Three Shades of Blue:
Air Force Culture and Leadership
Bernadette Pothan
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement of the degree of Master of Philosophy
University College, the University of New South Wales
2013
Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
ABSTRACT
The study explores unconstructive ideas of power in the military. In the thesis doctrine is seen to promote ideas of power over others under cover of the language of leadership. The study explains how Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.6: Leadership in the Australian Defence Force confuses ideas of command and leadership, and asserts that in doctrine unconstructive ideas of power have engulfed ideas of leadership. More than published text, doctrine is understood to describe ideas which have pervasive cultural meaning and impact. The thesis explores how acculturated myths of power are causally relevant to air accidents, decayed maintenance standards, and the prejudice borne by women in the Service. The so- called ‘warrior culture’ is interrogated as the rationalisation of unconstructive power and the aggregated risk which follows on its heels. The focus of the study is narrowed to the Royal New Zealand Air Force, and explicit attention is devoted to the ‘characters’ which give life to unhelpful elements of the ‘warrior culture’. The thesis unpacks the ‘characters’ (‘Aircrew’, ‘Maintenance Crew’, and ‘Support Crew’) and explores how unconstructive ideas of power are discernable in Air Force culture. ‘Aircrew’ are seen to infuse and dominate every aspect of Air Force life. ‘Maintenance Crew’ is a symbol for the Air Force maintenance culture, revealing the controlling influence and the practical repercussions of the ‘Aircrew’ myth. ‘Support Crew’ is more broadly indicative of the discriminatory themes which permeate and texture Air Force culture. The thesis reveals a propensity for a culture of resistance to reform, due to the persistence of deeply entrenched and profoundly unhelpful ideas of power. There is confusion surrounding the technicalities of leadership and command, ubiquitous when exploring doctrine. Practically, this sees unconstructive ideas of power masquerading as leadership. The study reveals that these unconstructive ideas of power perpetuate and promote the so-called ‘warrior culture’. Carefully selected case studies are used to illustrate key themes and concepts, and demonstrate the abstract ideas introduced in the thesis. The thesis interrogates the meaning and the repercussion of organisational myths and establishes the dangers associated with the unwitting perpetuation of cultural stereotypes.
ii Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Dr Callum Brown: thank you for your critical feedback and guidance which ultimately shaped the end product.
Rich: thank you for your enduring support and sage advice. You are a kind and gentle man.
Michelle: you are my rock - you help calm the storms. I am truly blessed to have you in my life.
Bernadette Pothan
iii Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract p. ii Acknowledgements p. iii Table of Contents p. iv Chapter One: Introduction p. 1 Thesis Framework p. 5 Aim of the Research p. 7 Methodology p. 8 Literature Review p. 9 Background p. 11 Thesis Outline p. 13 Future Research p. 15 Chapter Two: Concepts and Themes p. 17 The ‘Wing of Doctrine’ p. 18 The ‘Wing of Culture’ p. 22 The ‘Body of People’ p. 36 Chapter Three: ‘Aircrew’ – The Warrior p. 46 ‘Aircrew’ and Unconstructive Ideas of Power p. 46 Czar 52 p. 51 Sitka 43 p. 56 Diminishing Power p. 57 NZ 1990 p. 59 NZ 3806 p. 60 So What? p. 65 Chapter Four: ‘Maintenance Crew’ – The Warrior Enabler p. 67 Dominant Themes p. 68 Shark 02 p. 71 NASA Challenger p. 74 NASA Columbia p. 76 NASA – The Organisation p. 80 Nimrod XV230 p. 81 So What? p. 85 Chapter Five: ‘Support Crew’ – The Non-Warrior p. 89
iv Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The DLA Piper Report p. 90 Tailhook ‘91 p. 92 HMAS Success p. 97 The Broderick Review p. 103 The Apple or the Barrel? p. 106 So What? p. 109 Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations p. 115 ‘Aircrew’ – The Warrior p. 118 ‘Maintenance Crew’ – The Warrior Enabler p. 120 ‘Support Crew’ – The Non-Warrior p. 122 Glossary p. 127 Bibliography p. 131
v Chapter One
Introduction
Meaningful change is never easy – it takes courage to set aside the status quo. When that status quo, however, perpetuates marginalisation and loss of personnel, when it threatens the future capacity of the organisation, new and innovative ways of thinking must be embraced.1
A culture of resistance to reform and change exists in the military. Support for this claim is found in the DLA Piper Report,2 which acknowledges eleven reviews3 in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) since 1970, all aimed at cultural reform. Additionally, six recent reviews4 inform the latest strategic guidance (Pathway to
1 Elizabeth Broderick, Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force: Phase 2 Report (The Broderick Report), Australian Human Rights Commission, 2012, p. 1, viewed 23 August 2012, at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/defencereview/ADF_report/adf-complete.pdf. 2 The DLA Piper Review of Allegations of Sexual and Other Abuse in the Australian Defence Force was commissioned by the Australian Minister of Defence, Stephen Smith, on 11 April 2011. Volume One of the review was released on 10 July 2012. 3 Gary A. Rumble, Melanie McKean, and Dennis Pearce AO, Report of the Review of Allegations of Sexual and Other Abuse in Defence: Facing the Problems of the Past (DLA Piper Report), Department of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p.p. 80-91, viewed 11 July 2012, at http://www.defence.gov.au/culturereviews/docs/DLAPiper/. Reviews: The Fox Report: Committee of Enquiry into the Royal Military College (1970); The Rapke Report: Inquiry into HMAS Leeuwin and HMAS Sydney (1971); The HMAS SWAN Report: Senate Committee Report on Sexual Harassment (1994); The Bryson Report: Dealing with a Changing Work Environment – the Issue of Sexual Harassment in the ADFA (1994); The Burton Studies: Women in the Australian Defence Force (1996); The Grey Report: Review into Policies and Practices to Deal with Sexual Harassment and Sexual Offences at the ADFA (1998); The Birrer Report: Review of Disciplinary and Administrative Policy, Processes and Practices in Dealing with Cases of Unacceptable Behaviour in the ADF (1999); The Burchett Report: Inquiry into Military Justice in the ADF (2001); Senate Report on Military Justice System: The Effectiveness of Australia’s Military Justice System (2005); Whiddett and Adams Report: Audit of The ADF Investigative Capability (2006); Learning Culture Report: Inquiry into the Learning Culture in ADF Schools and Training Establishments (2006); Kafer Report: Review of Australian Defence Force Academy Military Organisation and Culture (2009). 4 Craig Orme, Beyond Compliance: Professionalism, Trust and Capability in the Australian Profession of Arms, Department of Defence, Australian Government, 03 August 2012; Margaret Hamilton, The Use of Alcohol in the Australian Defence Force: Report of the Independent Advisory Panel on Alcohol, Department of Defence, Australian Government, 19 August 2011; George Patterson Y & R, Review of Social Media and Defence, Department of Defence, Australian Government, 2011; Geoff Earley, Review of the Management of Incidents and Complaints in Defence, including Civilian and Military Jurisdictions, Department of Defence, Australian Government, 06 September 2011; Elizabeth Broderick, Review of the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force – Phase 1 Report (The Broderick Report – Phase 1), Australian Human Rights Commission, 21 October 2011; Elizabeth Broderick, Review of the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force – Phase 2 Report (The Broderick Report), Australian Human Rights Commission, 08 August 2012.
Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Change)5 – formal endeavours which aim to bring about cultural change in the ADF.6 This thesis asserts that resistance to cultural change stems inter alia from the persistence of deeply entrenched unconstructive7 ideas and interpretations of power.
Informed by the journey of organisational reform in the ADF, this study examines the myths which enable exclusive groups to develop within the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF). In particular, the thesis considers the idealised camarilla of ‘Aircrew’. In this thesis, the term ‘Aircrew’ defines more than merely the crew of an aeroplane; the term is used as a meme, referencing the unconstructive ideas of power 8 that permeate Air Force culture. The term ‘Aircrew’ is not used in a descriptive sense; rather it is used in a normative sense, as a metaphor standing for the unconstructive application of power. The myths, which have grown up around the ‘Aircrew’ meme, dominate the cultural motif of the Air Force, and operate to overpower and eclipse other organisational sub- cultures. Powerful narratives woven around the recurrent themes of the ‘Aircrew’ tradition may even transcend the explicit hierarchies of rank.
The influence of unconstructive ideas of power has long been recognised as a concern in professional aviation research. In 1979, the National Transportation Safety Board identified the unconstructive application of power by aircraft captains – and the corresponding timidity of junior crewmembers – as causal
5 Department of Defence, Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture, Australian Government, 2012, Message from the Secretary and Chief of Defence Force: “Pathway to Change is a five year programme of integrated and far-reaching efforts to tackle cultural challenges at their roots.” 6 Pathway to Change, 2012, p. 1: The catalyst for the six most recent reviews was a combination of Force 2030 (the Australia Defence White Paper – Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, 2009, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra) which states “we have strategic challenges ahead that require us to be even better in our approach to work and in our dealings with each other” and, a number of unsavoury events had occurred, thus “recent events remind us that we need to ensure our people demonstrate exemplary behaviour commensurate with the nation’s expectations, in and out of uniform, on and off duty.” 7 The term unconstructive is used to describe behaviour that does not have a useful or beneficial purpose; behaviour that has a negative impact and detracts from positive progress. 8 This idea is self-explanatory and describes the misinterpretation and misapplication of power and authority. The phrase ‘unconstructive ideas of power’ is not used in a technical sense, but rather more generally. It refers to the mishandling of authority, the misemployment of influence and the overstatement of prerogative. It has a corrosive effect on the intricate network of trust and confidence, which makes organisations more the mere goal-directed agglomerates. 2 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
factors in the 1978 loss of a United Airlines aircraft.9 The National Transportation Safety Board Accident Report observed:
The stature of a Captain, and his management style, may exert subtle pressure on the crew to conform to his way of thinking. It may hinder his interaction and force another crew member to yield his right to express an opinion.10
The Report illustrates similarly dangerous parallels with the RNZAF culture. Underlining the established connection between unconstructive ideas of power and aggregated organisational risk, the Royal Commission investigating the 28 November 1979 crash of Air New Zealand DC-10 (Flight 901) into Mt. Erebus, Ross Island, Antarctica observed:
It is the inherent responsibility of every crew member, if he (or she) is unsure, unhappy, or whatever, to question the pilot in command as to the nature of his (or her) concern. Indeed, it would not be going too far to say that, if a pilot in command were to create an atmosphere whereby one of their crew members would be hesitant to comment on any action then he would be failing in his duty as pilot in command.11
Each of these Reports identified the unconstructive over-emphasis of positional power, and connected the overstatement of power to risk and accident. Not valuing collaboration enough, aircraft captains were seen, even unconsciously, to have instigated an unsafe tentativeness in junior aircrew. Power as dominance, as the authority of one over others, textured the atmosphere and fuelled risk. This thesis is informed by the causal interconnection between unconstructive ideas about power and organisational risk. It is interested in the way power operates to distort ideas of leadership, and the way these ideas percolate through the
9 H.W. Orlady and H.C. Foushee, (eds), Cockpit Resource Management Training, NASA Conference Publication 2455, NASA-Ames Research Center: Moffit Field, CA, 1987. 10 National Transportation Safety Board, Aircraft Accident Report: United Airlines, Inc., Douglas DC-8-54, N8082U, Portland Oregon, December 28, 1978, (NTSB-AAR-79-7), Washington DC. 11 H.W. Orlady and L.M. Orlady, Human Factors in Multi-Crew Flight Operations, Ashgate: Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore and Sydney, 1999, p. 285, citing Vette, 1983, original emphasis: Evidence given at the public enquiry of the Erebus crash by a New Zealand Airline Pilots Association representative. 3 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
organisational fabric. More generally, the study looks at the way power qua dominance influences the narrative of social inequality.
Deborah Snow, writing in The Sydney Morning Herald of 22 August 2012,13 quotes the Australian Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick. The Commissioner describes the ‘warrior culture’ as a significant problem for the ADF. Observing an organisational culture which threatens the long-term viability of the Defence Force, the Commissioner tells of the ‘systemic, cultural and practical impediments’ to changing the internal culture of the armed forces. While many of these systemic impediments14 reflect the practical demands of military operations, many do not. Largely unacknowledged, many of the deep-rooted systemic problems confronting the military reflect unconstructive ideas of power. These ideas are entrenched in the arguments of military doctrine (defined as “the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of their nations objectives”)15 and established in the patterns of military fraternity. These ideas of power are not merely tolerated; they are encouraged and disguised by the affirming language of ‘strong leadership’.
The importance of this study is illustrated by a recent case in the United States Air Force (USAF), whereby the criminal conviction of a standout fighter pilot, was arguably wrongly overturned “based on insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”17 A public outcry and concern from Congress quickly
13 Deborah Snow, ‘Broderick has military revolution in mind’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 2012, at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/broderick-has-military-revolution-in-mind- 20120822-24m8v.html 14 Huba Wass de Czege, ‘Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in Complex Missions’, Military Review, 2009. Practical systemic impediments include barriers of time, space, and geography. 15 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP-D): Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Department of Defence, Australian Government, 2005, p.p. iii, 1-1, 1-2: The principles of doctrine are not unchangeable, and nor are they to be read as rules; they are provided for guidance. Whilst authoritative, doctrine requires careful judgement in application. 17 Craig Whitlock, ‘Air Force general’s reversal of pilot’s conviction for sexual assault angers lawmakers’, The Washington Post, 09 March 2013, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/air-force-generals-reversal-of-pilots- sexual-assault-conviction-angers-lawmakers/2013/03/08/f84b49c2-8816-11e2-8646- d574216d3c8c_story.html: Wilkerson, an F-16 fighter pilot who had flown missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, was serving as the acting inspector general at Aviano Air Base, Italy, when he was charged and found guilty of sexually assaulting a 49-year-old woman (an independent civilian contractor at the base). 4 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
ensued, with one Senator commenting, “It looks like somebody taking care of one of their guys.”20
This thesis explores ideas that are infused within the so-called ‘warrior culture’. It offers an alternative perspective, unravelling some of the complexity that lies unseen behind the rhetoric. The study considers these unconstructive ideas of power and explains the risk associated with how they find expression in the RNZAF. While the focus is specifically the RNZAF, this is not to confine the argument. Rather the specificity of enquiry enables ideas to be brought to a sharp focus. The argument draws useful parallels to the Navy and Army – but the cultural nuances of these services are not explored forensically. While this study is focused on what has been described as the ‘warrior culture’, and on the particular manifestation of this culture in the RNZAF, it is mindful that similar cultural mores exist and indeed thrive – and with a comparable detrimental effect.22 The explicit attention of this thesis is upon the RNZAF, and upon the characters, stereotypes and myths, which give life to the ‘warrior culture’ identified as so worrisome for the ADF by Commissioner Broderick. For the purposes of this study and in line with doctrine,23 the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the RNZAF, and the ADF and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) are viewed as having similar cultures.
Thesis Framework
Figure One depicts the structural and analytic framework of this thesis: the ‘Three Shades of Blue’. ‘Blue’, a mainstream denotation of the Air Force is expressed rhetorically in three shades. In this thesis, the shades stand for three different memes: ‘Aircrew’, ‘Maintenance Crew’ and ‘Support Crew’. These are metaphors or word pictures, each a partial and complementary allegory of Air Force culture,
20 Whitlock, ‘Air Force general’s reversal of pilot’s conviction for sexual assault angers lawmakers’, 09 March 2013. 22 An article in The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 2012, by Michael Cowley, ‘Kowalski admits concern at swimming team culture at Games’ emphasises that the masculine, unsophisticated ‘jock’ culture has wide social currency and a typically unconstructive net effect, viewed 12 September 2012, at http://www.smh.com.au/sport/swimming/kowalski-admits-concern-at- swimming-team-culture-at-games-20120912-25rdy.html. 23 Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP 00.6): Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, Australian Government, 2007, p. 3-9. 5 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
and each illustrative of the overarching claim that cultural change is impaired by entrenched, unconstructive interpretations of power.
Character Category Concept Impact Effect
‘Aircrew’ - The Combat Unconstructive ideas Perpetuates the Increased air Warrior of power culture and accidents (Chapter Three) Dominance benefits from it Elitism
‘Maintenance Combat Submission Reinforces the Decline in Crew’ - The Support Subservience culture maintenance Warrior Enabler Excessive deference standards (Chapter Four)
‘Support Crew’ - Combat Gender bias Supports the Under- The Non-Warrior Services against women culture, but representation of (Chapter Five) Support adversely women affected by it
Figure One
Formalised in military doctrine and tacit within the fabric of military culture, organisational characters – such as ‘Aircrew’ – illuminate and give social expression to unspoken, yet significant cultural beliefs. These characters are organisational stereotypes, part of the inherited tradition which is captured in the inclusive idea of organisational culture. They are seen by this thesis to mean “culturally created and imaginatively constructed artefacts.”26
Unconstructive ideas of power find expression in certain conspicuous military characters. For the purposes of this study these have been conceived as the characters of ‘Aircrew’ – The Warrior, ‘Maintenance Crew’ – The Warrior Enabler and ‘Support Crew’ – The Non-Warrior. Despite being focused centrally
26 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 3. 6 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
on cultural ideas in the RNZAF, they are also evident in other military stereotypes: 29 the Navy Principal Warfare Officer, dominating the ship’s operations room and bridge and the Army Sergeant Major yelling on a parade square come to mind. Regardless of the scenario, the symbolism is the same – a dominant senior and a subservient junior who obeys without question. In many cases the stereotype is merely myth. In other cases stereotypical ‘characters’ bear a close relationship to reality. Myths are defined as “ways of comprehending experience; they give order to our lives.”30 The term myth implies that everyone in a particular society perceives the ideologies as explanations for how the world is – not that they are either true or false. 31 Recognising the gulf between fact and fiction, this thesis interrogates the meaning and the repercussion of organisational myths and characters in the RNZAF.
Aim of the Research
In order to make a contribution to the RNZAF narrative and assist with growth and learning, this study defines and examines the damaging effects of unconstructive ideas of power within the RNZAF, through the examination of three characters, ‘Aircrew’, ‘Maintenance Crew’, and ‘Support Crew’. Reported recently in the public domain,32 Elizabeth Broderick is noted to have identified the ‘warrior culture’ as a significant problem for the ADF, however she did not identify formal or explicit articulation of ideas she saw as ‘warrior-like’. The so- called ‘warrior culture’ does however find expression in the tenets of doctrine. This study unpacks the characters, which vest doctrinal argument with cultural meaning.33 Formalised doctrinal reasoning is significant because the NZDF uses
29 David J. Schneider, The Psychology of Stereotyping, The Guildford Press, New York, 2004, p. 24: This thesis understands stereotypes to be “qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people.” 30 G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press, 1980, p.p. 185-6. 31 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors we live by, 1980, p.p. 185-6. 32 See Deborah Snow, ‘Broderick wants ADF to temper its Warrior Culture’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August 2012, at http://www.smh.com.au/national/broderick-wants-adf-to-temper-its- warrior-culture-20120822-24msk.html; and, Deborah Snow, ‘Broderick has military revolution in mind’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 2012, at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/broderick- has-military-revolution-in-mind-20120822-24m8v.html; 33 Specifically, ADDP 00.6, 2007. 7 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Australian doctrine as the cornerstone of professional military thinking.34 Beyond the themes of doctrinal argument, this thesis explores how unconstructive ideas of power are discernable in RNZAF culture. It illuminates ‘Aircrew’ as a symbol for omnipresent, influential and yet tacit unconstructive ideas of power. These ideas operate beside cultural artefacts such as formal rank hierarchies, and this study asserts that the dominant ‘Aircrew’ culture exists in symbiosis with the subservient cultures of ‘Maintenance Crew’ and ‘Support Crew’. Doctrine supports this assertion by acknowledging “followers shape leader behaviour,”35 and by recognising “relationships that develop between leaders and followers in organisations impact on job satisfaction, organisational performance and turnover.” 36 This thesis explores the negative organisational effect of these relationships and recommends practical steps that can be taken to remedy the situation.
