, in the same passage Grosseteste quotes from Lamentations 1:13, “He has sent
fire from on high into my bones and has taught me.”128 This verse, on the surface at least, speaks of a knowledge that one receives supernaturally from God and has something to do with love or some other kind of passion (suggested by the fire). Although this verse does not attempt the kind of philosophical precision that Grosseteste draws from it, it does nevertheless seem to lend real support to the kind of view Grosseteste is trying to articulate, a view in which one can learn through loving God. From Grosseteste’s use of these passages it appears that portions of the
Bible have real significance for the primacy of the affectus in his thought.
126 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 69v). See my discussions of this text in chapters 5 and 8. 127 1 John 2:27; John 14:26; John 16:13. 128 Lamentations 1:13, as quoted in Robert Groeesteste, Dictum 91 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.69v; trans. mine): “De excelso misit ignem in ossibus meis et erudivit me.”
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Augustine. While Grosseteste inherits many Augustinian ideas through the mediation of
other traditional sources, he also is an avid reader of Augustine, as his Tabula attests. I have
discussed Soliloquies 1.6 in the previous chapter. Here I will focus upon Soliloquies 1.14, which
Grosseteste quotes on three separate occasions in his Dicta (c.1230) . Reason says to Augustine:
“When you are such that no earthly thing delights you, believe me, in the same moment, in the
same point of time, you will see what you desire.” 129 In Dictum 14, Grosseteste says that when the eye of the mind has been purged of cupidity one begins to see God to some extent. To support this, he quotes both Matthew 5:8 and the line from the Soliloquies. 130 In Dictum 17,
which concerns the contempt of the world, Grosseteste says that one of the reasons temporal
things are to be held in contempt is that they blind the aspectus and make sticky ( inviscant ) the
affectus, so that it cannot fly upwards. Then, after a quotation from Augustine’s De Libero
Arbitrio, he quotes the Soliloquies to show that holding temporal things in contempt can protect
one from such blinding and sticking. 131 In Dictum 41, Grosseteste quotes the line from the
Soliloquies to support the idea that the intellectual vision of truth without phantasms is possible
129 Augustine, Soliloquies 1.14.24 (CSEL 89:37): “Itaque, quando fueris talis, ut nihil te prorsus terrenorum delectet, mihi crede, eodem momento, eodem puncto temporis videbis quod cupis .” 130 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 14 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.11v): “Quia vero, mortificata carne, iam incipit nil terrenorum delectari, et purgato a noxio humore cupiditatis terrenorum mentis oculo, iam incipit aliquatenus Deus videri, quia: ‘Beati mundo corde quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.’ Et Augustinus ait: ‘Crede michi, in qua hora nil terrenorum te delectat, in illa hora videbis Deum, quia inquam ita est.’” 131 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 17(Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.14v): “Contempnenda sunt hec temporalia, quia amata mentis aspectum obcecant, et affectum, ne possit evolare sursum, inviscant. … De cavendo hanc inviscacionem et obcecacionem dicit Augustinus: ‘Cavendum magno opere, dum hoc corpus agimus, ne sensibilium visco pene vostre impediantur, quibus integris perfectisque opus est, ut ad illam lucem ab hiis tenebris evolemus. Que se ne ostendere quidem dignatur in hac cavea inclusis, nisi tales fuerint ut ista effracta et dissoluta possint in auras suas evadere. Ita cum fueris talis ut nichil terrenorum te delectet, mihi crede, eodem momento, eodem puncto temporis videbis quod cupias.’”
94 through the contempt of earthly things, and that one can realize this ideal to the degree that one is free of the love of such things. 132
In light of these texts, there can be no doubt that Augustine himself provided strong impetus for Grosseteste to accept the view, characteristic of his mature thought on aspectus and affectus, that inordinate love of temporal things in the affectus hinders the intellectual vision of the aspectus. More specifically, this passage in Augustine appears to provide the basis for
Grosseteste’s view that one receives illumination and knows God/truth just to the degree that one is free from such love. 133 In this way, the primacy of the affectus in Grosseteste owes a significant debt directly to Augustine.
Bernard of Clairvaux. Bernard is one of Grosseteste’s trusted authorities, although not nearly approaching the stature of Augustine. Again, the Tabula bears witness to this. While it is unclear whether Grosseteste found the aspectus/affectus wordplay in Bernard of Clairvaux, there
is a similar pair of terms that Grosseteste manifestly does get from Bernard: intellectus and
affectus. Bernard uses the terms in the same sentence thirty-one times in his eight-volume
corpus. This is far more frequent than Bernard’s use of aspectus and affectus, which appear
132 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 41 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.30r): “ Ut autem ceteris prevideant, oportet ut clare videant. Ad claritatem autem huius visionis requisitum est oculi perspicuitas. Est autem perspicuitas puritas et defecacio a terrenis sordibus. Hec autem defecacio est non amare terrena. Quantoque minus amantur, tanto plus oculus depuratur . …[after this he gives several proofs of the point from Scripture]…Luce autem pura agere est sine nubilo fantasmatum intelligere, et veritatis lucem sine figurarum umbris posse contemplari, quod tanto magis possunt quanto suprascripte perspicuitati vicinantur. Depuracio enim oculi spiritualis per terrenorum contemptum ad hunc actum prestat efficaciam. Unde Augustinus, in libro Soliloquiorum: ‘Cum fueris talis, ut nil terrenorum te delectet, michi crede, eodem momento eodemque puncto temporis videbis quod cupias. ’” 133 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 216): “et in quantum avertitur amor a corporalibus corruptibilibus in tantum convertitur aspectus ad suum lumen et in tantum reperit ipsum .” I will explain the epistemological significance of this passage in chapter 8.
95 together only five times. 134 Grosseteste occasionally borrows intellectus and affectus beginning in roughly the late 1220s or c.1230 135 to convey more or less the same cognitive/appetitive
distinction as he means by aspectus and affectus. 136
In his comments on Psalm 100, Robert says that there are two feet on which contemplation walks, and these are two excesses of blessed contemplation. He then quotes
Bernard to explain. One excess is in the intellectus , which he connects with light and knowledge. The other is in the affectus, which he connects with fervor and devotion. 137 In this passage, Bernard’s intellectus/affectus pair mirrors what Grosseteste says in sermons and dicta around the same time concerning aspectus and affectus.138 In Sermon T22 139 and Sermon T48 140
(both c. 1230), he uses intellectus and affectus outside of quoting Bernard to make a
134 I have discussed these texts above. 135 There is one occurrence of intellectus in close proximity to affectus in the De Artibus Liberalibus (Baur, 1). This one appearance could be a signal that Grosseteste read intellectus and affectus in Bernard before writing the De Artibus Liberalibus, but it could also be a coincidence. Since intellectus naturally overlaps with Grosseteste’s meaning of aspectus and was readily available in other sources , it seems unnecessary to posit influence from Bernard on the De Artibus Liberalibus. 136 The pair does not always have this meaning, however. The opening paragraphs of Dictum 9, for example, use the terms to convey typical aspectus/affectus doctrine, yet the terms intellectus and affectus do not refer directly to the two powers. 137 Robert Grosseteste, Super Psalterium 100.6.54 (ed. Ginther, Sacred Page, 204): “Vel, VIA IMMACULATA, vt supradictum est, contemplatio est in Deum intenta. In hac via ambulatur duobus pedibus, id est duobus excessibus contemplationis, vt enim ait Bernardus: ‘Due sunt beate contemplationis excessus: in intellectu est, alter in affectus; vnus in lumine alter in feruore; vnus in agnitione, alter in deuotione. In qualibet igitur istarum viarum ambulans ministrat Iesu Christo quia non querit que sua sunt, set que Iesu Christi …’” Grosseteste is quoting Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones Super Cantica Canticorum, no. 49, par. 4 ( Opera 2:75). 138 See the section “Additional Texts (c.1230)” in chapter 3. 139 Robert Grosseteste Sermon T22, 12 (ed. Suzanne Paul. “An Edition and Study of Selected Sermons of Robert Grosseteste,” vol. 2 [Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 2002], 220): “ Delicatus uero istam dulcem bonorum mixturam non sentit secundum affectum etsi illam quoquomodo cognoscat per intellectum…” He does mention Bernard in the immediate context as supporting this idea, but it does not appear to be a quotation. 140 Robert Grosseteste Sermon T48, 6 (ed. Paul, “Sermons,” 309): “Rogemus ergo Dominum ut sic doceamus in hoc libro, Christum ipsum uerum Deum cognoscere possumus et melius cognoscemus in hoc libro Deum in affectu qua intellectu, quia liber amoris est et melius legitur in libro amoris affectu quam intellectu.”
96 cognitive/appetitive distinction. 141 It is striking how much less often Grosseteste uses this pair than he uses aspectus and affectus, but the fact he uses it at all is telling. Given that aspectus and affectus is his default cognitive/appetitive distinction, as will appear in the next chapter, his use of other terms for the same distinction may suggest the influence of some author who has used those terms. Since we know he reads the intellectus/affectus pair in Bernard, it is likely that his occasional use of the pair in place of aspectus and affectus is an indication of Bernard’s influence. It seems probable, therefore, that Grosseteste absorbs ideas about the perfection of aspectus and affectus through illumination and love at least partly from reading about intellectus and affectus in Bernard. 142
Another way Bernard’s influence left its mark on Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine
was through his doctrine of free will. John Sommerfeldt summarizes Bernard’s view as follows:
The action of the intellect must precede that of the will, for without knowledge there can be no choice. But the will is not necessarily governed by the intellect; the will may reject the correct judgements of the intellect or it would not be free. However, in another sense,
141 He may do the same in the following text, though his intention is less clear: Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 119 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 96v): “Figura itaque crucis corporalis, que est intersectio duarum linearum rectarum ortogonaliter se intersecancium, multiplices figuraciones spirituales in crucis formam spiritualiter formatas nostro intellectui innuit intelligendas. Innuit enim nobis crucem intelligibilem in affectione Christi hominis, et crucem intelligibilem in nostro affectu per crucem reformato .” 142 It is worth noticing in passing that Grosseteste receives similar influence from Pseudo-Bernard. In his comments on Psalm 86, Grosseteste quotes “Bernard” as saying that the intellectus needs to be made clear and the affectus purified for one to know and love the truth, since the whole good of man is to know and love his Creator. Robert Grosseteste, Super Psalterium 86 (Bologna, Biblioteca dell’Archiginnasio, MS A.983, fol. 87r-87v): “ De hac letitia dicit Bernardus: Omnes letantur in letitia et exultatione; omnes delectantur de Deo cuius aspectus pius, facies decora, eloquium dulce. Delectabilis est ad videndum, suauis ad habendum, dulcis ad perfruendum. Ipse per se placet et propter se sufficit; ad multum sufficit ad primum, nec extra illum quidquam aliud queritur quia totum in illo inunenitur quicquid desideratur. Semper libet illum aspicere, semper habere semper in illo delectari et illo perfrui. In illo clarificatur intellectus et purificatur affectus ad agnoscondam veritatem et diligendam, et hoc totum bonum hominis nosse, scilicet et amare creatorem suum .” This transcription by James Ginther was previously available on the Electronic Grosseteste: www.grosseteste.com (now www.grosseteste.org). Grosseteste is quoting Pseudo-Bernard of Clairvaux, Meditationes Piissimae de Cognitione Humanae Conditionis 4 (PL 194:492-493). This is exactly the sort of thing Bernard would have said, but modern scholars consider the work inauthentic.
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the will precedes the intellect, for it chooses that to which the intellect turns its attention. 143
In a general way, this resembles Grosseteste’s mature doctrine of aspectus and affectus , as will appear in the next two chapters. Bernard too seems to have ascribed priority to the intellect and a kind of primacy to the will. He also seems to have held their operation to be inseparable. It is possible that Grosseteste owes a debt to Bernard for these ideas, directly or indirectly. But there is more. According to Richard Cross, Bernard played a key role in developing medieval analyses of akrasia (doing what one knows to be wrong). After Bernard, one tradition—broadly speaking—would follow Bernard (and the early Augustine) in holding to a true liberty of indifference. In a given situation, one can choose either of two opposites (A or ~A), and reason does not (or does not always) determine this choice. The other tradition—broadly speaking— would follow Aristotle and hold that ignorance is the true cause of seemingly akratic actions. 144
People always choose what reason tells them is good.
143 John R. Sommerfeldt, The Spiritual Teachings of Bernard of Clairvaux: An Intellectual History of the Early Cistercian Order, Cistercian Fathers Series 125 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1991), 10. The classic statement of Bernard’s doctrine appears in Bernard of Clairvaux, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio 2.4 (Opera 3:169):” Is ergo talis consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem, et rationis, quod se cum semper et ubique portat, indeclinabile iudicium, non incongrue dicetur, ut arbitror, liberum arbitrium, ipse liber sui propter voluntatem, ipse iudex sui propter rationem ..” It may be worth noting that the givenness of the judgment of reason requires a qualified understanding of the will’s ability to reject the judgment of reason. Bernard is not saying the will can make just any choice. Reason’s judgment is necessary for choices to be made, but this judgment does not fully determine the will. 144 See Richard Cross, The Medieval Christian Philosophers: An Introduction (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 58-59. Obviously this is a greatly simplified sketch. Augustine and Bernard each had an important role for the intellect. On the other side, Christian authors who tended towards intellectual determinism rarely or never embraced it entirely. Nevertheless, I think Cross’s broad categories are helpful for identifying general tendencies in the tradition. For a study of human freedom among later Cistercians, see Andrew Cuff, “The Influence of Bernard of Clairvaux’s Analysis of Human Freedom on the Cistercian Masters of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries,” (Ph.D. diss, The Catholic University of America, 2018).
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Bernard’s De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio plays a significant role in Grosseteste’s De Libero
Arbitrio (1225-1230) .145 Grosseteste’s view of free choice fits within the generally Bernardine
tradition. He says it is “a natural and spontaneous ability of the will to turn to willing each of
opposites considered nakedly.” 146 Neil Lewis explains, “This power is a power to sin per accidens in our case, but it is not of its essence.” 147 God and humans both have this kind of free choice, but God’s options are all morally equal, being equally good. Humans, on the other hand, can choose to sin.
Grosseteste’s indebtedness to Bernard on free will extends to his account of free choice in
reference to substance or essence. In a discussion of De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio 2.4,
Grosseteste concludes that Bernard’s language suggests what judges and what is free are one in
essence. So then, reason ( aspectus ) and will ( affectus ) are the same substance or essence, and
this is the essence of free choice, the common root of both.148 As will appear in chapter five, there are other reasons why Grosseteste may have reached this conclusion. Still, Bernard is an important influence or support in addition to the factors I will discuss there.
145 See Neil Lewis, “The First Recension of Robert Grosseteste’s De Libero Arbitrio,” Mediaeval Studies 53 (1991): 14-15. 146 Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio prima ) 18.23 (ed. Lewis, “First Recension,” 87; trans. Lewis, “First Recension,” 11): “Est itaque arbitrii libertas ipsa naturalis et spontanea voluntatis vertibilitas ad volendum utrumlibet oppositorum nude consideratorum.” 147 Neil Lewis, “First Recension,” 11. See Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio prima ) 18.25 (ed. Lewis, “First Recension,” 88). 148 Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda) 17 (Baur, 228) : “ Hoc etiam satis consonum est supradictis verbis Bernardi quibus dicit liberum arbitrium esse consensum voluntarium, ipsum „liberum sui" propter voluntatem, eundem „iudicem sui" propter rationem…Sicut itaque splendor radii solis non est calor neque calor est splendor, et tamen calor et splendor non sunt aliud, quam una essentia radii et ambo sunt unum in unius radii essentia, sic aspectus et affectus, ratio scilicet et voluntas, licet simpliciter loquendo haec non sit illa, sunt tamen unum in radicis una essentia .” I have quoted the statement from Bernard in note 143 above.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have addressed both the origin of the aspectus/affectus distinction and the doctrinal sources that Grosseteste uses to make it his own doctrine. Grossesteste could have found the terms aspectus and affectus paired in any number of contexts, but so far no text has appeared that simply has Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction before Grosseteste. It is plausible that he developed the distinction directly out of the De Spiritu et Anima, but all one can say securely is that he draws his doctrine from the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition throughout his career. Some particularly important sources are the De Spiritu et Anima, the Bible,
Augustine, and Bernard of Clairvaux. The De Spiritu et Anima in particular is a useful text to use as a guide to the Augustinian/Cistercian themes in Grosseteste’s thought. In later chapters I will identify some non-Augustinian sources that he also brings into the picture, but these sources never change the basic meaning of aspectus and affectus .
With the contextual work finished, it is now possible to begin a proper exposition of aspectus and affectus in the writings of Robert Grosseteste. This will be the project of chapters three through five, after which chapters six through eight will further illustrate the significance of the aspectus/affectus doctrine in different areas of Grosseteste’s thought.
Appendix 2: A textual comparison showing that Philip the Chancellor does not attribute the De Spiritu et Anima to Isaac of Stella.
Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Philip the Chancellor, Summa De Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40: Alcherum (PL 194:1878D- de Bono “De Bono Gratiae,” in 782; emphasis mine) 1879A; emphasis mine) homine, C q.1 (ed. Wicki, 748- 749; emphasis mine). Item, Ysaac in libro De anima et spiritu secundum Augustinum :
De rationabilitate igitur omnis « De rationabilitate oritur omnis oritur animae sensus; de aliis anime sensus, de aliis vero …de rationalitate omnis sensus omnis affectus. Affectus vero scilicet de concupiscibilitate et oritur animae, de aliis omnis quadripertitus esse dignoscitur, irascibilitate, omnis affectus. affectus. Affectus vero dum de eo quod diligimus , aut Affectus vero quadripartitus esse quadripartitus esse dignoscitur: inpraesentiarum gaudemus, aut dinoscitur, dum de eo quod dum de eo quod amamus , jam futurum speramus, aut de eo diligimus aut in presentiarum gaudemus, vel gaudendum quod odimus, jam dolemus, aut gaudemus aut in futurum speramus; et de eo quod odimus, dolendum timemus , ac per hoc speramus aut de eo quod odimus jam dolemus, sive dolendum de concupiscibilitate gaudium et iam dolemus seu dolendum metuimus ; et ob hoc de spes, de irascibilitate vero dolor timemus , ac per hoc de concupiscibilitate gaudium et et metus oriuntur. Qui quidem concupiscibilitate gaudium et spes, de irascibilitate dolor et quatuor affectus animae omnium spes, de irascibilitate vero dolor metus oriuntur. Qui quidem sunt vitiorum aut virtutum quasi et metus oriuntur. Qui quidem quatuor affectus animae omnium quaedam elementa, et communis quatuor affectus omnium anime sunt vitiorum et virtutum quasi materies. Affectus etenim omni sunt vitiorum aut virtutum quasi quaedam principia, et communis operi nomen imponit. Et quoniam quedam elementa et communis materia. Affectus siquidem operi virtus est habitus animi bene materies; affectus enim omni nomen imponit. Et quoniam instituti, instituendi, et operi nomen imponit. Et quoniam virtus est habitus mentis bene componendi ordinandique sunt virtus est habitus animi bene compositae , componendi et apposita ratione ad id quod instituti , instituendi et instituendi atque ordinandi sunt debent et quomodo debent animi componendi et ordinandi sunt a animi affectus ad id quod debent, affectus, ut in virtutes proficere preposita ratione ad id quod et quomodo debent, ut in virtutes possint: alioquin in vitia facile debent et quomodo debent animi proficere possint; alioquin in deficient. affectus, ut in virtutes proficere vitia facile deficient. Cum igitur possint: alioquin in vitia facile prudenter, modeste, fortiter et Cum igitur prudenter, modeste, deficient. Cum igitur prudenter, juste amor et odium instituuntur, fortiter et juste amor et odium modeste, fortiter et iuste amor et in virtutes exsurgunt, prudentiam instituuntur, in virtutes odium instituuntur, in virtutes scilicet, temperantiam, exsurgunt, prudentiam, exsurgunt prudentiam, fortitudinem atque justitiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem et temperantiam, / fortitudinem et quae quasi origines et cardines justitiam, quae quasi radices , justitiam, que quasi radices , sive sunt omnium virtutum. sive cardines omnium omnino cardines omnium omnino dicuntur esse virtutum. dicuntur esse virtutum. »
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Part 2: The Meaning and Significance of the Aspectus/Affectus Distinction
Section 1:
Aspectus and Affectus as the Basic Powers of the Rational Soul
101 Chapter 3: A “Theme Song of His Life”: The endurance and basic meaning of the Aspectus/Affectus distinction
Now that I have laid the necessary foundation, in this part of the study I shall present
Grosseteste’s teaching on aspectus and affectus. In these six chapters it gradually will become evident that the aspectus/affectus distinction is an important key for understanding Grosseteste’s thought in various areas. In the present section, which includes chapters three, four, and five, I shall present the heart of Grosseteste’s doctrine as well as the rationale for the approach taken in the following section , which consists of chapters six through eight. Only after I have explained the fundamental importance of aspectus and affectus to Grosseteste’s psychology will their connections to other areas of Grosseteste’s thought be clearly discernible. In chapters six through eight I shall illustrate the deep significance of the aspectus/affectus doctrine for
Grosseteste’s views of salvation, sanctification, human knowledge, and other related issues, while also developing the themes introduced in the present section.
In this section I shall argue that the aspectus/affectus distinction is fundamental to
Grosseteste’s view of the soul throughout his career. The evidence for this claim is twofold.
The first part of the evidence, which I will present in the present chapter, is his actual use of the
distinction throughout his career. The second part, which I will present in chapter four, is that
this distinction between the cognitive and appetitive powers of the rational soul remains
conceptually present even when he uses other schemata of the soul or omits explicit reference to
the soul’s powers. This is particularly true in the case of knowledge and love. In light of this
fact, we should assume that the powers identified as aspectus and affectus remain in the
background, even when only their operations are under discussion.
102 103
If this part of my argument is successful, it will follow that all discussions concerning the interplay of cognitive and appetitive powers or operations in Grosseteste, and especially discussions of knowledge and love, are relevant to understanding the significance of the aspectus
and the affectus in Robert Grosseteste’s view of the soul. My belief is that orienting the
aspectus/affectus question in this way leads to the best understanding of the affectus/aspectus
distinction in particular and of Grosseteste’s theological anthropology in general.
At the same time, this section is the appropriate place for a detailed exposition of this
fundamental doctrine. Although Grosseteste uses the terms aspectus and affectus with some fluidity from one text to another, it is accurate to say that he uses them as technical terms for a cognitive/appetitive distinction among the rational powers. The aspectus is the cognitive power, and the affectus is appetitive and volitional. This section will identify and explain the consistent doctrinal themes that accompany Grosseteste’s use of this distinction.
In the present chapter, I will explain the meaning of the aspectus/affectus distinction beginning from two key texts—De Artibus Liberalibus and Dictum 19—arguing that these texts are of special importance for understanding Grosseteste’s view of the soul. The view they present is one in which the rational soul has two basic powers, the aspectus and the affectus, whose proper actions are knowledge and love, respectively. In the De Artibus Liberalibus, and also in later works, there is a certain priority of the aspectus, inasmuch as the affectus depends upon it for its operation. Yet, in the more mature Dictum 19 , there is also a primacy of the affectus, inasmuch as it can either limit the activity of the aspectus or improve its functioning . It also becomes evident that the actions of knowledge and love are inseparable in the life of the rational soul. With few exceptions, aspectus and affectus always act together. Identifying these
104 three themes—the priority of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the inseparability of knowledge and love—is my way of synthesizing Grosseteste’s doctrine. He does not write explicitly in terms of “priority,” “primacy,” or “inseparability,” but I believe imposing these terms for the sake of clarity is thoroughly justified by what Grosseteste does state explicitly in the texts under consideration here and in later chapters.
After corroborating and further explaining the doctrine of the two key texts by briefly presenting several others, including the late Letter 115 (1245) in the present chapter, I will extend my argument for the fundamental importance of the aspectus/affectus distinction in
Grosseteste’s psychology in chapter four. In that chapter, I will explain how the distinction relates to the other major schemata of the soul that Grosseteste uses in his Hexaëmeron . Then I will illustrate the continuity of Grosseteste’s psychology in his episcopal period through an exposition of the sermon Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat .
I will conclude this section with chapter five, in which I will attempt to account for the endurance of the basic cognitive/appetitive division of the soul, on the one hand, with
Grosseteste’s varying terms and schemata of the soul, on the other. The answer seems to lie in
Grosseteste’s metaphysical assumptions about the soul and its powers. I will also discuss the possible metaphysical reasons for the tandem operation of aspectus and affectus.
De Artibus Liberalibus (c.1195-1209)
Importance. The first text to consider in any discussion of the soul for Robert Grosseteste
is De Artibus Liberalibus. All modern scholars agree that the work is authentic. 1 James McEvoy
1 For Ludwig Baur, the use of aspectus and affectus was proof enough to corroborate the attributions of the work to Robert Grosseteste: “ Die Echtheit der Schrift anzuzweifeln liegt kein Grund vor. Die Unterscheidung von „aspectus mentis" und „mentis affectus" kehrt bei Grosseteste häufig wieder ” (Ludwig Baur, Prolegomena to Die
105 dates it to c. 1209 (or earlier) on the basis of its contents. 2 Since it lacks any sign of Aristotelian or Avicennian influence, it would appear to be his earliest extant work. 3 In form it resembles an
introduction to the arts, 4 which one would expect to be produced by a member of an arts faculty .5
Therefore it is likely that the opusculum reflects an actual period of teaching the liberal arts. 6 In
philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, ed . Ludwig Baur [Münster: Aschendorff, 1912], 57*). Works of Robert Grosseteste quoted from this edition will be cited as follows: Robert Grosseteste, Title of the Work (Baur, page number). 2 James McEvoy, “The Chronology of Robert Grosseteste’s Writings on Nature and Natural Philosophy,” Speculum 58 (1983), 616. 3 Southern, Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 139, in contrast, dates some minor scientific works earlier than the De Artibus Liberalibus (in notes hereafter DAL), but since they are not among my sources for Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction, there is no need to settle the matter of their dates. 4 Daniel A. Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” in Robert Grosseteste: Scholar and Bishop, ed. D. A. Callus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 16. 5 On twelfth-century introductions to the arts see R.W. Hunt, “The Introductions to the « Artes » in the Twelfth Century,” in Studia Mediaevalia in Honorem admodum Reverendi Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin Ordinis Praedicatorum S. Theologiae Magistri LXXUM Natalem Diem Agentis (Brugis Flandorum: De Tempel, 1948), 85- 112. The thirteenth century introductions to the arts also provide relevant background information. Claude LaFleur observes that all Parisian works in this broad category have two things in common: “ d’une part, ils présentent un aperçu d’ensemble du savoir ou, du moins, d’une partie du savoir; d’autre part, ils sont issus d’un même milieu, la faculté des arts ” (Claude LaFleur, Quatre Introductions À La Philosophie Au XIII e Siècle: Textes Critiques et Étude Historique, Université de Montréal Publications de l’Institut d’Études Médiévales XXIII [Montréal: Institut d’Études Médiévales; Paris: J. Vrin, 1988], 3). Within this category, some pieces are introductions to a specific work or discipline within the arts; others are compendia intended to cover all the required materials in the Paris arts program; and still others are commendations of philosophy, intended to give only a general overview of the arts and inspire students to diligent study (Ibid., 160). Several of these introductions, and not only works in the third category, commend the study of the arts on grounds that bear a general similarity to those given by Grosseteste. The similarity is not great enough to suggest influence, but it does lend further support to the notion that a text like the De Artibus Liberalibus would most likely originate from an arts faculty. See for example Accessus Philosophorum lines 1-14 (ed. LaFleur, Quatre Introductions, 179-180); Philosophica Disciplina lines 1-15 (ed. LaFleur, Quatre Introductions, 257); Arnoul de Provence, Divisio Scientiarum lines 100-113 (ed. LaFleur, Quatre Introductions, 304-305). On the thirteenth-century compendia of the arts, see also O. Lewry, “Thirteenth-Century Examination Compendia from the Faculty of Arts,” in Les Genres Littéraires dans les Sources Théologiques et Philosophiques Médiévales: Définition, Critique et Exploitation (Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut d’Études Médiévales de l’Université Catholique de Louvain, 1982), 101-116. Lewry discusses the structural components found in the compendia on pages 114-115. 6 In addition, Grosseteste was called a “master” by no later than 1190, and no later than 1198 he was praised to the bishop of Hereford as competent not only in the liberal arts, but also in medicine and law (James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], 21). See also Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 4-5. Grosseteste’s profound interest in the soul in the DAL, however, sets him apart from what appears to have been the current atmosphere among physicians in the area of Hereford at this time. In the opening questions of a collection that the editor Brian Lawn attributes to an English compiler with connections to the Hereford school c.1200, the
106 any case, it is safe to say that the De Artibus Liberalibus is earlier than any of the other works from which we can learn about aspectus and affectus. Thus it is the necessary starting point for this investigation.
Recent scholarship has found that there are serious textual issues with the De Artibus
Liberalibus. 7 What one decides about these issues will determine to a significant extent how one interprets the doctrine of aspectus and affectus in this work. Therefore, I cannot pass over them in silence. For the sake of clarity, however, I will first present my doctrinal conclusions about the text and then address the textual issues in detail.
Doctrinal conclusions. The Master of Arts divides the human person into three parts
which correspond to the sources of error in human works. 8 The first source of error is ignorance,
anonymous master lauds the study of the body over that of the soul because it is possible to know much more about the body than about the soul. He says, in fact, that human reason can have no experimentum (knowledge from experience or observation) about the human soul. The Prose Salernitan Questions, B 3 (ed. Brian Lawn, Auctores Britannici Medi Aevi V [London: The British Academy, 1979), 2: “ Magis itaque disserit de corpore quam de anima quoniam maiorem habet notitiam de corporis dispositione et de ipsius…De anima vero parum vel nihil attinet theoricis vel philosophis cum ipsius creatio et infusio sic divine conveniat potentie quod humana ratio de ipsius dispositione nullum possit habere experimentum sed sola fides meritum .” Although it seems likely that Grosseteste would have been familiar with this opinion, he does not seem to have shared it, even at this early date in his career. 7 I am indebted to Neil Lewis and all of the scholars of the Ordered Universe Project who are at present collaborating on the new critical edition of the DAL for informing me of these issues and for including me in some of their deliberations. When presented with an earlier draft of this chapter, all parties agreed that the major doctrinal readings for which I argue below should be adopted in the new critical edition. 8 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 1 [numbers added to show parallels]): “ In operibus humanis triplici de causa ingerit se error et imperfectio: [1] quia mens obtenebratur per ignorantiam et [2] quia eius affectus citra debitum sistit, vel ultra progreditur per immoderantiam et [3] quia virtutes motivae corporis instrumenta debilia sunt et imperfecta per carnis corruptelam. -- In quo autem opere incipit error et imperfectio, necessarium est regimen et adjutorium, quibus purgetur error et suppleatur defectus. In humanis vero operibus erroris purgationes et ad perfectionem deductiones sunt artes septenae, quae solae inter partes philosophiae ideo censentur artis nomine, quia earum est tantum effectus operationes humanas corrigendo ad perfectionem ducere. -- Opera enim nostrae potestatis [1] aut in mentis aspectu, [2] aut in eiusdem affectu, [3] aut in corporum motibus, aut eorumdem motuum affectibus omnia consistunt. ” In my exposition, I am reading affectibus, which occurs near the end of the quotation, as effectibus, at the suggestion of Neil Lewis.
107 and this has its effect in the aspectus (lit. “vision”) of the mind. 9 The second source of error is
failure of the affectus (lit. “desire”) of the mind. The affectus may fail by falling short of what is
appropriate ( citra debitum sistit ) or by going beyond it through a lack of moderation ( ultra
progreditur per immoderantiam ). Distinct from the first two, the third source of error is the
corruption of the flesh, which afflicts the motive powers of the body and their effects. The
soul/body division here breathes in the air of twelfth century works like the De Spiritu et Anima,
in which a distinction between the rational soul and the sensitive soul is explicitly rejected. 10 By the time Grosseteste writes the companion piece to the De Artibus Liberalibus, his De
Generatione Sonorum, he will have adopted the Aristotelian (and Avicennian) division of the soul into vegetative, sensitive, and rational or intellectual, but at this point he does not appear to be thinking in that vein. 11
9 The reading given here depends upon the parallels between the first and second paragraph of the quotation given in note 8. 10 De Spiritu et Anima 9 (PL 40 :784) : “Humana quidem anima, quia in corpore habet esse et extra corpus, anima pariter et spiritus vocari potest : non duae animae, sensualis et rationalis, altera qua homo vivat, et altera qua ut quidam putant, sapiat ; sed una atque eadem anima in semetipsa vivit per intellectum, et corpori vitam praebet per sensum.” 11 The De Generatione Sonorum contains almost the same theory of sound as the DAL , suggesting that it was written around the same time. (I am indebted to Neil Lewis for pointing this out to me.) The De Generatione Sonorum appears to be the later of the two texts due to its dependence on Aristotle and perhaps Avicenna. See Robert Grosseteste, De Generatione Sonorum (Baur, 7-8). James McEvoy held that Grosseteste in the latter work was deriving the tripartite division of the soul from Avicenna; James McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, 1986), 291ff. Neil Lewis recently pointed out to me, however, that the De Generatione Sonorum, with its use of the word sonativum and the idea that voices originate from a soul with cognitive capacities, shows the influence of Aristotle’s De Anima, in the translation prepared by James of Venice. See Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis , De Anima II, 8 (420a). Since Grosseteste could have derived the tripartite division from Aristotle directly, I am not sure whether Avicenna influenced this particular work. For an overview of Aristotle’s psychology, including a discussion of the three souls, see Christopher Shields, “Aristotle's Psychology,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2016 Edition)
108
Grosseteste explains how the aspectus and affectus of the mind or soul relate to one another: “First, the aspectus observes. Second, it verifies the things seen or cognized, and when
they have been verified to the mind or aspectus as fitting or harmful, the affectus desires to
embrace the fitting things or it retracts into itself in order to flee the harmful things.” 12 A crucial
point to notice here is that the affectus is subject to the judgment of the aspectus. At least in
logical priority, the affectus does not move until the aspectus has made some judgment about
what is beneficial or harmful. This is an instance of what I call the priority of the aspectus.
The liberal arts, according to Grosseteste, perform the vital task of purging and correcting
the errors that occur in the aspectus mentis, the affectus mentis, the motive powers of the body,
and their effects. The arts of the Trivium correct the powers of the soul, and those of the
Quadrivium aid the body and its works. Grammar correctly shapes what has been seen
(aspectum ) in the aspectus (or intellectus ), and logic leads it to right qualitative judgments.
Rhetoric then moves the affectus to proportionate action. 13 Later in the opusculum , it becomes clear that the affectus mentis is the same as the irascible and concupiscible appetites, since the
latter can stand in for the former: “Rhetoric indeed moves the concupiscible to desire, or the
12 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 1; trans. mine): “Aspectus vero primo aspicit; secundo aspecta sive cognita verificat et cum verificata fuerint apud mentem seu aspectum convenientia seu nociva, inhiat affectus ad amplexandum covenientia, vel in se ipsum retrahit, ut fugiat nociva.” 13 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 1-2): “Aspectum grammatica recte informat. Recte informatum quale sit logica sine errore dijudicat. Ut judicatum quale sit moderate fugiat affectus vel appetat, rhetorica persuadet.” Officium namque grammaticae est recte intelligere et recte intellecta recte enuntiando apud alterum recte formare. Officium vero logicae est, quod recte formatum est in intellectu, secundum tripartitam rationem sui quale sit judicare et discutare. Rhetorica vero, licet eius officium sit ex dialecticis et propriis locis argumenta probationis elicere, quod maxime intendit, est affectum movere. Estque in eius potestate, affectum animosque torpentes excitare, effrenos modificare, timidos animare, truces mitigare… Mentis ergo aspectum et affectum hae tres virtutes rectificant et ad perfectionem perducunt.”
109 irascible to flee.” 14 The need of rhetoric to persuade the affectus to perform its proper operations
seems to presuppose some notion of freedom in the affectus. Music harmonizes the movements
of the body. 15 Arithmetic and geometry aid the effects intended by human movements, and
astronomy (in the sense of astrology) provides the requisite information concerning the right
times to perform certain actions. Grosseteste also offers comments about the value of the arts to
the moral and natural sciences.
In summary, Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction appears very early in his career, and the way in which it appears sets an important precedent. He imposes what appear to be his own terms for a cognitive/appetitive division of the soul upon what was at the time a traditional three-part, or three-power, framework. The three powers of the soul were the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible. 16 Onto the rational power he maps the term aspectus, and for
the irascible and concupiscible together he uses the term affectus. The aspectus observes and
judges, and the affectus either desires or withdraws in response, although it is also free not to do
so.17 As I explained in chapter two, when Grossseteste maps his schema onto the rational/irascible/concupiscible division he may be following the example of Isaac of Stella, having read extracts of Isaac’s letter to Alcher as the work of Augustine in the De Spiritu et
14 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 4): “Rhetorica vero movet concupiscibilem ad appetendum, vel irascibilem ad fugiendum .” 15 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 2): “Cum autem attendimus non ad illud, quod efficitur per motus corporeos, sed in ipsis motibus moderationem, modificatrix est musica.” 16 See McEvoy, Philosophy , 299. 17 The case of consonance and dissonance in music, which I will discuss below, is an exception to this rule. One does not need rhetoric to persuade in that case. The difference would seem to be the involvement of reason in the judgment. Where reason has no part in the judegment, persuasion is irrelevant, and the affectus is moved without consent. Where the judgment in the aspectus is a deliverance of reason, the affectus responds with freedom. Rhetoric cannot change the judgment, but it can attempt to persuade the affectus to consent to the judegment and so embrace or flee.
110
Anima .18 If so, Grosseteste has changed the terms, trading sensus for aspectus, without changing
the basic view of the powers . In any case, the interchangeability of irascible/concupiscible and
affectus in the text itself sets the same precedent: Grosseteste appears to be perfectly happy to
change terms for powers of the soul without necessarily departing from the view represented by
the original terms, as he understands them.
Textual issues. In giving this exposition, I have for the sake of clarity passed over serious textual problems in the De Artibus Liberalibus that I must now address. Baur created his edition in 1912 on the basis of two manuscripts: Venice, Biblioteca Marciana (=San Marco), VI.163, fol.
82, and Prague, National Library, X.H.12 (formerly Univ. 1990), fols. 48r-50r. Thus, where the manuscripts differ (and they do this often), Baur had to adjudicate the more or less even textual evidence based upon the sense that seemed most correct. At present, three additional manuscripts are available, and the new critical edition will take them into account. 19 I would suggest that the additional manuscripts belong to the same family as Venice, San Marco, VI.163
18 De Spiritu et Anima 7 (PL 40:784): " Capax est omnium anima, quia per rationalitatem ad cognitionem, et per concupiscibilitatem ad dilectionem universitatis capax invenitur. Sunt enim duo in anima, et sunt id quod anima, scilicet naturalis sensus cognoscens omnia et dijudicans inter omnia; et naturalis affectus, quo suo ordine et gradu anima diligat omnia. Verumtamen facultates et quasi instrumenta cognoscendi et diligendi habet ex natura; cognitionem tamen veritatis et ordinem dilectionis nequaquam habet nisi ex gratia. Facta siquidem a Deo mens rationalis, sicut ejus imaginem suscepit, ita cognitionem et amorem .” This passage is a near quotation of Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum or Epistola Ad Quemdam Familiarem Suum De Anima (PL 194:1887). The De Spiritu et Anima states the whole rational/irascible/concupiscible doctrine in ch. 4 (PL 40:781-782). This passage is also dependent on Isaac of Stella (Epist. ad Alcherum ; PL 194:1878). Something somewhat similar to Isaac’s combination appears in De Spiritu et Anima 46 (PL 40:813-814). As I discussed in chapter 2, it is also possible that Grosseteste had some other proximate source that happened to do something similar to the De Spiritu et Anima. This is why I focus on his dependence on the tradition represented in the text, rather than on the text as such. 19 They are: Florence, Biblioteca Marucelliana, C.163; Modena, Biblioteca Estense, 649; Prague, Nat. Mus., XII.E.5. I wish to thank Neil Lewis, Cecilia Panti, and the other researchers on The Ordered Universe Project for sharing with me a pre-publication draft of the new critical edition. The only manuscript facsimile of this work that I have examined for myself at any length is of Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5. Thomson identifies Nat. Mus. XII.E.5 as one of the “most valuable” Grosseteste manuscripts (S. Harrisom Thomson, The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940], 20).
111
(hereafter Ve).20 This can be seen in their agreement against Prague, National Library, X.H.12
(hereafter Pu) on some peculiar variants. 21
Now, these four manuscripts also agree against Pu in two places of doctrinal significance.
Baur, following Pu, has “ Ut judicatum quale sit moderate fugiat affectus vel appetat, rhetorica
persuadet .”22 The other four manuscripts agree in reading appetitus for appetat. If the sentence
is to make sense with appetitus, one could take affectus and appetitus as accusative plurals. The
doctrinal result would be that rhetoric is for the purpose of persuading people to flee their desires
or appetites. More plausibly, both terms could be nominative singular, with the import that
rhetoric simply persuades the affectus or appetite to flee the object that has been judged
qualitatively. 23 In either case, the underlying assumption would be that only immoderate desires or harmful objects are in view, and the only proper response is flight.
A little later, Baur follows Pu to render: “ Rhetorica vero movet concupiscibilem ad appetendum, vel irascibilem ad fugiendum .” All other manuscripts omit ad appetendum. 24 On
20 The chief editor of the new edition, Sigbj ꬾrn S ꬾnnesyn, has recognized this fact and accounts for it in his stemma codicum. 21 They all read affectum where Pu has effectus at Baur, 1, line 11. They read incognita for cognita at Baur, 1, line 15. They have superfluum for sulfureum at Baur, 6, line 5. (These readings are reported Baur’s Varia lectio. ) In each of these cases, as I read the text, Pu retains a coherent meaning where all other manuscripts fail to do so. One could suggest that incognita refers to the fact that something only seen has not yet been known, but this seems to me to be an unnatural reading. I rather think Grosseteste is referring to the two ways the aspectus mentis can see. It can see objects presented to eyes (aspecta ) or ideas presented to the mind through words or by other means ( cognita, meaning “things cognized”). 22 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 1). 23 Still another option would be to punctuate the sentence with the scribe of Pk as follows: “…moderate fugiat // Affectus vel appetitus rethorica persuadet //” (Prague, Nat. Mus., MS XII.E.5, fol. 40v; spelling, capitalization, and punctuation as in original). Perhaps faced with nonsense in his exemplar, the scribe appears to have chosen to take Affectus vel appetitus as a sort of pendent nominative (with no resumptive pronoun), rendering the sense: “Concerning the affectus or appetite, rhetoric persuades,” or similarly, “As for the affectus or appetite—rhetoric persuades it” (supplying the implied resumptive pronoun). This interpretation, however, still seems to make flight, mentioned in the preceding sentence, the only option in view once a thing has been judged. 24 These readings are reported in Baur’s Varia lectio.
112 the surface, the result of omitting ad appetendum would seem to be nonsense: “Now rhetoric moves the concupiscible or irascible to flee.” The division of the soul’s powers into rational, irascible, and concupiscible was standard fare in the de anima literature coming out of the
twelfth century schools, and thirteenth century authors regularly used it as well. While some
medieval Latin authors would have the concupiscible power both to seek and to flee, 25 and others would assign flight to the irascible power, 26 I am not aware of any that would give the same action to both powers. As far as I know, the irascible and concupiscible powers were always described as complementary, not interchangeable. Yet, the majority reading can be intelligible
(as a sentence) if one assumes that concupiscibilem vel irascibilem is nothing more than a cipher for affectus. Then the doctrinal import, as in the first case, would be that rhetoric is simply for persuading humans to flee immoderate desires or harmful things. If there is such a thing as a desire that is not immoderate, or an object that is not harmful, it would not be in view here.
In favor of the majority text against Pu, one could note that Pu, in general, does not preserve a very good text. 27 Pk, on the other hand, is a good textual witness.28 If the principle of lectio difficilior be applied to this case, it is quite clear that the majority text has the more
25 See for example Thomas Aquinas , Summa Theologiae I, q. 81, a. 2, corpus (ed. the Leonine Commission, 1:623; emphasis original): “quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem, necesse est, quod in parte sensitiva sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una , per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea, quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva : et haec dicitur concupiscibilis . Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae convenientia impugnat, et nocumenta inferunt: et haec vis vocatur irascibilis .” 26 See for example De Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40:782) : “Per concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem habilis est affici ad aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum, amandum vel odiendum : et ideo de rationalitate omnis sensus oritur animae, de aliis omnis affectus. Affectus vero quadripartitus esse dignoscitur… et ob hoc de concupiscibilitate gaudium et spes, de irascibilitate dolor et metus oriuntur.” 27 Thomson, Writings, 20, said that its textual value is ”not great.” 28 Ibid., 20-21.
113 difficult readings in these passages. Finally, it would seem unlikely that four different manuscripts would by chance produce both of the doctrinally significant textual variants. 29
Nevertheless, I believe there are compelling reasons for following the readings preserved in Pu for these two passages. First, one must consider Grosseteste’s other works. 30 Normally when he refers to the affectus mentis he sees two possibilities. The affectus could be ordered rightly, so that it loves all things according to their degree of being (as do the saints in heaven), or it could be ordered wrongly, usually by loving temporal things too much and heavenly things too little. This view implies that, in reference to any given thing, it is possible to love it too little
(less than its degree of being requires) or too much (more than its degree of being requires). Yet the view suggested by the majority text readings would be that the affectus always (or nearly always) loves things too much (seldom or never too little) and therefore must flee what it desires.
It could also be simply that virtually all things are harmful, and therefore to be fled, but that would not accord with the idea of rightly ordered love any better. This consideration by itself is far from conclusive, however, since Grosseteste could have changed his mind in the years after writing the De Artibus Liberalibus .
The second reason for following Pu against the other manuscripts is that the textual evidence is not conclusive. If one were going to follow the majority readings, it would primarily be on the basis of the textual evidence. Yet, as I mentioned above, the doctrinally insignificant places where all manuscripts agree against Pu seem to indicate that the other manuscripts belong to a common family, stemming from a common exemplar. The two doctrinally significant
29 That is, if one does not think they belong to the same family. 30 See below for the textual basis of the statements that follow.
114 passages where the same phenomenon occurs only strengthen the case for this hypothesis. The most plausible way to explain all these peculiar variants is to suppose that they all occurred in a common exemplar (a rather bad one) that, through unknown channels of transmission, has left its mark on all extant manuscripts except Pu. In that case, the strongest argument for accepting the majority readings—that it is unlikely that two passages would exhibit the same doctrinal change at random in four manuscripts—is greatly weakened. It was most likely one manuscript that exhibited both changes, not four. Thus, the state of textual evidence for these two passages is about the same as it was in Baur’s day—one witness on each side.
The most compelling reason to side with Pu against the majority in these two passages is the internal coherence of the work itself. The readings in Pu make sense within the work as a whole, whereas the majority readings make it internally inconsistent. I will try to demonstrate this fact briefly.
There are two basic problems with the majority reading that lead to internal inconsistency. First, it assumes that only immoderate desires or harmful objects are in view in this work, and that the only correct response in view is to flee. Desires that are less than they should be and need to be encouraged would not be in view. This assumption is not correct.
Second, the doctrine of the majority text variants, on one way of reading them, may be taken to indicate that the affectus can be moved by rhetoric to flee what it desires. This is also false. As I walk through the text again, I will try to establish both of these points.
The affectus in this opusculum has two kinds of actions it can perform and two ways it can go wrong in each kind of action. It can desire and embrace its object, or it can retract and
115 flee from it. 31 Those are its two kinds of actions, and both remain in view throughout the text.
This is not a text about fleeing only. The affectus can go wrong by desiring or fleeing something less than it should, or, on the other hand, it can go wrong by desiring or fleeing something more than it should.32
The affectus does not desire the wrong things unless the aspectus makes a mistake. If all
is well with the aspectus, the affectus desires the right things (if it desires at all) but potentially in
the wrong degree. The error proper to the affectus is primarliy one of proportion. If one were in the situation of desiring the wrong thing, which certainly could happen, the reason for it would be found in the ignorance of the mens/aspectus that led it to make a wrong judgment about what
should be sought or fled .33 The solution would be to rehabilitate the aspectus through grammar and logic, not to persuade the affectus to flee. The affectus can only flee what the aspectus
judges to be harmful. If the affectus desires something, that means the aspectus has already
judged it to be fitting. With the judgment already made, the only question is whether the affectus
will (flee or) embrace moderately or immoderately (or at all), not whether it should flee or
embrace. Fleeing what the affectus desires is out of the question, given the internal logic of this
text. Therefore, the first majority variant reading, if understood to mean that rhetoric persuades
one to flee what is desired, cannot be correct. If taken simply to mean that the affectus or
appetite needs to flee in all cases presently under consideration (e.g., because only harmful
31 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 1) : “…cum verificata fuerint apud mentem seu aspectum convenientia seu nociva, inhiat affectus ad amplexandum covenientia, vel in se ipsum retrahit, ut fugiat nociva. ” 32 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 1) : “…quia eius affectus citra debitum sistit, vel ultra progreditur per immoderantiam.” 33 See exposition above for quotations of the lines that support this and the following statements.
116 objects are in view), the reading is more plausible, but still ultimately to be rejected. It is not true in this work that only flight is in view.
It is important to notice how rhetoric corrects the affectus. It can excite, or restrain. It can enliven or calm. It is like Mercury’s staff, capable of inflicting wakefulness or sleep. It is the zither of Orpheus, capable of making trees walk or wolves lie down in peace. 34 These
examples are not limited to the idea of flight and have nothing to do with fleeing wrong or
immoderate desires. Again, the affectus flees what is judged harmful, not what it desires. The
examples are all about exciting affect or calming it, mirroring perfectly the two errors possible
for the affectus : falling short or going too far. 35 Both possibilities remain in view.
When the aspectus of the soul makes its judgment in the memory alone, without the use
of reason as such, as when responding to consonance or dissonance in music, the affectus of the
soul still responds according to the standard activities of the irascible and concupiscible
powers. 36 The terms aspectus, affectus, irascible, and concupiscible are not used in that discussion, 37 but use of anima, memoria, delectatur, and offenditur make his meaning clear. The
34 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 2) : ”Rhetorica vero, licet eius officium sit ex dialecticis et propriis locis argumenta probationis elicere, quod maxime intendit, est affectum movere. Estque in eius potestate, affectum animosque torpentes excitare, effrenos modificare, timidos animare, truces mitigare. – Haec est enim virga Mercurialis, cuius uno capite vigilantibus somnum relictis ingerit, somnolentis vigilantiam, haec Orphei cythara, cuius modulationem saxa sequuntur et arbores et eius audita dulcedine pax est lupo cum agno, cani cum lepore, et catulo cum leone. – Mentis ergo aspectum et affectum hae tres virtutes rectificant et ad perfectionem perducunt.” 35 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 1) : “…quia eius affectus citra debitum sistit, vel ultra progreditur per immoderantiam.” 36 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 3-4) : “Exinde in tota anima aptatur numerus quidam, quo aptato cum numero, qui extra jam desinit per ipsum numerum, qui jam totus est in memoria, delectatur anima absque rationis judicio in numero sonantis, si sit consonus, aut offenditur, si sit dissonus.” 37 This is also true in later works. Where the cognitive and appetitive powers that would correspond to aspectus and affectus are not rational powers, Grosseteste does not use the pair aspectus and affectus. This seems to be reserved for the basic powers of the rational soul. In the DAL, however, our author does not yet have a clear distinction between rational and sensitive powers.
117 affectus rightly is delighted by consonance and offended by dissonance in music. This fits perfectly with the picture of an affectus that can rightly embrace or withdraw. Both possibilities are in view—not only withdrawal and flight.
In the second passage of doctrinal significance, even the immediate context militates against the majority reading. He says that moral science teaches what should be desired and what should be fled. 38 Both possibilities are in view. Then, clearly meaning to show how rhetoric connects with this task of moral science, he reiterates how this art of the Trivium moderates the affectus. If one follows the majority text, he says that rhetoric moves the affectus to flee, regardless of whether the irascible or the concupiscible appetite is in view. This would mean that rhetoric can only help with half of the items in moral science—those to be fled. It would seem to be unable to assist in the case of things that should be desired. If one did try to use rhetoric in that case, given that its only task is to insight flight, rhetoric would actually be working against moral science. It would be moving the affectus to flee the very things it ought to desire. This reading does not make sense.
If one follows Pu, however, the text makes perfect sense. 39 Rhetoric can move the concupiscible appetite to desire what should be desired and the irascible to flee what should be fled. It does not teach what should be desired or advocate against what is wrongly desired; moral science (corresponding to the activity of the aspectus ) does that. With moral teaching presupposed, rhetoric motivates the affectus to act on what one has learned. Since moral science
teaches sometimes to desire and sometimes to flee, both desiring and fleeing can be right actions
38 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 4) : “Moralis scientia etiam, quid appetendum, quid fugiendum est, edocet.” 39 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 4): “ Moralis scientia etiam, quid appetendum, quid fugiendum est, edocet. – Rhetorica vero movet concupiscibilem ad appetendum, vel irascibilem ad fugiendum .”
118 for the affectus, and both are in view . Since rhetoric complements the work of moral science, naturally it would persuade the affectus to desire or to flee, depending on the circumstances, not only to flee.
The principle of adopting the more difficult reading is a good guideline, but some readings are too difficult. If the majority text is right here, the paragraph about moral science seems to be incoherent. If Pu agreed with the other four manuscripts in dropping ad appetendum, some kind of emendation would seem to be necessary to render a coherent paragraph. Since there is a manuscript that offers a coherent reading, it seems to me far better to follow that text than to posit an emendation or to follow a text that in my judgment cannot plausibly reflect what Grosseteste meant to say.
My conclusion, then, is that Baur’s text of De Artibus Liberalibus is reliable for the passages that deal with aspectus and affectus. Therefore, the work does contain Grosseteste’s doctrine in the form I have explained above. The mind or soul has an aspectus, or power of
cognition, and an affectus, or power of appetite. The affectus depends on the judgment of the
aspectus, at least in the initial perception of an object or idea, to determine whether it should embrace or flee. Since rhetoric needs to persuade it to act on this direction, the affectus is apparently free to act or refrain from acting (i.e., to flee what is harmful or not, to embrace what is fitting or not). Thus there is an implicit notion of will in the affectus. 40 Already in the earliest
40 Later he makes this explicit. See below.
119 work, then, there is a priority of the aspectus and, if not yet a primacy of the affectus, at least a sort of freedom. 41
Dictum 19 (c.1225-1230)
Importance. Grosseteste probably wrote most of his Dicta Theologica during the period from 1229-1235, between the time when he was hired to teach the Franciscans at Oxford and the time when he had to relinquish university teaching to accept his responsibilities as Bishop of
Lincoln. 42 Grosseteste collected and published the 147 notes and sermons that comprise the
Dicta no earlier than 1238 and probably not later than c.1240. 43 As to their composition, Joseph
Goering dates the majority of the collection to the academic years around 1230. 44 He thinks the
Dicta represent the lecture notes Grosseteste used while teaching the Franciscans during that 1-2 year period, with the exception of some of the sermons that are evidently from his episcopal period after 1235.45 I think Goering’s 1-2 year time frame may perhaps be more precise than the evidence warrants, but at least it is safe to say that in general the Dicta represent Grosseteste’s
41 Upon reading a paper based upon a draft of this chapter, Neil Lewis raised the question of whether the apprehensive power moves the appetite immediately in the DAL. The notion of “freedom” in my interpretation assumes that this is not the case. I have written Appendix 3A to explain my position on this issue. 42 This is the time frame given by James Ginther, which I follow tentatively (James Ginther, “The Super Psalterium in Context,” in Editing Robert Grosseteste: Papers Given at the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference on Editorial Problems , ed. Evelyn A. Mackie and Joseph Goering [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003], 48). If Grosseteste also taught at Oxford for a few years before he began to teach the Franciscans, then some of the dicta could be from those years as well. 43 Joseph W. Goering, “Robert Grosseteste’s Dicta: The State of the Question,” in Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies, ed. John Flood, James R. Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering (Toronto: PIMS, 2013), 69, gives the range of 1235-1253 and then narrows it to 1238 or later. Because of the lack of significant influence from the Pseudo-Dionysius, however, one may surmise that Grosseteste probably had not yet translated and commented on the works of that author, which would suggest a date not later than about 1240. 44 Goering, “ Dicta ,” 70. In this opinion Goering is following some evidence and arguments of Richard Southern (Ibid.; Southern, Robert Grosseteste, 112-119.) 45 Goering, “ Dicta, ” 69-70.
120 views from his time as a university professor, with some later material also included. 46 Since all
the Dicta are notes or sermons that he himself chose for publication, the Dicta collection may be a better witness to his settled theological views than some of the continuous works he wrote during this period, which he may not have been able to review in the same selective way. 47
The sermon identified as Dictum 19 was perhaps Grosseteste’s inaugural sermon from his
inception as a master at the University of Oxford in 1229 or 1230. James Ginther has argued this
position on the basis of similarities between the topics covered in Dictum 19 and in Parisian
inception sermons.48 The paucity of known inception sermons preached at Oxford from
Grosseteste’s lifetime would perhaps render it dangerous to say that it is certainly his inception sermon. If, alternatively, Grosseteste incepted as a Master in Theology at Paris before coming to
Oxford, then the sermon could be more securely identified as his inception sermon.49 Without deciding this question, I think it is fair to assume this was Grosseteste’s inception sermon, whether at Oxford or at Paris, until more evidence comes to light.50 As Grosseteste’s inception
sermon, then, Dictum 19 is likely to present what the new master expected to be his special
contribution to the topics typically addressed in such a sermon. These standard topics included
46 See the Introduction for my reservations about Goering’s 1-2 year time frame. 47 He did, however, correct much of the Hexaëmeron in his own hand (Richard Dales and Servus Gieben, “Introduction,” in Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron, ed. Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VI [Oxford, New York: The British Academy, 1982, 1990], xv). He may have done this with some other works as well. 48 James Ginther, “Natural Philosophy and Theology at Oxford in the Early Thirteenth Century: An Edition and Study of Robert Grosseteste’s Inception Sermon ( Dictum 19),” Medieval Sermon Studies 44 (2000): 109. 49 D.A. Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 5, and more recently James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 29, have argued that Grosseteste may have studied theology at the University of Paris before he taught at Oxford. It is also possible that he incepted as a master at Oxford around 1225, a few years before he began to teach the Franciscans. For dicsussion of this matter, see the Introduction. 50 In any case, the evidence Ginther gives for the sermon being preached to a university audience is very strong (see Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 110). Consequently, one should still expect it to make some theological contribution, even if it turns out not to be Grosseteste’s inception sermon.
121 the nature of Scripture and the task of the theologian in relation to Scripture and moral formation. 51 In this sermon Grosseteste uses his aspectus/affectus division of the soul to relate
Scripture to the theologian and both of these to the moral life. This suggests that he may have seen the aspectus/affectus distinction as a special contribution he was making to theology. At the least, it is safe to say that it was an important concept in Grosseteste’s theology at the time.
In addition to the fact that Dictum 19 is probably Grosseteste’s inaugural sermon, two
further considerations support treating it as an especially good witness to Grosseteste’s most
deeply held convictions about the soul. One is that the new master states his view clearly and
decisively. Since Grosseteste has been using the aspectus/affectus distinction for possibly 20
years or more by this point, 52 the boldness of his assertion is unsurprising, but it is still
noteworthy. The other consideration is that Grosseteste is neither commenting on a
philosophical text nor borrowing someone else’s set of terms, both of which would potentially
obscure his own opinion. Instead, he is commenting on a scriptural text so obscure that the
interpretation is almost guaranteed to reflect the opinions of the interpreter: “I looked, and
behold, a hand was stretched out to me, in which there was a scroll. And he opened it before me.
It had writing within and without.” 53
51 For the typical subjects addressed in an inception sermon and where Ginther thinks Dictum 19 addresses these, see Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 110. 52 As stated above, Grosseteste probably wrote DAL around 1209 or earlier and Dictum 19 around 1229 or earlier. In between he used aspectus and affectus in his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, and perhaps some theological works, depending upon when one believes his regency to have begun. On the key passage from the CPA , see chapter 8. 53 Ezekiel 2:9, as quoted in Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §1 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,”125; trans. mine): “Vidi, et ecce manus missa ad me, in qua erat inuolutus liber. Et expandit illum coram me qui erat scriptus intus et foris. ”
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Key passage. Grosseteste’s important statement of the aspectus/affectus distinction,
which interprets this verse, is worth quoting at some length:
Now the soul has two parts, the aspectus and the affectus. Of these parts, the aspectus is, as it were, exterior because nothing passes into the affectus that does not first occur to the aspectus, for nothing is loved unless it is first known. Therefore, what is written down through cognition in the aspectus is depicted as if in a book without. If later the same inscription sinks in, that is, into the affectus, it shapes the love of the knower . Already the book is written without and within. 54
The new master will go on to say that the knowledge of the sacred page penetrates into the
affectus as if through the medium of the aspectus. This reforming of the affectus is what makes
one deiform, restoring the image of the Creator in him. 55 In fact, Scripture is the only book that
can do this. Pagan books tend rather to deform the affectus, if they are allowed to shape it .56
54 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §16 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130; trans. mine) : “Anime autem due sunt partes, aspectus videlicet et affectus quorum aspectus est velud exterior quia nichil in affectum peruenit quod prius aspectui non occurrit: nichil enim amatur nisi prius cognoscatur. Quod ergo per cognicionem in aspectum describitur quasi in libro foris depingitur, si sero eadem inscripcio se profundauerit, in affectum scilicet amorem scientis configurauerit. Iam liber est scriptus foris et intus.” 55 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §17 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130): “Taliter humane menti inscribenda est sacre pagine sciencia vt per medium aspectus profundet intimum affectus. Vt sit liber scriptus non solum foris sed eciam intus. Hec enim sic in intimum affectus profundata inscripcio conformat hominem Deo faciens que deiformem restituit honori de perdito, quia is est verus honor hominis reformacio ymaginis sui conditoris.” 56 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §19 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 131 [modified words underlined]) : “Nulle enim scripture cetere sic in intimum affectus debent se profundare totumque hominem sibi configurare, quia nulla est alia que affectum perfecte ordinat suppreme que pulchritudini conformat . Immo si, qua alia sit, per aspectum in affectum penetrat, non illuminat aspectum sed obtenebrat ; non affectum format, sed deformat .” Ginther has confortat for conformat. I have decided to alter the text based on the reading conformat found in London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol. 14rb; London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol. 119ra; and Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5, fol. 47va. The doctrinal significance of reading conformat here can be seen in the wax and seal illustration found in Dictum 91, on which see chapters 5 and 8. For the second and third underlined words, Ginther’s text and the witnesses it follows reverse the order, rendering per affectum in aspectum. This reading seems to be at odds not only with other passages in the same sermon, but also with the immediate context, where he has just said that no other books ought to sink into the deep part of the affectus. It would be very strange for Grosseteste suddenly to shift from thinking of the affectus as the deep destination of a book to conceiving of it as a medium through which writings can pass into the aspectus. Furthermore, I think the manuscript evidence is in favor of reading per aspectum in affectum. This reading appears in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 17rb and in Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5, fol. 47va, both of which are strong textual witnesses. Ginther’s apparatus indicates that per aspectum in affectum is also the reading found in Cambridge, Trinity College, MS B.15.20 and Prague, Metropolitan Chapter Library, MS 409. Ginther’s reading per affectum in aspectum is
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When the re-written affectus becomes manifest externally, the human scroll obtains another external writing, that of good works. Good works, in turn, re-illumine the aspectus so that it can begin the cycle over with an improved inscription, that is, with more perfect knowledge of
Scripture . This cyclical pattern is one reason Scripture is compared to wheels (referring to the wheels in Ezekiel’s vision). 57
Assuming that Grosseteste is concerned in the first place with his audience of fellow
theologians, his two-part doctrine of the soul explains what makes Sacred Scripture greater than
pagan books. It is tacitly granted that both kinds of books may be of benefit on a rational level,
in the aspectus, but only Scripture corrects what is wrong with the affectus. This has obvious
spiritual benefit in reforming the image of God in the theologian, but Grosseteste is also making
a subtle point about knowledge. Since the works that shine forth from a reformed affectus
improve the knowledge in the aspectus, Grosseteste is implying that the theologian who lets his
soul be formed primarily by Scripture will have a clearer intellectual perception than the
based upon London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol. 14rb and London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol. 119ra. 57 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §17-§18 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130-131) : “Cum autem hec interna descripcio prorumpit per lucem operum in manifesto, que se exerit legendam vi exteriorum operum quasi quibusdam litteri, quid aliud est nisi tercio modo totus homo liber scriptus foris et intus? Hec itaque scripcio libri quasi ab eodem in illud est quedam redicio, quasi a forinseca descripcione in aspectu protenditur in affectum, indeque erumpit in lucem forinsecorum operum. Ipsaque itidem lux operum amplius reilluminat aspectum expressius que et formacius inscribit prius inscriptum. Et forte propter hanc in se reuolucionem, hec scriptura rotis comparatur.” This process appears in altered forms in several passages scattered throughout Grosseteste’s works, although the in se revolucionem is often missing. I will discuss some of these passages below, but here is another that considers the matter from a more scientific perspective: Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 101 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.82va): “Est autem auris perfecta cum verbi sonantis in aure corporis significacio hauritur ab intelligencia, et intellecta reponitur in memoria, et memoria imprimitur in affectum beneplaciti, ut sit memoria mandatorum Dei ad faciendum ea.” For most citations of Bodley 798, I am utilizing the transcription begun by Edwin Westermann and completed by Joseph Goering formerly available on the Electronic Grosseteste at http://grosseteste.com/dicta.htm. For most passages, I have not consulted the manuscript directly. Westermann edited Dicta nos. 1-50 on the basis of Bodley 798 originally in 1942. See Edwin Jergen Westermann, “An Edition, with Introduction and notes of ‘Dicta’ I-L of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253” (PhD diss., University of Colorado at Boulder, 1942).
124 theologian who gets his real edification from Aristotle, for example. 58 This critique will become
more pointed in time. 59 What is already clear is that the affectus has a certain primacy over the
aspectus inasmuch as the aspectus depends upon the affectus for the perfection of knowledge .60
The affectus can aid the aspectus in its operation , or it can limit the aspectus by omitting the good works that bring further illumination. It is also worth noticing that aspectus and affectus denote rational powers.
Key phrases. Two phrases in the passage quoted above merit special attention for understanding the aspectus/affectus distinction. The first, which echoes sentiments found in
Augustine and Anselm ,61 is “nothing is loved unless it is first known/ nichil enim amatur nisi prius cognoscatur.”62 This phrase is especially important. It gives the reason why the activity of the aspectus has at least a logical priority to the activity of the affectus. Love cannot occur
without some cognitive awareness of the thing to be loved, so everything must appear first to the
aspectus. In this sense, there can be some cognition that pertains to the aspectus alone, even if
only as an initial mental perception and judgment to which the affectus responds. 63 There is no
58 This is not to say that Grosseteste thinks pagan authors should not be read. He read and commented upon Aristotle. The point he is making here is one of spiritual priority. One should be a disciple of Scripture, but only a student of Aristotle. 59 In the Hexaëmeron (c.1230-1235) , for example, he says, “ Non igitur se decipiant et frustra desudent ut Aristotilem faciant catholicum, ne inutiliter tempus suum et vires ingenii consumant, et Aristotilem catholicum constituendo, se ipsos hereticos faciant .” (Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 1.8.4 [ed. Dales and Gieben, 61]) 60 I will discuss in more detail the nature of this dependency in future chapters, especially chapter 8. 61 See Augustine, De Trinitate X.I.1 (CCSL 50:311): “Ac primum quia rem prorsus ignotam amare omnino nullus potest...” ; Anselm, Cur Deus Homo II, 13 (ed. F. S. Schmitt, S. Anselmi Opera omnia, vol. 2 [Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1938, 1946], 112): “Deinde si nihil amatur nisi quod cognoscitur : sicut nihil erit boni quod non amet, ita nullum bonum erit quod ignoret.” 62 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §16 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130; trans. mine). I am indebted to Neil Lewis for alerting me to the fact that this line echoes Anselm’s sentiment in the Cur Deus Homo (quoted above) . 63 Eventually Grosseteste will take the view that there must be consent even to the initial act of perception. See Robert Grosseteste, Expositio in epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas V §7 (ed. James McEvoy, in Opera Roberti
125 analogous initial perception in the affectus. If the affectus could act independently of cognition in the aspectus, the aspectus could in principle be bypassed. This is not the case. These observations lead to the conclusion that cognition belongs particularly to the aspectus rather than the affectus. Cognition, and by extension rational knowledge, is the proper action of the aspectus.
The second important phrase is: “If later the same inscription sinks in, that is, into the affectus, it shapes the love of the knower / si sero eadem inscripcio se profundauerit, in affectum scilicet amorem scientis configurauerit.” 64 This phrase confirms the observations I have made on the first important phrase. The conditional nature of the statement shows that something further must happen in order for a thing known to become a thing loved in the mind. The knower’s love has not changed (at least not siginifcantly) until the knowledge sinks in. Thus, in the initial cognition of something, the actions of the aspectus and the affectus are theoretically separable. This phrase also teaches about the affectus in particular. When love does occur, it is the proper action or disposition of the affectus . Since knowledge must precede this action of the
affectus, both love and knowledge are necessary for the love of anything. One cannot love
unless both the aspectus and the affectus are engaged. This is one way in which knowledge and
love are inseparable.
Grosseteste Lincolniensis , ed. James McEvoy, CCCM 130 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1995], 134) and Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §10 -§12 (ed. James McEvoy, in “Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Human Nature with the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat ,” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 47 [1980]: 174- 175). See also the discussions of these texts in chapters 4 and 6. This development, however, does not negate the priority of the aspectus. It only removes the awkward quasi-mechanical nature of initial acts of perception and judgment countenanced in the DAL and seemingly reaffirmed here. 64 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §16 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130; trans. mine).
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On the other hand, since the affectus can aid or limit the functioning of the aspectus, it would seem that one cannot realize one’s full potential for knowledge without love. This is another way in which knowledge and love are inseparable for Robert Grosseteste.
Relationship to De Artibus Liberalibus . It appears, then, that Dictum 19 is in continuity
with De Artibus Liberalibus both in the way Grosseteste divides the powers of the soul and in the
priority of the aspectus . The status of aspectus and affectus as distinctly rational powers is perhaps clearer in the later text. The more mature text also reveals the primacy of the affectus and adds to the inseparability of knowledge and love. As I have shown, the reason for the priority of the aspectus in Dictum 19 depends upon the associations of love with the affectus and
of knowledge with the aspectus . This fact is suggestive. Unless Grosseteste changed his reason
for giving the aspectus a sequential priority, the presence of that priority already in De Artibus
Liberalibus suggests that even in his earliest thought Grosseteste connected love with the
affectus and knowledge with the aspectus. This would certainly be consistent with his early use
of the rational-concupisciple-irascible model, 65 as well as with his connection of grammar and logic with the aspectus and of rhetoric with the affectus. 66 Thus the De Artibus Liberalibus and
Dictum 19 both treat knowledge and love as inseparable with reference to love, though Dictum
19 adds a further degree of inseparability with reference to knowledge. Concerning the primacy of the affectus, one could not easily deduce the doctrine of Dictum 19 from De Artibus
65 For Grosseteste, using this model does not necessarily entail referencce to sensitive powers. All three powers- rational, irascible, and consupiscible-can be powers of the rational soul. This seems to be his primary intention in the DAL. See also Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 4.29.4 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 152). 66 See discussion of DAL above. The following statement from DAL particularly supports this interpretation: “Aspectus vero primo aspicit; secundo aspecta sive cognita verificat et cum verificata fuerint apud mentem seu aspectum convenientia seu nociva, inhiat affectus ad amplexandum covenientia, vel in se ipsum retrahit, ut fugiat nociva” (Robert Grosseteste, DAL; Baur, 1).
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Liberalibus. In this way, a real development appears to have taken place, yet not in such a way as to contradict what he had taught before. 67
While the continuity with De Artibus Liberalibus is strong and the development of concepts understandable, there is at least one point where one can see a divergence from his early thought. The De Artibus Liberalibus showed a great optimism for the possibility of
correcting both the aspectus and affectus through the human knowledge of the liberal arts. In
Grosseteste’s day, one would obtain this knowledge through the study of various books,
including works written by pagan authors. In Dictum 19, however, Scripture is portrayed as the
only book that can truly reform the affectus. Pagan books can even be dangerous, if used improperly. 68
Yet the divergence may not be a great as it first appears. The art that was for helping the affectus was rhetoric. While Grosseteste does not, as far as I know, continue praising the ability of rhetoric to move the affectus, it does appear that he always believes in this ability, at least within the movement of grace. One can see this belief at work in Grosseteste’s strong advocacy of preaching in general and specifically in his belief that preaching is a means by which the aspectus can receive illumination and the affectus be rectified. In Dictum 2 he states: “But this illumination of the aspectus and the rectification of the affectus happen through the word of doctrine and of preaching.” 69
67 I do not mean to claim that Grosseteste had not expressed these ideas earlier than Dictum 19, only that the two texts differ as I have said. His Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, for example, seems to reflect more or less the same view as Dictum 19 and probably pre-dates it . For more hints at the development of Grosseteste’s thought on aspectus and affectus between DAL and Dictum 19, see note 76 below and Appendix 3E. 68 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §19 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 131), quoted in note 56 above. 69 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 2 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.1vb-2ra; partial trans. mine): “Prima ergo et precipua misericordia est amor relevandi stultum a stulticie miseria, ut per sapienciam illuminetur
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One can also see Grosseteste’s belief in the usefulness of rhetoric in his actual practice of preaching. That is to say, he uses rhetoric quite deliberately for the purpose of persuading his audience to flee what is harmful and to embrace what is fitting. It would be easy to multiply examples of this. Since I do not expect this point to be controversial, however, I will give just one example of Grosseteste’s continued belief in the important ability of rhetoric to move the affectus.
