A Wake-Up Call for Ukraine's Civil Society
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KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017 U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chats with President Petro Poroshenko before their bilateral meeting in Kyiv, Ukraine, on July 9, 2017. Credit: [State Department photo/ Public Domain]. A Wake-up Call for Ukraine’s Civil Society Kateryna Smagliy When U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson paid his are peeking through in places. Three years after first official visit to Ukraine on 9 July 2017, he met Petro Poroshenko assumed the presidency, the with a small group of Ukrainian civil society activists consensus is that a new Ukraine remains out of prior to his meeting with President Poroshenko. reach. Numerous experts now warn that a counter- The sequence of Tillerson’s conversations in Kyiv revolution is on the horizon and that Ukraine may was not coincidental. It sent a clear signal: the U.S. slide back to authoritarianism.1 government values Ukraine's civil society’s efforts and urges our leaders to strengthen cooperation Ukraine is at serious risk of following its own with anti-corruption groups and reform activists. footsteps in the failure of its 2004-05 Orange Revolution, when civic activism failed to achieve Ukraine’s vibrant civil society played a crucial role in enduring political changes. There is evidence safeguarding its democracy during the Euromaidan. that today Ukraine’s anti-corruption activists are To paraphrase Alexis de Tocqueville, it was the subject to wiretapping, surveillance, searches, time when Ukrainians of all ages, all conditions, smear campaigns, and even death threats.2 The and all dispositions got busy forming associations. state authorities increasingly sideline reformers, However, if Ukrainian society now boasts a new while volunteers are fatigued. Ukraine’s society is layer of democratic paint, the old oligarchic colors noticeably returning to political apathy. KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017 The big question is how could Ukraine end up at international conferences instead of town hall here again? What happened to the energy of meetings. Western donors, not local independent its civil society? Is it still capable of keeping the advisory boards, judged NGOs’ effectiveness and government in check? The 2004 Orange Revolution impact. The leaders of elitist NGOs, the so-called provides a cautionary tale for the risks of a failed “NGO-cracy,” were busy networking with Western revolution, it may also provide us with a map of the embassies rather than engaging with their fellow pitfalls to avoid. citizens.7 NGOs often failed to cooperate to create cross-regional networks. What Went Wrong after the Orange As a result, the work of revolution remained Revolution? unfinished. The lack of vigilance and civil society’s inability to hold the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko The West hailed the Orange Revolution as a triumph government accountable subsequently led to of Ukraine’s civil society. In 2007, Freedom House disillusionment with Orange leaders and the victory assigned Ukraine, for the first time in its history, a of revanchist forces in the 2006 parliamentary and rating of “free” in the categories of political rights 2010 presidential elections. and civic liberties.3 The number of officially registered NGOs grew from Civil Society after Euromaidan: What 40,000 in 2004 to almost 80,000 by 2014,4 but this Went Right? leap of activism did not equate to deeper citizen engagement or political transformations. The impact Ukraine paid a high price to restore its democracy in of civil society organizations stayed small - just 8-9 2013. The scope of innovation and civic engagement percent of them were truly active.5 By 2011, only at the 2013 Euromaidan was truly unprecedented. 29.9 percent of Ukrainians could name a single There are at least four areas where civil society NGO in their town or village, while 85.2 percent had achieved particularly strong results: never participated in any voluntary activities. On the 1. Ukraine experienced a remarkable eve of Euromaidan, NGO leaders characterized their growth groups that provide organizations as “mostly ineffective” in addressing of nationwide volunteer humanitarian support and social assistance to the policy issues.6 victims of the war in Donbas and other populations at risk. Volunteers became the most trusted group The 2004 Orange Revolution provides in Ukrainian society (replacing the church).8 a cautionary tale for the risks of a 2. Civil society groups influenced the post- failed revolution Euromaidan reform process. The largest and most visible reform network – the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR) – is comprised of 80 NGOs, After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s civil society 22 reform groups and 300 experts, who develop, mistakenly presumed