This thesis brings the idea of power to the fore as a conceptual tool, where it finds expression and is articulated in the stereotype or character of ‘Aircrew’. These unconstructive ideas of power also find expression in the unhelpful use of the ‘warrior’ and ‘warrior ideas’. These ideas are expressed in the unconstructive reading of ‘Aircrew’, the unconstructive reading of hyper-competitiveness, and the masculine ideas that are embedded in the ‘warrior culture’. Too much attention is given to aggressive, pugnacious ideas and by doing so critical attention is lost from the collaborative, collegial ideas that could enhance the Air Force and make it safe and inclusive for all. There is a place for the ‘warrior’ ideal, however its overemphasis draws attention away from other more inclusive ideas.
This thesis acknowledges the cultural inheritance which defines and enriches military service. Specifically this study recognises the benefits which derive from a culture rich with tradition. However, this is not a thesis which examines the advantage of the military’s cultural endowment. Rather, it directs its attention
34 New Zealand Defence Force Doctrine Publication (NZDDP-D), Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine, Department of Defence, New Zealand Government, 2008, p. 7-3. 35 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-18. 36 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-19. 8 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
toward the unhelpful and less advantageous aspects of the cultural foundations which define military life.
Methodology
This thesis sets out a qualitative 37 narrative analysis. Narrative analysis is an approach used to study organisations38 and it takes as its object of investigation the story39 itself.”40 The technique of purposeful sampling41 is used; cases of study (events 42 ) have been selected because they are information-rich, demonstrate abstract ideas, and offer insight about the phenomena.43
The emphasis in this study is on understanding social phenomena,44 through the analysis of artefacts, documentation, seminal text, and historical published cases. Construing the meaning of social action and exploring the way in which actions affect organisational performance allows us to understand better how the military operates at the human level. This perspective acknowledges that the world is not transparent and we often operate in ways that mask the truth. It allows us to challenge assumptions, not take things at face value, and enables us to delve deeper and search for broader meaning. Just like gestalt shift pictures, where in one we see an old woman, and yet if we change our focus we can see a young
37 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4th Edition, Sage, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, & Washington DC, 2011, p. 8: Qualitative research places “emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured…The stress in on the socially constructed nature of reality; on how social experience is created and given meaning.”; Christine Bold, Using Narrative in Research, Sage, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore & Washington DC, 2012, p. 174: “Qualitative research does not claim to provide definitive truths, but instead raises further areas of concern to explore and change.” 38 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3rd edition, Thousand Oaks: London & New Delhi, 2002, p. 118. 39 Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 2002, p. 116: “Stories and narrative offer especially translucent windows into cultural and social meanings.” 40 Catherine Kohler Riessman, Narrative Analysis, Qualitative Research Methods Series 30, A Sage University Paper, Newbury Park, London & New Delhi, 1993, p. 1. 41 Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 2002, p. 230. 42 Bold, Using Narrative in Research, 2012, p.p. 15-6: “An ‘event’ is something that has happened to a person or thing, at a particular time or in a particular situation. Narrative necessarily tells the events of human lives, reflects human interest and supports our sense making process.” 43 Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 2002, p.p. 40, 45-6. 44 Bold, Using Narrative in Research, 2012, p. 13: “A common factor among many who use narrative in research is a belief in the importance of subjective meaning and emotion in making sense of social events and settings.” 9 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
woman. These pictures remind us that “our initial perception may not be accurate and that we need to look differently at the world around us.”45
Literature Review
This thesis has drawn, in the main, on the sociological literature, with a focus on the investigations of Edgar Schein and Karl Weick. These researchers are significant because they established how ideas that are formally articulated have cultural relevance. Schein defines the ideas of organisational culture as “group norms, espoused values, formal philosophy, rules of the game, climate, embedded skills, habits of thinking, shared meanings, root metaphors, and formal rituals and celebrations.”48 His description of the “broad policies and ideological principles”49 that guides group thinking and action, confirms military doctrine as an influential cultural artefact. Weick emphasises sensemaking in organisations and he defines it as “the ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs.”50 To facilitate sensemaking, people draw on “institutional constraints, organisational premises, plans, expectations, acceptable justifications and inherited traditions.”51
The sociologist and educationalist Tony Kern has also informed this study. Formerly a pilot, Kern has made a strong contribution to the field of aviation. His research 52 explains how unconstructive ideas of power, so pervasive in the cockpit, are the inevitable precursors of aviation disaster, which negatively impacts on organisational performance. Sociologist Diane Vaughan’s work53 is also drawn upon, as she explains the impact of organisational culture on accidents, in particular the ‘dark side’ (deviance and compliance). Her research demonstrates
45 David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, Cornell University Press, USA, 2009, p. 15. 48 Schein, Edgar H., Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th edition, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, CA, 2010, p.p. 14-6. 49 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2010, p. 15. 50 Karl E. Weick, ‘The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1993, p.p. 628-52, p. 635. 51 Karl E. Weick, Kathleen M. Sutcliffe and David Obstfeld, ‘Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking’, Organization Science, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2005, p.p. 409-421, p. 409. 52 Tony Kern, Darker Shades of Blue: The Rogue Pilot, McGraw-Hill, Washington, 1999. 53 Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, The University of Chicago Press, 1996. 10 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
how the social aspects of an organisation affect individual decision-making and action.54
The work of James MacGregor Burns,55 Bernard Bass,56 and Bruce Avolio57 has informed the approach taken in this work to leadership. Burns progresses the idea of Transformational Leadership, asserting that leadership is a dyadic relationship between the leader and follower. He also claims that Transformational Leadership rests on the ongoing moral development of both leaders and followers, and results in increased follower motivation and performance. His thinking frames the present analysis, which seeks to demonstrate how less responsive theories are becoming increasingly out of step with the demands of the modern military. The ideas of Burns coincide with theories advanced by Joanne Ciulla, 58 who highlights the ethical component of leadership, and Gary Yukl,59 who brought to light ideas on power and how it influences behaviour and leadership effectiveness.
Besides sociology, this thesis has drawn upon a specific professional literature – military doctrine. The ideas of doctrine are meaningful as they are formal expressions of military philosophy. In particular this study draws upon ADF doctrine, specifically the capstone document Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP)-D: Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, which outlines the philosophical strategic intent of the ADF. It is also informed by two documents from the ADF Executive Series of doctrine, namely ADDP-00.1: Command and Control, which provides guidance to commanders and contains both philosophical and functional aspects of command, and by ADDP-00.6: Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, which describes the required basic leadership tenets, principles, and behaviours.
54 Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, 1996. 55 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, HarperCollins: New York, 2010 (1979). 56 Bernard M. Bass, Leadership and Performance, Free Press, New York, 1985; Bernard M. Bass and Ronald E. Riggio, Transformational Leadership, 2nd edition, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey, 2008. 57 Bernard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio, Improving Organizational Effectiveness through Transformational Leadership, Sage: California, London, New Delhi, 1994; Bruce J. Avolio, Full Range Leader Development, 2nd edition, Sage: California, London, New Delhi, Singapore, 2011. 58 Joanne B. Ciulla, The Ethics of Leadership, Wadsworth Publishing, 2002; Ethics, the heart of Leadership, Praeger Publishers, 2004. 59 Gary Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 8th edition, Prentice-Hall, 2012. 11 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Recently published Australian government reports are also referred to. These reports, reflecting significant research and investigative effort, give some insight into how it is that the military is still struggling to shake off the shackles of long- standing cultural issues. Lastly, this thesis is informed by the Australian Human Rights Commissioner’s review into the treatment of women in the ADF, as well as numerous official military documents, such as Investigation Board Reports and Boards and Courts of Inquiry.
Background
Militaries are hierarchical organisations where every person in the organisation subordinates to another person. Power is identifiable as rank and this ranking system is understood throughout military history as being conducive to the conduct of operations.60 This structure also creates a class system and hierarchy reliant on “credentialing for the presumption of competence, and on a culture of obedience and careerism to guarantee the correct attitude toward the values of the hierarchy.” 63 The groupthink and inefficiency typical of such structures 64 is endorsed by the tacit allegory of cultural stereotypes, and by explicit, corroborating doctrinal argument. An example of this is seen in ADF Leadership doctrine which maintains that
Within the Navy there are the seaman or submariners – and then the rest. In the Army there are combat arms, then support corps, and then the rest. In the Royal Australian Air Force it is fast jet pilots first, other pilots second and then the rest.65
This comment is nested in the section titled ‘Tribal Nature of Defence’, and while it is acknowledged that later comment decries this culture and urges leaders to suppress it, by actually writing about it doctrine demonstrates the institutional
60 Allan Mazur, Biosociology of Dominance and Deference, Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland, USA, 2005, p. 9: Emphasising why hierarchies are essential Mazur states that without them “operations would be chaotic; there would be no coordination or effective task implementation.” 63 Kevin A. Carson, Organization Theory: A Libertarian Perspective, BookSurge, Charleston, SC, 2008, p. 256. 64 Carson, Organizational Theory, p.p. 163-64. 65 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-3. 12 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
recognition of myths – ideas which exert pervasive influence, yet evade rational scrutiny. Exploring mythologised ideas and their practical effect, this thesis is not about individuals, but about the ideas which inform and frame individual conduct and social choice. Expressed in the cultural characters of ‘Aircrew’, ‘Maintenance Crew’ and ‘Support Crew’, myths surrounding these groups are ever present in military life. Organic to the cultural fabric, mythologised ideas become conventional wisdom, which operate to frame explicit doctrinal ideas.
In the RNZAF, the dominant group is ‘Aircrew’. Invariably masculine, the ‘Aircrew’ myth defines the prevailing culture. Misunderstandings caused by this structure and social classes are evident, and present some risk to the organisation. These ideas of power give the appearance of a ‘hollow mask’. Even though we understand that it is merely a ‘mask’, a myth, these ideas are still threatening, and there are associated consequences and risk, such as an increase in accidents, the decline in maintenance standards and the under-representation of women in the Service. This thesis is more than just about the myth; it is about ideas, which in rhetoric assume a dangerous dimension. This study attaches to the ideas and argument found in doctrine and to the culture observed and experienced in the RNZAF.
Mindful of the example68 set by Kern,69 author of Darker Shades of Blue: The Rogue Pilot, this thesis is not a criticism of ‘Aircrew’, but rather it examines and challenges the effect of unconstructive ideas of power. We need people to fly aeroplanes and do courageous things, but we also need to understand the downside – the negative effects of this type of culture. This study is not about ‘Aircrew’ per se; it is about the myth that has grown up surrounding them and the unconstructive entrapment that may occur because of it. The ‘warrior culture’ informs the myth, and as identified by Commissioner Broderick, the myth sets a trap and drives up organisational risk.
68 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. xviii: Kern stated that one of his fears in writing Darker Shades of Blue was that he “would be accused of wagging a condescending finger of blame at dead pilots and that was certainly not my purpose”; p. 3, that the goal of his book is “to contribute to personal and organisational health and development”; and p. 4, “to help individuals and organisations create safeguards without stifling creativity or innovation in the process.” 69 Kern is recognised as one of the world’s leading authorities on human performance in aviation and an expert in the field of applied human factors and performance improvement. 13 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
This thesis acknowledges the proud and successful history of the RNZAF. It is an extremely capable organisation of volunteers; dedicated men and women who discharge their duties with a high degree of professionalism. This study acknowledges too that there is a place for constructive power in the military. Coincident with ideas of resolute clear thinking and audacious decision, the constructive, appropriately assertive and purposeful ideas of power describe essential requirements for success in combat. In many ways there are positive aspects to the myths explored in this thesis – they can add to tradition and inspire individuals to excel and emulate feats of others who have demonstrated bravery and courage. This study does not critique these notions. Rather, it aims to highlight the problems associated with the predominance of a ‘warrior culture’.
Thesis Outline
This thesis is interested in Air Force culture and explores three significant characters. ‘Aircrew’ is the dominant theme and is contextualised by two subordinate themes – ‘Maintenance Crew’ and ‘Support Crew’. Well-known, pertinent cases and events are explored to illuminate and demonstrate the significance of unconstructive ideas of power. They are reflected upon as observations from them can assist learning and enhance success in organisations that are involved in complex, high-risk endeavours. These cases and events act as a lens through which organisations can reflect on their own performance, and this can aid planning for the future.70
Chapter Two helps contextualise the cases and events that are analysed in subsequent chapters, by way of exposing key concepts and themes. Firstly, doctrine and the link to unconstructive ideas of power are investigated with the examination of ADF leadership doctrine. Organisational culture, in particular the concepts of social ordering, tribalism and power, obedience, conformity and the normalisation of deviance are explored. The chapter closes by explaining how unconstructive ideas of power find expression in Service life. These themes and
70 William H. Starbuck and Moshe Farjoun, Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Colombia Disaster, Blackwell Publishing: USA, UK and Australia, 2005, p. xix. 14 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
concepts are explored in this chapter as they are central to the abstract ideas explored in the thesis.
Chapter Three establishes ‘Aircrew’ as the prevailing idea in the Air Force and they are prevailing within this thesis. They can be described as ‘the top of the pyramid’, ‘technically proficient’, and ‘risk takers’. This thesis understands the character of ‘Aircrew’ infuses every aspect of Air Force life and acts to dominate and suffocate ‘Maintenance Crew’ and ‘Support Crew’. ‘Aircrew’ operate to outshine these subordinate themes. Drawing on the USAF Czar 52 and Sitka 43 accidents as well as recent RNZAF accidents, this chapter exposes the ‘Aircrew’ myth and illustrates that unconstructive ideas of power serve to increase risk. This discussion supports the central thesis of ‘Aircrew’ demonstrating dominance that has deleterious effects on flying safety, standards in aircraft maintenance and the representation of women in the Air Force.
In Chapter Four, ‘Maintenance Crew’ the first subordinate theme in this thesis is explored. They can be described as ‘cautious’, ‘technically competent’, and ‘subservient’. ‘Maintenance Crew’ is a signifier for the Air Force maintenance culture, which is seen to be submissive and second-class. They are chosen as a signifier because next to human error, maintenance error is the single largest cause of aviation accidents.71 In this chapter the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Sea King N16-100 accident, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Challenger and Columbia disasters, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) Nimrod XV230 accident are used to investigate characters who are identified as ‘Maintenance Crew’. These cases highlight leadership failures, the marginalisation and powerlessness of maintenance personnel, and the normalisation of deviance. They reveal that unconstructive ideas of power suffocate effective maintenance cultures and increase the risk of accidents.
In Chapter Five, we find that just as maintainers are submissive and treated as
71 Boeing, AERO, 2007, p. 16, at http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/qtr_2_07/AERO_Q207.pdf : “The 2003 International Air Transport Association Safety Report found that in 24 of 93 accidents (26%), a maintenance-caused event started the accident chain. Overall, humans are the largest cause of all airplane accidents.” 15 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
second-class, so too are women. The second subordinate theme is ‘Support Crew’; the character used in this study to depict the concept of gender bias against women. They can be described as ‘incompetent’, ‘atypical’, and ‘submissive’. They are chosen as a subordinate theme, as we often miss sexist and discriminatory themes as they permeate modern life.72 The cases of Tailhook ‘91 and HMAS73 Success, coupled with two recent ADF Reports (the DLA Piper Report and The Broderick Report) are used to examine the character of ‘Support Crew’. The cases highlight the submissive role of women in the military, and the challenge with gender integration in a ‘warrior culture’. This thesis analyses these cases because until the military eliminates gender bias, this culture and associated behaviour will prevail and women in the Air Force workforce will continue to be under-represented.
Concluding discussion considers some of the practical issues which may need to be resolved in order to rejuvenate the organisational culture of the RNZAF. Some ideas are offered for consideration that, while requiring greater exploration, could assist with cultural change and greater inclusiveness.
Future Research
Using cases and events, this study examines unconstructive ideas of power and characters and connects these ideas to thinking about leadership. In doing so, the study points to the possibilities of future research, particularly research investigating ideas of command and leadership. Doctrine is important and we need to be mindful of the messages that it sends. Future research will be productive if
72 An example of this is the tendency to link incompetence with women. Whilst physiological differences between the sexes are acknowledged, there exist overarching and covert ideas of limitation that marginalise women. An example of this, which made headlines recently, was a move by the mayor of the German town of Triberg. He has reserved larger parking spaces for women, arguing they are necessary as women are worse at parking than men. See Allan Hall, ‘Achtung! German mayor risks sexism row by designating tricky parking slots as men only’, Daily Main Online, 10 July 2012, at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2171709/Triberg-mayor-risks- sexism-row-designating-tricky-parking-slots-men-only.html; Matthew Day, ‘Easy parking spots for women introduced by German mayor’, The Telegraph, 11 July 2012, athttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/9393451/Easy-parking-spots-for- women-introduced-by-German-mayor.html; Viknesh Vijayenthiran, ‘Town introduces easy parking spots for women’, Fox News, at http://www.foxnews.com/leisure/2012/07/12/town-introduces-easy- parking-spots-for-women/ 73 HMAS is the acronym for Her Majesty’s Australian Ship. 16 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
attention were given to questioning whether the RNZAF have developed and are maintaining an inclusive work environment, where all personnel are treated fairly. The Courts of Inquiry into the recent RNZAF accidents could also be examined, with a view to developing them as case studies. The focus should be on the deeper organisational cultural aspects that contributed to the tragedies. The vision should be to utilise them in education and training, as real and relevant lessons that the RNZAF ought to observe.
Conclusion
This thesis asserts that the dominant and elite ‘Aircrew’ culture co-exists with the submissive cultures of ‘Maintenance Crew’ and ‘Support Crew’, and explores the organisational effect and inherent risk associated with these relationships. It is about unconstructive ideas of power that are formally expressed in doctrine, and that find practice in the workplace, such as incidents, accidents and the submission of ‘Other’. This thesis is not merely about disenfranchisement of marginalised groups, but about how these ideas contribute towards the creation of an unhelpful environment. Exploring them is important because it enables an appreciation of the effect on organisational performance.
This study acknowledges that the military’s raison d’être is predominantly combat, and it acknowledges that power is an essential requirement for success in combat. However, it posits that a ‘warrior culture’ is not necessary to maintain security and fulfil defence responsibilities. There are unacceptable aspects of contemporary military life that need to be addressed. A more inclusive approach and sophisticated way of thinking, rather than simply a ‘warrior culture’ is necessary in a truly modern military environment.
17 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Chapter Two
Concepts and Themes
This chapter explores themes and concepts central to the thesis. The diagram below (Figure Two) depicts how these concepts and themes interrelate and affect organisational performance. Aircraft achieve operational excellence by being manufactured according to exact technical regulations, and maintenance routines are strictly adhered to in order to ensure safe flight. In this diagram the ‘plane’ is used to depict the relationships between three key Air Force components – Doctrine, Organisational Culture and People. If any of these components are sub- optimal, deficient or ‘cracked’ then structural integrity is compromised, and operational excellence and organisational performance is adversely impacted.