Dictum 138 is a sermon on the phrase “Let your loins be girt” from Luke 12:35. Among
other methods of encouraging chaste behavior, Grosseteste appeals to his audience’s sense of
shame:
Who among you would not turn red with shame at the thought of perpetrating some sin if he believed he could not do it except before the eyes of a hundred or a thousand old, wise, and venerable men? And how are you not more ashamed to sin in the sight of your Creator and Redeemer, and in the sight of the multitude of heavenly citizens? Do you indeed fear the face of man more than the face of God? Certainly, you are more ashamed to sin in the sight of God. Imagine, if you can, that time concerning which Daniel says, “The court sat, and the books were opened, and with the court were thousands upon thousands of angels ministering and ten thousand times a hundred thousand angels standing by.” Now imagine with these the college of apostles, the number of the prophets, the army of the martyrs, and gathered as one, I say, the united brotherhood of all the saints from the beginning of this world unto its end. 70
eius aspectus mentis ad veram fidem et scienciam, et rectificetur eius affectus ad iustitiam. Hec autem illuminacio aspectus et rectificacio affectus per verbum doctrine et predicacionis eveniunt …” For a variant reading of this passage see note 82 below. 70 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 138 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.114rb-114va; trans. mine): “ Quis vestrum non vehementer erubesceret perpetrare pecctum aliquod si crederet illud non posse fieri nisi coram oculis centum vel mille virorum senum, sapientum, et venerandorum? Et quomodo non magis erubescis peccare in conspectu creatoris et redemptoris [redemptorum MS] tui, et in conspectu multitudinis celestium civium? Numquid magis revereris facies hominum quam faciem Dei? Certissime magis qui in conspectu dei peccare erubescis. Ymaginare, si potes, tempus illud de quo loquitur Daniel dicens, [Dan. 7:10] "Iudicium sedit, et libri aperti sunt, et cum eo milia milium angelorum ministrancium et decies milies centena milia angelorum assistencium." Ymaginare adhuc cum hiis apostolorum chorum, prophetarum numerum, mart
129
The man can paint a picture with words, and his rhetorical skill is evident. Classical rhetoricians know that the appeal to emotions ( πάθος ) can operate quite effectively through
describing a scene in which the objects will arouse the desired emotion. 71 In this case, the desired emotion is shame. The appeal to shame is a classical rhetorical device for persuading people to avoid an undesirable action. Aristotle lists illicit carnal actions among those that should make people feel shame 72 and states that doing something of this kind before the eyes of those one respects is a normal cause of shame. 73 Grosseteste would have received his original
training in rhetoric in the classical tradition inspired by Aristotle and others who followed similar
principles. Thus, this passage suggests that Grosseteste is still operating according to the
jussu recognita et edita [Roma: Typographis Vaticanis, 1598], electronic edition by The Clementine Vulgate Project, 2000-2013: http://vulsearch.sourceforge.net/index.html). Both versions of the Vulgate mentioned follow the order of the original Aramaic and the Septuagint, all of which describe the multitude of ministers before mentioning the court and the books. The Clementine Vulgate has “ Millia millium ministrabant ei, et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei: judicium sedit, et libri aperti sunt. ” (op. cit.) The Aramaic has .Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia, ed. K) ” אֶ לֶף אַלְפִ ים [ אַלְפִ ין ] יְשַׁמְּ שׁוּנֵּהּ וְרִ בּוֹ רִ בְ וָן קֽ ָדָ מוֹהִ י יְקוּמוּן \ דִּ ינָא יְתִ ב וְסִפְרִ ין פְּתִ יחוּ“ Elliger and W. Rudolph [Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1967, 1977, and 1997], in loc.). The Septuagint has “χίλιαι χιλιάδες ἐθεράπευον αὐτὸν καὶ μύριαι μυριάδες παρειστήκεισαν αὐτῷ · καὶ κριτήριον ἐκάθισε καὶ βίβλοι ἠνεῴχθησαν ” ( Septuaginta, ed. Alfred Rahlfs [Stuttgart: Deutsch Bibelgesellschaft, 1935, 1979], in loc.). Since he changes the order of phrases and some of the grammar, it appears that Grosseteste is paraphrasing from memory. It is possible that he has rearranged the phrases for rhetorical effect. One can only perceive the relevance of the multitudes mentioned for feeling shame if one first knows that this is a scene in which deeds will be revealed (suggested by the books). Therefore, mentioning the court and the books before describing the ministers would seem to produce a greater rhetorical effect. Cf. Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 106. 71 Edward P.J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 88: “We cannot arouse an emotion, either in ourselves or in others, by thinking about it. We arouse emotion by contemplating the object that stirs the emotion. So if we seek to arouse the anger of an audience, we must describe a person or situation of a sort that will make the audience angry.” 72 Aristotle, Rhetoric II, 6 (1383b 20-25). 73 Aristotle, Rhetoric II, 6 (1384a 20-35; trans. Roberts, 630): “Now since shame is a mental picture of disgrace, in which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who form that opinion, it follows that the people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us…And we feel more shame about a thing if it is done openly, before all men’s eyes. Hence the proverb, ‘shame dwells in the eyes’. For this reason we feel most shame before those who will always be with us and those who notice what we do, since in both cases eyes are upon us.” Roberts’ translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric is cited from The Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, ed. W. D. Ross (Chicago, London, Toronto: William Benton, 1952).
130 principles of classical rhetoric that he learned through his study of the liberal arts. There should be no doubt that Grosseteste the preacher still values rhetoric as much as Grosseteste the liberal arts instructor.
Now I can draw a tentative conclusion about Grosseteste’s change of attitude towards the liberal arts. When he says in Dictum 19 that Scripture is the only book that can reform the affectus, one should not take this to mean that studying the liberal arts is not useful for reforming
the affectus indirectly. The statement, as it seems to me, is about the direct use of pagan books.
The practice of rhetoric is useful, but meditating upon a manual of rhetoric cannot lead to the
same result as meditating upon Scripture, and likewise with other pagan books. They should be
studied, but they should not shape the affectus simply through absorbing their contents. His
concern seems to be the danger of inordinate love for pagan books rather than any intrinsic
danger in them.
In fact, Grosseteste sees no knowledge of any kind as intrinsically dangerous. Rather,
elsewehere in Dictum 19 he says , “Also, every creature is good and therefore useful.” Soon after this he adds, “Therefore, there is no truth—especially concerning the being of a creature—that is not useful because truth and being are the same.” 74 If every truth is useful, no truth can be
intrinsically dangerous.
Still, whatever value the liberal arts may have for the affectus and the aspectus is clearly
surpassed by Scripture at this point in Grosseteste’s career. Among books, only Scripture ought
to power the cycle suggested by Ezekiel’s wheels in which the words sink through the aspectus
74 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §8 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 127-128; trans. mine): “Omnis eciam creatura bona ac per hoc vtilis…Non est ergo aliquod verum maxime de esse creature quod vtile non est quia verum et esse idem sunt.”
131 into the affectus, resulting in an outburst of good works that in turn reform the aspectus with a better inscription. “Clearly this Scripture is of a superior order to all other books, and this is what is compared to wheels of extreme height.” 75
Additional Texts (c.1230)
Grosseteste repeats or assumes the “two parts” doctrine in various other places both around this time and later in his career.76 Here I will draw attention to a few more texts from his time as a master of the sacred page that help confirm and explain this fundamental teaching of
Robert Grosseteste. From the following texts I will show that illumination and ordered love perfect the aspectus and the affectus, respectively, and that the perfection of both these parts is
75 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §19 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 131; trans. mine): “Patenter est hec scriptura ad alias omnes superioris ordinis, et hoc est quod comparatur rotis excelle altitudinis.” Cf. Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §17-§18 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130-131), quoted in note 57 above and Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §19 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 131), quoted in note 56 above. 76 From the period of the 1220’s, see for example Robert Grosseteste, Templum Dei 21.3(ed. Goering and Mantello, 66); Glossarum in Sancti Pauli Epistolas fragmenta: I ad Corinthios 14,3 and 14,29 (ed. Dales, 205), as well as the other passages cited in chapter 6; Commentary on the Posterior Analytics 1.14 (Rossi, 215-216). From the late 1220s and early 1230s see for example Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Physics., book 8 (Dales, 147); De Finitate Motus et Temporis (Baur, 105); De Decem Mandatis I 23 and VIII 6 (ed. Dales and King, Dec. Man., 17 and 82); De Cessatione Legalium I vi 4 (ed. Dales and King, Ces. Leg., 27); the passages of the Hexaëmeron cited in note 8 of chapter 4; Dicta nos. 3, 5, 17, 38, 41, and 45 (as well as the dicta and the sermon cited in this section). From Grosseteste’s Episcopal period see Letter 35, Translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, with Commentary (ed. Mercken, 11), Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy 3.7, 5.2, 7.1, and 7.5 (CCCM 268: 84, 115, 130, and 145) in addition to the texts discussed below. Letter 35 was addressed to Pope Gregory IX. The full information for the critical edition of the Glossarum in Sancti Pauli Epistolas fragmenta is: Robert Grosseteste, Glossarum in Sancti Pauli Epistolas Fragmenta, ed. Richard Dales, in Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , ed. James McEvoy (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995). The full information for the critical edition of the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics is: Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros, ed. Pietro Rossi (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981). The full information for the critical edition of the Commentary on the Physics is: Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Lincolniensis Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. Richard C. Dales (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1963). The full information for the critidal edition of De Decem Mandatis is: Robert Grosseteste, De Decem Mandatis, ed. Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). The full information for the critical edition of De Cessatione Legalium is: Robert Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium, ed. Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1986). The full information for the critical edition of Translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, with Commentary is Robert Grosseteste, Translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, with Commentary, ed. H.P.F. Mercken, Eustratius in Librum I Ethicorum Nicomacheorum, in The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI, 1 (1973): 1-193.
132 indicated by sapientia (wisdom) , for Grosseteste. This wisdom is partly attainable in this life and fully attainable in beatitude.
Dictum 100. The idea of doctrine moving through the aspectus into the affectus, an important feature of Dictum 19, also appears in Dictum 100. This dictum, which is in the Super
Psalterium as well ,77 discusses the twelve foundation stones of the Apocalypse. Playing on the idea that amethyst is easy to engrave, he says concerning men of this kind that “the minds of such men are easily inscribed by the docrtine of the wisdom of God penetrating through the aspectus into the affectus .” 78 The priority of the aspectus here seems to be about the same as in
Dictum 19.
Dictum 2. In Dictum 2, which is principally about compassion and giving alms,
Grosseteste discusses what it takes to perfect the aspectus and the affectus of the soul. “The good of the soul,” he says, “is twofold—the illumination, or aspectus, of the soul, and the rectitude of the affectus. ”79 The misery of the soul, in contrast, is “the darkness of ignorance and
77 Goering, “ Dicta ,” 82, 86. In the Super Psalterium it is connected with Psalm 39:3. 78 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 100 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.81vb; trans. mine): “Est autem sculpturis facilis, quia doctrina sapiencie Dei per aspectum in affectum penetrantis mens talium facile inscribitur .” Some witnesses have variant readings in this sentence that could be thought to affect the doctrinal point I am making from it. However, I am satisfied that the text of Bodley 798 is correct here. For a comparison of five manuscript witnesses to this sentence, see Appendix 3B. 79 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 2 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.1vb; trans. mine): “ Bonum anime duplex est: illuminacio sive aspectus anime, et rectitudo affectus .” I have checked this reading against one other manuscript, which matches it precisely (London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol. 103rb). For a description of Royal 7.E.II, see F.A.C. Mantello and Joseph Goering, “Robert Grosseteste’s Quoniam Cogitatio, a Treatise on Confession,” Traditio 67 (2012): 362. Like Mantello and Goering, I am following the foliation written in the codex, which has the Dicta beginning on folio102v. I have noticed that this foliation has folio 91 following directly upon folio 89, with no folio 90. The quality of my facsimilie does not allow me to determine with confidence whether a folio has been removed. The text moving from folio 89v to folio 91r, however, seems to read coherently. This leads me to suppose that the foliator simply made a mistake. Nevertheless, since citing the strictly correct foliation would only cause confusion, I have chosen to cite the folios according to the accepted convention. In addition to Mantello and Goering, the convention of citing the Dicta as beginning on folio 102v may be found in the catalogue prepared by Warner and Gilson (George F. Warner and Julius P. Gilson, Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King’s Collections in the British Museum , vol. 1: Royal mss. I A. I to II E. XI [London, 1921], 195).
133 the deviation of the will from rectitude.”80 He continues, “But both of these spiritual goods are
commonly comprised in one term, Wisdom ( sapiencie ); and both of the afflictions in the one
word, Folly. So, the sum of all spiritual good is wisdom ( sapiencia ), and complete spiritual
deficiency is folly.” 81 From this it is clear that Grosseteste views wisdom as encompassing
perfection both of knowledge and of will, which relate to the aspectus and to the affectus,
respectively. One cannot be wise unless both the aspectus and affectus are engaged. Again
knowledge and love prove to be inseparable.
This statement about the good of the soul, taken in isolation, would perhaps raise a
question as to why illumination is equated with the aspectus, rather than applied to it, but this
oddity is probably due simply to the natural metaphorical connection between illumination and
vision. A few lines later he says plainly that the aspectus receives illumination,82 and in his De
80 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 2 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.1vb; trans. mine): “ Duplex est ergo anime miseria, scilicet tenebrositas ignorancie, et voluntatis a rectitudine deviacio .” This quotation matches perfectly the text as found in London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol. 103rb. 81 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 2 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.1vb; trans. Jackson 1:9): “ Utrumque autem bonum anime unius nominis intencione solet complecti, scilicet in hoc nomine ‘sapiencie,’ et utraque eius miseria in hoc nomine ‘stulticia.’ Unde totum bonum anime est sapiencia, et tota eius miseria est stulticia. ” Here there is a discrepancy between Bodley 798 and Royal 7.E.II. The latter omits the first hoc, making no difference in the overall sense. However, it also omits the summary statement from unde to the end of the quotation (London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol. 103rb). F.A.C. Mantello (see note 79) told me personally that he feels the text of Royal 7.E.II is relatively bad in terms of scribal errors. Thus, until I can collate more manuscripts of this passage, I am tentatively assuming the summary statement found in Bodley 798 is original. The complete information for Jackson’s privately published translation is: Robert Grosseteste, The Complete Dicta in English, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Gordon Jackson (Lincoln, UK: Asgill Press, 2003), 9. Hereafter citations of Jackson’s translation will simply give his name, followed by the volume and page number, as above. 82 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 2 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.1vb-2ra): “Prima ergo et precipua misericordia est amor relevandi stultum a stulticie miseria, ut per sapienciam illuminetur eius aspectus mentis ad veram fidem et scienciam, et rectificetur eius affectus ad iustitiam. Hec autem illuminacio aspectus et rectificacio affectus per verbum doctrine et predicacionis eveniunt …” The text of Royal 7.E.II, which clearly includes an eye skip but still refers in one place to illumination of the aspectus , is as follows (London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fols. 103rb-103va): “ Prima ergo et precipua misericordia est amor releuandi stultum a stulticie miseria vt per sapienciam illuminetur eius affectus ad iustitiam · hec ergo illuminacio aspectus et rectificacio · affectus per verbum doctrine et predicacionis perueniunt… ”
134
Libero Arbitrio (second recension) he unambiguously equates aspectus with ratio and affectus
with voluntas. 83
Tota Pulchra Es. In the sermon, Tota Pulchra Es, which he preached around 1230, 84
Grosseteste offers some more explanation about the perfection of the aspectus and the affectus.
After repeating his two parts doctrine as if a simple matter of fact, he explains the full beauty
(pulchritudo plena ) of each part. The full beauty of the aspectus is to know all things knowable
in the divine light. The beauty of the affectus is to love all individual things in proper order.
Mary came to enjoy these things after her transmigratio .85 If I may make the assumption that rectitudo and pulchritudo are interchangeable in this context, this text adds to our understanding of Dictum 2 the fact that the rectitudo of the affectus is, specifically, the right ordering of loves.
At the same time, Dictum 2, which obviously deals with the same topic as applied to this life, rather than to beatitude, adds to our understanding of Tota Pulchra Es the fact that some degree
83 Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda), cap. 17 (Baur, 228) : “.. sic aspectus et affectus, ratio scilicet et voluntas…” For discussion of this passage see chapter 5. Even though Neil Lewis has edited the first recension of the De Libero Arbitrio (c.1225), Baur’s remains the most recent edition available of the second recension (c. 1230). Neil Lewis has prepared a a critical edition of both recensions soon to appear in the series Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, but it was not available in time to be used in this study. On the dating of the two recensions, see Neil Lewis, “The First Recension of Robert Grosseteste’s De Libero Arbitrio,” Mediaeval Studies 53 (1991): 23-26. Lewis’s edition of the first recension of the De Libero Arbitrio appears in the same article on pages 32-88. 84 This is the date suggested by Fr. Servus of St. Anthonis (Servus Gieben), “Robert Grosseteste and the Immaculate Conception. With the Text of the Sermon Tota Pulchra Es, ” Collectanea Franciscana 28 (1958): 221. 85 Robert Grosseteste, Tota Pulchra Es (ed. Fr. Servus, 223-224) : "Anima autem duas habet partes, aspectum scilicet et affectum. Pulchritudo plena aspectus est: in lumine divinitatis videre simul et aeternaliter ipsum lumen et in claritate eiusdem luminis videre omnia creata, praeterita, praesentia et futura. Cum enim anima naturaliter desideret omnem scientiam, si vel unicae rei scientia careret, non esset perfecta vel pulchrificata in parte illa, in qua sibi deesset illius scibilis scientia. Plena autem pulchritudo affectus est: omnia et singula ordinate diligere, unicuique scilicet tantum amoris impendendo quantum dignum est eidem impendi. Secundum utramque igitur dictarum partium animae constat beatissimam Virginem in transmigratione de hac vita mortali plenissimam recepisse pulchritudinem, ut scilicet in aeterno lumine ipsum lumen et omnia limpidissime aeternaliter conspiciat, atque unumquodque pro modo quo diligendum est, suavissime diligat.”
135 of illumination and rightly ordered love—that is, some degree of wisdom—is possible in this life. 86
Dictum 71. The sermon Pulchra ut Luna, also known as Dictum 71 , confirms this conclusion. In this sermon, which was written around 1230 and appears both in the Super
Psalterium and among the Dicta, 87 the Oxford professor offers several interpretations of the
phrase “as beautiful as the moon ( pulchra ut luna ).” 88 One of these expositions presents Mary as
the moon to the sun of Christ. He explains,
[S]he is clothed with this sun just as any faithful soul, but more excellently and ornately because from the sun of justice she shines more than others. And in this life she shined with rectitude of affectus from which, after the conception of Jesus Christ, she did not deviate even through venial sin. And she shines and shined more than others with illumination of aspectus by which she saw more clearly and believed more firmly the truth necessary for salvation…89
86 McEvoy, Philosophy, 326, in contrast, sees illumination as only applicable to beatitude and mystic experiences for Grosseteste: “The normal human condition is not that of illumination. We risk nothing in identifying the mundicordes and perfecti purgati of De Veritiate, those who see the veritas suprema as he is in himself, with the handful of mystics of the Christian tradition and with the blessed in heaven.” See also ibid., 333. I take McEvoy to be saying that what Grosseteste says about illumination applies only to a “handful of mystics.” If this were correct, it would mean that Grosseteste thinks no wisdom may be had in this life, which is obviously not the case. See note 82, where the first quotation mentions that illumination can occur through the means of preaching. The problem with McEvoy’s interpretation is that he seems to assume illumination has to be total beatitude or nothing—that it cannot admit of degrees. See also my discussion of Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat in chapter 4 and my discussion of illumination in chapter 8. 87 As Richard Southern explains, Durham, Cathedral Library, MS A.III.12 contains a description of a penance dated February 27, 1232 (Southern, Robert Grosseteste, 72). This allows us to date the part of the codex in which this appears to the years just before 1232. The sermon Pulchra ut Luna appears in this early manuscript of the Super Psalterium (through Psalm 32), as well as in other more complete Super Psalterium manuscripts. See Goering, “Dicta ,” 84-85. 88 The phrase is from Song of Songs 6:9 in the Vulgate. 89 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 71 (edition and translation mine): “ amicta est hoc sole, sicut quelibet fidelis anima, sed excellentius et ornacius, quia de sole iusticie plus ceteris splendet. Et in hac vita splenduit affectus rectitudine, a qua post conceptionem Jesu Christi, nec per veniale peccatum declinavit, et plus ceteris splendet et splenduit illustracione aspectus, qua limpidius veritatem saluti necessariam vidit et firmius credidit …” For the full working edition of this passage, see Appendix 3C.
136
Here Grosseteste states explicitly that Mary enjoyed a rightly ordered or upright affectus in this life (in hac vita ) and a high degree of illumination in reference to her aspectus in this life.
He further specifies that this is like what all the faithful receive from Christ, only greater in
degree (“more excellently and ornately”). He goes on in the same place to say that our vision of
truth can be through faith or intelligentia (understanding) . In either case, our “vision of truth”
and “love of rectitude” both come from Christ “just as the moon shines from the illumination of
the sun.” 90 The conclusion is inescapable. Wisdom, understood as illumination of the aspectus in knowledge and right ordering of the affectus in love, is possible in this life—to a degree. It is not necessarily equivalent to beatitude, as McEvoy thought, nor is it limited to a select few mystics. 91
There is a strand of aspectus and affectus discourse in Grosseteste that needs to be woven into the current thread. While Grosseteste often spoke of the illumination of the aspectus with
the ordering or directing of the affectus, during this same period of time he could also pair the
illumination of the aspectus with the enflaming or enlivening of the affectus. A brief look at some of the texts where he does this will suffice to show that this alternative pairing complements what has been described above and does not represent a different conception of the soul’s powers.
90 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 71 (edition mine): “ Is est enim ille interior amictus quo induimur ut honeste, sicut in die ambulemus aspectus veritatis per fidem, sive intelligentiam; et amor rectitudinis, quorum utrumque splendet in anima sancta, non aliunde quam de sole iusticie. De luce que illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum De veritate que Christus est velud splendet luna de solis illustracione .” For the full working edition of this passage, see Appendix 3C. 91 See note 86 above.
137
Dictum 89. The sermon identified as Dictum 89 was originally preached at Pentecost. It is about the tongues of fire mentioned in Acts 2:3.92 The preacher plays on the properties of fire,
light and heat, to describe the activity of the Holy Siprit: “The light on the outside was signifying
that the Spirit on the inside was lighting up the aspectus of the mind. The heat was indicating
that the Spirit on the inside was inflaming the affectus of the mind.” 93 This passage in isolation may seem to offer an alternative view of perfecting the affectus—that it wants heating or inflaming instead of ordering. Other passages from the Dicta , however, suggest that Grosseteste considers heating to be consistent with ordering.
Dictum 72. Dictum 72 is a sermon on Luke 24:32, in which the disciples that met the risen Christ on the road to Emmaus ask, “Did not our souls burn within us?” Here our preacher describes the divine nature as the sun both of justice and of understanding ( intelligentia ). As the
sun of justice, it heats the affectus. As the sun of understanding it illumines the aspectus. 94 The
fact that the sun of justice is what heats the affectus here suggests that Grosseteste does not see a significant discrepancy between ordering the affectus and heating or inflaming it. Since right
92 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 89 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.66rb-66va): “ Ad quam beatitudinem, ut perveniamus et fructu centesimo perfruamur, ille Spiritus, qui hodierna die discipulis in igne apparuit, illustret splendore suo nostre mentis aspectum, et fervore suo accendat affectum .” I have compared this sentence in Bodley 798 with the same sentence in Royal 6.E.V (London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol.40vb). They do not differ at all. Thomson, Writings, 20 ranks Royal 6.E.V as one of the three “most valuable” Grosseteste manuscripts, alongside Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5 and Durham, Cathedral Library, MS A.III.12. Also on Royal 6.E.V see Mantello and Goering, “A Treatise on Confession,” 363-364. 93 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 89 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.63vb-64ra; trans. mine): “Lux exterior significabat quod Spiritus interius illustrabat mentis aspectum. Calor vero innuebat quod Spiritus interius accendebat mentis affectum .” The only textual difference between Bodley 798 and Royal 6.E.V here is that the latter has signabat instead of significabat (London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol.39va). The meaning is the same. 94 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 72 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.54vb): “Eius enim divinitas est sicut sol radians, sol iusticie calefaciens affectum et intelligencie illustrans aspectum .” The reading in London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol.34va is exactly the same.
138 order is in accord with justice, no effect of the “sun of justice” is likely to be at variance with right order.
Dicta 8 and 25. Dictum 8 confirms this inference. Here also Grosseteste combines the sun of justice/sun of understanding pair with affectus and aspectus, but this time the he speaks of
direction instead of heat: “God is the sun of justice, directing the affectus, and the sun of understanding, illuminating the aspectus .”95 So, the sun of justice can either direct or heat the affectus. 96 Alternatively, in Dictum 25, he has the sun of both justice and understanding illumine
both the aspectus and the affectus —the former through truth and the latter through grace .97 The difference in what God does to the affectus appears to lie in what particular pastoral point
Grosseteste wishes to make. In every case, though, God needs to act upon both the aspectus and
the affectus to perfect their proper operations, so the end result would seem to be the same.
Dictum 54. Finally, Dictum 54 leaves no doubt that heating or inflaming the affectus
ultimately coincides with conforming it to right order or justice. In this piece, which also
95 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 8 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.8va; trans. mine): “Cum enim Deus sit sol iusticie, affectum dirigens, et sol intelligencie, aspectum illuminans …” I have checked this clause in Bodley 798 against London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol.9vb and Wroclaw (Breslau), University Library of Wroclaw, MS I.F.567, fol.7va. Not all mss attach the clause to the same sentence. Bodley 798, at least as transcribed by Westermann and Goering, attaches the clause to the sentence following it, while the other two manuscripts connect it to the preceding sentence. Nevertheless, all three mss do have the same words in the same order for the clause I have quoted. 96 The sun of justice/sun of understanding pair also appears, though without aspectus and affectus, in the sermon Ecce Nunc Dies Salutis §1-§2 (ed. Suzanne Paul, "Ecce Nunc Dies Salutis [2Cor 6:2]: A Sermon on Penitence Attributed to Robert Grosseteste," in Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition , ed. Maura O'Carroll [Roma: Istituto storico dei Cappuccini, 2003], 111). I am inclined tentatively to follow Paul, “Ecce Nunc,” 109, in accepting this sermon as authentic. Here Grosseteste makes Christ the sun of justice and of intelligence. The scriptural source for sol iusticie is Malachi 4:2. The phrase sol intelligencie is from Wisdom 5:6. 97 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 25 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.22rb): “ Cum itaque aversio voluntatis a summo bono sit mors, et ipsa aversio sit que umbram facit et privat radios solis intelligencie et iusticie ne illustrent aspectum per veritatem nec affectum per graciam, patet quod omnis substancia racionalis perverse voluntatis habitat in umbra proprie mortis .” I have checked this sentence in Bodley 798 against London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol.16vb. The two manuscripts have almost the same sentence, and what difference there is has no real impact on the meaning.
139 appears in the Super Psalterium at Psalm 44:2, 98 Grosseteste refers to vivifying, rectifying, and
inflaming the affectus all in the same passage. 99 It is evident that each of these descriptions represents some aspect of the perfection of the affectus and that all tend toward the same goal.
Otherwise, he could not combine them in this way.
That the affectus often needs to be inflamed, far from being at odds with its need for right
order, is actually a logical implication of this need. When the affectus needs a push, it needs it in
order to love God, or some created nature, to the degree that He, or it, ought to be loved. From
these texts, then, one should understand that ordering the affectus is not only about restraining
and directing it, but also about motivating it to love as much as it should.
Later Texts (c. 1238-1245)
Grosseteste’s two-parts doctrine, as all of these texts from around 1230 testify, was one of his favorite tools for preaching and teaching. The De Artibus Liberalibus allows us to see
how early he held the doctrine. It is also possible to trace the two-parts doctrine of Dictum 19
ahead in Grosseteste’s career.
98 Goering, “ Dicta ,” 80, 86. 99 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 54 §16-§17 (ed. Joseph Goering and Randall Rosenfeld, “The Tongue is a Pen: Robert Grosseteste’s Dictum 54 and Scribal Technology,” Journal of Medieval Latin 12 [2002], 126):“ Inter quod ostium et dictum thalamum quasi deductrix quedam sedet circumspeccio prudens que omne uerbum uolens egredi prudenter et uigilanter considerat an ipsum sit amictum ueritatis lumine ut possit aspectum mentis, ad quam uult progredi, illuminare, et an sit effectiue rectum et uiuax ut possit affectum rectificare et uiuificare. Et si uiderit illud tale, deducit illud ad ostiarium ut ei aperiat. Ubi autem uiderit illud non tale, clamat ostiario ut ei claudat. Est autem ostiarius aperiens amor illuminandi aspectum et accendendi affectum mentis aliene. ” Here the agent correcting the soul is not directly said to be God, but one may reasonably suppose that Grosseteste means it to be understood that these activities which perfect the aspectus and affectus are ultimately the work of God, even though the means of circumspection or prudence and preaching are involved. See the discussion of Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat in chapter 4, in the section concerning the activity of grace on the powers of the soul.
140
Dictum 51. Joseph Goering has proven that Dictum 51 belongs to the episcopal period,
1238 at the earliest. 100 In this sermon directed toward pastors, Grosseteste says they should have the “art of ruling life” inscribed on the aspectus, which would mean that each knows ( sciat ) at least the Articles of Faith, the Ten Commandments, and similar things. 101 Then he says,
This inscription made on the aspectus ought also to penetrate into the affectus in order that what the aspectus sees ought to be done, one’s amor loves into action. And thus at length through the medium of the affectus the inscription made in the mind ( menti ) may burst forth in the execution of manifest exterior works. 102
This passage echoes not only the division of the soul found in Dictum 19 but also the sequence of progress from instruction in the aspectus, to embracing the truth in the affectus, to the performance of good works—Ezekiel’s wheels. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Grosseteste still held to the aspectus/affectus division of the soul as reflected in his inaugural sermon a decade or more later as Bishop of Lincoln.
100 Goering, “ Dicta, ” 69. 101 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 51 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.38ra-38rb): “ In aspectu itaque mentis nostre sit primum inscripta ars vite regende, ut sciat unusquisque secundum fidem rectam ea saltem subditis exponere sine quibus non potest salus existere, et quibus observatis salus non potest abesse; ut sciat saltem simpliciter articulos fidei et decem mandata decalogi, et que sunt vicia criminalia, et qualis sit saluti sufficiens penitencia .” Concerning other mss see note 102 below. 102 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 51 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.38ra-38rb; trans. mine): “ Debet quoque ista aspectui facta inscripcio penetrare in affectum, ut quod videt aspectus debere fieri, diligat amor ad faciendum, et sic tandem per affectus medium prorumpat menti facta inscripcio in execucionem exteriorum et manifestorum operum .” I take amor, the subject of diligat, to be equivalent in meaning to affectus in this passage. Since amor performs the action of loving, the word must refer to the power by which one loves, rather than the love itself. This power is the affectus. I have collated the text quoted in this footnote and in footnote 101 with other manuscripts and Brown’s edition (1690). Since my critical text did not diverge from Bodley 798 at all, I have simply quoted the manuscript in these two notes. For the variant readings discovered in the collation, see Appendix 3D.
141
Letter 115. One can go further still. In Letter 115 (October, 1245), written to Hugh of St.
Cher, Grosseteste not only uses aspectus and affectus but even treats the sapientia gained through their training as an essential component of salvation: 103
Now your discretion knows that the health of the English Church and even of the realm depends greatly on the Venerable Father, the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury. Wherefore, he needs associates not only who are wise in the law of the realm, or only in civil and canon law, but also who are wise in the law of God, that is, who know Sacred Scripture and have the wisdom ( sapientiam ) of it inscribed not only in the aspectus of the mind, but also in the affectus, having been established in the same (affectui ) by the exercise of corresponding works. For through this [i.e., wisdom] most of all, as you know, kings rule and lawmakers discern what is just. By this alone the little boat of Peter is directed to the port of salvation. 104
As late as 1245, nearly 1246, the interdependence of knowledge, love, and good works remained intact. Grosseteste was still saying that wisdom (sapientia ) requires the exercise of both the aspectus and the affectus, and he was still saying that knowing Scripture in the aspectus , letting it sink into the affectus , and deepening this knowledge and love through good works was the ideal method to adopt. Ezekiel’s wheels were still turning.
Given the close parallels between the key passages quoted from Dictum 19, Dictum 51, and Letter 115, it is appropriate to assume that the same doctrinal outlook underlies them all.
This means that the priority of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the inseparability of
103 See chapter 6 for an exposition of the significance of aspectus and affectus in Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation. 104 Robert Grosseteste, Letter 115 (ed. Henry Richards Luard, in Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Quondam Lincolniensis Epistolae, Rolls Series [London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1861], 336 ; trans.mine, influenced by Mantello and Goering, Letters, 353-354): " Novit autem vestra discretio quod salus ecclesiae Anglicanae et etiam regni plurimum dependet a venerabili patre domino archiepiscopo Cantuariensi; quapropter necessaria sunt ei latera non solum quae sapiant jura regni, vel civilia et canonica solum, sed et quae sapiant jura Dei, hoc est quae sacram noverint Scripturam et saptentiam illius inscriptam habeant non solum in mentis aspectu sed et in affectu, operum affectui correspondentium exercitio firmatam. Per hanc enim maxime, ut nostis, reges regnant et legum conditores justa decernunt: hac sola ad portum salutis dirigitur Petri navicula. ” The full information for the translation by Mantello and Goering is: Robert Grosseteste, The Letters of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, translated with introduction and annotation by F.A.C. Mantello and Joseph Goering (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
142 knowledge and love are assumed in the latter two texts, even if they are not all expressed with equal clarity. 105
Conclusion
In this chapter I have done two things. I have explained the basic meaning of the aspectus/affectus distinction in terms of three major themes that consistently accompany
Grosseteste’s use of the paired terms—the priority of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the inseparability of knowledge and love. I have also shown that knowledge and love, broadly considered, are the proper actions of the aspectus and the affectus, respectively. It is a cognitive/appetitive distinction. The aspectus is the cognitive power, and the affectus is the
appetitive power, conceived as including both will and desire in the rational soul. It is not
surprising, then, that the perfection of the aspectus is complete knowledge through illumination
and that the perfection of the affectus is rightly ordered love through grace.
The other thing I have done in this chapter is that I have shown the endurance and consistency of aspectus and affectus in Grosseteste’s thought. From his early days as a liberal arts instructor, through his years of intense scholarship in the schools , and well into his episcopate—a period of perhaps 40 years in all—Robert Grosseteste returned again and again to the aspectus/affectus distinction as his preferred way of dividing the powers of the soul. And, with some developments noted, he generally meant the same thing by it. It was fundamental to his psychology. As James McEvoy observed, it was a “theme song of his life.” 106
105 I will adduce additional texts that illustrate these themes in chapter 4 below (the Hexaëmeron and the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat ) and in subsequent chapters. I have refrained from presenting all such texts here to avoid repetition. 106 McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 78. For a chart that summarizes Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction in chronological perspective, see Appendix 3E. The texts in that chart which are not explained in the present chapter will feature in later chapters.
Appendix 3A: Is there freedom in the De Artibus Liberalibus ?
In my doctrinal exposition of aspectus and affectus in the De Artibus Liberalibus, I have suggested that there is some notion of freedom in the affectus already in this early work. Of
course, Grosseteste will later identify the affectus with voluntas in his discussion of free choice.
Yet it would not be unreasonable to suppose that in the De Artibus Liberalibus (DAL) the
judgment of the aspectus moves the affectus immediately, which would imply that the affectus,
in Grosseteste’s early thought, is not in fact free to consent or to refuse consent to the judgment
of reason. On this way of approaching the question, the presence of freedom in the affectus turns
on the question of whether the cognitive and apprehensive power, the aspectus, does or does not
move the appetitive power, the affectus, immediately. 1 If the aspectus moves the affectus
immediately, the affectus is not free in the way I have suggested. If it does not, it would be
possible to see some notion of free will internal to the affectus as supplying the intermediary
movement.
I will address this problem by restating and summarizing my exposition of the text with
this matter in view. In the DAL, the basic model is:
cognition judgment desire
But Grosseteste does make that desire contingent upon some choice, so that at least in the later part of the work, where rhetoric moves the affectus (as irascible and concupiscible appetite), we
have:
cognition judgment | free will desire
1 I am indebted to Neil Lewis for suggesting to me this line of investigation. 143
What happens prior to the movement of affectus at this point in Grosseteste's career is the
judgment that one ought to desire or flee the thing that has been perceived. I think this, so to
speak, automatic judgment includes the degree to which one ought to desire or flee . That there is a proper degree of desire or aversion is presupposed in the notion that the affectus can fall short or go too far in its desire or aversion. Since there is a proper degree, which he obviously expects us to discern somehow, the judgment of this degree must occur in the aspectus. There is no other power in the DAL for rendering judgment. Furthermore, without such a judgment rhetoric would be without direction concerning how much it should calm or excite. For example , reason would tell me that I should desire God maximally and temporal things at a much lower level, however I may actually feel. Then the affectus responds by acting or not acting on what the aspectus has judged. The affectus can go wrong by desiring or fleeing something less than it should, or, on the other hand, it can go wrong by desiring or fleeing something more than it should. Later in the work it appears that the "less" can in some cases be equatable to not desiring or fleeing. It cannot go wrong by desiring the wrong thing, for that would be an error of the aspectus.
I suspect that our author is repeating the quasi-mechanical cognition judgment desire
(hereafter CJD) view from some source that used rational/irascible/concupiscible (with his own
terms overlaid), but in doing so he slips in his own assumption that there is freedom too. There
is some tension here, but it seems to me that the work is internally consistent if we understand it
as follows.
Rhetoric is for exciting or calming the affectus, and this role extends all the way to
eliciting desire (or aversion) in the first place. It is like Mercury’s staff, capable of inflicting
wakefulness or sleep. It is the zither of Orpheus, capable of making trees walk or wolves lie 144 down in peace. These examples are all about exciting affect or calming it, mirroring perfectly the two errors possible for the affectus : falling short or going too far. It seems to me that these
examples are consistent with the idea that there may not be any desire or aversion at first, when
only cognition and judgment have occurred. So, in the DAL, I perceive object X and judge that I
should desire and embrace object X to degree Y. Rhetoric cannot alter this judgment. If I want
better judgment, I have to study grammar and logic (particularly the latter).
So, I have perceived and judged. I know that I should desire object X to degree Y, but I
may actually feel that I desire object X to a greater or lesser degree than Y, depending on how
well-ordered I am. It is possible that I do not desire it at all. Wherever I may be in my initial
desire, rhetoric can take me where I know I should be. If I am a wolf, who desires X too much,
rhetoric can calm me down. I can consent to that attempt at persuasion, or I can persist in
desiring and embracing too much. If I am a tree, with no desire for object X at all, rhetoric can
wake me up and get me moving. I can consent to that attempt at persuasion, or I can persist in
failing to desire and embrace. What cannot happen on this model, as I understand it, is that I
judge I should desire object X to degree Y but find that I actually hate object X. That case would
involve two contrary judgments, rather than one judgment and one degree of desire or aversion
actually felt.
On this understanding, the apprehensive power, the aspectus, does not directly move the
appetitive power, the affectus. Robert assumes, without explaining himself, that there is some
kind of freedom in the affectus such that it has to consent to the direction of the aspectus. If this
were not the case, there would seem to be no need of persuading the affectus.
As far as the sequence of events is concerned, desire (or aversion) may or may not follow
at once upon the judgment of reason, depending upon the condition of 145 one's affectus. Presumably a well-ordered affectus would move as the aspectus instructs. In that
case, the affectus would consent and move at once, without any help from rhetoric. Rhetoric is needed only for the correction of error in the affectus. When rhetoric does its work, which is to
persuade the affectus to conform to reason, the affectus in need of persuasion is free to consent to
such movement or not. If there were no freedom, rhetoric would not persuade but coerce.
Coercion does not seem to be in view. This is why I hold that there is some notion of freedom in
the affectus already in the De Artibus Liberalibus.
146
Appendix 3B: The occurrence of aspectus and affectus in Dictum 100 according to five manuscripts
I have underlined the unique or potentially unique readings.
Manuscript Source Text
London, British Library, MS Lansdowne 458, Est autem sculpturis 1 facilis quia doctrina fol.92ra sapiencie dei per aspectum 2 in affectu penetrantis mens talium facile inscribitur London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, Est autem sculpturis facilis quia doctrina fol.48vb sapiencie dei per aspectum in affectum penetrantis mens talium facile inscribitur. London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, Est autem sculpturis facilis quia doctrine fol.193ra sapiencie dei per aspectum in[et ?] 3 affectum penetrantis mens talium facile inscribitur Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5, Est autem sculpturis facilis quia doctrina fol.64ra sapiencie dei per aspectum in affectum penetrantis mens talium facile inscribitur. Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, Est autem sculpturis facilis, quia doctrina fol.81vb 4 sapiencie Dei per aspectum in affectum penetrantis mens talium facile inscribitur
1 ms sculturis 2 ms asspectum 3 The glyph used here, a single minim crossed at a right angle by a transverse stroke, could possibly represent in or et. This scribe usually writes in without abbreviating and usually uses a different abbreviation for et. Therefore, I am not certain whether the scribe intended in or et here. Due to the witness of the other manuscripts, in seems more likely. Even if the scribe did intend et , however, that reading would be rejected for the same reasons that the other unique readings are to be rejected. 4 As elsewhere, I am using the Westermann-Goering transcription of Bodley 798 formerly available at www.grosseteste.com. 147
The readings in the Lansdowne manuscript and Royal 7.E.II could call into question my claim that this sentence portrays the priority of the aspectus in the same way as it appears in
Dictum 19, since in these witnesses the movement through the aspectus into the affectus is not as
clear. Nevertheless, it is easy to see how these unique readings could have been generated by
mistake, and the more reliable textual witnesses—Bodley 798, the Prague XII.E.5, and Royal
6.E.V—all agree against them. Therefore, I think the text I have quoted from Bodley 798 in this
chapter is reliable for supporting the priority of the aspectus.
148
Appendix 3C: Working edition of an important passage in Dictum 71.
Introduction
My intention in editing the passage below was to establish the text of the dictum
published by Grosseteste c.1238-1240, without assuming it would be precisely the same as the
sermon written around 1230 and published in the Super Psalterium, where the sermon comprises
the entire commentary on Psalm 8. Elizabeth Streitz has argued that the material common to the
Psalms commentary and the Dicta is best explained by the supposition that Grosseteste drew the
material to be published in the Dicta from his previously written material on the Psalms. 1 It is not unlikely that Grosseteste took the opportunity to make some changes to the earlier material in his publication of the Dicta, as Joseph Goering has suggested. 2 Comparison of this particular passage with its equivalent in Streitz’s edition of the first 36 chapters of the Super Psalterium , however, has led me to believe that Grosseteste did not make any changes to this portion of the sermon between its earlier and later publications. In all possibly significant places where my text differs from that of Streitz, at least two of the four manuscripts Streitz was using could be thought to support my reading (based upon the variants reported in her critical apparatus). This leads me to surmise that the text I have produced may be the most correct text for both editions of this passage in the sermon, although I have not directly consulted the manuscripts Streitz was using.
1 Elizabeth M. Streitz, “Robert Grosseteste: Commentarius in Psalmos, I -XXXVI” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1996), 7 2 Goering, “ Dicta, ” 75: “There can be little doubt that Grosseteste himself went over the exemplar or original manuscript copy of the collection and corrected it carefully.” 149
All variants are listed in the apparatus except for differences in orthography and punctuation. I have followed the orthography and punctuation found in Streitz’s edition.
Witnesses
P: Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5, fol. 56ra
R6 : London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol. 33ra
R7: London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol. 158rb
B : Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 51vb-52ra 3
S: Streitz (ed. 1996), p. 160-161
3 Unlike most references to Bodley 798 in this dissertation, which are normally to the Goering-Westermann transcription, for this edition I consulted a microfilm image of the manuscript itself. 150
Text et preter hoc amicta est hoc 1 sole, sicut quelibet fidelis anima, sed excellentius et ornacius, quia de sole iusticie plus ceteris splendet. Et in hac vita splenduit affectus rectitudine, a qua post conceptionem Jesu Christi, nec per veniale peccatum declinavit, 2 et plus ceteris splendet et splenduit 3 illustracione aspectus, qua limpidius 4 veritatem saluti necessariam 5 vidit et firmius credidit, utpote in qua sola salvata est fides in passione Jesu Christi deficientibus apostolis. Hoc 6 amictu solis interiori beacior 7 quam illo exteriori, 8 scilicet eiusdem carnis cum Christo participacione. Beatior enim fuit Christum credendo quam ipsum 9 concipiendo et pariendo. Is est enim 10 ille interior 11 amictus quo induimur 12 ut honeste, sicut in die ambulemus aspectus veritatis per fidem, sive intelligentiam; et amor rectitudinis, quorum utrumque splendet 13 in anima sancta, non aliunde quam de sole iusticie. De luce que illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.14 De veritate que Christus est velud splendet luna de solis illustracione.
1 R7: om. 2 P: declinat 3 splendet et splenduit] P: splendet splenduit et B: splenduit R7: splenduit et splendet 4 S: limpidus 5 S: necessarium 6 R6: hoc hoc 7 S: veracior 8 S: interiori 9 BR6: Christum 10 S: itaque 11 ille interior] S: interior ille 12 S: vidimus 13 R7S: resplendet 14 P: om. 151
Appendix 3D: Working edition of an important passage in Dictum 51
All variants are listed in the apparatus except for differences in orthography and
punctuation.
Witnesses
B : Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 38r
Br : Brown (ed. 1690), p. 260
P : Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5, fol. 52v
R6 : London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol. 25v
Text
In aspectu 1 itaque mentis nostre sit primum inscripta ars 2 vite regende, ut sciat unusquisque secundum fidem rectam ea saltem subditis exponere sine quibus non potest salus existere, 3 et quibus observatis salus non potest abesse; ut sciat saltem simpliciter articulos fidei et decem mandata decalogi, et que sunt vicia criminalia, et qualis sit saluti 4 sufficiens penitencia. Debet quoque ista aspectui facta inscripcio penetrare in affectum, ut quod 5 videt aspectus debere fieri, diligat 6 amor ad faciendum, et sic tandem per affectus medium prorumpat menti facta inscripcio in execucionem 7 exteriorum et 8 manifestorum operum.
1 Br : aspectum 2 P: superficies ( abbr . srs) 3 Br : consistere 4 Br : om. 5 R6: quoque 6 Br : dirigat 7 R6: excucionem 8 R6: om. 152
Appendix 3E: Aspectus, Affectus, and Related Concepts Chronologically Considered
De Artibus Liberalibus (c.1200-1209): Early • Aspectus =rational power Period 1 • Affectus = irascible and concupiscble power (c.1209 or • Priority of Aspectus earlier) • Inseparability of knowledge and love • Primacy of Affectus not yet clear Early Comm. Post. Anal.(1220-1230): Period 2 • Illumination of Aspectus by degrees (1220- • Affectus enables or prevents Aspectus from reaching higher truths (Primacy of 1225/1229) Affectus ) • Knowledge begins through sense experience Dictum 19 (1225-1230): • Clear 2-parts doctrine • Aspectus and Affectus connected explicitly with knowledge and love • Further inseparability of knowledge and love • Must know to love (priority of Aspectus ) • The wheel of Aspectus Affectus opera (primacy of Affectus )
Tota Pulchra es (c. 1230): • The 2-parts doctrine • Mary as perfecting Aspectus (in illumination) and Affectus (in ordered love) after transmigratio
Comm. Physics 8 and De Fin. Mot. et Temp. (c. 1228-1232): Magisterial • The limiting power of the Affectus absolute (Aristotle and eternity) Period • Love of temporal things with the Affectus is what limits the Aspectus (1225/1229- 1235) Hexaëmeron (c. 1230-1235): • Repeats the Aristotle passage with the remedy explained—turn Affectus from temporal things to God • The Trinity is loved to the degree that it is grasped by the understanding or by faith (priority of Aspectus ) • The highest face of the soul is a simple power in which God is loved, understood, and remembered without phantasms and which orders the lower powers of the soul
Dictum 91 (1229-1232 or 1235-1240): • The equation of love and illumination in the vision of God (partial in this life) • Love of God makes soul plene sapientem (primacy of Affectus ) • God enjoyed by visione et amplexu (inseparability of knowledge and love)
Episcopal Dictum 51 (1238 or later): Period • the wheel of Aspectus Affectus opera (1235-1253) Letter 115 (October, 1245): • the wheel of Aspectus Affectus opera
153 Chapter 4: Questions of Consistency and Continuity
As much as he liked it, the aspectus/affectus distinction was not Grosseteste’s only way
of describing the powers of the rational soul. I have shown in chapter three that Grosseteste
could also divide the rational soul into rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers, while
superimposing his aspectus/affectus division to group these powers into the cognitive and the
appetitive. 1 In this chapter, I will show how the aspectus/affectus distinction, even when not explicitly mentioned, nevertheless shapes Grosseteste’s view of the soul. 2 He divides the soul’s
powers in various ways, but he nevertheless maintains a consistent cognitive/appetitive
distinction and remains true to the three themes explained in the previous chapter—the priority
of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the inseparability of knowledge and love.
Chapter five will build upon the present chapter to give an account of why I believe
Grosseteste seems happy to divide the powers of the soul in many different ways. He seems to assume that the soul is the immediate principle of all its actions and that the different powers of the soul are each identical with the substance of the soul. This view of the simplicity of the soul had produced similar results in the De Spiritu et Anima. I will also reserve for chapter five the question of why aspectus and affectus always act toegther for Grosseteste. The simplicity of the soul is likely the primary reason for this, but the fact that the ultimate object of both knowledge and love is the same, namely God, may also be a factor.
1 See the discussion of the De Artibus Liberalibus in chapter 3. 2 I have prepared two tables to help clarify how I believe Grosseteste’s various schemata of the powers of the rational soul are all consistent with the aspectus/affectus division. They are included in Appendix 4A. 154 155
I have chosen to focus upon two works in this chapter. First I will treat Grosseteste’s
Hexaemëron (c. 1230-1235), 3 and then I will examine his sermon Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat
(c.1242-1244) . As mentioned in the introduction, the diversity and complexity of Grosseteste’s
reflections on the human soul require some artificial limitation of the materials one presents. 4
Nevertheless, for reasons I will explain in connection with each work, I believe these two works
are especially well-suited to the current investigation and are representative of Grosseteste’s
works in general concerning his doctrine of the soul.
Schemata of the Soul in the Hexaëmeron
Importance. Given this need to limit the scope of presentation, the Hexaëmeron recommends itself as an essential work to consider for four reasons. First, it is Grosseteste’s most theologically significant and comprehensive work. 5 Second, we know that he corrected
much of it in his own hand. We have the manuscript with these corrections, and the critical
edition takes them into account. 6 This makes the text unusually reliable for a medieval work. 7
3 Southern, “Richard Dales,” 12, thinks Grosseteste wrote the work around 1230. Dales and Gieben argue for a date of composition sometime from 1232 to 1235 (Richard Dales and Servus Gieben, “Introduction,” in Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron, ed. Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben [London: Oxford University Press, 1982], xiv). 4 For the sake of efficiency, I have tried to distribute relevant passages throughout this dissertation according to which topic they best represented. For example, I am confining most discussion of aspectus and affectus in Grosseteste’s Pauline commentaries to chapter 6 because several of them bear on Grosseteste’s soteriology. The benefit to this approach is that it allows readers to find most of the discussion of a given text in one place. The drawback is that most passages bear on a number of topics, so I never marshal all of the textual evidence for a given point. Nevertheless, I believe I offer sufficient evidence for each point I make. 5 James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste , 106-107; Dales and Gieben, “Introduction,” xii, seem to hold this view as well: “As our edition will make clear, he drew extensively on his other writings in composing his Hexaëmeron, which thereby presents us with the closest thing we have to a synthesis of his thought, unified by the great theme of the creation of the world and of man.” The British Academy published an English translation: Robert Grosseteste, On the Six Days of Creation, a translation of the Hexaëmeron by C. F. J. Martin, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VI(2) (Oxford, New York: The British Academy, 1996). 6 Dales and Gieben, “Introduction,” xv. Here they say that Grosseteste’s corrections go through fol.225r. This would mean that the text is corrected up to some point in chapter 5 of part 8.
156
Third, it contains various schemata of the powers of the soul from beginning to end, including the aspectus/affectus division. This feature of the text eliminates from the outset any temptation to explain the alternative schemata in terms of development in Grosseteste’s thought. Fourth, the eighth part of the work contains Grosseteste’s presentation of the image of the Trinity in man.
This is an especially important instance of Grosseteste using an alternative schema for the powers of the soul, both because the Augustinian schema occurs frequently in Grosseteste’s works and because this particular passage demonstrates how the aspectus/affectus distinction, even though not mentioned, nevertheless shapes Grosseteste’s understanding of the highest power of the soul and, consequently, of the Trinity as reflected in the soul.
Aspectus and affectus in the Hexaëmeron. Since Grosseteste wrote the Hexaëmeron either concurrently with or shortly after composing his Dicta , it is not surprising that he invokes
aspectus and affectus to divide the powers of the soul multiple times throughout the work. 8 It
does appear to be his default schema, and the doctrines outlined in chapter three above are found
in this work as well. Yet, at least three other schemata also appear in the Hexaëmeron . I will
highlight some passages in which Grosseteste uses aspectus and affectus or otherwise refers very obviously to related doctrines before I turn to the alternative schemata.
Possibly the most famous aspectus/affectus passage in the Hexaëmeron is the one in
which he attributes Aristotle’s failure in his aspectus to grasp the concept of simple eternity to a
disorder in his affectus. The philosopher and others like him just could not get past images that
7 Cf. Ibid., where they say of Bodleian Library’s lat. th. c. 17 “This was probably the bishop’s personal copy. We have considered this MS to be virtually definitive, particularly through fol. 225r, but also for the remainder of the work, since it is clearly copied from the autograph.” 8 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 1.5.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 55); 1.8.5 (61); 1.19.1 (79); 1.21.3 (81); 2.9.2 (96); 3.14.8 (114-115); 11.7.1 (314); The aspectus also appears alone in 6.7.7 (195), though clearly as part of the two parts doctrine.
157 they associated with time and space, and this love of temporal things set the limit for what such philosophers could conceive. Grosseteste’s solution to this problem expresses the primacy of the affectus : “And so the purgation of this error cannot happen except in this way: the affectus of the
mind must be purged from the love of temporal things so that the aspectus of the mind, free from
phantasms, can transcend time and understand simple eternity.” 9
In another passage, while suggesting various spiritual meanings of vacuus , inanis, and
tenebra in Genesis 1:2, 10 our author suggests that the terms could apply to the rational mind
through the triad aspectus/affectus/actus . When unformed, the aspectus is dark, the affectus is
empty, and good works are lacking (inane a bono actu ).11 This seems to reflect the cycle that he
presented in Dictum 19 of the Bible’s inscription in the aspectus, sinking down into the affectus,
and bursting forth in good works, which then improve the inscription on the aspectus. A little
later, interpreting the Septuagint translation of the same verse, 12 he connects this cycle with the
Augustinian doctrine of ordered love. He says that the earth of our hearts is invisible ( invisibilis )
without the light of good works, unordered ( incomposita ) when love is not in order in the
9 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 1.8.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 61 ; trans. mine): “ Unde et huius erroris purgacio non potest esse nisi per hoc quod mentis affectus purgetur ab amore temporalium, ut mentis aspectus immunis a fantasmatibus possit transcendere tempus et intelligere simplicem eternitatem … ” I will develop this strain of Grosseteste’s thought further in chapter 8. 10 As he quotes it (Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 1.18.1 [ed. Dales and Gieben, 77]): “Terra erat inanis et vacua, et tenebre erant super faciem abissi, et spiritus Domini ferebatur super aquas.” 11 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 1.19.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 79). Bernard of Clairvaux also used this triad. For discussion of Bernard’s use of aspectus and affectus see chapter 2. There one will find the primary text references as well. 12 As he translates the Greek into Latin (Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 1.21.1 [ed. Dales and Gieben, 80]): “Terra vero erat invisibilis et incomposita, et tenebra super abissum, et Spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquas.”
158 affectus, and darkness without the light of wisdom ( sapientia ) in the aspectus. “For the earth of the interior man is visible to us through the exterior light of good works.” 13
Grosseteste begins chapter 9 of part 2 with some spiritual interpretations of the word
“light ( lux )” in the division of light from darkness on the first day of creation. He says there is
light when any holy person contemplates the Trinity through intelligencia, angels through intellectus, or the temporal things of salvation through faith. 14 This hierarchy of intelligibles is clearly in the tradition of the De Spiritu et Anima. Although he has traded fides for ratio and has
changed the things to be known accordingly, he still places the intelligibles grasped by faith at a
lower level of being than that which one can know by intelligentia or intellectus, just as one would expect from someone who is imitating the movement from intelligentia to intellectus to ratio. 15
But there is another spiritual meaning of light to be understood “in the knowledge of truth in the aspectus of the mind” as well as “in the love of truth known in the affectus of the mind.”
Then, as if filling in the missing part about good works by reflex, he adds, “Similarly, wise and
13 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 1.21.3 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 81; partial trans. mine): “ Moraliter vero terra cordis nostri invisibilis est, cum se non manifestat per lucem bone operacionis ; cum videlicet non lucet lux nostra coram hominibus. Incomposita vero est,cum non est ordinata in affectu ; tenebrosa vero, cum caret luce sapiencie in mentis aspectu .” That the order of amor specifically is in view here becomes clear in the very next interpretation, where he states (Ibid.): “ Vel e contrario ordine mens dicitur invisibilis Deo: que caret luce sapiencie; affectus incompositus: qui caret amoris ordine; totum corpus tenebrosum: quod caret bone operacionis lumine .” 14 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 2.9.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 96): “ Spiritualiter autem tam in ecclesia quam in qualibet anima sancta fit lux, cum ipsa racionalis cognicio assurgit in contemplacionem trinitatis per intelligenciam a fantasmatibus denudatam; vel in speculacionem intellectualium creaturarum et incorporearum per intellectum; aut in cognicionem eorum que temporaliter in salutem humani generis disposita sunt et administrata per fidem .” This is one of several places in which Grosseteste treats the contemplation of God without phantasms as something Christians can attain in this life, quite in the face of Aristotle’s insistence that there is no knowledge without phantasms. See Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics 1.14 (Rossi, 212-216). 15 See chapter 2 for a discussion of the psychological tradition represented in the De Spiritu et Anima and its influence on Grosseteste.
159 spiritual prelates of the church are allegorically light, who shine with the knowledge and love of truth and with the outer splendor of good works.” 16
In this passage, then, Grosseteste begins with a variation on the Pseudo-Augustinian intelligentia-intellectus-ratio hierarchy of powers and in the very next paragraph switches to aspectus and affectus. The close juxtaposition of these two different schemata of powers shows almost beyond doubt that Grosseteste did not see them as mutually exclusive. 17
In Hexaëmeron 3.14.8, Grosseteste interprets the firmament in the creation account as
Sacred Scripture, which makes firm the mind through being written in it by means of aspectus and affectus. It also leads the mind into “heavenly conduct ( celestem…conversacionem ),” or good works. This seems to be a concise presentation of the doctrine of Dictum 19. Also similar to Dictum 19, human knowledge is said to be inferior to Sacred Scripture. Here the reason given
is the former’s mutability—humans are prone to forget what they have learned.18 Unlike Dictum
19, the focus here is on the inferiority of the human faculties for knowing, rather than the inferiority of the books created through human knowledge.
When giving a spiritual interpretation of the trees of paradise, Grosseteste links aspectus and affectus metaphorically with the senses of sight and taste. The trees of paradise are the
16 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 2.9.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 96-97; partial trans. mine): “Quemadmodum autem intelligitur lux in cognicione veritatis in mentis aspectu, intelligitur eciam lux in amore veritatis cognite in mentis affectu; tenebra quoque in amoris viciosa inordinacione. Item allegorice lux ecclesie sunt prelati, sapientes et spiritales, qui lucent veritatis cognicione et amore et bonorum operum exteriori splendore.” 17 In fact, one could almost describe the schema he presents in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat as the logical result (with some embellishment) of integrating the two schemata that Grosseteste simply juxtaposes here. See below for the schema found in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat . 18 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 3.14.8 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 114-115): “Item per firmamentum intelligitur sacra Scriptura…Cum enim sacra Scriptura describitur in mentis nostre aspectu et affectu, firmat eam et in celestem deducit conversacionem…Inferiores vero aque sunt humana sciencia, inferior ista sacra Scriptura, fluida et mutabilis, que nunc proficit per doctrinam, nunc defluit per oblivionem.”
160 doctrines of the virtues. These doctrines are “beautiful to the aspectus of the intelligentia and sweet-tasting to the affectus of the mind. They are beautiful in cognition, sweet in willing
imitation.” 19
Worth noticing here is the fluidity with which Grosseteste can use even technical terms.
The parallelism in the Latin sentence, which follows an ABCCBA pattern, seems to suggest that
Grosseteste is using intelligentia more or less synonymously with mens. The other way to
interpret the sentence would be to suppose that intelligentia does bear its technical meaning, or at any rate refers to a cognitive power. In that case, it would be aspectus that he is not using
according to its usual technical meaning in combination with affectus mentis. Rather than
referring to the cognitive power itself, mental vision, aspectus would be referring to the act of the
intelligentia, seeing with the mind. Intelligentia would be the power in this case instead of aspectus . On either interpretation, Grosseteste shows here that his terms for the powers and actions of the soul can bear somewhat different meanings in different contexts.
The general import of this passage is clear enough, however: knowledge or cognition is the action connected with aspectus and acts of willing belong to the affectus. At the same time, the connection of affectus with taste and sweetness reflects the genuinely affective or emotional facet of affectus. For Grosseteste, will and emotion are not always sharply distinct. The affectus can include both simultaneously, as it does here.
In some passages, Grosseteste articulates the principles connected to aspectus and affectus without mentioning the powers or even without mentioning the acts of knowledge and
19 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 11.7.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 314; trans. mine): “[A] Pulchra sunt eciam [B] aspectui [C] intelligentie et [C’] mentis [B’] affectui, [A’] suavia ad gustandum ; pulchra sunt cognicioni, suavia vero voluntarie imitanti.” I have added the letters to show the inverse parallelism in the first part of the sentence.
161 love. For example, in 9.7.2 he refers to grace “ordering and illuminating the natural powers
(ordinans et illustrans virtutes naturales ).” 20 This surely refers to the need of the aspectus to
receive illumination and of the affectus to be rightly ordered in its love. The passage that most clearly spells out the spiritual implication of the priority of the aspectus, Hexaëmeron 8.4.1,
actually mentions neither aspectus nor affectus. Here he says that comprehension of the Trinity
is absolutely necessary. The reason he gives for this is that love of God is necessary for
salvation and “He is only loved to the degree that he is comprehended by faith or by
understanding.” 21 This seems to imply that knowledge of God must in some way come before
love as a precondition, not only in the initial infusion of faith and love but also in the progress of the soul towards final salvation. 22
Other psychological models in the Hexaëmeron. I have sketched the doctrine of aspectus
and affectus as it is more or less plainly stated in the Hexaëmeron. Now I must address the
problem of the other schemata of the soul that appear interspersed in the same work.
The rational/irascible/concupiscible division appears at least twice. On one occasion it
refers to the rational mind, 23 and on another it appears to refer to a lower part of the soul. 24 In
these passages, Grosseteste does not explain how this schema relates to aspectus and affectus .
One can only assume that he would still treat it as another way of expressing the same view of
20 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 9.7.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 275). 21 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.4.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 222; partial trans. mine): “Maxime enim necessaria est nobis Trinitatis comprehensio. Huius enim amor salus est anime, et sine huius amore nulla salus est anima. Tantum autem amatur, quantum fide aut intelligentia comprehenditur.” 22 I will explore the relevance of Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine to his doctrine of salvation in chapter 6 and to his understanding of spiritual growth in chapter 7. 23 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 4.29.4 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 152). 24 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 9.9.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 277).
162 the soul as he expresses with the aspectus/affectus division, as he did in De Artibus Liberalibus.
Otherwise, it is hard to imagine how he could bounce back and forth between the schemata
without explanation.
When giving an allegory for the sun, moon, and stars mentioned in the creation narrative,
Grosseteste offers another schema. The sun is the racio superior. The moon is the racio inferior. Both of these must belong to the rational soul, for he mentions the sensitive soul as
distinct from both: the virtutes sensitive are the stars. 25 Given that, in the biblical text, the sun is
clearly presented as superior light to the moon and both of these as superior lights to the stars,
the aspectus/affectus distinction would have been no good here. He consistently places aspectus and affectus on the same level within the soul. He does not subordinate one to the other in the order of being. To find a psychological allegory for this biblical text, therefore, Grosseteste had to use some other schema of the rational soul. In this way, his use of a different division for the powers of the soul can be taken to suggest the consistency of his understanding. Minimally, there is no requirement to assume a change or inconsistency in his view.
In part 8 of the Hexaëmeron, Grosseteste exposits Genesis 1:26 in relation both to the image of God in man and to the doctrine of the Trinity. 26 Here, following Augustine’s doctrine of the image of the Trinity in man from his De Trinitate, Grosseteste borrows the schema that divides the highest power of the soul into memory, understanding, and will or love .27 He relates
the Father to memory ( memoria ), the Son to understanding (intelligentia ), and the Holy Spirit to
love ( amor ). More than simply observing the image of the Trinity in the rational mind,
25 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 5.20.3 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 179). 26 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.1.1-8.11.6 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 217-234). 27 See Augustine, De Trinitate XIV.VIII.11 (CCSL 50A:435-436) and XIV.XII.15 (CCSL 50A:442-443).
163
Grosseteste argues that the concept of memoria requires that it generate understanding and that love proceed from both. Memory generates understanding because “the act of memory itself is the generation of an understanding ( intelligencie ) similar to itself.” 28 Furthermore, “the memory generating and the understanding generated cannot fail to reflect mutual love between themselves.” 29
This second step, which is far from intuitive on the surface, reveals the fundamental importance of the aspectus/affectus distinction for Grosseteste, and of the inseparability of
knowledge and love that goes with it. Concerning this step in the argument, Ginther observes,
“Grosseteste’s own theological outlook allowed him to advance this proof to include a third
person.” He explains, “The answer lies in the fact that the term intelligentia is tied to wisdom,
and as noted wisdom demands full mental activity, and that must include the faculty connected to
love, namely the will ( affectus mentis ).” 30 In other words, wisdom requires the activity of both
aspectus and affectus. Since Grosseteste applies this requirement here, he is clearly thinking of
love/will as belonging to the affectus. Memory and understanding (intelligentia ) then belong to the aspectus. 31 There cannot be wisdom with the aspectus alone, so a third person who stands
for the affectus is also necessary. Thus, even though he does not mention it here, Grosseteste’s
28 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.3.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 220 ; trans. mine): “Ipse enim actus memoracionis est ipsius intelligentie sibi similis generacio.” 29 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.3.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 220 ; trans. mine):”Gignens autem memoria et generata intelligentia non possunt non reflectere in se mutuum amorem.” 30 Ginther, Sacred Page, 103. 31 That Grosseteste is conceiving of intelligentia/sapientia here as simultaneously cognitive and including the cognitive and appetitive is clear when he says that God is remembered, understood, and loved in the highest face of the reason (see note 83). This requires intelligentia to be classifiable within the highest power as cognitive or appetitive, even while it is identical with the highest power of the soul.
164 aspectus/affectus distinction not only interprets the memory/understanding/will schema for the
Oxford theologian but also contributes to his doctrine of the Trinity.
While Grosseteste moves freely between different schemata of the soul and uses
psychological terms with some fluidity in the Hexaëmeron , I have shown that this in no way means his actual doctrine is inconsistent or unsettled. When he freely uses other terms and schemata in later works, then, one should not assume that he has changed his mind. He is quite dedicated to the aspectus/affectus distinction and its main implications. It is prima facie more likely that he has some other reason for expressing his thoughts in a different way.
It may seem a bit odd, however, that in the last passage discussed Grosseteste can treat the intelligentia simultaneously as a cognitive power (aspectus ) and, in its connection with sapientia, the locus of both cognition and love. Grosseteste evidently does not think this problematic, for it is similar to what he does elsewhere in the same work, 32 and to what he will
do later with intelligentia/sapientia in his Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat. Still, this sort of move
raises the question of how these powers relate to one another. Are they really distinct “parts” of
the soul, or are they ultimately one thing considered under different aspects? The more obvious
issue of the various schemata in the same work raises the same question. Before I turn to this
32 In Hexaëmeron 2.9.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 96), he says the Trinity is contemplated without phantasms in the intelligencia, which is higher than the intellectus or fides. He says these latter powers deal with lower levels of truths, while the intelligencia is for the highest. He evidently does not see this as inconsistent with saying the memoria, intelligencia, and voluntas are all included in the suprema facie racionis, by which alone the Trinity may be contemplated without phantasms, which he says in part 8.5.1. Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 224-225): ”In genere autem huius exempli ultimi, memorie videlicet gignentis et sue genite similitudinis et amoris copulantis, vicinissimum exemplum Dei trinitatis est memoria, intelligentia et amor in suprema facie racionis, qua sola vi suprema Deus Trinitas sine nubulo fantasmatum, et non per corporeum instrumentum memoratur, intelligitur et diligitur … Et ita secundum hanc supremam virtutem unam et simplicem dicto modo memorantem, intelligentem et diligentem, est homo summa similitudo et per hoc imago unius Dei Trinitatis.”
165 question in the next chapter, however, I will offer my own exposition of the Ecclesia Sancta
Celebrat and address the question of development that it raises.
The Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat and the question of development
According to James McEvoy, Grosseteste’s sermon Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat represents
the bishop’s final, definitive, and complete view of the human person, and of the human soul in
particular. 33 I agree with this assessment, at least in general. Yet in this work Grosseteste does not use the aspectus/affectus distinction. He does refer to the affectus in more or less the technical way, but he does not pair it with aspectus. 34 Since this is somewhat surprising and
raises the question of development in Grosseteste’s thought, the sermon Ecclesia Sancta
Celebrat invites a close investigation.
I have argued in chapter two that Grosseteste based some fundamental themes of his
psychology, including both the aspectus/affectus distinction and the basic psychology of the
Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, on the tradition represented by the De Spiritu et Anima and its major source for these matters, Isaac of Stella . For this reason, it is prima facie unlikely that
Grosseteste would articulate a view in the late sermon that diverges from the aspectus/affectus distinction. Nevertheless, expectations cannot excuse one from close attention to the text, especially given the conspicuous absence of the aspectus/affectus pair. Through my own exposition of the text I will argue that Grosseteste does still hold to the basic cognitive/appetitive distinction he always intended by using the terms aspectus and affectus.35 The bishop has
33 James McEvoy, “Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Human Nature with the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat ,” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 47 (1980): 141. 34 See discussion below. 35 For McEvoy’s exposition see “Theory of Human Nature,” 144-168 or Philosophy, 300-312, which repeats verbatim (or nearly so) the exposition of the powers of the soul found in “Theory of Human Nature,” 144-158.
166 refined his thought into a system that is perhaps more complex than his earlier written works attest,36 but his basic division of powers and his intuitions about the inseparability of knowledge and love, the priority of the aspectus, and the primacy of the affectus, remain very much the same. In fact, the basic cognitive/appetitive division is present at every point in the system.
To demonstrate this, after some introductory comments, I will divide my exposition of the sermon into four parts corresponding to the four major components of Grosseteste’s mature psychological system: 1) the six powers of the rational soul specified by the objects of knowledge, 2) the three diffused powers of the rational soul, 3) The powers of the sensitive soul, and 4) the action of grace on the powers of the soul.37 Then I will conclude my treatment of
Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat with a consideration of why the aspectus/affectus distinction does not appear explicitly in this work .
Date, audience, and importance. Before I delve into the argument of the text, it I should explain why this sermon is important. Grosseteste finished commenting on the Pseudo-
Dionysian corpus in about 1243, and the last work on which he commented was the Mystical
Theology. 38 From similarities of both language and thought between the Commentary on the
Mystical Theology and the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, McEvoy has shown that Grosseteste
probably wrote the sermon in close proximity to the commentary, somewhere in the period of
1242-1244. 39 This places the sermon in the most mature period of Grosseteste’s thought, along with the treatise Deus Est (De Confessione II) and the sermon Ex Rerum Initiatarum, both of
36 This conclusion may be subject to change with the ongoing work of dating and editing Grosseteste’s works. 37 During the exposition, it may be helpful to refer to the charts in Appendix 4B, which present the schema of the soul found in this sermon. 38 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 138. 39 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 138-140.