there could be no backsliding promote, and in some cases even implement to authoritarianism. Activists spent too much time judicial, anticorruption and economic changes. KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017 3. Anticorruption initiatives became much What Went Wrong (Again)? more systemic and institutionalized. NGOs continuously monitored the process of The human toll of the Euromaidan was so high that constructing two major anticorruption agencies, most find the current cynical restoration of the old the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine system truly incomprehensible. As Novoe Vremya (NABU) and the National Agency for the editor Vitaliy Sych wrote: “I thought that after the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC). Under public killing of 100 people on the Maidan, after the deaths pressure, the government launched a publicly of thousands of people in the East, Ukraine would available online system for tracking the declared never be the same, and that politicians would assets of politicians, civil servants, and judges. understand the level of responsibility and the importance of the moment. But we still witness 4. Euromaidan ushered in a new type of political corruption, schemes, and political deals at the highest organization: membership-based political parties level.”9 However, the incomprehensible is unfolding detached from oligarchic funding. These civil before our eyes. Ukraine’s political class once again society-based political forces, like Democratic patiently waited for the revolutionary fervor to pass Alliance, Power of the People, Civic Movement before starting its “sweet counter-revolution”.10 “Khvylya” (the wave), and Mikheil Saakashvili’s The New Forces Movement, engage well- The first warning light for Ukraine’s civil society should educated Ukrainians and focus on anti-corruption. have been the “business as usual” approach of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson addresses Ukrainian reformers at a meeting in Kyiv, Ukraine, on July 9, 2017. Credit: [State Department photo/ Public Domain] KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017 Ukraine’s NGO community. While volunteers emerged than 70 percent of total funding), Centre UA and as the most trusted group in Ukraine after the the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Euromaidan, the NGO leaders continued to prioritize Research - all of which were already longtime relations with Western donors over engaging with its recipients of foreign aid.12 citizens, even the passionate army of volunteers. The funding flow not only created conflict between Certain NGOs resumed working with Ukraine’s recipient and non-recipient groups—it created financial elites. Ihor Kolomoisky, Viktor Pinchuk and something of a “warm bath” effect for the other oligarchs started employing financial, media, recipients. RPR turned its focus on donor reports and political resources to promote various activists and applications, rather then sustaining and growing and NGOs. The oligarchs predicted, correctly, that citizen participation. RPR’s office, opened in 2014 their support would buy a certain amount of influence with zero donor funding, looked like a beehive and protection. Social scientist Mikhail Minakov of civic activism. Today, the drive is gone and observed, “In 2014…oligarchic groups recognized bureaucracy prevails over innovation. When asked the functionality of civil society organizations and what made him most proud of the network, Artem attempted to use them—sometimes through Mirhorodkyi, chief of RPR’s secretariat, responded coercion—either to increase their rents or to defend he was “particularly glad that RPR’s reform bulletins their existing power and property.”11 were received and read by all foreign embassies and foreign organizations.” In many ways the cultural codes of Ukraine’s top NGO's mirror the patron-client nature of the country’s oligarchic power structures: many Kyiv- In many ways the cultural codes of based NGOs operate in a rather closed network of Ukraine’s top NGO's mirror the patron- people who have been friends for a long time, who client nature of the country’s oligarchic have a long history of cooperating with one another, and who built clientelistic networks either with power structures government representatives or international donors. Consider the Reanimation Package of Reforms Over time, results-oriented activists started (RPR) group. Donors rewarded RPR for its leaving the network. As Viktor Griza, a former effectiveness and success in advocating post- member of RPR’s group on cultural reform, Euromaidan reforms. From 2015-17, it received told me: “RPR grew into a club of beneficiaries millions of dollars in support from Ukraine’s [vygodopoluchateli]. Many RPR activists only use key donors: USAID, Pact, the Swedish SIDA, the RPR ‘brand’ to boost their personal capital – to the International Renaissance Foundation meet