Figure Two
This chapter is structured in three parts. The first part delves into the ‘Wing of Doctrine’ and throws light on unconstructive ideas of power, revealing that they are culturally powerful, often unspoken, and yet sometimes explicit in doctrine. In part two, the ‘Wing of Culture’ is explored and discussion concerns notions of organisational culture, social ordering, tribalism and power, obedience, conformity and the normalisation of deviance. These concepts are seen to play a significant part in military life and are present in the cases explored in later chapters. Unconstructive ideas of power articulated in doctrine are seen in part three (the ‘Body of People’) to find expression in the conversations, which
18 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
pervade and structure Service life. Accepting that doctrinal thinking finds expression in social practice, this chapter examines the proclivities of Service life, which underline and legitimate doctrinal reasoning.
The ‘Wing of Doctrine’
Figure Three
Doctrine provides a military organisation with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.75
In broad terms, doctrine is understood to be the prescribed expression of organisational culture and thinking. Additionally, this thesis understands that some ideas are doctrinal though they may not be written down.76 In a thesis that examines ideas of strength and power in the military, and which emphasises the need for greater moral responsibility and individual moral autonomy, the researcher Richard Adams established that “doctrine is foundational to the normative self-understanding which…defines the profession’s corporate identity (and) its code of conduct.” 77 Adams asserts that doctrine is more than just a
75 NZDDP-D, 2008, p. 1-2, citing General George H. Decker, Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1960-62. 76 Paul Latawski, ‘The Inherent Tensions in Military Doctrine’, Sandhurst Occasional Paper, No. 5, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2011, p. 8: Citing Jim Storr, The Human Face of War, London: Continuum, 2009, p. 189: “Doctrine can be both explicit (written down and published) and implicit (received wisdom and the way things are done).” 77 Richard Adams, (Unpublished thesis), ‘Strength and Power: Ideas of Moral Autonomy within Australian Doctrine’, University College, the University of New South Wales, 2012, p. 16, at http://www.unsworks.unsw.edu.au/primo_library/libweb/action/dlDisplay.do?vid=UNSWORKS&d ocId=unsworks_10835 19 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Service manual isolated from culture; rather, it is an inherent component within the universal culture. Doctrine is seen to be more than formally written guidance taught to “establish the rules of the game which are foundational to military culture, identity and ethos.”78 Doctrine is understood to describe ideas, which have a particular and pervasive meaning, and is seen as a large and expansive idea connected to and illuminated by the substantial literature dealing with organisational culture.
Unconstructive ideas of power illustrated in ADDP 00.6: Leadership in the Australian Defence Force
Doctrine, published in 2007, guides the development of leadership in the ADF, by describing basic tenets, principles, and behaviours necessary for leadership. It examines values-based leadership, the effects of leadership on culture and the role of leaders and followers. Significantly, it introduces what it terms ‘controversial issues’, such as cultural alignment, gender, diversity and adaptive change,79 and in doing so expresses the organisational desire to embrace and adapt to new social trends and standards. However, some key themes are apparent which this thesis asserts serves to detract from its overall aim.
A picture paints a thousand words. In doctrine, eleven photographs reveal only a single notion. Five pictures depict very senior male commanders. Four pictures feature senior male Non-Commissioned Officers. In one picture, the rank of the male soldier is not discernable. Lastly, one picture shows a female junior rating, and this photo is included in the section on Diversity, labelled ‘Gender’. These pictures, their subject matter and narrow focus, reveal doctrine’s logical mistake – the confusion of leadership with command. Leadership is defined as “the process of influencing others in order to gain their willing consent in the ethical pursuit of missions.”83 Whereas command is defined as “the authority which a commander in a military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or
78 Adams, ‘Strength and Power’, 2012, p. 10, citing C. Downes, An Ethos for an Army in the Twenty First Century, 1998, p. 67; and, D. M. Rousseau, ‘Why Workers Still Identify With Organisations’, Journal of Organisational Behaviour, Vol. 19, 1998, p. 217. 79 ADDP-D, 2005, p. iv. 83 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-5. 20 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
assignment.” 84 The photographs also reveal doctrine’s hidden bias – the assumption that leadership in the military is invariably masculine.
ADF doctrine, prescribed for use by the NZDF, also uses historical vignettes to expand key leadership concepts. Of the eighteen vignettes in Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, thirteen relate to senior commanders. The rhetorical effect of the emphasis upon rank seniority blurs ideas of leadership and ideas of command. Only two vignettes relate meaningfully to junior officers or to enlisted personnel. In only one vignette is rank immaterial. Of the eighteen vignettes, thirteen refer to ‘Aircrew’, three could be deemed to refer to ‘Maintenance Crew’, and two feature women. This evident bias underlines doctrine’s assumption that military leadership is necessarily masculine. The bias is emphasised by the tone with which women are discussed and considered. For example, describing Group Captain Clare Stevenson the first Director of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force, doctrine’s narrative effort is to lionise the efforts of Defence to be diverse and inclusive. Under the heading ‘Diversity’ women are described almost as a curiosity. There is muted amazement that women have performed creditably “doing jobs never before performed by females in Australia.”85 Group Captain Stevenson stated that she faced “discrimination, difficulty, and loneliness”86 in the 1940’s, and the outcomes of Commissioner Broderick’s recent review (particularly around representation of women at senior levels), suggests that perhaps little has changed. Doctrine acknowledges this by stating “negative perceptions are evident in the ADF where some long serving members tend to have negative attitudes about women occupying leadership roles.”87
The prevalence in doctrine of quotes that pertain chiefly to men, of senior rank, who are members of ‘Aircrew’, further reinforces the marginalisation of ‘Other’. Of the seventeen direct quotes used to amplify the narrative of doctrine, all are quotations from men. Four are attributed to academics, and the remaining thirteen are quotes credited to military men, invariably of very senior rank. Of the seventeen quotes, seven portray men of senior rank. Ten do not distinguish
84 ADDP-D, 2005, p. 4. 85 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-10. 86 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-10. 87 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-10. 21 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
gender.
The theme is apparent. Doctrine, through its use of pictures, quotes and vignettes that predominantly concern men of senior rank, unwittingly perpetuates the marginalisation of ‘Other’ (in particular women) and further adds to the confusion surrounding leadership. The minimal inclusion of and reference to women in doctrine does not engender the perception of an environment that is inclusive, and may detrimentally impact on women’s ability to aspire to senior positions in the military.
Doctrine says one thing, but expresses another. Doctrine states, for example, that “leadership is an everyday occurrence and it does not necessarily belong with a position or title,” 88 while holding that leaders “invariably occup[y] a formal position.”89 Espousing leadership at all levels, doctrine divorces leadership from rank or position. Yet this line of reasoning is undercut by the plethora of pictures featuring senior commanders. Doctrine states “leadership in the military should not be confused with command,” 90 and “command, compliance and discipline should not be confused with leadership.”91 Doctrine acknowledges command and leadership are separate ideas and not interchangeable. Yet, doctrine falls foul of this very confusion.
The language in doctrine is confusing, and language is important. It is more than just about semantics; there are practical consequences. Consciously or not, words have an effect; they influence actions, behaviours and relationships.92 Early on doctrine establishes that leadership concerns the language of ‘followership’, ‘followers’, ‘willing consent’, and so forth. However, in latter chapters doctrine uses the language of command synonymously with the language of leadership. Often, instead of using the term ‘follower’ to depict the willing participant involved in a relationship with the leader, doctrine refers to the ‘subordinate’. Coupled with this, the leader too is often discussed in terms of being the
88 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 2-2. 89 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 3-15. 90 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 2-2. 91 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 2-1. 92 Ann L. Cunliffe, A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book About Management, SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008, p. 8. 22 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
‘superior’, and leadership is discussed in terms such as ‘orders’, ‘discipline’, ‘chain of command’, and ‘superior commanders intent’.93 There is discussion too about leaders delegating authority;94 however, doctrine established earlier that authority is the purview of commanders. 95 The mixing of and interchanging between the language of command and the language of leadership, particularly throughout the latter stages of doctrine, characterises the confusion that surrounds these concepts. The entailing immanent tension is italicised by the photos, quotes, vignettes and language, which in doctrine underline the misapprehension of hard- edged command power for leadership influence.96
Confusing ideas of command for ideas of leadership, doctrine accords an unmistakeable cachet to mythologised notions of unconstructive ideas of power. Doctrine’s predominant messages underline prevailing, often-unhelpful cultural themes. In doctrine, men of senior rank glory in the reputation and machismo of renowned branches. These men are Principal Warfare Officers in the Navy, Infantry Officers in the Army, and ‘Aircrew’ in the Air Force. They are Cardinals, Princes of the Church in braided uniforms and distinguished positions. Doctrine’s tacit message is palpable. Not intended however to be a thesis on doctrine, this study uses doctrine to make a point; that point is apropos inequality and prejudice. While doctrine does in part seek to address long-standing and well-known cultural issues within the military, unconstructive ideas and themes remain conspicuous within its argument. These ideas are not only present in published doctrine, but also in the inexplicit doctrinal ideas which inform organisational culture.
The ‘Wing of Culture’
93 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 3-22. 94 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 3-23. 95 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-8: “…legitimate authority is not an example of leadership but rather an example of ‘command’.” 96 Sea Power Centre, The Royal Australian Navy Leadership Ethic, Royal Australian Navy, 2010, p. 20. Recognising the doctrinal tension, the RAN in their publication felt the need to highlight: “Leadership is neither masculine, nor feminine. Neither is leadership defined by attainment; countless tyrants achieve remarkable feats and many inspirational leaders – being overwhelmed by circumstances – fail to realise their ambitions. Leadership is not defined by high rank – people of junior rank often display inspirational leadership. Leadership is not related to age. In most cases age brings the benefit of experience, yet leadership is enriched more by the quality than by the quantity of experience.” 23 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Figure Four
Organisational culture is defined as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group.”97 It is understood to be the collective behaviour of a group98 – shared mental assumptions – which in turn guides interpretation and action, and thus defines appropriate behaviour. 99 Behaviour is influenced by culture and the “beliefs, norms, values and premises”100 of members of the military govern their conduct. Values are defined as “underlying and relatively stable dispositions, which people use to guide their actions and decisions and help them make judgements.”101 Values are generally deep, unwavering convictions that certain kinds of behaviour are preferable to others, and they have a powerful effect on how leaders structure their organisations.102 Beliefs are defined as “assumed facts about the world that do not involve evaluation.”103 They describe how concepts and ideas fit together and are not only learned through direct personal experience, but also through indirect influences. These indirect social reinforcers are potent fortifiers of beliefs. Beliefs have an ethical base (understanding the difference between right and wrong), whereas values are “socially constructed sets of
97 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2010, p. 18. 98 The groups in this thesis are firstly the wider, collective group of the members of the RNZAF. The members of the ‘Aircrew’, ‘Maintenance Crew’, and ‘Support Crew’ are sub-groups. 99 D. Ravasi and M. Schultz, ‘Responding to organizational identity threats: Exploring the role of organisational culture’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 49, 2006, p.p. 433-58, p. 437. 100Allan D. English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca, 2004, p. 10. 101 P. Hyde and B. Williams, ‘The importance of organisational values, Part 3: Choosing and implementing organisational values’, Focus on Change Management, Issue 63, 2000, p.p. 10-14, p. 10. 102 English, Understanding Military Culture, 2004, p. 11. 103 Gary Johns, Organizational Behavior, 2nd edition, Scott, Foresman: Boston, 1988, p.p. 117-8. 24 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
ideals.”104 Both values and beliefs are major contributors to organisational culture; they determine “perceptions, attitudes, expectations, language, interactions, and patterns of existence.” 105 Attitudes are defined as “a relatively enduring organisation of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner.” 106 Attitudes have two components – cognitive (opinions, beliefs, knowledge) and affective (emotional) and are products of beliefs and values. Attitudes therefore have a very strong influence on behaviour.
Organisational culture influences how people relate to each other and the way people believe they have to behave in order to ‘fit in’ with the group. The norms and values of a culture are the ‘rules’ by which its members operate. They are influenced by espoused values and underlying basic assumptions that are often not spoken about.107 Schein asserts a sense of group identity is a key component of culture, as it is the deepest, typically unconscious element of a group. It is less concrete and perceptible, yet it is pervasive and influences all aspects of an organisation. It ties beliefs, values and behaviours together, which Schein asserts is the very essence of culture.108 This patterning and integration evolves from the human need to make sense of an environment and to make it orderly. Coupled with formal articulated doctrine, people also draw on informal, unwritten doctrine to make sense of their surroundings. Weick argues that sensemaking requires more than just formal written doctrine. In order for people to make sense of things, understanding informal and unwritten rules is essential.
Leadership in the Australian Defence Force states “an organisation’s culture will determine who will lead and what leadership styles and behaviours are acceptable.” 109 This statement captions Figure 1-3, under the sub-heading ‘Culture’. Figure 1-3 is a photo of four young men pulling on a berthing line, appearing to play tug-o-war, with another man ‘yelling’ at them. This caption,
104 Kathleen MacLaurin, ‘Organizational Values and Cultural Diversity in the Canadian Forces: The Case of Aboriginal People’, in Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues, edited by Franklin C. Pinch, Allister T, MacIntyre, Phyllis Browne, and Alan C. Okros, Canadian Defence Academy Press: Kingston, Ontario, 2004, p. 148. 105 MacLaurin, ‘Organizational Values and Cultural Diversity in the Canadian Forces’, 2004, p. 148. 106 Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1972, p. 112. 107 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2010, p.p. 14-6. 108 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2010, p.p. 16-7, 32. 109 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-12. 25 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
combined with the representation of an all-male team, performing an activity that requires strength and power, under the instruction of another male who appears to be shouting instructions, sends a message. It could be construed that military leadership requires masculine strength and power.
Brian Martin in his book Uprooting War describes the military as a patriarchy, “where a set of social relationships provide for a collective domination of men over women.” 112 He describes ‘warriors’ as being specifically trained to use violence, be competitive and tough, and be masculine.
Dominance, confidence, strength, competition and rationality are seen as masculine, while submission, nurturing, caring, sensitivity and emotionality are seen as feminine. (Warriors are) trained to reject feminine characteristics of supportiveness, cooperativeness, tenderness and physical softness.113
There are useful aspects of a masculine ‘warrior culture’ paradigm; it is seen to bolster courage, promote aggression, and enhance group solidarity and a willingness to fight.114 At the extreme end of the spectrum of conflict, there is a requirement for controlled aggression and the use of violence in defence of self and others. The concern however, is the over-emphasis on a ‘warrior’ ethos that focuses on combat, to the exclusion of the other operational concepts and roles that Defence play in the security of the nation.
While military culture has shifted toward greater inclusion of ‘Other’, there still exists a ‘warrior culture’ paradigm that promotes homogeneity, separatism, and exclusion.115 Thus, there is a compelling need for change;116 in order to survive and thrive the military must adapt their culture to the changing environment.117
112 Brian Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984, p. 197. 113 Martin, Uprooting War, 1984, p. 197. 114 Mike Donaldson, ‘What is Hegemonic Masculinity?’, Theory and Society, Special Issue: Masculinities, Vol. 22, No. 5, 1993, p.p. 643-657, p. 644. 115 Karen O. Dunivin, Lt Col USAF, ‘Military Culture: A Paradigm Shift’, Air War College, Maxwell Paper No. 10, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1997, p.p. 2, 16, 17, 22; Jennings & Hannah, ‘The moralities of obligation and aspiration’, 2011, p.p. 1-22; Claire Duncanson, ‘Forces for Good? British Military Masculinities on Peace Support Operations’, The University of Edinburgh, 2007. 116 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 20. 117 Dunivin, ‘Military Culture A Paradigm Shift?’, 1997, p. 2; and, Karen D. Davis and Brian 26 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The prevailing culture must be one of “inclusiveness and heterogeneity, rather than exclusiveness and homogeneity.” 118 Thinking that validates the ‘warrior culture’ – that war is all about physical and masculine strength – is no longer relevant.119 The character of war is always changing, and as approaches to conflict evolve and technology develops we find that “there is more to war than simply warfighting.”120
Social Ordering
Ideas regarding social ordering can help explain how this thinking and culture have evolved. David Cannadine’s book Ornamentalism describes the dominant social metaphors in the texture of life. He describes nations as “imagined communities, depending on invented traditions, manufactured myths, and shared perceptions of the social order, that are never more than crude categories and oversimplified stereotypes.”125 Cannadine relates an example of the perception of the social order of the British Empire, of the “shared recognition of high social rank (and of) status similarities and the cultivation of affinities.”126
McKee, ‘Women in the Military: Facing the Warrior Framework’, in Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues, 2004, p. 66: “Research has started to identify skills and attributes other than traditional warrior attributes as more and more significant for the future.” Emphasis in original; Anna Simons, ‘Women in Combat Units: It’s Still a Bad Idea’, Parameters, Summer 2001, p. 89: “New post-Cold War missions require finesse, not brawn…Twenty-First century technologies are gender neutral.” 118 Franklin C. Pinch, An introduction to Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues, p. 47, in Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues, Franklin C. Pinch, Allister T. MacIntyre, Phyllis Browne and Alan C. Okros (eds.), Canadian Force Leadership Institute, Canadian Defence Academy Press, Kingston Ontario, 2006 (2004). 119 Stephanie Gardiner, ‘Rights watchdog 'not confident' women can flourish in military’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 2012, retrieved 23 August 2012, at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/rights-watchdog-not-confident-women-can-flourish- in-military-20120822-24lde.html. This is highlighted by the increased representation of women in all manner of roles in modern warfare as explained by Dunivin, ‘Military Culture: A Paradigm Shift?’, 1997, p. 5: During Operations Desert Shield (1990) and Desert Storm (1991) more than 40,000 United States servicewomen served in the Persian Gulf War. Similar to their male colleagues, women performed their military roles professionally and served their country with distinction. Shortly after the war, former secretary of defense Richard B. Cheney made the declaration that “women have made a major contribution to this [war] effort. We could not have won without them.” 120 Frank Hoffman and Michael C. Davies, ‘Joint Force 2020 and the Human Domain: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?’ Small Wars Journal, June 2013, p. 4, viewed 04 October 2013, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/joint-force-2020-and-the-human-domain-time-for-a-new- conceptual-framework 125 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 2001, p. 3. 126 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 2001, p. 8. 27 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
In the summer of 1881 King Kalakaua of Hawaii was visiting England and, in the course of an extensive round of social engagements, he found himself the guest at a party given by Lady Spencer. Also attending were the Prince of Wales, who would eventually become King Edward VII, and the German Crown Prince, who was his brother-in-law and the future Kaiser. The Prince of Wales insisted that the King should take precedence over the German Crown Prince, and when his brother-in-law objected, he offered the following pithy and trenchant justification: “Either the brute is a king, or he’s a common or garden nigger; and if the latter, what’s he doing here?”127
In this account, the hierarchical principle was not based on colour,128 but on social prestige and status. 129 Cannadine’s description of nations echoes the military; these attitudes and perceptions reverberate within the context of the modern armed forces. There is a conspicuous parallel between Cannadine and the argument of Nicholas Keijzer, who described the 18th century military in his seminal work Military Obedience.
Since the 18th century, officer posts were chiefly occupied by nobility, while the ‘inferiors’ were recruited from the lower strata of society, which resulted in a structure of organisation which was characterised by the idea of total submission, in particular lower ranks, and passive obedience to superiors.130
The 18th century saw a ‘comeback’ of nobility in the military. Officers and men were from that time divided by a wide social and cultural gap.131
An historical military example of social prestige and status overriding hierarchy is recounted in Norman Dixon’s book On the Psychology of Military Incompetence.