167 which contain similar doctrines of the soul and belong to the period after 1240. 40 None of these
works use the terms aspectus and affectus as a pair.
In addition to its date and subject matter, this sermon is of special significance because of
its audience. It was no ordinary sermon but a sort of conference delivered to clerics who had
assembled for the occasion. 41 In addition, there seems to be one particular prelate in view, whom he addresses, as he often addresses prelates in his letters, as “your charity.” 42 We know from his extant sermons that Grosseteste preached for such conferences a fair number of times. 43 These conference sermons tend to be fairly polished and doctrinally very dense, so they are more important for the study of Grosseteste’s theology than regular sermons. Moreover, Grosseteste’s other episcopal works tend to be commentaries, translations, or sermons and treatises that are more purely pastoral in nature. For this reason, his conference sermons may be the best source for studying his theology from 1235-1253. This particular conference occurred on an Easter
Sunday, and so it may be even more important than other pieces in the same genre. 44
The six powers of the rational soul. Grosseteste’s mature anthropology seems to be generated by three principles that the bishop accepts from his favored authorities. From Aristotle
40 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 137. 41 McEvoy “Theory of Human Nature,” 133, speculates that perhaps the clerics assembled for a later mass on the Sunday of a conference so that they could discharge their own pastoral duties first, and that perhaps he preached in the vernacular to them along with the laity present and then later worked his notes into a finished work in Latin. 42 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §1 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 169): “De resurrectione itaque Domini nostri Iesu Christi et mortuorum convenienter in hac solemnitate dicemus aliqua vestrae caritati.” 43 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 132. 44 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §1 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 169): “Ecclesia sancta celebrat hodie solemnitatem resurrectionis dominicae...”
168 he accepts his principle for the specification of powers. 45 A power is specified by its proper act, and an act is specified by its object. Consequently, for each object of activity, there will be a power whose proper act is to obtain that object. From the De Spiritu et Anima (he believes the writer to be Augustine) he accepts the principle that the soul, as a microcosm containing the similitude of all things, must necessarily be capable of knowing all kinds of things, including the divine nature. 46 Consequently, there must be a power in the soul for knowing each level of reality, including God. 47 Finally, he tacitly accepts his own principle derived from the
Augustinian/Cistercian tradition that the most basic powers of the soul are the cognitive and the
appetitive and that the operations of these powers are inseparable. This leads him to posit within
each power of the rational soul a power of apprehension and knowledge on the cognitive side
and powers of desire and motion towards holding the object in knowledge on the appetitive side.
In the first nine paragraphs of Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat these three principles, applied to
an Augustinian/Neo-platonic view of the hierarchy of being, result in Grosseteste’s view that the
rational soul has six main powers, each containing three component powers. The six powers
correspond to six levels of being ranging from the highest and absolutely immutable nature—
God—to the most changeable—acts of human will. Each level of being provides an object of
knowledge, and each object of knowledge requires a power which has as its proper action the act
of knowing natures at that level of being.
45 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 145. 46 See McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 146 and De Spiritu et Anima (PL 40:781, 784). 47 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §3 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 170-171): “Sunt autem omnia homini apprehensibilia, alioquin non esset humana anima quodammodo omnia ; unde et integra hominis vita est potentia et virtus apprehensiva omnium, et secundum differentias naturales entium apprehensibilium, ut testatur Philosophus, differunt naturaliter potentiae partiales naturales apprehensivae vitam hominis integram constituentes .” He applies these principles to God in §4, on which see below.
169
Grosseteste begins the sermon by explaining that his topic is the spiritual resurrection.48
Distinct from the eschatological resurrection, which will involve the restoration of natural life,
the spiritual resurrection is the restoration of spiritual life. It is the life of grace, and it
presupposes natural life. It is the direction, adornment, and perfection of natural life. 49
Therefore, in order to understand the spiritual resurrection and life that he intends to treat, one must first understand natural human life. 50
Natural human life is that which vivifies the human body. The pastor of pastors says he
is going to leave aside vegetative life and talk about vita (life) as apprehensive, appetitive, and
motive powers (motive, specifically, for obtaining or avoiding).51 The clear implication, by
excluding only the vegetative, is that these powers will belong both to the rational soul and to the
sensitive soul. He also says that all things must be apprehensible to human nature, or else man
would not be quodammodo omnia (in a certain way all things). 52 “Hence also,” he explains, “the whole life of man is the potency and power capable of apprehending all things.” 53 This all-
48 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §1 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 169). 49 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §2 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 170): “nec habet vita hominis spiritualis esse nisi in vita naturali, cuius ipsa est directio, adornatio et perfectio.” 50 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §2 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 170): “ad plenam vitae spiritualis intelligentiam oportet praecognoscere quid est vita naturalis.” 51 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §3 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 170). 52 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §3 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 170-171): “Sunt autem omnia homini apprehensibilia, alioquin non esset humana anima quodammodo omnia.” cf. De Spiritu et Anima 6 (PL 40:783). 53 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §3 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 171): “unde et integra hominis vita est potentia et virtus apprehensiva omnium.”
170 embracing power is constituted by apprehensive powers that are distinguished according to the natural kinds of things. 54
As the bishop of Lincoln walks his clergy through the natural kinds of things, one cannot
help but notice that they follow an Augustinian/Neo-Platonic hierarchy of being. Also, at each
level of being, the apprehensive power for knowing that kind of thing also contains an appetitive
power for desiring the knowledge of it and a motive power for moving toward obtaining that
knowledge and avoiding ignorance of the object. The first power he discusses is the power for
knowing the divine nature. This power he calls naturalis sapientia (natural wisdom) , although it
is clearly equivalent to what he elsewhere calls intelligentia. 55 The second power is for knowing
the principia immediata, or common conceptions of the soul, which it knows directly and per se.
This power is the intellectus. 56 The third power is for knowing the kind of principia that are apprehensible per media. This power, ratio, completes the Pseudo-Augustinian triad of intelligentia/intellectus/ratio. 57 (He saves the remaining powers of the De Spiritu et Anima,
imaginatio and sensus, for his discussion of the sensitive soul.) The fourth power, scientia, is
54 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §3 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 171): “ et secundum differentias naturales entium apprehensibilium, ut testatur Philosophus, differunt naturaliter potentiae partiales naturales apprehensivae vitam hominis constituentes.” His reference to “the Philosopher” here is to Aristotle, De Anima II, 1 (415a, 14-22). 55 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §4-§5 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 171); for a treatment of Grosseteste’s use of the term intelligentia throughout his career, see McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 153-155. 56 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §5 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 171); for a treatment of Grosseteste’s use of the term intellectus throughout his career, see McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 147- 153. 57 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §6 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 172); Cf. De Spiritu et Anima 4-5 (PL 40:782-783) McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 145-147, explains that this trio of powers originated in Proclus and that the De Spiritu et Anima gets it from Isaac of Stella. He does not attempt to trace the steps in between Proclus and Isaac of Stella. Like Proclus but unlike the De Spiritu et Anima, Grosseteste limits the role of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge to the rational and intellectual powers, reserving the intelligence for higher knowledge. Since Grosseteste did not know Proclus, McEvoy sees this as an original synthesis on the bishop’s part (“Theory of Human Nature,” 147).
171 that by which people know corporeal things that always behave in the same way, in other words, physical laws. The fifth power, ars, is for knowing what is probable (that is, what occurrs ut frequentius ). By means of the sixth power, naturalis prudentia, humans both know the moral quality of free voluntary acts and either perform those apprehended as good or refrain from performing them. 58 Unlike the higher natural rational powers, which are only speculative, this
second capability of natural prudence makes it active as well as speculative. All of these powers,
according to the bishop, constitute the rational soul. 59
In this section it first becomes clear that Grosseteste is still using his aspectus/affectus
division of powers at the level of concepts, even though he is not using the terms. For every one
of the above powers, he takes pains to state that the power includes not only a capability of
apprehending the object to be known, but also a capability of desiring to know the object and to
avoid ignorance of the object as well as a capability of moving toward holding the object in the
act of knowledge. His more or less standard formula for describing these three powers or
capabilities within each rational power makes it clear that he still operates with a basic two-part
division. He refers to the apprehensive or cognitive power as “ apprehensiva et cognocsitiva”
and then refers to the other two together as “ appetitiva et motiva ad habendum in actu
cognoscendi…et ad carendum ignorantia et errore.” 60 His consistent habit of referring to the
58 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §7-§9 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 173). 59 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §9 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 174). 60 Here are two examples: Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §6 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 172): “ Potentia itaque animae naturalis apprehensiva et cognoscitiva per media, appetitiva et motiva ad habendum in actu cognoscendi cognoscibilia per media, et ad carendum ignorantia et errore circa ea, dicitur ratio… .” ; Ibid. §7 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 173): “ Quarta vero pars vitae est potentia apprehensiva et cognoscitiva corporalium et in corporibus existentium, semper uno modo se habentium, appetitiva et motiva ad habendum ea in actu cognoscendi, et ad carendum ignorantia et errore circa ipsa, quae dicitur scientia .”
172 appetitive and motive powers as a unit juxtaposed to the apprehensive and cognitive power shows that his division at each level of being really has two parts, not three. The appetitive and motive powers belong to the same side of the basic cognitive/appetitive division.
The three diffused powers. To conclude his overview of the powers of the natural rational soul, Grosseteste adds three more, which he says are “diffused” throughout the other six: logic, faith, and free will. 61 As blood is distributed throughout the members of the body, and therefore is not enumerated among them, so these powers are active at every level of the soul, that is, within each of the six rational powers. 62 The ars logicae, in this context, is the power of knowing logic. 63 Its diffusion through the six powers of the rational soul clearly falls on the
cognitive side of each power. By fides here, Grosseteste does not mean only supernatural faith
but all knowledge that must be gained by trusting an authority. He gives the example of
believing in the existence of Rome or Jerusalem, even though one has never seen either of
them.64 It is clearly the complement to logic. People know some things through a clear understanding of necessary reasons; they know others at least in part through trust in an
61 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §10 -§12 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 174-175). 62 Ibid.; Grosseteste may be alluding, directly or indirectly, to Avicenna’s description of how the blood carries nutrients throughout the body so that the nutritive power proper to each part of the body can absorb them; Avicenna, De Anima II, 1 (ed. Van Riet 1:104): “ Deinde virtus nutritiva deducit illud in animal sanguineum, primo permutandum in sanguinem et humores ex quibus est constitutio corporis, sicut iam ostendimus alias. Sed omne membrum habet virtutem nutritivam propriam, quae est in eo, quae permutat nutrimentum in similitudinem eius propriam et unit ei .” 63 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §10 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 174). 64 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §11 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 175); McEvoy. in loc., observes that this is a westernization of Avicenna’s famous Mecca example and suggests that Grosseteste’s discussion is inspired by Avicenna’s treatment of propositiones experimentis acquisitae. For the latter, see Avicenna, De Anima V, 3 (ed. Van Riet 2:103-104).
173 authority. Therefore, faith also applies to the cognitive aspect of each of the six powers. 65 The third diffused power of the rational soul is free will ( libera voluntas ) or free choice ( liberum arbitrium ). It belongs to the free will at each level to command the power to execute its proper
action (such as knowing God or doing a good work) or to refrain from it. 66 Free will thus falls on the appetitive/motive side of each of the six powers.
Inasmuch as the three diffused powers quite naturally divide into logic and faith on the cognitive side (aspectus ) and free will on the appetitive side ( affectus ), they certainly are consistent with the supposition that the aspectus/affectus distinction still shapes Grosseteste’s thought. On careful consideration, one can also see that by diffusing these powers, Robert
Grosseteste, whether consciously or not, actually ensures that the fundamental implications of the aspectus/affectus distinction remain intact. I have said in chapter three that the relationship
of the aspectus to the affectus makes knowledge and love inseparable after the initial moment of
apprehension. This is no less true in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, although the thought here is
more nuanced . Since each of the six powers of the rational soul has both the means by which to know (logic and faith) and the free will to carry out the act of knowing or to refrain from it, there can be no knowledge that is not on some level chosen. On the other hand, since the very nature of man is directed towards knowledge of all reality and free will exists only within the powers of
65 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 156-157, uses “reasonable assent” instead of “faith” as a translation of fides. 66 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §12 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 175): “[I]psa enim naturaliter est imperativa aliarum potentiarum, ut secundum quod oportet et decet propumpant in suos actus proprios et naturales et ab eis vacent ; cuius imperio alie sunt naturaliter oboeditivae.”
174 knowing, there can be no choice to love without also knowing the object to be loved. This is what I have called the priority of the aspectus: “Nichil enim amatur nisi prius cognoscatur. ”67
Another implication of the aspectus/affectus distinction, which I will develop in chapter
8, is that the will has a limiting power over reason. One can fail to know due to the choice of the
will. This is one aspect of the primacy of the affectus. This implication not only remains in the
Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat but also finds its clearest justification here. For Grosseteste, the right
order of nature demands that the will be able to command all other rational powers.68 This is why it is diffused through all of them and must be so. If any cognitive power operated on its own as a fully distinct power, the will could not command it concerning its proper action. It would act, as it were, automatically. As a result, the man would not be free in respect of knowing the object of that rational power. The rational power would constrain the will. For the will to retain its proper activity, then, each cognitive power has to include an appetitive power, and free will specifically, rather than being fully distinct from it. The will present in that power can command it to carry out the act of knowing (or trying to know) or to refrain from knowing
(or trying to know).
The germ form of this idea was perhaps present in the De Artibus Liberalibus in the need for rhetoric to persuade the affectus to respond properly to the judgment of the aspectus .69
Already he was resistant to the idea of the affectus or will simply following the judgment of
reason, even though it was dependent on that judgment for its own proper action of embracing or
67 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §16 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130 ; trans. mine). 68 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §12 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 175), quoted in note 66 above; See also McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 157. 69 For discussion, see the section on the De Artibus Liberalibus in chapter 3.
175 fleeing. Yet, by the time Grosseteste writes the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat (in fact, by the time he comments on Galatians c.1230-1235),70 a definite development has taken place. While the priority of the aspectus remains, the quasi-mechanical process of judging and then responding or
not to that judgment has been superseded by a more realistic model in which the very judgment
of a cognitive power can be cut short (though probably not directly altered) 71 by a disinclined
will. There must be some first moment of apprehension for new knowledge to occur, but every
act of perception or judgment may be commanded or prevented by the will present in that
cognitive power.
Before I move on from Grosseteste’s discussion of the natural powers of the rational soul,
it is appropriate to point out something that Grosseteste has said more clearly here than perhaps
in any other work. By treating the natural powers as such before moving on to the influence of
grace, it is clear that he sees a strict parallel between the dynamics of the natural powers
operating according to nature and the natural powers as elevated by grace. Every power here
described will be perfected in the last section of the work, and the basic cognitive/appetitive
interplay will remain about the same. Therefore, even though he has not discussed how the
70 In the Galatians commentary a psychological doctrine along these lines is assumed and forms the conceptual basis for a subtle theological stance in which even the initial infusion of faith in the aspectus can be resisted by an obstinate affectus or will. Robert Grosseteste, Expositio in epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas V §7 (ed. James McEvoy, in Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , ed. James McEvoy, CCCM 130 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1995], 134): “ ueritas enim se uult imprimere aspectui mentis ad illuminationem et affectui ad dilectionem, ut sic prodeat exterius in bonam operationem. Qui ergo huiusmodi impressionem per mentis duritiam et obstinationem renuit a ueritate recipere, conuincitur ueritati non oboedire; qui autem dictam impressionem recipit, ueritati subiectus oboedit .” For discussion of this text, see chapter 6. For discussion of the dating of the Galatians commentary, see James McEvoy, Introduction to Robert Grosseteste, Expositio in epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas, ed. James McEvoy, in Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , ed. James McEvoy, CCCM 130 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 6-8. McEvoy does not actually give a neat date range. He says that it had to be written before 1235 and probably could not have been written long before 1230, although he treads carefully on the latter point. 71 The judgment of a cognitive power could be altered indirectly by the affectus limiting the range of possibilities the aspectus can consider, as in the Aristotle example, on which see chapter 8.
176 natural mind would actually function apart from grace, it is reasonable to assume that there would be an illumination in the order of nature, as there is in the order of grace, since he has posited such in earlier texts and neither denies it nor offers a real alternative here. 72 Here his purpose is to lay the foundation for his discussion of the influence of grace, so it is not important that he discuss the mechanics of natural knowledge at that level of detail.
What is important is that the strict parallel between nature and grace very clearly does hold with reference to the aspectus and the affectus. I have identified among the natural powers
considered as such not only the same basic cognitive/appetitive distinction Grosseteste elsewhere
identifies by aspectus and affectus, but also all three of the basic dynamics that govern the
relationship between the two powers: the inseparability of knowledge and love, the priority of
the aspectus, and the primacy of the affectus. It is not possible, therefore, to argue that these
dynamics only hold in the life of grace. 73 The bishop has clearly indicated that they belong to the very nature of the rational soul.
The powers of the sensitive soul . Since Grosseteste is primarily concerned with the rational soul and its perfection in this sermon, he treats the sensitive part of the soul only briefly.
Nevertheless, in these few paragraphs it is clear that the aspectus/affectus distinction has an
72 In the De Veritate and the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (hereafter CPA ) Grosseteste appeals to Augustinian illumination to explain all human knowledge, not only the knowledge of faith; Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 138): “Verum est igitur, sicut testatur Augustinus, quod nulla conspicitur veritas nisi in luce summae veritatis. Sed quemadmodum infirmi oculi corporis non vident colorata corpora, nisi superfuso lumine solis, ipsam autem lucem solis non possunt contueri in se, sed solum superfusam coloratis corporibus, sic infirmi oculi mentis ipsas res veras non conspiciunt nisi in lumine summae veritatis…Hoc modo puto, quod etiam immundi multi summam veritatem vident et multi eorum nec percipiunt se videre eam aliquo modo…Mundicorces vero et perfecte purgati ipsam lucem veritatis in se conspiciunt, quod immundi facere nequeunt.” ; Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.7, 1.14 and 1.17 (Rossi, 139-140 , 215-216 , and 240-241). For texts dealing specifically with illumination in the life of grace, see chapter 6. For further discussion, see chapter 8. 73 Here I am not responding to any argument I have read but rather am anticipating the sort of criticism I would expect from authors who tend to interpret Grosseteste along such lines, such as Marrone and, in a different way, McEvoy and Sharp.
177 analog in the sensitive soul . While following Avicenna closely, he also continues his theme of
treating each major power as an apprehensive power that includes within itself both capability of
apprehending its object on the one hand and appetitive and motive capabilities on the other. The
diffused powers of logic, faith, and free will seem to be replaced by the estimative power on the
apprehensive side and the irascible and concupiscible powers on the appetitive/motive side. 74
Unlike earlier works, in which, like the De Spiritu et Anima, he would sometimes place the irascible and concupiscible powers in the rational soul, Grosseteste here sounds more like
Avicenna 75 in that he uses the terms only in reference to the sensitive soul. 76
Completing the five rational powers from the sensus side of the sensus/affectus
distinction in the De Spiritu et Anima, 77 Grosseteste here treats the five sensus and the imaginatio. Most of the time he uses fantasia instead of imaginatio, but he clearly thinks they
74 See the charts in Appendix 4B. One chart also lists the estimative power as a third power in addition to the senses and imagination/fantasia because Grosseteste describes it that way later in the sermon (§25; ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 181). 75 Avicenna discusses the irascible and concupiscible powers primarily (perhaps exclusively) in connection with the sensitive soul. See Avicenna, De Anima IV, 4 (ed. Van Riet, 2:57-59) and De Anima I, 5 (ed. Van Riet, 1:82-83, 90). Avicenna appears to hold that these appetites cannot be experienced without input (whether present or recalled through imagination) from the senses. Avicenna, De Anima V, 7 (ed. Van Riet, 2:159): “ Unde verum est dici quod « quia sensimus, concupivimus » et « quia vidimus hoc et hoc, offensi sumus ».” Nevertheless, Avicenna does have an affective dimension in the rational soul. See Avicenna, De Anima I, 5 (ed. Van Riet, 1:92-94). For an overview of Avicenna’s psychology, see Jon McGinnis, Avicenna, Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Chapter 4 discusses the vegetative and sensitive powers. Chapter 5 discusses the theoretical, or higher, intellect belonging to the rational soul. McGinnis treats the practical, or lower, intellect of the rational soul in chapter 8. 76 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §13-§15 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 176-177); As we have seen, however, this does not mean he has changed his mind about the powers of the rational soul. The attractive and repulsive activities of the concupiscible and irascible powers remain in the rational soul, only he uses different terms. 77 The complete list is sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, et intelligentia (De Spiritu et Anima 4-5 [PL 40:782]); For an explanation of the sensus/affectus distinction in the De Spiritu et Anima, see chapter 2 above.
178 are the same. 78 The senses and the imagination alike have the species of sensible things as their
proper object, but the senses apprehend the species, while the imagination retains them. Within
the activity of each sense and the imagination, the estimative power judges the suitability of the
sensible thing to the sense that apprehends it and in response to this judgment either the
concupiscible power moves to apprehend or the irascible power moves to avoid apprehension. 79
It is only at this point in the sermon that Grosseteste uses the Avicennian terms attractiva
and repulsiva to describe the concupiscible and irascible powers within each sensitive or
retentive power of the sensitive soul. McEvoy sees part of Grosseteste’s originality in his
supposed application of Avicenna’s view of the attractive and repulsive powers of the vegetative
soul to the sensitive and rational powers as well. 80 In the rational soul, these powers appear as the appetitive and motive powers, which desire and move towards knowledge of the power’s object and away from ignorance of it.
I agree with McEvoy that there is an Avicennian feel to the way Grosseteste discusses the powers of the rational soul, particularly with the addition of a motive power to complete the appetitive aspect of each power. This detail does seem to be a new use of Avicenna. His
78 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §13 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 176): “…quae potentia vocatur fantasia et imaginatio.” 79 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §14 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 176-177): “Etiam quia vita omnis est appetitiva sibi convenientium et delectabilium, et repulsiva contristabilium, et per consequens omnis potentia sensitiva, ideo habet pars animae humanae sensitiva potentiam iudicativam sibi convenientium et delectabilium et inconvenientium et contristabilium, quae potentia dicitur aestimatio…sic et eis insitae potentiae appetitivae et motivae radicantur in una communi appetitiva, quae dicitur communiter concupiscibilis, quae dividitur in appetitivam delectabilium in sensu vel fantasia, et haec vocatur specialiter concupiscibilis, et appetitiva absentiae contristabilium in sensu vel fantasia, et haec vocatur irascibilis.” 80 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 143-144: “Avicenna had, of course, already pointed out that at the vital or purely vegetal level of existence the organism ensures its healthy survival by a single activity that has two distinct aspects, underlined in his classification of powers by the terms attractiva and repulsiva … Grosseteste seizes upon this idea, generalises it and adapts it to fit every aspect of human life, from the biological level through the sensitive or perceptual to the highest region of the mind and the spiritual life.”
179 discussion of the sensitive soul is even more Avicennian, although Avicenna himself had already placed analogues to the attractive and the repulsive powers in the sensitive soul, namely, the concupiscible and the irascible powers.81 I also agree that positing analogues to the attractive and repulsive powers in each level of the rational soul is distinctive of Grosseteste’s thought (as far as we know), but for two reasons I disagree with McEvoy’s suggestion that Avicenna is the main inspiration for doing this. First, the terms attractiva and repulsiva do not appear as a pair in the first part of the sermon, the part that deals with the rational soul. Rather, they appear in the brief section on the sensitive soul, where the connection to the body makes their use less surprising. If the bishop were specifically applying Avicenna’s views concerning the vegetative soul to the rational soul, one would have expected to see attractiva paired with repulsiva
somewhere in the discussion of the rational soul. If Grosseteste were generalizing and then
applying Avicenna’s views, the fact would be difficult to establish. Any number of thinkers
could have inspired Grosseteste to posit positive and negative appetites in the rational soul;
Avicenna’s account of the vegetative soul is not the only possible source. This leads to my
second reason.
The second reason I do not think Avicenna is Grosseteste’s main inspiration for placing
attractive and repulsive powers, or positive and negative appetites, in the rational soul is that
Grosseteste already had such powers in the rational soul (or rather, the mens ) by 1209 (or earlier) when he wrote the De Artibus Liberalibus. As mentioned above, this was before Grosseteste
began to appropriate the psychology of Avicenna . At that time, he used the terms concupiscible
and irascible, as in the De Spiritu et Anima, to name the positive and negative appetites of the
81 In addition to the texts cited in note 75 above, See Avicenna, De Anima I, 5 (ed. Van Riet, 1:101)
180 affectus mentis.82 Those powers were part and parcel of his aspectus/affectus distinction, which, as I argued in chapter two, he developed out of the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition. Therefore, although there is some new use of Avicenna, the presence of positive and negative appetites within every cognitive power of the rational soul testifies not to an original appropriation of
Avicenna but to a more detailed application of the very same cognitive/appetitive division he had used all along.
The action of grace. Having completed his overview of the natural powers of the human soul as a necessary foundation, Grosseteste moves on to his stated topic, the spiritual resurrection, for the remaining paragraphs (§16-§37). He explains that when acting by nature without grace, man will err. Therefore, he needs to participate in a life that cannot err, and this can only be the life of God. The restoration of spiritual life, the spiritual resurrection, consists in a restoration of a human’s participation in the life of God. 83
82 De Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40:781-782) : “Per rationalitatem habilis est illuminari ad aliquid cognoscendum infra se et supra se, in se et iuxta se. Cognoscit siquidem Deum supra se, et se in se, et angelum iuxta se, et quidquid coeli ambitu continetur infra se. Per concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem habilis est affici ad aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum, amandum vel odiendum : et ideo de rationalitate omnis sensus oritur animae, de aliis omnis affectus. ” ; De Spiritu et Anima 7 (PL 40:784): "Capax est omnium anima, quia per rationalitatem ad cognitionem, et per concupiscibilitatem ad dilectionem universitatis capax invenitur. Sunt enim duo in anima, et sunt id quod anima, scilicet naturalis sensus cognoscens omnia et dijudicans inter omnia; et naturalis affectus, quo suo ordine et gradu anima diligat omnia … Facta siquidem a Deo mens rationalis, sicut ejus imaginem suscepit, ita cognitionem et amorem.” See also note 18 in chapter 3. For Grosseteste’s usage of irascibilis and concupiscibilis in the DAL , see the discussion of that work in chapter 3. 83 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §16 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 178): “ Resurrectio itaque ab hac morte est restitutio in participationem vitae per se inerrabilis et impotentis decidere ab eo quod secundum naturam…vita autem per se inerrabilis solus deus est. ” Given the time of Grosseteste’s writing and the clear Pseudo-Dionysian inspiration of this section, it is not impossible that Grosseteste intends a truly Pseudo- Dionysian participation here. Referring to the period lasting from the twelfth century reception of the Pseudo- Dionysius to Thomas Aquinas, Chenu writes, « Il n’est pas impossible cependant de déceler chez ceux que touche Denys, le caractère physique de cette ὁμοίωσις , ressemblance croissante qu’accomplit la conversion hiérarchique, selon une loi interne dont l’effort moral n’est que le déploiement : réalisme de la participation, qui est d’une veine spirituelle différente tant de l’efficacité causale (du côté de Dieu) que de l’imitation (du côté de l’homme). En tout cas, ce réalisme demeurera, jusque chez saint Thomas (Iª Pars, q. 93) » (M-D. Chenu, La Théologie au Douzième Siècle, [Paris: J. Vrin, 1957], 296). Nevertheless, I am inclined to read Grosseteste’s references to participation in God as a participation of imitation effected by God’s grace due to Grosseteste’s use of the wax and seal analogy
181
The mechanism by which the human participates in the life of God is the Pseudo-
Dionysian divine ray ( divinum radium), subject to Grosseteste’s interpretation. The bishop explains that this ray is infused beginning at baptism and illuminates the rational powers. At the same time, it unites the person to God, who then directs the appetitive and motive aspects of these powers, resulting in the performance of their proper acts, both natural and supernatural. 84
This is similar to what Grosseteste had often said years earlier—that God perfects the aspectus through illumination and the affectus through directing its love in the right order, resulting in good works. 85
As the bishop specifies how this works, he first describes the action of grace from the top down (so to speak), and then from the bottom up. Participation in the divine ray is what produces the love of God. In the case of the highest human power, the natural faculty of wisdom
(naturalis sapientia ), this gratuitous participation both shapes the power (cognitive) and moves it
elsewhere. Consider, for example, Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (ed. mine): “Sicut enim cera mollis fortiter applicata sigillo recipit imitatoria similitudine omnium formarum et figurarum in sigillo inscriptarum pulcritudinem, sic anima per amoris copulam fortiter ad Deum applicata, non equali, sed cum summa imitatoria similitudine ipsius summe pulcritudinis recipit conformitatem.” For my working edition and translation of the entire passage in which this quotation appears, see Appendix 8B. For a brief discussion of participation in Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation see my summary of his doctrine of salvation in chapter 6. 84 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §17 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 178): “ Prima itaque participatio dei est quando…infundit divinum radium ad illuminationem secundum ordinem in predictas potentias vitam humanum integrantes, et ipsa infusione counit eas sibi, ut in eius directione quando oportet et decet et ut oportet et decet, prodeant in suos actus naturales naturaliter et secundum naturam se habentes, et etiam in sui supernaturalis counione supernaturaliter se habentes. ” Notably, this passage seems to imply two orders of illumination, one of nature and one of grace. Recalling that the “ actus naturales ” for most of the powers are the acts of knowing their proper objects, it is clear that Grosseteste sees special divine influence involved in both natural and supernatural knowledge. Here he says that the one receiving grace gets the natural illumination too, but the very fact that he distinguishes between natural and supernatural acts of knowledge that both depend on God’s help implies that God could give natural illumination apart from saving grace. For more discussion of Grosseteste’s theory of knowledge, see chapter 8. 85 Good works would be carried out by the active aspect of prudence, which is certainly included in the powers mentioned in the quotation in note 84 above.
182 to love God (appetitive). 86 He hastens to add, however, that “what is completely unknown is not
loved.” 87 Therefore, this love of God also presupposes knowledge of Him, and in this life such knowledge primarily comes through faith, with God illuminating (cognitive) and directing
(appetitive).88 Sanctifying participation in the divine ray, then, involves the infusion of both knowledge (faith) and love for the perfection of sapientia , and knowledge must in some way come first. 89 At the same time, Grosseteste remains true to his view, articulated in his commentary on Galatians, 90 that the will must consent even to the initial infusion of faith, for
here he says that faith and love are included in the same act. 91
Thus one can see that for Grosseteste, the life of grace, perfecting as it does the life of
nature, includes both cognitive and appetitive aspects in the highest power of the soul, the power
made for knowing (and loving) God, sapientia. In substance, this seems no different from the
doctrine of Tota Pulchra es and other texts discussed above: that illumination and love perfect
the aspectus and the affectus, respectively, and that the perfection of both these parts is indicated
86 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §18 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 178): “…naturalem sapientiam, quae informata divino radio et maxime mota in divini amoris actum est virtus et vita sapientiae gratuita…” 87 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §18 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 178; trans. mine): “[N]on amatur quod omnino ignoratur.” 88 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §19 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 179). 89 In addition to following from what has been said, Grosseteste seems to affirm this directly (Ibid.): “ Actus itaque fidei praeccessivus est et counitus in dicto amoris actu sicut et potentia naturalis credendi est counita in dicta amandi potentia, ac per hoc non immerito dicitur fides fundamentum omnium virtutum .” Presumably, in the case of infant baptism, he would see the faith of the Church as providing the necessary foundation for the infusion of faith and love. I have not yet found a text where he deals with this specific question. 90 Robert Grosseteste, Expos.ad Galatas V §7 (McEvoy, 134; italics original): “ ueritas enim se uult imprimere aspectui mentis ad illuminationem et affectui ad dilectionem, ut sic prodeat exterius in bonam operationem. Qui ergo huiusmodi impressionem per mentis duritiam et obstinationem renuit a ueritate recipere, conuincitur ueritati non oboedire; qui autem dictam impressionem recipit, ueritati subiectus oboedit. ” For translation and discussion of this passage, see chapter 6. 91 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §19 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 179). See the quotation in note 89.
183 by sapientia (wisdom). Again, the activities of the aspectus and affectus are inseparable, although there is a certain priority to the action of the aspectus.
There is also a certain primacy of the affectus in the way our bishop describes sanctification. After the divine ray does its work on the higher rational powers, the influence of love coming down from those powers leads natural prudence to judge as good what is pleasing to its beloved, God. 92 This judgment informs the concupiscible power to desire what is pleasing to
God and the irascible power to bear suffering that is pleasing to God and to resist what displeases
Him. Through the action of prudence, in union with the divine ray, and from the influence of love, the concupiscible power can thus exercise temperance and the irascible power fortitude.
He then traces the influence of love through all the powers of the sensitive soul. Justice comes from the natural active powers commanded by prudence from the influence of love. 93 After love has reached all the way to the toes, 94 Grosseteste pauses his discussion of that topic to explain the circumstances that make an act of prudential judgment just or unjust. Here his pastoral audience is most evident, for he chooses specifically pastoral matters to discuss. 95
Here I must pause for a moment to point out Grosseteste’s use of the term affectus in the passage just summarized. When discussing the judgment of prudence according to the love of
God and the resulting desire of the concupiscible appetite, the bishop explains, “[T]he things which [prudence] judges to be displeasing to the beloved…[the concupiscible power] does not
92 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §22 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 180). 93 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §22-§25 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 180-181). 94 As McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 136, puts it, “The senses, the imagination, and even the more subconscious levels of life ( potentia aestimationis, §24) in which the emotions are rooted, are rendered ever more permeable to the conscious control of prudence, and their life acquires a moral dimension called justice.” 95 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §26-§32 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 181-184).
184 desire, or at least, after its concupiscence in following these things, in no way does it apply the affectus .” 96 This seems equivalent to saying that even if the first movement of concupiscence may not be according to God’s will, there is no volitional consent to that desire. 97 If this reading is correct, then Grosseteste is using affectus as synonymous with will in the rational soul, since that is where consent would occur. Will or volition is a significant component of the meaning affectus has as a technical term in combination with aspectus. Even though the terms are not paired, Grosseteste here seems to attach approximately the same meaning to the term affectus.
With the descent of love through the different powers of the soul and the circumstances of prudential judgment sufficiently delineated, Robert Grosseteste finishes his conference sermon with an ascent of the mind to God, which, as McEvoy seems to have noticed, anticipates the general movement of Bonaventure’s Itinerarium. 98 As with the elevation and inchoate perfection of the other powers, the motive power here is supplied by the love of God.
Previously, Bishop Grosseteste had begun with sapientia and then skipped down to prudence and
96 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §22 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 180; trans. mine): “…et quae iudicat dilecto displicentia…non concupiscat, vel saltem nullo modo post concupiscentiam suam in his assequendis affectum apponat .” The suppplied subjects in my translation may be discerned from the first half of the sentence (not quoted), which the second half parallels. Whether prudentia or concupiscibilis is the implied subject of apponat is irrelevant because in either case the choice to consent to the desire must be made in the rational soul. If the subject is prudentia, the clause affectum apponat is straightforwardly about the rational soul. If the subject is concupiscibilis, the clause is about how the concupiscible power does not succeed in applying the affectus. The only reason for such a failure would seem to be the denial of consent from the free powers of the rational soul. 97 A similar evaluation appears in the Lectures on Romans once attributed to Grosseteste, in the comments on Romans 6:12. Lecturae in Epistolam ad Romanos V-XVI Roberto Grosseteste Adscriptae (ed. Elwood E. Mather, III, [PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1987], 23): “ aliquando nomen actus interioris, qui est in primo motu, qui dicitur propassio vel qui est in secundo motu, qui dicitur delectacio, vel tercio, qui dicitur consensus. Hic vero prohibet non concupiscenciam primo modo dictam, vel que est in primo motu, quia non est in potestate nostra quin surgat. Sed dei gratia conpescere possumus, ne usque ad delectacionem sive consensum precedat .” For discussion of the authorship of this work see Elwood E. Mather, III, “ Lecturae in Epistolam ad Romanos V-XVI Roberto Grosseteste Adscriptae ” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1987), xi-xviii and Ginther, Sacred Page, 16 . Even if Grosseteste perhaps did not write this passage, it nicely illustrates the view that seems to be presupposed in the passage of Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat under discussion. 98 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 142: “We have here a work which in its scope, compression and depth, foreshadows and anticipates in some respects the immortal Itinerarium Mentis in Deum of St. Bonaventure.”
185 then to all the lower active powers. Now, moving the opposite direction, he begins with art ( ars ) and describes how loves makes the speculative potencies to be speculative virtues.
The effect of love on ars is to make it seek and find its beloved (God) in all the objects proper to its knowledge (probable truths in the physical world). The result is that it sees God as
through a mirror obscurely and knows Him through a faint footprint ( per vestigium minus
formatum ). 99 This inflames it to desire to see Him per speciem 100 and to comprehend and hold
Him in Himself. 101
After a brief explanation of several ways that all creatures are mirrors of God, 102
Grosseteste states that the entire Beloved, though obscurely, can be found in every creature.
After the love of seeing God has increased in the power of ars, it flows from there up into the power of scientia. God is found more clearly in the objects of this cognitive power, and the
99 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §33 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 184-185). On the proper objects of the knowing powers, see the section above on the six powers of the rational soul. 100 There are two ways (at least) the phrase per speciem could be taken here. The bishop could mean this form of vision to be a via point between per vestigium and ipsum in se (see text in the next note) . If so, he probably is referring to the intellection of an intelligible species received by illumination directly from God. The other possibility is that seeing per speciem here is meant to be the same experience as comprehending God in Himself (ipsum in se ). If so, the reference is to the direct intellection of God as form, equivalent to the Greek “ εἰδος ”. The structure of the sentence (indicated in the next note) seems to favor the latter option. 101 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §33 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 185; underlining and bold print added to show parallels): “…tandem subobscure videt illum quasi per speculum subobscurum, et quasi per vestigium minus formatum eius agnoscit incessum quo amplius inflammatur ut videat eum per speciem, et ipsum in se comprehendat et teneat .” The underlined words indicate one stage of seeing and therefore knowing and loving. The words in bold print indicate another stage of seeing and therefore knowing and loving. This passage is a reaffirmation of Grosseteste’s view articulated in Dictum 91 that eternal beatitude consists in both vision and embrace ( visione et amplexu ), which correspond to the aspectus and the affectus, respectively. I will discuss Dictum 91 in chapters 5 and 8. 102 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §34 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 185); Grosseteste develops this theme at greater length in Dictum 60 (edited by Servus Gieben, “Traces of God in Nature According to Robert Grosseteste. With the Text of the Dictum, ‘ Omnis Creatura Speculum Est,’” Franciscan Studies 24 [1964]: 86-90).
186 pattern set at the level of ars repeats. The soul sees God more clearly and therefore longs more ardently to see Him at each level in the ascent. All of this is not yet seeing God per speciem. 103
As I said, there is a certain primacy of the affectus—recalling that love is the proper action of the affectus—in this process. It is love that makes the cognitive powers to do what they were made to do: to know God through the knowledge of all levels of reality. This is more than a limiting effect on the power of the aspectus to know. The primacy of the affectus here, in a way not dissimilar to Dictum 19, involves the positive ability to improve the functioning of the aspectus—even, in the case of supernaturally infused love, beyond the ability of nature.
After the ascent is complete, love retracts and quiets all the lower powers of the soul. It stands above and ignorant of itself and of all (created) things in the cloud of unknowing. 104 Here it waits for the Beloved to manifest Himself per speciem. When He does, presumably in mystical experience, the highest power, sapientia, fully lives ( plene vivit ) and is the most noble virtue. Consequently, the lower powers receive of its fullness so that each reaches the fullness of
103 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §35 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 186). 104 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §36 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 186). McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 165-166: “The ignorantia and the caligo of which he speaks (both in the commentary and in the sermon), and which presuppose th stilling of the lower powers of apprehension, refer only to the knowledge of creatures, not to that of God, and represent the highest stage of preparation for the direst manifestation of God.” The commentary McEvoy mentions here is Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Mystical Theology. McEvoy says that the ascent in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat is a condensed presentation of the ascent in the commentary. For the text and translation of the commentary see Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Mystical Theology, edited and translated by James McEvoy, in Mystical Theology: The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia, edited, translated, and with introductions by James McEvoy, 60- 121, Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 3 (Paris, Leuven, Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2003). McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 165, observes that Grosseteste has changed the Pseudo-Dionysius’ ascent in two ways: 1) He has changed it from an ascent of love independent of creatures to one of both knowledge and love that includes all grades of creatures in a positive way. 2) He has changed the end goal from a vision of theophanies that give no direct knowledge of the divine nature to one of direct vision of God per speciem.
187 life suitable to itself. 105 He ends the sermon with a brief summary of the action of the divine ray
on the soul that he has described. 106
In the life of the first resurrection, the divine ray illumines and directs the soul beginning with the highest power of the rational soul, sapientia, and ending with the lower powers of the sensitive soul as love of God flows down from one power to the next. In so doing, it perfects all the natural potencies, directing them to carry out their proper virtuous actions. Then, the supernatural actions of the powers so elevated lead the soul to see God at every level of reality.
This time the love of God flows upward in the soul, beginning from the lowest rational power and moving up to the highest as God is known indirectly at each level of reality. At the top, God may reveal Himself directly to the sapientia/intelligentia , and if He does, this grants the fullness of life to all the powers of the soul.
One familiar with Grosseteste’s teachings would expect a discussion of the life of grace in the aspectus and the affectus to involve a discussion of how, after God is known and loved, good works result and in turn improve the functioning of the aspectus, creating a cycle or an
upward spiral of sanctification (remember Ezekiel’s wheels).107 In this sermon, he does not do this exactly, but he comes very close. The higher rational powers are influenced first. This is analogous to other places where he speaks of learning truth in the aspectus. Then prudence is reformed. Since prudence is the power that both makes moral judgments and chooses all non- speculative actions, its reform is like learning sinking into the affectus. Then prudence guides
the lower powers to good works, just as good works follow from a reformed affectus elsewhere.
105 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §36 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 187). 106 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §37 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 187). 107 See the discussion of Dictum 19 in chapter 3 above.
188
Finally, an upward reform in the speculative powers ensues, which is like the improved functioning of the aspectus resulting from good works. There is not a neat, repeating cycle in the
Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, but the general movement of God’s influence in the soul is nevertheless similar to the way Grosseteste had long envisioned it.
The absence of aspectus and affectus. Now I turn to the question of why the Bishop of
Lincoln does not use the terms aspectus and affectus as a pair in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat .
The question is all the more urgent given their conspicuous absence from some of his other later works as well.108 I will first dispense with the obvious answers to this question before offering a possible explanation for the change in terminology.
The simplest answer would be that Grosseteste no longer held the view which he used the terms to explain, but this is not the case. As mentioned above, Grosseteste was still using the aspectus/affectus distinction late in the year 1245. To suppose that he changed his view and then
changed back again would be overly complex unless absolutely required by the evidence. It is
not so required. I have shown that the bishop still held the same basic view of the soul’s powers
at this time, although embellished with more detail than usual, and incorporating some new
elements. It would have been easy for Grosseteste to use aspectus and affectus in Ecclesia
Sancta Celebrat without changing the meaning either of the terms or of his view of the soul. He
could have said that soul has two parts, the aspectus and the affectus. Each power may be
subdivided into six powers, one for each level of reality, from God down to contingent
probabilities and the quality of free actions. 109 In the aspectus, each power is ordered to knowing
108 i.e., the Ex Rerum Initiatarum and Deus Est (De Confessione II), mentioned above. 109 It would not be out of character for Grosseteste to speak of powers within powers. As discussed above, he did this in the Hexaëmeron when he placed memory, understanding, and will in the intelligentia. He also does it in the
189 its object, and in the affectus each power is ordered to desiring to know and moving to know its object. He could have said that at every level the activity of the aspectus and the affectus cannot be separated because it belongs to free will, which permeates every power of the affectus, to command other powers to carry out or refrain from their proper actions, the actions of knowing at each level of being. In fact, as I have shown in chapter 2, the sensus/affectus division (from
Isaac of Stella) in the De Spiritu et Anima had already been used to convey the basic view of the soul Grosseteste articulates in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, so he also could have quoted chapter seven of that work, replacing sensus with aspectus. 110
Another explanation might be that the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat is spurious, but this
expedient is not at our disposal either. The sermon’s early and consistent appearance in
Grosseteste’s sermon collections confirms its authenticity with high probability. 111 In addition, other late works from which the terms are surprisingly absent are also securely authentic. 112
Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat when he places apprehensive/cognitive and appetitive/motive powers in each power of the rational soul. 110 For the text and translation of chapter seven, see chapter 2. Of course, Grosseteste says a good deal more in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat than is said in De Spiritu et Anima 7. 111 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 134, says its authenticity is “beyond any question.” 112 See for example Ex Rerum Initiatarum, ed. Servus Gieben, “Robert Grosseteste on Preaching. With the Edition of the Sermon ‘ Ex Rerum Initiatarum’ on Redemption,” Collectanea Franciscana 37 (1967): 100-141. Gieben discusses authorship on page 114. See also Robert Grosseteste, Deus Est (De Confessione II), ed. Siegfried Wenzel, “Robert Grosseteste's Treatise on Confession, Deus est,” Franciscan Studies 30 (1970). Wenzel’s edition will hereafter be cited as follows: Wenzel, page number. Wenzel concludes that the authenticity of the work is “highly probable” on page 237. One of his main reasons for this conclusion is the striking similarity between Deus Est and Templum Dei (he calls it Templum Domini ). This is significant because the earlier Templum Dei does use aspectus and affectus (Templum Dei 21.3; Goering and Mantello, 66). The following passage of Deus Est is of particular interest because Grosseteste seems to use passio for affectus and apprehensiva for aspectus without any noticeable change in meaning ( Deus Est [De Confessione II] A.3.a; Wenzel 262-263): “ Animae rationalis vires sunt duae: passio scilicet et apprehensiva. Passiones sunt gaudium, dolor, odium, amor. Apprehensivae sunt opinio, credulitas, intellectus, ratio. Opinio est acceptio alicuius in appendiciis materialibus absque materia, credulitas vel fides talium est in collatione, intellectus est acceptio alicuius absque materia et materialibus dispositionibus, qualium in collatione est ratio acceptio .” Compare this passage to Dictum 119 . It is also worth noticing that this passage does not perfectly correspond to the terminology of Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, even though written near the same time. This may suggest that the precise terms and numbers of the powers were not his foremost concern.
190
It is important to remember that Robert Grosseteste never was committed to just one way of describing the powers of the soul. Like the compiler of the De Spiritu et Anima before him 113
and like Bonaventure after him, 114 he happily used a variety of schemata for the soul without
necessarily changing his fundamental conceptions at every turn. One could easily extract several
sermon-length passages from the Hexaëmeron that discuss the soul and then ask why the
aspectus/affectus distinction is absent from them. Yet the distinction is present in other passages
of the Hexaëmeron, and so the question would be silly if intended to imply a change in
Grosseteste’s psychology.
Even given these considerations, the matter remains a bit puzzling. My tentative answer
to the question of why the terms (as a pair) sometimes disappear from Grosseteste’s mature
psychology is as follows. I think there is good reason to suppose that in his later works dealing
with psychology Grosseteste is simply adopting either the terminology of works that he has read
recently or the terminology that he takes to be the most up-to-date.
Although not for the purpose of addressing the present question, James McEvoy has
suggested that both of these dynamics are at work in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat. He notices
the first factor when fixing the date of the work. He attributes the preponderance of Pseudo-
Dionysian vocabulary to the fact that Grosseteste had recently commented on the Pseudo-
Dionysius. To support this argument he observes, “[W]e know that in other works which can be
dated without interdependence to approximately the same year, close correspondences occur
113 On the schemata of the soul in the De Spiritu et Anima¸ see Bernard McGinn, Introduction to Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology, ed. Bernard McGinn (Kalamazoo, MI:Cistercian Publications, 1977), 73-74, 99- 100. 114 For schemata of the soul in Bonaventure, see Elizabeth Ann Dreyer, “Affectus in St. Bonaventure’s Description of the Journey of the Soul to God” (PhD diss., Marquette University, 1982), 79-101 and 289-294.
191 which reflect the reading he was doing at that period.” 115 Since we know that Grosseteste’s recent reading does affect his written vocabulary, it is not unlikely that some of his choices for naming powers of the soul reflect not a change in ideas but simply a growth in the breadth of his reading.
McEvoy appeals to the updating of language to explain why we should assume that the
“common conceptions of the soul” known by the intellectus really have more Augustinian than
Aristotelian content. He writes, “For an Augustinian, even one who has decided to call things by
their scientific-sounding names, there can be no doubt that every necessary truth is a way of the
mind to the divine attributes of eternity, immutability and necessity, something that Grosseteste
wholeheartedly believed.” 116 At least two factors in the text confirm McEvoy’s judgment. One is the bishop’s division of rational powers into ratio, intellectus, and intelligentia (or sapientia), which are the Pseudo-Augustinian powers of knowing material things, created spirits, and God, respectively. 117 The second factor is a passing reference in the sermon to “powers capable of
knowing angels and immediate principles,”118 showing that he does attach Pseudo-Augustinian content to the Pseudo-Augustinian terms. Evidently, Grosseteste can use the Aristotelian language of cutting-edge research without drastically changing his Augustinian/Cistercian ideas.
The same could be true of his use of potentia apprehensiva, potentia appetitiva, and other terms that seem to replace aspectus and affectus in this work.
115 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 140. 116 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 162. 117 McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 146. On the anonymous compiler of the Pesudo-Augustinian De Spiritu et Anima, see chapter 2. 118 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §35 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 186): “…potentias apprehensivas angelorum et immediatorum principiorum…”
192
Scholars have observed the same dynamic at work in the Franciscan Thomas of York’s summa of metaphysics (the Sapientiale ) in the generation following Grosseteste. Thomas makes heavy use of Arabic and other non-Christian philosophical sources, and he often adopts
Aristotelian and Avicennian terms, but his metaphysics remain largely Augustinian. 119 Likewise
Grosseteste, by using the philosophical terms of the newly appreciated philosophers, is not signaling a major change in his psychology. He is primarily updating his language.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown how the basic cognitive/appetitive division meant by the aspectus/affectus distinction remains present even when Grosseteste is not using those terms.
Not only can the other schemata he uses be recast in terms of aspectus and affectus without
doing them violence, but one can also see that the basic themes connected with aspectus and affectus remain in the absence of the terms. Even when he uses other terms, Grosseteste still
holds to a certain priority of the aspectus, a primacy of the affectus, and an inseparable
119 John Patrick Edward Scully, “Reality and Truth in Thomas of York: Study and Text,” vol. 1 (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1960), viii-ix: “It was left to Thomas of York to be the first to use on a grand scale the philosophical wisdom of Aristotle and the Arabs, as well as the Jewish writers. His object is to integrate as much of the new learning as possible within the context of augustinianism, to which school he belongs.” For a survey of three earlier scholars who articulate versions of this view of Thomas of York and his Sapientiale , see Carlo Albert Grassi, “The Doctrine of Creation in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York: Study and Text,” vol. 1 (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1952), 5-13. Grassi’s favorite in this survey is Fr. Longpré. Ephrem Longpré, “Fr. Thomas d’York, O.F.M.: La Première Somme Métaphysique du XIII e Siècle,” Archivum Franciscanum 19 (1926): 894 : «…il donna à la métaphysique du XIII e siècle la première, sinon l’unique Somme exclusivement métaphysique, et cela en utilisant très amplement les éléments de valeur contenus dans l’aristotélisme et le néo-platonisme, mais sans rien sacrifier de la tradition philosophique augustinienne. » Longpré also believes that Thomas of York was perpetuating the philosophical and scientific tradition of Robert Grosseteste (Ibid., 875), whom he met (at least) in 1251 (Ibid., 879). Thomas was also acquainted with Adam Marsh, a good friend of Grosseteste, whose letter collection preserves much of what is known about Thomas’ life (Ibid., 876). Adam mentions Thomas in several letters, but letters 223, 224, and 225 are addressed to him directly (published and translated in Adam Marsh, The Letters of Adam Marsh, vol. 2, ed. and trans. C.H. Lawrence [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 538-543). Scully, “Reality and Truth,” 1:vii, dates the Sapientiale to the 1250s, so it is possible that Grosseteste and Thomas of York shared a common approach to philosophical matters due in part to their acquaintance or to Grosseteste’s general legacy at Oxford, where Thomas also taught for a time. (On Thomas’ tenure at Oxford, see Longpré, “Thomas d’York,” 879- 880.)
193 relationship between knowledge and love. For a man who has no commitment to using consistent terms or schemata, the consistency of his most basic concepts is impressive.
As I argued in chapter three, one must understand the aspectus/affectus distinction to understand Grosseteste’s theological anthropology. It is fundamental to his psychology. I also showed in chapter three that knowledge is the proper action of the aspectus and that love is the proper action of the affectus. As I argued in this chapter, the basic cognitive/appetitive division represented by the aspectus/affectus distinction is pervasive in Grosseteste’s psychology. For these reasons, in order to understand the full meaning and significance of aspectus and affectus in his psychology, it is not sufficient merely to survey the passages in which he pairs the terms.
It is necessary also to study texts from Grosseteste that deal with the interplay of cognition and appetite and especially of knowledge and love, even when Grosseteste makes no mention of aspectus or affectus. Only then can Grosseteste’s doctrine of the soul shine with its full brilliance. For this reason, I will in the remaining chapters utilize not only texts that directly mention aspectus and affectus, but also some key texts that deal with the same themes in other terms.
Appendix 4A: Grosseteste’s schemata of the rational soul
Some Psychological Schemata Arranged by Work
Text Highest power of the Cognitive power(s) Appetitive power(s) soul or locus of AA De Artibus aspectus (seu mens) = affectus= Liberalibus mens vis racionibilis vis concupiscibilis et vis irascibilis Dictum 19 anima aspectus, affectus, qui cognoscit qui amat anima, cuius bonum aspectus, affectus, Dictum 2 and sapiencia est qui in lumine cuius amor ordinatur, Tota Pulchra Es divinitatis videt qui per sapienciam mens et per sapienciam rectificatur illuminatur Dictum 51 mens aspectus, qui scit affectus, qui amat anima mens aspectus affectus Hexaëmeron intelligencia memoria et amor/voluntas racio superior intelligencia vis concupiscibilis et suprema facie racionis vis racionibilis vis irascibilis
De Libero Arbitrio radix quae est liberi aspectus=ratio affectus=voluntas arbitrii substantia
A Synthetic Comparison of Some Key Psychological Concepts
Cognitive Appetitive Together in aspectus affectus (rational) soul or mind memory and love/will the highest face of the understanding reason rational irascible and rational soul concupiscible knowledge love wisdom reason will one root that is the substance of free choice
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Appendix 4B: Schema of the soul in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat displayed in four charts
Aspectus and Affectus in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat (general)
Cognitive powers/operations Appetitive (aspectus ) powers/operations ( affectus ) potentia appetitiva et motiva potentia apprehensiva et ad habendum in actu In every power of the cognoscitiva cognoscendi rational soul ars logica et fides libera voluntas seu liberum arbitrium potentia sensitiva aut retentiva In every power of the potentia appetitiva et motiva sensitive soul potentia iudicativa ad apprehendendum (aestimatio)
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The Rational Soul in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat
Natural Power Cognitive Capacity Appetitive Capacity (aspectus ) (affectus ) • capable of • capable of desiring to know God and to avoid naturalis apprehending/knowing ignorance of God sapientia God • capable of moving toward holding God in the (=intelligentia) • logic and faith act of knowing operative • free will to execute the act of knowing or to refrain from it • capable of • capable of desiring to know common concepts apprehending/knowing and to avoid ignorance of them intellectus common concepts • capable of moving toward holding common directly concepts in the act of knowing • logic and faith • free will to execute the act of knowing or to operative refrain from it • capable of • capable of desiring to know principles and to apprehending/knowing avoid ignorance of them ratio principles through • capable of moving toward holding principles in media the act of knowing • logic and faith • free will to execute the act of knowing or to operative refrain from it • capable of desiring to know physical laws and to • capable of avoid ignorance of them scientia apprehending/knowing • capable of moving toward holding physical laws physical laws in the act of knowing • logic and faith • free will to execute the act of knowing or to operative refrain from it • capable of desiring to know probable truths and • capable of to avoid ignorance of them ars apprehending/knowing • capable of moving toward holding probable probable truths truths in the act of knowing • logic and faith • free will to execute the act of knowing or to operative refrain from it • capable of desiring to know the moral quality of a free act and to avoid ignorance of it • capable of moving toward holding the moral • capable of quality of a free act in the act of knowing naturalis apprehending/knowing • free will to execute the act of knowing or to prudentia the moral quality of refrain from it free acts • In addition, capable of doing acts apprehended as • logic and faith good and omitting acts apprehended as evil operative • free will to execute or to refrain from executing acts apprehended as good and to omit or to refrain from omitting acts apprehended as evil 196
The Sensitive Soul in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat
Natural Power analog to Aspectus analog to Affectus
• capable of apprehending • a power capable of desiring and the species of sensible moving to apprehend what is things judged suitable to that sense, of • being repulsed from what is judged each of the five each sense is rooted in the unsuitable senses common sense • estimative power • each such power is rooted in the (aestimatio ) is operative, common appetite/concupiscible judging a sensible thing to power, which is divided into be suitable or unsuitable to concupiscible and irascible that sense • a power capable of desiring and • capable of retaining the moving to apprehend what is species of sensible things judged suitable to the relevant • sense, of being repulsed from what fantasia estimative power (aestimatio ) is operative, is judged unsuitable judging a sensible thing to • this power is also rooted in the be suitable or unsuitable to common appetite/concupiscible the relevant sense power, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible
• irascible, concupiscible, and motive • capable of judging in powers capable of desiring and (aestimatio ) general what is suitable or moving to apprehend in general unsuitable to the sensitive what is judged suitable to the soul sensitive soul, of being repulsed from what is judged unsuitable
The Sensitive Soul in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat —simplified
Natural Power analog to Aspectus analog to Affectus • concupiscible power desires and each of the five • sensitive power apprehends moves to apprehend or senses • estimative power judges • irascible power moves to avoid apprehension • concupiscible power desires and fantasia • retentive power apprehends moves to apprehend or • estimative power judges • irascible power moves to avoid apprehension
197 Chapter 5: The Metaphysical Questions
In this chapter, I want to address two general questions. The first is the question of the composition of the soul and its powers. The second is that of the peculiar relationship between the aspectus and the affectus : why does Grosseteste believe that they always act together?
Although the polymath’s diffuse writings make it difficult to answer these questions in a
definitive way, it is necessary to address them because the aspectus/affectus distinction forces
them upon the attentive reader.
The first question arises due to Grosseteste’s proclivity for varied psychological
schemata, on the one hand, and his consistent conceptions related to aspectus and affectus, on the
other. Robert Grosseteste can schematize the rational soul in different ways even while his
fundamental understanding of aspectus and affectus remains about the same. One wants to know
why this is the case. This question is partly distinct from the one considered at the end of chapter
four. That problem was primarily one of terminology: why does he sometimes replace aspectus
and affectus with other terms? Undoubtedly, changing terms does have an effect on the concepts
involved, but I was able to show that the concepts remain similar enough to what he states
elsewhere that he could have used the terms aspectus and affectus had he wished. The present
question is properly metaphysical: how can he believe that the soul’s powers can be divided now
one way, now another? Do these schemata describe the real composition of the soul in terms of
substance and accidents, or not? If not, are aspectus and affectus distinct ex parte rei, or is the
distinction purely logical?
The second general question lies at the core of what I find most interesting about
Grosseteste’s psychology. I have explained his aspectus/affectus doctrine as involving the
198 199 priority of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the inseparability of knowledge and love. I will explore each of these themes more deeply in the next section, consisting of chapters six, seven, and eight. In chapter six I will discuss the inseparability of knowledge and love in salvation. For Grosseteste, God’s grace must touch both the aspectus and the affectus at every step in the process of salvation. In chapter seven, I will treat the priority of the aspectus in the process of reforming the divine image in man. Surprisingly to modern ears, one must understand the Trinity in order to love it, and one cannot love God more than one knows Him. In chapter eight I will examine the primacy of the affectus in Grosseteste’s epistemology. There we will see not only how the love of earthly things blocks one from grasping the highest truths, but also how the love of God ultimately includes the knowledge of all truth. The great fascination of the aspectus/affectus distinction lies in Grosseteste’s ability to use it to make profound statements, and these statements normally involve some way in which one power cannot act without the other. Therefore, one naturally wants to know why, for Grosseteste, aspectus and affectus cannot be separated in their actual operation.
I will answer these two general questions in five parts. First, I will discuss Grosseteste’s position on the division of the soul into vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls or powers.
Following James McEvoy on most points, I will argue that Grosseteste holds the rational soul to be a single substance possessing all human powers—vegetative, sensitive, and rational. This part will set the conceptual stage for the second.
In the second part, after some discussion of historical context, I will argue that
Grosseteste rejects the substance/accident composition of the soul in favor of identifying the soul with its powers. This explains how Grosseteste can schematize the soul in various ways. He
200 actually conceives of the soul as a single, direct principle of all its actions. In substance, there is no distinction between the different powers.
Yet, still within the general question of composition, there is a further and more difficult question that I must address. Given the identity in substance of the soul with its powers and of the powers with one another, what distinction remains? Is the difference between aspectus and affectus just a useful way of talking, or does the reality of the soul itself somehow give rise to the distinction? In the third part of this chapter, I will address this question in light of the texts discussed in the second part.
In the fourth part of this chapter, I will address the second major question. If aspectus and affectus are both identical with the substance of the soul, this is one good reason why
Grosseteste would treat their actions as always connected. But why does Grosseteste hold to this view in the first place, and is this the actual reason why aspectus and affectus act together? Is the identity of the true and the good, in created beings and in God, also a factor?
In the fifth part, I will discuss some texts from Grosseteste’s corpus that may seem problematic for the account I have developed. I will explain why I do not think these texts should alter any of the conclusions reached in the first four parts.
The end result of this chapter, I hope, will be an appreciation for the coherence and depth of the metaphysics of the soul that Grosseteste presupposes in order to hold his distinctive doctrines connected to aspectus and affectus.
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Part 1: Grosseteste’s Rejection of the Plurality of Substances and Forms
Virtually all thirteenth century Christian thinkers affirmed that the soul is in some way simple, yet in some other way not as simple as God.1 All would agree by this point that there are
no corporeal parts, and all would affirm at least some minimal composition, such as spiritual
form and spiritual matter or act and potency. Within this very general outlook, however,
different opinions abounded, and different authors often addressed differing sets of questions
pertaining to the constitution of the soul. 2 I have chosen to focus upon two of the possible composition questions: the question of substance/accident composition in reference to the powers, and the question of the powers’ distinction ex parte rei (roughly: on the part of the thing
itself) .3 I have chosen these particular questions in part because they help to explain how
1 See for example Robert Grosseteste (?), Tractatus beati Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis episcopi de anima (hereafter De Anima ) (Baur, 243): “Quattuor autem substantiae sunt: quarum prima omnino simplex est, id est nec ex partibus composita nec aliquid ibi compositum nec ipsa alicui composita ut Deus. — Secunda similiter non est composita ex partibus nec aliis composita cum aliquid aliud est ei compositum: haec est angelus. — Tertia similiter non est composita ex partibus cum est ei aliquid compositum et ipsa alicui: haec est anima. — Quarta omnino composita est, quia ex partibus composita est, et aliquid ei compositum est et ipsa alicui, ut corpus.” For discussion of the authorship of this work, see the Introduction. Authors could assert confidently the relative simplicity of the soul in the twelfth century as well. See for example Isaac of Stella, Epistola ad Alcherum 2 (PL 194:1876): “ Deus vero solus vere simplex est, corpus autem omne vere compositum, anima utriusque respectu utrumque dici potest. Aut si aliquod corpus simplex, anima utique simplicior, quae omni corpore superior: Deus vero simplicissimus, qui et summus .” 2 For a treatment of some of the questions that I am not addressing in this chapter see Richard Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995). Dales’ study is intended as background for understanding the condemnations of 1277 and tends to focus upon questions pertaining to soul as a substance and the soul as the form of the body, as well as the relationships between the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers or souls. For a study that overlaps partly with this chapter in terms of questions covered, but considers only Parisian masters who were contemporary to Grosseteste, see Magdalena Bieniak, The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200-1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series 1, vol. 42 (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2010) . In particular, Bieniak discusses the identity of the soul with its powers and the status of the sensitive and vegetative powers in part 2 of her study. 3 Although some of the literature discussed in chapter 1 is relevant to these questions, I am not aware of any secondary studies dedicated to answering these specific questions for Grosseteste. I am quite indebted to Neil Lewis, however, for suggesting that I should ask the question of distinction ex parte rei. This advice and other items he shared with me substantially influenced this chapter.
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Grosseteste can freely switch schemata of the powers while maintaining a generally consistent view and in part because they are addressed by other thinkers who lived close to Grosseteste in time. It will be possible, therefore, to place Grosseteste’s views in their proper historical context.
Before I can discuss these questions, however, I must briefly address the prior question of the three souls. In Part 2 of this chapter, I will place Robert Grosseteste in reference to the De
Spiritu et Anima and Thomas Aquinas concerning the soul and its powers. Here in Part 1, I will explain a point that the three hold in common. Like the De Spiritu et Anima before him 4 and like
Thomas Aquinas after him, 5 Grosseteste rejects the view, sometimes based upon the similarities
and differences between humans and animals, 6 that the sensitive and vegetative souls in humans
are distinct in substance from the rational soul. 7 The De Spiritu et Anima, Thomas Aquinas, and
Robert Grosseteste all hold that soul is only one according to substance.
4 De Spiritu et Anima 9 (PL 40 :784): “Anima et spiritus idem sunt in homine, quamvis aliud notet spiritus, et aliud anima. Spiritus namque ad substantiam dicitur, et anima ad vivificationem. Eadem est essentia, sed proprietas diversa. Nam unus et idem spiritus ad se ipsum dicitur spiritus, et ad corpus anima. Spiritus est in quantum est ratione praedita substantia rationalis: anima in quantum est vita corporis…Humana quidem anima, quia in corpore habet esse et extra corpus, anima pariter et spiritus vocari potest: non duae animae, sensualis et rationalis, altera qua homo vivat, et altera qua ut quidam putant, sapiat; sed una atque eadem anima in semetipsa vivit per intellectum, et corpori vitam praebet per sensum .” See also De Spiritu et Anima 48 (PL 40:814), where one can find a quotation of the same text from Gennadius of Marseilles ( De Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus XV [PL 58:984]) that Aquinas would use as the sed contra on this question in his Quaestiones de Anima (question 11). 5 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de Anima q. 11 corpus (ed. B.-C. Bazán, Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima, Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P. M. Edita Cura et Studio Fratrum Praedicatorum Tomus XXIV, 1 [Roma: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1996], 100.): “ Reliquitur ergo quod in homine sit tantum una anima secundam substantiam, que sit rationalis, sensibilis, et vegetabilis .” See also the previous note. 6 Plato, for example, although not using the terms vegetative, etc., posited that the body has its own soul, distinct from the immortal soul. Plato, Timaeus 69C-69D, in Platonis Opera , ed. John Burnet, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1905, n.p.): “ οἱ δὲ μιμούμενοι , παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον , τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θνητὸν σῶμα αὐτῇ περιετόρνευσαν ὄχημά τε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἔδοσαν ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσῳκοδόμουν τὸ θνητόν , δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον , πρῶτον μὲν ἡδονήν , μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ , ἔπειτα λύπας , ἀγαθῶν φυγάς , ἔτι δ᾽ αὖ θάρρος καὶ φόβον , ἄφρονε συμβούλω , θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον , ἐλπίδα δ᾽ εὐπαράγωγον : αἰσθήσει δὲ ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐπιχειρητῇ παντὸς ἔρωτι συγκερασάμενοι ταῦτα , ἀναγκαίως τὸ θνητὸν γένος συνέθεσαν .” See also Plato, Republic IX, 580D-581C. 7 Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Physics book 1(Dales, 15): “…anima est una simplex et indivisa tota in qualibet parte corporis…” For discussion see McEvoy, Philosophy, 317. Grosseteste discusses the ubiquity of the
203
Various texts. Grosseteste, for his part, describes the vegetative, sensitive, and rational as
“parts” to which the soul stands in potency. 8 When addressing the question of the three souls explicitly in the treatise Deus Est , he says they are really potencies (potentiae ) of the human soul, even if sometimes called souls (animae ).9 One should read this statement in light of the De
Anima ascribed to Grosseteste , which repeats the Parisian Philip the Chancellor’s thoughts on
this very question. Whether one considers the De Anima authentic or not, 10 this work, copied
c.1225-1230 by an English scribe,11 suggests how a schoolman in Paris or Oxford in
Grosseteste’s day likely would have seen his options. The possible accounts of the three souls the
De Anima presents are: 1) that they are three substances, which constitute the human soul, or 2)
soul in the body at length in Letter 1. For discussion of the simplicity of the soul in Letter 1, see McEvoy, Philosophy, 265. See also Robert Grosseteste, De Decem Mandatis V 7 (ed. Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King [Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987], 62). 8 Robert Grosseteste, Deus Est (De Confessione II) 2.A (ed. Siegfried Wenzel, “Robert Grosseteste's Treatise on Confession, Deus est,” Franciscan Studies 30 [1970], 248): “ Anima quidem totum potentiale est ad suas partes, quae sunt vegetabile, sensibile, rationabile. Corpus quidem humanum totum integrale est, cuius partes sunt qualitates quattor elementales. ” 9Robert Grosseteste, Deus Est (De Confessione II) 2.A.3.a (Wenzel, 262): “ Sed quod sequitur sententia non vacat, hoc scilicet, ex tota anima et ex toto corde et ex tota mente. Anima quidem proprie vegetabilium est, cor sensibilium, mens rationabilium, quae prout diversa perficiunt, animae sunt, sed in eodem potentiae dicuntur. Unde a philosophis dicitur anima vegetabilis, anima sensibilis, anima rationalis. In homine quidem sunt hae potentiae animae humanae, quarum quaelibet totum quoddam est ad suas vires .” He goes on to list the vires contained in each. 10 McEvoy, Philosophy, 484, writing in 1982, reports that the De Anima is generally regarded as inauthentic. He rejects it primarily on chronological grounds, noting that he sees Callus’ treatment (cited below) as definitive. For discussion, see the Introduction. 11 Thomson actually says the scribe could hardly have been writing later than the first decade of the thirteenth century, but the clear dependence of the text on the content of the Summa de Bono (and not vice-versa ) forces us to move the copying to the time of the composition of the Summa de Bono (1225-1228) or slightly later. Thomson gives the fullest presentation of the paleographical evidence in S. Harrison Thomson, “The De Anima of Robert Grosseteste,” The New Scholasticism 7 (1933): 201-221, esp. 203-207. Concerning the dependency either on the Summa de Bono or on the material that later became the Summa de Bono, see Daniel Callus, “Philip the Chancellor and the De Anima ascribed to Robert Grosseteste,” Medieval and Renaissance Studies 1, 1 (1943): 105-127, and Leo Keeler, “The Dependence of R. Grosseteste’s De Anima on the Summa of Philip the Chancellor,” The New Scholasticism 11, 3 (1937): 197-219. On the dating of the Summa de Bono , see Nicolai Wicki, Introduction to Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de Bono, ed. Nicolai Wicki, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta vol. 2, pt. 1 (Berne: Editions A. Francke SA, 1985), 63*-66*.
