Different Shades of Blue: Interwar Air Power Doctrine Development Part 1 Air Power, Doctrine and the Anglo-American Approach

DIFFERENT SHadES OF BLUE: INTerwar AIR POwer DOCTriNE DEVelOPMENT ParT 1 AIR POWER, DOCTRINE AND THE ANGLO-AMERIcaN AppROacH By Major William March Hawker Hurricane MK I Credit:16 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hurricane.r4118.ground.arp.jpg DIffERENT SHADES OF BLUE: parT 1 WInter 2009 • VOL. 2, NO. 1 National defense [sic] can be power doctrine in each of the four nations that assured“ only by an Independent will be examined. In the US this position was occupied by the Army Air Corps, in Britain by Air Force of adequate power. the Royal Air Force (RAF), in Germany the Giulio Douhet 1 ” Luftwaffe and in Japan the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force. These four organizations were pivotal in the development of their respective Introduction national approaches to air power during the interwar period. In this first of two parts, ir power was born over the trenches in this paper will briefly examine the birth of World War I, went through its adoles- air power, discuss the nature of doctrine and cence during the relative peace of the A examine the growth of Anglo-American air interwar period and reached a level of maturity power doctrine during the interwar period. The in European skies during World War II. It is second part will address the air power doctrine arguable that most students of air power theory development of Britain and the US’s primary would accept this statement at face value. adversaries during World War II and will offer Unfortunately, the statement is extremely Western-centric and reflects the domination, some conclusions on similarities and differences at least in air power literature, of the United between the combatants. States (US) and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain. Air Power Anglo-American air power would centre on three basic facts: strategic bombing was a Prior to 1914, aviation was in its infancy. war-winning, decisive strategy; the bomber Barely eleven years old when war engulfed would always get through; and only an inde- Europe, heavier-than-air aircraft were slow, pendent air force commanded by airmen could fragile and relatively unarmed. Although the implement the strategy. Even Germany, the first tentative steps had been taken to explore Anglo-American European foe, is accorded an the offensive potential of aircraft, aviation honoured place in air power discussions not commenced the war as essentially the “eyes” only because the German approach to air power of long-established land and maritime forces. was extremely similar to that followed by the It was the considered opinion of the military US and Britain, but because the Luftwaffe’s experts of the day that this was the most effi- lack of appreciation of the strategic bombing cient and effective use of this new technology. role resulted in its defeat. Therefore, Germany For the most part, the potential of this new is the perfect “negative” example of how not to technology to change the face of war and effect develop air power doctrine. However, the US national destinies was left to the imagination and Great Britain did face another major chal- 2 of fiction writers. Four years later, much of lenge with respect to the successful prosecution the fiction had become reality and aviation had of an air war in World War II—Japan. Japan’s become a tactical necessity on the battlefield, as approach to air power during the interwar well as a strategic concern on the home front. period was radically different from that pursued Nearly every major combatant in World War I, by the other three nations in that it never whether victor or vanquished, had an air service advocated a strategic bombing doctrine, was totally integrated with a parent service and was as part of their fielded military forces on not commanded by an airman. That Japan chose 11 November 1918. However, despite the emer- this approach to air power should not be seen gence of aviation as a major factor in modern as “wrong,” but merely reflective of a different war, the concept of “air power” as an element developmental process and as worthy of study of a nation’s military repertoire, as important as as the Anglo-American theories of air power. land or maritime power, had yet to be developed. Empirical proof from the war aside, nations My analysis and discussion is limited to the and militaries would struggle to find a “home” primary representatives and developers of air for air power throughout the interwar period. WInter 2009 • VOL. 2, NO. 1 DIffERENT SHADES OF BLUE: parT 1 17 The various bombing campaigns of World arena of peacetime politics and institutional War I planted the seeds for the development infighting. In other words, air power needed its of air power doctrine during the interwar own doctrine upon which to “hang its hat.” period, at least in the West. Beginning in 1916, the Germans began launching attacks against Doctrine London, at first with airships and then with What is doctrine and why is it important? large bombardment aircraft. Reprisal raids by Chris Demchak, in Military Organizations, Britain were the stated purpose of the Indepen- Complex Machines, and Modernization in the dent Force of bombers under the command of U.S. Armed Services, defined it as “the military a future leader of the RAF, Lord Trenchard. As professional’s best guess as to how organizations well, the Italians and Austrians were enthusi- should respond to the unknowns of wartime in astically bombing each other in their theatre 4 order to be successful.