127 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 2001, p. 8. 128 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 2001, p.p. 5, 8. Cannadine discusses how one of the ways Britons understood, visualised and imagined their empire hierarchically was in racial terms of superiority and inferiority. Another way was based on “notions of metropolitan-peripheral analogy and sameness” and Cannadine determines that “social ranking was as important as (perhaps more important than?) colour of skin.” 129 James Littlejohn, Social Stratification: An Introduction, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1972, p. 48: “Social status means a position in a hierarchical organisation or scheme which embraces a total society. It refers not to the rights and obligations, but to prestige and the way in which the incumbent of the status is treated by others.” 130 Nicholas Keijzer, Military Obedience, Sijthoff and Noordhoff, The Netherlands, 1978, p. xxiv. 131 Nicholas Keijzer, Military Obedience, 1978, p. 36. 28 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
An Infantry Captain was attending a horse racing event. The tote was voluntarily run by the Royal Army Pay Corps. In an opportunity to show-off he wished to wager 50 pounds on the favourite in a three-horse race. The Lieutenant Colonel Pay Corps Officer asked the Infantry Captain to consider lowering his stake so that others may have a chance to bet. The Infantry Captain “completely lost control. With an occasional and insultingly stressed use of the word Sir, he demanded to know what an ex-ranker member of the Pay Corps, could be expected to know about betting and gentlemen’s habits. He accused the colonel of snivelling, egalitarian, lower middle-class prejudice, (and) finally shouted aloud that if Pay Corps officers were too mean or spineless to risk 50 pounds on a horse, then it was time they had lessons from their betters.”132
This story indicates that status is fundamental to all other categories. 133 The infantry Captain “could ignore the entire official structure of the Army and give a blatantly feudal exhibition of hysterical spite.” 134 Keijzer and Dixon acknowledged ideas of status, and in the same way we find them prevalent in the Air Force. The “contemporary military reflects the social order, and myths of rank and class135 are hegemonic.”136 The social order of the Air Force is a carefully graded hierarchy of status, from ‘Aircrew’ at the top to those considered less worthy at the bottom. This point is prominent and readily recognisable (because it has cultural currency and effect), in the cartoon below. A satirical sketch by a USAF member137 demonstrates the pervasive nature of notions regarding social ordering and status that exist in contemporary Air Force culture.
132 Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Jonathon Cape Ltd, London, 1976, p. 231, citing Simon Raven, Perish by the Sword, Encounter, xii, 1959, p.p. 45-7. 133 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 2001, p. 9. 134 Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, 1976, p. 231. 135 Rosemary Crompton, Class and Stratification: An introduction to current debates, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 10: “Class can be used to describe groups ranked in a hierarchical order. This association with hierarchy has led to a second common term to indicate social standing or prestige.” 136 Adams, ‘Strength and Power’, 2012, p. 63. 137 Cartoonist Austin May is a Staff Sergeant in the USAF. Formally aircrew, and now a public affairs specialist, May runs the on line web comic Air Force Blues. He also published a book, by the same title in 2007. He features in an article on The Official Website of the USAF, at http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123081096, 29 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Figure Five138
Tribalism and Power
The danger of a culture built on status is the prevalence of the phenomenon tribalism. ‘Tribes’ exist because they are a tool for self-preservation; they provide an identity and create emotional ties, thereby catering to the human need to belong.139 The military has a deliberately powerful socialisation system that aids the development of highly motivated and cohesive groups, which positively contributes to success. However, an unhelpful consequence is that norms, values and stereotypes emerge that excludes ‘Other’. 140 Tribalism is the attitude that arises when sub-groups fixate on their own tasks and do not take into account the organisation as a whole entity. Tribalism impacts on the success of an organisation; it wastes time and resources, separates people, and hinders open communication. 141 A significant detrimental aspect of tribalism is that it acts against cultural alignment and change. Tribalism also leads to a sense of
138 www.afblues.com, an on-line comic strip of Air Force Blues, where cartoonist Austin May uploads his sketches, viewed 12 September 2012. 139 Trevor Hilder, ‘Viability versus tribalism’, Kybernetes, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2004, p.p. 632-46, p. 635. 140 Pinch, An introduction to Challenge and Change in the Military, p. 3, in Challenge and Change in the Military, 2006. 141 Hilder, ‘Viability versus tribalism’, 2004, p.p. 637, 642; Sheldon Stryker and Anne Statham Macke, ‘Status Inconsistency and Role Conflict’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 4, 1978, p.p. 57- 90, p. 58: “Social structure acts as both facilitator of and barrier to interaction; it brings particular actors and activities together and it keeps them apart.”; Lieutenant General David Morrison, AO, Chief of the Australian Army, Speech to the United Nations International Women’s Day Conference, New York, 8-9 March 2013, p. 3, viewed 10 August 2013, at www.army.gov.au: “In recent years [the] tribal culture, through which we sought to build small teams capable of enduring combat, had become distorted, misinterpreted and abused.” 30 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
exclusiveness, a tendency to ignore criticism that stems from outside the group, and it promotes ‘walls of silence’.143 This relates to Schein’s levels of culture, where he argues that ‘tribes’ use artefacts, espoused values, beliefs and basic assumptions to enhance ‘in and out’ groups.144
Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s Social Identity theory also relates to tribalism. Defined as “a person’s sense of who they are,”145 identity stems from belonging to groups and is a principal source of pride, self-worth and self-esteem. In order to increase their own image, enhancement of the status of their own group, and discrimination and prejudicial behaviour against groups to which they do not belong occurs. Craig Orme, in his 2011 Report into Australian Defence Force Personnel Conduct states
Social stratification coupled with a male-dominated cultural model can lead to multiple variations of the ‘winners’ or ‘insiders’, and ‘losers’ or ‘outsiders’. The ‘insiders’ are those who are socially strong and conform to the cultural ideal; the ‘outsiders’ are those who are judged to fail in, or pose a risk for the culture or are not accepted as part of the winning group.146
Tribalism is apparent in the RNZAF context. Units take great pride in signs and symbols which reinforce their differences from others. Everyday language contributes to a sense of tribalism, such as ‘sharps’ and ‘blunts’, and more recently as seen in the NZDF, the predominance of the terms ‘front’ and ‘back’. These terms are used to signify those working close to combat and conflict (‘sharps’ and ‘front’) and those working in enabling and support roles (‘blunts’ and ‘back’). Orme, in his 2011 review into aspects of ADF Culture asserts
The general phenomenon operating is one of ‘in-groups’ asserting their
143 Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, viewed 04 May 2012, at http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c5e.htm: “While unit loyalty is essential for armed conflict, smaller group loyalty can also undermine disciplinary authority. Walls of silence can be erected to protect a unit member.” Emphasis added. 144 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2010, p.p. 23-32. 145 John C. Turner, Some current issues in research on Social identity and Self-categorization theories, p. 7, in N. Ellemers, R. Spears, and B. Doojse (eds), Social Identity: Context, commitment, content, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, p.p. 6-34. 146 Orme, Beyond Compliance, 2011, p. 17. 31 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
dominance over ‘out-groups’ in a military culture that values masculine characteristics, such as assertiveness, courage, decisiveness, strength and action. Groups that see themselves as being ‘in’ will often engage in ritualised behaviour that allows them to overtly display such status towards those they perceive to be ‘out’.147
Tribalism is recognised in Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, whereby the ‘out’ group is termed the “second eleven.” 148 Doctrine also comments “It would be naive to deny these perceptions exist,”149 however its effect is to send a mixed message. The very fact that doctrine gives a name to the ‘out’ group communicates the acceptance of social stratification.150 Yet, it also states “Leaders must suppress cliques, nepotism and elitism.”151 These ideas of socially ordered tribal ascendancy inform this study. Critical to ideas of social dominance, the ideas of social worth and status circumvent the explicit motifs of formal hierarchies. Thus it is that the tacit social value of ‘Aircrew’ is seen, in this thesis, to overpower other more conspicuously salient notions of social relevance.
History tells of numerous cases of leaders succumbing to a sense of entitlement and self-importance, which portrays the inherent problem with elitism, classism and the system of ‘Aircrew’ over ‘Other’. Doctrine alludes to these issues, highlighting that self-serving leaders surround themselves with ‘yes-men’ and that tribal cultures encourage exclusive norms and appeal to elitism. 152 Doctrine condemns this type of leadership, but offers little in its place. Discussion in doctrine centres on values-based leadership, but it acknowledges this can be fraught with danger as everyone interprets values differently, and it is very much dependent upon which ‘group’ the person belongs to.
Sociologist William Sumner posited in his book Folkways that social relationships are characterised by separation into in- and out-groups. He determined that
147 Orme, Beyond Compliance, 2011, p. 18. 148 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-3. 149 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-3. 150 William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, Sociology, Houghton Mifflin Co, Boston, 1946, p.p. 333-336: “Social stratification is the process by which individuals and groups are ranked in a more or less enduring hierarchy of status.” 151 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-3. 152 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-7. 32 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
humans have a natural inclination to prefer their own group over others, stating “Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exists in its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders.” 153 Dominant groups ‘Other’ anyone who is different, who is ‘not like us’, in order to maintain superiority, which creates ‘them/us’ divisions. They “label ‘Others’ as inferior and (this) legitimates the exercise of power over them.”154 Power cultures encourage social exclusion, resulting in the alienation or disenfranchisement of certain people or groups. The power variable is important to leadership and cultural development, as leaders exert great influence on the orientation and continuity of culture.
The types of power that leaders employ are important. In 1960 French and Raven defined five forms of power – coercive, reward, legitimate, referent, and expert. 155 These types of power help us to understand the environment and differentiate power bases. In the military, leaders assume enormous legitimate power (also known as positional power). They have the recognised right or privilege to influence. This established right comes with the territory – the hierarchical structure, complete with rank and authority. This power is to the position not the individual – a potential trap for senior leaders (‘believing their own press’, sense of self-importance and egotism). Coupled with legitimate power, military leaders have high reward and coercive power. Coercive power has as its goal compliance, and it has a strong link through ‘discipline’ to military culture.
Doctrine uses a confusing example of ‘Leadership over Discipline’. Leadership and discipline are two separate ideas. Whereas leadership is about influencing to garner willing consent and commitment, discipline is defined as “training and conditioning (drills) to enforce obedient behaviour to rules and orders…It is based on legitimate authority and relies on coercive power and the fear of punishment
153 Marilynn Brewer, Ethnocentrism and Prejudice: A Search for Universals, p.p. 79-95, p. 79, in Social Psychology of Prejudice: Historical and Contemporary Issues, edited by Christian S. Crandall and Mark Schaller, Lewinian Press: Lawrence, Kansas, 2004, citing William Sumner, Folkways, 1906, p.p. 12-3, viewed 13 July 2012, at http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/bitstream/1808/4083/1/79-96.pdf. 154 Tew, Jerry, ‘Understanding Power and Powerlessness: Towards a Framework for Emancipatory Practice in Social Work’, Journal of Social Work, Vol. 6, No. 33, 2006, p. 36, citing Dominelli, Anti-oppressive Social Work Theory and Practice, 2002, p. 18. Emphasis in original. 155 B. H. Raven, The Bases of Power and the Power/Interactional Model of Interpersonal Influence, Analyses Of Social Issues & Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008, p.p 1-22. 33 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
for effect.”156 The vignette at worst encourages people to break rules, and in its most simplistic form it perpetuates the flyboy myth. It hints at double standards, buoyed by social stratification, and the trivialising of discipline – a fundamental tenet of military life and functionality.
[Pilots] did not need artificial contrivances to shape their behaviour (or to partake in) trifling tasks. As long as you were in the briefing room, properly fit to fly when you were required to fly, was all they asked. Exemplary dress and bearing, saluting, performing trivial duties on non-flying days, and so on, were ignored.157
Referent power comes from another person liking you or wanting to be like you. This type of power can also be used for coercion, in that it can be used to exclude ‘Others’ from a group. Expert power concerns knowledge and skill that others require and is the power of the ‘specialist’. Informational power 158 involves sharing information with others that influences them to think or act in a different manner.
The crucial point concerning the use of power is that it must be regulated and controlled – used for organisational benefit (‘the greater good’) and not the betterment of self. The unconstructive use of power opens leaders and organisations up to repeating the mistakes of the past, which have a deleterious effect on individuals and the organisation. Power, discipline, and influence play an integral part in military culture, especially with the inculcation of the value of obedience.
Obedience, Conformity and the Normalisation of Deviance
The concepts of obedience, conformity and the normalisation of deviance are prevalent in military culture and are explored here as they find relevance in the cases and events examined in later chapters. Obedience is when an individual reacts in response to a direct order from someone else; usually someone in authority, where hierarchy of power (based on legitimate power) and status are
156 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 2-4. 157 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p.p. 2-4, 2-5. 158 Raven added Informational Power in 1965. 34 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
involved. Obedience to authority is an ingrained quality, taught and expected in the military; it is a critical requirement that contributes to the effective functioning of military forces. This type of obedience is not to be confused with blind obedience, or compliance, 159 where complete obedience occurs without any individual thought.160 Doctrine supports these notions stating, “Followership is not a passive activity for the meek and submissive. Followers have responsibilities and obligations to their organisation and to their leader. Responsible followers must exercise judgement and not just blindly follow a leader ‘come what may’.” 161 The military culture of obedience, which enforces strict hierarchical structure and discipline in the face of adversity, still allows for an individual to exercise personal conscience.
Conformity is a social influence that results in a change in belief or behaviour so as to ‘fit in’ with a group; it is about ‘giving in to peer pressure’. Solomon Asch’s 1951 conformity experiment was a simple test in visual discrimination that investigated the extent to which peer pressure from a majority could affect an individual’s conformity.162 Asch’s findings suggest that a substantial number of individuals will go along with a group, even though they do not believe in their conforming answers, just so they will not be ridiculed.163 They want to ‘fit in’ with the group (normative influence) and they also believe the group is more knowledgeable than them (informational influence).164
Doctrine recognises the potential negative effect of a culture of conformity and espouses, “A responsible follower will choose dissent when faced with leadership influence that the follower believes is unlawful, unsafe, oppressive or counter to
159 Blind obedience or compliance as used in this thesis is seen to be different to obedience and regulatory compliance, which is required for good governance. 160 Examples of blind obedience can be seen in: Michael Bolton and Kevin Sim, Four hours in My Lai, Penguin Books, New York, 1992; Jim Frederick, Black Hearts, Random House, New York, 2010; and, Paul T. Bartone, ‘Preventing Prisoner Abuse: Leadership Lessons of Abu Ghraib’, Ethics & Behaviour, Vol. 20, No. 12, 2010, p.p. 161-173. 161 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-18. 162 Solomon E. Asch, ‘Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority’, Psychological Monographs, Vol. 70, No. 9, 1956, p.p. 1-70, p. 3. 163 Asch, ‘Studies of Independence and Conformity’, 1956, p. 70. 164 Morton Deutsch and Harold B. Gerard, ‘A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences upon Individual Judgement’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1955, p.p. 629-36, p. 629. 35 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
the goals of the organisation.”165 There is potential for a clash with the culture of obedience and aspects of conformity that contribute to teamwork and cohesion, that are so valued and rewarded in the military. Those that actually do dissent are often treated poorly or punished. Doctrine recognises this stating, “Even more telling is when espoused values are publicly stated but privately punished.”166 Doctrine acknowledges this occurs because “there are always invisible social forces or what can be described as unwritten rules of social order, often with no formal force to back them up, that make it difficult for individuals,”167 which supports the central argument of this thesis. These unwritten rules of the social order exist. In fact, they are acknowledged in doctrine, yet little traction appears to have been made since the publication of ADDP 00.6 in 2007, and indeed little is written in doctrine about how to actually change this prevailing culture.
Doctrine asserts, “When individuals or members of groups give unthinking or unwilling consent, they may be contributing to the demise of their organisation.”168 The cases and events explored in this thesis are examples of where blind obedience and unthinking conformity have resulted in disaster. The important question is how does the military actually embrace a culture that encourages and allows dissent, while operating inside its strict hierarchical order? The vignette used in doctrine to define responsible and irresponsible consent reinforces the high regard that officers of rank, ‘Commanders’, or in the vignette’s case the Principal Warfare Officer (the Navy’s equivalent ‘Aircrew’ character), are held. At his court martial, Markham169 stated in his defence that he “thought Admiral Tyron must have some trick up his sleeve’.”170 Markham thought that Tyron had it under control. He appeared influenced by Tyron’s legitimate, expert and referent power. Could Markham really have disobeyed Tyron’s orders? What part did the power gradient have to play? After all, Markham was just a Rear Admiral and Tyron a Vice Admiral.
165 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-19. 166 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-4. 167 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-4. 168 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-19. 169 Rear Admiral Markham was the captain of the Camperdown, a ship that was in a collision with another ship commanded by senior officer Vice Admiral Tyron. 170 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-20. 36 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Aspects of conformity enhance team building and group cohesion, which is fundamental to military effectiveness. The downside of conformity however, can been seen in catastrophic safety events and disasters, whereby personnel have not been willing to speak up for fear of being ‘outed’ from the group (normative influence), combined with the mentality of ‘everyone operates this way/we’ve done it this way for years’ (informational influence). This is where the normalisation of deviance171 can and has made its presence known. Normalisation of deviance is a phenomenon where individuals/groups repeatedly ‘get away’ with deviating from the accepted or approved standard. They eventually fail to see their behaviour as deviant, and this significantly impacts on the safety culture172 of the organisation. Over time an acceptance of more and more risk becomes the norm, and the boundaries are pushed to extremes, without understanding where and why the original limits were established. 173 This is a particularly hazardous way of thinking and operating, especially in highly technical organisations, such as Air Forces.
The ‘Body of People’
‘Aircrew’ “dominate the leadership and mythology of the Air Force.”174 They are the ‘elite’ group and there are “tight controls over entry to elite circles and access to power that is possible only for members of the elite group.”175 ‘Aircrew’ see themselves as specialists and they believe that the expert nature of their roles separates them from others; they belong to a ‘brotherhood’. Acknowledging the “myth of the solitary and heroic single-combat warrior is important,”176 this thesis asserts a ‘warrior culture’ is also damaging to operational excellence and organisational performance.
171 A term coined by Diane Vaughan in The Challenger Launch Decision, 1996, p. 112. 172 James Reason, ‘Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice’, Work & Stress, 1998, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 294, citing B. Uttal, ‘The Corporate Culture Vultures’, Fortune Magazine, 17 October 1983: Defines a safety culture as “shared values (what is important and beliefs – how things work) that interact with an organisations structures and control systems to produce behavioural norms (the way we do things around here).” 173 Richard C. Prielipp, Maria Magro, Robert C. Morrell and Sorin J. Brull, ‘The Normalization of Deviance: Do We (Un) Knowingly Accept Doing the Wrong Thing?’, AANA Journal, Vol. 78, No. 4, 2010, p.p. 284-87, p. 284. 174 George R. Mastroianni, ‘Occupations, Cultures, and Leadership in the Army and Air Force’, Parameters, Winter, 2005-6, p. 80. 175 Mastroianni, ‘Occupations, Cultures, and Leadership’, 2005-6, p. 85. 176 Mastroianni, ‘Occupations, Cultures, and Leadership’, 2005-6, p.p. 80-81. 37 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Figure Six
Unconstructive Ideas of Power and Their Expression in Service Life
Formally articulated doctrinal ideas paint only a partial picture. Doctrine finds its most meaningful and vibrant expression in the human metaphor or ‘character’. This is the argument of Alasdair MacIntyre, who explained how certain social roles provide a culture with moral definition and by doing so serve as culture’s moral representatives, who legitimate moral and social existence.177 In this thesis, the human metaphor or character of ‘Aircrew’ is used to illustrate unconstructive ideas of power because it meets the criteria of the definition of a ‘tribe’. Moreover, they are seen to be the ‘in-group’; it is a significant thread in doctrine and is prevalent within Air Force culture.