204 that the three are three powers founded in one substance, which is the human soul. 12 As I read
both the De Anima and Philip’s Summa de Bono, the authors opt for the second account. 13 The
statement just cited from the episcopal Deus Est favors this view, as does an especially clear
statement in the magisterial De Cessatione Legalium .14 Thus, Robert’s model would seem to be
one of a single substance with multiple powers. 15
De Statu Causarum. An important affirmation of the single substance view appears in
Grosseteste’s De Statu Causarum. This opusculum of the later 1220s is a discussion of
12 Robert Grosseteste (?), De Anima VIII (Baur, 271): “Propter hoc dicunt quidam, quod in homine triplex est substantia…Et licet sint tres substantiae, non tamen sunt tres animae, eo quod anima nomen est perfectionis…Et ita tres substantiae incorporeae sunt una anima…Alii dicunt, quod tantum una substantia est in homine, scilicet rationalis et huius sunt potentiae vegetabilis et sensibilis et rationalis in una substantia fundatae….” For discussion of the authorship of this work, see the Introduction. 13 Even though our author/compiler in the De Anima does not explicitly give a determination to this question, one can see that he agrees with the alii dicunt view by virtue of the fact that after stating the alii dicunt he spends the rest of the question answering the opening objections in order, and these objections were the basis of the dicunt quidam view. (Robert Grosseteste [?], De Anima VIII; Baur, 270-272). Philip explicitly concedes the point of the alii dicunt. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono “De Bono Nature” IV q.3 (ed. Nicolai Wicki, Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de Bono, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta volume 2, 2 parts [Berne: Editions A. Francke SA, 1985], 237): “ Apparet per hoc quoniam fundantur in una substantia, quod concedimus .” S. Harrison Thomson and Richard Dales interpret the De Anima and the Summa de Bono, respectively, as agreeing with the three substance view. See Thomson, “ De Anima ,” 212-213 and Dales, Rational Soul, 25-26. Concerning Philip’s doctrine, there have been different interpretations. Besides Dales, Bieniak, Soul-Body Problem , 123, also favors the plurality of substances interpretation of Philip, though she grants that the passages in which Philip seems to affirm plurality of substances could perhaps be understood to refer to a succession of substances in the developing embryo. Lottin and Wicki both found, as I also have, that Philip ultimately means to affirm only one substance in the soul. D. Odon Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XII e et XIII e Siècles, vol. 1 : Problèmes de Psychologie (Louvain, Belgium : Abbaye du Mont César, 1942), 467 : “Mais le Chancelier signale, et pour l’approuver, la thèse opposée qui voit dans l’âme une substance unique, douée de trois facultés. ” Lottin also states, on page 477, note 1, that the De Anima attributed to Grosseteste repeats Philip’s view on this matter, citing the exact page range in Baur that I have cited above. See also Niklaus Wicki, Die Philosophie Philipps des Kanzlers: ein philosophierender Theologe des frühen 13. Jahrhunderts (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2005), 123, cited in Bieniak, Soul-Body Problem , 121. I have not consulted Wicki’s study directly. 14 Robert Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium III i 27 (ed. Dales and King, 131): “Communicat quoque anima rationalis cum anima sensibili brutorum in potentia sensitiva, et cum anima vegetabili plantarum in potentia vegetativa.” See also Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 10.2.4 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 291). Note also Grossetete’s preference to speak of potencies rather than substances in Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §15 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 177). 15 McEvoy, Philosophy, 316-317, reaches a similar conclusion. His study suggested to me several of the texts I have cited here, in addition to the ideas cited here and in other notes. I do not follow him in every detail, however.
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Aristotle’s four causes. 16 Early in the work, he equates form with act and matter with potency. 17
In the part dealing with the multiple kinds of formal cause (or form), he discusses substantial
forms. Here he treats substantial forms as distinct from substances. 18 In the part about the two kinds of material cause ( ex qua and in qua ), he says that a substance comes to be from matter ex
qua, which he says is potency. I take this to mean that a created substance consists of matter ex
qua (potency) and one or more substantial forms (supplying the act).19 With this metaphysical
16 McEvoy, Philosophy, 230-231, dates this work to c.1225-1228. 17 Robert Grosseteste, De Statu Causarum (Baur, 121): “…in quolibet, quod efficitur ab efficiente, necesse est existere duo, scilicet actum et potentiam, hoc est formam et materiam…” 18 Robert Grosseteste, De Statu Causarum (Baur, 124): “ Forma vero substantialis multipliciter capitur : aut absolute, aut in respectu ; absolute, ut substantiarum formae substantiales; in respectu, ut albedo dicitur forma substantialis albi… .” Here he refers to “the substantial forms of substances,” which seems to imply that a substance consists of one or more substantial forms and something else. Later he says that there is a matter of substances, which is potency. This must be the “something else.” Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 9-46, believes that Grosseteste holds to universal hylomorphism inspired by Avicebrol as a major influence, and McEvoy, Philosophy, 228 n.5, rejects this assertion as baseless. I do not wish to weigh in on that debate, but it does seem to me that the discussion of substances in the De Statu Causarum assumes some version of universal hylomorphism. See the next note. 19 Robert Grosseteste, De Statu Causarum (Baur, 126 ; my suggestion in brackets): “Materia vero dicitur aut ex qua, aut in qua. „Materia ex qua" est, ex qua res est, hoc est substantia [ l. substantiarum materia]. „Materia in qua" est, in qua res fit, quod est proprie accidentium et dicitur sic, quod est proprie et per se subiectum accidentis eiusdem materiae. Et est differentia istarum materiarum, quia materia, ex qua fit substantia, potentia est; materia vero, in qua fit accidens est, ens in actu et per se causa sui accidentis.” The passage is a bit confusing, since in Baur’s edition he says that matter ex qua is substance and then refers to the matter from which (ex qua ) substance comes. I would suggest that the problem is more likely to be Baur’s than Grosseteste’s. Baur’s Varia lectio reports that two out of Baur’s four manuscripts say that matter ex qua is the matter of substances (reading substantiarum materia for substantia ). This coheres perfectly with the statement just below that the matter from which ( ex qua ) substance comes is potency. Potency alone is not a substance. A substance consists of potency (matter ex qua ) and one or more substantial forms. It has a material cause and a formal cause (as well as an efficient cause and a final cause). Accidents are formed by the other kind of matter ( in qua ) and accidental forms, which Grosseteste discussed along with substantial forms. I think Baur may have taken Grosseteste to mean that matter ex qua is potency/substance and matter in qua is act/accidents. Then he would just be saying that substances, meaning things, consist of potency and act, which is the same as substance and accident. Of course, Groseteste is affirming that concrete things are composed in these two ways, but we must not miss the fact that he is talking about two kinds of matter. Matter always needs a form to make a thing, and Grosseteste has discussed substantial and accidental forms. Therefore, it is only natural to assume that in this last paragraph of the work the language of substances and accidents coming to be “from” or “in” the two types of matter is there because both substances and accidents only exist when their form and matter are combined. One may hope that a better edition of the text will eventually help to clarify this issue.
206 view, 20 it would seem that Grosseteste could hold to the single substance account while affirming one or multiple forms in the soul. 21 His remarks on the topic could possibly be understood to
involve a single form—that of the rational soul—or multiple forms—one for each of the three
souls. In one sentence he says that the form of the rational soul becomes present ( superveniens )
to the other two. This sounds like there are three forms, and possibly three substances. 22 In the next sentence he says concerning the form of the rational soul, “[T]his form lacks (or leaves behind - relinquat ) no multitude or diversity of operation or of essence in its perfection.” 23 This
sounds like the second view in the De Anima : the rational soul includes all three kinds of
powers—vegetative, sensitive, and rational. In its context in the De Statu Causarum, it also seems to make the vegetative and sensitive souls unnecessary, for the rational soul does not lack their powers. I believe he is saying that there is only one substantial form in the human soul—
20 If I have understood Grosseteste correctly here, I have also solved a problem which McEvoy left unsolved. After noting that Grosseteste, in various ways, refers to the soul as a substance in its own right, he writes ( Philosophy, 273): “How did he combine these Platonic denominations with the Aristotelian designation of forma substantialis, applied to the soul in the De Statu Causarum ? In this area we are without positive information, for it is a problem he nowhere discussed.” The answer appears to be that Grosseteste was taking forma substantialis to mean the form of a substance, as opposed to the form of an accident. As I have explained in the above notes, each substance comes about through the combination of substantial form and matter ex qua (potency), while accidents come about through the combination of accidental form and matter in qua (ens in actu, the per se cause of accidents). Thus, when he refers to the soul as a substantial form, he does so in deference to Aristotle, but with the intention of explaining later in the work that a substance must also have matter ex qua. The soul is a substance that has a substantial form. (It would only be the form or perfection of the body in a secondary sense, but that is another discussion.) 21 Scholars only familiar with the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas may be surprised to hear this. Howard Robinson explains, “According to Aquinas, a substance possessed only one form, and its matter was the essentially characterless prime matter…Others disagreed.” (Howard Robinson, "Substance," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta [Spring 2014 Edition]
207 that of the rational soul. If there is only one substantial form, clearly there is only one substance as well.
Grosseteste’s use of the words superveniens and advenit remains problematic, 24 but it
does not ultimately imply plurality of forms. The language of arrival probably stems from the
idea that the rational soul, created directly by God, has to be added to the developing human in
the womb, which would already have a vegetative and a sensitive soul. 25 If so, Grosseteste would seem to be saying that these souls or forms are subsumed into the higher simplicity of the rational soul, when it arrives. Then again, the sense may simply be that the rational form is added to the others. 26 This addition may or may not involve a temporal sequence. It could be merely a conceptual addition reflecting the fact that there is a significant difference between souls that only have powers of sense and vegetation and souls that also have the rational power.
In that case, Grosseteste would not be committed to any souls actually existing apart from the rational, which contains the powers of all three.
Whatever Grosseteste means by superveniens and advenit, the fact remains that the form of the rational soul possesses all the operations of the lower souls. This still leads to the
24 McEvoy, Philosophy, 264, says that this text “does not allow of any positive pronouncement” regarding plurality of substantial forms. My conclusion is slightly different. 25 McEvoy, Philisophy, 314-315, argues that Grosseteste’s mature thought (after the De Statu ) must be taken to assume that God creates the single substantial form of the soul simultaneously possessing all its powers, implying that it does not subsume any pre-existing souls already present in the baby. That may be so, but in the De Potentia et Actu, another work likely of the 1220s, it is quite clear that he believes the rational soul is added to the developing child. See Robert Grosseteste, De Potentia et Actu (Baur, 128). When this information is brought to bear on the interpretation of the De Statu, where the rational form is added to and replaces the other two, it seems that in both works he probably does think the baby has one or more lower forms that are replaced in some way by the rational form. Thus he seems to hold to a version of delayed hominization in the 1220s. In any case, Grosseteste’s precise view on this question does not necessarily dictate his general answer to the question of the three souls. 26 Deferrari says that supervenio can sometimes mean “to add” (Roy Deferrari, A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas [Boston, MA: St. Paul Editions, 1960] , 1017).
208 conclusion that the human with a rational soul has no need of the lower souls, and, we should assume, does not have them as distinct substances or even forms. This supposition is confirmed in part by Grosseteste’s statement that the whole man, and not merely a part, understands. 27 I do
not think he could say this if the lower souls remained distinct substances from the rational soul.
When Grosseteste refers to the three souls in deference to his authorities, we should take him to
be referring to the vegetative and sensitive powers included in the rational, or human, soul, not to
distinct forms or substances in the soul.
Part 2: Grosseteste’s Tacit Rejection of Substance/Accident Composition
Now the stage is set for discussing the question of the soul and its powers. I will begin
with an historical orientation. The two most important points of reference for placing Robert
Grosseteste on the question of substance/accident distinction of the soul and its powers are the
Augustinian/Cistercian tradition of the twelfth century, represented by the Pseudo-Augustinian
De Spiritu et Anima, and the foundation of the Dominican tradition of psychology in Thomas
Aquinas’ Questions on the Soul. Although comparison to both of these works would be easy to justify due simply to their proximity to Grosseteste and their importance, the main impetus for my selection is the fact that Aquinas responds directly to the De Spiritu et Anima on this very question. Thus, when I show that Grosseteste sides with the De Spiritu et Anima on the simplicity of the soul in reference to its powers, I will at the same time be showing how Aquinas would have disagreed with Grosseteste, had he responded to him directly.
27 Robert Grosseteste, De Statu Causarum (Baur, 125): “…nulla pars hominis est homo, nec aliqua pars hominis intelligit…”
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As Chenu explains, there arose in the twelfth century a tension between the Pseudo-
Dionysian and Aristotelian tendencies to divide the soul into essence and distinct powers on the one hand and the multipotent mens of the Augustinian tradition on the other. 28 Writers in the
Augustinian tradition held to the identity of powers with one another and with the substance of the soul, 29 maintaining a simplicity analogous to the simplicity of God. 30 As translations of
Aristotle and the Pseudo-Dionysius made their way into the Latin west during the Twelfth
Century Renaissance, Augustinian thinkers generally embraced the tendency in these new works to analyze the soul according to specific powers that are sharply distinct, yet they maintained their basic metaphysical outlook. The drama of this mixture of disparate psychologies played out in the extensive de anima literature of the twelfth century, of which the De Spiritu et Anima is one example. 31 The result was a psychology rich in powers of the soul that, due to the substantial identity of the powers, allowed for a certain fluidity among the functions of the
28 Chenu, La Théologie au Douzième Siècle, 297-298. 29 See for example De Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40:782), quoted in note 32 below. While the De Spiritu et Anima was wrongly attributed to Augustine, the same doctrine could be found in the real Augustine. Augustine De Trinitate X.XI.18 (CCSL 50:330-331; emphasis original) : “ Haec igitur tria, memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas, quoniam non sunt tres uitae sed una uita, nec tres mentes sed una mens, consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt sed una substantia… Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum quo una uita, una mens, una essentia … Quapropter quando inuicem a singulis et tota et omnia capiuntur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis et tota singula simul omnibus totis, et haec tria unum, una uita, una mens, una essentia .” It has been debated, however, whether Augustine’s settled view does or does not involve a real distinction between the soul and its powers. For discussion see Bieniak, Soul-Body Problem, 98-99. Whatever Augustine may have thought, the idea that the soul is identical with its powers became the dominant view among Christian thinkers. Bieniak, Soul-Body Problem, 99, states that “before the thirteenth century, most Christian theologians maintained this doctrine and almost unanimously ascribed it to Augustine.” This view even appears in Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, D.3, c.2, on which see Bieniak, Soul-Body Problem, 100. 30 For example, De Spiritu et Anima 36 (PL 40:807): “Creata est anima a Deo, vita a vita, simplex a simplici, immortalis ab immortali; ut non sit longe a Creatore suo, cui appropiare videtur simplicitate essentiae et perpetuitate vitae.” 31 Chenu, La Théologie au Douzième Siècle, 297, nt. 3, observes, “ Le mens (-memoria) d’Augustin est irréductible aux distinctions essence-faculté .” On the plentiful psychological literature of the twelfth century, including a brief comment on the De Spiritu et Anima, see Ibid., 298.
210 powers. 32 In the working of any given power, it was the same simple soul that was acting directly.33 In the Cistercian context, this feature was exploited as a means of directing all the powers of the soul to God. 34 Grosseteste’s general indebtedness to this school of thought cannot
be doubted.
Thomas Aquinas would later side with Aristotle on this question. Question twelve of
Aquinas’ Questions on the Soul is “Whether the soul is its own powers.” In this question, the
Dominican shows that he is well aware of the traditional view he is abandoning, citing the De
Spiritu et Anima, Bernard of Clairvaux, and even Augustine himself in the objections portion. 35
Aquinas states his own position as follows:
Therefore it is obvious that the essence of a soul is not itself the immediate principle of a soul’s operations, but rather it operates by the mediation of accidental principles. Hence the powers of a soul are not its very essence but are its properties.
32 The variety and identity of the powers is expressed, for example, in De Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40:782): “Sensus vero unus est in anima, et quod ipsa: et cum corpus non sit, corporeus dicitur, quia corpus non transcendit, vel quia corporeis exercetur instrumentis; unde et ob numerum instrumentorum quinquepartitus dicitur, cum intus non sit nisi unus. Verumtamen propter varia exercitia variatur et varie nuncupatur. Dicitur namque sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia. Et haec omnia in anima nihil aliud sunt, quam ipsa, aliae et aliae inter se proprietates propter varia exercitia, sed una essentia rationis et una anima: proprietates quidem diversae, sed essentia una: secundum exercitia, multa sunt; secundum essentiam vero, unum sunt in anima et idem quod ipsa .” See also de Spiritu et Anima 13 (PL 40:788-789). 33 De Spiritu et Anima 19 (PL 40:794): “Anima vero in quibuscumque suis motibus vel actibus tota simul adest. Tota videt, et tota visorum meminit: tota audit, et tota sonorum reminiscitur: tota odorat, et tota odores recolit: tota per linguam et palatum sapores sentit et discernit: tota tangit dura vel mollia: tota simul approbat et reprobat. Calida vero vel frigida summo tantum digito tota discernit. Tota est visus, tota est auditus, tota meminit: et cum tota meminit, tota est memoria; cum tota vult, tota est voluntas; cum tota cogitat, tota est cogitatio; cum tota diligit, tota est dilectio. Potest namque ex parte cogitare, et ex parte diligere.” 34 De Spiritu et Anima 4 (PL 40:782): “Et sicut mundus iste visibilis quinquepartita quadam distinctione est ordinatus; terra scilicet, aqua, aere, et aethere, sive firmamento, ipsoque supremo coelo, quod empyreum vocant: sic animae in mundo sui corporis peregrinanti quinque progressus sunt ad sapientiam; sensus scilicet, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, et intelligentia. Quinque enim progressionibus rationalitas exercetur ad sapientiam, et quatuor affectibus ad charitatem: quatenus novem istis progressionibus in semetipsa proficiens anima, sensu et affectu, quaternis quibusdam pedibus, quae spiritu vivit, spiritu ambulet usque ad Cherubim et Seraphim, id est, usque ad plenitudinem scientiae, et regnum charitatis, habeatque anima per exercitium virtutes, quarum facultates habet per naturam.” 35 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de Anima q. 12 ob. 1-4. Of course, he tries to offer alternative intrepretations of some of the objections in his responses to them.
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This same conclusion can also be proved from the diversity of a soul’s actions, which are generically diverse and cannot be reduced to a single immediate principle…And so, since the essence of the soul is a single principle, it cannot be the immediate principle of all its actions, but rather it must possess a number of diverse powers which correspond to the diversity of its actions. 36
Here Aquinas clearly articulates a metaphysical distinction between the soul’s substance
and its powers, and also between the powers as diverse principles of actions. For Aquinas, the
powers are accidents that always accompany the substance of the soul, but they are not the
substance or essence of the soul itself. 37
The great benefit of Aquinas’ text is that it lays out the options clearly. The
Augustinian/Cistercian tradition had said that the soul was its powers, and this meant that the soul’s powers were not accidents but were the substance of the soul itself. They were not principles through which the soul acted mediately, but rather the soul itself was the immediate principle of all its actions. Aquinas’ alternative view holds that the powers of the soul are
36 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de Anima q. 12 corpus (ed. B.-C. Bazán, 110 ; trans. James H. Robb, 158): “Manifestum est igitur quod ipsa essentia anime non est principium immediatum suarum operationum, set operatur mediantibus pincipiis accidentalibus. Vnde potentie anime non sunt ipsa essentia anime, set proprietates eius. / Deinde hoc apparet ex ipsa diuersitate actionum anime, que sunt genere diuerse et non possunt reduci in unum principium immediatum…Et ita, cum essentia anime sit unum principium, non potest esse immediatum principium omnium suarum actionum, set oportet quod habeat plures et diuersas potentias corrospondentes diuersitati suarum actionum .” The full information for Robb’s translation is Thomas Aquinas, Questions on the Soul [Quaestiones de Anima], trans. James H. Robb, Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation 27 (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984). Although the translation is older than the edtion, this fact does not make any difference to this quotation. 37 See also Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 2. As Wippel explains Thomas’ view, he believes the soul’s powers to be proper accidents that always accompany the soul but are not identical with its essence (John F. Wippel, The MetaphysicalThought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being [Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000], 277). See Aristotle, Categories 8 (9a-10a), where, under the third kind of quality, Aristotle discusses human capacities and affections. Since Aristotle places these things in the category of quality, he apparently wishes to distinguish them from substance. Romanus Cessario sees Aquinas’ appropriation of this “faculty psychology” as one of “the more profound insights that Christian theology borrows from Aristoteliam anthropology” (Romanus Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, second edition [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009, 2013], 57). A chief reason Cessario gives for the importance of this insight is that with such a distinction “the virtues can enjoy a reciprocity among themselves” (Ibid., 59). It is worth noticing, however, that Grosseteste’s view, as seen in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat (chapter 4) has no lack of influence between the virtues.
212 accidents distinct from the substance of the soul and from one another precisely because they are and must be distinct immediate principles of the soul’s varied actions. On Aquinas’ view, therefore, it would not be possible to say that the soul ultimately has only one power or to say that generically different powers belong to one over-arching power. For Aquinas, a power of the soul is an immediate principle of action, and generically different powers “cannot be reduced to a single immediate principle.” 38 Conversely, if one did collapse generically different powers into a single power or did hold that the soul was the immediate principle of all its actions, 39 then one would clearly be on the Augustinian/Cistercian side of this question.
Now it is time to place Robert Grosseteste relative to these two points of reference. On this question, which Aquinas helpfully frames as dealing with the substance/accident division of the soul and its powers, Grosseteste maintains the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition. 40 He sees the
soul’s powers as identical with the substance of the soul, so that any distinction between the soul
and its powers is not a substance/accident distinction but of some other sort (perhaps a logical
distinction). Likewise, the soul’s powers are identical in substance with one another. They are
not distinct immediate principles of actions. Since the soul is a single immediate principle of its
generically diverse actions, Grosseteste can combine or further divide the powers for the sake of
discussion, according to whatever aspect of human experience is in view. He does not need to
articulate a single, consistent schema of the soul’s powers.
38 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de Anima q. 12 corpus (ed. Bazán, 110 ; trans. Robb, 158). 39 Incidentally, Bieniak, Soul-Body Problem, 99, states that the most common way authors before the thirteenth century expressed the identity of the soul with its powers was by claiming that the soul constituted the immediate principle of its own operations. 40 James McEvoy has pointed out the fact that Grosseteste holds to the simplicity of the entire soul in line with the Augustinian tradition (McEvoy , Philosophy , 316-317). While McEvoy’s presentation is accurate on this point, he does not give much detail in reference to the identity of the powers.
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Now that I have placed Grosseteste with the Augustinians over against Aquinas, I will give my positive exposition of his views pertaining to substance/accident division of the soul and its powers. First, I will show from Letter 1 that Robert Grosseteste was aware of the substance/accident discussion in psychology. Then I will adduce multiple texts that show his position to be as I have just described. After briefly revisiting the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, I will proceed to the relevant passages that also happen to refer to aspectus and affectus. These passages appear in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, the De Libero Arbitrio, and the
Hexaëmeron. Then I will discuss an additional passage from the Hexaëmeron , complemented by
Dictum 33 and Dictum 32, in order to illustrate Grosseteste’s conceptual consistency on this point.
Letter 1 (1225-1228) 41 . We find in Letter 1 that the soul acts as a whole, whether it is
vivifying, moving, or governing. This view, coming most likely from the De Spiritu et Anima, 42 is based on an analogy between the action of the soul and the action of God, so it seems likely that Grosseteste conceives of the soul as a single immediate principle of its diverse actions and thus identical with its one all-embracing power. Our author gives a more direct treatment of the soul’s relationship to its powers later in the same letter:
41 This is the date range given by Mantello and Goering, Letters, 35. 42 Robert Grosseteste, Letter 1 (Baur, 114): “ Sicuti Deus unus semper ubique totus est, omnia vivificans, movens et gubernans, sic anima in suo corpore ubique tota viget, vivificans, gubernans et movens illud. ” Baur entitles this portion of Letter 1 “De Intelligenciis.” Here Grosseteste could be quoting Pseudo-Ambrose, De dignitate conditionis humanae 2 (PL 17:1015) or De Spiritu et Anima 35 (PL 40:805). See also Claudanius Mamertus, De Statu Animae III, ii, 1 (PL 53:761). Grosseteste quotes the same passage, attributing it to Augustine, and so probably getting it from the De Spiritu et Anima, in Hexaëmeron 8.7.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 228-229). If he quotes this passage from the De Spiritu et Anima later, it is likely that the quotation in Letter 1 is also drawn from that work, rather from Pseudo-Ambrose. This was a popular passage, however, so it is difficult to say for certain what work or quotation Grosseteste had before him.
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From these words it is plain that the entire soul (anima tota ) is essentially present everywhere in the body, which it vivifies, just as God is essentially everywhere as a whole in the universe, which He rules. And the soul is not essentially present in the heart alone or in the brain alone, and elsewhere in the body not through essence but through its power ( virtutem ). This is perhaps the thought of some who do not consider that the power ( virtus ) of the soul is either an accident of it, or the whole substance, or part of the substance. 43
Our concern here is with the three options given in the last sentence. He goes on to explain that, whichever option is true, the soul must be essentially present everywhere in the body, since in none of these cases could the power of the soul actually be separated from its substance. He does not say which view he holds, 44 but this is presumably because the question at hand concerns the location of the soul, rather than its relationship to its powers. What this text tells us beyond doubt is that Grosseteste was aware of the issue. He knew he had to hold one of these positions.
Since it is clear here that he is thinking of the virtus (the term used by his opponents) as the principle of the soul’s actions toward the body, what he believes about the soul and its virtus vis-
à-vis substance and accident should be the same as what he believes about the soul and its powers. In both cases, the question amounts to whether the soul is the immediate principle of its actions or whether it works through one or more mediate principles conceived as accidents. 45
43 Robert Grosseteste, Letter 1 (Baur, 114-115 ; partial trans. mine): “Ecce ex his verbis aperte habes, quod anima tota essentialiter ubique est in corpore, quod vivificat, sicut Deus ubique totus essentialiter est in universo, quod regit. Neque anima in corde solo aut solo cerebro est per essentiam et alibi in corpore non per essentiam, sed per virtutem suam, ut forte sentiunt aliqui non considerantes, quod virtus animae aut est accidens eius, aut substantia tota, aut pars substantiae. Quod si virtus animae sit tota eius substantia vel pars eius, ubicumque est eius virtus, est ipsa tota, quia etiam ubi est eius pars, est ipsa tota, cum non sit magnitudine molis distenta. Si vero dicatur virtus eius esse eius accidens, cum accidens non possit esse a subiecto divisum, ubicumque est eius virtus et eius substantia est .” 44 Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 29-30, takes this passage to be a straightforward affirmation that the virtus is the whole substance of the soul, and not an accident. I do not see it this way, but if she should be right the fact would only strengthen my argument. 45 The question of media between the soul and the body is a separate question, which I am not treating in the present chapter.
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I believe that his own position is the second one stated—that the soul is identical with its power (virtus ). Elsewhere Grosseteste says that the substance of the soul is simple in its presence to all parts of the body, 46 so the third option is not likely to be his view. 47 It is more difficult to eliminate the first option. He could say that the substance of the soul is simple but that it is distinct from the accidental powers through which it works. This is why an extended argument is necessary.
Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat (c.1243) . Before I introduce new key texts, it is important to
point out that Robert Grosseteste’s statements we have already seen in chapter 4 seem to require
him to stay with the De Spiritu et Anima tradition in holding to the identity of the soul with its
powers. This is especially true in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat. The diffused powers of logic, faith, and free will are operative within all six powers of the rational soul. Each of the six powers of the rational soul has a different object that specifies its function, but the diffused powers share in these functions. Now, the view in which the powers are distinct accidents, at least as defended by Aquinas, holds that they are distinct immediate principles of diverse actions. 48 Therefore, every power should have one distinct kind of action it performs. This is
perhaps not a problem for the six powers, but it is problematic for the three diffused powers.
46 Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Physics book 1 (Dales, 15): “…anima est una simplex et indivisa tota in qualibet parte corporis…” 47 The soul would not be simple if its substance had parts. It is possible that the two texts, Letter 1 and the Commentary on the Physics, utilize different concepts of simplicity. For example, the statement that the soul is simple could mean that the substance of the soul is not extended and has no spatial parts. If so, it could be that Letter 1 envisages substantial parts of another kind, such as powers. Still, since both texts deal with the soul’s presence and action in the body, I think it more likely that Grosseteste would rely on the same concept of substantial simplicity in both texts. If this is not satisfactory, there is another way to eliminate the substantial parts view, at least in reference to the powers of the soul. If the different powers were parts of the substance, they would seem to be distinct principles of action. Therefore, my argument below that there is only one principle of action in the soul, if successful, will also eliminate the substantial parts view. 48 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de Anima q. 12 sed contra and corpus. See note 36.
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They take part in the actions of the six powers, all of which differ due to their different objects.
Each diffused power, then, actually takes part in six different actions with six different determining objects. If Grosseteste were thinking of the powers as distinct principles of diverse actions, he would designate a different power for each kind of action. He would not have one power “diffused” throughout several other powers. More likely, he would not have powers within powers at all, since this results in multiple powers sharing the same function. Thus it is likely that Grosseteste did not intend these to be understood as distinctions between accidents of the soul.
In addition, his statement that “the whole life of man is the potency and power capable of apprehending all things” 49 seems tantamount to saying that the soul ultimately has one all- embracing power. Since this one power is the very life of man, he probably does understand it to be identical with the essence of the soul. 50
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (1220s) . After Letter 1 and the Ecclesia Sancta
Celebrat, the third key text is Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics 1.14 . He writes the following:
[T]he a ffectus and the aspectus of the soul are not separate ( divisi ), nor does its aspectus reach anywhere except where its affectus or love reaches. When therefore the love and
49 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §3 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 171): “unde et integra hominis vita est potentia et virtus apprehensiva omnium.” 50 McEvoy, Philosophy, 300, arrives at a similar conclusion: “Grosseteste saw the entire range of the capacities of human life as constituting a marvelous unity in which a single dynamic principle is at work, producing an openness to reality, a movement towards being and away from self-destruction and isolation. The natural habitat of this multiple wholeness that is man’s life cannot be defined in terms of a restricted environment, as it can in the case of plants and animals; it is Being itself, since all that is can be apprehended by some level of human life, and since the soul in the fullest meaning of the word, the life-principle, ‘is in some way all things’,--a clear reference to the celebrated dictum of Aristotle found in the De Anima (III, 8, 431b, 20).”
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affectus of the soul is turned to the body and to corporeal enticements, it necessarily drags the aspectus with it…51
This is one of several passages in which Grosseteste says that the affectus can limit the functioning of the aspectus. 52 He says the aspectus and affectus are not divisi. The word divisi in this passage does not by itself prove that Grosseteste holds one view or another. He could use the word and mean that both aspectus and affectus are proper accidents that must always accompany the soul, and in that way cannot be separated. However, this would not imply that the aspectus is limited by the affectus. If they were distinct accidents simply joined to the same substance, I see no reason to suppose that the aspectus could not reach a great many things that were ignored or despised by the affectus, since each would be the immediate principle of its own distinct actions. Yet here Grosseteste seems to think that the inseparability of the aspectus and the affectus is precisely what prevents one from leaving the other behind. This would only follow, I believe, in the case that the aspectus and affectus are not distinct immediate principles but one and the same immediate principle of action.
De Libero Arbitrio (1225-1230) . The next key text is Grosseteste’s De Libero Arbitrio.
Here he writes:
And so, just as the brightness of a ray of the sun is not heat, nor is heat brightness, and yet heat and brightness are not other than the one essence of the ray and both are one in the essence of the one ray, so aspectus and affectus, that is, reason and will, although simply speaking this is not that, they are nevertheless one in the one essence of the root. 53
51 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (ed. Pietro Rossi, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros [Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981], 216; trans. mine): “ …affectus et aspectus anime non sunt divisi, nec attingit aspectus eius nisi quo attingit affectus sive amor eius. Cum igitur amor et affectus anime convertitur ad corpus et ad illecebras corporales necessario trahit secum aspectum…” For an exposition of this passage see chapter 8. 52 For other passages, see chapter 3 and chapter 8. 53 Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda), cap. 17 (Baur, 228; trans. mine): “Sicut itaque splendor radii solis non est calor neque calor est splendor, et tamen calor et splendor non sunt aliud, quam una
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One could certainly be forgiven for seeing the relationship of light’s essence to its brightness and heat as substance/accident composition. Nevertheless, this is not how Grosseteste sees the matter. The important phrase is where he says that brightness and heat “ non sunt aliud, quam una essentia radii (are not other than the one essence of the ray).” This remark, when transferred by analogy to aspectus and affectus, cannot be reconciled with the idea that the soul’s powers are accidents. Accidents are not substance, by definition, and in Letter 1 Grosseteste clearly understood this.54 Since substantia and essentia would be interchangeable in this way of using
essentia, his equation of both powers with the essentia of the one root is the same as equating both with the substance and consequently implies a denial that they are accidents. 55
Grosseteste goes on to refer to “this one essence of the root, looking and desiring, extending itself into judging reason and into changeable and free will.” 56 For Grosseteste, free
essentia radii et ambo sunt unum in unius radii essentia, sic aspectus et affectus, ratio scilicet et voluntas, licet simpliciter loquendo haec non sit illa, sunt tamen unum in radicis una essentia. ” 54 Of course, medieval thinkers sometimes used differing definitions of substance and accident. In Letter 1, quoted above, Grosseteste appears to follow Aristotle in believing that substance and accident cannot be separated in actu , since the essence of the soul would still be present everywhere it acts, even if its virtus were an accident. (Presumably transubstantiation would be a miraculous exception to this rule.) Yet, it is equally clear in Letter 1 that an accident is neither identical with substance nor any part of it, since those are the other options in that passage. 55 Though not through this chain of reasoning, Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 37, also interprets this passage as affirming the identity in substance of the powers of the soul. 56 Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda), cap. 17 (Baur, 228; partial trans. mine): ”Et haec radicis unica essentia aspiciens et appetens sese protendens in rationem iudicantem et voluntatem vertibilem et liberam, in quantum haec radix est sic sese protendens „iudex sui" propter rationem et „libera sui" propter voluntatem, liberum est.” Although not explicitly addressing the question of substance/accident composition, Neil Lewis, clearly with this passage in mind, explains, “Grosseteste takes the capacities underlying free decision to be reason and will, which he identifies with aspectus and affectus respectively, two notions characteristic of his thought. He holds, probably under Augustine's influence, that these capacities are at root one, but this one capacity can be exercised in one way through a decision, and in another through a choice. In proposing this doctrine Grosseteste appears concerned to maintain the simplicity of the soul.” (Lewis, “Robert Grosseteste,” n.p.) On Grosseteste’s theory of free decision, see Neil Lewis, “ Libertas arbitrii in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio ,” in Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies, ed. John Flood, James R. Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering, Papers in Medieval Studies 24 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2003), 11-33, esp. 15-17. In addition, Dr. Lewis has prepared a new edition of the two recensions of Grosseteste’s De Libero Arbitrio soon to appear in the series Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi. Until this volume is available, one may consult
219 choice involves a single substance or essence that carries out the actions of both reason and will.
Since the soul is only one substance for Grosseteste, it seems that he would want to say this one essence of free choice is ultimately the essence of the soul itself. The main point here is that the light analogy, as Grosseteste explains it, excludes substance/accident composition.
Hexaëmeron 8.3.1 (c.1230-1235). Let us move on to the Hexaëmeron to confirm this interpretation. Grosseteste uses the same analogy—light, its brightness, and its heat—in part eight as an analogy of the Trinity:
Now because God is in a Trinity of persons, it follows that God is light, not corporeal but incorporeal. Or rather, God is neither corporeal nor incorporeal light but is above both. Now all light has this naturally and essentially: that it begets from itself its own brightness. But light begetting and brightness begotten necessarily embrace one another mutually and breathe out from themselves their mutual heat. 57
Of course, the light begetting is the Father. The brightness begotten is the Son, and the mutual heat is the Holy Spirit. A little later in the same paragraph, discussing how these three differ, he adds, “But in God it is not possible that the begotten be another ( alterum ) from the one begetting, since we say ‘another’ through accidental difference.” Ultimately he concludes that each is not another thing (aliud ) but another person ( alius ), with each person being the Boethian “individual substance of a rational nature.” 58
There are two important points to notice here. The first is that each of the three is a substance. In substance, the three aspects of light or the three persons of the Trinity are identical.
Lewis’ edition of the first recension: Neil Lewis, “The First Recension of Robert Grosseteste’s De Libero Arbitrio,” Mediaeval Studies 53 (1991): 1-88. 57 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.3.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 220; trans mine, influenced by Martin): “Quod autem Deus sit in personis trinus, inde sequitur quod Deus est lux, non corporea sed incorporea; immo magis neque corporea neque incorporea, sed supra utrumque. Omnis autem lux hoc habet naturaliter et essencialiter quod de se gignit suum splendorem. Lux autem gignens et splendor genitus necessario sese amplectuntur mutuo, et spirant de se mutuum fervorem.” 58 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.3.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 220; trans mine).
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They differ, in this case, by their mutual relations: light begetting to brightness begotten and light and brightness together breathing to the mutual warmth breathed out. The second feature of this passage to notice is the explicit denial of accidental difference between the three persons. Now, this passage is about the Trinity and not about the soul. Also, it is about God as light-above- light. Nevertheless, he says that all light “naturally and essentially” acts in the way he describes.
While he does say elsewhere that corporeal light has accidents, 59 it is light as an analogy that we care about here. In these analogies Grosseteste is thinking about light as such, not necessarily corporeal light. The case with the Trinity shows beyond doubt that Grosseteste can use the light analogy to deny substance/accident composition. It seems unlikely that he would use light, a favorite entity in his metaphysics, 60 to exclude substance/accident composition in God in one
place and to affirm the same composition in the soul in another, especially when we remember
Grosseteste’s very Augustinian love for comparing the powers of the soul to the Trinity. It is
more likely that in both cases when Grosseteste uses the light analogy substance/accident
composition is excluded. In this way, Hexaëmeron 8.3.1 confirms my interpretation of the text
from the De Libero Arbitrio.
Hexaëmeron 8.5.1. Let us now consider one of Grosseteste’s uses of the Augustinian
psychological analogy, a particularly important one that also happens to appear in Hexaëmeron
part eight:
But in the genus of this last analogy ( exemplum ), namely, of memory begetting, of its begotten similitude, and of the bond of love, the nearest analogy of the Trinity of God is memory, understanding, and love in the highest face of reason. By this highest power alone is God the Trinity remembered, understood, and loved without the cloud of
59 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 2.10.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 98-99). 60 On the theme of light in Grosseteste’s metaphysics, see McEvoy, Philosophy , 149-205 and 450-451.
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phantasms or the use of a corporeal instrument…And so, according to this one, simple, and highest power—remembering, understanding, and loving in the way I said—man is the highest similitude, and through this the highest image, of the one God, the Trinity.61
Here Grosseteste explains that the suprema facies racionis, the highest face of reason, is a simple power that performs three actions: remembering God, understanding God, and loving
God. Since Grosseteste explicitly says that this power is simple, one cannot break it down into distinct principles of action. Consequently, it cannot be the case that the object of love is in the intellect (here identified by remembering and understanding), for this would make that which loves ( affectus ) and that which remembers and understands (aspectus ) into distinct principles of
action. So then, the object of love has to be the same as the object of knowledge in this case,
meaning that both the knowledge and the love are direct.62 Memory, understanding, and will or
love are reduced to a single immediate principle. As I said before, treating the soul’s powers as
accidents involves treating them as distinct immediate principles of action. Grosseteste does not
want to do this, particularly in the case of the rational soul.
61 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 224-225 ; trans mine): "In genere autem huius exempli ultimi, memorie videlicet gignentis et sue genite similitudinis et amoris copulantis, vicinissimum exemplum Dei trinitatis est memoria, intelligentia et amor in suprema facie racionis, qua sola vi suprema Deus Trinitas sine nubulo fantasmatum, et non per corporeum instrumentum memoratur, intelligitur et diligitur … Et ita secundum hanc supremam virtutem unam et simplicem dicto modo memorantem, intelligentem et diligentem, est homo summa similitudo et per hoc imago unius Dei Trinitatis.” Cf. Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 60 (ed. Servus Gieben, “Traces of God in Nature According to Robert Grosseteste, with the Text of the Dictum, ‘Omnis Creatura Speculum Est, ’” Franciscan Studies 24 [1964]: 156-157). 62 Thomas Aquinas, by contrast, places the object of the will in the intellect, creating, it would seem, the awkward implication that we cannot love God directly, even if we see Him directly. Our love is mediated through our own powers of cognition. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.82, a.3 corpus (ed. the Leonine Commission, 1:629), quoted in note 97 below. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.27, a.2 corpus. As Andrew Whitmore pointed out to me, one could see this feature of Thomas’ psychology as an application of his axiom “what is received is receieved according to the mode of the receiver.” On this axiom in Thomas’s metaphysics, see chapter four of John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 113-122. Wippel, ibid., 122, suggests that Thomas found the inspiration for the “what is received…” axiom primarily in sense perception and intellection. He says Thomas’s historical sources for this idea were Aristotle, Boethius, the Liber de causis and the Pseudo-Dionysius.
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Furthermore, this simple power with three kinds of action is the highest created similitude of the Trinity. If there is any place where it is appropriate to assume that Grosseteste means to keep a close analogy between God and the soul, it is here. After all, it was in this very sort of reflection that Augustine articulated his own opinion that the powers in this analogy are identical in substance with the soul and one another. 63 For both Augustine and Grosseteste, the powers of the rational soul are identical in substance as the persons of the Trinity are identical in substance.
Likewise, since the persons of the Trinity are not accidents of the Divine Nature, neither are the powers accidents of the rational soul.
Dictum 33 (c.1230) . The next text to consider is Dictum 33. This dictum is a theological explanation of John 14:19: “He that has seen me has seen my Father.” He uses two different
Trinitarian triads, in this dictum : power, wisdom, and goodness as appropriations to the persons of the Trinity and memory, understanding, and will or love as analogues to the persons in their mutual relations. The latter is the same analogy he used in the simple power passage of the
Hexaëmeron (8.5.1) . He also mentions power, wisdom, and love as a triad but does not explicitly connect it to the Trinity on this occasion. 64
Near the beginning of Dictum 33, after saying that one knows all three persons of the
Trinity through knowing one due to their identity in essence, 65 he says that the same is true with the “higher” created trinity in the human soul:
63 See Augustine De Trinitate X.XI.18 (CCSL 50:330-331), quoted in note 29 above. 64 See the quotation of Dictum 33 in note 69 below. 65 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 33 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.24rb): “Quia quantum quis agnoscit Filium secundum substanciam divinitatis, tantum novit Patrem et eciam Spiritum Sanctum secundum essenciam eandem.”
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And he who sees beyond the cloud of appearances the higher created trinity in his own soul, according to which trinity the soul is an image of the highest Trinity, if he knows in that trinity one person as in a mirror he will know the rest in that same mirror. 66
This sentence requires careful attention. At this point in the dictum he has not yet introduced
either of the triads he is going to discuss, but three factors make it very highly probable that he
has the triad of memory, understanding, and will in view here. The first is that he calls it the
“higher created trinity.” This probably reflects Augustine’s preference of this trinity (and
particularly these three powers directed towards God) as the highest image of God to be found. 67
We know that Grosseteste knew of and agreed with this estimation from the simple power passage in the Hexaëmeron. 68 The second factor also concerns the simple power passage.
There, as here, he refers to contemplation “without the cloud of phantasms” (“appearances” in
66 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 33 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.24rb; trans. Jackson 3:25): “Qui eciam absque nubilo fantasmatum videt in anima superiorem trinitatem creatam, secundum quam trinitatem anima est ymago summe Trinitatis, in ipsa trinitate anime sicut in speculo agnoscens unam personam agnoscit in eodem speculo ceteras. ” Concerning Grosseteste’s view that one can contemplate ideas in God without phantasms, see chapter 8. 67 The following four quotations encapsulate the line of thought that leads Augustine to the conclusion that remembering, understanding, and loving God is the highest trinity there is below God himself: Augustine De Trinitate XIV.VIII.11 (CCSL 50A:435-436): “Nunc uero ad eam iam peruenimus disputationem ubi principale mentis humanae quo nouit deum uel potest nosse considerandum suscepimus ut in eo reperiamus imaginem dei. Quamuis enim mens humana non sit eius naturae cuius est deus, imago tamen naturae illius qua natura melior nulla est ibi quaerenda et inuenienda est in nobis quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius.” Augustine De Trinitate XIV.X.13 (CCSL 50A:441): “…cum profecto ex quo esse coepit, numquam sui meminisse, numquam se intellegere, numquam se amare destiterit sicut iam ostendimus. Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsam cogitatione conuertitur fit trinitas in qua iam et uerbum possit intellegi. Formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione, uoluntate utrumque iungente. Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quaerimus.” Augustine, De Trinitate XIV.XII.15 (CCSL 50A:442-443): “Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit sapiens ipsa fit.” Augustine De Trinitate XIV.XIV.20 (CCSL 50A:448; italics original): “Diligere porro se ipsam non posset si se omnino nesciret, id est si sui non meminisset nec se intellegeret. Qua in se imagine dei tam potens est ut ei cuius imago est ualeat inhaerere. Sic enim ordinata est naturarum ordine non locorum ut supra illam non sit nisi ille. Denique cum illi penitus adhaeserit, unus erit spiritus, cui rei attestatur apostolus dicens : Qui autem adhaeret domino unus spiritus est …” 68 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 224-225): ”In genere autem huius exempli ultimi, memorie videlicet gignentis et sue genite similitudinis et amoris copulantis, vicinissimum exemplum Dei trinitatis est memoria, intelligentia et amor in suprema facie racionis, qua sola vi suprema Deus Trinitas sine nubulo fantasmatum, et non per corporeum instrumentum memoratur, intelligitur et diligitur … Et ita secundum hanc supremam virtutem unam et simplicem dicto modo memorantem, intelligentem et diligentem, est homo summa similitudo et per hoc imago unius Dei Trinitatis.”
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Jackson’s translation). This suggests the same highest trinity is in view here as was in view there.
Finally, memory, understanding, and love form the first image of the Trinity that he discusses after the sentence quoted above. 69 I shall proceed, then, on the assumption that this sentence in
Dictum 33 refers to the triad of memory, understanding, and will or love.
In this sentence, Grosseteste says that in any one of the trinity of memory, understanding,
and will or love found in the soul one can know the corresponding person of the Trinity as in a
mirror ( sicut in speculo ). This is a reference to 1 Corinthians 13:12, in which seeing through a
mirror ( per speculum ) is in contrast to direct knowledge. 70 Grosseteste is saying that the soul, or the image of God in the soul, is the mirror. When one looks at memory in the soul, he sees not only an image of the Father, but also of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Where he sees the other persons, though, is not in the divine essence (for this is indirect vision) but in the “same mirror” as he saw the first person. It is possible that this is due only to the mutually entailing relations between the persons, but Grosseteste goes on to admit that these are less than obvious to many people. 71 Perhaps a better option, especially in light of the Hexaëmeron’ s explicit affirmation of
69 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 33 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.24rb): “Philosophi et curiosi amatores potencie et sapiencie, et non habentes amorem ordinatum, et ideo habentes oculum cordis obscuratum, plus noverunt in se, licet impure, tum noverunt memoriam gignentem intelligenciam, et intelligenciam genitam de memoria, quam amoris ordinem, et ideo in speculo anime plus cognoverunt duas personas quam terciam .” I take him to be saying that the philosophers should have known all three persons through the mirror of the soul for the reasons stated, but this intellectual vision was partly blocked by their misdirected affectus. I will explain this dynamic in Grosseteste’s epistemology in chapter 8. 70 1 Corinthians 13:12 (Vulg.): “Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem. Nunc cognosco ex parte : tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum .” Unless otherwise noted, biblical quotations with the designation “Vulg.” are from Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam versionem, fourth revised edition, ed. Robert Weber (Stuttgart: Deutsch Bibelgesellschaft, 1969, 1994). Since Weber’s edition uses line division instead of conventional punctuation, I have added capitalization and punctuation to all quotations, generally following suggestions found in text of the Clementine Vulgate ( Biblia Sacra Vulgatæ editionis, Sixti V Pontificis Maximi jussu recognita et edita [Roma: Typographis Vaticanis, 1598]) as presented by The Clementine Vulgate Project. http://vulsearch.sourceforge.net/index.html. 71 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 33 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.24rb): “Non tamen sequitur ita propinque ut qui concedit duas personas concedat et terciam. Potest enim habere obscuram noticiam Patris et Filii, et
225 the simplicity of the suprema facies racionis is that this statement is connected with his opening
statement about seeing all three persons in the Trinity due to their identity in essence. If this is
correct, the same dynamic that allows the viewer to see one person in another in the Trinity is
present in the image of the Trinity found in the soul. Since he has described that dynamic in the
Trinity in terms of the identity of essence, he appears to believe the same is true of the soul. He
who has seen memory in the soul has seen understanding and love, for they are identical in
essence or substance.
Dictum 32 (c.1230) . There is another Trinitarian analogy text that seems to affirm both
the identity of the soul with its powers and the identity of the powers with one another, but
differently from the above passages. Grosseteste’s Dictum 32 is a brief note on the indivisibility
of the power, wisdom, and will of the soul in their actions based upon an analogy with the
appropriations of power, wisdom, and will or love to the persons in the Trinity. Since this is all
Grosseteste does in the note, it is an especially good witness to his own personal view on the
matter. He is not commenting on a text. He is not exhorting an audience. He is not focused on
some other matter. He seems to have had no other reason to write this note than to work out or
present his own view of this very question. He states:
Each of our voluntary actions is the product of three things, namely, power, wisdom, and will or love; and yet we attribute each of our actions to one of the three more properly than to the others. For these three may now show favour to the wretched, then read or dispute most eloquently, and after that best an enemy with manly vigour: yet the first of these is properly attributed to love, the second to wisdom, and the third to power. 72
ignorare eos spirare amorem quo se amant adinvicem, sed non potest agnoscere Patrem et Filium esse spirantes, nisi eciam agnoverit eorum spiramen.” 72 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 32 (ed. mine; trans. Jackson 3:25, modified by the author): “Unumquodque operum nostrorum voluntariorum faciunt tria, scilicet potencia, sapiencia, voluntas sive amor, et tamen unumquodque operum nostrorum alicui uni istorum trium magis proprie quam aliis attribuimus. Hec enim tria tunc beneficia
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So far he has said that power, wisdom, and will are all involved in all voluntary actions, but he has not yet stated how precisely they relate to the soul and to one another.
He goes on to say that it is like power, wisdom, and will in the Trinity. Although works of power are attributed to the Father, works of wisdom to the Son, and works of kindness to the
Holy Spirit, nevertheless we understand that each person performs the whole of every work. 73
Presumably this is because the simple divine substance is the direct principle of God’s every
action, as Thomas Aquinas also would grant.74 But for Grosseteste, the power, wisdom, and will of the human soul work analogously to the same in God. This would seem to imply that the substance of the rational soul (at least) is the direct principle of all its actions. His conclusion seems to confirm this inference: “So also in us the will does the whole; wisdom does the whole; power does the whole.” 75
Here also we must notice the difference between this Trinitarian analogy and the one in the highest power of the soul, which I explained above. The present triad includes wisdom and power instead of intellect and memory. Because power ( potentia ) is in the triad, it would seem
to be a confusion to say he is talking about three powers that may or may not be identical. As far
as I know, there is no power of the soul called simply “power ( potentia )” that could be
prestant miseris, dum diserte legunt aut disputant, tunc viriliter hostem prosternunt, et tamen primum horum proprie attribuitur amori, secundum sapiencie, tercium vero potencie.” For my working edition of this dictum see Appendix 5A. 73 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 32 (ed. mine): “ Sic opera Trinitatis, licet sint indivisa, quedam tamen magis proprie attribuuntur Patri, alia Filio, alia Spiritui Sancto; utpote Patri opera potencie, Filio sapiencie, Spiritui Sancto benignitatis. / Nec sic operantur quod una faciat partem operis unam et alia aliam, sed quelibet totum operatur. ” For my working edition of this dictum see Appendix 5A. 74 See Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de Anima q. 12 corpus (ed. Bazán, 109) and Summa Contra Gentiles II c.9-10. 75 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 32 (ed. and trans. mine): “Sic eciam in nobis totum operatur voluntas, totum sapiencia, totum potencia. ” For my working edition of this dictum see Appendix 5A.
227 distinguished from other powers. Rather, all powers belong in some way to the potentia of the soul. By naming power alongside wisdom and will, Grosseteste has already removed the possibility of seeing the three as distinct powers in this context. The power of wisdom and the power of will can be no other than the potentia with which they are grouped in the triad.
Grosseteste has to be saying that there is just one power in the rational soul, which is the principle of the actions both of wisdom and of will. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude at least that the rational soul is identical with its powers, and they are identical in substance with one another. 76
In sum, Grosseteste in several places seems to indicate that he holds the soul to be identical with its powers and that these powers are all ultimately one, identical in substance with one another. The soul is the immediate principle of its actions. Whatever accidents the soul may have,77 its natural powers are not to be numbered among them.
Part 3: The Question of Distinction Ex Parte Rei
Now I turn to the question of distinction ex parte rei. A distinction ex parte rei (literally,
“from the part of the thing”) is a distinction that is not purely created by the human mind, that is not merely logical. Even if it cannot be explained precisely how the thing gives rise to the distinction, the one making such a distinction nevertheless holds it to be true that in making the distinction he is saying something about the thing itself and not merely the human experience of it. Yet a distinction ex parte rei need not involve the actual separability of the items
76 Given that wisdom belongs to the aspectus and will to the affectus, here again we have the identity of aspectus with affectus. 77 I think he would say that the moral qualities of the soul, for example, are accidents, but the point is of no consequence to the present discussion.
228 distinguished, nor is it required that the substance of the thing be divided in any way to account for the distinction. Scotus’ formal distinction, which he would later posit both between the persons of the Trinity and between the powers of the soul, is a classic example of a distinction ex parte rei that does not require separability or substantial division. In fact, one way of framing the question at hand could be to ask whether Grosseteste in some way anticipates Scotus’ formal distinction. 78 For my part, I will be content at present simply to answer the question in reference to Grosseteste.
The key passages for considering this question have already appeared. One is the light analogy from De Libero Arbitrio, 79 and the other is the simple power passage from the
Hexaëmeron (8.5.1) . I will begin by presenting the evidence in favor of seeing a distinction ex parte rei between aspectus and affectus. Then I will raise an objection to this line of interpretation, and finally I will attempt to resolve the question.
The evidence for a distinction . The evidence for distinction is twofold. First, in the light analogy we have seen in the De Libero Arbitrio, Grosseteste says that “simply speaking, this is not that,” referring to aspectus and affectus. 80 This kind of language seems to imply that the powers are different in some way. But one wants to know in what way. It cannot be a distinction in essence or between accidents. It could conceivably be a logical distinction or a
78 In a recent paper, Neil Lewis pointed out that Richard Rufus’ anticipation of Scotus’ formal distinction occurs in part as an explanation of the light analogy from Grosseteste’s De Libero Arbitrio (Neil Lewis, “The Structure of the Soul: Aspectus and Affectus in Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus of Cornwall” [paper presented at the conference “Aspectus and Affectus: Robert Grosseteste , Understanding and Feeling,” held at Georgetown University, March 31- April 1, 2017]). If Grosseteste has a distinction ex parte rei in that very passage, Grosseteste could be seen as Rufus’ inspiration. It is not, however, my intention to take a position on how Grosseteste influences Rufus. 79 Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda), cap. 17 (Baur, 228), quoted above. 80 Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda), cap. 17 (Baur, 228 ; trans mine): “…sic aspectus et affectus, ratio scilicet et voluntas, licet simpliciter loquendo haec non sit illa, sunt tamen unum in radicis una essentia. ”
229 distinction ex parte rei. Among the generation of masters succeeding Grosseteste, Richard
Fishacre and Richard Rufus of Cornwall asked a very similar question about this very passage and arrived at opposite conclusions. 81
The second part of the evidence in favor of a distinction may serve as a guide for
interpreting the De Libero Arbitrio passage. Richard Dales has observed that “The central feature of Grosseteste’s view of the human soul is that it is the image of the Trinity.” 82 I would
say that this Augustinian theme is at least a very important feature, and we have seen this in the
simple power passage from the Hexaëmeron. If Grosseteste sees the operation of the powers of the soul as analogous to the operations of the persons of the Trinity, it seems highly probable that, in addition to implying the substantial identity of the powers, this analogy also implies differences between the powers that are analogous to the differences between the persons in the
Trinity. These would presumably be distinctions ex parte rei, and so we know that Grosseteste has such a conception at his disposal. Now we can safely interpret the light analogy. Since he uses light, brightness, and heat as an analogy for the persons of the Trinity and also for aspectus, affectus, and their common essence, it seems likely that he intends the same kind of distinction in both cases. Therefore, both the simple power passage in the Hexaëmeron and the light analogy in De Libero Arbitrio seem to treat the powers of the rational soul as distinct ex parte rei.
81 According to Neil Lewis, “Structure of the Soul,” Richard Fishacre argued that the two are only one power, the power of apprehension. Richard Rufus, in contrast, argued that they are two powers and in doing so seems to have anticipated Duns Scotus’ formal distinction. Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus both use Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus light analogy passage in their commentaries on the Sentences at Distinction 24 of Book 2. For a discussion of Fishacre’s treatment of aspectus and affectus accessible in print, see Raymond James Long, “The Problem of the Soul in Richard Fishacre’s Commentary on the Sentences,” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1968), 86-88. For the text of Fishacre’s Sentence commentary that supports Long’s discussion, see Ibid., *26-*29, which is.part of Fishacre’s comments on Book 1, Distinction 3. Long also edited the relevant discussion in Book 2, Distinction 24, (Ibid., *110-*135). 82 Dales, Rational Soul, 38.
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The evidence against a distinction. The evidence against a distinction ex parte rei
between aspectus and affectus is that Grosseteste explicitly affirms the simplicity of the highest
power of the soul, a power that clearly includes both aspectus and affectus. As mentioned above,
in Hexaëmeron part eight he says that the highest face of the reason ( suprema facies racionis ) is
a simple power in which God is loved, understood, and remembered. 83 When discussing the
Hexaëmeron in chapter four I pointed out that Grosseteste’s use of memory, understanding, and will is filtered through his aspectus/affectus distinction. Memory and understanding belong to the aspectus, and will or love belongs to the affectus. So then, it is also true in the thought of
Grosseteste’s Hexaëmeron that the highest power of the soul is a simple power in which God is known and loved through the aspectus and affectus.
If Grosseteste really does hold, as he plainly says, that there is a simple power responsible for the actions of aspectus and affectus, this will make it difficult to say that he believes they are nevertheless distinct powers ex parte rei. How could a simple power include powers within itself in any meaningful way?
Resolution of the question. Yet, we must notice that the very passage I have adduced in favor of the simple power posits a simple power precisely as an analogue to the three persons of the simple Divine Nature. Therefore, we cannot accept the inference that the simplicity of the power rules out any distinction whatever any more than Grosseteste would accept that the simplicity of divine action rules out distinction of the persons. The fact that he calls this power simple in the special context of Trinitarian analogy implies that the powers within it are distinct
83 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 224-225), quoted in note 61 above. Within the Hexaëmeron, the term also appears in 1.1.1 and 8.5.4-8.5.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 49-50 and 226).
231 in some way. In addition, Grosseteste’s own statement of the simplicity of God in reference to the persons is closely parallel to his statement of the simplicity of the soul in reference to aspectus and affectus, and they both appear in the De Libero Arbitrio. 84 It appears that
Grosseteste intends to maintain a distinction between the powers of the soul analogous to the
distinction of the persons of the Trinity. Assuming, as I think we should, that Grosseteste holds
the persons of the Trinity to be distinct ex parte rei, it would seem that we should also understand him to hold to a distinction between memory, understanding, and love ex parte rei.
But a problem remains. If Grosseteste holds to a distinction ex parte rei between
memory and understanding, which both belong to the aspectus, what will become of the
suggestion that this is the very kind of distinction that holds between aspectus and affectus ? Any attempt to distinguish the powers by their mutual relations, as Grosseteste does with the persons of the Trinity, would presumably distinguish the three powers of memory, understanding, and will, not the two powers of aspectus and affectus. It would be nice if Grosseteste addressed this question directly, but I am not aware of any text where he does so. Still, I can say something in this regard. It is logically possible that aspectus and affectus could be distinct ex parte rei and that within the aspectus (and maybe within the affectus too) there are also further distinctions ex parte rei, i.e., between memory and understanding .85 I would hesitate, however, to affirm that
84 Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda), cap. 8 (Baur, 196) : “In qua tamen pluralitate non ponitur nisi simplex et indivisa essentia, et tamen nulla persona est alia...” ; Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda), cap. 17 (Baur, 228), quoted above. 85 Since the powers corresponding to the Father and the Son both belong to the aspectus, it may be possible to speculate that the distinction between aspectus and affectus is analogous to the opposed relations in which the Father and the Son, as a single principle, breathe out the Holy Spirit. This would fit nicely with the priority of the aspectus, since it would give a theological analogy by which to illustrate it. I am not aware of any text where Grosseteste relates aspectus and affectus to the Trinitarian psychological analogy in this much detail, however.
232 this simply is Grosseteste’s view of the powers of the soul. I would rather say that this is a question with which he has not fully grappled and leave it unresolved.
My conclusion, then, concerning the question of distinction ex parte rei between aspectus and affectus is that Grosseteste probably does believe that such a distinction exists. This is not a substance/accident distinction. There are not two principles of action. There is only one principle and in that sense only one power. Nevertheless, as the persons of the Trinity are a single substance and a single principle of action yet remain distinct, so it is with aspectus and affectus.
Part 4: Why Aspectus and Affectus Always Act Together
I have answered the first major question of this chapter, the question of the soul’s
composition. The powers of the soul are identical with its substance and therefore are identical
in substance with one another. They are neither accidents nor substantial parts of the soul, and
so they are not distinct immediate principles of action. This is why Grosseteste can schematize
the soul’s powers in various ways while keeping his basic conceptions the same. In all that it
does, the soul acts as a whole and is the direct principle of its actions. The reasons for dividing
the powers of the soul do not include making a precise map of its parts. It has no parts of that
kind. Presumably, the reasons for distinguishing the powers are primarily practical. The
schemata are meant to aid the discussion of human experience and especially, as in the Cistercian
tradition, the journey of the soul to God. Yet, it seems that he does wish to maintain a kind of
distinction ex parte rei between at least the highest powers of the soul, including aspectus and
affectus.
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Now it remains to address the second major question of this chapter. Why does
Grosseteste believe that aspectus and affectus always act together? There are at least two possible answers to this question. It could be due to the identity of the soul with its powers, or it could be due to the identity in substance of the objects of knowledge and love. The first explanation looks to the structure of the soul. The second looks to its operation ad extra . These are not exactly alternative explanations, since both treat aspectus and affectus as a single principle of action. The question is whether the metaphysical simplicity of the soul or the way the soul actually knows and loves offers a more plausible explanation for the tandem operation of aspectus and affectus in Grosseteste’s thought .
Metaphysical simplicity of aspectus and affectus. By this point, the reasons for suggesting the first answer may seem obvious, but I will summarize them briefly. The identity of the soul with its powers seems to give a good reason for believing aspectus and affectus always act together. What the soul does, it does as a whole. From this it is natural to infer that if the soul engages an object for intellection, its will and desires must also engage that object in some mode.
Likewise, if the soul engages an object for love, it can only do so while also knowing.
The analogy between God and the soul also exercised a strong pull towards assuming the powers act together. As we have seen, Grosseteste was inclined to look to the analysis of divine actions for help in analyzing the soul. God acts indivisibly as a direct principle because of His absolute simplicity, so it is fitting that the soul should do the same and for the same reason, even
234 if only by a distant analogy. Grosseteste was not without some warrant here, since man bears the image of God. 86
Again, the tradition received from Augustine and his followers made this outlook quite natural for a man of Grosseteste’s age. Most of his work on Aristotle appears to date from the
1220s, when he was already over fifty years old, while Augustine looms large from the very beginning in the De Artibus Liberalibus. 87 It comes as absolutely no surprise that Grosseteste
had the courage to base his aspectus/affectus doctrine in the received assumptions about the simplicity of the soul, rather than relying upon the practical considerations that would sway an
Aristotle or an Aquinas.
Finally, as mentioned above, in one passage Grosseteste states that the reason why the aspectus cannot reach higher than the affectus is that they are not divisi, which I take to be a
reference to their identity in substance. 88 I believe this is as close as he gets to giving an explicit
rationale for the tandem operation of aspectus and affectus.
The single object of aspectus and affectus. James Ginther has suggested another reason
why aspectus and affectus relate as they do for Grosseteste. He states, “…for Grosseteste truth
and goodness cannot be separated. To know truth required that both the mind’s gaze and its
86 He appeals to this reason in Hexaëmeron 8.7.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 228-229) by quoting the De Spiritu et Anima 35 (PL 40:805), attributing the quotation to Augustine. The quotation states that the indivisibility of the soul’s action ubique tota is how the soul bears the image of the unity of God’s omnipotence. This quotation appears to be from the same passage that Grosseteste quotes in Letter 1, which quotation I have discussed above. Incidentally, this passage of the De Spiritu et Anima appears to be the inspiration for Grosseteste’s discussion of the location of angels in that letter. 87 My observations here are inspired by McEvoy, Philosophy, 447-448, although his discussion in those pages concerns a broader topic. 88 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (ed. Rossi, 216): “ …affectus et aspectus anime non sunt divisi, nec attingit aspectus eius nisi quo attingit affectus sive amor eius. Cum igitur amor et affectus anime convertitur ad corpus et ad illecebras corporales necessario trahit secum aspectum…” See my discussion of this text above.
235 desire be directed towards the truth and the good, that is God himself.” 89 Whereas the first explanation reasons from the simplicity of the soul to the unity of its actions, Ginther’s explanation moves in the opposite direction. He reasons from the simplicity of truth and goodness to the unity of the soul’s cognitive and appetitive actions. In explaining Ginther’s view, I will have to make some inferences about how it works, since he treats the matter only very briefly and in passing. For this reason, Ginther himself may or may not recognize the following account. It is, nonetheless, a view worthy of consideration.
In summary, this view holds that the formal objects of the knowledge and love, the true and the good or beauty, distinguish the aspectus from the affectus for the purpose of naming but
that the material object is what actually distinguishes the immediate principle of action. There is
a single material object, so there is actually only one principle of action. Just as the formal
objects are logically distinct yet identical in substance, so the powers are logically distinct (but
also more than that, as we have seen) yet remain identical in substance.
In this discussion, I will not use the terms “material object” and “formal object” except
where absolutely necessary. These are terms I have not seen in Grosseteste, and I want to
preserve the possible ambiguity in his own terminology. In the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, he
speaks of the proper acts of the rational powers, and he treats the acts as distinguished by their
objects. 90 Yet he does not make a distinction between material and formal objects. For this
reason, I will present what I take to be his view by discussing simply the the proper or
determining object—the object upon which the power specially acts. He does not precisely use
89 Ginther, Sacred Page, 56. This idea also resonates well with Augustine. See the section on Augustine in the second part of chapter 2, where I discuss the influence of the Soliloquies . 90 See discussion in chapter 4.
236 therse terms either, but at least they correspond to the concept he uses to distinguish the powers in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat. In most or all cases discussed in this section, the proper or determining object will be equivalent to the material object.
The text Ginther cites to support the assertion that for Grosseteste truth and goodness
cannot be separated is one he discovered in the Super Psalterium . Explaining Psalm 100:4b, 91
Grosseteste says that the upright person does not know the one who departs from rectitude. 92
Our commentator gives two possible reasons for this lack of knowledge. The first is the association of malice with darkness. The second is that a non-entity (such as malice) cannot be known or loved. The way he states the second point is of particular importance: “Again malice is not known by good men, that is, it has not approbation. The affection of charity does not touch it, nor does the vision of truth, because a lack of essence is as a privation of light.” 93
Had he simply said that a non-entity could not be known, the passage would have no significance to the current question. Instead, he shifted the discussion from bare cognition to approbation, which would include both cognition and approval, a kind of love. Then he explained the lack of both parts of approbation by constructing a neat parallel in which the
91 As he quotes it: “ Declinantem a me maligno non cognoscebam.” The Clementine Vultate has malignum (Biblia Sacra Vulgatæ editionis, Sixti V Pontificis Maximi jussu recognita et edita [Roma: Typographis Vaticanis, 1598], electronic edition by The Clementine Vulgate Project, 2000-2013: http://vulsearch.sourceforge.net/index.html, in loc. ) 92 Robert Grosseteste, Super Psalterium 100.4.33 (Ginther, Sacred Page, 199). 93 Robert Grosseteste, Super Psalterium 100.4.33 (Ginther, Sacred Page, 199; Latin text altered by the author; trans. mine): “ Item, malitia aput bonos non habet cognitionem, id est non habet approbationem. Non tangit illam affectio caritatis, nec aspectus veritatis quia essentie defectio est vt lucis priuatio. ” I have altered Ginther’s text, which he says is not critically established ( Sacred Page, 193), slightly here. He has, “ Item, malitia aput bonos non habet cognitionem, id est non habet approbationem non tangit illam affectio
237 affectio of charity and the aspectus of truth, 94 respectively, cannot “touch” ( tangit ) malice
“because a lack of essence is as a privation of light.” The “lack of essence” refers to malice as
evil, since evil is a privation of goodness/being. 95 This privation leaves the soul with no object to love. The “privation of light” is the aspect of malice that leaves the soul with no object to know. So the privation of goodness and the privation of truth go together. To lack goodness is also to lack truth. Thus, in the case of malice, the lack of knowledge and the lack of love are inseparable due to the non-being of the potential object.
The clear implication of this is that an object with goodness/being may be both known and loved. He would say that aspectus and affectus can “touch” it. I take this as an indication that there is a single object of both knowledge and love—any thing that has being. Every being, insofar as it participates in being, is both true and good and therefore the proper object of both knowledge and love. Obviously, this would in fact include wicked people, but only to the degree that they retain the goodness of being. They are unknown and unknowable to the extent that they are evil.
A helpful contrast to Grosseteste’s view may be found in Thomas Aquinas. 96 For
Aquinas, the object of the will or intellectual appetite is the good, but this is not the good found in the thing itself but the good as it is found in the intellect that judges the thing to be good. 97
94 Here aspectus refers to the act of intellectual vision. 95 Grosseteste refers to malice as a lack of essence, for instance, in Hexaëmeron 1.24.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 83). 96 Here I am constrained to present Thomas’s view very simply. A recent study that treats intellect and will in Aquinas is Michael Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005). 97 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.82, a.3 corpus (ed. the Leonine Commission, 1:629): “Si ergo intellectus, et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus, eminentior invenitur, et hoc apparet ex comparatione objectorum ad invicem ; objectum enim intellectus est simplicius, et magis absolutum, quam objectum
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Although one may have expected Grosseteste to move in this direction if one knew only the De
Artibus Liberalibus, his eventual inclusion of freedom in the very act of perceiving and judging reflects the fact that knowledge and love do share a single object. In addition, when Grosseteste addresses the fact that there is a species of the good in the soul through which one desires it, he quickly adds that this species is not the end for the sake of which one acts. The true end, which would seem to be the same as the object of desire, is the good outside the mind.98
While Ginther’s passage deals with the inseparability of truth and goodness in created things, Grosseteste says the same in the case of uncreated goodness and truth, God:
Now beatitude is to have all things one wants and to want nothing badly. This is not achieved by the rational creature unless, by pure intelligence in the uncreated Light, it sees the uncreated Light itself and all creatures in their uncreated reasons eternally expressed in the uncreated Light and it loves, by an ordered love, both the creator known directly ( sine nubilo ) and the creatures, one and all. And of this loving knowledge or knowing love, that is, of this enjoyment, lasting without the interruption of change, without the loss of diminution, without the limit of an end, it must have the firmest certitude. 99
I have shown above, when discussing Hexaëmeron 8.5.1, that in the direct contemplation of God, for Grosseteste, God is the single object of both knowledge and love. Here Grosseteste includes
voluntatis: nam objectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis: bonum autem appetibile, cujus ratio est in intellectu, est objectum voluntatis.” See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q.27, a.2 corpus. 98 Robert Grosseteste, De Statu Causarum (Baur, 125) : “Intentio autem boni accepta cum intellectu agentis dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, quod ipsa species boni in intellectu accepta sit vere bonum, quod vere finis est; et sic solum est in intellectu primi. Alio modo, quod ipsa species boni existens in anima non sit vere bonum, sed sit imago vel similitudo boni existentis extra animam; et sic non est vere finis, sed est eius similitudo.” 99 Robert Grosseteste, De Cessatione Legalium I iv 1 (ed. Dales and King, 17; trans. mine): “Beatitudo autem est habere omnia que quis vult et nichil male velle. Quod non completur rationali creature nisi cum pura intelligencia in lumine increato videt ipsum lumen increatum et, in racionibus creaturarum omnium increatis in lumine increato eternaliter expressis, videt etiam omnes creaturas, diligitque amore ordinato tam cognitum sine nubilo creatorem quam creaturas singulas et universas; huiusque diligentis cognitionis vel cognoscentis dileccionis, id est fruicionis, retinende sine vicissitudinis interpolatione, sine diminucionis remissione, sine termini finicione habeat firmissimam certitudinem.” There is a published English translation as well: Robert Grosseteste, On The Cessation of the Laws, trans. Stephen M. Hildebrand, The Fathers of the Church Mediaeval Continuation 13 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012).
239 within the knowledge and love of this single object the knowledge and love of all creatures through their ideas in God.100 The rhetorical line, “loving knowledge or knowing love” shows
how very unconcerned Grosseteste is with distinguishing the acts, let alone their objects. In
Dictum 91 it becomes clear that the two acts actually are reducible to a common operation that
can account for all knowledge and love, but I shall discuss that below.
For now, it will suffice to conclude that Ginther was correct to insinuate that, for
Grosseteste, God, as the Good and the True in which beings participate, is the single end and
object of both knowledge and love. This holds true whether he is discussing perfect knowledge
and love in beatitude, where things are known and loved in God, or the imperfect knowledge and
love of this life, where God is known and loved in things.
