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KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chats with President before their bilateral meeting in , , on July 9, 2017. Credit: [State Department photo/ Public Domain].

A Wake-up Call for Ukraine’s Civil Society

Kateryna Smagliy

When U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson paid his are peeking through in places. Three years after first official visit to Ukraine on 9 July 2017, he met Petro Poroshenko assumed the presidency, the with a small group of Ukrainian civil society activists consensus is that a new Ukraine remains out of prior to his meeting with President Poroshenko. reach. Numerous experts now warn that a counter- The sequence of Tillerson’s conversations in Kyiv revolution is on the horizon and that Ukraine may was not coincidental. It sent a clear signal: the U.S. slide back to authoritarianism.1 government values Ukraine's civil society’s efforts and urges our leaders to strengthen cooperation Ukraine is at serious risk of following its own with anti-corruption groups and reform activists. footsteps in the failure of its 2004-05 , when civic activism failed to achieve Ukraine’s vibrant civil society played a crucial role in enduring political changes. There is evidence safeguarding its democracy during the . that today Ukraine’s anti-corruption activists are To paraphrase Alexis de Tocqueville, it was the subject to wiretapping, surveillance, searches, time when of all ages, all conditions, smear campaigns, and even death threats.2 The and all dispositions got busy forming associations. state authorities increasingly sideline reformers, However, if Ukrainian society now boasts a new while volunteers are fatigued. Ukraine’s society is layer of democratic paint, the old oligarchic colors noticeably returning to political apathy. KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017

The big question is how could Ukraine end up at international conferences instead of town hall here again? What happened to the energy of meetings. Western donors, not local independent its civil society? Is it still capable of keeping the advisory boards, judged NGOs’ effectiveness and government in check? The 2004 Orange Revolution impact. The leaders of elitist NGOs, the so-called provides a cautionary tale for the risks of a failed “NGO-cracy,” were busy networking with Western revolution, it may also provide us with a map of the embassies rather than engaging with their fellow pitfalls to avoid. citizens.7 NGOs often failed to cooperate to create cross-regional networks.

What Went Wrong after the Orange As a result, the work of revolution remained Revolution? unfinished. The lack of vigilance and civil society’s inability to hold the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko The West hailed the Orange Revolution as a triumph government accountable subsequently led to of Ukraine’s civil society. In 2007, Freedom House disillusionment with Orange leaders and the victory assigned Ukraine, for the first time in its history, a of revanchist forces in the 2006 parliamentary and rating of “free” in the categories of political rights 2010 presidential elections. and civic liberties.3

The number of officially registered NGOs grew from Civil Society after Euromaidan: What 40,000 in 2004 to almost 80,000 by 2014,4 but this Went Right? leap of activism did not equate to deeper citizen engagement or political transformations. The impact Ukraine paid a high price to restore its democracy in of civil society organizations stayed small - just 8-9 2013. The scope of innovation and civic engagement percent of them were truly active.5 By 2011, only at the 2013 Euromaidan was truly unprecedented. 29.9 percent of Ukrainians could name a single There are at least four areas where civil society NGO in their town or village, while 85.2 percent had achieved particularly strong results: never participated in any voluntary activities. On the 1. Ukraine experienced a remarkable eve of Euromaidan, NGO leaders characterized their growth groups that provide organizations as “mostly ineffective” in addressing of nationwide volunteer humanitarian support and social assistance to the policy issues.6 victims of the war in and other populations at risk. Volunteers became the most trusted group The 2004 Orange Revolution provides in Ukrainian society (replacing the church).8 a cautionary tale for the risks of a 2. Civil society groups influenced the post- failed revolution Euromaidan reform process. The largest and most visible reform network – the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR) – is comprised of 80 NGOs, After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s civil society 22 reform groups and 300 experts, who develop, mistakenly presumed there could be no backsliding promote, and in some cases even implement to authoritarianism. Activists spent too much time judicial, anticorruption and economic changes. KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017

3. Anticorruption initiatives became much What Went Wrong (Again)? more systemic and institutionalized. NGOs continuously monitored the process of The human toll of the Euromaidan was so high that constructing two major anticorruption agencies, most find the current cynical restoration of the old the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine system truly incomprehensible. As Novoe Vremya (NABU) and the National Agency for the editor Vitaliy Sych wrote: “I thought that after the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC). Under public killing of 100 people on the Maidan, after the deaths pressure, the government launched a publicly of thousands of people in the East, Ukraine would available online system for tracking the declared never be the same, and that politicians would assets of politicians, civil servants, and judges. understand the level of responsibility and the importance of the moment. But we still witness 4. Euromaidan ushered in a new type of political corruption, schemes, and political deals at the highest organization: membership-based political parties level.”9 However, the incomprehensible is unfolding detached from oligarchic funding. These civil before our eyes. Ukraine’s political class once again society-based political forces, like Democratic patiently waited for the revolutionary fervor to pass Alliance, Power of the People, Civic Movement before starting its “sweet counter-revolution”.10 “Khvylya” (the wave), and ’s The New Forces Movement, engage well- The first warning light for Ukraine’s civil society should educated Ukrainians and focus on anti-corruption. have been the “business as usual” approach of