Characters can “accurately convey the prevailing aura and texture of the dominant culture, mode of thought, and behaviour, which reflect a social structure and perpetuate it.” 178 Schein describes the influence of tacit or ambient cultural stereotypes and the process of socialisation.179 The depiction of Air Vice Marshal
177 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue – a study in moral theory, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1981, p. 28. 178 Alkis Kontos, (ed), Domination, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1975, p. 225. 179 Gary Johns and Alan M. Saks, Organisational Behaviour: Understanding and Managing Life at Work, 6th edition, Prentice-Hall, Toronto, Ontario, 2005, p. 246: “Socialisation is the process by which people learn the norms and roles that are necessary to function in a group or organisation”; and, Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2010, p.p. 3, 7, 8, 11-22. 38 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Sir Frederick Scherger in Leadership in the Australian Defence Force is just such a cultural metaphor,180 where ideas of leadership are revealed.
During the New Guinea campaigns, where campsites were rough and facilities invariably rudimentary, Scherger (later Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick) moved among his troops with an easy camaraderie, often working stripped to the waist or wearing a bush shirt that carried no rank badges. Concern for the welfare of his men was always paramount, but while he was particularly mindful of the physical and psychological problems of flying personnel, he was a martinet when it came to pilots, trainee or otherwise who needlessly stressed aircraft in unnecessary flight manoeuvres. A savage dressing down by Scherger, brutally stressing that trainees were available in endless numbers, while machines were in short supply, remains a vivid memory for some very senior Australian Airmen.181
Doctrine mistakenly uses the vignette of Scherger as an example of leadership, and by doing so demonstrates that doctrine has confused the technicalities of command and leadership. The vignette titled ‘The Character of a Leader’ is used to describe leadership. Earlier, doctrine describes character as “an individual’s values and attitudes, and includes such things as social capacity, interpersonal skills, personal integrity, conscientiousness, self-assurance and trust- worthiness.” 182 Yet, in this vignette, terminology associated with command is apparent and serves to confuse the character of leadership. The vignette describes Scherger as a ‘martinet’, and includes terms such as ‘savage’ and ‘brutally’. This terminology resonates with ideas of authority and dominance, and is more akin to command.
Harry Rayner describes Scherger’s general practice of appearing as ‘one of the boys’, particularly in the Mess and off-duty, but “woe betide officers and airmen who presumed in too familiar a fashion.” 183 Scherger, in these examples, is playing two parts. The first involves the theme of masculinity, where he behaves
180 This idea was advanced by Adams in his thesis ‘Strength and Power’, 2012, p. 202. 181 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-15. Emphasis added. 182 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-14. 183 Harry Rayner, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger: Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in The Commanders – Australian Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century, edited by D. M. Horner, Allen and Unwin: Australia, 1984, p. 310. 39 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
as ‘one of the boys’ (shirt off and no rank badges); the second, more powerful theme is that of dominance – the unconstructive use of power. The reality is Scherger can never stop being the ‘Commander’. However, when subordinates take him at face value and treat him as if he truly is ‘one of the boys’, prevailing ideas of dominance surface and they are categorically rebuked.
Scherger is the quintessential pilot, and he is quintessentially a stereotype too, one of the characters to whom MacIntyre refers. In Scherger we find the embodiment of the masculine, technically proficient, dominant and daring pilot. He was considered to be skilful, albeit a little reckless at times, but he generally got away with it.184 His behaviour was disguised as ‘command presence’ – a combination of assertiveness, dominance and masculinity. With his “cloth-helmet-and-goggles and open cockpit flying charisma,”185 Scherger was “a most attractive figure to airmen. He had come out of Duntroon with a chip on his shoulder, and the way he was going to overcome that was by being a devil-may-care airman.”186
Despite the large number of accidents it seemed nothing could change an organisational ethos defined by clubbishness and the belief that all pilots were dashing and skilful, and that ‘dash’ and ‘skill’ were the same as reckless. Fred Scherger, one of the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) leading pilots in the 1930’s, persistently courted disaster with his penchant for low-level, inverted manoeuvres, sometimes over large crowds. Unlike many of his colleagues, Scherger was sufficiently skilful and lucky to get away with it. Senior officers almost invariably turned a blind eye or, more commonly, tacitly endorsed such antics.187
In defining leadership, doctrine states that influence is central, and it asserts that as leadership is about inspiring willing commitment, coercive and legitimate power are less useful.189 Authority is defined as “conferred power to perform a
184 Rayner, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, 1984, p. 304: “PLTOFF Scherger, in the late 1920’s, also stood to attention before his flight commander to be castigated for incidents connected with inverted and very low level flying.” 185 Rayner, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, 1984, p. 313. 186 Rayner, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, 1984, p. 313. 187 Alan Stephens, The Royal Australian Air Force – A History, Oxford University Press, Australia, 2001, p. 38. 189 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-8. 40 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
service”190 and doctrine asserts the use of legitimate authority is an example of command, not leadership. Yet, doctrine promotes Scherger as a leader to be emulated. Perpetuated in doctrine, and exemplified by the Scherger fable, the ‘Aircrew’ myth is real and powerful. It proves the cultural authority of ‘machismo’,191 and smacks of confidence in the square-jawed bygone fable – that masculine prowess wins wars. The Scherger myth operates to confuse the technicalities of leadership and command. Doctrine also quotes John Gardner commenting, “Confusion between leadership and official authority has a deadly effect on large organisations.”192 The doctrine is not bad, but in writing about Scherger to depict leadership, doctrine demonstrates how powerful, dominant and enduring the myth of ‘Aircrew’ is. The doctrinal example perpetuates the myth of masculinity, power and dominance.
Scherger, or at least the mythologised Scherger, embodies the Air Force pilot. Significantly, some fifty years after he retired from the RAAF and thirty years after his death, his character and example are praised in doctrine. The meaning resonates over numerous decades, despite the introduction of equity policies, the evolution of gender integration and the promotion of diversity and inclusion. Scherger epitomises the ideas that are emblematic in Tom Wolfe’s The Right Stuff. This is significant, because Wolfe reveals how clichéd motifs come to have wide cultural currency and effect. Wolfe’s depiction of pilots as devil-may-care, leather-jacketed invincibles was identified by Tony Kern as a significant sub-text, which was addressed by NASA in the evolution of Crew Resource Management (CRM)193 theory. This theory operates explicitly to defuse myths surrounding the dominant captain and the subordinate, submissive co-pilot.
190 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-8, citing Ronald Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, Harvard University Press, 1994; ADDP 00.6, p. 2-3 cites The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation definition of command: “The authority which a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.” Further it states “The essence of command is the legal authority to direct subordinates towards the completion of assigned tasks.” Emphasis added. 191 “The strong, exaggerated sense of masculinity that stresses the attributes of physical courage, virility, domination of women and aggressiveness.” Oxford Dictionary,
Military culture is masculine and hierarchical, emphasising power, dominance and subordination.196
Unconstructive ideas of power involve relationships between ideas of dominance and submission; the existence or identity of one is dependent on the co-existence of the other. Just like ‘up’ cannot exist unless there is a ‘down’, dominance and submission co-substantiate one another. It is not about strength and weakness of character; these relationships concern power and control. Significantly, the submissive (‘Maintenance Crew’ and ‘Support Crew’) proffer a certain amount of power to the dominant (‘Aircrew’). The logic is that dominance requires submission, because each depends upon the opposite for logical sense. In formal, hierarchic organisations, dominance and submission are often implicit, unmentionable aspects of the culture. They are generally taboo and are “concealed behind the values and assumptions of organisational culture, particularly a culture of narcissism, in which hierarchic structure is replaced by ideology and the arbitrary abuse of power and authority.”197 Narcissism is an “excessive interest in or admiration of oneself and one’s physical appearance.” 198 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force erroneously promotes narcissism stating “Leaders require a certain amount of narcissism to drive them towards leadership positions.”199 Perpetuated in doctrine, this sense of egotism finds meaning in those people who are seen to exemplify the ‘Aircrew’ myth and unconstructive ideas of power. These ideas are the narrative of social inequality and are supported by positive social consequences. 200 They are concealed in positive language, for example: ‘strong leadership’, ‘decisiveness’, ‘command presence’, ‘taking charge’, and ‘square-jaw-frank-eyes-steadfast-gaze’. This type of language smothers and obscures other language, which is much less complimentary, such as
196 Mark Thompson, ‘Is sexual violence endemic to the U.S. military’, quoting from an interview with Aaron Belkin, TIME U.S., 18 July 2012, viewed 10 August 2012, at http://nation.time.com/2012/07/18/is-sexual-violence-endemic-to-the-u-s-military/ 197 Michael A. Diamond and Seth Allcorn, ‘Moral Violence in Organizations: Hierarchic Dominance and the Absence of Potential Space, Organizational & Social Dynamics, Vol. 4, No. 1, p.p. 22-45, 2004, p. 34. 198 Oxford Dictionaries, viewed 12 July 2012, at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/narcissistic 199 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 1-17, citing Kets de Vries, 2001. 200 Weininger, Dominance in Children, 1975, p. 6, citing Principles of Behaviour Modification, New York, 1969, p. 380. 42 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
bullying, harassment, pretentiousness, pomposity, arrogance, superiority and obsequiousness.
Militaries are dominance or status hierarchies – albeit they operate subtly. A dominance or status hierarchy is defined as “a fairly persistent, unequal ranking of members in terms of power, influence and access to valued prerogatives.”201 The hierarchy is accepted as normal and legitimate because of the cultural norms and traditions of the organisation.203 Dominance hierarchies persist because everyone recognises and accepts their place in it. They know who is dominant, who is subordinate and where they fit within the system. Hierarchic structures endow those at the top with excessive power 204 and authority, which reinforces dominance and submission as a pattern of human relations. Where dominance and submission prevail, fear and mistrust can shape the character of relationships.206 The downside of this pattern of relations is depersonalisation. People can be transformed into numbers; treated as non-persons and organisational ‘fat’. 208 Another complexity within a culture of dominance is problem solving can lack imagination and become flawed. Perceptions and experiences are not viewed as worthy of recognition and learning from experience is highly unlikely. Defensive habits lead to the inability to recognise contradictions and tensions; they are denied, rejected, and suppressed rather than experienced and processed.210 This is important as it contributes to a culture of resistance to reform and change, which Commissioner Broderick highlights is an issue for the ADF, and therefore is deemed a problematic area too for the RNZAF.
Highlighting the suffusive influence of command ideas, leadership doctrine states “Rank, uniform and medals give those in leadership positions a ‘jump start’ in their credibility stakes,”234 which indicates that status, made declarative by rank
201 Mazur, Biosociology of Dominance and Deference, 2005, p. 7. In the military, valued prerogatives are the exclusive rights or privileges exercised by virtue of rank and position, such as availability of car parks, transport, reserved accommodation etc. 203 Mazur, Biosociology of Dominance and Deference, 2005, p. 7. 204 Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, 1976, p. 215: “The military leader possesses constitutional power of a magnitude which surpasses that of leaders in most other human groups.” 206 Diamond and Allcorn, ‘Moral Violence in Organizations’, 2004, p. 34. 208 Diamond and Allcorn, ‘Moral Violence in Organizations’, 2004, p.p. 33, 36. 210 Diamond and Allcorn, ‘Moral Violence in Organizations’, 2004, p. 41. 234 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 2-16. 43 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
and medals, provides the leader with an ‘edge’. Command is quite different from leadership; however, in doctrine leadership is “couched and perceived in terms of command.”235 Ideas in this thesis are seen to corrupt discussion of, and thinking about leadership. Leadership is revealed by this thesis to be a code word for command, authority, power over, and a culture where unconstructive ideas of power are tolerated.
Unconstructive ideas of power can exert a negative effect upon organisational performance. The imperative for change is informed by an awareness of the deleterious effects of this type of culture. This thesis hypothesises these to be:
- an excessive focus on masculine power – evident in the promotion and reward of ‘heroic’ and task-focused behaviour. Ideas of task focus are borne out in the descriptors of leadership in performance reports, such as ‘physical courage’, ‘productive’, ‘efficient’, and ‘skilled’. 236 The terminology is very ‘square-jawed’ and indicates that leadership thinking is predicated on results, in particular achieving results efficiently.
- the marginalisation of maintainers, which promotes obsequiousness and subservience – evidenced by incidents where operations have been deemed more important than logistics, and socially supported practices and rewarding ‘not communicating the bad news upwards’. The truth and power of these ideas is demonstrated in Leadership: Cases and Concepts. It is a RAN publication, which acknowledges the seriousness of these ideas and concepts in its review of the ‘Rizzo Report’,237 which revealed the normalisation of technical and bureaucratic deviance238 disguised by a ‘can do, make do’ culture.239
235 Adams, ‘Strength and Power’, 2012, p. 203. 236 AD 645, Performance Appraisal Report, 2010, p. 5. 237 The ‘Rizzo Report’ details the findings of the review into the systemic failure within RAN engineering, conducted by Mr Paul J. Rizzo, ‘Plan to Reform Support Ship Repair and Management Practices’, Department of Defence, Government of Australia, July 2011. 238 Royal Australian Navy, Leadership: Cases and Concepts, (In Press), p. 203. 239 Rizzo Report, 2011, p. 10. 44 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
- the marginalisation of women. Equity policies and practices are prevalent and well established in wider society, and are mostly reflected in the military. However, in practice the military appear to be falling short. The seriousness of this idea is evident in The Broderick and DLA Piper Reports, illustrated with comment such as “Being a female – a minority group in most Australian Defence Force environments – might be sufficient to put the female on the fringe of the group and thus prone to exclusion from the dominant group culture.”240
Identifying and accepting that these unconstructive ideas of power are having a real world effect on military operations and organisational performance is vital. Understanding and acknowledging that this type of culture can result in unpalatable consequences – that people might be too scared to speak up, that people may take unnecessary risks,241 that we needlessly lose platforms and more importantly lives – is fundamental to even conceiving a pathway to organisational cultural change. The ADF, as a result of numerous cultural reviews, has recently accepted there is a requirement to change their prevailing culture.242 However, cultural change is difficult because basic assumptions are “non-confrontable and non-debatable.” 243 Culture is “deeply ingrained and behavioural norms well learned.” 244 Culture is also largely unrecognised, and commonly shared interpretations, values, and behavioural patterns are difficult to modify. Schein asserts
240 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. 22. 241 AAP, The Canberra Times, Fire Pilots ‘taunted’ before fatal plane crash, 21 November 2013, at http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/fire-pilots-taunted-before-fatal-plane-crash-20131120- 2xw80.html: Evidence of how machismo fuels risk can be seen in a recent plane crash whereby a pilot was killed when his plane crashed fighting bushfires. He was taunted before take-off for voicing his reluctance to fly in poor weather, being told “real men and real pilots would be up there.” 242 Duncan Lewis and General D.J. Hurley, Senior Leadership Focuses on ‘Pathway to Change’, DEFGRAM 551/2012, 13 August 2012: “While we should celebrate our traditions and our successes, we have a significant problem in Defence’s culture that must be addressed,” and “We must achieve a respectful, fair and inclusive organisation.”; Elizabeth Broderick, ‘A new review would help make the ADF a model employer’, The Canberra Times, 30 November 2012, p. 16: “There is no doubt that the senior leadership of the ADF are ready to embrace change. The challenge is to accept and implement it.” 243 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2010, p. 28. 244 English, Understanding the Military Culture, 2004, p. 23. 45 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Deeply held assumptions often start out historically as values but, as they stand the test of time, gradually come to be taken for granted and then take on the character of assumptions. They are no longer questioned and they become less and less open to discussion...If one understands culture in this way, it becomes obvious why it is so difficult to change.245
Myths are not taken seriously. Some people are unable or unwilling to recognise they exist – they are themselves blinded by unconscious bias. They are unaware of the power, influence and consequence of myths. Often, good initiatives are thwarted because they are discarded by the underlying culture. Unconscious patterns and norms of behaviour influence decision-making and choice; they perpetuate the status quo and allow established patterns, values and norms to remain firmly rooted. Cultural transformation is not an easy process, particularly for large organisations that are steeped in history.246
Conclusion
Discussion in this chapter has fenced the ground for further analysis, and has been particularly significant insofar as it has illuminated the cultural currency of the masculine motifs. For example, in the case of Air Chief Marshal Scherger, doctrine’s masculine banality perpetuates the unconstructive myth of ‘Aircrew’. This thesis goes on to explicate how it is that the dominant ‘Aircrew’ culture co- exists with the submissive cultures of ‘Maintenance Crew’ and ‘Support Crew’, and it explores the consequential and deleterious organisational effects of these relationships. This thesis makes plain that the dominance of ‘one’ and the submission of ‘Other’ impels significant risk. These risks are the propensity for aircraft accidents, a decline in maintenance standards, and the under- representation of women in the workforce, all of which impact and limit organisational performance.
245 Edgar H. Schein, ‘Organizational Culture’, American Psychologist, Vol. 45, No. 2, 1990, p.p. 109-19, p. 112. 246 Lewis and Hurley, Senior Leadership Focuses on ‘Pathway to Change’, 2012: The ADF recognises the difficulty with implementing cultural change – “We must start making the changes now because it will take time to change the culture of the organisation in real and tangible ways.” 46 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Figure Seven
The following chapters examine the intersection (as highlighted in Figure Seven) of the three constituent components – Doctrine, Organisational Culture and People – through the lens of the ‘Three Shades of Blue’ (‘Aircrew’, ‘Maintenance Crew’ and ‘Support Crew’). The chapters explore cases and events that illustrate the key concepts and themes exposed in this chapter, and highlight the risks associated with the continuance of a ‘warrior culture’. While the military demands and expects some aspects of obedience and conformity, particularly at the artefact level (such as uniformity in dress, ceremony), transgressions into the realm of the normalisation of deviance however, can and do have catastrophic individual and organisational consequences.
These concepts and their effect are examined in the following chapters with a view to setting out an alternative future. A future where an inclusive leadership style, that draws on the well-documented evidence of diverse views in enabling organisational performance, is adopted and practised by all. A future where ‘Maintenance Crew’ are valued for their contribution to capability, and where women are represented in higher numbers across the rank levels, and they too are valued for their contribution to capability. What becomes apparent in the following chapters is that where Doctrine, Organisational Culture or People are sub-optimal, deficient or ‘cracked’, the full potential of the organisation is not reached.
47 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Chapter Three
‘Aircrew’ – The Warrior
The previous chapter introduced key concepts and themes relevant to the cases and events explored in this chapter. Chapter Two also revealed that doctrine emphasises the primacy of command. Along with a précis of the visual picture that doctrine promotes, the vignette of Air Vice Marshal Scherger was identified as an example in doctrine that technically confuses aspects of command and leadership. The previous chapter also explored the unconstructive ideas of power that are evident in doctrine and which find expression in Service life.
Unconstructive ideas of power are widespread and evident in every day life, from movies and books, to doctrine. This chapter explores these ideas by illuminating the character of ‘Aircrew’, and it reveals the tragic, real world effect of unconstructive ideas of power. The case of Czar 52 exposes how a failure in leadership can result in tragic consequences. In a similar way to the historical example from Norman Dixon’s book that was explored in the previous chapter, the case of Czar 52 reveals how the dominance of ‘Aircrew’ can override the rank-based hierarchical structure of the military. This chapter also examines recent cases – the July 2010 USAF C-17 (Sitka 43) accident, the January 2010 RNZAF Airtrainer (NZ1990) accident, and the April 2010 Iroquois (NZ3806) accident. Observations about these accidents link to the prevailing ideas revealed in the main case, Czar 52.
