Uncertain Times Jeopardize Enlargement

Strong Headwinds Uncertain Times Jeopardize Enlargement By Pál Dunay PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION 18 per Concordiam stablished 70 years ago with the signa- The FRG’s accession 10 years after the end Visitors walk past a tures of 12 original members, NATO of World War II in Europe, in May 1955, had remaining section E of the Berlin Wall now has 29 members, meaning more than half multiple consequences. It meant: in 2018. The end of are accession countries. Enlargement by accession • The FRG’s democratic record had been the Cold War and occurred over seven separate occasions, and on recognized. the unification of one occasion the geographic area increased with- • The country could be integrated militarily, Europe entailed out increasing the number of member states when which signaled its subordination and a clear the unification of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became requirement not to act outside the Alliance. Germany. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS part of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in • The FRG’s membership in NATO created an October 1990. incentive for the establishment of the Warsaw The conditions surrounding the enlarge- Pact, which followed West German membership ments — the first in 1952 (Greece and Turkey) by five days in 1955 and led to the integration and the most recent in 2017 (Montenegro) — have of the GDR into the eastern bloc. This signaled varied significantly. The first three enlargements the completion of the East-West division, at occurred during the Cold War and are regarded least as far as security was concerned. as strategic. They contributed to the consolida- tion of the post-World War II European order The third enlargement — Spain in 1982 — meant and helped determine its territorial boundaries. membership for a country that had been integrated That first enlargement provided a NATO pres- militarily, including the presence of U.S. bases on its ence in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea territory, though the accession did not change much region. It also culminated Greece’s somewhat as far as the central theater of NATO’s operations hesitant integration with the West. Turkey was not in the Cold War was concerned. Although political a full-fledged democracy at the time, but strategic considerations also contributed, strategic importance considerations prevailed. determined enlargements in the Cold War era. per Concordiam 19 The end of the Cold War and the unification of Europe supervision practiced by the communist parties represented entailed the long-awaited reunification of Germany. a more direct involvement in military affairs. In most However, the conditions of German unity would have smaller socialist countries, unlike in the Soviet Union, the been better negotiated between the two German states bargaining position of the armed forces was fairly weak than internationally in the so-called 2 + 4 Agreement. and subordinate to the political leadership. It was clear that the FRG’s international engagements The post-Cold War enlargements were indeed political in would continue, including its memberships in NATO, the some sense. Namely, the military capabilities of the candidate European Communities and other international institu- countries were of secondary importance. However, in 1999 tions. However, it is not entirely clear whether a price has when three former Warsaw Pact states (the Czech Republic, been paid for this negotiation considering Russia’s insis- Hungary and Poland) became NATO members, classic tence that the West promised not to enlarge NATO to the defense-related considerations were partially suppressed. east, or at least not to deploy NATO forces there. The West NATO required only minimum interoperability. It could be and Russia can be expected to continue an inconclusive said that the enlargement consisted of must-have countries. debate over these terms with neither side providing any It was obvious that the Czech Republic and Poland — both fully convincing evidence. having had a turbulent history with Germany, and Poland having had its tribulations with Russia and later the Soviet Union — could not be left out of the first eastern enlargement cycle. Concerning Hungary, the problem was somewhat different, though Germany must have thought some debt was owed because of Hungary’s actions in hastening the Iron Curtain’s fall in 1989. Hungary presented a special problem: It had no NATO neighbor and providing aid to its fellow members would be limited to what could be done with aircraft. However, NATO was well aware of the interoperability limitations of eastern and central European countries. To address this shortfall, NATO — during its 50th anniver- sary summit in Washington a month after the first post-Cold Soldiers participate in a War eastern enlargement — Strategic vs. political NATO exercise west of made several major decisions, Whereas the Cold War enlargements have been charac- Vilnius, Lithuania. All NATO including the adoption of members are expected to terized as strategic, the post-Cold War ones have been contribute to the security the membership action plan presented as political. However, their political nature offered by the Alliance. (MAP). As will be demon- does not mean they were entirely nonstrategic. The one THE ASSOCIATED PRESS strated later, a full mythology factor common to the more recent enlargements is that has developed around this plan every new NATO member since the late 1990s is a former during the past two decades. It is important to emphasize socialist/communist country. Most had been members of that NATO wanted to lengthen the preparation time for the Warsaw Pact or territorially part of states that were membership. States aspiring to become NATO members among its members (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or enter the MAP and are helped in their preparation. Experts were republics of the only nonaligned socialist country, remain divided on whether the MAP actually facilitates Yugoslavia (Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia). It does not membership. mean that the countries share the same history or political The next eastern enlargement consisted of a more course. However, all of them had nondemocratic periods varied club, including states that missed the earlier and all were unfamiliar with democratic control over the round due to their own pace of development or for other military. It is necessary to emphasize that political control reasons. The largest group that ever acceded to NATO of militaries was commonplace in those countries. But the consisted of seven members: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 20 per Concordiam Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. Although are references to democracy, the peaceful nature of Vladimir Putin had replaced Boris Yeltsin as Russia’s head the state and its readiness to maintain and develop of state by then, opposition to NATO enlargement had a capacity to resist an armed attack. Has NATO not yet reached the level that has characterized the period been consistent as far as meeting its standards? This since 2008. One of the main lessons of eastern enlarge- is subject to interpretation regarding the admitting ment is that it is a fair-weather process best carried out of new members and when members backtrack on when there is no strong opposition. performance. While the Alliance has a mechanism for The years that followed brought piecemeal advance- accession, it lacks one for expulsion. Unless a member ment, with Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2013 wants to leave the Alliance, it will not be obliged to and Montenegro in 2017. Those enlargements demon- depart. Although this is an abstract possibility and has strated the Alliance’s determination to keep the door open never been officially contemplated, being aware of it is to states in the Western Balkans. important. 5. The last material condition may well be the most The Washington Treaty delicate. Namely, it requires that a state invited to join It is important to contemplate certain legal and politi- the Alliance be able to contribute to the security of the cal issues when considering the three accessions since North Atlantic area. This is certainly a perceptional 2004. The foundation of NATO enlargement is Article requirement, and NATO members must be confident 10 of the Washington Treaty. It states: “The Parties may, that the invited state meets it. Two concerns have by unanimous agreement, invite any other European emerged recently. First, what if a non-NATO member State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty expresses the view that the Alliance’s acceptance of and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic certain countries would threaten the security of the area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may North Atlantic area? Legally, the situation is clear: become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument A state that is not a NATO member has no say over of accession with the Government of the United States enlargement decisions. However, the political reality of America. The Government of the United States of may well be different. A large state that can influence America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of European security may send signals that a poten- each such instrument of accession.” tial NATO enlargement threatens regional security. A closer look at the article’s meaning is essential. The Second, what if there are concerns that a country’s conditions of accession are as follows: accession would not contribute to security because the 1. Any state may seek membership. The conditions of state lacks adequate defense capabilities and could be statehood are defined under international law and perceived as a freeloader? There are two factors that are not very demanding. A state can be large or small may give such an impression: a low level of commit- and have a population in the thousands or more ment by current members that haven’t delivered on than a billion.

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