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson addresses Ukrainian reformers at a meeting in Kyiv, Ukraine, on July 9, 2017. Credit: [State Department photo/ Public Domain] KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017

Ukraine’s NGO community. While volunteers emerged than 70 percent of total funding), Centre UA and as the most trusted group in Ukraine after the the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Euromaidan, the NGO leaders continued to prioritize Research - all of which were already longtime relations with Western donors over engaging with its recipients of foreign aid.12 citizens, even the passionate army of volunteers. The funding flow not only created conflict between Certain NGOs resumed working with Ukraine’s recipient and non-recipient groups—it created financial elites. Ihor Kolomoisky, Viktor Pinchuk and something of a “warm bath” effect for the other oligarchs started employing financial, media, recipients. RPR turned its focus on donor reports and political resources to promote various activists and applications, rather then sustaining and growing and NGOs. The oligarchs predicted, correctly, that citizen participation. RPR’s office, opened in 2014 their support would buy a certain amount of influence with zero donor funding, looked like a beehive and protection. Social scientist Mikhail Minakov of civic activism. Today, the drive is gone and observed, “In 2014…oligarchic groups recognized bureaucracy prevails over innovation. When asked the functionality of civil society organizations and what made him most proud of the network, Artem attempted to use them—sometimes through Mirhorodkyi, chief of RPR’s secretariat, responded coercion—either to increase their rents or to defend he was “particularly glad that RPR’s reform bulletins their existing power and property.”11 were received and read by all foreign embassies and foreign organizations.” In many ways the cultural codes of Ukraine’s top NGO's mirror the patron-client nature of the country’s oligarchic power structures: many Kyiv- In many ways the cultural codes of based NGOs operate in a rather closed network of Ukraine’s top NGO's mirror the patron- people who have been friends for a long time, who client nature of the country’s oligarchic have a long history of cooperating with one another, and who built clientelistic networks either with power structures government representatives or international donors.

Consider the Reanimation Package of Reforms Over time, results-oriented activists started (RPR) group. Donors rewarded RPR for its leaving the network. As Viktor Griza, a former effectiveness and success in advocating post- member of RPR’s group on cultural reform, Euromaidan reforms. From 2015-17, it received told me: “RPR grew into a club of beneficiaries millions of dollars in support from Ukraine’s [vygodopoluchateli]. Many RPR activists only use key donors: USAID, Pact, the Swedish SIDA, the RPR ‘brand’ to boost their personal capital – to the International Renaissance Foundation meet foreign diplomats, get media opportunities, (IRF), UNDP, and the EU Delegation to Ukraine. get invited to international conferences, or win Although RPR is officially comprised of 80 prestigious fellowships in the . For NGOs, all Western funding has been channeled some, RPR is a ticket to power corridors, where through a select group of NGOs—such as the they can make friends with government officials or Center for Democracy and Rule of Law (more KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017

politicians and maybe get elected to the Verkhovna The unraveling of the Euromaidan spirit through Rada during the next election.” NGO stagnation and activist ambition helped open the door for Ukraine’s oligarchic economic elites to The stagnation in Ukraine’s NGO community was regain their influence. To win back the revolution, matched only by the ambition of many civic leaders the veterans of Euromaidan, groups and individuals to take advantage of their newfound influence. In alike, must re-consider their priorities. Even that 2013 Ukraine’s activists represented a potent and will not be sufficient: they must offer a clear action vigorous force. Authorities were forced to reckon plan of reforms. with activist power and cooperate with its leaders on reforms. This opened a window of opportunity Winning the Revolution for Euromaidan leaders to go into politics, and many took advantage of the opportunity to convert Winning the revolution will take more than winning their standing into attractive parliamentary or the Maidan. To win the Maidan, it was sufficient governmental positions. As a consequence, the to marshall popular support against the massive leaders on the street failed to form a united political corruption of the Yanukovych administration and force to run for parliament in 2015. Instead, they stand for “European values,” without providing much allowed the country’s old elites to split their ranks in the way of specifics. After the new government and co-opt them into different political projects. took power, the effectiveness of anti-corruption as a platform declined. A wave of nationwide The Euromaidan spirit was not the only loser in anti-corruption forums that Mikheil Saakasvili, this exchange—the leaders themselves now face the Democratic Alliance party, and other activists the consequences of their actions. According to organized failed to pay dividends with the electorate. polling by the International Republican Institute, The most recent opinion poll indicates that Democratic today even the most active civic leaders remain Alliance enjoys only a 0.1 percent popularity rating, largely unknown to most Ukrainians: 81 percent of while Saakashvili’s New Forces Movement is favored Ukrainians don’t know who is, 58 percent are unfamiliar with Serhii Leshchenko, and 30 percent have never heard of Euromaidan’s hero, .13

Reformers try to increase their visibility online through , but in a country with low internet penetration, “Facebook democracy” is not the most efficient instrument to attract supporters or mobilize voters in a sustained manner.