Grosseteste was not alone in his day in thinking that the cognitive and appetitive powers
share a single determining object. Philip the Chancellor uses the following argument, among
several others, to argue for the identity of ratio and voluntas 101 :
Again, the end of reason is the true, and the end of will is the good. Therefore, as end relates to end, so potency will relate to potency. But the true and the good differ only logically ( ratione ). Therefore, will is only logically different from reason, and so they are one, which we concede. 102
100 I will discuss this mode of knowing further in chapter 8. 101 According to Bieniak, Soul-Body Problem, 107-108, the portion of the Summa De Bono from which I have quoted below, the “De Bono Nature,” also affirms the identity of the soul with its rational powers in general. 102 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono “De Bono Nature” IV q.2 (ed. Wicki, 180; trans. mine): “Item, finis rationis est verum, volunatis bonum. Ergo sicut se habet finis ad finem, ita potentia ad potentiam. Sed verum et bonum tantum differunt ratione. Ergo voluntas a ratione tantum diversa est ratione et ita sunt unum, quod concedimus.” Thomas Aquinas, in contrast, will say that the logical distinction between the good and the true is sufficient to distingiush intellect from will in angels. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.59, a.2, ad 2 (ed. the Leonine Commission, 1:454): “Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentiae non diversificantur secundum materialem distinctionem objectorum, sed secundum formalem distinctionem, quae attenditur secundum rationem objecti. Et ideo diversitas secundum rationem boni, et veri sufficit ad diversitatem intellectus, et voluntatis.” Thomas seems to mean this as a distinction between accidents because he also distinguishes these two powers from the nature or substance of the angel in the corpus of the question.
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Here the powers are logically distinguished by their ends but their metaphysical identity is determined by the metaphysical identity of their ends. Its seems likely that Grosseteste would agree with the chancellor’s reasoning here, to a point. As I suggested above, Grosseteste seems to maintain a distinction ex parte rei between aspectus and affectus. This is more than a merely logical distinction, so he would not affirm that aspect of Philip’s conclusion. Nevertheless, it seems that he would affirm the substantial identity of the powers based upon the identity in substance of their formal objects, that is to say, based upon their common material object. This identity could then account for their unity in action.
Yet the matter is not that simple. While the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, discussed in chapter four, seems to support the idea that the cognitive and appetitive powers share a common object at each level of being, that work also posits distinct objects of knowledge/love to inhabit the different levels of being. My knowledge and love of an angel would share a common object, but there would seem to be a completely separate common object for my knowledge and love of a rock, for example. So then, assigning a single object to both knowledge and love is not sufficient, in Grosseteste’s thought, to explain why aspectus and affectus always act together.
By itself, this consideration would actually create several distinct aspectus/affectus powers in the
soul, one for each level of being.
One could appeal to Grosseteste’s theory of illumination to solve this problem, in part.
Grosseteste does hold, as I will discuss in chapter eight, that all knowledge comes through
illumination. For Grosseteste, all knowledge is ultimately knowledge of God, even if only
through a distant vestige of the Divine Light communicated through creatures. In this way, one
could again unify all objects of knowing, but the same beings as objects of love would seem to
241 remain distinct. If the identity of objects explanation is to account for the unity of aspectus and affectus in action, what one needs is a passage in which Grosseteste actually reduces both the knowledge and the love of all things in this life to a single object and in which he gives an account of how this works.
Happily, such a text does exist. 103 In Dictum 91, a sermon preached for the instruction of clergy on some special occasion, 104 Grosseteste gives the following account of how the love of
God actually teaches all truth:
For just as soft wax, when a seal is applied firmly, receives by an imitating likeness the beauty of all the forms and shapes inscribed in the seal, so also the soul, when firmly applied to God through the bond of love, receives conformity, not with an equal likeness, but with the highest imitating likeness of his highest beauty. And since the highest beauty lacks no beauty…in the soul that has been imprinted by the highest beauty through the bond of love no beauty will be absent, but the beauty which is above her will shine in that soul by way of imitation. Every beauty of things equal to her will shine in that soul just as it is in the things equal to her by way of beauty. Every beauty below her will shine in that soul much more than in the same inferior things by the charm of ornament. And since the form of the highest beauty and highest wisdom are the same, when the soul is perfectly conformed to the highest beauty, and through this to the highest wisdom, she will be as a consequence illumined with the fullness of wisdom. And so love, which makes the soul deiform, makes her fully wise by participation in the highest wisdom. 105
103 See also the discussion of this passage in chapter 8, where the focus will be on its epistemological significance. 104 The opening of the sermon refers to some particular addressee, whom he calls “your charity.” In his letters, this is a way he frequently addresses prelates of the Church. The content of the sermon is clearly directed towards clergy . 105 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (ed. and trans. mine): “Sicut enim cera mollis fortiter applicata sigillo recipit imitatoria similitudine omnium formarum et figurarum in sigillo inscriptarum pulcritudinem, sic anima per amoris copulam fortiter ad Deum applicata, non equali, sed cum summa imitatoria similitudine ipsius summe pulcritudinis recipit conformitatem. Et cum apud summam pulcritudinem nulla desit pulcritudo…in anima, per amoris copulam a summa pulcritudine impressa, non erit alicuius pulcritudinis absencia, sed refulgebit in illa pulcritudo que super ipsam est imitatorie. Omnis vero pulcritudo parium sibi refulgebit in illa tanta quanta est in ipsis sibi paribus speciositate. Omnis vero inferior se pulcritudo refulgebit in illa multo ampliori quam sit in eisdem inferioribus decoris venustate. Et cum idem sit summe pulcritudinis forma et summa sapiencia, cum anima fuerit perfecte conformis summe pulcritudini ac per hoc summe sapiencie, erit per consequens anima illustrata sapiencie plenitudine. Unde et amor, qui facit animam deiformem, facit illam summe sapiencie participacione plene sapientem.” For my working edition and translation of the entire passage in which this quotation appears, see Appendix 8B.
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The key to this passage is the mechanism by which the soul knows and loves. It is participation in the divine nature by way of imitation. He concludes the reflection a few sentences later by stating that full love is the knowledge of all truth. 106 The soul is only doing one thing here: conforming to the divine nature. Yet this one action is both love, inasmuch as
God is the highest beauty (or good), and it is knowledge of all things, inasmuch as God is the form of all truth. Without using the terms, he has reduced aspectus and affectus to a common principle and a common operation.
Grosseteste goes on to explain that this process of shaping the soul by imitation begins in this life and is complete in eternal beatitude. 107 Since it occurs in this life, the soul must be able in this life to operate in some degree as he describes here. As we have seen in the Ecclesia
Sancta Celebrat, grace perfects nature and does not destroy it. Therefore, the capacity of the soul to receive this conformity to God should not involve any violence to its natural powers.
Rather, it must bring the soul to perfection. It follows, then, that the soul has a natural capacity to conform to God. To the degree that it does so, it both knows and loves.
With this account , it is possible to use a shared proper object (so to speak) to explain the unity of action between aspectus and affectus. Aspectus and affectus have the same end and the same object: God. All knowledge and love, though perhaps mediated, indirect, and unconscious of the fact, is ultimately a degree or mode of conformity to this single end, and so the actions of aspectus and affectus reduce to the act of conformity to God. My knowledge and love of an
106 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (ed. mine): “Est igitur dilectio plena tocius veritatis magistra; immo ipse amor est ipsa veritatis noticia .” For my working edition and translation of the entire passage in which this quotation appears, see Appendix 8B. 107 For the full passage with a full translation, see Appendix 8B.
243 angel and my knowledge and love of a rock, by this analysis, actually are the operation of the same power, the power of imitating or conforming to God.
Resolution of the question. Now that I have presented both options, I should say which explanation more plausibly accounts for the fact that aspectus and affectus always act together in
Grosseteste’s writings. It could be due to the metaphysical assumptions about the identity of the soul with its powers that Grosseteste inherited from (and in) the twelfth century, or it could be due to his particular understanding of how the single object of both knowledge and love, God, reduces both to a common operation of the soul. It seems to me that both are factors in
Grosseteste’s mature thought, at least in some works. And, of course, they are closely related. I find that the single object account, understood in terms of the soul’s conformity to God, is a more complete and satisfying account. The problem with it as an explanation for why
Grosseteste links aspectus and affectus is that he does not appeal to it often. He uses the wax and seal analogy elsewhere, 108 but I have not yet found another text where he gives this exact account. 109 We may have here a situation parallel to that of the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat. His most mature and profound reflections have survived only in a sermon prepared for instructing the clergy.
108 See for example Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 60 and Letter 1 (ed. Luard, 4-5, 7). 109 We should bear in mind that Grosseteste’s unedited sermons may well contain additional material like that in Dictum 91. In addition, I have not made an exhaustive search of all his works that are available. Here are some passages in which he refers to the soul’s conformity to the highest beauty or in some similar way to deiformity: Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 2 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 2r) ; Dictum 19 §17 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130) ; Dictum 49 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 33v) ; Dictum 69 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 51v) ; Dictum 85 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 60v) ; Dictum 89 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 65r). A systematic analysis of these texts is certainly a desideratum for a future study of the Dictum 91 conformity account.
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Even if this precise doctrine does not appear elsewhere in his corpus, it may give us the best explanation of a theme that does occur several times. The cycle of “Ezekiel’s Wheels,” found in his inaugural sermon as a master in theology (Dictum 19 ) and in other texts discussed in chapter three, says that the knowledge of Scripture is first inscribed in the aspectus, and then should sink into the affectus. After that, it can issue outward in good works. The good works, in turn, form a new and better inscription in the aspectus. This last step seems odd on the surface, but perhaps in the light of Dictum 91 we can finally grasp his point, or the point towards which he was reaching. First, the soul conforms to God through the knowledge of Scripture. Then it conforms to God through the love of what it has learned. When this beloved knowledge finds expression in one’s life, the soul further conforms to God by imitating Him in good works.
Inasmuch as good works conform the soul to God, they result in the very knowledge of truth. Or rather, the new conformity is the very knowledge of truth. This is the improved inscription in the aspectus, which begins the cycle again. From this we can see that Grosseteste may have been developing the ideas that would crystallize in Dictum 91 110 from the very beginning of his career as a theologian. 111
Two other important texts seem to presuppose something like the Dictum 91 conformity account. The Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, which gives the most diversified account of the soul’s
powers I have found in Grosseteste’s corpus, speaks of the sanctification of the whole person in
110 Dictum 91 dates from either the magisterial period or the early episcopal period, but not later than c.1240. For discussion see chapter 8. 111 In Dictum 19 itself he focuses upon deiformity in the affectus, yet he clearly says that Scripture conforms the whole man to itself. It is equally clear that conforming to Scripture is the same as conforming to the highest beauty . Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §19 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 131 [modified word underlined]) : “ Nulle enim scripture cetere sic in intimum affectus debent se profundare totumque hominem sibi configurare, quia nulla est alia que affectum perfecte ordinat suppreme que pulchritudini conformat .” For my rationale behind changing the underlined word, see note 56 in chapter 3.
245 terms of participation in the “divine ray.” I noted when explaining this sermon in chapter four that the participation Grosseteste had in mind was probably one of imitation. If this is correct, there is a basic coherence between Grosseteste’s most mature and most diversified account of the soul’s knowledge and love and the elegantly simple conformity account of Dictum 91. Both texts are describing knowledge and love as finding their perfection in the soul’s imitation of God.
Another text gives an even closer parallel to the Dictum 91 account. In Hexaëmeron
8.5.1-2 Grosseteste sets forth a top-down reformation of the soul very similar to that in the
Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, except without the Pseudo-Dionysian language. He says when the highest face of reason, a natural potency, has the habit of remembering, understanding, and loving God directly, it is a renewed image of the Trinity and made deiform. Then this simple power brings all the lower powers of the soul into imitation of and conformity with itself, to the extent that such is possible. 112 In this way, Grosseteste can cast his overall vision of
sanctification in terms of the soul’s conformity to God, with the highest imitation being the direct
knowledge and love of God. 113
As I said, the single object account gives the most complete explanation of why
Grosseteste always has aspectus and affectus acting together. God is the proper object of both aspectus and affectus , and so the two, though in some sense distinct ex parte rei , reduce to a
112 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.1-2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 224-225). I think the idea here is that the lower powers of the soul perform actions, such as throwing rocks, that are less like God than the rational contemplation and love of the highest power. Since the acts they do, even when perfected, are less like the acts of God than are the acts of the highest power, he speaks of the lower powers as having less conformity, even though he ultimately holds that all the powers are the soul itself. Similarly, the language of mediation between the powers should be taken to refer to the order of actions (contemplating God leads to doing good works) rather than any mechanical mediation in the soul, since the soul does not have faculties as parts but only as potencies. 113 For discussion of how aspectus and affectus are included in the highest face of reason, see parts 2 and 3 of the present chapter. For further discussion of the reformation of the divine image in man, see chapter 7.
246 single power. We find that this power is the power to conform to God. The acts of both aspectus and affectus are all modes or degrees of the soul’s power of conforming to God as the
True and the Good (or the Beautiful, as in Dictum 91 ). Nevertheless, for a single explanation that holds in general throughout Grosseteste’s career, I think the evidence still slightly favors the simplicity account. It seems more likely that Grosseteste always assumes unity on the part of the soul’s powers than that he is always thinking about the conformity of the soul to God, especially in his early works. Further editing and study of Grosseteste’s works may alter this judgment, but it is the best answer I can give at this time: Aspectus and affectus always act together primarily because Grosseteste believes that every act of knowledge or love is simply an act of the soul.
The substance acts directly, and so it cannot be divided in its actions.
Part 5: Some Problematic Texts (or Answers to the Objections)
Dictum 36. There is a passage in Dictum 36 that seems to run contrary to view that
Grosseteste believes the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers all belong to a single substance. In this brief sermon on fasting he writes,
The number 10 signifies the knowledge of the creator and the creature: the creator is threefold; the creature, however, is seven, made up of the four elements and three incorporeals, to wit, the intellective powers, the sensitive non-rational powers, and the vegetative powers, without sense or reason. 114
Initially, this passage appears to contain a straightforward affirmation of a substantial distinction
between the three souls—rational, sensitive, and vegetative. After all, there can be no doubt that
the elements are distinct parts of the composite human body, and elsewhere he says that humans
114 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 36 (trans. Jackson 3:35).
247 exist ex septenario. 115 It would seem to follow that the three kinds of powers mentioned are the
three distinct parts composing the human soul.
Yet, I do not believe the composition of the human creature is in view here. The
quotation above is from Gordon Jackson’s translation of Dictum 36 . I have prepared my own
Latin edition of this sentence, which I assume must differ from the text Jackson translated. 116
My version of the text may be rendered as follows:
Now ten signifies the knowledge of creator and creation, for the creator is threefold, while creation consists in seven parts because of the four elements and the three incorporeals. Incorporeal things are either rational intellective substances, or irrational sensitive substances, or vegetative substances without sense and reason. 117
I believe Grosseteste is referring to the composition of all creation. The three incorporeals are not three substances in the human but three kinds of incorporeal substance in the universe. There
115 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 9.9.3 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 278): “ Moraliter autem Deus complet opus suum, id est hominem, in septenario; quia sicut constat ex septenario naturaliter, ex quattuor videlicet elementis secundum corpus et ex tribus potentiis anime, sic complet eum gratuito septenario donorum Spiritus Sancti.. .” It is important to notice in this passage, however, that he refers to three powers of one soul, rather than three incorporeal things. Therefore, even if Grosseteste is referring to the human creature in Dictum 36, it still may not follow that he means to indicate a distinction in substance. He may just be referring to the three powers of the one soul in a very loose way. 116 Jackson used Lincoln, Cathedral Chapter Library, MS 188 and Lincoln, Cathedral Chapter Library, MS 202 for his translation of the Dicta (Jackson 1:vi) . At some point in the process, he also began using the transcription of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798 prepared by Westermann and Goering (Jackson 13:36) . For this passage , I have consulted the transcription of Bodley 798 and facsimilies of other manuscripts listed in Appendix 5B, but not the two Lincoln manuscripts. I can only guess that one or both of them must read potencie for substancie, since this would seem to be the only way to account for Jackson’s translation. If the final, definitive edition of Dictum 36 should reflect Jackson’s meaning, I would have to revise my argument, but I think the conclusion would still be the same. If Grosseteste is referring to the rational, sensitive, and vegetative potencies of the human creature, one then must remember the simplicity of God. He says that God is threefold, referring to the persons of the Trinity, but he does not, presumably, mean that there are three substances in God. Likewise, if Grosseteste wrote potencie instead of substancie, and if he is referring to three kinds of powers in the human soul, then he need not be positing substantial division in the human soul any more than he is positing it in God. In fact, the choice of potentia over anima would seem to suggest a single-substance view, as discussed above. 117 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 36 (edition mine; trans. mine, influenced by Jackson 3:35): “ Denarius autem signat scienciam creatoris et creature, quia creator trinus est, creatura autem in septenario consistit propter quaternarium elementorum et trinarium incorporalium, que incorporalia aut sunt substancie intellective racionales, aut sensitive irracionales, aut vegetative absque sensu et racione. ” See Appendix 5B for my working of edition of this sentence based on five manuscripts.
248 is the rational kind, which is the kind of incorporeal substance humans and angels have. There is the sensitive but non-rational kind, which animals have, and there is the vegetative kind, which plants have. Grosseteste does not mention people, animals, or plants here, but I take this to be the view assumed in this description of creation. Far from being a statement affirming substantial distinctions between the three souls of a human, this statement rather implies that the kind of soul humans have is distinct from, rather than added to, the kinds of souls animals and plants have. This would seem to suggest that a rational incorporeal substance, in the case of humans, includes in itself the sensitive and vegetative powers found also in the other kinds of incorporeal substances.
Dictum 60. Dictum 60 presents a problem for the identity of the soul with its powers.
Here Grosseteste seems to assume that the soul can in fact work either without wisdom, without
will, without either, or even without power. He states, “…just as the works of the Trinity are
undivided, so also in us power, wisdom, and upright will ought to work indivisibly.” 118 The verb operetur is in the subjunctive case, and Grosseteste confirms that he means by the subjunctive to indicate an obligation that may perhaps not be met 119 when he goes on to explain what happens
118 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 60 (ed. Servus Gieben, “Traces of God in Nature According to Robert Grosseteste, With the Text of the Dictum, ‘ Omnis Creatura Speculum Est’” Franciscan Studies 24 [1964]: 158; trans. and emphasis mine): “…sicut sunt trinitatis opera indivisa, sic in nobis indivisibiliter operentur potentia, sapientia, voluntas recta ..” Gieben’s edition will hereafter be cited as follows: ed. Gieben, “Traces,” page number. 119 Wheelock calls this way of using the subjunctive “jussive” (Frederic Wheelock, Wheelock’s Latin, sixth edition, revised, rev. Richard A. LaFleur [New York, HarperCollins Publishers, 2005], 188). Allen and Greenough call it “hortatory” in §266 (J. B. Greenough and J. H. Allen, Allen and Greenough’s Latin Grammar, revised and enlarged edition [Boston and London: Ginn and Company, 1899], 277-278). The clause could just as easily be translated “so also in us let wisdom, power, and upright will work indivisibly.” Jackson translates it with the word “should” (Jackson 6:9). I have used “ought” because of the clear parallel with debemus in the first half of the sentence: “ Item debemus et hanc similitudinem de summa trinitate reportare, ut sicut sunt trinitatis opera indivisa, sic in nobis indivisibiliter operentur potentia, sapientia, voluntas recta ” (Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 60 [ed. Gieben, “Traces,” 158]).
249 when the operation of any member of the triad is missing. 120 This would seem inconsistent with his assertion in Dictum 32 that power, wisdom, and will each perform the whole of every act.
I believe the inconsistency is only apparent, however. What Grosseteste means by an act without power, wisdom, or will is an act that is not rightly ordered. When power acts without wisdom there is error. 121 But error is a defect of the intellect. If there were truly no wisdom at
all in an action, as in the case of a seizure or a reflex, “error” would not be a relevant descriptor.
Since Grosseteste does refer to “error,” the intellect or wisdom has to be at work in this situation.122 His evaluation of the lack of wisdom assumes the inseparability of power and
wisdom in human actions rather than any real possibility of distinct operation. Similarly, when
right will is lacking, iniquity results. But iniquity can only be a descriptor of voluntary actions.
Therefore, the will has to be at work even when it is not “right” ( recta ). When power is lacking,
the work fails to be completed. If the work was begun, however, power was at work. If it was
not done at all, there is no action to be analyzed. Either way, he is not actually saying there can
be a work without power. Rather than running contrary to Dictum 32, this pastoral application at the end of Dictum 60 actually seems to presuppose the same doctrine.
120 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 60 (ed. Gieben, “Traces,” 158): “Cum enim in nobis operatur potentia sine sapientia, efficit errorem; cum vero operatur potentia sine voluntate recta, efficit iniquitatem; cum vero potentia operatur sine utrisque, efficit errorem et iniquitatem. Cum vero vel utraque vel altera praedictarum operari incipit absque potentia, efficit defectionem invenitque idem probrosum. Hic incipit aedificare et non potuit consummare.” 121 In this paragraph I am explaining the quotation in note 120 above. 122 Here Grosseteste may be referring to wisdom as a power or as the perfection of a power, but the reasoning and the conclusion would be the same either way. Concerning Grosseteste’s use of “wisdom” ( sapientia ) as a power of the soul, see chapter 4 above, especially the exposition of Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat.
250
De Motu Supercaelestium. In the De Motu Supercaelestium, which McEvoy believes
Grosseteste wrote around 1229-1231, 123 and Cecilia Panti places at c.1225, 124 Robert treats the objects of sense and intellect as distinct on the basis of the fact that what is desired is apprehended by sense and what is understood is apprehended by intellect.125 This view seems to be inconsistent with the idea that knowledge and love share a single object.
Two observations may explain this anomaly. The first is that Grosseteste is primarily acting as an expositor of Aristotle here.126 He is not concerned with building his own model of
the soul and its powers but rather with answering a particular question about how intelligences or
angels move the heavenly spheres. The second observation is more important. This passage
repeats very closely the doctrine found in Averroes’ commentary on book XII of the
Metaphysics. 127 In the Latin translation, Aristotle used the words desideratum and intellectum, 128 and Averroes explained them. 129 Although he does appear to agree with his sources, Grosseteste is primarily reporting the views of others here.
123 On the dating see James McEvoy, “The Chronology of Robert Grosseteste’s Writings on Nature and Natural Philosophy,” Speculum 58 (1983), 644-648. 124 Cecilia Panti, Moti, Virtù e Motori Celesti nella Cosmologia di Roberto Grossatesta: Studio ed edizione dei trattati De Sphera, De Cometis, De Motu Supercelestium (Firenze : SISMEL, 2001), 186. 125 Robert Grosseteste, De Motu Supercaelestium (ed. Panti, Moti, Virtù e Motori Celesti, 332): “Item quaestio est si desideratum sit idem quod intellectum in illis. Manifestum enim est quod in nobis differunt et sunt principia diversorum motuum quorum unus est sensibilis, reliquus autem rationalis. In illis autem videtur quod non differunt. Causa autem est quod sensus in nobis differt ab intellectu, quia potentie, quibus comprehenduntur res in nobis, sunt diverse, scilicet sensus et intellectus. Sensu enim comprehenditur desideratum et voluptuosum, intellectu autem intellectum. / Cum igitur corpora celestia non sentiunt, non erit in eis desideratum differens ab intellecto.” 126 McEvoy, “Chronology,” 644, refers to this opusculum as a “largely exegetical essay.” 127 The apparatus in Panti’s edition shows this very nicely. See Panti, Moti, Virtù e Motori Celesti , 332. The passage in Averroes is Metaphysica XII, 36, 318F-G. 128 Aristotle, Metaphysica XII, 7 (1072a25-26), 318E (as quoted in Panti, Moti, Virtù e Motori Celesti, 331): “Et movet sicut movet desideratum et intellectum.” 129 Averroes, Metaphysica XII, 36, 318F-G (as quoted in Panti, Moti, Virtù e Motori Celesti, 331-332): “necesse est ut iste motor moveat quemadmodum desideratum et affectatum movent nos…Desideratum enim apud nos differt ab
251
Perhaps Grosseteste took desideratum in reference to humans as pertaining only to what
one desires for the good of the body and not to higher desires (even though intelligences also
have a desideratum ). If this is the case, this text only indicates that Grosseteste sees sense (as in
the five senses) and intellect as distinct principles of action. This fact would change nothing
about Grosseteste’s view of the rational soul qua rational. It would only prove that the rational
soul and the sensitive soul are distinct principles of action. The rational soul itself could still be
a single principle of action.
Nevertheless, in comparison with Grosseteste’s other works, there are strong reasons to
take his remarks in De Motu Supercaelestium as not representing his settled opinions about the
soul. These remarks seem to treat all desire as rooted in the sensitive soul, and none of it in the
rational soul. If he were thinking of an affectus in the rational soul, the contrast with intelligences would be out of place, and the reason given why the thing desired and the thing understood have to differ for humans would not prove anything. Humans could have an intellectual desideratum just as the intelligences have, and then the difference between sense and intellect would not prove that the thing understood and the thing desired differ for humans. But
Grosseteste says they clearly do differ for us on this basis. He seems to have forgotten all about the affectus mentis. Again, these remarks treat the sensitive soul and the rational soul (at least) as distinct principles of action, whereas elsewhere his view seems to be that there is only a single principle of action. On both of these points the De Motu Supercaelestium is out of step with
Grosseteste’s psychology.
intellecto, quia potentia qua comprehenditur desideratum differt ab ea qua comprehenditur intellectum. Desideratum enim comprehenditur sensu…intellectum antem intellectu”
252
Perhaps one could take the second point as a strike against my interpretation of
Grosseteste on the identity of the soul with its sensitive powers if not for the first point. The fact
that this text seems unaware of Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction, not aware that there is
in fact a desideratum of the rational soul, is sufficient reason to dismiss the whole passage as a
source for Grosseteste’s psychological views. Maybe he thought he could reconcile what he was
reporting with his own view of the soul, or maybe he failed to notice the problem. Either way, I
do not think he has given us his own considered view here. I believe this conclusion is
warranted by what I have shown in chapters three and four about Grosseteste’s consistency in
holding to the basic conceptions connected to aspectus and affectus.
Conclusion
Grosseteste was anything but systematic in his theological and philosophical output, at least, as far as we know from his extant works. There are specific issues, such as free will or the nature of truth, of which Grosseteste gives a clear and, at the time of writing, definitive explanation. 130 For other matters, such as his aspectus/affectus doctrine, the scholar has to
search far and wide in his corpus for every hint of doctrine and pattern of thought. This is
doubtless a hazardous process, but it is also part of what makes historical theology a real
adventure. In this chapter, I have said what I can about the basic metaphysical questions urged
by the aspectus/affectus distinction. The aspectus and the affectus, along with all powers of the
soul, are in substance identical with the soul and with one another. Yet aspectus and affectus remain distinct ex parte rei in a way analogous to the distinction of the persons of the Trinity.
This is the sense in which we should understand Grosseteste’s “two parts” doctrine. It is correct
130 I am thinking of his De Libero Arbitrio and De Veritate.
253 to speak of the aspectus and the affectus as powers or parts of the soul because of their distinguishable actions, but they are not actually parts of the soul. The Father, the Son, and the
Holy Spirit are each identical with the whole divine nature, although each is distinct from the others. In an analogous way, the aspectus and the affectus are each identical with the whole substance of the soul, yet distinct from the other.
Aspectus and affectus always act together because they are, as the substance of the soul, but one immediate principle of action. This is the account that holds in general for Grosseteste.
In some works one can also see that aspectus and affectus act together because both knowledge and love are modes of conforming to God, the single proper object of both aspectus and affectus.
These conclusions suggest a few further observations on the material discussed in chapters three and four. It is no wonder that Grosseteste can schematize the soul in different ways not only over time in different works, but even within the same work, as he does in the
Hexaëmeron . The differing schemata are not conflicting maps of the proper accidents of the soul. Rather, they are descriptions of what the soul can do in relation to various entities and situations. Because the soul is multipotent, it is helpful to speak of powers. Because embodiment, sin, and other factors impose limitations on the operations of the soul (it can feel rocks, but not angels, for example), it is helpful to place the powers or “parts” in some relation to one another to describe how the soul can and cannot act. Yet, since it is always the soul that is acting directly and simply, 131 the schemata may vary as much as needed, according to the
constraints imposed upon the soul from without.
131 Of course there are media outside the soul, such as the body and the light that mediates between the soul and the body, but I am saying there is no real mediation within the soul, for Grosseteste.
254
It is also no wonder that Grosseteste can treat intelligentia both in the Hexaëmeron and in
the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat as a cognitive power distinct from love in one sense while in
another sense it also includes both knowledge and love. The activities of the aspectus and the affectus are different in some meaningful way, but they are also inseparable. There is also a
sense in which they are a single power with a single operation. Grosseteste can tease out
whichever dynamic is most applicable to the discussion at hand.
The terms and the emphases may change. The basic Augustinian purpose of the soul—to
know and love God—does not. On the level of basic concepts, it seems to me that Grosseteste is
surprisingly consistent. He almost always makes statements that are consistent with
Augustinian/Cistercian assumptions about the metaphysics of the soul. The soul is its powers. It
always acts as a whole. The powers of the rational soul exist in a way that is analogous to the
persons of the Trinity. For a thinker who, it seems, was not often trying to approach the soul in a
systematic way, Robert Grosseteste maintained an admirable level of coherency and consistency,
at least on the questions treated in this chapter. It was, perhaps, an intuitive consistency, judging by the frequency with which he trades terms. This feature, though maddening, only makes his achievement more impressive. To the degree that he was consistent, it was due not to some memorized formulae but to a deep understanding of the soul and the life of the soul within a venerable tradition. He developed this tradition, to be sure, but I believe Robert Grosseteste remained fundamentally Augustinian in his metaphysics of the soul. 132
132 I should conclude this chapter with a note of caution. I cannot claim to have examined Grosseteste’s corpus exhaustively for every point of inquiry. It is likely that there are additional texts that would also be worthy of consideration here. My sense is that a more exhaustive treatment would allow for more discussion of development, or perhaps more likely of ebb and flow, in Grosseteste’s assumptions about these questions. I would be surprised, however, if additional texts were to require any substantial revision of what I have said here.
Appendix 5A: Working edition of Dictum 32
I have followed the orthography of Bodley 798, as found in the Goering-Westermann transcription, but I have used the paragraph divisions found in Royal 6.E.V.
Witnesses
B: Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.24ra-24rb
R6: London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol.17vb
R7: London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol.126ra
Text
Unumquodque operum nostrorum voluntariorum faciunt tria, scilicet potencia, sapiencia 1, voluntas sive amor, et tamen unumquodque operum nostrorum alicui uni 2 istorum trium magis proprie quam aliis 3 attribuimus. Hec enim tria tunc 4 beneficia 5 prestant miseris 6, dum diserte 7 legunt aut 8 disputant, tunc viriliter hostem prosternunt, et tamen primum horum proprie attribuitur amori, secundum sapiencie, tercium vero9 potencie 10 . Sic opera Trinitatis, licet sint indivisa 11 , quedam tamen magis proprie attribuuntur Patri, alia Filio, alia Spiritui Sancto; utpote Patri opera potencie, Filio sapiencie, Spiritui Sancto benignitatis. Nec 12 sic operantur quod una faciat partem operis unam 13 et alia aliam, sed quelibet 14 totum 15 operatur. Sic eciam 16 in nobis totum operatur voluntas, totum sapiencia 17 , totum potencia.
1 R7: add. et 2 R7: om. 3 R7: alii 4 R7: sunt 5 R7: add. que 6 R7: miseriis 7 R6: deserte 8 B: ac 9 R7: om. 10 R7: penitencie 11 B: diversa R6: diuisa 12 B: Hec 13 R7: om. 14 R7: quilibet 15 R7: totam 16 R6: et 17 R7: add. et 255
Appendix 5B: Working edition of a sentence in Dictum 36
Witnesses
B: Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.27ra-27rb
P: Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5 fol.50ra
L: London, British Library, MS Lansdowne 458, fol.63ra
R6: London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol.19rb
R7: London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol.129va
Text
Denarius autem 1 signat scienciam 2 creatoris et creature, quia 3 creator trinus est, creatura autem in septenario consistit propter quaternarium elementorum et trinarium incorporalium, que incorporalia 4 aut sunt substancie intellective 5 racionales, aut sensitive irracionales, aut vegetative 6 absque sensu et racione.
1 PR 7: add. numerus 2 P: sententiam (?) 3 BR 6: qui 4 L: incorporalie 5 B: intelligencie 6 L: vegetativa 256
Part 2: The Meaning and Significance of the Aspectus/Affectus Distinction
Section 2:
The Influence of Aspectus and Affectus in Grosseteste’s Theology and Philosophy
257 Chapter 6: Aspectus and Affectus in Grosseteste’s Doctrine of Salvation
In the previous section, consisting of chapters three, four, and five, I explained the meaning and significance of Robert Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction. I dealt with his
theological anthropology, and primarily his psychology. Yet, the meaning and significance of
the aspectus/affectus distinction in Grosseteste’s thought extends far beyond his psychology.
The fundamental psychological themes connected with aspectus and affectus—the priority of the
aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and the inseparability of knowledge and love—appear
many places in Grosseteste’s theology and philosophy, often with very interesting results. Most
of the time, Grosseteste also happens to use the terms aspectus and affectus, which makes their
importance to other doctrines easy to track. At other times, the influence of these basic
psychological concepts may be seen even though the terms are not used.
I have divided this section into three chapters. Each chapter will focus on a particular
area of Grosseteste’s theology or philosophy and develop a particular theme connected with
aspectus and affectus within that area. In the present chapter, I will examine the importance of
the aspectus/affectus distinction for Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation. This examination will
illustrate and develop the inseparability of knowledge and love for Robert Grosseteste. In
chapter seven, I will treat Grosseteste’s doctrine of the reformation of the divine image in man
and develop the priority of the aspectus in that area. In chapter seven, I will explain some ways
in which aspectus and affectus shape Grosseteste’s doctrine of human knowledge and in so doing
develop the primacy of the affectus.
In the current chapter, I will limit my primary investigation to Grosseteste’s biblical
commentaries, and especially his Pauline commentaries. The reason for this is simple. The
258 259 aspectus/affectus distinction appears no less than nine times in his commentaries on Paul, and on
several occasions its use is not only theologically significant but also displays a common
theme—the inseparability of knowledge and love in salvation. I will also consider a text from
Grosseteste’s Super Psalterium that uses aspectus and affectus in a way that relates to this theme.
I will begin with a brief overview of Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation. This overview
will be based principally upon James Ginther’s observations which appear in his study of
Grosseteste’s theology, Master of the Sacred Page. It will also include some of my own
observations based upon various passages in Grosseteste’s corpus. Then, after a brief
introduction of texts, I will survey the theologically significant uses of aspectus and affectus in
Grosseteste’s Pauline commentaries and one selected passage from the Super Psalterium with a
view to identifying how Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction shapes his interaction with
Scripture and traditional interpretations of Scripture. These passages give us a window into how
Grosseteste’s favorite wordplay actually shapes his interpretation of Scripture and the Christian
doctrine of salvation as understood through earlier interpreters. At the end of the chapter, I will
present my conclusions.
Robert Grosseteste’s Doctrine of Salvation
James Ginther has treated the basic features of Robert Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation
in Master of the Sacred Page, chapter six .1 The main focus of that chapter is Grosseteste’s
Christology, but Ginther approaches Grosseteste’s Christology through the lens of soteriology.
Noting that others have explained sufficiently Grosseteste’s doctrine of the absolute
1 James Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 121-150.
260 predestination of Christ, Ginther elects to focus upon “how Christ’s saving work aligns with his cosmic role.” 2 Ultimately, Ginther finds a connection between these two roles in Christ’s work of unifying all things. In his cosmic role, Christ unifies created reality, and in His saving role,
Christ reunites creation with its Creator. 3 It is in the course of this discussion that Ginther highlights some important features of Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation.
For any western soteriology of this period, one must ask how it relates to Anselm’s Cur
Deus Homo. Concerning Grosseteste’s soteriology, Ginther gives two important answers to this question. First, having chosen Grosseteste’s De Cessatione Legalium as his principal source for discussing the saving role of Christ, he compares Grosseteste’s methodology in this work to
Anselm’s method in the Cur Deus Homo. He notes that Grosseteste takes a different approach
from his late eleventh century predecessor. Whereas Anselm proceeded on the basis of reason
alone, Grosseteste begins with Scripture, especially the literal meaning of the Old Testament, and
then applies natural reason. 4 The other point of comparison concerns the doctrine of satisfaction.
Anselm had been dissatisfied with the Christus Victor account inherited from the church fathers
and had offered his own theory of satisfaction as an alternative. Grosseteste, like many in his
day, retains the Christus Victor account but combines it with satisfaction. Yet, Ginther points
2 Ginther, Sacred Page, 121. For other treatments of Grosseteste’s soteriology, see Servus Gieben, “Robert Grosseteste on Preaching. With the Edition of the Sermon ‘ Ex Rerum Initiatarum’ on Redemption,” Collectanea Franciscana 37 (1967): 100-141, at 114-119, and James McEvoy, “Robert Grosseteste on the Cross and Redemptive Love. With the Text of his Sermon on Galatians 5:24 and Notes on its Reception,” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 66, 2 (1999): 289-315, at 295-299. See also C. William Marx, The Devil’s Rights and the Redemption in the Literature of Medieval England (Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 1995), 65-79. The absolute predestination of Christ is the doctrine that the second person of the Trinity would have become incarnate even if no human had ever sinned. For an introduction to this topic, see Daniel P. Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation? Reconsidering the History of the Absolute Predestination of Christ in Light of Robert Grosseteste,” The Heythrop Journal 52 (2011): 374-391. 3 Ginther, Sacred Page, 140. 4 Ginther, Sacred Page, 123.
261 out, Grosseteste’s way of combining the two accounts does not grant the Devil any real rights, even while maintaining that he must be conquered. 5
There is a small body of literature on Grosseteste’s doctrine of redemption that I must mention here. Some earlier accounts of Grosseteste’s doctrine of redemption focused on his popular Anglo-Norman work (which was also translated into Middle English), Le Chasteau d’Amour (The Castle of Love) (c.1235 or later). 6 They concluded that Grosseteste did in fact
hold to a theory of redemption in which the Devil had rights over mankind and God must pay a
ransom to the Devil. 7 C. W. Marx, reading the same work alongside Dictum 10 8 and in light of how Grosseteste was adapting his sources, argued that the “ransom” in Le Chasteau d’Amour is
5 Ginther, Sacred Page, 127. Ginther quotes from Dictum 38 in support of this point; Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 38 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. fol. 28vb): “Sed ad concordiam in hiis verbis veridicis declarandum, ymaginemur aliquem qui regnum alterius fraudulenter et iniuste invasisset et sibi subiugasset. Et ymaginemur heredem contra eum dimicasse, eumque sic vicisse non ut omnino nullus sit in eo motus rebelligerans, sed ut nullus sit eius motus quem superare non possit, omnis viriliter resistens. In hoc ergo casu omnis virilis in potestate et in securitate si vellet pacem haberet, licet nondum omnis motus rebellans quiesceret. Sic itaque per Christi victoriam in passione mors est triumphata, id est diabolus, peccatum, et peccati fomes, ac per consequens mors corporis penalis, non ut omnino non sit motus spiritui nostro rebellans, sed ut omnem rebellantem motum superare possit spiritus fortiter resistens .” 6 This is the date given by McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 151. 7 See Sister Mary Immaculate Creek, “The Sources and Influence of Robert Grosseteste’s Le Chasteau d’Amour ,” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1941), 27-85. Building upon Creek’s study was Kari Sajavarra, Introduction to The Middle English Translations of Robert Grosseteste’s ‘Château d’Amour,’ ed. Kari Sajavarra, Mémoires de la Société Néophilologique de Helsinki 32 (1967): 54-62. Both of these works are discussed in Marx, The Devil’s Rights , 65- 79. My citations of Creek and Sajavarra are adapted from Marx’s pages 65 and 66. I have not consulted those two works directly. 8 In Dictum 10 Grosseteste uses an extended analogy to explain the redemption. In this analogy, a ransom is paid both to a king, representing God, and to a wicked torturer, representing the Devil. Yet, there is no indication that the torturer has any right to ownership of the prisoner in the first place, and Grosseteste’s only remark on the matter seems to imply that in fact he does not; Robert Grosseteste, Sermo44/Dictum 10 (ed. C. William Marx, The Devils’s Rights, 158): “Item quia ille tortor precium recepit, etiam si ius aliquod habuisset, id amisit ...” Marx interprets this line a bit differently. Taking Grosseteste to be only “almost skeptical about the notion of the Devil’s right of possession,” he concludes that “it is likely that Grosseteste failed to appreciate fully the implications of Anselmian ideas on the questions of the Devil’s rights” (Marx, The Devil’s Rights, 67). In light of the clear indication of the Devil’s unjust possession of humankind in Dictum 38 (quoted in note 5 above), I am rather inclined to assume that in this line Grosseteste is simply acknowledging that some people think the Devil had rights and mentioning that such a view does not hurt his analogy. If he thought the Devil had any real right of possession, there would be some explanation of it in Dictum 10.
262 paid to God, not the Devil. 9 Therefore he concluded, “Ultimately the Devil is irrelevant to the
redemption.” 10 Though Ginther does not cite this literature in the chapter under consideration, he
seems to have arrived at a similar conclusion to that of Marx.
Ginther also discusses Grosseteste’s doctrine of justification. Like most theologians of
the period, Grosseteste sometimes refers to justification as equivalent to the process of
salvation. 11 He also repeats the Pauline/Augustinian theme of faith working through love and in
Dictum 74 connects this theme with a more specific idea of justice and justification. Ginther
observes, “This is a justice that justifies and comes from a faith that works through love.” 12
Because I am concerned in this chapter with the roles of knowledge and love in
Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation, it is necessary at this point to pause and offer some additional remarks on Dictum 74, going beyond Ginther’s analysis. It is important to notice in Dictum 74 that Grosseteste specifically says the justice of a person who has faith working through love merits the kingdom of heaven. 13 He explains that this kind of justice exceeds that of the scribes
and Pharisees (cf. Matthew 5:20) because, even though the works themselves may be the same,
they differ in root and end. 14 This meritorious justice is a property of a work that is rooted in
9 Marx, The Devil’s Rights, 66-73. 10 Marx, The Devil’s Rights, 72. 11 Ginther, Sacred Page, 133. 12 Ibid. 13 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 74 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. fol. 55va): “Idem itaque in quo vestra iusticia ab illorum iusticia habundat per se meretur regnum celorum, quia ex operibus non iustificatur omnis caro coram ipso, sed ex fide per dilectionem operante.” 14 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 74 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. fol. 55va): “Hec itaque iusticia habundat a iusticia scribarum et phariseorum in radice et fine, communicat autem in opere.”
263 charity and has the highest good as its end. 15 From Robert Grosseteste’s remarks here it is clear
that both the knowledge of faith and the love of charity are necessary for justification.
In his commentary on Galatians, Grosseteste makes explicit what is implicit in Dictum
74, namely, the connection between the justice of a work that merits eternal life and the personal justice of the person who does the work: “For those works of justice are dead which do not proceed from a living interior justice.” 16 In Dictum 74 the works proceed from the root of
charity. Here they proceed from interior justice. One can only assume that Grosseteste sees the
two roots as intimately linked. Thus, although slightly different constructions may be possible, it
appears that Grosseteste holds to an interior justification in which the personal justice of the
believer, through divinely given faith and charity, produces works that merit eternal life due to
their divine root and end. 17
Ginther brings out two other important aspects of Grosseteste’s doctrine of justification.
Both of these concern the nature of personal justice and appear in Dictum 3 . Grosseteste follows
Anselm in placing justice in the will and also identifying it with beauty and right order. Then
Grosseteste supports this point by citing Boethius’ view that justice is “likeness with the celestial and divine substances.” 18 In Dictum 3 the substances in view are angels, so the Christian’s
personal justice is a likeness to the angels.
15 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 74 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. fol. 55va): “Tercia iusticia est cum opus rectum et a sacra scriptura regulatum a radice caritatis procedit, et finem habet summum bonum.” 16 Robert Grosseteste, Expositio in epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas III §15 (ed. James McEvoy, in Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , ed. James McEvoy, CCCM 130 [Turnhout: Brepols, 1995], 85; trans. mine): “Mortua enim sunt illa opera iustitiae, quae non procedunt a uiuente iustitia interiore.” 17 As will become clear in the main discussion below, this personal justice must be a product of baptism. 18 Ginther, Sacred Page, 134.
264
Here again I will take a step beyond Ginther’s discussion, which, it should be said, was by no means intended to be a complete account. While angels are the heavenly substances that
Christians imitate in Dictum 3 , Grosseteste also upholds the almost universal medieval western tradition of identifying God with every one of His attributes, including justice and beauty. 19 This means that God is justice itself and beauty itself. If personal justice is a likeness to heavenly substances and is also beauty and order in the will, it follows that personal justice should ultimately be a likeness to God himself, considered as the highest beauty or justice. In Dictum
91 , though not directly discussing justice, Grosseseteste affirms this kind of conformity:
For just as soft wax, when a seal is applied firmly, receives by an imitating likeness the beauty of all the forms and shapes inscribed in the seal, so also the soul, when firmly applied to God through the bond of love, receives conformity, not with an equal likeness, but with the highest imitating likeness of his highest beauty. 20
Since God is a Trinity, and since the human person bears the image of the Trinity in the highest power of the soul (understood to include memory, understanding, and will), the highest instance of imitating the Divine Nature is in remembering, understanding, and loving God. 21 This
19 Robert Grosseteste Epistle 1/ De Forma Prima Omnium (Baur, 108): “Item quis non concedet Deum formosum et speciosum esse? Ergo ipse et species est, cum nihil sit in ipso, quod ipse non sit, sicut cum sit iustus ipse, est iustitia ipsa, qua iustus est. Sic, cum sit formosus et speciosus ipse, est forma et species, qua formosus et qua speciosus est, immo ipsa formositas et speciositas.” 20 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (ed. and trans. mine): “Sicut enim cera mollis fortiter applicata sigillo recipit imitatoria similitudine omnium formarum et figurarum in sigillo inscriptarum pulcritudinem, sic anima per amoris copulam fortiter ad Deum applicata, non equali, sed cum summa imitatoria similitudine ipsius summe pulcritudinis recipit conformitatem.” For my working edition of the entire passage in which this quotation appears, see Appendix 8A. 21 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 49 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. fol. 55va): “Caput anime est potencia memorandi, intelligendi, diligendi Deum creatorem scilicet Trinitatem. Conformacio qua conformatur anima Trinitati memorando et intelligendo et diligendo ipsam, protectio est huius capitis et salus. Unde hec est [Eph. 6:17] ‘galea salutis,’ de qua loquitur Apostolus. Deiformitas ergo in supprema parte anime sive mentis dicitur renovacio spiritus, de qua dicit Apostolus: [Eph. 4:23] ‘Renovamini spiritu mentis vestre,’ sive conformitas spiritus ipsi cui canimus: [Ps. 26:1] ‘Dominus illuminacio mea et salus mea.’.”
265 imitation is possible through participation in the life of God available through grace. 22 Thus, the
personal justice which gives rise to works of justice is the conformity of the Christian soul to the
beauty or justice of God which occurs through grace.
In summary, Robert Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation is centered on the work of Christ
by which He makes satisfaction to God for our sins and on human participation in the life of God
through grace. This life of grace must include both the knowledge of faith and the love of
charity in order for the human person to be conformed to God’s justice and so merit eternal life
through willing good deeds that have their root in charity and their end in the highest good,
God. 23
Aspectus and Affectus in Grosseteste’s Biblical Commentaries
With the basic features of Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation in hand, it is now time to
introduce the principal texts which underlie the present study. I will present two passages from
Grosseteste’s glosses on the Pauline epistles. Richard Dales collected and edited these glosses
from two works of Thomas Gascoigne, a fifteenth-century admirer of Robert Grosseteste. 24
Gascoigne tells us that he copied these glosses from Grosseteste’s original manuscript. The
autograph, he says, was a copy of the Pauline epistles accompanied by the common gloss.
22 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §16 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 178): “Resurrectio itaque ab hac morte est restitutio in participationem vitae per se inerrabilis et impotentis decidere ab eo quod secundum naturam…vita autem per se inerrabilis solus deus est.” 23 Inasmuch as Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation appears piecemeal spread across many works, a brief summary such as this certainly runs the risk of improper emphasis. I have omitted important themes almost entirely, and I have not considered the question of doctrinal development through Grosseteste’s career. Nevertheless, an overview of Grosseteste’s soteriology that truly does the subject justice could not fit within the confines of a study like this without taking it over entirely. 24 Dales left the editing of the fragments on Galatians to James McEvoy, since he was also editing the larger commentary on Galatians. They are printed in James McEvoy, Introduction to Robert Grosseteste, Expositio in epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas, ed. James McEvoy, in Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , ed. James McEvoy, CCCM 130 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 27-30.
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Grosseteste had written his own glosses on select passages of the epistles, and occasionally on the gloss itself, in the margins of this book and had also composed a prologue to his marginal glosses. 25 Dales dates Grosseteste’s original composition of this now fragmentary work to the
1220s. 26
The remaining texts from Pauline commentaries I have chosen to survey are all found in
Grosseteste’s commentary on Galatians (c.1230-1235). 27 Unlike his earlier glosses on all the
Pauline epistles, this almost complete exposition of just one letter proceeds verse-by-verse. The commentary exists in one manuscript, in which there is oddly no prologue to the work and the last few folios appear to be missing. James McEvoy has edited the commentary based upon this manuscript (Oxford, Magdalen College, MS 57). 28 According to McEvoy, Grosseteste was the
first commentator on Galatians who tried to utilize all previous commentaries on the epistle in
his interpretation of the text. 29 This included some apparently untranslated Greek commentaries.
He also worked with the Greek text of Paul’s letter. 30 If his work on Galatians had been his only book, Grosseteste still would have made a serious contribution to the history of biblical commentary.
25 Richard Dales, Introduction to Robert Grosseteste, Glossarum in Sancti Pauli Epistolas fragmenta, ed. Richard Dales, in Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , ed. James McEvoy , CCCM 130 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 180. 26 Dales, “Introduction,” 183. 27 McEvoy’s precise suggestion is that “a later date within the period 1225-1235 is…to be preferred to an earlier one” (McEvoy, “Introduction,” 8). He does not, however, set a firm terminus post quem. 28 See McEvoy, “Introduction,” 4-6, 35-37. 29 James McEvoy, “Introduction,” 8. 30 Ibid., 11-14.
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In Grosseteste’s Pauline commentaries as we have them today, the aspectus/affectus distinction appears at least nine times, and several of these occurrences are theologically significant. I have chosen seven passages to present in this study. The choice was easy because all seven passages relate in some way to his doctrine of salvation. I will now walk through these texts, observing what they reveal about the relationships between Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction, his interpretation of Paul, his stance towards earlier interpreters of Paul, and his doctrine of salvation.
Grosseteste’s glosses on 1 Corinthians. I will begin with the glosses. Both of the passages relevant to this study appear among Grosseteste’s glosses on the fourteenth chapter of 1
Corinthians. Verse three of that chapter, as Grosseteste has it, says “The one who prophesies speaks unto edification, and exhortation, and consolation.” 31 In his gloss on this verse,
Grosseteste uses aspectus and affectus to explain the meaning of this instruction on prophecy in
Christian meetings. He writes,
He edifies who illumines the aspectus to see something previously not seen, and through this turns the affectus to the same. He exhorts who teaches nothing new but by some persuasion, when discernment is already had, heats up, as it were, the affectus and moves it to work more. He consoles who removes sadness that is cooling the affectus already had. 32
Decades before writing this gloss, Grosseteste had taught in his De Artibus Liberalibus that the aspectus informs the affectus concerning what is desirable and then the affectus can be persuaded
31 Robert Grosseteste, Glossarum in Sancti Pauli Epistolas fragmenta: I ad Corinthios 14,3 (Dales, 205; trans. mine): “Qui prophetat, loquitur ad edificacionem et exortacionem et consolacionem.” 32 Robert Grosseteste, Glossarum in Sancti Pauli Epistolas fragmenta: I ad Corinthios 14,3 (Dales, 205; partial trans. mine): “Edificat qui illuminat aspectum ad aliquid prius non uisum uidendum, ac per hoc ad idem attendit affectum. Exhortatur qui nil docet nouum, sed persuasione aliqua affectum agnoscentem prius habitum quasi calefacit et mouet ad operandum amplius. Consolatur qui remouet tristiciam affectum prehabitum refrigerantem, nec plura facit scripturarum exposicio nisi aut nouam agnicionem diligenter imprimit, aut habitam promouet, aut retardancia promicionem seu illuminacionem tollit.”
268 to act on this knowledge or not. The very same view is presupposed here and transposed into a theological key. It is through the illumination of the aspectus that the affectus may be directed, and then motivating the affectus or removing obstacles to its motivation are additional steps that may be taken. Nothing about edification, exhortation, or consolation required him to say this.
Rather, Grosseteste’s preconceptions about the powers of the soul and how they relate to one another has profoundly shaped the way he interprets Paul’s teaching on prophecy in Christian meetings.
Our second passage, which is Grosseteste’s gloss on 1 Corinthians 14:29, complements the first. Here again Grosseteste is dealing with Paul’s teaching on prophecy—this time the instruction that only two or three prophets should speak in a meeting. Now Grosseteste makes explicit what was only implicit in the other gloss, namely, that he is taking “prophecy” in these instructions to be virtually a cipher for “preaching.” One can see this in the fact that
Grosseteste’s gloss refers not to prophets who speak and other prophets who judge, Paul’s precise subject, but to “preachers” ( predicatores ) and “hearers” ( auditores ). 33 The goal of preaching, he says here, is “that the hearers, illumined in the aspectus, might learn and, moved in the affectus, might be exhorted.” 34
Thus we can see that Grosseteste’s application of aspectus and affectus to Paul’s teaching
on prophecy in Christian meetings is very significant. By both interpreting Paul’s instructions
33 Robert Grosseteste, Glossarum in Sancti Pauli Epistolas fragmenta: I ad Corinthios 14,29 (Dales, 205): “Auditor uerborum debet diiudicare que audit et cedere ad humilitatem et ad maiorem uocandi facilitatem. Item, predicatores non simul et confuse, sed per singulos et per partes predicarent, et est finis predicacionis ut discant auditores illuminati in aspectu , et exhortentur commoti in affectu; et predicatores sibi inuicem cedant ut sit unitas, concordia non discordia.” 34 Robert Grosseteste, Glossarum in Sancti Pauli Epistolas fragmenta: I ad Corinthios 14,29 (Dales, 205 ; trans. mine): “…et est finis predicacionis ut discant auditores illuminati in aspectu , et exhortentur commoti in affectu…”
269 through the aspectus/affectus distinction and assuming that those instructions apply directly to preaching, Grosseteste ultimately sees the very purpose of preaching in terms of aspectus and affectus.
Grosseteste’s commentary on Galatians. When we move on to the slightly more mature
and much more erudite commentary on Galatians, the aspectus/affectus material gets even more
interesting. In chapter two, paragraph 30, Grosseteste comments upon the second part of
Galatians 2:19: “In order that I might live to God, I have been crucified with Christ.” 35 Our commentator tells us that this is a literal translation from the Greek. He is correct, although he is
following the punctuation of Theophylact, rather than that of our modern editors. 36 He also follows Theophylact’s Greek commentary for the first part of his interpretation, saying that, having been crucified with Christ, we die with Him in baptism, and this is how we live to God. 37
After repeating Theophylact’s entire comment, however, Grosseteste goes on to bring in aspectus and affectus.
At first, he seems to be offering an alternative interpretation: “But to live to God, and to have God in oneself, illumining the aspectus to see truth and moving the affectus to do it for His sake is to be crucified with Christ.” 38 This time the death in view is not the death of baptism but
35 Robert Grosseteste, Expositio in epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas II §30 (McEvoy, 67 ; trans. mine): “ Vt Deo uiuam, Christo crucifixus sum .” 36 The editors of the Nestle-Aland New Testament attach the statement about being crucified with Christ to the words that follow it, rather than those that precede: “ ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον , ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω . Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι · ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγῶ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός ...” (Galatians 2:19-2:20a in Novum Testamentum Graece, 27 revidierte Auflage, ed. Aland, et al. [Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1898, 1993]). 37 Robert Grosseteste, Expos.ad Galatas II §30 (McEvoy, 67); cf. Theophylact, Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas, in loc. (PG 124:980C). 38 Robert Grosseteste, Expos.ad Galatas II §30 (McEvoy, 67; partial trans. and emphasis mine): “Viuere autem Deo, et habere Deum in se, illuminantem aspectum ad ueritatem uidendam et mouentem affectum ad faciendum eam propter illum, concrucifigi Christo est (mortificatis membris, quae sunt super terram extenta, uidelicet
270 the mortification of the flesh, which amounts to not doing the deeds of concupiscence, as he explains. Grosseteste then ends his comment by tying the two interpretations together. He says that one receives the life of God, the one in which the aspectus is illumined and the affectus rightly moved, in the sacrament of baptism. 39
I mentioned above that Grosseteste probably wrote his commentary on Galatians after
having previously written occasional glosses throughout his copy of the common gloss on the
Pauline epistles. Assuming this is correct, it is possible that this passage reflects an instance in
which Grosseteste found his own previous glosses and his new commentary sources somewhat at
odds. Rather than choosing one or the other, he integrated both into a theologically consistent
synthesis. The seams, as it were, are only visible in the quite different construals of the literal
sense of the text. Without the full text of Grosseteste’s original glosses available, however, it is
nearly impossible to render any firm judgment.
Whether this speculation be on target, or whether Grosseteste simply brought his
unwritten ideas into conversation with his sources, in either case we have seen in this passage
what can happen when Grosseteste brings aspectus and affectus to bear upon a received
interpretation of Scripture. He has retained the traditional understanding: being crucified with
Christ and living to God is about baptism. But he has also expanded this understanding, as it
relates to this verse, to include the Christian’s lived experience after baptism. To live to God is
not just to have been baptized but also to have the divine life received at baptism active within concupiscentia, uel superata per uitam spiritus, ipsa concupiscentia non moueat membra ad actus uoluptuosos), et configurari morti Christi, ut sicut Christus mortuus est carne, ita ipse mortuus fuit uitae et actibus cunctis quae concupiscentiae
271 oneself, correcting both the Christian’s knowledge in the aspectus and her actions resulting from a rightly moved affectus .40
The remaining four texts all appear in Grosseteste’s comments on Galatians chapters five and six. Commenting on chapter five, verse four, he uses aspectus and affectus to explain how those who seek to be justified by the law have been purged ( evacuati ) from Christ and cut off from grace. 41 After noting that such people have freely abandoned what they received in
baptism, he adds, “Note also that they had and abandoned illumination in the aspectus of the
mind, for Christ is the truth and wisdom of the Father, and that they had and abandoned the grace
that was elevating and directing in the affectus of the mind.” 42 McEvoy’s text has aspectus
instead of affectus here, but the single manuscript he had for this edition is clearly in error. The
very next thing Grosseteste writes makes this plain: “Note also that truth is what fulfills the
aspectus and grace is what elevates and directs the affectus, and the emptiness and crookedness of it are opposed to these things.” 43 If affectus is correct here (and I think it is), it belongs in the
previous sentence as well. The part about emptiness and crookedness anticipates the next
sentence, where he says that the Old Testament Law is a sort of vacuitas, or absence, of truth and
that it fails to direct the voluntas, or will . This is why the verse says those who seek to be
40 I must note that Theophylact does mention the mortification of one’s earthly members in his comment on the next verse (Theophylact, Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas, in loc. [PG 124:980D]). He does not, however, refer to intellect or affect. That part appears to be the fruit of what Grosseteste already thought about the aspectus and affectus of the soul. 41 Grosseteste seems to have had a slightly different gloss on this verse in his earlier work on the Pauline epistles. For his earlier gloss, see McEvoy, “Introduction,” 29. 42 Robert Grosseteste, Expos.ad Galatas V §3 (McEvoy, 131 ; my alteration in square brackets ; trans. mine): “Notat quoque,
272 justified by the Law are evacuati from Christ and cut off from grace. 44 Being in Christ and His
grace involves divine action in the aspectus and the affectus , but the Law alone provides neither of these things.
It is important to notice here how aspectus and affectus shape Grosseteste’s interpretation of this verse. As we have seen, the life of grace, with Grosseteste’s two-power model of the soul, involves illumination of the aspectus, and the right movement or direction of the affectus.
Therefore, he naturally wants to find in the Law a lack of these two things to show that dependence on the Law for justification cuts one off from the life of grace. From Hebrews 10:1 he has it that the Law was only a shadow of the truth, so it fails to help the aspectus. Perhaps from the common gloss on Psalm 18:8, 45 perhaps from some other source, Grosseteste accepts from the Christian tradition that the Old Testament Law restrains the hand, but not the voluntas .
Thus the Law does not help the affectus either, since voluntas and affectus can be
interchangeable, when our author wants them to be. Yet this mere data, that the Old Testament
Law lacks fullness of truth and fails to correct the will, does not directly suggest anything about
grace and salvation. It is only because Grosseteste already conceives of the life of grace in terms
of intellect and will, of aspectus and affectus, that this data becomes relevant. Because he
believes that one must have not only faith, through illumination, but also an upright will, through
interior grace, to be saved, he brings in these ideas from elsewhere in Scripture and tradition to
serve his argument. His two-power model of the soul, combined of course with traditional
44 Robert Grosseteste, Expos.ad Galatas V §3 (McEvoy, 131): “Cum igitur lex sit umbra et quaedam uacuitas ueritatis, non ueritatis soliditas, sit quoque rigor puniens et manum cohibens, non remittens nec uoluntatem dirigens, manifestum est quod qui uolunt in lege iustificari, euacuati sunt a ueritate et exciderunt a gratia remittente et interius dirigente.” 45 See Glossa Ordinaria, Ps. 18:8 (PL 113:871C). This is the source identified in McEvoy’s apparatus fontium for this line.
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Christian ideas about salvation, seems to be the main force shaping his comments on this verse,
Galatians 5:4.
Aspectus and affectus appear again a few pages later, when Grosseteste is explaining
Galatians 5:7: “You were running well, who has impeded you so that you do not obey the truth?” 46 Our commentator explains what it means to obey the truth:
For the truth wishes to impress itself upon the aspectus of the mind resulting in illumination and upon the affectus resulting in love in order that it might issue outward in good works. Therefore, the one who through hardness and obstinacy of the mind refuses to receive from the truth an impression of this kind is shown not to obey the truth. But the one who receives the impression, having been made subject to the truth, obeys. 47
This is a fascinating passage because it shows the inseparability of intellect and will, and of knowledge and love, in the life of grace. According to Grosseteste, Paul refers to obeying the truth because the one who believes the truth will also obey it, but how he gets to that explanation makes all the difference. The truth, and by this he may mean Christ himself or perhaps the truth of the Christian faith, is capable of changing both the aspectus and the affectus to bring about
good works. This whole movement of grace, however, depends upon the consent of the mind in
question. Without consent, there can be no illumination of the aspectus nor movement of the
affectus to love. With consent, the truth, it seems, does all the work.
Grosseteste has not imposed his two-power model of the soul on this text without
warrant. The paradoxical phrase about obeying the truth invited him to give some explanation in
terms of obedience and truth. It is no surprise that he gives us an explanation that connects both
46 Robert Grosseteste, Expos.ad Galatas V §7 (McEvoy, 133 ; trans. mine): “ Currebatis bene…quis vos impediuit ueritati non oboedire ?” 47 Robert Grosseteste, Expos.ad Galatas V §7 (McEvoy, 134 ; trans. mine): “ueritas enim se uult imprimere aspectui mentis ad illuminationem et affectui ad dilectionem, ut sic prodeat exterius in bonam operationem. Qui ergo huiusmodi impressionem per mentis duritiam et obstinationem renuit a ueritate recipere, conuincitur ueritati non oboedire ; qui autem dictam impressionem recipit, ueritati subiectus oboedit.”
274 obedience and faith to the life of grace. It is interesting, though, that he reaches for aspectus and
affectus to do this, rather than simply repeating a line from Jerome or one of the other
commentaries he is following. It shows how important this basic conception of the soul is to his
thought.
It is also interesting that he gives us a rather developed conception of salvation in which
knowledge and love prove to be inseparable on two levels. There is the need of the truth to
produce both illumination and love on one level, and this is clearly the work of grace. But on
another level, there is the need to consent to the very impression of truth in the first place. It is
truth that has to be received, and so knowledge is necessary. But inasmuch as there must be
consent to the impression of truth, there must be a choice, which involves the will and love. Just
as knowledge and love are inseparable for Grosseteste, it seems his basic conception of the soul
and his doctrine of salvation are likewise inseparable.
Our last two Pauline commentary texts both invoke aspectus and affectus to explain what
it means to live according to the Spirit, so I shall discuss them together. When explaining the
line “if we live by the Spirit let us also walk by the Spirit” in Galatians 5:25, he presents two
parallel interpretations, both of which seem to be rooted in Jerome’s commentary, 48 although
Grosseteste has recast them. One interpretation says that to walk by the Spirit is to act according to the interior grace of the Holy Spirit, and the other connects the “spirit” to the spiritual interpretation of the law. Our concern is primarily with the first, since that is where aspectus and affectus appear. Grosseteste explains, “ If we live by the Spirit, that is, if the Holy Spirit in our spirit, which is conformed to Himself, illumines our aspectus and inflames our affectus, then let
48 See Jerome, Comm. Epist. ad Galatas III (PL 26:422C-423A).
275 us walk, that is, let us work by the Spirit, that is, according to the interior illumination of the spirit.” 49 In other passages we have seen from this commentary Grosseteste has attributed the illumination of the aspectus and the inflaming, moving, or directing of the affectus to God, truth, and grace. Here he attributes both to the Holy Spirit. This attribution adds little to our understanding of his doctrine, but it does provide a convenient opportunity to point out that all of these helps to the aspectus and affectus are more or less interchangeable. In all of these passages he is considering the divine work of grace in salvation under different aspects. What is common to every case is that God must act on both the aspectus and the affectus with the result that the knowledge of faith through illumination and love through divine motivation are inseparable in
Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation.
About a page later, apparently referring back to the same idea, he describes the “spiritual” individuals of Galatians 6:1 as having three qualities. They have been shown that they should leave behind the carnal requirements of the Law and live according to the Spirit. Their aspectus has been illumined to see the necessary rules, and their affectus has been inflamed through persuasive admonitions. 50 This passage adds to our understanding of the others some
information about how the Holy Spirit inflames the affectus. Evidently one way this can occur is
through the persuasion of human words. Realizing this fact can deepen our understanding of
what Grosseteste said in his glosses on 1 Corinthians about preaching—the first two passages
49 Robert Grosseteste, Expos.ad Galatas V §40 (McEvoy, 159 ; trans. mine; italicization of Scripture original): “ Si uiuimus spiritu , hoc est, si Spiritus Sanctus in spiritu nostro sibi conformato nostrum illuminat aspectum et accendit affectum , tunc ambulemus , hoc est, operemur spiritu , hoc est, secundum interiorem spiritus illuminationem.” 50 Robert Grosseteste, Expos.ad Galatas VI §1 (McEvoy, 160): “Ostenso quod relictis carnalibus legis uiuendum est secundum spiritum, et non solum ad uidendum pernecessarias rationes illuminato aspectu , sed etiam per commonitiones persuasorias accenso affectu , quasi iam per hoc aliquibus effectis spiritualibus commouet eosdem et instruit qualiter ipsi se habeant ad infirmiores, qui nondum sunt spirituales; unde uocat hic spirituales eos
276 considered in this study. The persuasion involved in preaching, it seems, can be an instrument by which the Holy Spirit does his work of moving the affectus. Since he also said in the glosses on
1 Corinthians that preaching illumines the aspectus, it is safe to assume that both functions of preaching, instruction and exhortation, may be powered by the Holy Spirit.
The Super Psalterium. To conclude this textual study, I will consider a relevant passage from Grosseteste’s commentary on the Psalms, commonly known as the Super Psalterium. In his exposition of the line “ Qui loquitur iniqua non direxit in conspectu oculorum meorum (No one who speaks wicked things has made his way into the sight of my eyes)” in Psalm 100:8
(Vulg.), Grosseteste brings aspectus and affectus into ethics in a way that is closely parallel to his discussions of aspectus and affectus in preaching. He says that speech is wicked ( iniqua ) if used for some end other than that for which it was made.51 “Speech was made,” he says, “in order
that it might illumine unto truth the aspectus of the person who hears or inflame his affectus to
charity, or do both, or that it might resound the praises of God.” 52 He says that the person who does not abide the one who speaks wrongly could be Christ or any wise master of a household
(paterfamilias ). For Grosseteste, then, the purpose of preaching turns out to be a large part of the purpose of human speech in general.
In order to appreciate the significance of Grosseteste’s interpretation here, it will be helpful to begin with a consideration of this verse in the original language. Grosseteste here is discussing the second half of the verse. In Hebrew, the whole verse reads:
51 Robert Grosseteste, Super Psalterium 100.7.63 (Ginther, Sacred Page, 207). 52 Robert Grosseteste, Super Psalterium 100.7.63 (Ginther, Sacred Page, 207; trans. mine): “Factus autem sermo vt illuminet audientis aspectum ad veritatem, siue accendat eius affectum ad caritatem, siue vtrumque faciat, siue vt laudes Dei resonet.”
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לֹא ־יֵשֵׁ ב בְּקֶרֶ ב בֵּ יתִ י עֺשֵׂ ה רְ מִ יָּה
53 דֹּבֵ ר שְׁקָרִ ים לֹא־יִכּוֹן לְנֶגֶד ֵ ינָי
A literal translation (with structural markers added) would be as follows:
(A) He will not dwell in the midst of my house, (B) the one who practices deception.
(B) The one who speaks falsehoods (A) will not be established before my eyes.
This verse is a clear example of synonymous parallelism. 54 The second line repeats the meaning of the first line in different terms. In this case the parallelism is inverse or chiastic, following an
ABBA pattern (as shown). This means that one kind of offense is in view—deception. There is
יֵשֵׁ ב בְּקֶרֶ ב ) also just one response to the offender described. To “dwell in the midst of my house
Taking ”.( יִכּוֹן לְנֶגֶ ד ֵ ינָי ) bears the same meaning as to “be established before my eyes ”( בֵּ יתִ י the synonymous descriptions together, one can see that the Psalmist is describing a relationship of support. The Psalmist is saying that he will not employ, or establish, in his household anyone who lacks integrity. 55 In the context of the Psalm as a whole, this verse suggests that the phrase
in verse 2 (Heb., not Vulg.) was also referring to a ”( בְּקֶרֶ ב בֵּ יתִ י ) in the midst of my house“
53 The Hebrew is according to the diplomatic text Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia, ed. K. Elliger and W. Rudolph (Stuttgart:Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1967, 1977, and 1997). 54 Alternatively, it may be called a synonymous distich. Karl Keil and Franz Delitzsch, Old Testament Commentaries (Grand Rapids: Associated Publishers and Authors, Inc., 1967), vol. 4, 380 (emphasis original): “The simplest form is, according to the fundamental peculiarity of the Hebrew verse, the distich. The relation of the two lines to each other is very manifold. The second line may repeat the thought of the first, only in a somewhat altered form, in order to express this thought as clearly and exhaustively as possible. We call such proverbs synonymous distichs.” 55 Willem A. VanGemeren, Psalms, in The Expositor’s Bible Commentary vol. 5, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991), 644: “The king who vows to walk blamelessly in his house and who invites the faithful of the land to ‘dwell’ with him (vv. 2, 6) excludes from dwelling in his house all who do not conform to God’s high standards of integrity.”
278 household which the author manages. Therefore it is likely that the intervening verses should be read as relating to the governance of a household as well.
If regarding authorial intention is considered a virtue, then Grosseteste’s decision to make several comments on earlier verses concerning the upright governance of a household was appropriate for this Psalm, although modern scholars would tend to interpret this household as that of the king specifically. 56 The point in observing all of this is to show that Grosseteste here is following the literal meaning of the text in his initial interpretation, even if additional spiritual interpretations may be added. The appearance of aspectus and affectus is part of his explanation of the literal meaning. He uses the pair to explain the definition of wicked speech mentioned in the verse. Inasmuch as his definition, mentioned above, concerns the God-intended purpose of speech, it speaks both to the nature of humankind and to the elevation of that nature in the life of grace. It seems that the knowledge, love, and praise of God is the ultimate end he has in mind, but his definition is broad enough to include all rightly ordered love and, significantly, all knowledge of truth. 57 Because aspectus and affectus belong to the basic constitution of the human creature, these powers have the same purposes and functions in all people and therefore render the same natural obligations.
56 For example: Keil and Delitzsch, Old Testament Commentaries , vol. 4, 125: “He pledges himself to walk in his house, i.e. his palace, in the innocence or simplicity of his heart…”; VanGemeren, Psalms , 640: “Clearly the Psalm belongs to the royal psalms, and further it is in the form of a declaration of commitment.” ; See also Derek Kidner, Psalms 73-150: An Introduction and Commentary, Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries 16 (London: Inter-Varsity Press, 1975, 2008), 390-392. The main cue in the text itself that the king is speaking is the reference to the “city of the Lord” in verse 8. 57 I will suggest in chapter 8 that Grosseteste, like Augustine, sees illumination as the means to human knowledge both in the order of nature and in the order of grace. This text from the Super Psalterium pushes in that direction, but see chapter 8 for additional texts.
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Conclusions
It is time to draw some conclusions. Grosseteste appeals to aspectus and affectus to explain prophecy and preaching, to explain what it means to be crucified with Christ and to be cut off from grace, to explain what it means to obey the truth, to live by the Spirit, and to be a spiritual person. Over and over again, where Paul’s teaching has something to do with the
Christian experience of salvation, Grosseteste analyzes it in terms of his basic two-power model of the soul, aspectus and affectus. At the least we can say that the aspectus/affectus distinction is very significant in Grosseteste’s interpretation of Paul, in his interactions with traditional interpretations of Paul, and in his own doctrine of salvation.