‘Aircrew’ and Unconstructive Ideas of Power
Unfeminine and mythologised ideas of dominance rest comfortably within the hierarchic culture of the Air Force. 249 The culture is characterised by social conservatism and homogeneity; it is predominantly a male workforce with masculine values and exclusionary laws and practices.250 Karen Dunivin describes military aviation as
249 Orme, ‘Beyond Compliance’, 2011, p.p. 17, 19, 66. 250 Dunivin, ‘Military Culture A Paradigm Shift?’, 1997, p. 2. 48 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
A masculine subculture with a flyboy mythos, characterised by the hard-charging, hard-drinking, skirt-chasing, arrogant conqueror, where male hyper- heterosexuality is the ideal to emulate.251
This picture of aviation culture is a leitmotif of Tom Wolfe’s The Right Stuff. The Right Stuff is a celebration of American heroes – the test pilots and astronauts of the 1950’s and 1960’s. They were risk-takers; men who found meaning in life by ‘pushing the outside of the envelope,’252 and by ‘hanging their hides out over the edge.’253 The Right Stuff provides insight into the extraordinary advances in air and space travel, and it is also an investigation and portrayal of masculinity. The book is about “manliness, manhood, [and] manly courage.”254 The military pilot is regarded as the “quintessence of manly daring,”255 and their courage is alluded to by references to the ‘right stuff’.256
In The Right Stuff, there are numerous incidents of flagrant violations of rules and senior leaders’ unwillingness to curb or sanction breaches. Tacit approval by senior leaders is apparent.
They [superiors] repeatedly forbade so-called hot-dog stunts, such as outside loops, buzzing, flat-hatting, hedgehopping and flying under bridges. But somehow one got the message that the man who truly had it could ignore those rules – not that he should make a point of it, but that he could – and that after all there was only one way to find out – and that in some strange unofficial way, peeking through his fingers, his instructor halfway expected him to challenge all the limits.257
251 Dunivin, ‘Military Culture: A Paradigm Shift’, 1997, p. 12. 252 Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff, Picador, New York, 1979, p.p. 8, 10, 83, 84, 113, 149, 335, 341, 343: A flight-test term that refers to the pilot probing the outer limits of the aircraft. 253 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p.p. 60, 76, 105, 131, 196, 304. 254 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. 21. 255 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. xii. 256 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p.p. 18, 34, 49, 149, 153, 313: “The very Brotherhood of the Right Stuff itself”; p.p. 32, 48, 49, 52, 140, 168, 222, 223, 231, 232, 240, 246, 313: “The true brothers of the right stuff.” 257 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p.p. 22, 23, “Every unofficial impulse on the base seemed to be saying: Hell, we wouldn't give you a nickel for a pilot who hasn't done some crazy rat-racing like that. It's all part of the right stuff.” 49 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Technical mastery is portrayed in both Top Gun and The Right Stuff as being fundamental to success. It is all about the ‘skill’ of ‘Aircrew’ and it is vital for them to aspire to reach the ‘top of the pyramid’258 – to be the “True Brother at the top of the entire pyramid.”259 A sense of invulnerability is apparent in both as well. They are vivid portrayals of the mindset and identity of ‘Aircrew’. They did not view crashes as an indication that their job was dangerous, but rather they deemed them as “the pilot was somehow lacking what it took to overcome obstacles.”260 The theory was
There are no accidents and no fatal flaws in the machines; there are only pilots with the wrong stuff.261
Comments after each funeral of a colleague in The Right Stuff support this assertion. For example
They shook their heads and said it was a damned shame, but he should have known better than to wait so long before lowering the flaps.262
A sense of invulnerability has operational consequences. The “macho attitude of invulnerability can lead to risk taking, failure to rely on fellow crew members, and team-based errors.”263 ‘Aircrew’ may involve themselves in risk-taking behaviour because they incorrectly perceive the risk associated with hazardous conditions, or they are subliminally less afraid of them. Successful encounters with adverse
258 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p.p. 31, 32, 48, 52, 348, 351. 259 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. 140. 260 Charles S. Ross, ‘The Rhetoric Of The Right Stuff’, The Journal of General Education, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1981, p.p. 113-22, p. 114. 261 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. 25. 262 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. 9. Other examples include: p. 9, “A good man but was inexperienced, and when the malfunction in the controls put him in that bad corner he didn’t know how to get out of it.”; p. 10, “How could anybody fail to check his hose connections? And how could anybody be in such poor condition as to pass out that quickly from hypoxia?”; and, p. 11, “The departed was a swell guy and a brilliant student of flying; a little too much of a student, in fact; he hadn't bothered to look out the window at the real world soon enough.” 263 R. L. Helmreich, ‘Culture and error in space: Implications from analog environments’, Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, Vol. 71, 2000, p.p. 133-9, p. 135, viewed 23 July 2012, at http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/group/helmreichlab/publications/pubfiles/Pub249.pdf 50 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
conditions breeds a sense of heightened competency, which can lead to a reduced perception of risk when considering similar conditions in the future.264
Recalling the logic of the previous chapter, wherein the arguments of David Cannadine and Norman Dixon were cited approvingly, the men in The Right Stuff were not treated by outward rank. Their world was divided by status – those who had ‘it’ and those who did not.265 A fast sports car, more importantly driving it fast and drunk,266 and showing up on time for beer call at the Officers’ Mess were also signifiers that portrayed having the ‘right stuff’.267
This culture is readily identifiable in the 1986 movie Top Gun. Maverick is a young ‘devil-may-care’ naval aviator. Grossing US$353,816,701, 268 Top Gun found commercial success and sweeping social resonance in the dramatic representation of widely appreciated cultural myths. But more than a social fiction, the attraction of Top Gun’s machismo finds empirical measure. United States Navy recruiting figures reveal that following the film’s release, applications from aspirant fast jet pilots rose 500 percent.269
A testosterone-driven experience that depicts a world of macho heroes, the character of ‘Aircrew’ is striking and palpable in Top Gun. The dialogue is riddled with sexual innuendo and cultural artefacts,270 such as ‘aviator sunglasses’ and ‘bomber jackets’. Wolfe in The Right Stuff also refers to cultural artefacts, such as “the unmistakable cocky rolling gait of fighter jocks,”271 and comments that their
264 Keryn A. Pauley, David O’Hare, and Nadia W. Mullen, ‘Implicit Perceptions of Risk and Anxiety and Pilot Involvement in Hazardous Events’, Human Factors, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2008, p.p. 723-33. 265 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. 17. 266 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. 27. 267 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. 28: “The system itself had long ago said Skol! and Quite right! to the military cycle of Flying & Drinking and Drinking & Driving, as if there was no other way.” Emphasis in original. 268 http://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=topgun.htm 269 David Robb, Operation Hollywood: How the Pentagon Shapes and Censors the Movies, Prometheus Books, New York, 2004, p. 182. 270 Schein, Organisational Culture and Leadership, 2010, p. 23: Schein describes artefacts as “the visible products of the group, its language, its style, as embodied in clothing, manners of address, and its myths and stories. Observable behaviour is also an artefact, as are the organisational processes by which such behaviour is made routine. Among artefacts are important symbols that reflect the deep assumptions of the culture. They are attributes that can be seen and heard and their purpose is to act as reminders and triggers as to a persons identity within the culture.” 271 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. 62. 51 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
wristwatches are “practically fraternal insignia among the pilots.” 272 These cultural artefacts are ubiquitous in today’s modern Air Force, primarily because “behaviours of the powerful have inordinate pull – their actions have greater impact and matter more.”273
The relevance of Top Gun exoticism is underlined by the case of Tailhook ‘91. Explored in Chapter Five of this study, the Tailhook Official Inquiry Report cited the Top Gun film as a material influence inciting debauched behaviour. The movie Top Gun is also mentioned in Tony Kern’s Darker Shades of Blue. It refers to the character of Maverick “creating the false impression that it takes a rogue to really gets things done.”275 In support of this, Kern relates the tragic case of another pilot, who having lost an F-14 earlier the same year, crashed another after performing a vertical take off in a solid cloud deck which far exceeded regulations. 276 The pilot’s exhibitionism resulted in five deaths. His “desire to prove that he had made it to the big time meant he had interpreted that to mean the need to be reckless.”277 This accident prompted a public backlash, with the United States Secretary of Defense coining the term ‘Top Gun mentality’ and declaring “the need to get it under control.”278 Kern asserts that the “movie Top Gun may have helped recruiting, but it sure did not do much for the mishap rate of the F-14 fleet.”279
Importantly, the film plays on ubiquitous tropes – pervasive cultural artefacts which define the meaning and value of ‘Aircrew’. The dashing and skilful pilot found celebrity in cinemas worldwide, and he resonated with Air Force too. Maverick was not a parodist, nor was he a mere impressionist. He made tacit fables real, sensational and explicit. His legend is discernible in the doctrinal rendition of Air Chief Marshal Scherger, quintessentially a pilot, and a myth made larger in the retelling.
272 Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 1979, p. 62. 273 Cameron Anderson and Adam D. Galinsky, ‘Power, optimism, and risk-taking’, European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 36, 2006, p.p. 511–36, p. 511: “Power affects diverse psychological processes, from stereotyping to styles of dress.” 275 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 53. 276 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 132. 277 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. p. 132-33. 278 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 134. 279 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 133. 52 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Part of Scherger’s character that is celebrated is that he “appears as one of the boys particularly in the Mess.”280 The permutation of the Scherger myth can be seen today in the perpetuation and tacit sanction of ‘hijinks’ and general rambunctious behaviour that takes place in the Air Force Mess. Epaulettes off, carrier landings, swinging from the rafters, pants optional days are examples of such behaviour. Failure by senior leaders to appropriately deal with this type of behaviour promotes its continuation. This behaviour is generally passed off as ‘high spiritedness’ or ‘the boys letting off steam’. Wolfe too supports this mindset with his description of the test pilots
When they were good they were very, very brave. But when they were bad they were rowdy.281
The prototypical pilot is burlesqued in the comedic Blackadder Goes Forth character of Lord Flasheart. He is rowdy, conceited and not entirely absurd since he is recognisable as a stereotypical World War 1 Royal Flying Corp flying ace. The character is relevant for the way in which Flasheart plays upon the keynotes of narcissistic and sexist excess. His signature shout is “Woof!”282 or “Let's do-oo- ooooo it!”283 Never subtle, Flasheart’s innuendo was often goatish – but the point is important: his character ridicules a non-fictional stereotype. Thrusting his hips Flasheart orders his new recruits to
Treat your kite like you treat your woman...get inside her five times a day; take her to heaven and back.284
Oblivious to the deeper significance of this caricature, Flasheart appears regularly in Air Force Induction and Promotion training. Alongside Maverick, who is also a standard training aid, Flasheart perpetuates the ‘Aircrew’ myth. Cultural artefacts associated with Flasheart, such as his dress and bearing are mimicked by
280 Rayner, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, 1984, p. 310. 281 Ross, The Rhetoric Of The Right Stuff, 1981, p. 114. 282 IMDb, viewed 07 July 2012, at http://www.imdb.com/character/ch0093836/quotes 283 IMDb, viewed 07 July 2012, at http://www.imdb.com/character/ch0093836/quotes 284 IMDb, viewed 07 July 2012, at http://www.imdb.com/character/ch0093836/quotes 53 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
‘Aircrew’ today. These examples reveal the actual power of cultural artefacts; these organisational memes encourage ‘Aircrew’ to play a role. They make the unconstructive ideas which reverberate in doctrine, books, and movies more than merely comedic. The myth of ‘Aircrew’ ascendency is alive and well in today’s military aviation environment and their tragic consequence is confirmed in the case of Czar 52.
Czar 52
On 24 June 1994 at Fairchild Air Force Base, a B-52 (call sign Czar 52) crashed during its final rehearsal for an air show. The bomber was directed to ‘go around’ as another aircraft was on the runway. It performed a tight turn around the control tower, and after passing through approximately one hundred and eighty degrees of turn, banked over almost ninety degrees, stalled and impacted terrain. Tragically, there were no survivors.286
On the face of it, the crash was a result of poor airmanship. Significantly however, the flight profile had been briefed to and sanctioned by senior leaders, even though it exceeded limitations and regulations. Senior leadership enabled this accident by not enforcing flying regulations, and failing to act when clear indicators and warning signs were apparent.287 Several incidents in the lead up to the accident depict cultural decay over an extended period, where rules and regulations were twisted or ignored on numerous occasions. Outright failure by leadership to respond to seven preceding events lead to the fatal crash of Czar 52.
Preceding events and unconstructive ideas of power
A number of incidents in the lead up to the crash illustrate the prevalence of unconstructive ideas of power. The myth of ‘Aircrew’ was in effect; Bud Holland was ‘too powerful’ for even his superiors to reign in. He was “teflon-coated”288 –
286 Michael G. McConnell, AFR 110-14 USAF Accident Investigation Report, Vol. 3, June 1994, p. AA-22.3, viewed 01 July 2012, at http://www.foia.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100510- 029.pdf 287 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 30. 288 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 32. 54 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
his superiors ignored and overlooked his bending of the rules and regulations. They displayed excessive deference289 to the number one ‘natural stick and rudder guy’.
In the first example, a car was conspicuously parked in a no parking zone in front of the headquarters building. As two people passed one commented, “What’s the deal with this guy?” referring to the illegally parked vehicle. “That’s Bud’s car. He always parks there.” After a few more steps the first person inquired, “How does he get away with that?” The response: “I don’t know – he just does.”290 This is a reflection of just how dominant Bud Holland was. No one, not even his superiors, were prepared to take action over his car parking habits and his flagrant disregard for base orders.
On 19 May 1991 at an air show at Fairchild, Bud Holland violated several regulations and flight manual parameters by exceeding bank and pitch limits. He also contravened Federal Aviation Regulations by flying directly over the crowd at lower than minimum altitudes.291 Senior leaders in attendance at the air show took no disciplinary action. A B-52 pilot remarked
The entire wing staff sat by and watched him do it. What was the sense in saying anything? They had already given him a license to steal.292
Less than two months later on 12 July 1991, Bud Holland was pilot in command for a change of command ceremony ‘fly over’. He violated numerous regulations and technical orders. No overt punishment occurred. The appearance of taking disciplinary action, merely a “slap on the wrist,” 293 disclosed hypocrisy and double standards regarding the violation of rules and regulations.294
289 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 26: Excessive deference is where pilots are perceived by others as being highly skilled and experienced, and they are therefore left alone and not ‘checked’ as much. In the cockpit it is known as ‘co-pilot syndrome’. 290 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 30. 291 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 36. 292 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 36. Emphasis in original. 293 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 37. 294 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 37. 55 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The following year on 17 May 1992 at an air show at Fairchild, Bud Holland flew a flight profile similar to the 1991 air show, although the manoeuvres were “slightly more drastic and were accomplished at lower altitudes.” 295 No disciplinary action appeared to occur. A B-52 pilot remarked
I was amazed that they (senior staff) let him keep doing that. Getting away with it once you could understand, you know…forgiveness is easier to get than permission. But this was the third time in less than a year. I was appalled, but not surprised.296
A year later in April 1993, Bud Holland was appointed to lead a formation on a mission to a bombing range. He violated numerous regulations, including ‘suggesting’ that a crew member leave his station, in order to take video footage of the release of live munitions from the bomb bay.297 Post-mission senior leaders were delivered evidence (video footage and photographs) of deviant airmanship; they took no action. Bud Holland appeared invincible and untouchable.
On 08 August 1993 at an air show at Fairchild, Bud Holland’s manoeuvres once again exceeded technical orders. No disciplinary action was taken. The dangerous affect that Holland’s deviant airmanship and “ability to break the rules with apparent impunity”298 was having on the younger and less skilled members of the wing was evident. Copycat behaviour resulted in near disaster, when another B-52 pilot attempted to duplicate a manoeuvre he had witnessed Bud Holland perform. Also, administrative action was taken against a new aircraft commander who repeated a manoeuvre he had witnessed Bud Holland complete at an air show.299 Yet Bud Holland remained untouchable.
During a bombing run on 10 March 1994, to practice munitions and allow an opportunity for official ground photography of the B-52, several violations occurred including grossly exceeding minimum altitude levels. A crew member
295 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 38. 296 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 38. 297 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 39. 298 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 40. 299 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 40. 56 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
estimated “the final ridgeline crossover was somewhere in the neighbourhood of three feet.” 300 Bud Holland also reportedly questioned the radar navigator’s masculinity, as he refused to open the bomb doors for a photograph.301 During this flight crew members spoke up regarding their concerns, and on return from the mission, due Holland’s reckless behaviour, they said “they would not fly with (him) again.”302
Post this mission, Bud Holland’s attitude towards his colleagues was apparent in the following comment from a co-pilot:
I was sitting there and he [Bud] came over and said, “That little f---er,” referring to Lt Col McGeehan, “tried to get me grounded. But I solved that, the three of us.” And Lt Col Holland told me, speaking directly at Lt Col McGeehan, that he didn't respect him as a man, as a commander, or as a pilot. Apparently Lt Col McGeehan had said something about him being dangerous and Lt Col Holland indicated that he told him that he was just a “weak dick.”303
Bud Holland was Chief of Standardisation and Evaluation for the wing, and he had more B-52 hours than any other pilot. Many aviators considered Bud Holland to be “an outstanding pilot, perhaps the best in the B-52 fleet”;304 he was the “top of the pyramid”.305 He had developed an aura of untouchability. In reality, he had become “complacent, reckless, and (he) wilfully violated regulations.” 306 Just weeks before the accident Bud Holland let his feelings about taking orders and guidance from his superiors known, at the same time displaying his profound level of arrogance and dominance.
I’m going to fly the air show and, yeah, I may have someone senior in rank flying with me…He may be the boss on the ground, but I’m the boss in the air and I’ll do what I want to do.307
300 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 42. Emphasis in original. 301 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 42. 302 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 43. 303 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 44. 304 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 34. 305 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 34. 306 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 46. 307 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 48. 57 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
During the first of two scheduled practices in the lead up to the June 1994 air show, violations of regulations and technical orders occurred. Senior leaders witnessed the practice and at the end of it stated “the profile looks good; looks very safe, well within parameters.” 308 But it was not. Senior leaders did not enforce standards; they stood by and did nothing in the face of gross violations of flying safety criteria. Bud Holland was an “outstanding stick-and-rudder pilot,”309 who was “as good a B-52 aviator as I have seen,” and “was probably the best B- 52 pilot that I know.”310 These comments from his superiors indicate that they appeared in awe of him; they had become trapped by the myth of the dominant pilot. A B-52 pilot commenting on Bud Holland’s ability to dominate his superiors stated, “It was worse than the blind leading the blind. It was more like the spider and the fly.”311
This accident does not solely rest with the actions of one man. The deeper meaning behind the crash of Czar 52 lies in the organisational culture – the failure of leadership due to unconstructive ideas of power, which enabled the accident. This crash was caused by a prevailing culture of the normalisation of deviant airmanship, where rules were flexible and regulations were blatantly disregarded. The upshot was the fostering of a non-compliant culture and a grave failing in leadership. The inability of those in supervisory positions to enforce orders displayed a lack of moral courage; they failed to ‘walk the walk’.312
The following case highlights that the USAF did not learn the lessons of the past – the crash of Sitka 43 is reminiscent of the Czar 52 crash that occurred sixteen years earlier.