Demonstration in Kyiv commemorating the slain journalist Pavlo Sheremet. Source: Democratic Alliance party, Ukraine. KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017

by only 1.4 percent of voters.14 The prospects for The reformers are slowly losing the very positions Mikheil Saakashvili’s party are even grimmer after they conquered at the height of their influence. The President Poroshenko’s decision to strip the former National Reform Council (NRC), which originally had Georgian president of his Ukrainian citizenship. four represenatives of civil society, is now comprised solely of people loyal to President Poroshenko. The The people of Ukraine may know what civil society most recent additions to the NRC include MP Iryna activists are against, but they are unaware of what Lutsenko (the prosecutor general’s wife) and Artur they stand for. Do they have a reform plan and a Herasymov (the leader of Poroshenko’s parliamentary team to implement it effectively? Yanukovych is bloc in the Rada). Elswhere in government, at least gone, and the signing of the Ukraine-EU Association 22 top reformers were forced out in 2016. MPs Agreement and adoption of the EU visa liberalization Svitlana Zalishchuk and Mustafa Nayem were kicked regime are achievements largely seen as success stories of Poroshenko’s presidency. To succeed going forward, NGOs and civil society must not only The longer civil society turns a blind eye issue the anti-corruption rallying cries, as they did to government violations against the during the Euromaidan, but also offer specific reform proposals on topics that matter to Ukraine’s citizens: civic space, the longer it will take to win healthcare, education, culture, pensions, and social this space back security. At the moment, these are precisely the out of Ukraine’s parliamentary delegation to the areas where they have almost nothing to offer. Council of . They were replaced by an ally of Yet the key first step for Ukraine’s pro-democracy former Presidnet Yanukovych, Vadim Novinskyi (a acvitsts and groups is to renew their focus on Ukrainian oligarch of Russian origin); a move met with honesty and integrity, and stand for those principles little outcry from civil society. in full public view. For example, many activists President Poroshenko established a new state and public intellectuals think that criticism of the agency, the Civil Society Coordination Council, to government automatically undermines Ukraine’s serve as a mediator between the state and civil international standing and weakens its position vis- society. Tellingly, it is modeled on a similar body à-vis . But reforms that do nothing to build established by in December Ukraine’s rule of law do not deserve defending. 2012. To the surprise of few, the Council is not Ukraine’s war in the East is no excuse for its leaders led by a representative from civil society, but by to assault activists, silence investigative journalists, two state officials: the deputy chief of presidential or harass reformers. It is dishonest to extoll Ukraine administration and vice-prime minister for regional for protecting European values against Putin’s development. aggression if Ukraine’s political leaders smash these very values at home. The longer civil society turns a So far, the Council has done little to represent the blind eye to government violations against the civic interests of civil society within the government. space, the longer it will take to win this space back. It failed to challenge legislation requiring KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017

activists of anticorruption NGOs to file publicly economy and war without end is paving the road for accessible electronic asset declarations as if populists and hardline nationalists. they were state officials. It issued no critical To win this revolution, Ukraine’s civil society leaders assessment of Poroshenko’s ban of Russian social must remember and learn from the lessons of the networking sites Vkontakte and – a past. The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan have decision Reporters Without Borders described shown that the solution can only come from within. as a “disproportionate measure that seriously Our NGOs and activists must move beyond the undermines the Ukrainian people’s right to victory in the street, and pursue victory in town information and freedom of expression.”15 halls and elections. It is long past time to leave the Yet if the Council lacks in effectiveness, it is not comfort zone of “semi-opposition.” It’s time to unite short on civic star power. Several prominent and stand up for dignity once again. figures, like Yevhen Bystrytskyi, director of George Soros’ International Renaissance Foundation, serve The opinions expressed in this article are those as members. solely of the author. None of the Council’s members resigned in protest over state actions. By participating in the state’s game of sham reforms and ignoring its abuses, reformers “turn into back-up dancers in government’s Endnotes:

starlight ritual dance with the Civil Society Council to 1 “Golovakha: Ukraine is leaving the Soviet pattern behind, demonstrate its pseudo engagement in the reform but it does not necessarily move towards democracy”, [in process,” criticized Bohdan Maslych, director of the Ukrainian], Bigmir.net, May 29, 2017, http://news.bigmir. oldest civil society information and support center, net/ukraine/1079276-Golovaha-Ykraina-yhodit-ot-sovka- GURT. If Ukraine’s civic leaders are to stand for the no-ne-navernyaka-k-demokratii-ly) openice publict of 25 members presented their ctionary business in the country. European principles they fought for on the Maidan, See Yaroslav Hrytsak, “ose in government. ur they need to shed their timidity in standing up to, or resigning from, the current government and its 2 Halayna Korba, “Harassment of Anti-Corruption Activists”, “Potemkin village” civil society councils. [in Ukrainian], Novoe vremya, issue 27, July 28, 2017, http:// magazine.nv.ua/article/post/64142-travlya-borcov-s-korrupcyey No doubt, Ukraine’s civil society faces numerous 3 Freedom House, 2007 Freedom in the World report, challeges. President Poroshenko is busy https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world reconstructing his power vertical before the 2019 elections. The EU and United States are busy 4 Official statistical data from the National State Registry with their own priorities, and a return of “Ukraine of Ukrainian Enterprises and Organizations is available at: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua; The 2004 NGO Sustainability fatigue” and declining assistance is a real possibility. Index for Central and and Eurasia, USAID, The oligarchs are more than ready to lead again and (May 2005), at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadd432.pdf ’s capacity to stoke or escalate the military conflict in Donbas is not remotely diminished under 5 Liubov Palyvoda, Sofia Golota, “State and Dynamics Western sanctions. The combination of a weakening of Development of Non-Governmental Organizations of Ukraine, 2002-2010”, [In Ukrainian], Kyiv, 2010, p. 18. KENNAN CABLE No. 25 l August 2017

6 “Civil society sector and politics: cooperation, neutrality Kateryna Smagliy or confrontation?’ [in Ukrainian], Democratic Initiatives Foundations, July 13, 2013, http://dif.org.ua/article/gromadskiy- Kateryna Smagliy is Director of the sektor-i-politika-vzaemodiya-neytralitet-chi- Kennan Institute office in Ukraine. She was previously a consultant 7 Orysia Lutsevych, “How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in , and Ukraine,” for the European Endowment for Briefing Paper, Chatham House, January 1, 2013, p. 17. Democracy, Director of the Anti- Crisis Humanitarian Program at the International 8 “Who Are the Most Trusted Groups: The Government, Civil Renaissance Foundation in Ukraine, and Political Society, or the Media?” [in Ukrainian], Democratic Initiatives Assistant at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. Foundation, August 3, 2015, http://dif.org.ua/article/komu- bilshe-doviryayut-ukraintsi-vladi-gromadskosti-zmi

9 Vitaliy Sych, “Three years of reforms: in short, I am Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars dissapointed’, [in Ukrainian], Novoe vremya, June 7, 2017, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza http://m.nv.ua/opinion/sych/tri-goda-reform-esli-korotko-ja- 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW razocharovan-1254874.html Washington, DC 20004-3027

10 The term “sweet counter-revolution” was introduced by Ukraine’s historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, who sarcastically hinted that Ukraine’s President Poroshenko owns the biggest confectionary business in the country. See Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Sweet counter-revolution,” [in Ukrainian], Novoe vremya, June 11, 2017, http://nv.ua/ukr/opinion/grytsak/ The Wilson Center solodka-kontrrevoljutsija-1288921.html wilsoncenter.org 11 Mikhail Minakov, “Changing Civil Society after Maidan,” facebook.com/WoodrowWilsonCenter Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine, @TheWilsonCenter 2014, https://www.danyliwseminar.com/mikhailo-minakov 202.691.4000 12 Reanimation Package of Reforms, Annual Reports for 2015 and 2016, http://rpr.org.ua/richni-zvity/ The Kennan Institute 13 Melinda Haring, “Can Ukraine’s New Liberal Party wilsoncenter.org/kennan Succeed?,” , October 17, 2016, http://www. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/can-ukraine-s-new- [email protected] liberal-party-succeed. facebook.com/Kennan.Institute

14 “Citizen’s attitudes to political situation, elections and @kennaninstitute political parties”, [in Ukrainian], Democratic Initiatives 202.691.4100 Foundation, July 27, 2017, http://dif.org.ua/uploads/ pdf/11837777675979e41751cad8.18422987.pdf

15 “RSF Urges Ukraine to Scrap Ban on Russian Social Media Sites,” Reporters Without Borders, May 23, 2017, https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-urges-ukraine-scrap-ban- russian-social-media-sites