But we can be more specific. I would say, based upon the Pauline commentary texts, that
Grosseteste has appropriated a traditional understanding of Paul’s soteriology as he received it from both eastern and western Christian sources and processed it through the grid of his own understanding of the powers of the soul. (This understanding also comes from the Christian tradition, but that is another discussion.) The result, as I believe he intended, is a relatively clear and very memorable articulation of the Christian experience of salvation: God’s grace must touch both the aspectus and the affectus.
The passage from the Super Psalterium adds to our understanding the universal human
context of this vision. God made all people to know and to love. When God’s grace perfects
human knowledge and love, He is bringing them to the end for which He created them.
Finally, the passages surveyed in this study allow us to explain in greater detail the inseparability of knowledge and love that always accompanies Grosseteste’s appeals to the aspectus/affectus distinction. For Grosseteste, as we know from other works, the final perfection
280 of the human creature is in the vision and embrace of God in eternal beatitude. 58 That is to say,
it involves both knowledge and love. From his use of aspectus and affectus in his biblical
commentaries we can add the following. Knowledge and love remain inseparable at every single
step on the journey to beatitude. We have seen that baptism renews both aspectus and affectus.
We have seen that accepting the truth by faith must involve both aspectus and affectus. We have seen that the Christian progresses towards the goal of beatitude through preaching (and presumably other means) only when there is both illumination of the aspectus and right movement of the affectus through the inner work of the Holy Spirit. Wherever there is a participation in the divine life, for Robert Grosseteste, aspectus and affectus must both be engaged, and knowledge and love are inseparable.
58 See for example Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fols. 72ra-72rb): “Est igitur radix cure pastoralis vita sana et integra verus amor Christi vie, veritatis, et vite, erumpens in nobis in imitacionem sufferencie passionum Christi, ut pro fratribus non trepidemus eciam mori, qua parte amoris diligimus ipsum viam; erumpens quoque in nobis per imitacionem ipsius per predicacionem veritatis, qua parte amoris diligimus ipsum veritatem; ardens eciam in nobis desiderio fruendi visione et amplexu sue divinitatis, qua parte amoris diligimus ipsum vitam.” See also Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 224-225), quoted in note 74 of the introduction.
Chapter 7: Aspectus, Affectus and Grosseteste’s Doctrine of Reforming the Divine Image in Man
In the previous chapter, I examined aspectus and affectus in Robert Grosseteste’s doctrine of salvation and in doing so illustrated the inseparability of knowledge and love in his thought. The present chapter is dedicated to illustrating and developing the priority of the aspectus, and chapter eight will emphasize the primacy of the affectus. I have chosen to examine the priority of the aspectus in the context of Grosseteste’s understanding of the reformation of the divine image in man in part because this is where its appearance may be surprising. Many thinkers, medieval and modern, have thought that one could love beyond the level of one’s intellectual grasp of something, but for Grosseteste, at least in the texts I will examine here, that is not the case. 1 In the pursuit of conformity to God through his image, the aspectus must lead the way, even while the process requires the right ordering and consent of the affectus.
While I will be analyzing Grosseteste’s thought in this chapter using the terms aspectus and affectus, the principal texts I will use, selections from parts eight and nine of the
Hexaëmeron, do not actually use the pair of terms. I have established the legitimacy of this approach in chapter four. In short, one should think of aspectus and affectus as Grosseteste’s general cognitive/appetitive distinction for the rational soul. The meanings of aspectus and affectus remain present even when Grosseteste is using other terms to discuss knowledge and love. Consequently, all discussions of knowledge and love are likely to bear the mark of his aspectus/affectus doctrine. The present chapter will further confirm this expectation.
1 Similarly, I will in chapter 8 examine the primacy of the affectus in the context of Grosseteste’s epistemology in part because that is an area where many thinkers, medieval and modern, would think that intellect has primacy. But again, it is not so for Grosseteste. 281 282
I will conduct the argument of this chapter in a manner similar to the previous chapter.
First I will provide some context in which to understand Grosseteste’s teaching on reforming the divine image in the human person. This brief section will summarize some pertinent findings of
James Ginther. Then I will give an exposition of passages in Hexaëmeron part eight that discuss the reformation of the divine image. Along the way, I will observe both the development of the priority of the aspectus and how Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine shapes his synthesis of traditional sources, through which he arrives at his own doctrine. At the end I will summarize my findings .
Doctrinal Context: Robert Grosseteste on Deification
James Ginther will provide this study with a point of departure. Chapter seven of Master
of the Sacred Page is entitled, “The Church, Pastoral Care, and the Deification of Humanity.”
Ginther’s observations on Grosseteste’s doctrine of deification appear throughout this chapter. I will collect several of these observations to provide a doctrinal backdrop for the present investigation.
Ginther defines deification for Grosseteste as human nature’s “ultimate union with the
Trinity.” 2 He describes this event as “conformity to the divine nature” and emphasizes that it begins and ends in the context of the Church. 3 It begins at baptism 4 and ends in the eschaton
2 Ginther, Sacred Page, 151. 3 Ginther, Sacred Page, 173. 4 Ginther, Sacred Page, 158.
283 with the resurrection and the union of God with the Church Triumphant. 5 Christ is the means of
deification through the Incarnation and the justification He provides. 6
In the present life, the deformation of the image of God in humanity involves descending
to the love of finite things, which can ultimately make the reason subject to the control of bodily
desires. The upright heart, in contrast, conforms to the will of God. 7 Grosseteste affirms the value of both action and contemplation. 8 One can ascend to the contemplation of God through
seeing His attributes in creation. 9 The action that leads to eternal life involves keeping the
Decalogue. 10 Ultimately, the soul merits the seven gifts of eternal life through the theological
and cardinal virtues. 11 Through the theological virtues it merits vision, delight, and enjoyment of
God. 12 Through the cardinal virtues the soul merits impassibility, clarity, subtlety, and agility for the body. 13 Through constancy in justice, one obtains an unchanging, or impassible, body.
Through the enlightenment of prudence, one obtains clarity. Fortitude leads to agility, and
temperance gains one subtlety. 14
5 Ginther, Sacred Page, 173. 6 Ginther, Sacred Page, 151. 7 Ginther, Sacred Page, 161. 8 Ginther, Sacred Page, 157-158. 9 Ginther, Sacred Page, 171. 10 Ginther, Sacred Page, 172. Note that I am synthesizing Ginther’s material. He does not follow this exact order of thought. 11 Ginther, Sacred Page, 173. Ginther only explicitly mentions how the cardinal virtues obtain the gifts of the body. I am supplying the rest from Goering’s study and edition: Joseph Goering, “The De Dotibus of Robert Grosseteste,” Mediaeval Studies 44 (1982): 83-109. Goering discusses the correspondence of virtues to gifts on pages 98-99. 12 Robert Grosseteste, De Dotibus 3.1 (ed. Goering, 105-106). 13 Robert Grosseteste, De Dotibus 3.2 (ed. Goering, 106). 14 Ginther, Sacred Page, 173. As Joseph Goering has noticed, this list of correspondences does not match the list given in the Templum Dei. See Goering, “The De Dotibus, “ 93. One probably should not attach much significance to the specific choices of which virtue matches each attribute of the resurrected body.
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One other thread of Ginther’s study is relevant to the present one. Ginther notices
Grosseteste’s emphasis on the spiritual value of theological instruction, which pertains to the special priority of the aspectus I will discuss below. In one place he says that Grosseteste had a
“theological spirituality,” and explains, “for Grosseteste any theological teaching had a role to play in the development of the human potential to move towards union with God.” 15 Ginther also makes an insightful observation concerning the events of 1231, when Grosseteste resigned all his benefices except for one, yet chose to continue teaching the Francsicans in their studium at
Oxford. He writes, “Even if we could assert that Grosseteste himself had a capacity for pastoral ministry, it would still seem correct to conclude that he was more comfortable in the master’s chair than the confessor’s seat.” 16 While Ginther can adduce other reasons why Grosseteste
would make the choice to teach rather than to care for souls, the choice may also reflect the
importance he placed on the spiritual value of theology. He did not quit teaching the Franciscans
until forced to do so by the necessities of being a bishop. Even then, he continued to teach
clergy, as his conference sermons indicate. Finally, in a summary statement related to
Grosseteste’s theological method, Ginther captures, without the terms, something of the dynamic
between aspectus and affectus that is also present in Grosseteste’s view of deification generally:
“He did not resist the use of reason in theological discourse, but insisted that theological
knowledge have its currency in relation to a divinely ordered life. In the end, as a theologian, he
15 Ginther, Sacred Page, 109-110. 16 Ginther, Sacred Page, 164.
285 taught his students to seek God with all of their mind, which for him included all that we would now classify as the heart.” 17
Reforming the Imago Dei in Hexaëmeron 8
Now that we have a general sketch of Grosseteste’s doctrine of deification and the spiritual importance he attaches to reason, I will present his teaching on the reformation of the divine image in the human person. This topic is almost coextensive with deification as Ginther presents it, except that it principally concerns the individual human person. 18 I will omit the points already covered in the summary of Ginther’s research.
One should understand from the outset that this chapter will not contain a synthetic view of all Grosseteste has to say about the reformation of the divine image in the individual human.
Grosseteste treats this theme in several places, frequently in connection with deiformity. 19 I have not attempted to find them all, much less compare them. Out of the passages readily available,
17 Ginther, Sacred Page, 77. To be clear, Ginther was not at that point talking about deification. The presence of this dynamic in Grosseteste’s view of deification will become evident below. 18 In Ginther’s presentation, as we have seen, deification concerns the whole Church as well as individual transformation, whereas the passages I will treat concern individual transformation exclusively. The difference is primarily a matter of emphasis, since it is of course granted that individual transformation occurs in an ecclesial context for Grosseteste. 19 See for example Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §17 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130) : “Taliter humane menti inscribenda est sacre pagine sciencia vt per medium aspectus profundet intimum affectus. Vt sit liber scriptus non solum foris sed eciam intus. Hec enim sic in intimum affectus profundata inscripcio conformat hominem Deo faciens que deiformem restituit honori de perdito, quia is est verus honor hominis reformacio ymaginis sui conditoris.” ; Dictum 49 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 33v) : “Caput anime est potencia memorandi, intelligendi, diligendi Deum creatorem scilicet Trinitatem. Conformacio qua conformatur anima Trinitati memorando et intelligendo et diligendo ipsam, protectio est huius capitis et salus. Unde hec est “galea salutis,” [Eph. 6:17] de qua loquitur Apostolus. Deiformitas ergo in supprema parte anime sive mentis dicitur renovacio spiritus…” ; Dictum 69 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 51v) : “Est autem caritas appetenda quia facit hominem deiformem et summe pulcritudini conformem. Facitque eum participem suppremi nominis, ut propter deiformitatem Deus dicitur, non substancialiter, sed per denominacionem, facitque illum celi habitatorem, et ab omni insultu insuperabilem, omniaque possidentem, etc.” ; Dictum 85 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 60v) : “Vas autem sic iniciatum splendificari oportet per lucem fidei, complanari et levificari per consolacionem spei, celari per caritatem. Ipsa namque caritas efficit animam deiformem et summe pulcritudini conformem, reparans in ea Trinitatis ymagine.”
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Hexaëmeron part eight recommends itself for several reasons. One is that the Hexaëmeron
(1230-1235) is Grosseteste’s theologically most important work, as I discussed in chapter four.
Another is that I have already discussed Dictum 19 and Dictum 91, two other texts that deal with the reformation of the image, in other chapters. It also helps that Grosseteste discusses the reformation of the image at some length in this part of the Hexaëmeron and gives some further interpretive clues in nearby part nine. It is thus possible to put together a fairly complete account from the text. Finally, the account in Hexaëmeron part eight has a special feature that so far I have not found elsewhere. Several texts refer to the soul becoming deiform and to restoring the damaged image through conformity to the highest beauty achieved by love. 20 The key passage in
Hexaëmeron part eight assumes this basic idea but explains more clearly than any other passage how this soul-conforming love relates to knowledge. Since the subject under investigation is how the priority of the aspectus connects to Grosseteste’s account of the reformation of the image, this particular passage is an obvious choice for close scrutiny.
I will begin by outlining the general discussion of the first five chapters of Hexaëmeron part eight. Then I will discuss the key passage in part eight. After that, I will integrate the teaching of the key passage into the overall account of the reformation of the divine image given in part eight, with some help from remarks Grosseteste makes in part nine. I will also use works discussed in earlier chapters for comparison and interpretive assistance. The general thesis I will argue is that Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine strongly influences his doctrine of the reformation of the divine image in the human person, even though he does not use aspectus and
20 See the texts quoted in note 19 above.
287 affectus in the principal texts under investigation. My observations concerning the priority of the aspectus in Hexaëmeron 8.4.1 will be equal to my general thesis in importance.
A Key Passage: Hexaëmeron 8.4.1. Grosseteste begins part eight of the Hexaëmeron at
Genesis 1:26, with a discussion of man made in the image ( imago ) and likeness ( similitudo ) of
God. Since he follows Augustine in understanding the imago to be an image of Trinity, 21 he
dedicates most of chapters one through three to a discussion of the Trinity. In chapter four, he
turns to illustrations of the Trinity for the sake of spiritual benefit. He focuses first upon
appropriations and then upon illustrations of the Trinity in sense, imagination, and intellection in
a manner reminiscent of Augustine’s much longer process in the De Trinitate . The discussion
culminates in chapter five with the best image of God in the highest face of reason ( suprema
facies racionis )—remembering, understanding, and loving God. This is the “simple power
passage” that was important in chapter five above.
The first and most important passage for the present investigation is the short explanatory
paragraph that opens chapter four. Here Grosseteste explains why he is going to give numerous
illustrations of the Trinity:
Let us be content at present with these reasons proving the Trinity in unity. But let us adduce some illustrations in order to imagine in some way that which has been proven. For the comprehension of the Trinity is highly necessary for us. For the love of the Trinity is the salvation of the soul, and without this love there is no salvation for the soul. But the Trinity is loved to the degree that It is comprehended by faith or understanding (intelligentia ). For it is Beauty Itself that snatches the comprehension of the one who believes and of the one who understands into the love of Itself. 22
21 For a conspectus of the patristic sources Grosseteste uses in the Hexaëmeron concerning the image of God in human nature see Celina A. Lértora Mendoza, “La Espiritualidad Patrística en la Obra de Roberto Grosseteste,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 64, 1 (Jan.-Mar. 2008): 332. 22 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.4.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 222; trans. mine, influenced by Martin, 226): “Hiis racionibus trinitatem in unitate probantibus ad presens contenti simus. Sed ad imaginandum aliquo modo id quod
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If Grosseteste had simply said that one has to know the Trinity in order to love the Trinity, this would have illustrated the priority of the aspectus in a completely expected way. Many would hold that one cannot love something that is entirely unknown. Instead, Grosseteste ties knowledge and love much more closely together. He says that one will love God to the degree that one understands the Trinity. Happily, the understanding of faith suffices for this, but the salient point is that knowledge and love are correlative, with knowledge, in this case, as the controlling variable. The reason for this seems to be that the soul perceives God’s beauty in degrees, and therefore God’s beauty can only snatch comprehension into love to the degree that this beauty is perceived or comprehended.
It may be helpful to compare Grosseteste’s view to that of Thomas Aquinas, for the sake of contrast. In question 27 of the Prima Secundae, in reply to an objection, Aquinas gives a clear explanation of why he thinks one can love something, including God, more than one knows that thing:
Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known … The same applies to the love of God. 23
probatum est exempla aliqua afferamus. Maxime enim necessaria est nobis Trinitatis comprehensio. Huius enim amor salus est anime, et sine huius amore nulla salus est anima. Tantum autem amatur, quantum fide aut intelligentia comprehenditur. Ipsa enim est pulchritudo que rapit in sui amorem credentis et intelligentis comprehensionem.” 23 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 27, a.2, ad 2 (ed. the Leonine Commission, 2:212; trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province [New York, Benziger Brothers, 1947]): “Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris: cognitio enim ad rationem
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Thomas and Robert would agree that knowledge precedes love in some sense, but beyond that point they part ways. For Thomas, it is sufficient that one know a thing in itself ( in se ) to love it perfectly. Since this kind of knowledge could be quite incomplete, it is possible to love something, including God, more than one knows that thing, without anything being out of order.
Given that Thomas holds reason and appetite to be distinct principles of action with different objects, it is not surprising that he would hold this view. 24 Grosseteste, on the other hand, holds that the soul is identical with its powers and is the immediate principle of both knowledge and love. Further, in some works at least, he treats knowledge and love as sharing a common object and being reducible to the action of conforming to God as both Truth and Good (or Beauty). 25 It is unsurprising, given these differences, that Grosseteste would be relatively more inclined to keep the operations of knowledge and love together.
But this only explains why knowledge and love would go together. It does not explain why Grosseteste should privilege knowledge as leading to love. To understand this one must turn back to the doctrine of aspectus and affectus in De Artibus Liberalibus and Dictum 19, which I discussed in chapter three. In the first work he explains that the aspectus perceives and judges, and this is a necessary precondition for the response of the affectus. Importantly, the judgment of the aspectus includes not only the fact of whether something is to be embraced or pertinet, cujus est distingucre inter ea, quae secundum rem sunt conjuncta, et componere quodammodo ea, quae sunt diversa, unum alteri comparando: et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur, quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes, et virtutes, et proprietates. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem, secundum quod in se est: unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit, quod res, prout in se apprehenditur, ametur; ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus ametur, quam cognoscatur, quia potest perfecte amari, etiamsi non perfecte cognoscatur … et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei.” 24 I have discussed these features of Thomas’ psychology in chapter 5. For a fuller discussion of Thomas Aquinas’ view of the soul and its powers, see Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study Of Summa Theologiae 1a, 75-89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 143-170. 25 For discussion see chapter 5.
290 fled but also, as I argued, the degree to which the affectus ought to desire or withdraw. Dictum
19 reaffirms this basic priority of the aspectus and applies the model to love as the proper action of the affectus. Putting the two texts together, then, one could infer that Grosseteste believes the affectus should love to the degree judged appropriate by the aspectus, provided the aspectus is not in error. Since love is a response to beauty here in the Hexaëmeron, one can add that the aspectus will judge an object to be desirable to the degree that it perceives the beauty of the object (or the action, as the case may be).
Dictum 19 addresses the problem of degrees of knowledge obliquely. As I explained in chapter three, the knowledge of Scripture in the aspectus can sink into the affectus, thus making it deiform . Expressing this corrected affectus through good works then has the effect of improving the operation of the aspectus—in that case, improving one’s grasp of Scripture. The improved knowledge of Scripture can then sink into the affectus to improve it further, leading to further good works. This cycle, which Grosseteste compares to the wheels in the vision of
Ezekiel, does seem to imply that with increased knowledge of God through Scripture comes increased love for God and neighbor.
The passage in Hexaëmeron 8.4, then, reflects basic principles about love and knowledge that Grosseteste elsewhere explains through aspectus and affectus. In particular, it reflects the
priority of the aspectus and the inseparability of knowledge and love. Yet this passage also
makes explicit what was only implicit before, namely, that one can only love God to the degree
that one knows God as Beauty. This likely applies to other objects of knowledge and love too, in
a qualified way. Since he holds that love is a response to beauty, it would seem to follow that the
affectus will only love to the degree that the aspectus perceives an object or action to be
291 beautiful, unless the affectus is disordered. 26 In this way, Grosseteste has reaffirmed the priority
of the aspectus and given it clearer content.
Yet this clarification seems to create a problem. At first glance, Grosseteste’s view in
Hexaëmeron 8.4.1 that one can only love the Trinity to the degree that one comprehends the
Trinity would seem to be at odds with his treatment of love in Dictum 91, which I have discussed
in chapter five. In Dictum 91, he says that love teaches all knowledge and ultimately is itself the
very knowledge of truth. God as Beauty is the object of our love, and this love conforms our
souls to God. In this conformity we receive the form of truth by way of imitation. God is the
seal, and the soul is the soft wax. If love itself is the knowledge of God as truth, then how can
one’s love for God depend on knowledge?
In Grosseteste’s understanding, I think the two passages are consistent with one another.
It is vitally important that he invokes God as beauty at the key point in both passages. 27 This
suggests that he is teasing out different aspects of the same concept of conformity to God’s
beauty that he has in his mind. In the Hexaëmeron passage, God’s beauty provides the rationale
for why love is dependent on knowledge. He is saying that the perception of God’s beauty is
what inspires love. This is not necessarily different from what he said in Dictum 91, if one reads it in light of the De Artibus Liberalibus (while also allowing for some development) . The very notion that the soul loves God as beauty (or Good) presupposes perception and judgment on the part of the soul. The soul has judged God to be beautiful, and so it is attracted. In this way, even
26 The possibility of a disordered affectus in this situation raises a thorny problem, which I will address in Appendix 7. 27 See also the passages from the Dicta quoted in note 19 above.
292 though love and knowledge are the same action, namely, that of conforming to God, there is a logical priority to the cognitive aspect of this conformity.
The full resolution to this problem will have to wait until the next chapter, but for now enough concepts are available to bring the passages together. In both Dictum 91 and
Hexaëmeron part eight Grosseteste’s basic idea is that the knowledge and love of God as Beauty
are two aspects of one experience. Even though the cognitive aspect is logically prior, it cannot
stand alone as a separate action. In Dictum 91 this is because ultimately the action of
conforming to the divine nature is the only one in view. In the Hexaëmeron, he hints at this idea
by saying that God’s beauty snatches ( rapit) the soul’s comprehension into love. At the same
time, one need not read coercion into the text. As we have seen from the Ecclesia Sancta
Celebrat (c.1243) in chapter four, and from De Libero Arbitrio (1225-1230) in chapter five,
Grosseteste believes the soul acts freely in knowledge and in love. Therefore, the soul could
begin to see God’s beauty and choose not to love. It could do this by turning the mind’s gaze to
something lower. 28
The other way the Hexaëmeron text may allude to the Dictum 91 view is in the direct correlation between knowledge and love. Although one could explain the text in other ways, it is entirely possible that the reason why love increases with knowledge of God’s beauty, and cannot increase without it, is that the two are ultimately the same, as in Dictum 91 . The fact that
Grosseteste is treating God’s beauty as the object of both knowledge and love in the Hexaëmeron passage seems to support this reading.
28 Here I anticipate my tentative solution the problem of the disordered affectus that I will discuss in Appendix 7.
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The Process of Restoring the Image. It is necessary now to integrate the account of comprehending and loving God’s beauty into the general account of reforming the divine image in the human person that Grosseteste gives in this part of the Hexaëmeron. Here at least four significant factors shape Grosseteste’s presentation. One is his overall view of the created universe and created natures in relation to God. Two other factors are important traditional ideas of the divine image that Grosseteste combines in his account. One is from Augustine , and the other is from “Jerome” (Pseudo-Bede). The fourth factor is his aspectus/affectus doctrine lurking in the background. First I will explain Grosseteste’s overall view of created natures in the universe, including human nature’s place in the universe, from Hexaëmeron part nine. Then
I will present Grosseteste’s account of how the image is reformed. I will observe the influence of aspectus and affectus in both parts of the exposition.
Since the Hexaëmeron is in the first place an exegesis of the creation text in Genesis 1 and 2, for a discussion of created natures one needs to look to part nine, chapter three, where
Grosseteste discusses what it means for God to have rested on the seventh day. For God’s part, it means that he created no new natures after the sixth day, 29 but at the end of the chapter
Grosseteste extends the idea of rest not only to humankind, but to all created natures. First he
observes that in Scripture God can act through people, and people can carry out their actions in
God. He applies this principle to God’s rest. When Scripture says God rested it is indicating that
He made the rational creature to rest. 30 The rational creature ascends through God’s visible works to the invisible by God’s illumination. Then the rational creature rests in the
29 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 9.3.4 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 271). 30 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 9.3.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 272).
294 contemplation and enjoyment of God. 31 While the terms are not mentioned, contemplation and enjoyment would be actions of aspectus and affectus, respectively. The verse of Scripture he uses to illustrate this point is also very telling: “But for me, to cling to God is good.” 32 This resonates very well with Dictum 91, in which it is said that the bond of love is what conforms the soul to God. 33
Our expositor goes on to say that God uses all of His works to lead us by the hand
(manuducit ) into His rest. For Grosseteste, this tells us that God made all things for the sake of man. Humans, for their part, are supposed to call all created things back to God. 34 He ends the chapter by explaining, “For all things, in their own way, desire the highest Good, and in their own way ( pro modo suo ), by participation in the same Good, rest in that Good.” 35
Every created nature can participate in God as the highest Good and can rest in God, and each nature has a special way that it does so. God uses created natures to raise human nature to contemplation and enjoyment of Himself, and human nature has the task of leading all other natures to participate in God in their special ways. This is a grand teleological vision,
31 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 9.3.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 272): “per opera namque visibilia ipso illustrante mentem interius ascendimus in invisibilia ipsius in quibus per comtemplacionem et fruicionem quiescimus…in ipso omne desiderabile tenentes.” 32 Psalm 72:28, as quoted in Robert Grosseteste Hexaëmeron 9.3.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 272; trans mine): “Mihi autem adherere Deo bonum est.” 33 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (ed. mine): “Sicut enim cera mollis fortiter applicata sigillo recipit imitatoria similitudine omnium formarum et figurarum in sigillo inscriptarum pulcritudinem, sic anima per amoris copulam fortiter ad Deum applicata, non equali, sed cum summa imitatoria similitudine ipsius summe pulcritudinis recipit conformitatem. ” For my working edition and translation of the entire passage in which this quotation appears, see Appendix 8B. 34 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 9.3.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 272). 35 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 9.3.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 272; trans. mine, adapted from Martin, 278): “Omnia enim pro modo suo summum bonum appetunt, et pro modo suo participantia eodem bono in eodem bono quiescunt.”
295 reminiscent of Augustine’s conception of created natures, 36 and it is worth taking a little liberty to illustrate what he seems to have in mind. It is as though all of creation is an orchestra, playing a song of the Good. All non-human natures play the music, and human nature conducts. Human nature leads every other nature to play its part: cultivating plants to grow, tending animals as they move and eat, and building mineral natures into tools and castles. All the other natures, by playing their respective melodies and harmonies, act as the instruments by which God illumines the human mind, raising it to Himself. Man’s mode of participating and resting in the highest
Good is the only one Grosseteste tells us explicitly in this passage—contemplating and enjoying all that is in God.
With the grand scheme of the universe in mind, we now have a context in which to understand the discussion of the divine image in human nature. The place for Grosseteste to discuss the image of God in human nature, as appeared above, is in part eight, when he is at
Genesis 1:26. The highest image of the Trinity in all creation, as would be obvious to any good
Augustinian, is to be found in the human mind remembering, understanding, and loving God.
Grosseteste has his own way of explaining the image though. He says there is a simple power, the suprema facies racionis, in which God is remembered, understood, and loved. A human is by nature an image of God by having this power, and by grace the image can be renewed. 37 He explains, “But when he has the habit and act of this potency, then is man a renewed image of the
36 See Brett W. Smith, “Augustine’s Natural Law Theory in De Libero Arbitrio ,” Irish Theological Quarterly 80, 2 (2015): 123: “Throughout his early writings, then, Augustine developed order as a component of his metaphysics with ethical implications…In short, God has arranged all things so that they participate in order by imitating God’s unity in their appointed ways.” 37 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 224-225).
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Trinity of God. He is deiform, renewed in the image of his mind, and a new creature.” 38 When
this highest power of the soul is made deiform, it brings the lower powers with it so that they too
conform to God according to their natural receptivity. And so the whole person and her actions
are brought into conformity with the Trinity to the degree that is possible for each part. 39
A little later, Grosseteste explains how the suprema facies racionis receives its deiformity
from God. He says that the image of the Trinity with which God impresses it, with no medium
in between, is the highest imitatory similitude. 40 This is the same as saying that the soul is joined directly to God and through that bond takes on God’s image. This bond in Dictum 91 is love,
and God is considered as Beauty rather than as the Trinity. Here the bond would seem to be
knowledge and love. But the accounts do not really differ on this point. In Dictum 91,
knowledge and love of God are ultimately the same thing—conformity to the Divine nature.
This is where the key passage from part eight, chapter four fits into the picture. God as
beauty can only be loved, and through that love give all illuminative grace, to the degree that the
soul perceives Him as beauty. Thus, even though knowing and loving God are reducible to
conforming to God, knowing God has logical priority. This view coheres perfectly with the
three-action model as well, for there too is a logical priority to the cognitive—memory and
understanding—inasmuch as love proceeds from them, as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the
Father and the Son. Just as the Holy Spirit is a single principle of actions ad extra with the
38 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 225; trans. mine): “Cum autem habet habitum et actum huius potentie, tunc est homo renovata imago Dei Trinitatis, deiformis videlicet, et renovatus spiritu mentis sue, et nova creatura.” 39 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 225). 40 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.5.4 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 226).
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Father and the Son, yet proceeds, so Grosseteste can have love as a single action with knowledge, even while love must proceed from knowledge.
It is also worth noticing that remembering, understanding, and loving God can hardly be different from contemplating and enjoying God. What this means is that the actions of knowledge and love by which the soul conforms to God and becomes a renewed image are the same actions by which the human creature participates in God pro modo suo (in its own way).
To know and to love God is thus to fulfill the primary purpose of human nature. In this way, aspectus and affectus are at the very core of Grosseteste’s theological anthropology.
Grosseteste explains in chapter six that there are three ways to consider reason and will, through which, as the rational powers, humans bear the image of God. There is the natural image: humans have reason and will. There is the renewed image: reason and will enjoy God and the person becomes deiform. There is the deformed image: reason and will turn from the highest good to lower things. The natural image can never be lost. The renewed image is lost through sin. The deformed image is removed through the grace of the Holy Spirit. 41
In chapter seven Grosseteste walks through some patristic quotations that further illumine
the topic of the image of God in man. 42 The only one that pertains to the present investigation is
his paraphrase of “Jerome.” Referring actually to the commentary on the Pentateuch by a
Pseudo-Bede, 43 Grosseteste says that a human bears the image of God through participation in
41 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.6.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 227). 42 One of these is the quotation probably coming from the De Spiritu et Anima 35, which entered into the notes for my discussion of Letter 1 in chapter 5. 43 See Pseudo-Bede, Comm. in Pent., Gen. (PL 91: 201). There the author attributes the view to Origen and a partly similar view to Faustinus. The idea that bearing the image of God involves an imitation of God’s eternity likely originates in Wisdom 2:23 (RSVCE): “for God created man for incorruption, and made him in the image of his own eternity.” In Weber’s Vulgate (p. 1005), the verse reads: “ quoniam Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem et ad
298 eternity and the likeness of God through his or her behavior. 44 Since eternity is an unchangeableness of essence, Grosseteste reasons, the human being is the closest image of God through participation in unchangeableness of essence. 45
It may seem problematic for Grosseteste to admit a second way humankind is the closest image of God, but actually it is not. We have seen above that remembering, understanding, and loving God amounts to the same thing as conforming to God through knowledge and love, and that this is man’s way of participating in God. The conformity language signals a participation of imitation. The participation in unchangeable essence seems to be just another way of referring to this participation in God. In this way, Grosseteste is able to combine two different traditional views on the image of God in human nature. Augustine and “Jerome” (Pseudo-Bede) are able to agree.
Grosseteste, furthermore, accepts all of the patristic views he mentions by saying that everything predicated of God can also be said of the human being by way of imitation. 46 He
synthesizes these views by explaining that the image of God in man is “the natural capacity of all
imaginem suæ similitudinis fecit illum .” The Clementine Vulgate likewise has similitudinis instead of aeternitatis. (Biblia Sacra Vulgatæ editionis, Sixti V Pontificis Maximi jussu recognita et edita [Roma: Typographis Vaticanis, 1598], electronic edition by The Clementine Vulgate Project, 2000-2013: http://vulsearch.sourceforge.net/index .html). The Septuagint (ed. Rahlfs 2:348), however, has τῆς ἰδίας ἀϊδιότητος , which means “of his own eternity.” Origen, reading the Greek, likely would have had τῆς ἰδίας ἀϊδιότητος . If Pseudo-Bede’s attribution is correct, the image of God’s eternity in man comes to the west at least partly through Origen. So then, even if the true meaning of the verse was lost to Latin readers, they seem to have recovered its doctrine thanks to the use of Origen by Pseudo-Bede. 44 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.7.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 229). 45 A similar idea will later surface in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat as the rationale for why humankind needs to participate in God to reach the second resurrection. See the discussion in chapter 4. 46 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.7.4 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 229).
299 things which are in God through the very closest imitation.” 47 When it receives these things in the way that it can, i.e., by a participation of imitation, the image is reformed. When it withdraws from imitating them, the image is deformed. 48
So far we have seen how grace acts on the natural powers from the top down, so to speak, and what we have seen is a lot like Dictum 91 and a lot like the account he will later give in the
Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat . We have seen that the human person bears the image of God through memory, understanding and will—and is the closest image through remembering, understanding and loving God. Yet the human person is also the closest image through participation in God’s eternity. For Grosseteste, both would amount to a participation in the divine nature by way of imitation. This imitation depends upon contemplation and love of God through aspectus and affectus , which conforms the soul to God. We have also seen that the key to renewing the image or lapsing into deformity is the imitation of all things in God. One who imitates God is a reformed image. One who does not imitate God is deformed. What one wants to know, however, is how this renewal or reformation plays out in life. What does one do day-to-day to move the process along?
Grosseteste comes to this topic at the end of part eight. At the beginning of chapter 30, he indicates that he has finished discussing the literal meaning of Genesis 1 and will now offer
47 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.7.4 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 229 ; partial trans. mine) : “ Naturalis igitur capacitas omnium que sunt in Deo per maxime propinquam imitacionem est in homine Dei imago.” This doctrine, which seems to develop the capax omnium doctrine of Isaac of Stella and the De Spiritu et Anima (on which, see the quotations in chapter 2) provides one of the basic operating principles of the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, as we saw in chapter 4. The only difference is that the later work does not explicitly say that the knowledge is a mode of knowing God. 48 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.7.4 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 229).
300 some allegorical and moral meanings. 49 He offers these meanings in chapters 30-35. Chapters
30 and 31 relate the six days to the six ages of the world. Chapter 32 relates them to the six ages of a human being (infancy, childhood, adolescence, youth/manhood, seniority, old age). For
Grosseteste, the progression of human life is not a story of growth, maturity, and decline alone.
The body follows that pattern, but the soul can continually progress in wisdom. In fact, the weakening of the body in the fifth age, seniority, allows the inner powers to strengthen for contemplation, which is connected with the renovation of the inner man. 50 Then, in old age,
again because of the increasing weakness of the body and its passions, 51 the mind grows in
wisdom, beauty, and strength. This, for Grosseteste, is the prime time for renewing the image of
God in the human person. 52 Relating this age allegorically to the sixth day, he says, “For this reason, in this age the earth of human nature brings forth the living soul, and it becomes a human being to God’s image and likeness.” 53 This sanguine perspective on old age is all the more noteworthy when one considers that Grosseteste would have been in his sixties at the time of writing.
49 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.30.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 253). 50 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.32.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 257). Grosseteste alludes to 2 Corinthians 4:16 as the basis of this idea. 51 One should not interpret Grosseteste’s joy at the weakening of the body as a negative evaluation of sex or sexual pleasure. According to Jacqueline Murray, Grosseteste held a generally positive view of sex and sexual pleasure within marriage. Murray argues that Grosseteste was so disposed because he accepted Galen’s theory of generation, which required both male and female to experience pleasure in order for procreation to be possible. See Jacqueline Murray, “Sexuality and Spirituality: The Intersection of Medieval Theology and Medicine,” Fides et Historia 23, 1 (winter-spring 1991):31-34. If Grosseteste at one time had a wife and children, as may well be the case, this could be another explanation for his relatively positive stance toward sex. For the evidence that suggests Grosseteste may have raised a family in Paris in roughly the first two decades of the thirteenth century, see N.M Schulman, “Husband, Father, Bishop?: Grosseteste in Paris,” Speculum 72 (1997): 330-346. See also my overview of Grosseteste’s life in the introduction. 52 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.32.6 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 257). 53 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.32.6 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 257 ; trans. Martin, 262) : “Qua propter hac etate producit terra humane nature animam viventem, et fit homo ad Dei imaginem et similitudinem.”
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In chapters 33 and 34 Grosseteste finally gives two actual plans for a path of reforming the image of God in the human person. The plan in chapter 33 is a set of six ages of the new man, the person who has been regenerated through baptism. Chapter 34 treats the same topic— stages of spiritual progress corresponding to the six days—but without correlation to the ages of a human life.
In chapter 33, he explains that the ages of the spiritual man are not temporal but stages of progress towards eternal life and the perfection of the divine image. The age corresponding to day one is a spiritual infancy in which one nurses at the breasts of history, from which one can learn profitable examples. 54 In the second age one has forgotten human things and is focused on
the divine. By reason one walks towards the “highest and unchangeable law,” and the firmament
of day two comes about through frequently doing good works. The waters below the firmament
are lower passions, now in check. The firmament supports the waters above, which represent the
upward motion of the reason into God. 55
Already by day two, two important components of Grosseteste’s program are in motion.
He is already talking about rational contemplation of God and a movement towards that which is
unchanging. This may reflect his idea of the image of God as including both remembering,
understanding , and loving God, on the one hand, and participation in God’s eternity on the
other. One can also perceive aspectus and affectus in the background, even though he does not mention them. The first thing to do after baptism is learn history for moral examples. This suggests a movement from activity of the aspectus in learning history to activity of the affectus
54 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.33.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 257). 55 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.33.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 257).
302 in applying the examples, reflecting the priority of the aspectus . The second stage involves an important relationship between reason and good works. Because good works express a reformed affectus ,56 the idea that habituation in good works supports the elevation of reason to God expresses the primacy of the affectus. Here, also, is a practical instance of Ezekiel’s Wheels
turning. 57 One has to learn the right things to do from history and later from rational reflection on the unchangeable law. This is the initial inscription in the aspectus. Then, once the moral law has sunk into the affectus , one does good works frequently. This habit of good works re- illumines the aspectus by supporting the rational contemplation of God. In this way,
Grosseteste’s seemingly diverse plans of progress towards God—the one being cyclical ( Dictum
19 ) and the other being an ascent (e.g., Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat )—come together.
The story of spiritual progress continues with the third age, in which carnal appetites are married to reason and become so subject to it that one no longer desires to sin. This is like the waters collecting into seas so that dry land can appear. 58 In the fourth age, one continues to act the same way, but with greater firmness and order. Then the virtues are like the undisturbed courses of the lights in the firmament. 59 Here again Grosseteste’s multifaceted view of the divine image finds practical expression. Firmness is a mode of unchangeableness, and order is closely connected to beauty. Since man bears the image of God through participation in the
56 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §17 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130-131) : “Taliter humane menti inscribenda est sacre pagine sciencia vt per medium aspectus profundet intimum affectus…. Hec enim sic in intimum affectus profundata inscripcio conformat hominem Deo faciens que deiformem restituit honori de perdito, quia is est verus honor hominis reformacio ymaginis sui conditoris. Cum autem hec interna descripcio prorumpit per lucem operum in manifesto, que se exerit legendam vi exteriorum operum quasi quibusdam litteri, quid aliud est nisi tercio modo totus homo liber scriptus foris et intus?” 57 This is a concept I explained in chapter 3. 58 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.33.3 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 258). 59 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.33.4 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 258).
303 unchangeableness and beauty of God, the person making progress in reforming this image will exhibit these qualities in doing good works.
Unchangeableness and contemplation, so important in day two, return in day/age five, in
which one enjoys the unchanging reign of the highest wisdom. The person at this stage lives in
that wisdom and in the serene contemplation of it. 60 In the sixth age, one is in the process of
forgetting temporal life completely and transitioning into “the perfect form which was made to
the image and likeness of God.” 61 Thus the first of Grosseteste’s two itineraries at the end of
Hexaëmeron part eight ends with contemplation of God and the reformation of the image as the goal towards which one moves through all six ages.
From this account, there would seem to be a reciprocal relationship between contemplation of increasing heights of God’s truth and increasing stability in doing good works.
Knowledge is required for good works, but then good works make possible a higher knowledge.
Good works become more consistent, it seems, through greater participation in wisdom. Then this increased firmness allows one to reach the highest life of contemplation.
Grosseteste’s second set of six stages of spiritual growth is much more succinct, lasting only one paragraph. 62 Here also the presence of the Dictum 19 account of aspectus and affectus is evident. The light of the first day signifies free will overshadowed by ignorance. On the second day comes the knowledge of firm truth. Inasmuch as this knowledge appears as the remedy to ignorance, it seems that real progress does not begin until one reaches the knowledge
60 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.33.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 258). 61 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.33.6 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 258; trans. Martin, 264): “…perfecta forma, que facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei.” 62 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.34.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 258).
304 of truth. In this way one can see the priority of the aspectus. The love of the truth known then appears on the third day and quells concupiscence. This mirrors Dictum 19. The love of the truth known in the present passage reflects how knowledge sinks from the aspectus into the
affectus in Dictum 19. The quelling of concupiscence corresponds to the rectification or ordering
of the affectus at the same stage in Dictum 19. Then good works shine forth, like the lights of the
fourth day. Again, this is just like the expression of the deiform affectus through the light of
good works in Dictum 19.
The fifth day adds the light of doctrine, in the sense of teaching others. He cites Jesus as
his example, who he says first did, and then taught. 63 This gives a very concrete bit of
instruction. Grosseteste believes that one should have his own life in order, including the
exercise of good works, before presuming to teach others. The teaching stage appears also to
involve a contemplative aspect, in the sense that one not only teaches but also cultivates deeper
knowledge of the truth one is teaching. One can see this subtle aspect in Grosseteste’s choice of
the term perscrutatio. 64 A teacher who engages in the diligent examination of perscrutatio is clearly not merely proclaiming the truth but learning it more perfectly in connection with teaching. Grosseteste would have known this experience well as a master of the Sacred Page. 65
Again we see the combination of linear progress in an ascent to God with the cyclical process
represented by Ezekiel’s Wheels. The teacher is at a more advanced stage than the learner of day
63 The editors Dales and Gieben, in loc., suggest Acts 1:1 as a verse that may be relevant to this understanding of Jesus’ life and teaching. 64 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.34.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 258): “…in qua doctrina perscritacio veritatis reptat et volat per aera, docentis verba tanquam volatilia.” 65 Ginther, Sacred Page, 13-20, presents evidence that Grosseteste performed all the traditional tasks of a master: reading, disputing, and preaching. See also Ginther, “Super Psalterium in Context,” 48. While any of the three tasks could be construed as perscrutatio, the fact that he refers to a teacher ( docens ) rather than a preacher indicates that he has in mind teaching that truly advances knowledge and does not merely exhort.
305 two, and so there is linear progress. But the teacher is also learning, which is a return to the knowledge stage after the first steps of knowledge, love, and good works.
Robert the teacher concludes, “Then on the sixth day shines the light and consummation of the contemplative life, by which the renovation of the image of God in the higher reason occurs.” 66 It is worth noticing that in the second plan of spiritual progress contemplating God is
not clearly practiced until this final stage. This fact provides an important glimpse into what
Grosseteste means when he says that the reformation of the divine image occurs through
knowledge and love of God in the highest face of the reason and that this power orders the lower
powers. There is a sense in which real contemplation and its fruits are only for the spiritually
most advanced, and this is clearly the case in chapter 34.
Synthesis. Yet there is another sense in which knowledge and love of God is reforming
the image of God in the human person all along. This, indeed, is the picture that emerges when
one overlays all the passages discussed above. The journey to God begins at baptism, with the
initial infusion of the knowledge of faith and the love of charity provided through the grace of
Christ’s death and resurrection. 67 Grace then powers the entire process of reforming the image that had been deformed by sin. After baptism, one receives elementary instruction based largely on moral exemplars. When one grows to love what they know of the Christian faith, one begins to practice good works. A life of steady good works, reflecting a well-ordered affectus, provides the foundation for real progress. Progress again begins with knowledge, now able to reach higher truths of doctrine, which one would both practice more perfectly and teach to others.
66 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.34.1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 258; trans. mine): “Sexto vero die splendet lux et consummacio vite contemplative, qua fit renovacio imaginis Dei in superiori racone.” 67 On this topic see chapter 6.
306
Through this process of teaching in word and deed, learning continues. Due to increased moral stability and love, reason can reach greater heights, finally attaining to the contemplation of God
Himself in the suprema facies racionis. Here the human person reaches perfection, for the loving contemplation of God makes the soul deiform, completing the restoration of the image of
God. The knowledge and love of God given by grace have been increasing the soul’s conformity to God and so restoring the image ever since baptism, and throughout the process the higher powers have been ordering the lower. The final stage of contemplation, then, is not radically different from the rest of the process. It is the consummation of what the soul has been practicing throughout the life of grace. For Grosseteste, the ascent to God is an upward spiral of ever-increasing knowledge, love, and good works through which God brings the soul into conformity with His own nature through a participation of imitation, until there is nothing to do but contemplate and enjoy God.
Conclusions
For Grosseteste, bearing the image of God ultimately means that humankind can imitate, at a distance, all that can be said of God. God is a Trinity. The human mind can remember, understand, and love God as an image of the three persons of the Trinity. God is eternal. The human person can participate in eternity in the sense of unchangeableness through becoming less changeable, especially morally. God is the highest Beauty. Through the knowledge and love of
God as Beauty the soul is capable of conformity to God. In this very conformity the soul can imitate not only God’s beauty and eternity, but also all that is in God, in the manner appropriate to human nature. Every created nature has its own way to desire and rest in God, and the mode particular to human nature is the contemplation and enjoyment of God.
307
The image of God in the human person has been deformed by sin but can be reformed through the grace of Christ. The process of reformation is both linear and cyclical, progressing from baptism to beatitude, but always including knowledge, love, and good works in a reciprocal relationship.
The common thread running through all the material on reforming the image of God in the human person is that one can explain it in terms of the soul’s conformity to God. To restore the image deformed by sin is to make the soul more like God. Knowledge, love, and good works, the human aspect of reforming the image, are all modes of conformity to the divine nature. Yet this does not mean one can start wherever one likes. Without love, one cannot do good works. Without knowledge, one cannot have love. So knowledge must lead the way.
Within the movement of knowledge, love, and good works ascending to God, several major features of Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus doctrine are strongly present, even though
Grosseteste does not mention the terms in the principal passages under investigation here. It is
clear that the aspectus/affectus distinction has significant influence in Grosseteste’s doctrine of
the reformation of the divine image in the human person.
Perhaps the most significant feature of aspectus/affectus doctrine that appears in
Hexaëmeron part eight is the priority of the aspectus, and from what he says it is possible to further specify the priority of the aspectus in Grosseteste’s thought. He says that the human person can only love God to the degree that she knows Him through faith or understanding. The statement in Hexaëmeron 8.4.1 is not isolated in his thought. He seems to hold the same belief in his other discussions of reforming the divine image that follow in part eight, as we have seen above. Even though knowing and loving God both reduce to a participation of imitation, there is
308 always a logical priority to knowledge. The love that makes deiform is a response to beauty, but this presupposes perceiving God to be Beauty Itself. The case would seem to be similar with any object of love. Unless the affectus is disordered, it can only love to the degree that the object or action is judged to be beautiful. 68 This makes knowledge and love correlative, with knowledge
as the controlling variable.
The priority of the aspectus gives Grosseteste’s account of the spiritual life a distinctive
flavor. For Grosseteste, love of an unknown God would be defective precisely to the extent that
God is unknown. Likewise, any mysticism that would remove cognition from the soul’s union
with God is unthinkable. He could still say, as many have, that simple people may love God
more than scholars, but he would not say they love more than they know, as Thomas said.
Rather, he would have to say that their knowledge of God through faith is greater than the
knowledge had by some scholars through understanding. The result would be that simple people
may both know and love God more than scholars who have only the appearance of knowing God
more.
It may be that a discussion of progressing spiritually towards God is the place where one
is least likely to affirm the priority of the aspectus. Not only does Grosseteste affirm it, but he
applies it even to degrees of knowing and loving God, and even to knowing and loving the
Trinity. This strong stance shows how deeply Grosseteste holds to the priority of the aspectus
while also revealing a special feature of this priority. Not only must knowledge logically
precede love, but love, when rightly ordered, will correspond to the degree of knowledge. The
more perfectly one knows something to be beautiful, the more one can love that thing. The more
68 I will address the situation of the disordered affectus in Appendix 7.
309 intimately one knows something to be harmful, the more one can despise and flee that thing.
Given the profound importance of theological knowledge in this system, it is no wonder that
Grosseteste deeply valued teaching the Franciscans as a master and instructing his clergy as a bishop. It was his own way of leading souls to God.
Appendix 7: The Problem of the Disordered Affectus
In this chapter I have assumed the possibility of a disordered affectus loving more or less than it should based upon the judgment of beauty in the aspectus. This possibility is consistent with the relatively simple doctrine of the De Artibus Liberalibus, but in Grosseteste’s magisterial and episcopal thought it raises a problem. Grosseteste holds that knowledge and love are correlative, as I have explained in this chapter. How, then, can aspectus and affectus ever fail to be in harmony?
One possible answer is that Grosseteste’s mature thought does not perfectly match the thought of the De Artibus Liberalibus on this issue. He holds in the De Artibus Liberalibus that the affectus can fall short of the degree of desire indicated by the aspectus as fitting as though this would have no effect on the judgment of the aspectus, but his later views on the primacy of the affectus and the inseparability of knowledge and love may suggest that when the affectus rejects the judgment of the aspectus, that judgment ceases to be the soul’s judgment. This could
express the freedom that is present in the initial perception of something, but after that moment
of perception the explanatory value of this solution disappears. If the affectus could simply reject a judgment already made (and thus in the first moment accepted) , this would create an unexpected ability of the affectus to erase knowledge from the soul. I am not aware of any text in which Grosseteste countenances the possibility of the affectus changing or nullifying a judgment of the aspectus that it has previously accepted. This solution also cannot account for the affectus loving something, such as temporal things, too much. Grosseteste always holds this to be a possibility, so there must be some way to account for it.
310
My tentative suggestion is that there are three ways the affectus can be disordered for
Grosseteste. The first way is for the aspectus to be deceived and thus deliver a wrong
valuational judgment. Then the affectus would become disordered by following the judgment of
the aspectus. He clearly holds that this can happen. In such a case, there is no disagreement
between aspectus and affectus and thus no problem.
The second way is that the aspectus could deliver a wrong judgment because it is itself
disordered, or otherwise dysfunctional. The ignorance inherited through original sin could cause
this. It also seems to be the case that when the affectus drags down the aspectus it impairs the
functioning of the latter. It would seem consistent with this view to say that the aspectus could
deliver incorrect judgments as a result of this influence from the affectus with the consequence of
confirming the affectus in its disordered love . In chapter eight I will discuss why the affectus would initially drag down the aspectus. Yet this case also results in agreement between aspectus
and affectus and so does not solve the current problem.
The third way for the affectus to be disordered, and the way that would solve the problem
at hand, is that the affectus could choose to draw the attention of the aspectus to something lower
without impairing judgment. In doing so, it would not reject the valuational judgment of the
aspectus directly, as though the knowledge could be changed or erased by a mere act of will.
Rather, the previous judgment would be rendered irrelevant and perhaps in time could be
forgotten. This solution can account for both excess and shortfall on the part of the affectus
while keeping knowledge and love correlative.
The key concept to this solution is that disordered love is not directly contrary to the right
judgment of reason. The aspectus, if allowed to operate, can only judge by what it perceives.
Given the same input, and given that it is working correctly, it will always judge object X to be 311 beautiful to degree Y. Yet, by directing the aspectus away from object X to object Z, the affectus can divest itself of the need to love object X. Supposing object Z is less beautiful than object X, this choice would be equivalent to loving Z too much and X too little, even though the affectus would only love object Z to the degree judged fitting by reason. It is not that we love
things too much or too little in the face of our own judgment but that we turn our attention, with
knowledge and love together, to the wrong things. In doing so, we love some things too much
and others too little only relatively speaking.
I will now use this solution to analyze a concrete scenario. There is a person who knows
both people and rocks. This person is not deceived or ignorant but knows perfectly well that
people are more beautiful and therefore more to be loved than rocks. The affectus cannot change
these judgments, but it can choose to think about rocks so much that people are temporarily out
of mind. The affectus cannot love a rock as much as it could love a person. It can only love a
rock as much as the rock deserves. Nevertheless, one could say that a person loves rocks more
than people in the sense that she chooses to know and love rocks while she neglects the
knowledge and love of people. One this analysis it would be accurate to say that the affectus
loves rocks too much and people too little, even though love and knowledge remain correlative
and the affectus loves the object of perception precisely as much as the aspectus accurately
judges to be appropriate.
I will now apply this solution to the scenario assumed in De Artibus Liberalibus, in which
one perceives and judges an object yet finds that the response of the affectus is not correct and thus in need of rhetoric’s aid. Let us again take our introverted geologist as the example. She sees a person and judges that she should love that person more than rocks. Yet she finds that she has no love of people. The reason for this lack of love could be that she is actually still thinking 312 about rocks. She is so distracted by her love for rocks—which still does not go beyond the judgment appropriate for rocks considered in themselves—that she cannot attend to either the knowledge or the love of the beauty of people for more than a few moments. Indeed, this seems to be something that concerns Grosseteste about temporal things relative to God. They distract people from God so that they do not ascend to the contemplation and love of God.
Again, let our geologist perceive a rock. She is enraptured, for rocks truly are beautiful.
Yet she finds that she loves rocks far too much. If only rocks existed, she would not love them too much, for her love is just right in reference to rocks considered in themselves. She knows them well, so she loves them much, perceiving their full beauty. Yet it is still accurate to say that she finds herself to love rocks too much in the sense that she knowingly neglects more valuable things, like people, in order to focus fully upon rocks. She knows, when she thinks about it, that she should turn her attention to people to perceive their beauty more fully, but then she chooses to keep thinking about rocks.
On this analysis, a disordered affectus always loves the object of perception to the degree that beauty is perceived, but it finds higher objects difficult to keep in mind and lower objects difficult to set aside. The disordered affectus tends to turn the aspectus from higher things to lower and in this sense can be said to love lower things too much and higher things too little.
There are reasons to suppose that this could be part of Grosseteste’s understanding. One is his concern that temporal things distract us from God, which I have already mentioned. The other is the great value of knowing about God in his view of the spiritual life. If perceiving the beauty of God in the aspectus will indeed snatch the affectus into love, then the best way to pursue the love of God would be to know as much as possible about Him in His beauty and to
313 think about what one knows all the time. This seems to be a significant component of what
Grosseteste wants people to do.
Here I have been considering the three ways the affectus can be disordered separately, but of course they could also combine in actual situations. Probably Grosseteste’s understanding is a mixture of all three. He may or may not have consciously teased out all three options, but they all seem to be present in his thought. The first two options clearly appear in his thought. The third seems to be required by two beliefs he holds. At least in the De Artibus Liberalibus, he holds that the affectus can be in a state of non-conformity to the judgment of the aspectus, and this seems to remain an option at least in the inordinate love of temporal things. Yet he also holds in Hexaëmeron 8.4.1 that knowledge and love are correlative, with knowledge as the controlling variable. Since the third option allows him to hold both views simultaneously, we may tentatively consider it an implicit component of his thought.
314 Chapter 8: Aspectus and Affectus in Grosseteste’s Epistemology
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate and develop the primacy of the affectus in
Grosseteste’s thought. In the previous two chapters, I have illustrated and developed the inseparability of knowledge and love and the priority of the aspectus. In those chapters, I needed to show how the aspectus/affectus distinction shaped his thought in the relevant areas. In this chapter, the influence of aspectus and affectus is too obvious to be worth arguing, although I will make note of it in passing. What needs attention is how aspectus and affectus fit into
Grosseteste’s theory of knowledge.
In this chapter I will illustrate and develop the primacy of the affectus in Grosseteste’s thought by examining the roles of aspectus and affectus in his epistemology. In this realm, there are two topics to discuss. One is how the affectus limits the aspectus. The other is how the affectus helps or expands the aspectus. It has already appeared why the aspectus can only know what is in the range of the affectus. As I discussed in chapter five, the two powers always act together. Ad intra, this would seem to result from the fact that aspectus and affectus are together only a single immediate principle of action. Ad extra, his reason, at least in some texts, is that both knowledge and love share a common object, God, and that knowledge and love are reducible to the action of conforming to the Divine Nature. What remains unexplained is how, given the priority of the aspectus, the affectus ever can direct the aspectus to a higher, or a lower, knowledge of truth. One can best answer this question within the framework of Grosseteste’s illuminationist theory of knowledge.
This chapter will proceed in four parts. First I will briefly explain Grosseteste’s theory of knowledge from his De Veritate and Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, with some reliance
315 316 on other works and secondary studies to fill gaps. I will only treat such aspects of his theory as have a bearing on the present study. I will argue that Grosseteste believes all knowledge of truth comes through illumination, although he envisions two different ways that illumination can work. I will call these ways special illumination and common illumination. This first part of the chapter will furnish the answer to how the affectus can turn the aspectus to the knowledge of
higher things and expand its range of vision.
In the second part, I will apply Grosseteste’s theory of illumination to the case of
Aristotle. Grosseteste uses aspectus and affectus to explain why Aristotle could not know that the world is not eternal. His affectus loved earthly things too much, and this clouded his mind
with phantasms. This discussion will illustrate both how the affectus can help the aspectus and how it can limit the aspectus.
In the third part, I will treat the question of how the body drags down the soul. It seems that the corrupt (post-fall) body is able to entice the affectus to love earthly things too much.
There I will also explain the different ways in which the affectus can direct and limit the aspectus
to the knowledge of lower truths.
In the fourth part, I will revisit Dictum 91 to explore how Grosseteste’s conformity
account of knowledge and love coheres with his illumination account. The two accounts seem to
describe the same view of knowledge from different perspectives. Illumination describes
knowledge in terms of what God does for the soul with special reference to the aspectus. The
conformity account describes knowledge in terms of what God does to the soul with special
reference to the affectus. After synthesizing the two accounts I will use the combined theory to
317 offer a deeper understanding of both the positive and the negative possibilities for the primacy of the affectus .
At the end, I will summarize my findings with special reference to the primacy of the affectus. By then it will be clear that for Robert Grosseteste, love is the key to knowledge.
Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Illumination
There is a surprising range of interpretations regarding Grosseteste’s theory of illumination. At one end of the spectrum, Gilson and Lynch see Grosseteste as remaining fully
Augustinian and not taking Aristotle’s theory of knowledge seriously. 1 Marrone, at the other
end, sees Grosseteste as espousing an incoherent mixture of Augustine and Aristotle that is more
Aristotelian than the theories of later Augustinians. 2 McEvoy and Van Dyke both see
Grosseteste as utilizing elements of Aristotle within a framework of more or less Augustinian illumination, and I think they are largely correct, Van Dyke more so than McEvoy. McEvoy sees the more Aristotelian account in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics as knowledge for fallen human life and argues that Grosseteste reserves illumination in this life for the mystical experiences of a select few. 3 Van Dyke believes that the Aristotelian account of knowledge
1 See Etienne Gilson, « Pourquoi Saint Thomas a Critiqué Saint Augustin , » Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, vol. 1 (Paris : J. Vrin, 1926), 98: « Sa pensée se meut sur un plan si complètement augustinien et si totalement étranger à l’aristotélisme, qu’ayant à expliquer pourquoi le manque d’un sens détermine le manque de la science correspondante, ainsi qu’Aristote l’enseigne, Grosseteste répond tranquillement que c’est à cause du péché originel. » ; Lawrence E. Lynch, “The Doctrine of Divine Ideas and Illumination in Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln,” Medieval Studies 3 (1941): 172 : “[T]here is no Aristotelian abstraction. There is only Augustinian illumination along with a very interesting attempt to extend the doctrine of light to the order of being.” 2 Steven P. Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 31-34, esp. 32. See also Steven P. Marrone, William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 157-214. 3 See McEvoy, Philosophy, 327-345, esp. 329, 337-338. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, 33, seems to assume that illumination only occurs in the life of grace.
318 becomes a form of illumination in Grosseteste, while the ideal Augustinian illumination—similar to McEvoy’s view—is only for a privileged few. 4 Timothy Noone, like Van Dyke, interprets
Grosseteste as holding to a theory of illumination as the ordinary human mode of knowledge.
Noone, however, focuses upon Grosseteste’s De Veritate and rightly emphasizes that
Grosseteste’s main philosophical debt in the area of illumination is to Anselm. 5
I will argue that Grosseteste understands all knowledge to involve illumination, although there are two ways this can occur. One can receive illumination for knowledge through abstraction, beginning from sense knowledge. I will refer to this as common illumination. One can also receive illumination through the vision of eternal reasons. I will refer to this as special illumination. These are my own terms, but I find them necessary for the sake of clarity and avoiding the repetition of long descriptions. Both of these ways of knowing are available to some degree in the present life. Neither way is limited to a select few, although special illumination requires the infusion of grace and common illumination can take on a different character after that infusion. Grosseteste’s picture of the progress of knowledge seems to suggest that the two ways can function together as progressive stages, although they can also function in parallel. 6
De Veritate. Robert Grosseteste wrote the De Veritate during his time as a master of the sacred page (c.1225/1229-1235). One can see this in the form of the work. Although edited to
4 See Christina Van Dyke, “An Aristotelian Theory of Divine Illumination: Robert Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, ” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17, no.4 (2009): 685-704. 5 See Timothy Noone, “Divine Illumination,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Robert Pasnau, assoc. ed. Christina Van Dyke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 373-374. See also Timothy Noone, “Truth, Creation, and Intelligibility in Anselm, Grosseteste, and Bonaventure,” in Truth: Studies of a Robust Presence, ed. Kurt Pritzl (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 114-120. 6 For an example of their parallel functioning, see the quotation form Dictum 89 in note 56 below.
319 resemble a treatise, it bears the marks of having been a disputed question. 7 In addition, there is a general consensus among Grosseteste scholars that the work belongs to the decade 1225-1235. 8
While his principal intention in this work is to reconcile the Anselmian idea that Truth is one
with the idea that created truths exist, 9 he also articulates a view deeply indebted to Anselm 10 in
which all knowledge comes through illumination.
His definition of truth is vitally important. He says that the truth of any created thing is
“its conformity to its reason in the eternal Word.”11 For example, he says that what makes a tree a true tree is the conformity of that tree to the ratio of tree in the eternal Word. 12 To know the
7 See Ginther, “ Super Psalterium in Context,” 48 and Sacred Page, 16-17. 8 See Travis James Cooper, “One Truth or Many Truths? Two Medieval Accounts of Truth: Anselm of Canterbury and Robert Grosseteste” (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 2012), 134-145. Here Cooper gives a detailed discussion of the secondary literature on dating the De Veritate to arrive at the conclusion that Marrone’s unique opinion against the 1225-1235 range is not reliable. Cooper’s study also includes a detailed exposition of Grosseteste’s theory of truth focused on the De Veritate on pages 150-221. 9 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 130): “„ Ego sum via veritas et vita " [Jn.14 :6] . Hic ipsa Veritas dicit se esse veritatem. Unde dubitari non immerito potest, an sit aliqua alia veritas, an nulla sit alia ab ipsa summa veritate? Si enim nulla est alia veritas, tunc veritas est unica et singularis nec recipit distributionem aut pluralitatem, ut dicatur „omnis veritas", aut „multae veritates". — Sed e contra in Evangelio legitur: „ Ipse docebit vos omnem veritatem'' [Jn. 16 :13].” 10 Concerning Grosseteste’s debt to Anselm for his theory of illumination, see Timothy Noone, “Divine Illumination,” 373-374. Noone, ibid., 371, describes Anselm’s view in his De Veritate as follows: “According to Anselm’s teaching in this dialogue, truth is an uprightness that is perceptible to the mind alone; it is an awareness that things are as they ought to be, and that they conform to their ultimate measure in the divine mind. What this means is that the truth found in creatures consists in their conformity to their eternal divine models.” 11 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 137): “...veritas cuiuscunque est eius conformitas rationi suae in aeterno Verbo .” Ginther, Sacred Page, 96, explains that Grosseteste here adapts Avicenna’s correspondence theory of truth—that it is the adequation of a concept ( sermo ) and a thing—by shifting the sermo first to the “inner word” in the mind and then to the inner word in God’s mind. “In other words,” Ginther explains, “truth is best defined in terms of relations between God and his creation.” As Neil Lewis explains, this definition applies to both things and propositions in two ways. There is the truth by which a thing is the sort of thing it is, and there is the truth by which a thing is as it ought to be. Both are a matter of correspondence to a divine idea. The kind of thing a proposition ought to be, in conformity to its eternal reason, is one that reflects the actual state of affairs. See Neil Lewis, “Robert Grosseteste,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2013 Edition), n.p.
320 truth of a tree would then seem to require that one be able to perceive both the tree and the exemplar form of treeness in the divine mind—or at least some reliable image of that exemplar. 13
When the question of recourse to the reason ( ratio ) in the divine mind arises, Grosseteste does
not at first say that one necessarily must see the exemplar directly but only that a created truth is
clear to the degree that the light of its eternal reason is present to the knower. 14 Thus for any
knowledge of truth, some special influence from God, which Grosseteste follows Augustine in
characterizing as a giving of light, is necessary.
Grosseteste goes on in the De Veritate to countenance two possible paths to the
knowledge of truth—one available to all and one only for the pure of heart. Both involve
illumination. The path available to all, which I am calling common illumination, operates
through the perception of created things:
Therefore it is true, as Augustine testifies, that no truth is perceived unless in the light of the highest Truth. But just as the weak eyes of the body do not see colored bodies unless the light of the sun pours over them, yet they cannot behold the very light of the sun in itself, but only as poured over colored bodies, so the weak eyes of the mind cannot perceive the true things themselves except in the light of the highest truth. However, they cannot perceive the highest Truth in itself, but only in conjunction with the true things themselves and by a certain outpouring [of the light of the highest truth]. In this way I
conformitas rationi arboris in Verbo aeterno? ” When he says “created truth,” then, I take him to refer to a created thing considered as true—not to the relation of conformity as a separate entity. For general discussion of this passage, see also Simon Oliver, “Robert Grosseteste on Light, Truth, and Experimentum,” Vivarium 42, no. 2 (2004): 159-163. 13 See the discussion of the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics below. 14 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 137): “ Omnis igitur creata veritas intantum patet, inquantum conspicienti praesto est lux suae rationis aeternae, sicut testatur Augustinus.” This mode of expression allows him to divide illumination into two types in the subsequent paragraphs. Both those who see the light directly and those who see the light in connection with the created thing have access to the light of the exemplar, but the former see it directly, while the latter only see it to the degree that there is light (analogous to color) in the created thing.
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think that even many impure people see the highest truth and many of them do not perceive that they see it in any way…15
Since the light pours over the eye and the colored object in the analogy, he evidently sees the spiritual light as illumining the mind’s eye and the object of cognition in this form of illumination. Yet the spiritual light only reaches the mind’s eye indirectly, in conjunction with the light of the created truth it actualizes. 16 In using this analogy, he seems concerned to maintain two things simultaneously: 1) created things contain the truth which they reveal, as colored bodies contain color, and 2) created truths can only be known with help from the highest
Truth, as colored bodies are only visible in the light.
It is important to attend carefully to the imagery here. Grosseteste is not saying that these people see God directly. Just as they cannot look at the sun, so they cannot perceive God.
Yet the fact that they know anything shows that they see God’s light in conjunction with the things themselves. In this sense they do see God, albeit indirectly. 17
15 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 138; trans. mine): “Verum est igitur, sicut testatur Augustinus, quod nulla conspicitur veritas nisi in luce summae veritatis. Sed quemadmodum infirmi oculi corporis non vident colorata corpora, nisi superfuso lumine solis, ipsam autem lucem solis non possunt contueri in se, sed solum superfusam coloratis corporibus, sic infirmi oculi mentis ipsas res veras non conspiciunt nisi in lumine summae veritatis; ipsam autem veritatem summam in se non possunt conspicere, sed solum in coniunctione et superfusione quadam ipsis rebus veris. Hoc modo puto, quod etiam immundi multi summam veritatem vident et multi eorum nec percipiunt se videre eam aliquo modo…” 16 Travis Cooper, “One Truth or Many Truths,” 167-168, although offering an interpretation of this analogy that goes beyond what I want to affirm here, notices helpfully that Grosseteste’s understanding of color is very important to the meaning of this analogy. For Grosseteste, color is “light incorporated in a transparent medium” (Ibid., 167). Because of this incorporation, the light that is color cannot self-replicate the way ordinary light does until exterior light is joined to it and moves it to self-replication. In the analogy, then, “color is not an illuminating light in addition to the light of the sun but is rather a dormant light that is actualized by the light of the sun shining upon it” (Ibid., 169). Given that the De Veritate is either roughly contemporary with or later than the CPA, it seems likely that the analogical color in the created truth is the same as the trace of the divine light perceived through the senses in CPA 1.14. In both accounts, the created thing contains the truth it reveals while also depending on the highest Light or Truth to reveal it. 17 Neil Lewis, “Robert Grosseteste,” n.p., explains “all who know truth must in some way have at least an unwitting cognition of the Supreme Truth and its light, and in it a vision of the eternal reasons, that falls short of the direct vision of God.” An additional text that supports this view of Grosseteste’s theory of knowledge appears in Dictum
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Later in the De Veritate Grosseteste returns to this idea when discussing how all
knowledge of beings is knowledge of the First Being. It is like observing water in a container.
The water is seen to have a shape, but this shape can only be the shape of the container on which
the water depends for its shape. 18 Similarly, since all creatures depend constantly upon God for
their being, to see the being of a creature is to see the First Being that supports it, even if one is
not aware of the fact. 19 While this could be misunderstood as ontologism—the view that all
knowledge is direct knowledge of God—the analogy clearly indicates that this is only an indirect
knowledge of God.
The path for the pure in heart, which I am calling special illumination, is simpler. They
see the Light of truth in itself. 20 Some scholars have arrived at a different construction of
Grosseteste’s epistemology by assuming that the way of the pure in heart in the De Veritate is
only for a few and not in some way for Christians generally. 21 While it is reasonable to interpret
the first brief reference to this path in such a way, Grosseteste restates the view later in broader
terms: “But we said above that a healthy ( sanus ) eye of the mind seeing the first and highest
Light in itself also sees in It all other things more clearly than when it beholds the same things in
119, where he states, apart from explicit mention of illumination, that all people have some knowledge of God; Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 119 (London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol.57vb): “ nullus caret omnino dei cognicionem .” 18 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 141). 19 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 141-142): “Nec scitur vere aliqiud creatum esse, nisi in mente videatur ab aeterno Verbo supportari. Et ita in omni esse, quod est adhaerere esse primo videtur aliquo modo esse primum, licet etiam nesciat videns se videre esse primum, nec videtur esse posterius, nisi in comparatione eius ad esse primum, quod supportat illud.” 20 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 138): “Mundicordes vero et perfecte purgati ipsam lucem veritatis in se conspiciunt, quod immundi facere nequeunt.” 21 See for example McEvoy, Philosophy, 326: “The normal human condition is not that of illumination. We risk nothing in identifying the mundicordes and perfecti purgati of De Veritiate, those who see the veritas suprema as he is in himself, with the handful of mystics of the Christian tradition and with the blessed in heaven.” See also 326- 345, where he explains each relevant passage from the CPA in accord with this understanding.
323 themselves.” 22 It is safe to infer that a healthy eye of the mind would be one that is reformed by
grace, at least, but it seems unlikely that he thinks only a few select saints have a healthy eye. 23
He then goes on to explain that a thing can be known in two ways. One can know
something in itself or in its likeness or exemplar. When the exemplar is of a more intelligible
essence than the thing itself, one can know the thing more clearly in the exemplar than in the
thing itself. 24 The more intelligible exemplar would be the idea in the divine mind. By holding to this duplex cognitio he affirms that it is possible to know things both in themselves and in their eternal reasons and that these are two distinguishable modes of knowing.
A remark appearing in the De Libero Arbitrio, written around 1225-1230, can help one to understand how both modes of knowing fit into a single theory of divine illumination. When discussing whether one may predicate free choice univocally of Creator and creature, Grosseteste says one cannot do so. Nevertheless, one may use the same term in reference to Creator and creature because in free choice the rational creature is the closest created image of God. The imitatory likeness is so close, in fact, that one can see both the exemplar and its copy (God’s free choice and that of the creature) in a single act of cognition. The way he explains this is important: “…the intellect can behold in a single glance the exemplar in the copy ( exemplar in exemplato ) and the converse, just as the image of a seal in wax that has been impressed by that
22 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 142): “Diximus autem supra, quod oculus mentis sanus videns primam et supremam lucem in se in ea etiam omnia cetera videret clarius, quam contuens eadem in seipsis.” 23 I will discuss this matter further below. 24 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 142): “Sed cum duplex sit rei cognitio, una in se, altera in exemplari vel similitudine sua, cum similitudo vel exemplar lucidioris est essentiae, quam ipsa res, cuius est similitudo, nobilior et clarior et apertior est rei in sua similitudine vel exemplari cognitio.”