Sitka 43 – ‘When will we ever learn...’318
308 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 46. 309 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 32. 310 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 34. 311 Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 41. 312 ‘Walk the walk’ – indicates that actions speak louder than words. Kern, Darker Shades of Blue, 1999, p. 11: “You are not who you think you are. You are not who others think you are. You are not what you – or others – say you are. You are what you do – pure and simple.” 318 Lyrics from Pete Seeger’s song, Where have all the flowers gone?, 1961. 58 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Pilot error was the primary cause of a USAF Boeing C-17 (call sign Sitka 43), which crashed in Alaska on 28 July 2010. The subsequent investigation exposed imprudent oversight of an aggressive pilot, who repeatedly performed an unsafe air show routine without censure.319 On the day of the accident, the pilot and three crew members departed Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson to practice manoeuvres for the 31 July 2010 Arctic Thunder Air show. Immediately after take-off the pilot executed an aggressive right turn and the stall warning system activated. The pilot continued the turn instead of starting stall recovery procedures. When he eventually attempted recovery he employed incorrect procedures and the aircraft impacted the ground, tragically killing all on board.320 The accident investigation report describes the pilot as
An extremely precise and knowledgeable aviator who had garnered the utmost respect from squadron leadership and his peers.321
In seeking to “put on a good show”322 the pilot had “developed an unsafe flight profile.”323 The evidence showed the primary cause of the accident to be pilot error, citing “over aggressiveness, channelised attention, overconfidence, and program oversight” 324 as substantial contributors to the accident. 325 The report also emphasised a breakdown in command climate as a contributing factor, in that “because he was an accomplished aviator, leadership allowed him to operate
319 Stephen Trimble, ‘C-17 crash report exposes cracks in USAF safety culture’, Flight International, 17 December 2010, viewed 14 July 2012, at http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/c-17-crash-report-exposes-cracks-in-usaf-safety-culture- 351032/ 320 Carlton D. Everhart II, USAF Air Accident Investigation Board Report – C-17A T/N 00-0173, 27 September 2010, p. 2, viewed 15 July 2012, at www.pacaf.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD- 101214-048.pdf 321 Everhart, USAF AAIBRR – C-17A T/N 00-0173, 2010, p. 26. 322 Everhart, USAF AAIBRR – C-17A T/N 00-0173, 2010, p. 25, “Misplaced motivation is a factor when an individual replaces the primary goal of a mission with a personal goal.” 323 Trimble, ‘C-17 crash report exposes cracks in USAF safety culture’, 2010. 324 Everhart, USAF AAIBRR – C-17A T/N 00-0173, 2010, p.p. 21-7: “Overaggressive is when an individual is excessive in the manner in which they conduct a mission; Channelised attention is when the individual is focusing all conscious attention on a limited number of environmental cues, to the exclusion of others of a subjectively equal or higher or more immediate priority, leading to an unsafe situation – described as a tight focus of attention; Overconfidence is when the individual overvalues or overestimates personal capability, the capability of others or the capability of the aircraft, creating an unsafe situation; Program oversight is when programs are implemented without sufficient support, oversight or planning and this leads to an unsafe situation.” 325 Everhart, USAF AAIBRR – C-17A T/N 00-0173, 2010, p. 2. 59 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
independently with little or no oversight.”326 The accidents of Czar 52 and Sitka 43 are eerily similar. Aerial demonstration procedures were replaced with individual techniques. Caution and warning signals were ignored. Channelised attention was apparent – both pilots continued their turns and did not apply correct stall recovery techniques. Both pilots displayed overconfidence and a sense of invulnerability. Misplaced motivation was apparent – they were both conducting air show practices and wanted to ‘put on a good show’. Significantly, procedural guidance and program oversight were lacking; senior leaders did not enforce rules and standards and this lack of supervision resulted in actions going unchecked.327
Diminishing Power – Crew Resource Management (CRM)
CRM evolved from a NASA sponsored workshop held in 1979. Research presented at the workshop identified that the majority of human error aspects of aviation crashes were a failure of interpersonal communications, dominance, poor decision-making, and lack of leadership. 328 CRM enabled the confrontation of unconstructive ideas of power in the cockpit, where junior pilots lacked assertiveness and captains were overly authoritarian. These ideas are ubiquitous and difficult to address, and the myth cannot be disregarded as it has significant cultural influence. Robert Helmreich captured this by commenting
The culture of pilots is a strong one – exemplified by the rugged individualism vividly portrayed by Tom Wolfe in The Right Stuff. In addition to having great professional pride, many pilots strongly deny susceptibility to stress – they are unwilling to acknowledge that fatigue and sudden danger can dull thinking and slow response times. This sense of invulnerability can manifest itself in a desire to play the role of the white-scarfed lone aviator battling the elements.329
326 Everhart, USAF AAIBRR – C-17A T/N 00-0173, 2010, p. 27. 327 Ian Brown, The direction of aviation safety - are the lessons of the past being applied today?, 2011, p.p. 7-8, viewed 15 July 2012, at http://asasi.org/papers/2011/The%20Direction%20of%20Aviation%20Safety%20(Merged)%20- %20Ian%20Brown.pdf 328 Helmreich, Merritt and Wilhelm, ‘The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training in Commercial Aviation’, International Journal of Aviation Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1999, p.p. 19- 32. 329 Robert L. Helmreich, ‘Managing Human Error in Aviation’, Scientific American, 1997, p.p. 62-7, p. 66. 60 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Geert Hofstede’s work on organisational culture has also significantly influenced the CRM system. Hofstede illuminated the idea of ‘power-distance’ in organisational, social and cultural systems.330 Power gradients are part and parcel of everyday life in the Air Force. A downside of a culture where power gradients feature prominently is that it can stifle followers. They become reluctant to speak up and ask questions. Schein asserts that it is the leaders responsibility to break down these communication barriers and create a climate of openness, as “good relations and reliable communication across hierarchic boundaries are crucial” for high hazard industries in which safety is paramount.331 These ideas of power link to uncertainty avoidance332 and groupthink,333 and essentially the CRM system aims to foster a culture where the dominant idea is power with, as opposed to power over.
Many organisations involved in highly technical and complex endeavours have adopted the technique of CRM in their efforts to minimise risk. The RNZAF regularly trains aircrew and maintenance personnel in CRM. However, as the cases explored in this chapter highlight, CRM training alone is not enough to deter accidents; organisational culture plays a considerable role. The deeper meaning behind the USAF crashes of Czar 52 and Sitka 43 resonate with some aspects of
330 Amy C. Edmondson, ‘Speaking Up in the Operating Room: How Team Leaders Promote Learning in Interdisciplinary Action Teams’, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 40, No. 6, 2003, p.p. 0022-2380, p.p. 1423-1424: “Power, defined as the capability of one organisation member to direct the behaviour of others, inhibits the upward flow of information in organisations. In groups, members with less power defer to those with more power, protecting themselves through self- censorship to avoid being rejected or marginalised. In contexts in which formal power differences are present and speaking up matters for performance, it is incumbent upon those with power to find ways to minimise its silencing effects. In some teams, leaders have an unusual degree of power or authority relative to other members. Such large power discrepancies may adversely affect low-power members’ perceptions of the ease of speaking up, inhibiting open discussion, and posing a practical risk.” 331 Edgar H. Schein, Humble Inquiry: The Gentle Art of Asking Instead of Telling, Berrett-Kochler Publishers, San Francisco, 2013, p. 2. 332 Geert Hofstede, ‘Cultural Differences in Teaching and Learning’, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 10, 1986, p.p. 301-30, p. 308: “Uncertainty avoidance defines the extent to which people within a culture are made nervous by situations, which they perceive as unstructured, unclear, or unpredictable. They try to avoid these situations by maintaining strict codes of behaviour and a belief in absolute truths. Cultures with high uncertainty avoidance are active, aggressive, emotional, compulsive, security seeking, and intolerant.” 333 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: a Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1972, p.p. 8-9: “A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.” 61 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
the Court of Inquiry findings of the 2010 RNZAF NZ1990 Airtrainer and NZ3806 Iroquois accidents.
NZ 1990
On 14 January 2010 the Red Checkers334 were tasked to conduct two standard display practices. At 0806 hours during the ‘Fishtail Pass’ component of the first display practice, Airtrainer NZ1990 crashed. Tragically, the sole occupant died on impact.335 The Court of Inquiry report details the causal factors as a combination of pilot error and a lack of oversight, supervision, official documentation and training.336
The pilot in command “was a high achiever who had won the Lawson aerobatic trophy and achieved high academic marks”337 on his Flying Instructors Course.338 The Court of Inquiry report attributes pilot error – the normalisation of deviance, unstable and dangerous flying technique, a sense of invulnerability, and fixation – to the cause of the accident.339 That ideas of invincibility may have played a part in this accident cannot be ignored. Recalling ideas from earlier in this chapter, it was revealed that a sense of invulnerability has operational consequences. That pilots may undertake risk-taking behaviour because they perceive the threat to be low, or that previous success in adverse conditions increases their willingness to take risks, are factors that may have contributed to this accident.
334 The Red Checkers are the RNZAF’s aerobatic display team, consisting of five members who fly CT-4E Airtrainers. 335 New Zealand Defence Force, Redacted version of the Court Of Inquiry into the accident involving Airtrainer NZ1990 at Raumai Air Weapons Range on 14 January 2010 (NZ1990 COI), 18 October 2011, p. 1. 336 NZ1990 COI, 2011, p.p. 4-5. 337 NZ1990 COI, 2011, p. 18. Emphasis added. 338 As part of the course, all students are taught low-level aerobatics and display flying, and compete in the Lawson low-level aerobatics competition. 339 NZ1990 COI, 2011, p.p. 36-7. Emphasis added. The pilot in command: “Failed to discuss any of the departures he encountered, with other team members or Qualified Flying Instructors; and, he repeatedly persevered with the Fishtail Pass after encountering departures.”; p. 4, “Had a mindset that the Fishtail Pass was a benign manoeuvre, combined with desensitisation to the risk as a result of already having recovered from a number of similar departures in previous displays and practises.”; p. 40, “Pushed the boundaries of the Fishtail Pass in order to make the manoeuvre appear more interesting and dynamic, by extending and prolonging the yaw.”; p. 4. “Was flying the Fishtail Pass significantly more aggressively than previous pilots who had flown the manoeuvre. His Fishtail Passes were poorly and inconsistently flown, right from the first recorded flight, in November 2009.”; p. 45, “Persevered with the Fishtail Pass following a departure from controlled flight to the right, resulting in an unrecoverable departure from controlled flight to the left.” 62 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The Court of Inquiry report noted too “the pressures involved in display flying” 340 stating
Of the five most recent RNZAF aircraft accident fatalities…three (or 60%) occurred during a practice for a low level aerobatic display.341
In this accident, a sense of invulnerability that promotes a culture of over- confidence (particularly around flying displays), which was such a critical factor in the Czar 52 and Sitka 43 crashes, and so much a part of the Top Gun narrative, played a decisive part.
NZ 3806
On 25 April 2010 a formation of three Iroquois helicopters (callsign IROQUOIS BLACK) departed RNZAF Base Ohakea to conduct ANZAC Day flypasts in the Wellington region. At 0549 hours NZ3806 (callsign IROQUOIS BLACK 2) crashed in a valley. Tragically, of the four crew on board only one survived.342
The Court of Inquiry report lists as causal factors a number of cultural and organisational issues. Significantly, a ‘can do’ culture was in existence for some time on 3 Squadron. Another name or face for a ‘can do’ culture is a ‘warrior culture’. These terms also bring into perspective other ideas, such as a sense of invulnerability and a sense of worth being derived from the accomplishment of tasks. Other cultural factors that contributed to this accident include: the normalisation of deviance and non-compliance; pro-task motivation and pressure to complete tasks; and, risk denial. The organisational or systemic issues that contributed to this accident include: a lack of governance – supervision and oversight; a lack of training; disingenuous orders and procedures; and, leadership inaction and missed opportunities.
340 NZ1990 COI, 2011, p. 40. 341 NZ1990 COI, 2011, p. 25. 342 New Zealand Defence Force, Redacted version of the Court of Inquiry investigating the accident involving Iroquois NZ3806 near Pukerua Bay on 25 April 2010 (NZ3806 COI), 13 December 2011, p. 1. 63 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Cultural Factors
‘Can do / Warrior culture’. That a ‘can do’ culture existed on 3 Squadron for some time prior to the accident is evident in the following comment
Reports from similar situations involving 3 Squadron indicate that this risk accepting aspect of the ‘can do’ culture was widespread in the lead up to this accident. Historic reports indicate that the culture was probably present, and had been a factor in accidents and safety events at 3 Squadron for some time.343
Normalisation of deviance, rule violation, and non-compliance. Echoing Czar 52, comment from the Court of Inquiry report points to a culture where bending the rules appeared normal and acceptable.
The formation was flying in conditions below its authorised met minima of 600ft cloud base because they were comfortable doing so. The use of ‘comfort’ as a criteria may be an indication of the operating culture on 3 Squadron at the time. They considered they were permitted to continue the task, provided they felt ‘comfortable’ to do so. A subjective feeling of ‘comfort’ being the widely accepted criteria.344
Pro-task motivation and pressure = increased acceptance of risk. Pro-task motivation and the pressure of the ANZAC Day flypast cannot be discounted as causal factors.
343 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p. 62. Similar comment includes: p. 9, “Flight Safety Event reports and anecdotes recounted during the RNZAF Supervisors Course provided important demonstrations of a ‘can do’ culture and attitudes towards flying orders and instructions.”; p. 82, “The ‘can do’ culture on 3 Squadron was such that the crews of IROQUOIS BLACK considered they were permitted to continue the task below Night Vision Goggle meteorological minima required by orders, provided they themselves were ‘comfortable’ to do so, and if the act would increase the probability of completing the task.”; p. 86, “A ‘can do’ culture was prevalent on 3 Squadron at the time of the accident. Positive aspects of this culture included increased motivation and increased effort towards achieving tasks from scarce resources. A significant negative aspect of the culture had manifested in the understanding amongst aircrew that they were permitted to break certain flying rules.” 344 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p. 23. Similar comments include: p. 12, “Lack of currency was not unusual under the 3 Squadron currency programme at the time, because the currency programme was considered out of date and typically not followed.”; p. 50, “Twenty four relevant Civil and Defence Force orders, instructions and publications may not have been complied with in the course of the IROQUOIS BLACK task.”; p. 53, “This apparent non-compliance was common on 3 Squadron at the time.” 64 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The captains of IROQUOIS BLACK were to be made aware of the importance of the task. 485 Wing described the flypast as a ‘big event’ and that they did not want to be embarrassed. Their collective decision to continue the task in poor weather conditions and statements of their personal expectation to get tasks done were indicative of pro-task motivation. The attitude to this task might have shaped decision making and consequently increased acceptance of risk.345
Rewarding of deviant behaviour. Comments in the Court of Inquiry report are indicative of an organisational expectation to complete tasks. The subsequent reward for doing so appears to have inadvertently condoned a culture of risk- taking.
3 Squadron gets the job done, that’s just the way they are. Aircrew stated that if you wanted to get another task, you’d get this one done. This reinforcement is apparent in the Unit Citations, Search and Rescue Awards and other commendations received by the Squadron.346
Organisational Factors
The Court of Inquiry report reveals numerous organisational factors that contributed to the accident.
Governance and supervision/orders. In 2001 a new functionally aligned system for the management of flying was introduced, which led to “crossed lines of communication and unclear responsibilities.”347 Post the restructure authoritative documentation was not effective in providing a permanent means to govern flying operations.
345 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p. 19. Also, p. 82, “The particular pressures associated with high profile public tasks in general and ANZAC Day flypasts in particular.” 346 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p. 61. Similar comment includes: p. 56, “That it was right to ‘interpret’ orders was reinforced through the high regard 3 Squadron is held in for its ability to complete tasks.”; p. 66, “The ‘hero-villain’ would be lauded for what he/she had achieved, but was known to be pushing the limits of safe operations and therefore in conflict with the safety and rules expectations of the RNZAF.” 347 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p.p. 60, 86: The situation was described as “like working under divorced parents – Mum is in Auckland, Dad is in Upper Hutt.” 65 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Orders, instructions and procedures were too complex, contradictory, convoluted and, in some cases, out-of-date to be useful. As such, they were not adequate to ensure the crews of IROQUOIS BLACK were fully qualified, competent, and had sufficient currency to undertake the task.348
Leadership – missed opportunities. Echoing Czar 52, there were numerous indicators of a tragedy unfolding, and yet the organisational response was not appropriate so as to minimise the risk.
Some of the Flight Safety Event reports demonstrated a leadership link to the attitude towards rule breaking. The way that these events were acted on demonstrated organisational tolerance of the rule breaking attitude, or at least inactivity in correcting it.349
Earlier opportunities for RNZAF commanders to intervene and address the culture and attitudes to orders and instructions prevalent on 3 Squadron were not undertaken in a manner adequate to clearly demonstrate that command would not tolerate non-compliance.350
What these examples indicate is the very essence of organisational culture induced accidents – that is “we weren’t sufficiently alarmed to do anything about it.”351
348 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p. 83. Similar comment includes: p. 85, “Non-compliance is more likely an organisational problem, than an isolated case of an individual or group conducting non-compliant acts.”; p. 86, “The RNZAF Governance systems were inadequate in modifying practices on 3 Squadron. Preceding 485 Wing audits identified shortfalls with orders and instructions.”; p. 56, “The deficiencies had been recognised for some time but had not yet been addressed, [this] undermined confidence in the orders. This, coupled with the ambiguity of the orders, led to a belief that some were open to interpretation.” 349 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p. 9. Similar comment includes: p. 53, “All aircrew interviewed (including aircrew not on 3 Squadron) could relate instances when significant breaches of orders and procedures by other 3 Squadron aircrew had apparently passed without command action being taken.”; p. 60, “A number of reports brought the command effectiveness in the management of 3 Squadron’s culture into question. The Accident Analysis Report noted several incidents and allegations relating to apparently significant breaches of safe flying practice and rule breaking. Command missed a number of opportunities to be effective in the management of the negative aspects of the Squadron’s culture.”; p. 65, “The action taken was not transparent to other squadron members and so did not demonstrate any clear consequence for putting the aircraft and crew at unnecessary risk. By not taking any formal action that would have been visible to the rest of the Squadron, Command lost a valuable opportunity to publicly demonstrate its expectation that appropriate attitudes towards operating culture and adherence to orders and instructions be maintained.” 350 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p. 83. 351 Reason, ‘Achieving a safe culture’, 1998, p. 297. 66 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Unconstructive ideas of power and a breakdown in CRM. Explicit ideas that are revealed in the Court of Inquiry report include
The captain of BLACK 3 had set an incorrect frequency. The Co-pilot recognised the wrong frequency but did not bring it to the attention of the Captain. This is a consequence of the captain of BLACK 3 not attending the formation/authorisation brief and a breakdown in Crew Resource Management. The Co-pilot should have informed the captain that the incorrect frequency was set.352
Why did the Co-pilot not bring this error to the attention of the Captain? That unconstructive ideas of power played a part, where the Co-pilot felt he could not undermine the Captain, cannot be discounted. Also, during the flight out over the sea and not long before impact
The captain of BLACK 3 asked the formation whether everyone was qualified for Low Level Over Water. The Pilot In Command of BLACK 2 needed to be prompted by the Formation Leader, then replied that he was and that he had set the Radar Altimeter to 50ft. The Court of Inquiry found no evidence that the Pilot In Command of BLACK 2 was Low Level Over Water qualified. 3 Squadron Standard Operating Procedure states that when operating at 250ft over water at night 200ft is to be set on the Radar Altimeter low set index. The fact that BLACK 2 was not corrected indicates a formation Crew Resource Management breakdown in so far as the Formation Leader did not want to question the decision of another aircraft’s captain.353
In this accident, the socially vibrant examples seen in The Right Stuff, Top Gun, and the crash of Czar 52 are apparent. Leadership failing, lack of governance and oversight, a culture of ‘can do’ and the normalisation of deviance come to bear. This accident was seeded in organisational failure. That some senior leaders were aware of the culture on 3 Squadron is highly likely (as is evident in the Court of Inquiry findings354). Fundamentally, leaders play a role propagating a ‘can do’
352 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p. 22. Emphasis added. 353 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p. 24. Emphasis added. 354 NZ3806 COI, 2011, p.p. 9, 83. 67 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
attitude, and their apprehension in dealing proactively with known deficiencies results in its persistence.