…” This simple defini- of war. All of these campaigns had a profound tion highlights three general perceptions about effect on theorists who either had direct experi- doctrine: it is the exclusive purview of the ence in bombing operations, such as Trenchard military, it is a “guess” and that it is only and Giulio Douhet, or experienced them second applicable in wartime. Such a definition ignores hand through discussion and observation, such the impact of non-military contributors, such as William Mitchell. as politicians, academics or business people, to Douhet wrote that air power was an offensive a nation’s air power doctrine. These contribu- force that would dominate the modern battlefield. tions were especially important during a period In order to triumph, a nation must be prepared when air power doctrine was in a permanent to strike quickly at the beginning of a conflict state of flux. At the same time, although there and launch “massive attacks against the enemy may be an element of “guess work” involved centres of population, government and indus- in doctrinal development, all factors being try—hit first and hit hard to shatter enemy equal, it is normally mitigated by experience civilian morale, leaving the enemy government and practice. It could be argued that, given its no option but to sue for peace.” He also argued rather short history, interwar air power doctrine that “an independent air force armed with relied rather heavily on “guess work”; however, long-range bombardment aircraft, maintained this varied from nation to nation and was more in a constant state of readiness, [was] the likely to occur when other developmental factors primary requirement” to accomplish this dominated the process. Without disputing its mission.3 With only slight variations, this wartime utility, doctrine should permit the would become the focus of Anglo-American employment of all the elements of national air power doctrine between the wars. power, including military aviation, to further the state’s goals be it during peace or war. Despite its rapid development during World War I, military aviation’s place within Barry Posen’s definition of doctrine is closer the political and military apparatus of nations to the mark. Posen wrote that military doctrine was far from certain during the interwar period. “is a response to both national and international Without doubt military aviation was here influences. It represents the state’s response to to stay, but what shape this new element of the constraints and incentives of the external warfare would take had yet to be determined. world, yet it encompasses means that are in the Although the aircraft had proven itself to be a custody of military organizations.”5 In other formidable addition to the combat power of a words, doctrine is “bigger” than just a military nation, the life and death struggle of the war organization and is influenced by a number of meant that air power had been guided by the factors external to that organization. As well, requirements of day-to-day survival rather than Posen argues that military doctrine has a direct a coherent approach to its long-term utility to bearing on the well-being of the state in that it national interests. Battle-proven, air power now has an impact on international political life and had to establish itself in the somewhat harsher the security of the state.6 Interwar air power 18 DIffERENT SHADES OF BLUE: parT 1 WInter 2009 • VOL. 2, NO. 1 advocates would have found little in Posen’s ignoring potential lessons to be learned statement to disagree with. from other militaries or organizations; and corrupting or suppressing evidence that Posen advances two theories to serve as the 11 contradicts their preferred doctrine. basis for analysing French, British and German doctrinal development between the wars: orga- The second theory that Posen advances to nizational theory and balance of power theory. explain doctrinal development is the balance Organizational theory tends to focus on the of power theory. This theory predicts a “greater organization’s purpose, people and environment heterogeneity in military doctrine” based upon as the principle causal factors that influence “reasonable appraisals by each state of its politi- its approach to basic doctrinal elements such cal, technological, economic and geographical as adopting an offensive, defensive or deterrent problems and possibilities in the international posture; political-military integration; and in- system.”12 Accordingly, offensive doctrines will novation.7 On the whole, Posen concludes that most likely be adopted by states that wish to military organizations favour offensive doctrine.

Load more