324 seal and the converse.” 25 There are two ways of intellectual seeing here. One can look at the copy, human free choice, and see the exemplar, divine free choice. Or, one can look at the exemplar, divine free choice, and see the copy, human free choice. The metaphor that allows for the two possibilities is the same one he used to get all knowledge into the human soul in Dictum
91—the wax and the seal. The wax contains all that is in the seal, only in reverse, like a photographic negative, and not necessarily perfectly.
It is possible that Grosseteste would only affirm the simultaneous vision of exemplar and copy in the case of the closest imitatory similitude found in free choice, but it seems more likely that the same would be true in some degree for all exemplar-copy relations. The knowledge of the exemplar in the copy may be less clear in cases of lesser similitude, but the wax and seal analogy seems to suggest that one would still see the exemplar in the copy to a certain degree.
So, when one perceives a tree as an object of cognition, one can see in this tree (the copy) the divine idea of treeness (the exemplar) at least to some degree.
I now return to the De Veritate. The healthy eye of the mind, then, can see the eternal reasons, and in seeing these reasons it knows created things better than it could know them in themselves. All people, even those with sick mental eyes, can know created things and see in them some imitatory likeness of the eternal reasons. For both kinds of knowers, truth is the conformity of a thing to its eternal reason. Therefore, both kinds of knowers must see copy and exemplar in order to judge the degree of resemblance and thus the truth of the thing. The difference lies in the mode of perception. The pure see both exemplar and copy in the exemplar
25 De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda) 16 (Baur, 218; partial trans. mine): “Et est quoque similitudo tam vicine imitatoria, quod intellectus unico aspectu contueri potest exemplar in exemplato et e contrario, sicut imaginem sigilli in cera ab illo sigillo impressa est et e contrario.”
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(special illumination). The impure see both exemplar and copy in the copy (common illumination). Both need the aid of divine light.
My essential point here is that Grosseteste’s theory of knowledge includes these two ways of knowing—one through creatures and one through eternal reasons. It is possible to argue, both here and in some passages of the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, that
Grosseteste only has exceptional saints and exceptional experiences in mind when he mentions special illumination. In some passages, whether in these works or elsewhere, he clearly does refer to such a select group. This does not, however, disprove my point. The experience of beatitude or something like it is one mode of special illumination, but there are others. In other places, he clearly does believe that ordinary Christians have knowledge through cognition of eternal reasons yet in a way that is not the same as eternal beatitude. 26 I will discuss one such
way below.
A final question to raise concerning illumination in the De Veritate is how the impure
knower can actually make a judgment, since his access to the divine exemplar is mediated
through the very thing he is trying to judge. In other words, his access to the exemplar is only as
good as the copy. It may be that the spiritual light that provides illumination includes sufficient
knowledge of the exemplar itself to make up for the deficiency of the copy. But this would seem
inconsistent with the color analogy inasmuch as it would introduce a knowledge of the divine
light in addition to the light received in conjunction with the created truth. A possible solution to
this problem will appear below.
26 See note 119 below.
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It may be appropriate to conclude this discussion of the De Veritate in Grosseteste’s own
words, which conclude the initial comparison of the clean (special) and unclean (common) ways
of knowing:
Therefore there is no one who knows something true who does not also, either knowingly or unknowingly, know the highest Truth itself in some way. So now it is clear in what way only the pure of heart see the highest Truth and in what way even the impure are not deprived of the inner vision of It. 27
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics. Grosseteste wrote his most popular Aristotelian commentary, the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (CPA ), 28 sometime between 1220 and
1230. 29 Thus it comes after the De Artibus Liberalibus and perhaps before Dictum 19. Yet its
aspectus/affectus doctrine reflects the developments found in Dictum 19—the primacy of the
affectus and the mode of the inseparability of knowledge and love in which love is required for at
least higher degrees of knowledge.
As in the De Veritate, one can find two general modes of illumination in the CPA—one
beginning from the exemplar and one beginning from the created thing. 30 In CPA 1.7 he says
27 Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate (Baur, 138 ; trans. mine) : “Nemo est igitur, qui verum aliquid novit, qui non aut scienter aut ignoranter etiam ipsam summam veritatem aliquo modo novit. Iam igitur patet, quomodo soli mundicordes summam vident veritatem et quomodo nec etiam immundi penitus eius visione frustrantur.” 28 Rossi lists 32 surviving manuscripts and ten early printed editions; Pietro Rossi, “Introduzione,” in Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros, ed. Pietro Rossi (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981), 32-37. 29 Southern dates the work to around 1220 (Richard Southern, “Richard Dales and the Editing of Robert Grosseteste,” in Aspectus et Affectus: Essays and Editions in Grosseteste and Medieval Intellectual Life in Honor of Richard C. Dales, ed. Gunar Freibergs [New York: AMS Press, 1993], 10). Rossi, “Introduzione,” 18-21, dates the work to between 1220 and 1230, preferring a date nearer to the end of the decade than to the beginning. McEvoy, “Chronology,” 642-643, dates the work between 1224 and 1230, with the completion of the work close to 1230. 30 Neil Lewis, “Robert Grosseteste,” n.p., recognizes that these two types of illumination appear in the CPA, but he seems to hold that the better kind (special illumination) is reserved for a select few: “Grosseteste reconciles this doctrine with Aristotle’s teachings by holding that with rare exceptions most individuals in the present life do not have knowledge of this sort…” Van Dyke, whom Lewis largely follows, expresses the same view. See Van Dyke, “Divine Illumination,” 688. I think this interpretation is mostly right, but I want to qualify it a little. There are passages where Grosseteste seems to have rare exceptions in mind, but these do not exhaust Grosseteste’s thoughts
327 that the pure see the “first light” immediately and in this light also see all created things. 31 This is special illumination. The weak and unclean intellect may yet see exemplars through the mediation of angels ( intelligentiae ). This would seem to be a species of special illumination since it still involves knowing the exemplar and the copy in the exemplar. Still worse minds are limited to lower principles of knowing, with the lowest being knowledge through accidents alone. 32
Later in the commentary it becomes clear that knowledge beginning from the senses involves common illumination. In the Rossi edition of the CPA , Grosseteste spends five pages
explaining Aristotle’s statement that the failure of one sense causes the failure of all knowledge
obtained through that sense. The commentator closes his remarks as follows:
For, since reason has been put to sleep in us, it does not act except after it has been awakened through the operation of sense, with which it is mixed. But the cause on account of which the vision of the soul is obscured through the trouble of the corrupt body is that the affectus and the aspectus of the soul are not separate, nor does its
on special illumination. Grosseteste’s references elsewhere to the functioning of the intelligentia—the highest intellectual power that does not rely on the body—in this life and his references to knowing things through knowing God suggest that more than just a few people have access to special illumination. Special illumination is not always like the beatific vision for Grosseteste. It can occur in degrees and in different modes that are not equivalent to beatitude yet still involve knowledge through exemplars, rather than through abstraction from sense data. One can see special illumination at work in degrees, for example, in Dictum 91, which I will discuss below. See also Appendix 8A. 31 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.7 (Rossi, 139-140): “Et he sunt quas vocavit Plato ydeas et mundum archetypum, et he sunt secundum ipsum genera et species et principia tam essendi quam cognoscendi, quia, cum intellectus purus potest in his defigere intuitum, in istis verissime et manifestissime cognoscit res creates, et non solum res creatas, sed ipsam lucem primam in qua cognoscit cetera” See also Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 213; my alteration underlined according to note 113 in chapter 2) : “Et similiter si pars suprema anime humane, que vocatur intelligentia et que non est actus alicuius corporis…non esset mole corporis corrupti obnubilata et aggravata, ipsa per irradiationem acceptam a lumine superiori haberet completam scientiam absque sensus adminiculo, sicut habebit cum anima erit exuta a corpore et sicut forte habent aliqui penitus absoluti ab amore et phantasmatibus rerum corporalium.” 32 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.7 (Rossi, 140-141). This passage discusses different levels of universals as principles of knowledge. For discussion see McEvoy, Philosophy , 327-328.
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aspectus reach anywhere except where 33 its affectus or love reaches. When therefore the love and affectus of the soul is turned to the body and to corporeal enticements, it necessarily drags the aspectus with it and turns it away from its own light, which relates to it just as the sun to the exterior eyes. But the aspectus of the mind turned away from its own light necessarily is turned to darkness and torpor, until, going in some way through the exterior senses into sensible exterior light, it somehow finds a trace of the light that is natural to itself. When the aspectus strikes against such a trace, as if awoken, it begins to seek its own light; and to the degree that its love is turned away from corruptible corporeal things, its aspectus is to that degree turned to its own light and to that degree finds it. 34
Here one can see that Grosseteste’s theory of illumination does apply to the average life. In this passage, the soul finds the divine light only after being awakened by sense, and then it finds that light by degrees. Neither of these features would be applicable if illumination occurred only in the afterlife. Marrone avoids this conclusion, and any connection to illumination, by identifying the intellect’s “own light ( suo lumine )” with the intellect itself. 35 Yet, as Christina Van Dyke has noticed, 36 this would result in the very odd image of the intellect shining on itself, since its light
“relates to it just as the sun to the exterior eyes ( se habet ad ipsum sicut sol se habet ad oculos
33 I have taken quo here to be the adverb rather than the ablative pronoun, supposing the sentiment is a parallel to those quoted below about how the aspectus cannot reach higher than the affectus : Robert Grosseteste, Comm. Phys., book 8 (Dales, 147) and Robert Grosseteste, De Finitate Motus et Temporis (Baur, 105). 34 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 215-216 ; trans. mine): “Ratio enim in nobis sopita non agit nisi postquam per sensus operationem, cui admiscetur, fuerit expergefacta. Causa autem quare obnubilatur visus anime per molem corporis corrupti est quod affectus et aspectus anime non sunt divisi, nec attingit aspectus eius nisi quo attingit affectus sive amor eius. Cum igitur amor et affectus anime convertitur ad corpus et ad illecebras corporales necessario trahit secum aspectum et avertit eum a suo lumine, quod se habet ad ipsum sicut sol se habet ad oculos exteriores. Aspectus autem mentis a suo lumine aversus necessario convertitur in tenebras et otium, donec egrediens modo aliquo per sensus exteriores in luce sensibili exteriori per modum aliquem reperit lucis ad ipsum nate vestigium, ad quod cum offendit quasi excitatus incipit querere lumen proprium; et in quantum avertitur amor a corporalibus corruptibilibus in tantum convertitur aspectus ad suum lumen et in tantum reperit ipsum.” 35 Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, 48, n.31: “The implication was that intellect and intelligible light were the same.” To be precise, Marrone here refers to the passage cited below from CPA 1.17, as well as an additional passage from the same chapter found on Rossi, 249. 36 Van Dyke, “Divine Illumination ,” 697. To be precise, Van Dyke also is referring to the passage cited below from CPA 1.17.
329 exteriores ).” 37 A little later the sun image reappears and clearly refers to the illumination by God
of both the mind’s eye and the objects of perception. 38
Thus, Grosseteste grants Aristotle’s point but also undermines it. Sense knowledge can lead a person back to the light in which one can know all things, the light of CPA 1.7.
Knowledge only remains dependent upon the senses to the degree that the soul has not yet found
the Light it seeks. It begins to seek this Light because of its traces. His use of the word “trace
(vestigium )” is important. The word could also translate as “footprint.” In the De Libero
Arbitrio, Grosseteste uses vestigium as roughly synonymous with similitudo and imago. 39 The point is that sensible things bear an imitatory likeness of the divine Light. The traces are not the
37 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 216 ; trans. mine). 38 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.17 (Rossi, 240-241) : “Dico ergo quod est lux spiritualis, que superfunditur rebus intelligibilibus et oculo mentis, que se habet ad oculum interiorem et ad res intelligibiles sicut se habet sol corporalis ad oculum corporalem et ad res corporales visibiles. Res igitur intelligibiles magis receptibiles huius lucis spiritualis magis visibiles sunt oculo interiori, et magis sunt huius lucis receptibiles que nature huius lucis magis assimilantur. Res itaque huius lucis magis receptibiles ab acie mentis, que similiter est irradiatio spiritualis, perfectius penetrantur, et hec penetratio perfectior est certitudo maior. ” As Van Dyke notices, the term similiter here proves that the light of the mind is not identical with the higher light that illumines both the mind’s eye and intelligible things (Van Dyke, “Divine Illumination,” 697-698). McEvoy, Philosophy, 336, explains this text as follows: “This text reaffirms the Augustinian light-metaphysics, according to which natures closer to the divine light are more light-filled and intelligible, and hence capable of giving rise to a higher degree of certitude in the mind of the knower.” I would note also that the sun imagery likely owes a debt to Aristotle’s De Anima III and Avicenna’s interpretation of Aristotle’s metaphor in his own De Anima . In Aristotle and Avicenna, the sun is the agent intellect (Avicenna, De Anima pars 5, cap. 5 [ed. S. Van Riet 2:126-128]; See McGinnis, Avicenna, 130-137). Consequently, some scholars, observing that Grosseteste puts God in the place of Avicenna’s agent intellect, assert that he views the human intellect as lacking any autonomy. A recent example of this assertion appears in Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Chichester, UK: Wiley- Blackwell, 2011), 107. Schumacher, however, appears to be repeating the view of Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160-1300 , Warburg Institute Studies and Texts 1 (London, Turin: The Warburg Institute, 2000), 208, where Hasse includes Grosseteste in a list of thinkers who are “promisingly close to both Augustine and Avicenna” on the active intellect. What Hasse actually says about Grosseteste specifically is that it is difficult to say whether he meant to identify God with the agent intellect (Ibid., 215). Since Grosseteste lacked Avicenna’s philosophical reasons for wanting the active intellect to be external, it is reasonable to suppose that there is a place in his psychology for an individual active intellect. McEvoy, Philosophy, 346-351, argues that Grosseteste does have such a notion. 39 Robert Grosseteste, De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda) 16 (Baur, 217-218) : “Concedimus revera, quod nihil univoce dicitur de creatura et Creatore; sed tamen creatura rationalis ita propinquum est vestigium et similitudo et imago sui creatoris, quod in his, secundum quod est propinquum et assimilatum vestigium, meretur etiam communicare et nomen, non quidem univoce sed propinqua, imitatoria similitudine.”
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Light itself, but they reveal the Light in the sense that the exemplar in the divine mind may be known through its likeness in the copy, as discussed above. It is like how a footprint reveals the shape and size of a foot. It is also like the color in the object in the color analogy. It is a distinct created truth, yet it reveals its own divine exemplar to some degree.
This beginning stage of knowledge through the senses appears to be the same as the common illumination discussed in the De Veritate, but now it is possible to specify what
Grosseteste means. This passage is about ratio and how it works. Ratio, for Grosseteste in this commentary, is a power by which people obtain knowledge through abstraction. 40 Therefore, striking against traces of the divine light would seem to be a reference to obtaining universals through abstraction.
From this passage, then, it appears that all knowledge of immutable truth (at least) is a matter of illumination for Grosseteste. It is also true for Grosseteste that the embodied human intellect can reach universals through abstraction from sense experience. Although there may seem to be tension between these two statements, 41 I believe they can cohere with little difficulty, if one may speculate a little beyond what Grosseteste explicitly says. On the basis of
Dictum 7, 42 one can say that the traces of the higher Light which the aspectus strikes in the world
are not only in the things but also in the sensible species, the abstractions that, according to
40 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 214) : “Ratio vero expergefacta dividit colorem a magnitudine et figuram a corpore et iterum figuram et magnitudinem a corporis substantia, et ita per divisionem et abstractionem pervenit in cognitionem corporis substantie deferentis magnitudinem et figuram et colorem.” 41 See for example McEvoy, Philosophy, 340: “There is, of course, interest in asking how he reconciled illumination with the activity of the intellect in abstraction; his own writings, however, provide no conclusive answer.” McEvoy offers his suggested answer on pages 350-351. 42 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 7 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 8r-8v): “Quinque sensus porte sunt per quas intrat mors, ut dicit Ieremias. [cf. Ier. 9:21] … Populus intrans per has portas sunt species rerum sensibilium … Est et quartus adhuc venerabilior populus, scilicet in ipsis speciebus sensibilibus vestigia creatorum, cui si obvia fuerit sciencia speculativa, eum introducit, celebratque canticum laudis et exultacionis.”
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Grosseteste, are already present in sense perception. 43 Indeed, the traces received could hardly be anywhere else, since Grosseteste says they are found through the exterior senses. 44 The sensus
communis actively synthesizes and stores the species in the memory. 45 From these species the intellect abstracts universals, which are not particular to space and time. 46 This is how the
intellect is able to gaze upon immutable truth. Yet, truth is the conformity of a thing to its
exemplar in the divine mind, and knowledge of truth must involve the divine light. God must
illumine the intellect and the sensible species 47 so that the species can yield a universal. 48 This universal comes from the trace of the divine light that is in the species and originally in the created thing. Thus, in grasping the universal, one is perceiving the exemplar through the copy. 49 While this account is speculative, I offer it to show that there is no serious difficulty in thinking of abstraction as involving illumination 50 within the confines of Grosseteste’s thought.
At any rate, it seems safe to say that Grosseteste understands abstraction to be an important part
of arriving at knowledge through common illumination. It is also probable, bearing in mind the
43 On the sensible species in Grosseteste’e thought, see McEvoy, Philosophy, 341. 44 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 215-216). See the quotation from this passage above. 45 On the sensus communis in Grosseteste’s thought, see McEvoy, Philosophy, 341. 46 Explaining the nature of a universal form in Grosseteste’s thought, McEvoy, Philosophy, 342-343writes, “In the abstract way in which it exists in the mind, it is freed from the individualizing conditions of space and time, which govern all individuals and sensations; it is semper et ubique.” 47 See CPA 1.17 , quoted in note 38 above. In the CPA , as in the De Veritate, the spiritual light must pour over the mind’s eye and the thing it perceives. 48 Cf . Van Dyke, “Divine Illumination ,” 699: “the central function of the spiritual light in the CPA is to shine on the proper objects of cognition so that they become visible to us as we engage in the process of abstraction.” 49 Van Dyke, “Divine Illumination,” 688, argues that the universals resulting from illuminated abstraction are not the universals in the divine mind. This is probably true. They rather reproduce the divine exemplars. My point here is that they provide knowledge of what the exemplar would be like if one could perceive it directly. Given Grosseteste’s definition of truth, it seems that he needs to hold something like this. 50 By “illumination” I mean a cognitive process that requires a special influence from God in order to arrive at knowledge or certain knowledge. I take this to be about the broadest definition possible.
332 color analogy of the De Veritate, that abstraction can only occur due to the special influence of the divine light illumining the aspectus and the sensible species. 51
It is now possible to describe more fully how one who receives common illumination,
which involves knowing the exemplar and the copy in the copy, actually can know the exemplar
in the copy. The abstracted universal stands in for the exemplar in making judgments about
created truths. Grosseteste explains that one must encounter many singulars to abstract a
universal. 52 Since truth for Grosseteste involves reference to a divine exemplar, there would
have to be a divine exemplar corresponding to any given universal. Since abstraction involves
illumination, this illumination may serve to guarantee that the abstracted universal reliably
represents the divine exemplar. 53 Thus the knower can know the exemplar indirectly through many copies. This explains how the recipient of common illumination can arrive at the required knowledge of the exemplar while still lacking direct knowledge of the exemplar in God.
51 I leave open for the present the question of whether the special influence of God in giving light in common illumination is to be conceived as a non-miraculous intervention in the natural world by which God gives light to individuals in logically distinct acts or as something akin to the activity by which God maintains all things in existence. Either way, Grosseteste wishes to ensure that the knowledge of any truth be dependent upon the active involvement of the highest Truth, God. Without the sun, the light of the eye (for Grosseteste holds to an extra- missive theory of vision) is not sufficient for seeing color in an object. Similarly, without God, the light of the mind’s eye (active though it may be) would not be sufficient for the formation of abstract concepts on the basis of sense data. As I said, this is a probable conclusion. 52 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 212) : “…deficiente inductione accepta ab illis singularibus deficit apud intellectum cognitio universalis eorum singularium, quia ipsum universale non est acceptum nisi per inductionem.” ; Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 214) : “Verumtamen non novit ratio hoc esse actu universale nisi postquam a multis singularibus hanc fecerit abstractionem et occurrerit ei unum et idem secundum iudicium suum in multis singularibus repertum.” 53 Van Dyke, “Divine Illumination,” 702-703, explains what I take to be an equivalent opinion in these words: “Grosseteste does not go into detail concerning what it means literally for God to illuminate the objects of our cognition. It seems highly likely to me, however, that he sees God as the answer to an important question concerning the Aristotelian process of abstraction: namely, as we apply reason to sense experience and phantasms, what enables us to abstract to the actual essence of a substance? In other words, when we contemplate the nature of the beings with whom we live, what enables us to reach the answer ‘rational animal’ rather than ‘featherless biped’ or ‘laughing strategist’ – what makes it possible for human intellects to, in Plato’s words, ‘carve reality at the joints’?.”
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Another matter worthy of attention is the progress by degrees envisioned at the end of
CPA 1.14. From the idea that one finds the Light by degrees, one may perhaps infer that, with increasing degrees of illumination, one obtains the universals of increasingly abstract concepts.
In thinking this way, Grosseteste may be appropriating Avicenna’s notion of degrees of abstraction. 54 From the idea that progress in illumination by degrees is directly proportional to
the correction of the affectus, one may further infer that common illumination can progress to the illumination of the pure in heart, in which the intelligentia operates without dependence on the body. 55 Acts of intelligentia involve knowledge through the exemplar idea, so they belong exclusively in the realm of special illumination. In this way, CPA 1.14 seems to envision a gradual transition from common illumination to special illumination.
I will now summarize what I have said about CPA 1.14 so far. The two modes of illumination come together in CPA 1.14. Awakened by the traces of light contained in sense perception, the aspectus gropes towards the light that it needs to illumine it further. It receives this light at first in degrees through abstraction and demonstrative science. The one who knows immutable truth knows the divine exemplar through the created copy (or copies). This is what I have called common illumination. As by degrees the affectus turns away from temporal things
54 Avicenna holds that abstraction occurs in degrees, and the highest degree leaves behind accidents (and therefore phantasms) completely. See Avicenna, De Anima pars 5, cap. 5 (ed. S. Van Riet 2:126-128). McGinnis, Avicenna, 137, summarizes Avicennian intellectual cognition this way: “Therefore, in a very real sense human intellectual perception is for Avicenna nothing more than the reception of an emanation from the Active Intellect/Giver of Forms, even though the reception of that emanation could not occur without sensation, abstraction, and a lot of activity in the brain.” See also McGinnis, Avicenna , 100 and 117-137. In Grosseteste Avicenna’s thought is thoroughly Christianized and integrated with Augustine’s thoughts on illumination, among other mediating sources. 55 For Grosseteste’s understanding of intelligentia, see Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 213; my alteration underlined according to note 113 in chapter 2) : “Et similiter si pars suprema anime humane, que vocatur intelligentia et que non est actus alicuius corporis…non esset mole corporis corrupti obnubilata et aggravata, ipsa per irradiationem acceptam a lumine superiori haberet completam scientiam absque sensus adminiculo, sicut habebit cum anima erit exuta a corpore et sicut forte habent aliqui penitus absoluti ab amore et phantasmatibus rerum corporalium.”
334 and toward the eternal, illumination increases. Since the pure in heart ultimately receive illumination through seeing the exemplar and the copy in the exemplar, which I have referred to as special illumination, it would seem to be possible at some point in the process to move from common illumination to special illumination.
This account of knowledge raises a question of nature and grace. How does grace fit into the two kinds of illumination? In Grosseteste’s thought, to be pure in heart obviously requires the infusion of grace. Thus, special illumination would seem to be for Christians, while common illumination is available to all. Christians would apparently experience both modes of illumination, learning many things the normal way but also ascending through contemplation to enjoy a degree of special illumination. It is already clear from earlier chapters that Grosseteste envisions something like this, and it will be still clearer below. 56
Yet the Christian experience of common illumination can also have contemplative value.
The Eccelsia Sancta Celebrat , for example, describes a knowledge of God through creatures in the life of grace. 57 For the soul touched by the divine ray, God may be known and loved through creatures with increasing levels of clarity as one ascends to the knowledge of higher realities.
This would seem to be a supernatural version of common illumination. At the end of the ascent,
56 A vivid illustration of the two modes of illumination appears in Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 89 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 64r-64v): “ Multum et ultra modum laborat vana curiositas hominum, ut sciat cursus astrorum et proporciones numerorum, vel consonancias sonorum, vel mensuras figurarum, disposicionem oribis terrarum, virtutem elementorum, inicium et consummacionem et medietatem temporum, mutacionem morum, naturas animalium, iras bestiarium, et vim ventorum, et cogitaciones hominum, differencias arborum, et virtutem radicum. Nec tamen laborando attingit ad alicuius dictorum corporalem particulam. Tu autem, solummodo dilata sinum cordis, admitte radios invisibilis et spiritualis lucis. Videbis tandem manifestante Spiritu Sancto aspectu mentis unico, nulla vicissitudine interpellato, nullo fine terminato, nulla incertitudine obfuscato, non solum pretacta, sed quecumque sunt incerta et occulta, absconsa et improvisa. Nec solum videbis ea in seipsis ubi sunt mortua, sed in libro vite ubi sunt viva. Quod enim factum est in ipso vita erat. Nec in illo libro sunt ista multa verba multa, sed Verbum unum, eternaliter a Patre loqutum. Et unum dicendo eternaliter dicit omnia, quod unum contemplando sine fine contemplabimur omnia. ” 57 Robert Grosseteste, Eccelsia Sancta Celebrat §33-§36 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 184-187).
335 the soul waits in the cloud of unknowing for God to manifest Himself directly. If He does, the highest power of the soul, the power for knowing God directly, becomes fully active. This is at least one way Grosseteste envisions common illumination progressing to special illumination.
In light of these considerations, it is not possible to say that common illumination is illumination without grace and special illumination is illumination with grace. Special illumination, because of the need to get rid of phantasms through ordered love, can only occur in the life of grace, even though intelligentia is a natural power. Common illumination can occur through nature or grace, although it seems the knowledge of God is unwitting in the natural version. All three kinds of illlumination—special illumination with grace, common illumination with grace, and common illumination without grace—utilize natural powers for their created ends and involve some special influence from God.
In this framework of illumination by degrees, it is now possible to appreciate what a key role the affectus plays in Grosseteste’s epistemology. There are two points worthy of special notice. First, the aspectus can only reach ( attingere ) where the affectus reaches. 58 Second, the
degree to which the affectus is free from attachment to mutable goods is the degree to which the aspectus can and in fact does find God/eternal truth. 59 Thus the affectus may affect knowledge either by preventing it, if turned to the wrong goods, or by enabling it, if it is purified and turned to God. A rightly ordered affectus is necessary for the proper functioning of the aspectus by which it may receive special illumination or the gratuitous form of common illumination. As I
58 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 216): “…nec attingit aspectus eius nisi quo attingit affectus sive amor eius .” See fuller quotation above. 59 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.14 (Rossi, 216): “…et in quantum avertitur amor a corporalibus corruptibilibus in tantum convertitur aspectus ad suum lumen et in tantum reperit ipsum.” See fuller quotation above.
336 said in chapter six, the illumination of the aspectus and the correction of the affectus begin with the infusion of faith and charity at baptism.
It is also possible to explain how the affectus can turn the aspectus to the contemplation of God without negating the priority of the aspectus . It does not move spontaneously, as though turning the aspectus to something completely unknown. All knowledge of truth requires God to
provide illumination, and this means that there is a real sense in which God takes the initiative in
the ascent of the mind to Himself. The light is there. God offers it first through sense
knowledge and later through the infusion of illuminative grace. 60 It is not that the affectus grasps
at God but that God provides light to the aspectus. Since the affectus is free, as discussed in
earlier chapters, it can consent to letting the aspectus see in that light or not. When it consents,
both aspectus and affectus are thereby fixed on a higher truth than previously known. In this way, the aspectus retains logical priority while the affectus is responsible for opening the soul to higher truths. Since light is always available, the degree of progress is the same as the degree to which the affectus is rightly ordered—not preoccupied with temporal things but rather seeking
God. 61 A bad affectus will block higher knowledge. A good affectus is the key to all knowledge.
The Problem with Aristotle’s Affectus
With the framework of Grosseteste’s theory of knowledge established, it is now possible
to consider some further ways aspectus and affectus figure in Grosseteste’s epistemology. No
study with this purpose could neglect Grosseteste’s discussions of Aristotle’s aspectus and
affectus . To these fascinating case studies I now turn.
60 See chapter 6 for further discussion of illumination in the life of grace. 61 See the end of the long quotation from CPA 1.14 above.
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One of the most heated philosophical and theological debates of the thirteenth century was over the question of the eternity of the world.62 Aristotle had taught that the world always existed, and this view seemed to deny the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 63 Aristotle’s western admirers in the early thirteenth century sought to save him from holding this heterodox position by saying that Aristotle only meant that there was no time before the world was created, or that God had eternally created the world. 64 Robert Grosseteste, 65 like Saint Bonaventure after him, 66 took a different approach. He argued on philosophical grounds that the world could not
62 For an introduction to this debate that traces its development from its origins in antiquity to the fourteenth century, with a special emphasis on the thirteenth century, see Richard C. Dales, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World (Leiden: Brill, 1990). For medieval texts from the 1220s to the fourteenth century that bear on the eternity of the world debate, see Richard C. Dales and Omar Argerami, eds. Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World (Leiden: Brill, 1991). Note, however, that this volume primarily contains previously unpublished texts. The discussions of famous masters like Grosseteste and Bonaventure must be located within the existing editions of their works. 63 One key text is Aristotle’s Physics book 8, where he says, for example, “[I]f there is always something of this nature, a movent that is itself unmoved and eternal, then that which is first moved by it must be eternal” (Aristotle, Physics 8.6 259b-260a [trans. Ross in GB 8:345]). The full bibliographical information for the translation is Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle Volume I, trans. W.D. Ross. Great Books of The Western World Volume 8, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler (Chicago: William Benton, 1952), 345. See Grosseteste’s response to book 8 below. 64 Alexander of Hales, who espoused the first option, was the most significant figure on this side of the debate for both Grosseteste and Bonaventure. For a discussion of the accommodation of Aristotle in the first half of the thirteenth century, including Alexander’s position, see Dales, Medieval Discussions, 57-70, esp. 68. 65 Grosseteste had no patience for this way of interpreting Aristotle. Consider Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on the Physics, book 8 ( Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Lincolniensis Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. Richard C. Dales [Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1963], 146): “ Verumptamen quecumque istarum trium intencionum fuerit intencio Aristotelis, argumenta quibus nititur ostendere perpetuitatem motus sui intencioni videntur conveniencia. Sciendum tamen quod illud quod intendit Aristoteles in hoc loco probare de perpetuitate motus falsum est et hereticum.” ; Robert Grosseteste, Hexaemeron 1.8.4 (ed. Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VI [Oxford, New York: The British Academy, 1982, 1990], 61): “ Non igitur se decipiant et frustra desudent ut Aristotilem faciant catholicum, ne inutiliter tempus suum et vires ingenii consumant, et Aristotilem catholicum constituendo, se ipsos hereticos faciant.” 66 Bonaventure was more conciliatory on the interpretation of Aristotle, possibly owing to his great respect for Alexander of Hales. See his Collations on the Six Days 7.2 (trans. Jose de Vinck, in The Works of St. Bonaventure vol. 5 [Paterson, NJ: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1970], 110; Collationes in Hexameron et Bonaventuriana Quaedam Selecta, ed. R.P. Ferdinandus Delorme, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi Tomus 8 [Florence: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1934], 99). Bonaventure was just as firm as Grosseteste, however, on the fact that the world could not be eternal and that those who thought it was had a spiritual problem at the root of their epistemological problem.
338 be eternal. Any philosopher who thought it was, was wrong. Yet Grosseteste needed an explanation for how such a great philosopher as Aristotle (and other ancient and contemporary philosophers who agreed with the Stagirite) could be so badly mistaken. Robert’s aspectus/affectus doctrine provided a ready answer. Because of a disorder in his affectus,
Aristotle posited the eternity of the world.
Commentary on the Physics. In his Commentary on the Physics (Comm. Phys. ) (ca. 1228-
1232) ,67 Grosseteste applies his theory of aspectus and affectus to the problem of the eternity of the world in Aristotle. 68 After indicting both Aristotle and Plato (since Plato thought the world
would not end), he states,
It was necessary for the philosophers to fall into this error because no one can be scientifically freed from the error of the perpetuity and infinity of movement and of time, past and future, except one who is able to understand the simplicity of eternity. But yet, the aspectus, or intelligence, of the mind cannot ascend higher than its affectus, or appetite, ascends. 69
67 This date is suggested by Richard Dales, the editor of the work (Introduction to Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Lincolniensis Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. Richard C. Dales [Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1963], xviii). McEvoy, “Chronology,” 643-644, affirms Dales’ argument and adds considerations to support it. 68 For a good, concise summary of Grosseteste’s philosophical argument against the eternity of the world, see Dales, Medieval Discussions, 71-74. Although Dales mentions the inability of pagans to raise their mental gaze to timeless eternity, he says nothing here about the reason Grosseteste gives for this. He does acknowledge it, however, on page 96. 69 Robert Grosseteste, Comm. Phys., book 8 (Dales, 147 ; trans. mine): “Necesse fuit philosophos in hunc errorem incidere, quia ab errore de perpetuitate et infinitate motus et temporis ex parte ante et ex parte post nullus potest scientifice liberari, nisi qui potest simplicitatem eternitatis intelligere; sed cum mentis aspectus, vel intelligencia, non possit superius ascendere quam ascendat eius affectus vel appetitus .” An interesting question here is whether the comprehension of simple eternity would be a matter of common or special illumination. Since it requires significant correction of the affectus, it would require grace. Thus it cannot belong to natural common illumination. It would seem reasonable that it could belong either to a high degree of supernatural common illumination or to special illumination. One might think that the mention of intelligentia requires a reference to special illumination, but to be sure of this one would have to look at how Grosseteste uses intelligentia elsewhere in the commentary. It is possible that he is using it in a general way that would not necessarily require its actions to involve cognition of divine exemplars. For now the question remains open.
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The language of height and ascent is obviously in reference to reaching truths that are closer to the divine light and therefore more certain and less subject to change. The affectus is
what was holding the philosophers down: “The affectus (pl.) of the philosophers, however, were
bound more with transitory things than with the eternal. Indeed, their apprehension, detained in
the phantasms of mutable things, was not able to reach the simplicity of eternity.” 70
It is especially noteworthy here that the limiting power of the affectus over the aspectus is
absolute. So definitely is it the case that the aspectus cannot rise above a disordered affectus that
the philosophers’ attachments to temporal things rendered their failure to grasp the concept of
simple eternity a matter of necesssity ( Necesse fuit ). Given the axiomatic nature of the statement
that the aspectus can go no higher than the affectus, it seems beyond doubt that this sort of
limitation would occur in any such case. If the affectus is directed toward temporal things, the
truths that are eternal must always remain out of reach.
One wants to know why this is the case. It is likely true that the affectus redirecting the
aspectus to lower things is vitally important. In other words, distraction is a major factor. It is
also true that the phantasms involved in knowledge of temporal things cloud the mind and hinder
it from reaching pure concepts. This is another major factor. Yet these factors seem insufficient
to explain why the aspectus actually cannot reach higher truths. Grosseteste himself clearly
believes he has reached higher truths, even while he has to contend with concupiscence and
phantasms. There must be more to the explanation, so I will return to this question below.
70 Robert Grosseteste, Comm. Phys., book 8 (Dales, 147; trans. mine): “Philosophorum autem affectus ligati erant plus cum transitoriis quam cum eternis, immo illorum apprehensio in phantasmatibus mutabilium detenta, simplicitatem eternitatis attingere non potuit.”
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Hexaëmeron. Grosseteste repeats this sentiment about the error of philosophers in De
Finitate Motus et Temporis 71 and in a slightly different form in his Hexaëmeron (ca. 1230-
1235) .72 The latter work, according to McEvoy, is doctrinally Grosseteste’s most important,
containing most of his main emphases. 73 In the Hexaëmeron , Grosseteste explains the remedy for Aristotle’s faulty affectus :
And so the purification of this error cannot occur in any way but this: the affectus mentis must be cleansed from the love of temporal things in order that the aspectus mentis, free from phantasms, might be able to transcend time and to understand simple eternity, where there is no extension according to before and after, and from which every moment 74 of time proceeds, both the before and the after. 75
71 Robert Grosseteste, De Finitate Motus et Temporis (Baur, 105) : “Consimile accidit Aristoteli et aliis, qui per discursum rationis firmiter sciunt aeternitatem simplicem esse et tamen ipsam aeternitatem simplicem perspicue non intellexerunt, sed sub phantasmate extensionis temporalis quasi a longe speculantes eam viderunt et sequentes ipsum phantasma extensionis temporalis multa inconvenientia affirmaverunt, sicut de perpetuitate motus et temporis et per consequens mundi. Et necesse fuit philosophos in hunc errorem incidere, cum mentis aspectus vel intelligentia non possit superius ascendere, quam ascendunt eius affectus, et ita, cum philosophorum affectus ligati erant plus cum transitoriis quam cum aeternis, ipsorum apprehensiva in phantasmatibus mutabilium detenta simplicitatem aeternitatis attingere non potuit.”; See also Robert Grosseteste, De Ordine Emanandi Causatorum a Deo (Baur, 150). 72 Southern, “Richard Dales,” 12, dates the work to about 1230. Dales and Gieben, the editors of the work, date it to around 1232-1235 (Richard Dales and Servus Gieben, Introduction to Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron, ed. Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VI [Oxford, New York: The British Academy, 1982, 1990], xiv). 73 James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 106-107. Similarly, Dales and Gieben, Introduction, xii, state, “As our edition will make clear, he drew extensively on his other writings in composing his Hexaëmeron, which thereby presents us with the closest thing we have to a synthesis of his thought, unified by the great theme of the creation of the world and of man.” 74 That Grosseteste means every moment of time, rather than all time generally, is clear both from the temporal modifiers here and from the immediate context. Just a few lines earlier he has explained that some have posited “ante omne tempus tempus aliud ” and this “ usque in infinitum. ” The possibility of repeating time before time unto infinity suggests that by “ omne tempus ” he means every moment or period of time considered in one continuous timeline, rather than the timeline we know taken as a qualitative whole. 75 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaemeron 1.8.5 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 61; trans. mine): “Unde et huius erroris purgacio non potest esse nisi per hoc quod mentis affectus purgetur ab amore temporalium, ut mentis aspectus immunis a fantasmatibus possit transcendere tempus et intelligere simplicem eternitatem, ubi nulla est extensio secundum prius et posterius, et a qua procedit omne tempus et prius et posterius ” It is just possible that Grosseteste could be referring to analogy per prius et posterius, also known as the analogy of attribution. This is the analogy by which health is said to be in a dog in the prior sense and in his food in a posterior sense, as contributing to health in the dog (Jennifer Ashworth, " Medieval Theories of Analogy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Winter 2013 Ed.], ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/analogy-medieval). If this is what
341
Here Grosseteste clearly reaffirms his view that the aspectus cannot reach higher (i.e., closer to
God) than the affectus, but he also shows the positive value of the affectus for gaining
knowledge. Since he believes one must understand simple eternity to escape Aristotle’s error, he
must believe that at least some Christian teachers (himself presumably among them) can cognize
without phantasms and understand simple eternity. The cleansing of the affectus and its reorientation by which one turns one’s love or desire toward God is necessary for reaching this elevated understanding. Within Grosseteste’s theory of knowledge, where concepts closer to the first Light are more intelligible and more certain,76 this means that those who love God more than temporal things are in a position to receive greater illumination, including both additional knowledge and a higher degree of certainty about that knowledge, than are people who love temporal things inordinately, however intelligent the latter may be. This gives lovers of God a strong epistemic advantage over lovers of the world, at least in relation to eternal truths.
In the example of Aristotle, then, Grosseteste gives a vivid illustration of how serious he is about the primacy of the affectus. One who loves primarily temporal things is completely unable to transcend them conceptually, while one who accepts illuminative grace from God can ascend beyond the need of phantasms to grasp the highest truths. It is safe to assume one needs
Grosseteste means, the words “ omne tempus et prius et posterius ” should be translated “all time, in the primary sense and in the secondary sense.” This would probably be in reference to the primary sense of time as a whole, which he has just spoken of transcending, and the secondary sense of time as a moment or period of time, which was the meaning of omne tempus a few lines earlier. According to Ashworth, Grosseteste knew of both the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proportionality as early as his CPA (E. Jennifer Ashworth, Les Théories de l’Analogie du XII ᵉ au XVI ᵉ Siècle [Paris: J. Vrin, 2008], 50). Still, I think the translation I have given in the text conveys the most likely meaning. The first use of the phrase “prius et posterius” is clearly referring to relationships of moments in a timeline, and it would seem overly subtle for him to use a different meaning the second time without giving a clear cue in the text. On Grosseteste’s refusal to allow “before and after” in eternity, see Dales, Medieval Discussions, 74. 76 Robert Grosseteste, CPA 1.17 (Rossi, 240-241). See quotation from this text and explanation in note 38 above.
342 grace for this ascent because it requires a serious purgation of the affectus, one that frees it form the love of temporal things.
Now it is clear why the error of ancient philosophers was a matter of necessity. The inordinate love of temporal things, in which the fallen affectus always remains apart from grace,
guarantees that the aspectus will remain clouded with phantasms and unable to cognize highly
abstract concepts.
Since it plays such a crucial role in his thought, this love of temporal things requires further investigation. From Aristotle’s error we can see that the affectus gets stuck on temporal things, and it is no surprise that where the affectus is stuck the aspectus is likewise held fast.
What one wants to know, however, is why the affectus loves temporal things too much in the
first place. A related question is: how can the affectus turn the aspectus from higher to lower
things, given the priority of the aspectus ?
The Corruption of the Flesh
The answers to these questions are to be found in the corruption of the flesh, although not exclusively. Taking inspiration from Wisdom 9:15 77 and the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition of concupiscence, Grosseteste connects the dysfunction of both the aspectus and the affectus with the "mass of the body ( moles corporis )," the corruption of it, or its love of temporal things multiple times. I will give just a few examples. 78
77 Wisdom 9:15 (RSVCE): “…for a perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthly tent burdens the thoughtful mind.” 78 Two additional examples include Dictum 89 , in which the body corrupts and weighs down the soul, and Dictum 102, where, though not discussing aspectus and affectus , he attributes dullness of understanding to carnal affections.
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In CPA 1.14 above we have seen that the affectus limits the ken of the aspectus. The
affectus, for its part, follows the body and its allurements or enticements ( illecebras ). While an
Augustinian like Grosseteste would not be likely to hold that body can act upon the soul in any coercive way, he does hold that “the soul follows the body in its passions.” 79 Somehow the body tempts the soul, so to speak.
In Dictum 3 he says that the carnis affectus, by which he seems to mean concupiscence, clouds the mentis aspectus .80 He quotes Wisdom 9:15 as a partial basis for this idea and says that this state of affairs will no longer obtain when the corruption is undone, quoting from 1
Corinthians 15 concerning the resurrected body.
In his De Decem Mandatis, Grosseteste explains that there are two kinds of concupiscence—the concupiscence of the flesh in the sensitive appetite and the concupiscence of the spirit in the rational appetite. The latter appetite, which he also identifies as voluntas, is equivalent to the affectus mentis. The concupiscence of the flesh includes desires that arise contrary to the command of reason. These may be the enticements of CPA 1.14. The concupiscence of the spirit consists in loving created things for their own sake, whereas one should love them for the sake of God. This concupiscence is also called cupidity. 81
79 Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 5): “…anima sequatur corpus in suis passionibus…” 80 Dictum 3 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 4v): “ In hac autem mortalitate, dum ‘corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam,’ [Sap. 9:15] et carnis affectus obnubilat mentis aspectum, non possumus revelata facie, sicut faciunt angeli, ineffabilem pulcritudinem Trinitatis contemplari .” I have checked this text against London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fol. 106r and London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol. 7v. Among other differences, Royal 7.E.II reads gravis where the other two manuscripts have carnis. While the gravis reading would be more in accord with Grosseteste’s normal usage, carnis as the more difficult reading and the reading of the better manuscripts is to be preferred, until a true edition can be made. I have also discussed this text in a footnote in chapter 2. 81 Robert Grosseteste, De Decem Mandatis 9.2-9.7 (ed. Dales and King, 85-88).
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In Dictum 17 he gives the Augustinian basis of his view on the body. Dictum 17 is about the contempt of the world. Here, among many reasons why Grosseteste says temporal things should be held in contempt, one is that they blind the aspectus and make the affectus sticky, so that it cannot fly upwards. One who holds temporal things in contempt will not be subject to blinding and sticking. He quotes Augustine’s Soliloquies to show this. 82 Augustine says that
one will see what one seeks—God—in the very instant in which one takes no delight in earthly
things. The blinding caused by temporal things may be connected to both phantasms and
ignorance inherited through original sin. The stickiness is likely a way of referring to the
inordinate love of temporal things. Due to concupiscence inherited through original sin, the
affectus has a tendency to love temporal things too much. The key point, though, is that purifying the affectus instantly fixes the aspectus. This shows that phantasms only cloud the mind to the degree that love of earthly things is inordinate.
In the Hexaëmeron he says that the love of the transitory world obscures the aspectus mentis. 83 He also says that the mind is stronger and may be more conformed to the image of God in old age because the flesh is weaker. 84 Treating the matter positively, he says that viewing
lower things as nothing frees the mind to rise to the desire of higher things. 85
82 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 17 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.14v): “ Contempnenda sunt hec temporalia, quia amata mentis aspectum obcecant, et affectum, ne possit evolare sursum, inviscant. … De cavendo hanc inviscacionem et obcecacionem dicit Augustinus: ‘Cavendum magno opere, dum hoc corpus agimus, ne sensibilium visco pene vostre impediantur, quibus integris perfectisque opus est, ut ad illam lucem ab hiis tenebris evolemus. Que se ne ostendere quidem dignatur in hac cavea inclusis, nisi tales fuerint ut ista effracta et dissoluta possint in auras suas evadere. Ita cum fueris talis ut nichil terrenorum te delectet, mihi crede, eodem momento, eodem puncto temporis videbis quod cupias.’ ” For discussion of the influence of this passage of the Soliloquies on Grosseteste, see chapter 2. 83 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 6.12.7 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 195). 84 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 8.32.5-6 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 257). 85 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron 7.11. 1 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 205-206).
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It would be easy to misconstrue Grosseteste’s remarks as a negative attitude towards the body as such. However, one can see that having a body simpliciter is not the problem through
the fact that Grosseteste does not see the body as any kind of hindrance before the fall or after
the final resurrection. For instance, he says in On the Cessation of the Laws 1.5.2 that Adam
knew the whole natural law before the fall, and in 1.7.6 he describes the gradual weakening of
human nature by sin. He seems to assume that Adam was not subject to cognitive problems
before the fall.
In Dictum 25, he attributes the problems with both affectus and aspectus to the fall. It is
the distortion of the will that can cut off the aspectus from the light of truth and the affectus from
the light of grace. This distortion is itself a privation. 86 In the case of the Devil, the negative
results for aspectus and affectus are traceable to the distortion in the will alone that chose to sin.
In the case of man, he adds the corruption of the flesh as also leading to the aspectus/affectus problems, citing Wisdom 9:15. This corruption is itself dependent on the distortion of the will.
The reborn and the penitent are not fully subject to this corruption, yet in the wayfaring state they retain some impediment. 87 This implies that before the sin that caused corruption, the body was
no hindrance. In fact, Grosseteste implies that Adam enjoyed a full special illumination before
the fall. 88 Also, the discussion of the fall of the Devil in this passage shows that one does not
86 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 25 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 22r): “Nil autem obstare potest radiis solis iusticie et intelligencie nisi distorcio voluntatis qua avertitur voluntas ab amando summe summum bonum ad amandum summe aliquid non summe bonum … Hec itaque racionalis voluntatis distorcio, que velud terra est, radiis solis intelligencie et iusticie obstant ut non illustrent sic distorte voluntatis aspectum lumine veritatis, nec affectum lumine gracie. Nec mirum si aversionem voluntatis a summo bono non penetret radius huius solis, quia aversio ipsa privacio et defectio est.” 87 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 25 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 22v).
346 need a body to distort the affectus and blind the aspectus, only freedom. The Devil, like man, has problems with both aspectus and affectus. 89
Concerning the resurrection, in the De Dotibus he affirms the standard belief in the seven
gifts of eternal life, including four properties for the resurrected body—clarity, agility, subtlety,
and impassibility. This body is clearly no hindrance to enjoying the gifts to the soul—vision,
love ( dilectio ), and enjoyment. In Dictum 38, he follows Anselm’s Proslogion 25 in his
explanation of how aspectus and affectus will be conformed to God in beatitude. He further says
that conforming the higher powers to God will conform the lower powers, resulting in the perfect
temperance of the body (quoting Psalm 84:2). 90 This seems to imply that the resurrected body
will not be a mere placeholder for the soul but a body that operates with powers at least
analogous to the lower powers the soul now uses to govern the body. Yet that body will be no
hindrance to the soul.
It is not the body as such that causes problems, but maybe it is the fact that the body has
temporal needs. It is possible to rule out this option too. In Dictum 1 ,91 he explains that contempt of temporal things is really the wish to see them properly used, and so, in a sense,
88 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 25 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 22v): “Cumque non potuit sua vi interponere se inter oculum mentis hominis et solem spiritualem, persuasit homini ut veniret in umbram suam, quod homo fecit dum voluntati diaboli consensit.” 89 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 25 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 22v): “Habuit quoque diabolus supra dorsum scutum obumbrans ipsum, id est distorcionem sue voluntatis que privabat eius affectum a radiis gracie et eius aspectum a radiis veritatis et intelligencie.” One way this is possible will appear below. Since love conforms the soul to the object of love and knowledge, the Devil’s spiritual essence would be conformed to something lower than God. This conformity would prevent full conformity to God. From the example of the Devil one can see that the problem of phantasms is actually a symptom of the real problem—that of disordered love. 90 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 38 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 29r). 91 I am inclined to believe that Grosseteste placed this dictum at the beginning of the collection as a key to understanding two things: 1) the centrality of love in his thought (notice the imitation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in the opening line) and 2) that contempt of the world is not inconsistent with the ordered love of all things (including temporal things), both of which are common themes in the Dicta .
347 actually involves a love of temporal things. Here one can see that the need for and love of temporal things, when in right order, is an important part of the Christian life. Problems with temporal needs only arise because the love of temporal things is inordinate. The mere fact of having temporal needs, then, does not directly contribute to the disorder of the affectus that limits the aspectus.
In summary of what I have said so far, one can repeat the opening thought of the De
Artibus Liberalibus: The aspectus, the affectus, and the body each can cause error. All of this
results from the fall. The fallen aspectus is born in ignorance. The fallen affectus is born with a
tendency to love in a disordered way. The fallen body is weak and prone to failure. The concern
at present is with the third option. How does the body interfere with aspectus and affectus ?
From the above texts, it appears that the corrupt body leads the affectus to an inordinate love of
temporal things. Since aspectus and affectus are not divisi (CPA 1.14), an affectus stuck on
temporal things keeps the aspectus in the same place.
So then, it is time to answer the questions posed at the end of the previous section. The
affectus can get disordered in two ways. It is born with concupiscence and thus begins already
disordered. The other way is that it can follow the passions of the body. But why would a weak,
corrupted body lead the affectus of the soul into disorder? Somehow it entices the affectus. Yet
this would logically require some sort of presentation made by the body to the soul. It is difficult
to be certain how this would work. Perhaps the body somehow gives the soul a false impression
348 of what it needs. 92 The aspectus, based on bad information, would make a wrong judgment. The affectus could then respond to this wrong judgment with proportionately wrong love.
The problem with the above scenario is that the order of causation is as follows:
body aspectus affectus
Yet the order in CPA 1.14 is different. There the corruption of the body drags down the aspectus
by means of the affectus like so:
body affectus aspectus
But how can the affectus drag down the aspectus without violating the priority of the aspectus ?
In other words, how can the affectus actually turn the aspectus from higher to lower things?
It seems that there are two ways this is possible in Grosseteste’s thought. The obvious
way is that the affectus can choose to return to something previously judged by the aspectus as
good or beautiful. Since lower goods exist, they are inevitably present in the memories of
virtually all humans. Thus the affectus can ignore the present judgment of the aspectus (for
example, justice is good, so I should continue contemplating it) by returning to an earlier
judgment of the aspectus (for example, money is useful for human life, so I should get some).
This would have the effect of drawing the aspectus from a higher reality (justice) to a lower one
(money). As long as the affectus remains fixed on the love of money, the aspectus will not be
able to contemplate justice. The body would be the cause of this movement only indirectly—
92 I am not aware of a text where Grosseteste says this, but it seems to be the most natural way to combine three ideas that he does affirm: 1) that the affectus can only love what the aspectus judges to be desirable, 2) that the soul follows the body in its passions, and 3) that the body weighs down the soul. The soul obviously cannot follow the body unless there is a judgment made that to do so is desirable. If the body only gave right impressions of its needs, one could not accuse it of weighing down the soul. Caring for the body can be part of ordered love. Therefore, in order for the body to weigh down the soul, it needs to mislead the aspectus so that it makes a wrong judgment about how to care for its needs. For example, one’s body may ask for sleep, food, or sex when it does not actually need it.
349 from the fact that bodies have temporal needs. The corruption of the body would play no special role. Thus, this model does not sufficiently explain how the corrupt body can entice the affectus.
The other way the affectus can redirect the aspectus to lower things may explain how the corrupt body drags down the soul. For Grosseteste, not all judgments in the soul are subject to rationality and choice. 93 Some judgments occur through the sensitive power of apprehension. In
the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, as I explained in chapter four, his cognitive/appetitive distinction
applies to the sensitive powers and well as the rational. The sensitive apprehensive power can
perceive, judge, and elicit a response from the sensitive appetitive and motive powers without the
involvement of reason or free will. Perhaps the body introduces error at this level . The corrupt
body, by shaping sensory information a certain way, causes the judgment of the sensitive
apprehensive power to be skewed, at least in some cases. As a result, desires arise in the
sensitive appetitive power against the command of reason. This could be the concupiscence of
the flesh described in the De Decem Mandatis and the enticements of the body mentioned in
CPA 1.14 . Since a judgment of the sensitive equivalent of the aspectus precedes the affectus, the
priority of the aspectus is retained, at least partly. Yet the order of causation can still move from
body to affectus to aspectus. This model would work as follows:
body non-rational judgment (sensitive aspectus )desire against reason (sensitive
affectus )affectus aspectus
93 As a possible alternative to the sensitive judgment option, one finds in the DAL that judgment can occur in the memory. He says that consonance or dissonance in music can delight or offend the soul while passing only through memory, without the judgment of reason. The sensory information thus receives a sort of judgment from the aspectus, but it is not subject to rationality or choice. Robert Grosseteste, DAL (Baur, 3-4): “ Exindeque progrediens in memoriam, [desinens]que extra et in sensu totus simul et in memoria totus simul reponitur. Exinde in tota anima aptatur numerus quidam, quo aptato cum numero, qui extra jam desinit per ipsum numerum, qui jam totus est in memoria, delectatur anima absque rationis judicio in numero sonantis, si sit consonus, aut offenditur, si sit dissonus. ”
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His thought seems to be that sensitive desires drag down the aspectus by enticing the rational affectus . This would be the moment when the affectus turns to the body’s enticements, as described in CPA 1.14. One may assume that the aspectus does perceive and judge the elicited desire, meaning the model more precisely works as follows:
body non-rational judgment (sensitive aspectus )desire against reason (sensitive
affectus )aspectus (a) affectus aspectus (b)
However, an aspectus (a) already mired by sensitive desires would not be in a position to judge
accurately. Thus he simplifies the matter by leaving out the perfunctory judgment of the
aspectus (a) and instead just refers to the affectus turning to bodily enticements and consequently
dragging down the aspectus (b). In this way, even the proper meaning of the priority of the
aspectus may be retained while allowing the corrupt body to drag down the aspectus through the
affectus.
This discussion has become a bit technical, but the overall point is simple. The fallen
body is corrupt in such a way that it encourages an inordinate love of earthly things in the
affectus . With the affectus so detained, the aspectus likewise cannot break free of the cognitive
aspect of earthly things—phantasms. Having senses is not the problem, for phantasms can be
ignored to the degree that the affectus is pure. It is loving the things sensed for their own sake
(rather than for the love of God) that causes the mind to remain always clouded with images
rather than ascending to a higher plane of cognition.
Illumination and Dictum 91
One final matter remains. In this dissertation I have explained Grosseteste’s theory of knowledge in two different ways. In chapter five I explained the conformity account of Dictum
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91, and in chapter seven I discussed the reformation of the divine image in the human person from Hexaëmeron part eight, a similar conformity account . In chapter three I argued that
illumination and ordered love perfect the aspectus and the affectus , respectively, and that a
degree of these gifts of grace are available in the present life. In the present chapter, I have
explained some further features of his theory of illumination. In Dictum 91, Grosseteste refers to illumination in connection with his conformity account. 94 This study cannot end, therefore, until
I have explained how these two accounts relate to one another. In offering this explanation I will also provide another perspective on Aristotle’s error and further thoughts on how the affectus can aid or hinder the aspectus.
Dictum 91 is the third in a trilogy of sermons on pastoral care. This is evident from the opening paragraph. 95 James Ginther has identified the second in the series as Dictum 90, and he
suggested that Dictum 101 may be the first. 96 Dictum 101 is about good pastors. Dictum 90 is
about bad pastors. Dictum 91 explains the root of pastoral care—love. 97 Dictum 90 states that
the previous sermon was about the good pastor and the pastoral officium. 98 Dictum 101 takes its
inspiration from the phrase “I am the good shepherd” and explains the pastoral officium in detail.
If Dictum 101 is indeed the first in the series, it may be possible to narrow the date of
94 See below. 95 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 69r): “ In penultimo sermone quem feci caritati vestre, loqutus sum, prout tunc docere dignatus est unus et verus magister, de boni pastoris officio. In ultimo vero sermone quem ad vos habui, loqutus sum de malorum pastorum necgligenciis, et omissionibus, et viciosis actionibus, temptans hec resecare comminatarum penarum iehenne acumine.” 96 Ginther, Sacred Page, 165, 180 n.88. 97 For a summary of the general ideas about pastoral care presented in Dictum 91, see Ginther, Sacred Page, 165- 167. 98 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 90 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 66v): “In sermone quem postremo loquebar caritati vestre, prout Dominus tunc dedit, descripsi vobis pastorem bonum, et pastoris boni pastorale officium.”
352 composition to either his tenure as an archdeacon (1229-1232) 99 or the beginning of his service as bishop (1235-1240), since he refers to nos prelatos .100 Further research is needed to settle the
question definitively. He addresses Dicta 90 and 91 to a particular prelate ( caritati vestre ) who
was responsible for other pastors, such as a bishop or an archbishop. 101 Ginther mentioned Hugh de Welles as a plausible conjecture of who this prelate might be, but this question too awaits further research. 102 For now, it is safe to say, on the basis of doctrinal similarity to other Dicta and the Hexaëmeron, and on the basis of its presence in the Dicta collection, that Dictum 91 was
composed either in the magisterial period or the early episcopal period no later than about
1240. 103 It thus belongs to the same general phase of Grosseteste’s career as the CPA and the De
Veritate—either in or reasonably close to the magisterial period.
In this sermon, Grosseteste says that love is the root of pastoral care. He approaches the topic from multiple angles, only one of which concerns the present study. He discusses the love that binds and conforms the soul to God, thus teaching all knowledge. As I discussed in chapter five, this account reduces knowledge and love to a single operation—that of conforming to God in a participation of imitation. After the contributions of chapter seven, one can now say more specifically that he envisions a process (of logical, not temporally sequential steps) in which the
99 On the dates and circumstances of his tenure as archdeacon of Leicester, see Ginther, Sacred Page, 163. 100 I am indebted to Joe Goering for pointing this out to me. See Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 101 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 81v). Grosseteste became bishop in 1235 and published the Dicta in about 1238-1240. 101 Ginther, Sacred Page, 165. 102 Ginther, Sacred Page, 180 n.88. It is worth noticing that the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat (1242-1244) is likewise a special sermon to a group of pastors directed to a vestrae caritati. See Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §1 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 169). 103 After c.1240, he consistently mixed Pseudo-Dionysian language into discussions of the soul and God, which provides my working terminus ante quem for the composition and publication of the Dicta. The characteristic Pseudo-Dionysian phrases do not appear in the Dicta, as far as I can tell .
353 soul perceives God as Beauty and consequently loves Him. That love makes the soul to conform to the highest Beauty. Since this Beauty is also the highest Truth and the form of all truths, one knows all things, in an imitatory way proportioned to human nature, through the imitatory similitude of the form of all truth impressed upon the soul. 104 It is like how the beauty of a seal exists in the wax it has shaped.
Dictum 89 contains a similar passage. Though this passage lacks the wax and seal analogy , it reflects a similar idea. In the Dictum 89 version, Grosseteste says that this loving vision involves the knowledge of concrete facts, such as matters of geography, as well as higher abstract truths. Knowing things this way is far better than following the ordinary route. 105
A degree of this knowledge through love is possible in the present life, but it will be complete only in beatitude. Grosseteste explains this process in Dictum 91 with another analogy.
The Holy Spirit is the master, and we are the students learning His art. As the student of rhetoric
or geometry starts with basic principles and eventually advances to mastery of the art, so we are
now learning the first principles of the art of all knowledge. As our love grows, our knowledge
104 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (ed. mine): “Sicut enim cera mollis fortiter applicata sigillo recipit imitatoria similitudine omnium formarum et figurarum in sigillo inscriptarum pulcritudinem, sic anima per amoris copulam fortiter ad Deum applicata, non equali, sed cum summa imitatoria similitudine ipsius summe pulcritudinis recipit conformitatem. Et cum apud summam pulcritudinem nulla desit pulcritudo…in anima, per amoris copulam a summa pulcritudine impressa, non erit alicuius pulcritudinis absencia, sed refulgebit in illa pulcritudo que super ipsam est imitatorie.” For my working edition and translation of the entire passage in which this quotation appears see Appendix 8B. 105 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 89 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.64r-64v): “Multum et ultra modum laborat vana curiositas hominum, ut sciat cursus astrorum et proporciones numerorum, vel consonancias sonorum, vel mensuras figurarum, disposicionem oribis terrarum, virtutem elementorum, inicium et consummacionem et medietatem temporum, mutacionem morum, naturas animalium, iras bestiarium, et vim ventorum, et cogitaciones hominum, differencias arborum, et virtutem radicum. Nec tamen laborando attingit ad alicuius dictorum corporalem particulam. Tu autem, solummodo dilata sinum cordis, admitte radios invisibilis et spiritualis lucis. Videbis tandem manifestante Spiritu Sancto aspectu mentis unico, nulla vicissitudine interpellato, nullo fine terminato, nulla incertitudine obfuscato, non solum pretacta, sed quecumque sunt incerta et occulta, absconsa et improvisa.”
354 of the art grows, and when our love is complete in beatitude, we will have consummate knowledge of the art. 106 This means that one grows in knowledge of all things to the degree that one loves God. This implies that all baptized Christians in a state of grace would participate in this knowledge of all things to the degree that they have grown in charity. Clearly, he has in mind an experience not limited to contemplative moments. This perception of God must occur not only in degrees but also in a mode (or modes) that allows it to occur unnoticed.
This account makes a very important contribution to our understanding of the primacy of the affectus in Robert Grosseteste’s epistemology. He says that this love, when it is full and conforms the soul fully to God, is the knowledge of all truth. 107 By “all truth” he means all truth
in the way it can be known by the human soul. So not only can the affectus improve or expand
the aspectus, but ultimately it enables the aspectus to reach the utmost limit of what a human
being can know—all things through their forms or exemplars in the divine mind. Since a degree
of this loving knowledge is possible in the present life, and since this knowledge is superior to
knowledge gained the ordinary way, love again proves to be the ultimate key to knowledge.
106 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (ed. mine): “ Est igitur dilectio plena tocius veritatis magistra; immo ipse amor est ipsa veritatis noticia. Nec moveat aliquem quod multi in via Deum amant, nec est in eis plena noticia veritatis. Quia sicut dicitur magistrum docere discipulum aliquam artem totam, puta rethoricam vel geometriam, cum adhuc tamen discipulus versatur circa artis principium vel medium, nondum sciens artis ultimum vel finem, sic et Spiritus Sanctus dicitur nos docere velud quamdam unam magnam et universalem artem, omnem videlicet veritatem, cum tamen adhuc versamur circa huius artis primordia. Augmentata vero in nobis dilectione, augetur et huius magne artis noticia. [cf. Deut. 6:5; Mc. 12:30; etc.] Cum vero complebitur in nobis amor, ut diligamus Deum ex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et tota mente, ut videlicet omnis particula amoris nostri conversa sit totaliter in ipsum, quod finita hac peregrinacione erit in patria, erit insimul et huius magne artis consummata noticia. Efficit igitur amor consummatam decoris speciem et sapiencie plenitudinem secundum modum consummacionis qui potest esse in supprema facie creature racionalis.” For my working edition and translation of the entire passage in which this quotation appears see Appendix 8B. 107 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 69vb): “Est igitur dilectio plena tocius veritatis magistra; immo ipse amor est ipsa veritatis noticia. ” For my working edition and translation of the entire passage in which this quotation appears see Appendix 8B.
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One can also see here how grace, in Grosseteste’s thought, is necessary for bringing the human person to her created end. In chapter seven, I said that the contemplation and enjoyment of God is the end of human nature. The love by which this occurs in Dictum 91 is certainly the
infused love received originally at baptism. 108 Apart from this gift of grace, the human person
could not fulfill the end for which God created her.
The Necessity of a Synthesis. While there is no single text, as far as I know, that expresses
the equation of conformity to God with illumination and ordered love in detail, there are several
texts supporting the idea that some theory of this kind is what Robert Grosseteste had in mind.
In these texts, conformity to God and illumination and/or ordered love are treated as correlative
or the same thing.
Dictum 19 fits this description. When the knowledge of Scripture sinks from the
aspectus into the affectus it makes the human person deiform, 109 orders the affectus, and conforms it to the highest beauty. 110 When pagan books go from aspectus to affectus, they do
not illumine the aspectus but darken it. They do not form the affectus but deform it.111 In this
text, conformity to God is equated or closely tied with ordered love and is closely associated
with illumination.
108 Concerning the infusion of faith and love, see chapter 6. 109 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §17 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 130) : “Taliter humane menti inscribenda est sacre pagine sciencia vt per medium aspectus profundet intimum affectus. Vt sit liber scriptus non solum foris sed eciam intus. Hec enim sic in intimum affectus profundata inscripcio conformat hominem Deo faciens que deiformem restituit honori de perdito, quia is est verus honor hominis reformacio ymaginis sui conditoris.” 110 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 19 §19 (ed. Ginther, “Theology at Oxford,” 131; modified words underlined) : “ Nulle enim scripture cetere sic in intimum affectus debent se profundare totumque hominem sibi configurare, quia nulla est alia que affectum perfecte ordinat suppreme que pulchritudini conformat . Immo si, qua alia sit, per aspectum in affectum penetrat, non illuminat aspectum sed obtenebrat ; non affectum format, sed deformat .” For explanation of my modifications, see note 56 in chapter 3. 111 Ibid.
356
In Dictum 49, Grosseteste supports his point about conforming the rational powers to
God with Psalm 26:1, “the Lord is my light ( illuminacio ) and my salvation.” 112 This suggests a
strong tie between conformity to God and receiving illumination.
In Dictum 89, as mentioned above, there is an account of knowledge that is similar to the
Dictum 91 account. Like Dictum 91, it mentions both conformity to God and receiving
illumination in connection with the contemplative knowledge and love of God. 113 It also refers
explicitly to illumining the aspectus and the inflaming of the affectus as a way of moving towards beatitude .114 As I explained in chapter three, inflaming the affectus is another way of
referring to putting love in order.
The closest Grosseteste comes to a complete synthesis of the conformity account and
illumination is perhaps his account in the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat (1242-1244) , which I have
discussed in chapter four . There the dominant theme in the life of grace is participation in the
divine ray, inspired by the Pseudo-Dionysius. In Grosseteste’s interpretation, this refers to man’s
112 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 49 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 33v): “Deiformitas ergo in supprema parte anime sive mentis dicitur renovacio spiritus, de qua dicit Apostolus: ‘Renovamini spiritu mentis vestre,’ [Eph. 4:23] sive conformitas spiritus ipsi cui canimus: “Dominus illuminacio mea et salus mea.’ [Ps. 26:1]” 113 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 89 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.66r): “Fert namque vos sursum ferventi desiderio celestium, sursumque latos ibidem quietat et collocat, quia, sicut dicit Apostolus: ‘Conversacio vestra in celis est,’ [Phil. 3:20] ubi superiore mentis vestre facie conformes et coaptati estis Deo, quasi suppremo celo, dicentes semper: ‘Michi autem adherere Deo bonum est,’ [Ps. 72:28] ” ; Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 89 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.64v): “Tu autem, solummodo dilata sinum cordis, admitte radios invisibilis et spiritualis lucis. Videbis tandem manifestante Spiritu Sancto aspectu mentis unico, nulla vicissitudine interpellato, nullo fine terminato, nulla incertitudine obfuscato, non solum pretacta, sed quecumque sunt incerta et occulta, absconsa et improvisa.” 114 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 89 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol.66rb-66va): “ Ad quam beatitudinem, ut perveniamus et fructu centesimo perfruamur, ille Spiritus, qui hodierna die discipulis in igne apparuit, illustret splendore suo nostre mentis aspectum, et fervore suo accendat affectum .” I have compared this sentence in Bodley 798 with the same sentence in Royal 6.E.V (London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V, fol.40vb). They do not differ at all.
357 participation in the life of God. 115 It is an open question whether Grosseteste has changed his
concept of participation in this later work, but on balance it seems more likely that a participation
of imitation—and thus a conformity account—is still in view. Participation in the divine ray also
involves illumination, including activation of the intelligentia or sapientia, and direction of the
soul’s powers by God, which seems equivalent to the ordering of love.
In light of the close or equivalent identities of conforming to God and receiving
illumination/rectification of love in these texts, I think I am justified in suggesting that
illumination and conformity to God by imitation do indeed converge for Grosseteste. I could
mention other factors too, such as the fact that both accounts feature in the Hexaëmeron and the
Dicta. I think, however, that I have said enough. The best evidence for reading Grosseteste as
generally consistent in using these two accounts is perhaps the ease with which they converge. 116
Synthesis of Illumination and the Conformity Account. At least when he wrote Dictum 91, the conformity account was more or less correlative with Grosseteste’s understanding of illumination, as the following passage reveals:
And since the form of the highest beauty and the highest wisdom are the same, when the soul is perfectly conformed to the highest beauty, and through this to the highest wisdom, she will be as a consequence illumined ( illustrata ) with the fullness of wisdom. And so love, which makes the soul deiform, makes her fully wise by participation in the highest wisdom.117
115 Robert Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat §16-17 (ed. McEvoy, “Theory of Human Nature,” 177-178). 116 I do mean generally consistent. In matters of detail, there are often differences even within the conformity account. My sense is that these differences tend to turn on his belief that the soul is identical with its powers. Since talk of the different powers is primarily for spiritual or practical purposes, he really had no need to be perfectly consistent in talking about their actions and how those actions reach perfection. 117 Robert Grosseteste, Dictum 91 (ed. and trans. mine): “Et cum idem sit summe pulcritudinis forma et summa sapiencia, cum anima fuerit perfecte conformis summe pulcritudini ac per hoc summe sapiencie, erit per consequens anima illustrata sapiencie plenitudine. Unde et amor, qui facit animam deiformem, facit illam summe sapiencie
358
Since this passage is about knowing things in God, it evidently refers to special illumination.
When one sees the exemplar (and consequently its copy) in God, this is the same event as perceiving God as beauty, loving that beauty, and through love conforming to it. The illumination account describes the event of knowledge from the perspective of what God must do for the soul. He must reveal the divine idea to the soul in His Light. The conformity account describes what God must do to the soul. He must impress the exemplar idea in the soul through love. One could say that illumination describes knowledge in reference to the aspectus, while the conformity account describes the same event in reference to the affectus. 118
Since the love that conforms the soul to God is the person’s love for God, the human person is active in the process and not a mere recipient of knowledge. Since this love is divine charity given through grace, on the other hand, God does all the work. All the person contributes is consent to the gift of light—through love. I explained above that this conformity of the soul to
God occurs to the degree that charity increases in this life. Since this conformity is the same as at least one mode of special illumination, 119 it is now clear that special illumination can occur by degrees. 120 The one who knows the eternal ideas in God during this life does not receive the
participacione plene sapientem.” For my working edition and translation of the entire passage in which this quotation appears see Appendix 8B. 118 Indeed, this seems to be his general approach in Dictum 19 and Dictum 89. 119 There would seem to be at least three modes in which special illumination can occur for viatores. Dictum 91 indicates that there is a basic mode in which the knowledge of God increases with love. This would seem to have no obvious experiential component. The Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, mentioned above, indicates that it can occur more intensely or fully in mystical experience. Dictum 72, quoted in Appendix 8A, describes an experience that seems more common than mystical experience yet is still distinguishable as an experience of special illumination. A thorough examination of all the illuminative possibilities would likely be daunting but would shed much light on Grosseteste’s doctrine. 120 This conclusion does not, however, depend on this synthesis. For additional texts that suggest a degree of knowledge through the vision of exemplars (special illumination), see Appendix 8A.
359 whole of knowledge and beatitude instantly. Rather, the soul sees God and conforms to Him to the degree that grace is given by God and accepted by the will.
Next comes the question of common illumination and the conformity account. I suggested in chapter five that all knowledge and love for Grosseteste would seem to be a mode of conformity to the divine nature. This fits eminently well with his view, which I explained in chapter seven, that created things serve human nature’s created purpose—to know and love
God—by raising the rational creature through contemplation to the knowledge and love of God.
Every created nature, as I explained there, has its own way of participating in God by imitation, and man’s mode of participation is the contemplation and enjoyment of God. Thus, when created natures assist man in ascending to the contemplation of God, they are helping man to participate in the divine nature by imitation. In the present chapter, it has appeared that knowing
God through His creatures occurs in common illumination. In this way, the conformity account converges with common illumination too.
In this case also one can say that illumination and conformity describe the same process from the perspectives of aspectus and affectus, respectively. What God does for the soul is provide traces of His nature in created things and light by which to abstract these traces as universals. This is the aspectus perspective. What happens to the soul is the impression of the likeness of God’s nature that exists in created things. It would still seem to be love that conforms the soul, and so this perspective concerns the affectus. But this time the love may be natural or supernatural. In the natural version of common illumination, natural love conforms the soul to God as revealed in His traces. This love is directed towards the soul’s proper light,
God, as CPA 1.14 indicates, but the individual who knows and loves may not be aware that she
360 is knowing and loving God. In the supernatural version, infused charity knowingly conforms the soul to God as revealed in His traces. In either version, common illumination conforms the soul to God in some degree by conforming the soul to His traces in created things.
It is now possible to give another description of Aristotle’s error and the way the affectus limits or even lowers the aspectus to the knowledge of earthly things. The fallen affectus tends to love earthly things too much, whether due to its own concupiscence or the concupiscence of the flesh caused by the corrupt body. Since love conforms the soul to the thing known, the result is that the fallen soul tends to conform to earthly things. This is why phantasms have such a complete power to cloud the mind. The soul is actually conformed to those things. To the degree that truth is known, this is also a conformity to God, but it is limited by the medium and by the power of natural love. Common illumination conforms the soul to God only to the degree available in the traces and to the degree that the soul loves the light she is seeking. Aristotle, then, had his soul conformed to temporal things. This gave him some knowledge of God, but it also prevented his soul from receiving a higher light and a more perfect impression of the divine nature. The wax was not soft but rather hardened in a less perfect shape.
I have said above that the affectus can redirect the aspectus from higher to lower realities by returning to an earlier judgment of the aspectus in the memory or by consenting to desires that arise through the sensitive powers of apprehension and appetite. In terms of conformity to
God, this would mean that the affectus, by fixing its love too strongly or too long on earthly things, replaces, or at least obscures, the previous impression of higher things by conforming to the form of the lower things loved. As long as the bond of love remains, the impression of the lower things cannot be replaced, or rather improved, by the higher. Once the bond is released,
361 however, divine light can be accepted and the soul can begin to receive higher forms, whether in common or special illumination. Since all forms are of God, the movement by degrees to knowledge of higher realities would be a continuous improvement of the impression in the soul.
Conclusion
It will doubtless be helpful to end with a summary of what I have said in this chapter.
My understanding of aspectus and affectus in Grosseteste’s epistemology is as follows. He believes that all knowledge comes through illumination, whether knowledge beginning from sense experience with common illumination or knowledge beginning from divine exemplars with special illumination. Either way, God must supply a special influence in order for the mind to know truth or to reach knowledge of higher truths. God provides light to the aspectus, and the aspectus receives that light just to the degree that the affectus is free from the love of temporal things and seeking God. It is thus through rightly ordered love that the affectus can expand the intellectual range of the aspectus.
In the corruption of the flesh, Grosseteste sees not a problem with the body as such but a disordered condition resulting from the Fall. The corrupt body entices the soul to love temporal things too much. In the fallen state, the affectus inevitably loves temporal things too much , and therefore the aspectus that is always with it cannot break free of cognition through phantasms.
This is why Aristotle could not conceive of simple eternity. His love of temporal things made it impossible for him to cognize without phantasms, and only one who can cognize without phantasms can conceive of simple eternity. Further, the affectus can drag the aspectus back down from higher truths to lower, whether through returning to earlier judgments of the aspectus
362 concerning lower realities 121 or through consenting to the desires elicited against the command of reason in the sensitive powers. Due to its fallen state, the affectus begins life with the inclination to do both.
At the same time, the road of progress to higher knowledge runs through temporal things, for they carry the traces of divine light. It seems that Grosseteste wishes for the knower not to despise temporal things entirely but to turn them to their proper use, which is the knowledge and love of God. Loving created things in this ordered way allows the aspectus, by degrees, to
cognize higher and higher truths, as the affectus becomes rightly ordered.
While Grosseteste gives two accounts of knowledge, I have argued that the two accounts
converge. Illumination describes knowledge in reference to the aspectus. The conformity account of
Dictum 91 describes the event or process of knowledge in reference to the affectus. It is a mark of
Grosseteste’s genius that his sometimes scattered thoughts on these topics cohere with surprisingly few and minor difficulties. The essential contribution of the conformity account to the primacy of
the affectus is the idea that love of God actually constitutes knowledge of truth through special
illumination. As one grows in love for God, one grows in knowledge of all things through the
knowledge of God.
In this chapter the primacy of the affectus has found its fullest expression. The affectus has the power to raise the aspectus on high or to confine it to the dirt and phantasms of the
created world. In beatitude, and to some degree in the present life, the love of God is the
knowledge of truth. In fact, love is the key to knowledge. The one who loves only earthly things
binds her soul to them and cannot receive greater illumination. Her cognition is plagued by the
121 This is a speculative option that I discussed in Appendix 7.
363 images of the things she loves. The one whose affectus is purged, however, will find the whole universe to be a ladder by which to ascend through love to the knowledge of all things in God.
Appendix 8A: Some texts in Grosseteste that suggest a degree of special illumination in this life
Dictum 14 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 11v):
In octavo autem lapide insculptum et depictum est ieiunium, extenuatum et pallens, et tamen inexhausti vigoris, et ad modum reverendi vultus iocundi et sereni. Ibidem eciam describitur disciplina verberum livens et rubens, textura cilicii aspera et pungens, vigilia nictitans, oracio protensis ad sidera palmis supplicans, et genuflectione crebra camelorum duriciam in genibus contraxit. Quia vero, mortificata carne, iam incipit nil terrenorum delectari, et purgato a noxio humore cupiditatis terrenorum mentis oculo, iam incipit aliquatenus Deus videri, quia: [Mt. 5:8] “Beati mundo corde quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.” Et Augustinus ait: [cf. Augustinus, Soliloquiorum libri, xxx; PL 32, 882; CSEL 89] “Crede michi, in qua hora nil terrenorum te delectat, in illa hora videbis Deum, quia inquam ita est.”
Adhuc sinister pes aliquanto alcius est elevandus et quasi in nono lapide, id est nil terrenorum delectari, firmiter figendus. Sed quia hoc parum est, in nullo terrenorum delectari, pes dexter supra sinistrum quasi in decimo lapide, scilicet in Dei contemplacione et in contemplacionis huius delectacione, firmissime figendus.
Dictum 41 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 40r):
Luce autem pura agere est sine nubilo fantasmatum intelligere, et veritatis lucem sine figurarum umbris posse contemplari, quod tanto magis possunt quanto suprascripte perspicuitati vicinantur.
Depuracio enim oculi spiritualis per terrenorum contemptum ad hunc actum prestat efficaciam. Unde Augustinus, in libro Soliloquiorum: “Cum fueris talis, ut nil terrenorum te delectet, michi crede, eodem momento eodemque puncto temporis videbis quod cupias.” [Augustinus, Soliloquiorum libri, 1, 14; PL 32, 882] Hac puritate lucis scienciam legis debet contemplari prelatus ecclesie, “ut labia eius custodiant scienciam, et legem ex ore requirant, quia angelus Domini exercituum est.” [Mal. 2:7] … Item, nullum visorum simul videtur totum, quia nulla viatorum intelligencia, eciam prelati, qui puriore utitur intelligencia, aliquid intelligibilium perfecte comprehendit.
Dictum 72 (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, fol. 54v-55r):
Et hoc “dum loquitur nobis in via,” [Luc. 24 :32] id est in huius vite decursu, quia finita hac vita, non erit ultra tempus audiendi. Loquitur, inquam, extra per litterarum apices, vel per creaturarum species. Sicut enim omnes littere scripture loquitur creatorem, sic et omnes species creature validissima et limpidissima voce eundem confitentur auctorem, et
364
earum voces liquidissime audiremus, nisi strepitu fantasmatum et vanitatum intus obsurduiscemus. [? absurduissemus MS]
Loquitur eciam intus duobus modis, uno cum per seipsum absque omni corporali similitudine mentis nostre superiori intelligencie veritatis pure et incorporee imprimit agnicionem. Altero, cum ministerio angelico in spiritu nostro, parte scilicet mentis inferiore, corporalium rerum imprimit similitudines, in quibus similitudinibus quasi in quibusdam speculis in corpore veritatis quamdam ostendit refulgenciam. Et hec duplex interior loqucio verissima est scripturarum apercio. Sic igitur loquitur nobis in via duplici sermone exteriori, et exponit scripturas duplici interiori.
Letter 90 (c.1240) (ed. Luard, 284):
…sed dirigat vos in agendis omnibus prudentia ad finem bonum per viam rectam ; provehat vos scientia ad legendum in omnibus creaturarum speciebus, quasi in quibusdam literarum apicibus, Creatorem trinum et unum; conjungat vos intelligentia angelicis spiritibus, ut secundum possibilitatem humanam imitemini conversationem angelicam; superferat vos sapientia in ipsam simplicem Deitatem, ut purgato mentis oculo ab omni rei materialis concupiscentia, ipsam lucem primam, in qua in se visa videntur omnia, cujus etiam visio est aeterna vita, pure et irreverberate contemplemini.
[While he says the vision of all things in God is eternal life, he also advocates the present
contemplation of the very same first Light as if it is possible in some way or degree. In
addition, the joining of the intelligentia to angelic spirits would likely involve special
illumination.]
Letter 124 (early 1246 962 ) (ed. Luard, 350; emphasis original):
Quod autem in fine literse vestrse nobis mandastis, videlicet quod intimaremus quid unctionis sacramentum videatur adicere dignitati, cum multi sint reges qui nullatenus unctionis munere decorentur… tandem vero dono sapientiae , quo ad dilucidam cognitionem Dei pertingitur ; ut ad exemplar ordinis mundi et ordinis angelici, secundum leges aeternas in aeterna Dei ratione descriptas, quibus regit universitatem creaturae, rempublicam sibi subjectam ordinabiliter regat tandem et ipse.
[This letter was written to King Henry III.]
962 This is the date suggested in Mantello and Goering, Letters, 366. 365
Appendix 8B: Working edition and translation of the conformity account in Dictum 91
I have followed the orthography and paragraph divisions of the Goering-Westermann transcription of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798 ( B). I have given preference to B and to Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5 ( P) in cases where the best reading is not entirely clear. I have noted all variants from the critical text except for differences in word order, spelling, and punctuation. All source citations except two are repeated from the Goering-
Westermann transcription of B.
Witnesses
B: Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798 (SC 2656), fols. 69v – 70r * P: Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5, fol. 60v R: London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II, fols. 178v-179
† L1 : Lincoln, Cathedral Chapter Library, MS 188, fols. 83v-84r ‡ L2: Lincoln, Cathedral Chapter Library, MS 202, fols. 87r-87v
* I have used the transcription of this manuscript by Edwin Westermann and Joseph Goering formerly available at www.grosseteste.com (now www.grosseteste.org). Where I had questions about the text, I consulted a facsimile of the manuscript as well, occasionally correcting the transcription. † I have used Gordon Jackson’s transcription of this manuscript. Jackson did not expand the abbreviations in his transcription, so it reflects the original as nearly as possible. ‡ I have used Gordon Jackson’s transcription of this manuscript also. Jackson did not expand the abbreviations in his transcription, so it reflects the original as nearly as possible. Where I had questions about the text, I consulted a facsimile of the manuscript as well, occasionally correcting the transcription. 366
Text
In primis, quid sit amor? Attendentes quem 1 beatus Augustinus in libro De Trintitate sic diffinit: [Augustinus, De Trinitate 8 , 10] "Amor est vita quedam duo copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet 2 et amatum." Amor namque noster Deum amans copulare appetit, et tandem perfecte copulat nos cum eo ita ut per hanc copulam anime amantis cum Deo amatore, [Eph. 4:23-24] renovemur 3 spiritu mentis nostre, et induamur “novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est in iusticia et sanctitate veritatis." [cf. Rom. 12:2; Col. 3:10] Renovati in novitate 4 sensus nostri, 5 et [cf. 2 Cor. 3:18] transformati a claritate in claritatem, in creatoris nostri similitudinem et ymaginem, et in ipsius summe pulcritudinis conformitatem, ac per hoc effecti deiformes, adherentes ipsi predicta 6 amoris copula, unus spiritus cum eo simus, 7 quia [1 Cor. 6:17] "qui adheret 8 Deo unus spiritus est."
Et 9 quis ad tantum bonum non ardentissime inhiat, quod omnes deformitates veteris hominis exuit, 10 quod renovacionem 11 post vetustatem 12 inducit, 13 quod in anima 14 renovata non partem aliquam pulcritudinis, sed omnem pulcritudinem tandem informando inscribit. 15 Sicut enim cera mollis 16 fortiter applicata sigillo recipit imitatoria 17 similitudine 18 omnium 19 formarum et figurarum in 20 sigillo inscriptarum 21 pulcritudinem, 22 sic anima per amoris copulam fortiter ad Deum 23 applicata, 24 non equali, sed cum 25 summa imitatoria 26 similitudine ipsius summe pulcritudinis 27 recipit conformitatem. Et cum apud summam pulcritudinem nulla desit pulcritudo
1 L1: quomodo 2 om. P 3 B: renovemini 4 R: sanctitate 5 P: vestri 6 R: patri dicta 7 L1L2: sumus 8 L2: adhereret 9 om. L1 10 RL 1: exuat 11 R: add . novi hominis 12 L1: add. hominis 13 R: inducat 14 P: add. sic 15 PR : inscribat 16 enim cera mollis] L2: omni cera molle 17 B: mutatoria 18 L2: similitudinem 19 L1: omni 20 om. BL 2 21 om. P; L1: inscripturarum 22 R: pulcritudine 23 R: dominum 24 L2: applicatam 25 BL 2: tamen 26 B: mutatoria 27 L1: similitudinis 367
(Ipsa enim dicit quod [Ps. 49:11] "pulcritudo agri mecum est") in anima, per amoris copulam a summa pulcritudine impressa, non erit alicuius pulcritudinis absencia, sed refulgebit in illa pulcritudo que super 28 ipsam est imitatorie. 29 Omnis vero pulcritudo parium 30 sibi refulgebit in illa 31 tanta quanta est in ipsis sibi paribus speciositate. Omnis vero inferior 32 se pulcritudo refulgebit in illa multo ampliori 33 quam sit in eisdem inferioribus decoris 34 venustate. Et cum idem sit summe pulcritudinis forma et summa sapiencia, cum anima fuerit perfecte conformis summe pulcritudini ac per hoc summe sapiencie, erit per consequens anima illustrata sapiencie plenitudine. Unde et amor, qui facit animam deiformem, facit illam summe sapiencie participacione plene sapientem. Unde et Iohannes dicit: [1 Ioan. 2:27] "Unctio 35 eius docet nos 36 de omnibus." Et per os ipsius veritatis dicitur in Iohanne 37 :38 [Ioan. 14:26] "Spiritus Sanctus, quem mittet Pater 39 in nomine meo, ille 40 vos docebit omnia 41 ,"etc. 42 Et iterum: 43 [Ioan. 16:13] "Cum autem 44 venerit ille spiritus veritatis, docebit vos 45 omnem veritatem." Et in 46 trenorum 47 primo 48 de amoris igne sic scribitur: [Lam. 1:13] "De excelso misit ignem in ossibus meis et erudivit me 49 ."
Est igitur dilectio 50 plena tocius 51 veritatis magistra; immo ipse amor est ipsa veritatis noticia. Nec moveat aliquem quod multi in via Deum amant, nec est in eis plena noticia veritatis. Quia sicut dicitur magistrum 52 docere discipulum aliquam 53 artem totam, puta rethoricam vel 54 geometriam, cum 55 adhuc tamen 56 discipulus versatur circa artis principium vel medium,
28 RL 1: supra 29 B: mutatorie 30 P: proprium corrected in another hand to parium 31 BL 2: ipsa 32 BL 2: inferiorum 33 L1: amplior 34 BL 2: decorum 35 L1: bnccio corrected to Unccio 36 om. B; RL 2: vos 37 R: Johannem 38 o L2: add. 14 capitulo 39 P: add. meus 40 B: ipse 41 om. L1 42 om. PL 1 43 o o L1: add. Io. 16 ; L2: add. capitulo 16 44 om. L1 45 omnia…docebit vos] om. R 46 RL 1: add. contemptu 47 B: trenis ; R: terrenorum 48 o om. RL 1L2 ; L2 add.in marg. 1 capitulo 49 R: add. in marg. 50 L1: add. vera 51 om. L1 52 L1 magister 53 RL 2: aliquem 54 om. R 55 P: dum 56 P: sit 368 nondum sciens artis ultimum vel finem, sic et Spiritus Sanctus 57 dicitur nos docere velud quamdam unam 58 magnam et universalem artem, omnem videlicet veritatem, cum tamen adhuc versamur circa huius 59 artis 60 primordia. Augmentata vero in nobis dilectione, augetur et huius 61 magne 62 artis noticia 63 . [cf. Deut. 6:5; Mc. 12:30; etc.] Cum vero complebitur in nobis amor, ut diligamus Deum ex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et 64 tota mente, ut videlicet omnis particula amoris nostri conversa sit totaliter in ipsum, quod finita hac peregrinacione erit in patria, erit insimul et 65 huius magne artis consummata noticia. Efficit igitur amor consummatam decoris speciem et sapiencie plenitudinem 66 secundum modum consummacionis qui potest esse in supprema facie creature racionalis.
57 om P 58 om. RL 1 59 P: huiusmodi 60 P: predicta 61 P: huiusmodi 62 om. L1 63 P: medicina 64 PR : add. ex 65 om. L1 66 B: pulcritudinem 369
Translation
In the first place, what is love? Hear how Blessed Augustine defines it in his book On the Trinity: “Love is a certain life joining two together or desiring to join them, namely, the lover and the beloved.” For our love, since it loves God, desires to join and at length does perfectly join us with him. As a result, through this union of the loving soul with God the lover we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and we put on “the new man who is created according to God in justice and holiness of truth.” Renewed in the newness of our mind, and transformed from brightness into brightness, in the likeness and image of our creator and in conformity to his highest beauty, and through this made deiform, adhering to him by the aforesaid bond of love, we may be one spirit with him. For, “the one who adheres to God is one spirit.”
And who does not most ardently desire such a good, which strips away all the deformities of the old man, which brings in renewal after old age, which inscribes in the renewed soul not some part of beauty, but—at length, by shaping her—all beauty. For just as soft wax, when a seal is applied firmly, receives by an imitating likeness the beauty of all the forms and shapes inscribed in the seal, so also the soul, when firmly applied to God through the bond of love, receives conformity, not with an equal likeness, but with the highest imitating likeness of his highest beauty. And since the highest beauty lacks no beauty (for she herself says that “the beauty of the field is with me”) in the soul that has been imprinted by the highest beauty through the bond of love no beauty will be absent, but the beauty which is above her will shine in that soul by way of imitation. Every beauty of things equal to her will shine in that soul just as it is in the things equal to her by way of beauty. Every beauty below her will shine in that soul much more than in the same inferior things by the charm of ornament. And since the form of the highest beauty and the highest wisdom are the same, when the soul is perfectly conformed to the highest beauty, and through this to the highest wisdom, she will be as a consequence illumined with the fullness of wisdom. And so love, which makes the soul deiform, makes her fully wise by participation in the highest wisdom. And so John says, “His anointing teaches us about all things.” And through the mouth of the Truth Himself in John: “The Holy Spirit, Whom the Father will send in my name, He will teach you all things,” etc. And again, “But when the Spirit of Truth comes, He will teach you all truth.” And in the first chapter of Thrones (Lamentations), concerning the fire of love, it is written thus: “He sent fire from on high into my bones and taught me.”
Therefore, full love is the teacher of all truth. Or rather, love itself is the very knowledge of truth. Nor does it change anything that many love God in this life yet the full knowledge of truth is not in them. For just as a master is said to be teaching a student an entire art, such as rhetoric or geometry, even though the student is still engaged with the beginning or middle of the art, not yet knowing the last or the end of it, so also the Holy Spirit is said to teach us, as it were, a single great and universal art, namely, all truth, even though we are still engaged with the beginnings of this art. When love has grown in us, the knowledge of this great art grows as well. And when love will be complete in us, so that we love God with the whole heart, and with the whole soul, and the whole mind, so that every particle of our love is totally turned over to Him—this will be in the fatherland when this pilgrimage has ended—then also the knowledge of this great art will be complete. Therefore love brings about the complete beauty of ornament and the fullness of
370 wisdom according to the mode of consummation which can occur in the highest face of the rational creature.
371 Conclusion
The aspectus/affectus distinction was indeed, as James McEvoy said, a “theme song” of
Robert Grosseteste’s life. 1 In fact, this study has found that to explain fully the meaning and significance of Grosseteste’s use of this distinction, one must view a cross-section of the great
Englishman’s thought. This study has explored Grosseteste’s psychology, metaphysics, soteriology, mystical theology, and epistemology—all for the purpose of explaining aspectus and affectus. But if it is true that one must study all these areas of his thought to understand this one distinction, it is also true that in grasping this single distinction one obtains a good introduction to his theology and philosophy. For some readers, this may indeed be the greatest value of this study. The aspectus/affectus distinction also unifies Grosseteste’s corpus, appearing in almost every genre of his remarkably varied works and throughout his career over a period of about forty years. Consequently, it has been necessary for this study to gather into one place many recent findings pertinent to Grosseteste’s life and work in general. Through this work of gathering, and by adding to some of these findings,2 the present study, though in no way
supplanting McEvoy’s overview, 3 has updated the study of Robert Grosseteste as an author
generally.
The primary purpose of this study has been to give a full historical and systematic
exposition of the aspectus/affectus distinction in Robert Grosseteste’s thought. To conclude this
study, therefore, I will do three things. First I will give a summary overview of my findings
pertaining to aspectus and affectus . Then I will recapitulate a few other theses I have argued that
1 McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 78. 2 I will review some of my additions in the second section below. 3 I am referring to James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste , Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 372 373 pertain to aspectus and affectus but are ancillary to my main argument. In the third section, I will explain how my findings have laid a foundation for future research in three areas: The works and doctrines of Robert Grosseteste, the historical reception of Grosseteste’s thought, and the contemporary relevance of Grosseteste’s thought.
Summary of Findings on Aspectus and Affectus
In the most general terms, this study has found that the aspectus/affectus distinction is an
important key to understanding a whole web of interrelated themes in Grosseteste’s thought. Not
only are the doctrines accompanying these terms fundamental to his psychology, but they also
have important connections to his metaphysics, his doctrine of salvation, his view of reforming
the divine image in the human person, and his theory of knowledge.
Origin of the Distinction. The aspectus/affectus distinction first appears in Robert
Grosseteste’s De Artibus Liberalibus (c.1195-1209). The English master of arts used this play on words to name the cognitive and appetitive powers of the soul, or mens. He used aspectus
(vision) to name the cognitive power and affectus (feeling or desire) for the appetitive power.
Both the wordplay and the idea of dividing the soul’s powers into these two basic categories had been common in the twelfth-century Augustinian/Cistercian tradition out of which Grosseteste takes his fundamental psychological views. One representative of this tradition that is especially helpful for understanding the background to Grosseteste’s view of the soul’s powers is the De
Spiritu et Anima . Other important direct sources in this tradition include the Bible, Augustine,
and Bernard of Clairvaux. 4
4 See chapter 2.
374
The aspectus mentis and affectus mentis do appear as a pair in Isidore of Seville, 5 but in general one can say that before Grosseteste’s time the aspectus/affectus wordplay did not have a fixed meaning. Its most common use appears to have been in reference to physical sight and the emotional response that can follow from seeing something, such as a woman. Ambrose and
Augustine used the wordplay in this general way, and a couple of passages from Augustine in particular were often quoted in medieval authors. This perhaps bears some relationship to but is not the same as Grosseteste’s usage. Various authors, including notable twelfth-century
Cistercians, sometimes used the wordplay apart from quotation in this way and in others. Yet so far I have not found a text from the twelfth-century that anticipates Grosseteste in treating aspectus as equivalent to the rational power in general (to include inner and outer perception) when paired with affectus .6
For the basic cognitive/appetitive division of the soul’s powers, there was no universal terminology in twelfth-century Christian authors. Hugh of St. Victor, Richard of St. Victor,
Bernard of Clairvaux, and Isaac of Stella each had his own pair of terms for making this division.
While I do not know precisely what Grosseteste read before writing the De Artibus
Liberalibus, it is safe to assume that Grosseteste’s sources furnished both the idea for making a
general cognitive/appetitive distinction and the terms with which to do it. In the De Spiritu et
Anima, for example, one finds both Isaac’s sensus/affectus distinction—which in content closely
resembles the distinction in the De Artibus Liberalibus —and Augustine’s statement that ratio is
the aspectus of the soul or mind. These elements occur near one another in the text but are not
5 See chapter 2. 6 The uncertain dating of some texts makes it impossible to be certain about this, however.
375 combined. It is possible that it was Grosseteste’s own idea to apply aspectus and affectus to the cognitive and appetitive powers of the soul as found in a source like the De Spiritu et Anima , but it is also possible that he followed a text or teacher presently unknown or unnoticed who had this idea first.
Basic Meaning. Beginning with the De Artibus Liberalibus and continuing through at least Letter 115 (October, 1245), Robert Grosseteste frequently used aspectus and affectus. It appears to be his default schema of the soul’s rational powers and as such it is fundamental to his psychology. 7 It also shapes his theological and philosophical views in various areas and remains
conceptually present even when Grosseteste uses other terms or omits explicit mention of the
soul’s powers. All discussions of knowledge and love in Grosseteste can and should fit within
the general discussion of aspectus and affectus .8 Some of the most important texts for
understanding aspectus and affectus, such as the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat and the conformity account in Dictum 91, do not even use aspectus and affectus as a pair.
As the general name for the cognitive power or powers of the rational soul, Grosseteste treats aspectus as capable of both perception and rational judgment. It can be equated with ratio, or reason, but it also includes the powers of intellectus (a higher cognitive power) and intelligentia or sapientia—the power for seeing God . Grosseteste uses affectus to name the appetitive and motive powers of the soul. It includes both will ( voluntas ) and the desires of the rational soul. In general, the proper action of the aspectus is knowledge and that of the affectus is love. The perfection of the aspectus is the illuminative knowledge of all things (in the way
7 See chapter 3. 8 I argued for the legitimacy of this approach in chapters 3 and 4.
376 appropriate to human nature) in the vision of God. The perfection of the affectus is the love of all things for the sake of God in accord with the created order. His basic cognitive/appetitive distinction applies to the sensitive soul as well, but Grosseteste normally uses other terms to refer to those apprehensive and appetitive powers.
Free choice is the common root of both aspectus and affectus. 9 It has a single substance or essence that carries out the actions of both reason ( aspectus ) and will ( affectus ). These two
rational powers, with all natural potencies, are in the final analysis identical with the essence or
substance of the soul for Grosseteste, as they were in the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition. The fact that the soul is the immediate principle of the actions of knowledge and love is the most likely general explanation of why he assumes aspectus and affectus must work together, although
the fact that in some works God (as truth and goodness or beauty) is treated as the single object
of both knowledge and love, even the knowledge and love of created things, is also significant.
Yet Robert does maintain a distinction ex parte rei between aspectus and affectus. They are like
the persons of the Trinity—a common principle of action and a single substance, yet still distinct
in a way that is not merely logical. 10
The Three Major Themes. Through examining aspectus, affectus, and related concepts across the genres and time periods of Grosseteste’s oeuvre, I have identified three interrelated themes that consistently accompany the aspectus/affectus distinction. Earlier scholars of Robert
Grosseteste, such as Daniel Callus, James McEvoy, Richard Southern, and James Ginther, have
9 See the discussion of De Libero Arbitrio in chapter 5. 10 See chapter 5.
377 recognized some or all of these themes in different terms, 11 but I have devised the names they now bear. 12 The three themes are the priority of the aspectus, the primacy of the affectus, and
the inseparability of knowledge and love.
The inseparability of knowledge and love describes the dynamic between aspectus and affectus according to which the powers are mutually dependent in performing their proper actions. In the early De Artibus Liberalibus (DAL), the love, or at least appetitive motion, of the affectus cannot occur without the knowledge (as perception and judgment) that occurs in the aspectus. In later works, such as Dictum 19 (c.1225-1230) , it is further true that full or perfect knowledge cannot occur without engagement of the affectus in love . In his mature works generally, Grosseteste appears to adopt the view that aspectus and affectus always operate in tandem. With the exception of initial perception, works like the Commentary on the Posterior
Analytics (c.1220-1230) and the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat (c.1243) treat knowledge and love as always occurring together. In the Commentary, this appears in the fact that one arrives at abstractive knowledge precisely to the degree that one loves God (the soul’s proper light) as revealed through His traces in created things. In various works it appears that one can only love what is known. In the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, freedom, appetite, and motive power are included in each power of cognition, so that any operation of knowledge or love necessarily involves the other. In some works, such as Dictum 91, it is even possible to reduce knowledge and love to the single operation of conforming the soul to God as truth and goodness (or beauty).
The profound theological significance of the inseparability of knowledge and love appears in
11 See chapter 1. 12 No previous scholar has spent more than several pages on the aspectus/affectus distinction, so what I have offered in this study is in some respects original.
378
Grosseteste’s Pauline commentaries, where he uses aspectus and affectus to develop an
interpretation of Paul in which knowledge and love remain inseparable at every moment of the
Christian journey—from baptism to beatitude.
The priority of the aspectus describes Grosseteste’s belief that knowledge (or perception
and judgment) must come before love or desire, at least logically. In other words, it refers to the
dependency of the affectus upon the aspectus for its operation. One cannot love what one does
not know. The priority of the aspectus is evident from the very beginning in the DAL . There he
says that the aspectus perceives and judges an object of cognition as harmful or beneficial before
the affectus responds, if all is well, with desire or flight in the degree appropriate to the object.
While the DAL and Dictum 19 are not entirely clear on the question of whether this is a temporal
or only a logical sequence, in his mature works it is at least sometimes a logical sequence
without temporal distinction—knowledge and love in the same moment. This is true, for
example, in his commentary on Galatians, where he indicates that one is free to accept or refuse
the gratuitous impression of truth in the aspectus, which, if accepted, would illumine the
aspectus and move the affectus to love . It is truth that the soul needs, reflecting the priority of
the aspectus. Yet without consent—a response of love—to the impression of truth, the
impression does not occur, implying that knowledge and love either occur in that same moment
or not at all. 13 Perhaps the most significant affirmation of this logical priority of the aspectus is
in Hexaëmeron part eight, where he says that one can only love God to the degree that one
understands the Trinity—in the sense of perceiving the Trinity’s beauty. To the degree that one
perceives the Trinity as beauty, one also loves It. This ultimately implies that knowledge and
13 See chapter 6.
379 love are correlative, with knowledge as the controlling variable. 14 When the powers are working
properly, one loves to the degree that one judges something to be beautiful.
The primacy of the affectus refers to the ability of the affectus either to contract or to expand the range of things knowable to the aspectus, as well as its prerogative to govern the operation of the aspectus. This involves a dependency of the aspectus on the affectus. There is no indication that the affectus can alter the judgment of the aspectus directly, but it does seem to be able to halt or redirect its gaze. In the Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat, for example, all of the powers of the rational soul are free, so that even cognitive perception, it seems, can be halted (or at least redirected) if the will or affectus within that power so desires. 15
The idea of the dependency of the aspectus on the affectus takes some time to develop in
Grosseteste’s thought. In the DAL, the affectus seems to have freedom to respond with desire or aversion to the degree judged appropriate by the aspectus or to remain as it was, but it does not seem to have the role of aiding or hindering cognition that it has in all later works. From The
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics onward the affectus is able to open the aspectus to higher degrees of illumination or to limit it to knowledge that scarcely moves beyond the senses.
To the degree that the affectus is ordered to the love of God, the aspectus can and does receive knowledge. Thus for Grosseteste the love of God is the key to knowledge.
The passages in which Grosseteste discusses the problem with Aristotle’s affectus express most vividly the limiting power of the affectus. If the affectus loves earthly things for
14 See chapter 7. 15 See chapter 4.
380 their own sake, rather than for the sake of God, this attachment renders the aspectus unable to
cognize without phantasms and therefore unable to conceive of timeless eternity, for example.
The ability of the affectus to aid the aspectus appears in a very practical context in
Dictum 19, in which there is a cyclical process corresponding to Ezekiel’s vision of wheels.
Knowledge of Scripture (or of God/wisdom in other works) begins in the aspectus but must sink
in to the affectus in order to issue in good works. These good works in turn re-illumine the
aspectus with a more perfect knowledge than it had before. In this way, the perfection of
knowledge depends upon the affectus , as does the progress of deification. The Christian life can
be an upward spiral into greater and greater knowledge, love, and service of God.
The ultimate primacy of the affectus appears in Dictum 91. The affectus loves God
(perceived as the highest Beauty), and this bond of love conforms the soul to God. By
conforming to God, the first form of all things who contains all exemplars, the soul comes to
possess the exemplars, and in them all truth, through an imitatory similitude. It is like how soft
wax is able to receive the beauty of all the figures in a seal. Thus in Dictum 91 love not only
teaches all truth but in fact is the very knowledge of truth. 16
While Grosseteste’s usage of aspectus and affectus has some fluidity from one text to another, the three themes, once they develop, are consistently present. Thus it is possible to speak of an aspectus/affectus doctrine, and I have done so in this study. Grosseteste naturally leaves some questions unanswered, but at various junctures in this study I have suggested what
16 See chapter 8.
381 his answers could be. 17 On the whole, it has been surprisingly easy to develop Grosseteste’s scattered discussions into an internally coherent system. This fact underscores not only the importance of aspectus and affectus to Grosseteste, but also his profound brilliance. When he wrote of the soul’s aspectus and affectus, he drew from a deep well of insight into both speculative truth and human experience.
Other Contributions of this Study
In the course of this study it has been necessary at certain points to make contributions to
the study of Robert Grosseteste that have relevance beyond their application to aspectus and
affectus . For the convenience of other researchers I now will review some of these contributions.
In the introduction I noticed two manuscripts that have not previously been included in lists of the manuscripts of Robert Grosseteste’s Dicta. I also attempted to compile a complete list of Grosseteste’s extant works. While this list probably is not perfect, it is the most complete list of which I am aware.
In chapter two I argued that Grosseteste draws some of the main themes of his psychology from the Augustinian/Cistercian tradition throughout his career. I expanded this idea in chapter five by arguing that Grosseteste is fundamentally Augustinian in his metaphysics of the soul. While these observations are not original, I have placed them on a broader textual basis than previous studies. Grasping these features of Grosseteste’s psychology is important for understanding the problem discussed in chapter four—why he is so blissfully inconsistent in the ways he schematizes the soul’s powers. It is because he, like the twelfth-century authors he
17 I have chosen to keep such conjectures to a minimum in this concluding overview. I did not want to risk presenting a distorted picture of Grosseteste’s thought. One who wants the full systematic synthesis may find chapters 5, 7, and 8 to contain most of the synthetic material. It would be best to read the whole study.
382 imitates, primarily divides the powers of the soul for practical and spiritual reasons, not because he thinks he is giving a map of accidents distinct from the substance of the soul. To Grosseteste, at least for the rational powers, but probably for all natural powers, the soul is the immediate principle of its actions.
In chapter two I also corrected a common misconception—that Philip the Chancellor attributed the De Spiritu et Anima to Isaac of Stella. Rather, Philip seems to have had access to both Isaac’s Epistola Ad Alcherum and the De Spiritu et Anima. The former he attributed to
Isaac, and the latter he consistently attributed to Augustine.
In chapter three I gave a detailed analysis of some important textual variants in the manuscripts of the De Artibus Liberalibus. Also of textual significance is some editorial work I have done in the appendices. I have given a working edition of Dictum 32 in an appendix to chapter five. Also worthy of notice is my working edition and translation of the conformity account in Dictum 91, which may be found in an appendix to chapter eight. This edition is important because it corrects a series of wrong readings in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley
798. Bodley 798 reads mutatoria or mutatorie instead of imitatoria or imitatorie in three places, profoundly changing the meaning of the conformity account. The Goering-Westermann transcription of Bodley 798 is the text most Grosseteste scholars use for the Dicta, so this correction is significant.
In chapter six I made some observations concerning Grosseteste’s doctrines of justification and merit. Although I did not make the connection explicit there, my observations could be used to show that Grosseteste anticipated the doctrine of the Council of Trent in
383 important ways. This would provide support to the argument that Grosseteste was not the proto- reformer scholars once imagined him to be. 18
In chapter seven I offered an expanded account of Grosseteste’s doctrine of deification.
While James Ginther had covered the topic well, his focus was on the ecclesial aspect of deification. I approached the topic from the perspective of the reformation of the divine image in the individual human, placing human nature in its proper place relative to other created natures.
In this context it appears that the individual Christian’s journey to union with God includes growing in conformity to God in a way that is both linear and cyclical. The divine image is restored by degrees as the individual first knows God, then loves, then does good works, which in turn enable the mind to reach higher knowledge of God.
In chapter eight I expanded Christina Van Dyke’s account of Grosseteste’s doctrine of illumination. While Van Dyke recognized what I call common illumination, she thought that what I call special illumination was reserved for a select few. I have offered an account in which
Grosseteste countenances several illuminative possibilities. There is common illumination, in which God provides divine light for obtaining knowledge through abstraction. In the order of nature this involves an unwitting knowledge and love of God through his traces imprinted in created things, but in the order of grace it involves an explicit knowledge and love of God through which the soul can ascend to higher levels of contemplation. Also in the order of grace is special illumination, in which the soul knows things through seeing their exemplars that exist in God. This can be equivalent to beatitude, but in the present life it can also occur by degrees in other modes. For example, there is a special illumination mediated by angels, and there is also a
18 See McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 62-75. McEvoy titles that chapter “The Myth of the Proto-Reformer.”
384 special illumination enjoyed by all Christians to the degree that they love God. In that chapter I also showed how Grosseteste’s illumination account is coherent with his Dictum 91 conformity account of knowledge and love.
Future Research Directions
In addition to advancing the study of Robert Grosseteste in the ways I have described, this study has laid foundations for multiple future lines of research. These research possibilities fall into three general categories. First I will discuss future directions for the study of
Grosseteste’s works and doctrines. Then I will discuss what this study means for examining the historical reception of Grosseteste’s thought. Last I will discuss the relevance of this study to contemporary appropriations of Grosseteste’s thought.
The Works and Doctrines of Robert Grosseteste. This study has uncovered a need for further studies in the works and doctrines of Robert Grosseteste. I mentioned two such desiderata in the introduction. The frequent use of aspectus and affectus in the commentary on
Romans possibly attributed to Robert Grosseteste calls for reconsideration of whether this work,
now generally regarded as spurious, may be a genuine work from the stylus of our author. The
De Anima ascribed to Grosseteste, although not containing the aspectus/affectus distinction, also awaits reconsideration as possibly authentic. I intend to undertake both of these studies myself in the near future.
There is also a need for further studies in the doctrines of Grosseteste. The vision of spiritual growth I traced in chapter seven is fascinating. The question of how to become more like God was a major interest for Grosseteste, and it will require something like a book-length study to take full account of all the texts relevant to this area of his thought. As in psychology,
385
Grosseteste does not give just one account but many different accounts that share common themes. I believe chapter seven is a good start towards such a study, but there is much more work to be done. The fruit of such a study would be immense. It would give a picture of how the Franciscans were being formed at Oxford and how Grosseteste was attempting to form clergy in the diocese of Lincoln. Given the frequent movement of Franciscans between Oxford and
Paris in the later decades of Grosseteste’s life, such a study may reveal connections to Parisian
Franciscans like Bonaventure as well.
Another project that someone needs to undertake is a full systematic and historical study of Grosseteste’s theory of illumination. Previous studies have tended to focus only upon the De
Veritate and the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, but it has appeared in chapter eight of the present study that Grosseteste’s other writings, such as the Dicta and his letters, also provide
important data, especially concerning the possibilities for special illumination in the present life.
A future study will need take these texts into account, as well as the traditional ones. It should
also explore further the relationship between illumination and the soul’s conformity to God,
which I have treated only briefly. Such a study would have great value for understanding other
important theories of illumination in the thirteenth century, such as that of St. Bonaventure.
The Historical Reception of Grosseteste’s Thought. This study has also provided a foundation for inquiries into the historical reception of Grosseteste’s thought. James McEvoy said of Grosseteste, with what seems a note of sadness, “no school formed around his major impulses.” 19 Obviously this is true, if to found a school of thought one has to create a distinctly
original synthesis of knowledge that is consciously adopted and developed by many thinkers.
19 McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 138.
386
For some reason, perhaps related to Grosseteste’s friction with the Pope, 20 the teacher of the
Oxford Franciscans did not inspire any cohort of scholars to call themselves “Grossetestians.”
(Maybe it was just the name.) There are other ways of exerting influence, however. In fact,
much of Franciscan thought from the middle to the end of the thirteenth century reverberates
with ideas that Grosseteste strongly defended (and sometimes perhaps originated). Richard
Dales 21 and Timothy Noone 22 have both suggested that Grosseteste influenced Bonaventure on
the question of the eternity of the world. Daniel Horan has noticed that Grosseteste very well
may have influenced John Duns Scotus on the absolute predestination of Christ. 23 At the very
least, Duns Scotus used Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics and considered him to be an authority of some weight. 24
Richard Southern has suggested, “When all his works have been critically edited, as one
day they will be, Grosseteste will come into full view, with a degree of detail not yet available,
and with a range of intellectual vision not yet fully explored, as one of the giants of medieval
Europe.” 25 I think Southern’s prophecy is likely to come true, and giants tend to influence those around them, whether through imitation or opposition. While we wait for these editions to be finished (or while we work on them ourselves), I suggest that further comparisons of Grosseteste
20 For an overview and analysis of Grosseteste’s friction with the Pope, see McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 31-50. 21 Dales, Medieval Discussions, 96. 22 Timothy B. Noone, “The Originality of St. Thomas’s Position on the Philosophers and Creation ,” The Thomist 60, 2 (April, 1996): 292. 23 Daniel P. Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation? Reconsidering the History of the Absolute Predestination of Christ in Light of Robert Grosseteste,” The Heythrop Journal 52 (2011): 386-387. 24 I have written a study that I hope to publish in the near future illustrating Scotus’s use of Grosseteste. It is entitled “Scotus and Grosseteste on Phantasms and Illumination.” 25 Southern, “Richard Dales,” 13.
387 with Bonaventure and other Franciscan thinkers are likely to uncover more and more resonance and evidence of influence.
The present study has furnished a useful way for the study of Grosseteste’s influence on later thinkers to move forward. Several thinkers contemporary with and subsequent to
Grosseteste used aspectus and affectus to name the cognitive and appetitive powers of the soul in general. 26 Given the seeming lack of this practice before Grosseteste, and given the fact, observed in chapter one, that Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus clearly get aspectus and affectus directly from Grosseteste, the proliferation of aspectus and affectus in the thirteenth century is highly significant. Although each case will have to be considered individually, it is likely that many or perhaps all of these thinkers owe their aspectus/affectus distinctions to
Grosseteste, whether directly or indirectly. In some cases, the degree to which they approximate
Grosseteste’s doctrine may be indicative—considered together with other factors—of how nearly each thinker was associated with Grosseteste. In this age of searchable electronic texts, aspectus and affectus may prove to be a useful tool for investigating various relations of influence and dependency, especially at the initial stage of searching for possible connections.
A useful supplement to the present study would be an investigation of the reception of
Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus distinction in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Since both
Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus discuss aspectus and affectus in their Sentence commentaries, 27 it would be desirable for such a study to delve into Sentence commentaries that
26 These thinkers include at least John of Forde, Alexander of Hales, Richard Fishacre, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Bonaventure, Roger Bacon, Thomas of York, and Robert Kilwardby. 27 Richard Fishacre, In Sent. (Oxford, Balliol College, MS 57, fol.4va and fol. 128va), quoted in Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 22, n.1 and 30, n. 1; Richard Rufus of Cornwall, In Sent. (Oxford, Balliol College, MS 62,
388 remain unedited in addition to searching the standard databases. If the discussion occurs in the same place in multiple commentaries, it may be possible to trace the development of aspectus/affectus theory among the masters. At the very least, such a study would add to our present understanding of the reception of Grosseteste’s thought among his immediate and near successors at Oxford and among their contemporaries at Paris.
An additional historical study of value would compare Grosseteste’s distinction between aspectus and affectus in the De Libero Arbitrio to similar discussions in Richard Rufus and John
Duns Scotus. As I mentioned in chapter five, it is worth asking the question whether Grosseteste may have anticipated Rufus in Rufus’s anticipation of Scotus’s formal distinction.
The Contemporary Relevance of Grosseteste’s Thought. Robert Grosseteste’s influence is not limited to the Middle Ages. He is also influencing artists and scientists in the present.
Through the interdisciplinary collaborations of the Ordered Universe Project, Grosseteste’s works have inspired new contributions to both art and science. 28 Grosseteste’s aspectus/affectus
distinction has been a part of the contemporary discussion. In a recent paper, scientist and
Ordered Universe researcher Tom McLeish raised the question of whether Grosseteste’s
aspectus/affectus distinction may have value for thinking about the process of scientific creativity. 29 He suggested that there may be resonance between Grosseteste’s thought and the
fols. 160vb-162rb), cited in Callus, “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar,” 22, n.1 and 30, n. 2. I have it on good authority that Robert Kilwardby discusses aspectus and affectus in his questions on the Sentences as well. 28 For the contributions to science, see https://ordered-universe.com/ordered-universe-publications/. For the contributions to art, see https://ordered-universe.com/the-projection-studio/. 29 Tom McLeish, “An Exploration of Scientific Creativity Through the Mirror of Aspectus and affectus ,” paper presented at the conference “ Aspectus and Affectus: Robert Grosseteste , Understanding and Feeling,” held at Georgetown University, March 31-April 1, 2017.
389 contemporary work of Iain McGilchrist. 30 Now that I have explained the meaning and significance of Grosseteste’s aspectus /affectus doctrine, it is possible for a future study to
compare Grosseteste and McGilchrist in depth to determine what sort of resonance there may be.
Whether Grosseteste can align with McGilchrist or not, his doctrine also may have
relevance to contemporary Christian theological education. It is often the case that theology is
taught as a purely academic discipline, as though the initial impression in the aspectus is
sufficient. Appeals to the affectus are highly suspect in some circles. But Grosseteste reminds us of something that good teachers have known all along. Other considerations being equal, students who are really invested in their subject achieve higher levels of competency. The way a student gets invested in theology as an academic subject is through loving God. Theological education will be most effective when it engages both aspectus and affectus. If this study were to inspire some educator to open a new discussion about the value of forming the affectus in theological education, I think Robert Grosseteste would be very pleased.
30 See Iain McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2009).
List of Abbreviations
CCCM: Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio mediaevalis. Turnhout: Brepols, 1966- .
CCSL: Corpus Christianorum: Series latina. Turnhout: Brepols, 1953- .
CSEL: Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum. Vienna: Hölder, Pichler, Tempsky, 1866- .
MGH SS : Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores. Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani,1826-2000.
PL: Patrologiae cursus completus: Series latina. Paris: Migne, 1844-1855.
SChr. : Sources Chrétiennes. Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 1942- .
390
Bibliography
Manuscripts
Bologna, Biblioteca dell’Archiginnasio, MS A.983 1
Lincoln, Cathedral Chapter Library, MS 188 2
Lincoln, Cathedral Chapter Library, MS 202 3
London, British Library, MS Lansdowne 458
London, British Library, MS Royal 6.E.V
London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.II
Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798 4
Prague, National Museum, MS XII.E.5
Wroclaw (Breslau), University Library of Wroclaw, MS I.F.567
Bibliographies
Gieben, Servus. “Bibliographia Universa Roberti Grosseteste ab an. 1473 ad an. 1969 .” Collectanea Franciscana 39 (1969): 362-418.
_____. “Robertus Grosseteste: Bibliographia 1970-1991.” In Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship , edited by James McEvoy, 415-431. Instrumenta Patristica XXVII. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995.
Flood, John (ed.). “Publications (2000- ).” In The international Robert Grosseteste Society website.
Ginther, James, et. al. “Bibliography.” In The Electronic Grosseteste website. Previously
1 As transcribed by James Ginther for the Electronic Grosseteste: www.grosseteste.com (now www.grosseteste.org). 2 As transcribed in the hand of Gordon Jackson. 3 As transcribed in the hand of Gordon Jackson, unless otherwise noted. 4 As transcribed by Westermann and Goering for the Electronic Grosseteste, unless otherwise noted. 391
Editions 5
Adam Marsh. The Letters of Adam Marsh. Edited and translated by C.H. Lawrence. 2 volumes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006-2010.
Anselm. S. Anselmi Opera Omnia. Edited by F. S. Schmitt. 6 volumes. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1938, 1946.
Avicenna Latinus. Liber De Anima. Edited by S. Van Riet. 2 volumes. Leiden: Brill, 1968-1972.
Augustine. Regula Tertia vel Praeceptum. Edited by Luc Verheijen. In La Règle de Saint Augustin , Volume 1: Tradition Manuscrite, 417-437. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1967.
Bernard of Clairvaux. Sancti Bernardi Opera. 8 volumes. Edited by J. Leclercq, C.H. Talbot, and H.M. Rochais. Rome: Cistercian Editions, 1957-1977.
Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia. Edited by K. Elliger and W. Rudolph. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1967, 1977, and 1997.
Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam versionem, Fourth Revised Edition. Edited by Robert Weber. Stuttgart: Deutsch Bibelgesellschaft, 1969, 1994.
Biblia Sacra Vulgatæ editionis, Sixti V Pontificis Maximi jussu recognita et edita. Roma: Typographis Vaticanis, 1598. Electronic edition by The Clementine Vulgate Project, 2000-2013: http://vulsearch.sourceforge.net/index.html.
Bonaventure. Collationes in Hexameron et Bonaventuriana Quaedam Selecta. Edited by R.P. Ferdinandus Delorme. Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi Tomus 8. Florence: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1934.
_____. Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae S. R. E. Episcopi Cardinalis Opera Omnia . 10 folio volumes. Edited by PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura. Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi): Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902. (abbreviated OO in the notes)
Chronicon de Lanercost:1201-1346. Edited by Joseph Stevenson. Edinburgh: Impressum Edinburgi, 1839.
Collectarium-Pontificale Baturichi Ratisbonensis Episcopi. Edited by Franz Unterkircher. Spicilegium Friburgense 8. Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1962.
5 I omit here works edited in the series indicated in the list of abbreviations. I have not followed this rule in the case of Grosseteste, however. I list each work of Grosseteste that I have cited in this study, devoting a separate entry to each. 392
Decretum Magistri Gratiani (Concordia Discordantium Canonum). Edited by Aemilius Friedberg. Corpus Iuris Canonici, Tome 1. Leipzig: B Tauchnitz, 1879.
Gerald of Wales (Giraldus Cambrensis). Opera. 8 volumes. Edited by J. S. Brewer, J. F. Dimock and G. F. Warner. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1861-1891.
Hoskin, Philippa M., ed. Robert Grosseteste as Bishop of Lincoln: The Episcopal Rolls, 1235- 1253. Suffolk, UK, Rochester, NY: Lincoln Record Society, 2015.
Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World. Edited by Richard C. Dales and Omar Argerami. Leiden: Brill, 1991.
Novum Testamentum Graece. 27 revidierte Auflage. Edited by Aland, et al. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1898, 1993.
Peter the Venerable. Letters. Edited by Giles Constable. The Letters of Peter the Venerable. Volume 1. Harvard Historical Studies 78. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967.
Philip the Chancellor. Summa de Bono. Edited by Nicolai Wicki. Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de Bono. Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta volume 2. 2 Parts. Berne: Editions A. Francke SA, 1985.
Plato. Platonis Opera . Edited by John Burnet. 5 volumes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1905.
The Prose Salernitan Questions. Edited by Brian Lawn. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi V. London: The British Academy, 1979.
Ratherius Veroniensis (Leodiensis siue Lobiensis). Notae autographicae in ms. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 149/1195 8. Edited by François Dolbeau. « Ratheriana III. Notes sur la culture patristique de Rathier. » Sacris Erudiri 29 (1986): 151-221.
Richard Fishacre. Commentary on the Sentences (Selections concerning the soul). Edited by Raymond James Long. “The Problem of the Soul in Richard Fishacre’s Commentary on the Sentences. ” PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1968.
_____. In Secundum Librum Sententiarum, Part 1: Prol., Dist. 1-20 . Edited by R. James Long. Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2008.
_____. In Secundum Librum Sententiarum, Part 2: Dist. 21-44, Appendices . Edited by R. James Long. Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011.
393
Richard Rufus of Cornwall. Scriptum Super Metaphysicam, Bk. 12, Dist. 2. Edited by Timothy Noone. “An Edition and Study of the Scriptum Super Metaphysicam , bk. 12, dist. 2: A Work Attributed to Richard Rufus of Cornwall.” PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1987.
Rituale Monasterii Biburgensis. Edited by W. von Arx. In Spicilegium Friburgense 14, 155-289. Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1970.
Robert Grosseteste. Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy. Edited by Declan Lawell, James McEvoy, and James McQuade. Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Lincolniensis Versio Caelestis Hierarchiae Pseudo-Dionysii Areopagitae Cum Scholiis Ex Graeco Sumptis Necnon Commentariis Notulisque Eiusdem Lincolniensis. CCCM 268. Turnhout: Brepols, 2015.
_____. Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy. Edited by James S. McQuade. “Robert Grosseteste's Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.” PhD diss., Queen’s University, Belfast, 1961.
_____. Commentary on the Mystical Theology. Edited and translated by James McEvoy. In Mystical Theology: The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia, edited, translated, and with introductions by James McEvoy, 60-120 (even-numbered pages). Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 3. Paris, Leuven, Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2003.
_____. Commentary on the Physics. Edited by Richard C. Dales. Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1963.
_____. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (CPA) . Edited by Pietro Rossi. Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981.
_____. De Artibus Liberalibus (DAL) . Edited by Ludwig Baur. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 1-6. Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
_____. De Cessatione Legalium. Edited by Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VII. Oxford, London: The British Academy, 1986.
_____. De Decem Mandatis. Edited by Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi X. Oxford, New York: The British Academy, 1987.
_____. De Dotibus. Edited by Joseph Goering. “The De Dotibus of Robert Grosseteste.” Mediaeval Studies 44 (1982): 83-109.
_____. De Finitate Motus et Temporis. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 101-105 . Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
394
_____. De Generatione Sonorum. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 7-9. Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
_____. De Libero Arbitrio (recensio prima). Edited by Neil Lewis. “The First Recension of Robert Grosseteste’s De Libero Arbitrio.” Mediaeval Studies 53 (1991): 1-88.
_____. De Libero Arbitrio (recensio secunda). Edited by Ludwig Baur. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 150-241 . Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
_____. De Motu Supercaelestium. Edited by Cecilia Panti. In Moti, Virtù e Motori Celesti nella Cosmologia di Roberto Grossatesta: Studio ed edizione dei trattati De Sphera, De Cometis, De Motu Supercelestium, 329-345. Firenze: SISMEL, 2001.
_____. De Ordine Emanandi Causatorum a Deo. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 147-150 . Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
_____. De Potentia et Actu. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 126-129 . Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
_____. De Statu Causarum. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 120-125 . Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
_____. De Veritate. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 130-143 . Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
_____. Deus Est (De Confessione II). Edited by Siegfried Wenzel. “Robert Grosseteste's Treatise on Confession, Deus est.” Franciscan Studies 30 (1970): 218-293.
_____. Dicta 1-50. Edited by Edwin Jergen Westermann. “An Edition, with Introduction and notes of ‘Dicta’ I-L of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253.” PhD diss., University of Colorado at Boulder, 1942.
_____. Dictum 19. Edited by James Ginther. “Natural Philosophy and Theology at Oxford in the Early Thirteenth Century: An Edition and Study of Robert Grosseteste’s Inception Sermon ( Dictum 19).” Medieval Sermon Studies 44 (2000): 108-134.
_____. Dictum 54 . Edited by Joseph Goering and Randall Rosenfeld. “The Tongue is a Pen: Robert Grosseteste’s Dictum 54 and Scribal Technology.” Journal of Medieval Latin 12 (2002): 114-140.
_____. Dictum 60. Edited by Servus Gieben. “Traces of God in Nature According to Robert Grosseteste. With the Text of the Dictum, ‘ Omnis Creatura Speculum Est.’” Franciscan Studies 24 (1964): 144-158. 395
_____. Ecce Nunc Dies Salutis. Edited by Suzanne Paul. "Ecce Nunc Dies Salutis (2Cor 6:2): A Sermon on Penitence Attributed to Robert Grosseteste." In Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition, edited by Maura O'Carrol, 103-123. Roma: Istituto storico dei Cappuccini, 2003.
_____. Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat. Edited by James McEvoy. “Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Human Nature with the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat .” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 47 (1980): 131-187.
_____. Expositio in epistolam Sancti Pauli ad Galatas. Edited by James McEvoy. In Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , edited by James McEvoy, 41-175. CCCM 130. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995.
_____. Ex Rerum Initiatarum. Edited by Servus Gieben. “Robert Grosseteste on Preaching. With the Edition of the Sermon ‘ Ex Rerum Initiatarum’ on Redemption.” Collectanea Franciscana 37 (1967): 100-141.
_____. Glossarum in Sancti Pauli Epistolas fragmenta . Edited by Richard Dales. In Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , edited by James McEvoy, 185-231. CCCM 130. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995.
_____. Hexaëmeron. Edited by Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VI. Oxford, New York: The British Academy, 1982, 1990.
_____. Letter 1 (De Unica Forma Omnium and De Intelligentiis). Edited by Ludwig Baur. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 106-119 . Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
_____. Opuscula Quaedam (selected Dicta, Letters, and other documents). Edited by Edward Brown. In Appendix ad Fasciculum Rerum Expetendarum et Fugiendarum, 250-414. London: Richard Chiswell, 1690.
_____. Qui Manet in Caritate. Edited by Edward B. King. “Durham Cathedral MS A. III. 12 and the Corpus of Grosseteste's Homiletical Works.” In Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship , edited by James McEvoy, 277-288. Instrumenta Patristica XXVII. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995.
_____. Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Quondam Lincolniensis Epistolae. Edited by Henry Richards Luard. Rolls Series. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1861.
_____. Sermons from Durham, Cathedral Library, MS A.III.12. Edited by Suzanne Paul. “An Edition and Study of Selected Sermons of Robert Grosseteste.” Volume 2. Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 2002.
396
_____. Sermo 44/Dictum 10. Edited and translated by C. William Marx. In The Devil’s Rights and the Redemption in the Literature of Medieval England, 155-159. Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 1995.
_____. Super Psalterium 1-36. Edited by Elizabeth M. Streitz. “Robert Grosseteste: Commentarius in Psalmos, I -XXXVI.” PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1996.
_____. Super Psalterium 100. Edited by James R. Ginther. In Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235, 193-211 . Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.
_____. Tabula. Edited by Philipp W. Rosemann. In Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis , edited by James McEvoy, 245-320. CCCM 130. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995.
_____. Templum Dei. Edited by Joesph Goering and F.A.C. Mantello. Toronto: PIMS, 1984.
_____. Tota Pulchra Es. Edited by Servus of St. Anthonis [Servus Gieben]. “Robert Grosseteste and the Immaculate Conception. With the Text of the Sermon Tota Pulchra Es. ” Collectanea Franciscana 28 (1958): 211-227.
_____. Translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, with Commentary. Edited by H.P.F. Mercken. Eustratius in Librum I Ethicorum Nicomacheorum. In The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI, 1 (1973): 1-193.
Robert Grosseteste (?). De Anima. Edited by Ludwig Baur. Tractatus beati Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis episcopi de anima. In Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 242-274 . Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
_____. Lecturae in Epistolam ad Romanos V-XVI Roberto Grosseteste Adscriptae. Edited by Elwood E. Mather, III. PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1987.
Robert Kilwardby. De Natura Theologiae. Edited by Fridericus Stegmüller. Opuscula et Textus Historiam Ecclesiae eiusque Vitam atque Doctrinam Illustrantia; Series Scholastica XVII. Münster: Aschendorff, 1935.
_____. De Ortu Scientiarum. Edited by Albert G. Judy. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi IV. Oxford : The British Academy and The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1976.
Septuaginta. Edited by Alfred Rahlfs. 2 volumes in 1. Stuttgart: Deutsch Bibelgesellschaft, 1935, 1979.
Thomas Aquinas. Catena Aurea in quattuor evangelia. Edited by P. Angelici Guarienti. 2 volumes. Taurini: Marietti, 1953. 397
_____. Questions on the Soul [Quaestiones de Anima]. Edited by B.-C. Bazán. Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima. Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P. M. Edita Cura et Studio Fratrum Praedicatorum Tomus XXIV, 1. Roma: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1996.
_____. Summa Theologica (Summa Theologiae ). Edited by the Leonine Commission. Divi Thomae Aquinatis Ordinis Praedicatorum Doctoris Angelici A Leone XIII P. M. Gloriose Regnante Catholicarum Scholarum Patroni Coelestis Renunciati Summa Theologica ad Emendatiores Editiones Impressa et Accuratissime Recognita. 4 volumes. Rome: Typographia Senatus, 1886-1887.
Thomas of Eccleston. Fratris Thomae vulgo dicti de Eccleston Tractatus de Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam. Edited by A.G. Little. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1951.
Thomas of York. Sapientiale book 7. Edited by Paul Michael Byrne. “The Doctrine of the Soul in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York: Study and Text.” 3 volumes. PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1955.
Vita Leonis IX (Die Touler Vita). Edited by H.-G. Krause. In Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum 70, 80-242. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1999.
Translations
Adam Marsh. The Letters of Adam Marsh. Edited and translated by C.H. Lawrence. 2 volumes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006-2010.
Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle, edited by W. D. Ross. 2 volumes. Chicago, London, Toronto: William Benton, 1952.
Bonaventure. The Works of St. Bonaventure . Translated by Jose de Vinck. 5 volumes. Paterson, NJ: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1960-1970.
Robert Grosseteste. Commentary on the Mystical Theology. Edited and translated by James McEvoy. In Mystical Theology: The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia, edited, translated, and with introductions by James McEvoy, 61-121 (odd-numbered pages). Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 3. Paris, Leuven, Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2003.
_____. The Complete Dicta in English. Edited and translated by Gordon Jackson. 13 miniature volumes. Lincoln, UK: Asgill Press, 2003-2006.
398
_____. The Letters of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln. Translated with Introduction and Annotation by F.A.C. Mantello and Joseph Goering. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010.
_____. On The Cessation of the Laws. Translated by Stephen M. Hildebrand. The Fathers of the Church Mediaeval Continuation 13. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012.
_____. On the Six Days of Creation. A Translation of the Hexaëmeron by C. F. J. Martin. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VI(2). Oxford, New York: The British Academy, 1996.
Thomas Aquinas. Questions on the Soul [Quaestiones de Anima]. Translated with an Introduction by James H. Robb. Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation 27. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984.
_____. Summa Theologica (Summa Theologiae ). Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947.
William of Saint Thierry. The Mirror of Faith. Translated by Thomas X. Davis, with an Introduction by E. Rozanne Elder. Cistercian Fathers Series 15. Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1979.
Secondary Literature
Baur, Ludwig. Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste Bischofs von Lincoln († 1253). Münster: Aschendorff, 1917.
_____. Prolegomena to Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, 1*-181*. Münster: Aschendorff, 1912.
Bieniak, Magdalena. The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200-1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries. Ancient and Medieval Philosophy De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series 1, volume 42. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2010.
Boquet, Damien. L’ordre de l’affect au Moyen Ȃge: Autour de l’anthropologie affective d’Aelred de Rievaulx. Caen, France: Publications du CRAHM, 2005.
Byrne, Paul Michael. “The Doctrine of the Soul in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York: Study and Text.” 3 volumes. PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1955.
Callus, Daniel. “The Date of Grosseteste’s Translations and Commentaries on the Pseudo- Dionysius and the ‘Nicomachean Ethics.’” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 14 (1947): 186-210.
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_____. “The Oxford Career of Robert Grosseteste.” Oxoniensia 10 (1945): 42-72.
_____. “Philip the Chancellor and the De Anima ascribed to Robert Grosseteste.” Medieval and Renaissance Studies 1, 1 (1943): 105-127.
_____. “Robert Grosseteste as Scholar.” In Robert Grosseteste: Scholar and Bishop, Essays in Commemoration of the Seventh Centenary of his Death, edited by D.A. Callus, 1-69. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955.
Cazes, Denis. La Théologie Sapientielle de Guillaume de Saint Thierry. Studia Anselmiana 148. Roma: Pontificio Ateneo Sant’Anselmo, 2009.
Cessario, Romanus. The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics. Second Edition. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009, 2013. Cheney, Christopher Robert. “King John and the Papal Interdict.” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 31, 2 (1948): 295-317.
Chenu, Marie-Dominique. La Théologie au Douzième Siècle. Paris: J. Vrin, 1957.
Cooper, Travis James. “One Truth or Many Truths? Two Medieval Accounts of Truth: Anselm of Canterbury and Robert Grosseteste.” PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 2012.
Corbett, Edward P.J. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Creek, Sister Mary Immaculate. “The Sources and Influence of Robert Grosseteste’s Le Chasteau d’Amour .” PhD diss., Yale University, 1941.
Cross, Richard. The Medieval Christina Philosophers: An Introduction. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014.
Cuff, Andrew. “The Influence of Bernard of Clairvaux’s Analysis of Human Freedom on the Cistercian Masters of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries.” Ph.D. diss, The Catholic Universty of America, 2018.
Dales, Richard. Introduction to Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Lincolniensis Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Edited by Richard C. Dales, v-xxxii. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1963.
_____. Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World. Leiden: Brill, 1990.
_____. The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century. Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995.
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Dales, Richard and Servus Gieben. Introduction to Robert Grosseteste. Hexaëmeron. Edited by Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben, xi-xxix. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi VI. Oxford, New York: The British Academy, 1982, 1990.
Davis, Thomas X. Appendix to William of Saint Thierry, The Mirror of Faith. Translated by Thomas X. Davis, with an Introduction by E. Rozanne Elder, 93-95. Cistercian Fathers Series 15. Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1979.
Dreyer, Elizabeth Ann. “Affectus in St. Bonaventure’s Description of the Journey of the Soul to God.” PhD diss., Marquette University, 1982.
Ellis, Henry and Francis Douce. A Catalogue of the Lansdowne Manuscripts in the British Museum. London, 1819.
Gieben, Servus [Servus of St. Anthonis]. “Le potenze naturali dell'anima umana secondo alcuni testi inediti di Roberto Grossatesta.” In L’Homme et son destin, d’après les penseurs du Moyen Age. Actes du Premier Congrès international de philosophie médiévale, 437-443. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1960.
_____.“Robert Grosseteste and the Immaculate Conception. With the Text of the Sermon Tota Pulchra Es. ” Collectanea Franciscana 28 (1958): 211-227.
_____. “Robert Grosseteste at the Papal Curia, Lyons 1250: Edition of the Documents.” Collectanea Franciscana 41 (1971): 340-393.
_____.“Robert Grosseteste on Preaching. With the Edition of the Sermon ‘ Ex Rerum Initiatarum’ on Redemption.” Collectanea Franciscana 37 (1967): 100-141.
Gilson, Etienne. « Pourquoi Saint Thomas a Critiqué Saint Augustin . » In Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age Volume 1, 5-127. Paris: J. Vrin, 1926.
Ginther, James R. Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.
_____. “Natural Philosophy and Theology at Oxford in the Early Thirteenth Century: An Edition and Study of Robert Grosseteste’s Inception Sermon ( Dictum 19).” Medieval Sermon Studies 44 (2000): 108-134.
_____. “The Super Psalterium in Context.” In Editing Robert Grosseteste: Papers Given at the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, University of Toronto, 3-4 November, 2000, edited by Evelyn A. Mackie and Joseph Goering, 31-60. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2003.
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_____. “The Super Psalterium of Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1170-1253): A Scholastic Psalms Commentary as a Source for Medieval Ecclesiology.” Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1995.
Goering, Joseph W. “The De Dotibus of Robert Grosseteste.” Mediaeval Studies 44 (1982): 83- 109.
_____. “Robert Grosseteste’s Dicta: The State of the Question.” In Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies, edited by John Flood, James R. Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering, 64-86. Toronto: PIMS, 2013.
_____. “When and Where did Grosseteste Study Theology?” In Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship, edited by James McEvoy, 17-51. Instrumenta Patristica XXVII. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995.
Grassi, Carlo Albert. “The Doctrine of Creation in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York: Study and Text.” 3 volumes. PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1952.
Greenough, J. B. and J. H. Allen. Allen and Greenough’s Latin Grammar, Revised and Enlarged Edition. Boston and London: Ginn and Company, 1899.
Hasse, Dag Nikolaus. Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160-1300. Warburg Institute Studies and Texts 1. London, Turin: The Warburg Institute, 2000.
Hildebrand, Stephen. Introduction to Robert Grosseteste, On The Cessation of the Laws, trans. Stephen Hildebrand, 3-24. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012.
Horan, Daniel P. “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation? Reconsidering the History of the Absolute Predestination of Christ in Light of Robert Grosseteste.” The Heythrop Journal 52 (2011): 374-391.
Hunt, R.W. “The Introductions to the « Artes » in the Twelfth Century.” In Studia Mediaevalia in Honorem admodum Reverendi Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin Ordinis Praedicatorum S. Theologiae Magistri LXXUM Natalem Diem Agentis, 85-112. Brugis Flandorum: De Tempel, 1948.
Keeler, Leo. “The Dependence of R. Grosseteste’s De Anima on the Summa of Philip the Chancellor.” The New Scholasticism 11, 3 (1937): 197-219.
Keil, Karl and Franz Delitzsch. Old Testament Commentaries. 6 volumes. Grand Rapids: Associated Publishers and Authors, Inc., 1967.
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LaFleur, Claude. Quatre Introductions À La Philosophie Au XIII e Siècle: Textes Critiques et Étude Historique. Université de Montréal Publications de l’Institut d’Études Médiévales XXIII. Montréal: Institut d’Études Médiévales; Paris: J. Vrin, 1988.
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_____. “ Libertas arbitrii in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio .” In Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies, edited by John Flood, James R. Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering, 11-33. Papers in Medieval Studies 24. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2003.
_____. “Robert Grosseteste.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2013 Edition)
_____. “The Structure of the Soul: Aspectus and Affectus in Richard Fishacre and Richard Rufus of Cornwall.” Paper presented at the conference “ Aspectus and Affectus: Robert Grosseteste , Understanding and Feeling,” held at Georgetown University, March 31- April 1, 2017.
Lewry, O. “Thirteenth-Century Examination Compendia from the Faculty of Arts.” In Les Genres Littéraires dans les Sources Théologiques et Philosophiques Médiévales: Définition, Critique et Exploitation, 101-116. Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut d’Études Médiévales de l’Université Catholique de Louvain, 1982.
Long, Raymond James. “The Problem of the Soul in Richard Fishacre’s Commentary on the Sentences. ” PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1968.
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Lottin, D. Odon. Psychologie et Morale aux XII e et XIII e Siècles. Volume 1 : Problèmes de Psychologie. Louvain, Belgium: Abbaye du Mont César, 1942.
Lynch, Lawrence E. “The Doctrine of Divine Ideas and Illumination in Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln.” Medieval Studies 3 (1941): 161-173.
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_____. “Robert Grosseteste’s Quoniam Cogitatio, a Treatise on Confession.” Traditio 67 (2012): 341-384.
Marrone, Steven P. William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
_____. The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century. Volume 1. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
Marx, C. William. The Devil’s Rights and the Redemption in the Literature of Medieval England. Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 1995.
Mather, Elwood E. III. Introduction to “ Lecturae in Epistolam ad Romanos V-XVI Roberto Grosseteste Adscriptae, ” v-xx. PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1987.
McEvoy, James. “The Chronology of Robert Grosseteste’s Writings on Nature and Natural Philosophy.” Speculum 58 (1983): 593-655.
_____. The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
_____. Robert Grosseteste. Great Medieval Thinkers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
_____.“Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Human Nature with the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat .” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 47 (1980): 131-187.
_____. Robert Grosseteste, Exegete and Philosopher. CS 446. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1994.
_____. “Robert Grosseteste on the Cross and Redemptive Love. With the Text of his Sermon on Galatians 5:24 and Notes on its Reception.” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 66, 2 (1999): 289-315.
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