As these cases reveal, history is replete with accidents rich in examples of neglecting previously identified weakness. 3 Squadron has a proud history and had been rewarded for achievements in the past because of their ‘can do’ attitude. In many ways the culture is valued and inculcated as it has positives associated with it – it encourages initiative and self-reliance, which are highly desirable attributes. The challenge is to ensure that initiative and self-reliance does not degenerate to corner cutting and undue risk taking,355 as ‘can do’ can equate to a ‘make do’ or ‘can do at all costs’, which inevitably results in deviations from the required safety procedures in order to get the job done.
So What?
The accidents explored in this chapter reveal similar causal factors. James Reason asserts that “far from being random, accidents have a way of falling into recurrent patterns.” 356 This is due to powerful factors acting to push safety into the background. Organisations need to instil and sustain a healthy and intelligent respect for hazards. The price of complacency is recurring accident patterns that have the same cultural drivers, the same uncorrected traps, with the resultant effect being the same or a similar event happening again.357
This chapter has exposed the general cultural resonance of the ‘Aircrew’ character and myth. The main case Czar 52 was characterised by unconstructive ideas of power, which veered away from the traditional military hierarchy. In the case of Bud Holland, the most important person was seen to be himself. Not only had Bud fallen foul of the myth, but those who worked closely with him (including his senior leaders) had become entrapped by the myth of ‘Aircrew’. The cases in this chapter illustrate that unconstructive ideas of power and the ‘can do/warrior
355 Andrew Hopkins, Safety, Culture and Risk: The Organisational Causes of Disasters, CCH Australia Limited, Sydney, 2005, p. 89. 356 Professor James Reason developed the ‘Swiss Cheese Model’ of accident causation, which asserts that many errors in complex systems are caused by incomplete layers of protection, thus allowing error to pass though ‘holes’ in the systems defences. 357 Reason, ‘Achieving a safe culture’, 1998, p. 305. 68 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
culture’ serve to increase risk. Recurring themes, such as the normalisation of deviance, non-compliance, and a lack of supervision and oversight (resulting from a culture of ‘can do’) serve to entrap good people. The RNZAF, a safety-oriented professional organisation, ought to ask how training had not passed on lessons from the past and why governance systems were not adequate.
What is also revealed in these cases is what is known as a ‘display’ culture, where senior leaders look the wrong way. Instead of out, about and down, they are looking in and up, concerned about their own careers and their own path to promotion. This, coupled with an insouciant attitude leads to a ‘can do’ culture prevailing. Leaders create culture and their role and responsibility is to ensure they create a constructive influence. Leaders must change the drivers and remove the traps (‘can do’, time pressures, cost-cutting, indifference to hazards and the blinkered pursuit of tasks) otherwise they stand the chance of being ‘kicked for the second time by the mule’.358
Conclusion
This chapter explored unconstructive ideas of power and the character of ‘Aircrew’. From Air Chief Marshal Scherger in doctrine, to Tom Wolfe’s The Right Stuff, the movie Top Gun and the comedic character Lord Flasheart, what is evident is that cultural artefacts and myths find meaning in everyday life. The main case Czar 52 highlights the elevated risk associated with individual failure and senior leaders lack of intervention. These themes were also evident in three recent accidents – Sitka 43, NZ1990 and NZ3806. What is apparent is that a ‘can do/warrior culture’ can be dangerous and unconstructive; it ‘can kill’.361
358 Reason, ‘Achieving a safe culture’, 1998, p. 302. 361 David Fisher, ‘Air Tragedy: email warning’, The New Zealand Herald, 11 September 2012, citing the acting Squadron Commander of 3 Squadron at the time of the accident, viewed 12 September 2012, at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10833176: "How long do we let this line of thinking develop before someone screws up and gets charged or, worse, crashes?...Can do, can kill." Emphasis added. 69 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Chapter Four
‘Maintenance Crew’ – The Warrior Enabler
The previous chapter revealed similarities that were apparent in four tragic events, where themes such as the normalisation of deviant airmanship, and the lack of leadership and supervision lined up to result in catastrophic accidents. Despite evident strengths, the culture of military aviation continues to be burdened by unhelpful myths.
This chapter begins to explore how the ‘Aircrew’ myth can operate to undermine consociate other groups, by investigating the character of ‘Maintenance Crew’. Discussion provides a theoretical frame to illustrate the way in which ‘Aircrew’ dominate out-groups of ‘Other’, and further illustrates the phenomenon of normalised deviance. These themes texture the accidents that are discussed in the second half of the chapter. In 2005, the RAN lost a Sea King helicopter, call sign Shark 02. The loss of this aircraft, alongside the loss of the NASA shuttles Challenger and Columbia and the loss of RAF XV230, reveals the effect of marginalisation and powerlessness on organisational performance. These accidents demonstrate the causally relevant impact of cultural ideas, which are pervasive within the RNZAF. In this chapter ‘Maintenance Crew’ is revealed as a symbol for excessive deference, for deference to authority which is unconstructive, and which may be described as subservient (as it is deference that is overly compliant and acquiescent). This group, by being biddable and tractable, are seen to support and reinforce the dominant culture.
Recalling ideas illuminated in Chapter Two on social ordering and tribalism, what becomes clear in the discussion to follow is the cultural authority and practical control of ‘Aircrew’. Everyone else is seen to be the out-group or ‘Other’. In part, the cause of the accidents that are explored in this chapter lies in the thinking of subordinates and in their inability to stand up to the power that exists in strict hierarchical systems. In these accidents the dominance of ‘Aircrew’ is seen to suppress ‘Maintenance Crew’. This chapter explains how the interplay between these culturally enmeshed and unconstructive ideas of power inhibit
70 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
organisational performance. People were reluctant to speak up and raise their concerns, especially outside of their ‘group’. For example, in the Challenger disaster a Morton Thiokol (contractor) engineer became increasingly insistent about the potential failure of the O-rings,363 and sent repeated messages to his Vice President of Engineering expressing that the situation was dire and that catastrophe could result. The warnings eventually had some effect, as the Vice President on the eve of launch recommended against it. 364 However, Marshall Space Flight Centre managers refused to accept bad news and resisted the Thiokol recommendation. The insistent engineer said “He argued until it became clear that no one wanted to hear what I had to say.” 365 This discloses the status of engineering personnel at NASA; their influence was limited due to their perceived standing in the hierarchy. In this regard, the engineers are seen to be like ‘Maintenance Crew’ and subservient to the managers (seen to be like ‘Aircrew’) who ran NASA. This type of unconstructive power leads to personnel believing that they will not be listened to. It results in their reluctance to express their thoughts and creates a communication vacuum, which drives up risk and can lead to organisational failure.
Investigations of disasters often reveal that someone, somewhere in the organisation knew of the impending failure and yet did not (or felt they could not) share that knowledge, particularly with the people who make decisions.366 This rings true in the accidents explored in this chapter.
Bad news is not often passed upward in organisations. Moreover, even when bad news is sent, people are less likely to believe it than good news.367
363 D. A. Winsor, ‘Communication Failures Contributing to the Challenger Accident: An Example for Technical Communicators’, IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1988, p.p. 101-7, p. 104: On July 31 1985 (six months prior to the disaster) a Thiokol engineer (Boisjoly) sent a memo to the Vice President of Thiokol Morkol expressing his concern and closing with “It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to dedicate a team to solve the problem with the field joint having the number one priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad facilities.” 364 Winsor, Communication Failures, 1988, p.p. 104-5. 365 Winsor, Communication Failures, 1988, p. 106. 366 Winsor, Communication Failures, 1988, p. 101; Schein, Humble Inquiry, 2013, p. 2: “A common finding is that lower ranking employees had information that would have prevented or lessened the consequences of the accident, but either it was not passed up to higher levels, or it was ignored, or it was overridden.” 367 Winsor, Communication Failures, 1988, p. 101. 71 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Dominant Themes
In discussion to follow, what is revealed is that the organisations involved in each of the accidents viewed each other as “outsiders and therefore they did want to air their dirty linen in public.” 368 This, combined with the slow pace of communication between the ‘groups’, resulted in communication failure. What is exposed are the harmful organisational effects of unconstructive ideas of power within hierarchies, and the divisive influence of in- and out-group behaviour. The artefacts of organisational culture, the hierarchy of cultural memes, and the primacy and allure of the ‘Aircrew’ myth are reflected in the NASA Challenger disaster with Marshall’s reaction to the O-ring issue. They treated it as serious when communicating downward, but “as relatively minor when they communicated up to NASA headquarters.”369 As Challenger was preparing for launch, engineers knew it had a fatal flaw. “According to our engineering people the (shuttle) was going to blow up on the pad.” 370 What this reveals is a fundamental breakdown in culture, whereby maintenance personnel felt they were powerless to prevent the launch.
In the accidents examined in this chapter, what cannot be ignored is that maintenance personnel felt a sense of powerlessness – revealed in their inability to express their concerns, their drift into non-compliant and deviant practices, and their acceptance of increased risk. Recalling the narrative on conformity and the normalisation of deviance in Chapter Two, what is revealed in the following cases is that most accidents are caused by “a small error in judgment that is then magnified through a cascading sequence of decisions and actions, because no one questions the first faulty premise.” 371 In all of the accidents examined in this chapter, a major causal factor was organisational culture. A specific contributory factor was normalised deviance. If repeated deviant behaviour does not result in catastrophe, it becomes an organisational social norm. These conscious violations
368 Winsor, Communication Failures, 1988, p. 101. 369 Winsor, Communication Failures, 1988, p. 102. 370 Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, 1996, p. 332. 371 Robert W. Gunn and Betsy Raskin Gullickson, ‘The Normalization of Deviance’, Accompli, 2004, p. 1, viewed 13 July 2012, at http://www.paci.com.au/downloads_public/risk/11_NormalisationOfDeviance.pdf. 72 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
without negative consequences encourage an organisational mindset that more readily permits future violations. This occurs regardless of well-established evidence that suggests violations can and do lead to serious incidents. 372 Individuals who buck the trend of deviance and challenge it are considered nuisances or even threats, and more often than not are marginalised and ignored.
The Columbia accident is an unfortunate illustration of how NASA’s strong cultural bias and its optimistic organisational thinking undermined effective decision-making.373
Psychologist Irving Janis in his seminal work Victims of Groupthink, scrutinised United States policy decisions such as the escalation of the Vietnam War. He determined that in the situations that ended badly there existed a cluster of eight symptoms, which he termed ‘groupthink’.374 Groupthink is defined as “a mode of thinking people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group; when the members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action [and] involves a deterioration of mental efficacy, reality testing and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures.”375 Dorwin Cartwright concludes
The greater a group’s cohesiveness the more power it has to bring about conformity to its norms and to gain acceptance of its goals and assignments to tasks and roles…Highly cohesive groups provide a source of security for members, which serves to reduce anxiety and to heighten self-esteem.376
372 American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Key Lessons From The Columbia Shuttle Disaster, p. 2, viewed 13 July 2012, at http://www.aiche.org/uploadedFiles/CCPS/Resources/KnowledgeBase/Self- evaluation_tool_Rev_2.pdf 373 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report (The CAIB Report), Government Printing Office, Washington DC, Vol. 1, 2003, p. 181. 374 Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 1972, p. 198: The eight symptoms of groupthink syndrome are: “the illusion of invulnerability – creates excessive optimism and encourages taking risks; collective efforts to rationalise in order to discount warning; unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality – they ignore ethical and moral consequences of their decisions; stereotyped views; direct pressure against any member who expresses strong arguments against the group’s stereotypes, illusions or commitments; self-censorship of deviations from group consensus; shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgment conforming to the majority view; emergence of self-appointed mindguards – members who protect the group from adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions.” 375 Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 1972, p. 9. 376 Dorwin Cartwright, Group Dynamics, Tavistock Publications: London, 1968, p. 105. 73 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Groupthink was prevalent in the lead up to the accidents explored in this chapter. Cultural paradigms of unthinking conformity and collective misjudgement existed, and risks were not taken seriously.
The prevalence of ‘can do’, and the acceptance that operations drive logistics and therefore safety, is apparent in all four accidents. Operations are deemed to be all flying activities and logistics are activities that enable and support operations, including maintenance work. Operations always take precedence over logistics. Operations are the raison d’être of the Air Force and logistics exist only to serve operations. The inherent problem with this attitude is that it invites people to take ‘short cuts’, to put in ‘work-arounds’, to put off deeper level maintenance work; ultimately to resort to non-compliant practice, which inevitably drives up risk. Coupled with this aggregation of risk, “Pilots are trained to think of themselves as the elite of the Air Force.”377 The status system in the Air Force emphasises the priority of operations, and the ‘can do’ attitude pervades maintenance sections and is a real source of pressure.378
These dominant cultural themes are prevalent in the following four cases. In the first case, the experience of the RAN during Operation Sumatra Assist II demonstrates how important it is to not misread the absence of accident as the absence of risk.
Shark 02
Losing Sea King helicopter Shark 02, the Australian experience reveals how the misreading of the absence of accident traps good people as they begin to overestimate their ability. On 02 April 2005 Shark 02 crashed on its final approach to the Indonesian island of Nias, while completing an ADF humanitarian aid mission after a major earthquake. Of the eleven ADF personnel on board, nine
377 Hopkins, Safety, Culture and Risk, 2005, p. 85. 378 Hopkins, Safety, Culture and Risk, 2005, p. 86. 74 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
were fatally injured in the accident and two were seriously injured.379
The primary cause of the crash was determined as a loss of fore/aft pitch control following a maintenance error, which allowed the fore/aft bell crank in the mixing unit to separate.380 However, a comprehensive review of the accident revealed significant organisational cultural issues and deficiencies.381 The Board of Inquiry found that this accident was not a separate chance event, caused by a few people. It determined the crash was a multi-causal accident, “the result of a complex interaction of individual and systemic failings across the entire ADF.”382 This case illuminates ideas explored in the first half of this chapter. Specifically, the accident was deemed the “result of a series of errors and non-compliance with maintenance regulations,” 383 and there were several dominant themes that contributed to it.
There was evidence of long-standing non-compliant maintenance practices, that came to be accepted as approved ‘shortcuts and workarounds’. These appear to have been tacitly condoned.384 The ‘drift’ was seen as an “inevitable outcome of high operational tempo and a lack of resources, and this high demand led to a pressure to cut corners.”385 Poor communication led to poor logistic support, poor management of risk and misunderstandings over the status of work and inspections.386 Communication issues with higher command, where the language used did not convey a sense of urgency or concern, suggests that a tension existed between honest reporting and being seen to be ‘doing your job’ and ‘having it under control’.387 Unconstructive ideas of power leave open the possibility that junior personnel were intimidated and afraid, and senior people would not brook anything which compromised mission accomplishment, as that would undercut ideas of status and success.
379 Royal Australian Navy, Nias Island Sea King Accident Board of Inquiry Report (Sea King BOI Report), Executive Summary, Commonwealth of Australia, 2007, p. 1. 380 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Chapter 6, p. 82. 381 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Chapter 21, p. 1. 382 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 7. 383 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 2. 384 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 6; Chapter 8, p.p. 11, 12, 13, 34, 38, 43, 44, 45; Chapter 9, p.p. 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 17, 20, 24, 35. 385 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Chapter 21, p. 3. 386 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 6. 387 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Chapter 21, p. 4. 75 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Personnel did not understand the rationale behind why they were required to adhere to rules, regulations and procedures, which left them open to accepting and adopting non-compliant practices in order to ‘get the job done’.388 There was a misunderstanding or ignorance regarding individual roles and responsibilities, which was seen to significantly influence performance.389 Senior leaders did not have a clear understanding of their personal and organisational obligations, resulting in an unacceptable level of risk.390 There was a lack of safety leadership and adequate safety focus that saw the priority placed on mission achievement vice safe working practices;391 that is, operations were seen to override logistics. The Board of Inquiry found that the Squadron was a “fragile, high risk maintenance environment,”392 and there appeared to be a ‘compliance mentality’ operating.393 It also determined that a significant causal factor was the prevalence of ill-founded trust, where reliance on a framework for review, testing and assurance was not apparent.394 Trust was being used as a reason for the lack of engagement with subordinates and lack of supervision, which the Board found was a major weakness in the safety system evident at all levels.395
This accident was not caused by deliberate acts of negligence. Rather, people became desensitised to risk and therefore failed to correctly perceive things for what they were. The erosion of standards and procedure (normalised deviance) operated to deceive people, and resulted in the unacceptable becoming routine and normal. A high operational tempo and a logistically inhibited environment 396 contributed to the downward spiral and drift in standards and procedures. What is significant is that this culture was predicated on the drive to achieve tasks and missions, and resulted in the prevalence of a ‘can do’ attitude, where unrealistic belief and over-confidence took hold and risk was normalised. The basis of a ‘can
388 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 6; Chapter 8, p.p. 26-27. 389 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 6. 390 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Chapter 21, p. 2. 391 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 6. 392 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 6. 393 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Chapter 21, p. 2: “Solutions to problems based on administrative expediency, rather than a genuine concern for safety outcomes.” 394 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 6. 395 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Chapter 21, p. 3. 396 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Chapter 8, p.p. 11-12. 76 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
do’ culture is the accomplishment of tasks and because we often reward people for doing so, the message sent is ‘mission first’. In this case, operations were seen to override logistical and safety requirements.
A poor safety culture will encourage an atmosphere of non-compliance to safe operating practice. Violations are likely to be most common where unspoken attitudes and beliefs mean that goals are seen to outweigh those relating to safety.397
Leadership plays a strong role in developing and maintaining culture. In this case, the Commanding Officer of the Squadron had reached the conclusion prior to the accident that “there was an embedded culture of maintenance shortcuts and workarounds.”398 He assured command that he had introduced measures to rectify it through a series of initiatives and corrective action. There is a strong possibility however that the Commanding Officer was the victim of the myth he was trying to counteract; his people were ‘saying anything to the boss to keep him happy’. It would have been almost impossible for him to hear the truth from his people, because he was still their Commander. Senior leaders did not recognise that the corrective measures put in place were not working, and that intervention was required.399 They did not fully understand and comprehend their responsibilities regarding airworthiness.
Tragically, this was a preventable accident where earlier warning signals were not seen for the risk they were. Myths were getting in the way of truth. The then Chief of the RAN summed up the inherent risk of a ‘warrior culture’ when he stated
Above all, what this accident has taught us is that we must move forward from a CAN DO mentality to a CAN DO SAFELY attitude.401
397 Reason, ‘Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice’, 1998, p. 297. Emphasis added. 398 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 3; Chapter 9, p.p. 1, 5: In a Minute dated 12 November 2004 to Navy Aviation Force Element Group and Maritime Headquarters the Commanding Officer referred to “an embedded culture of unauthorised shortcuts and workarounds” and specifically mentioned “undocumented maintenance and failures of supervision and inspection”. He further stated “It is possible that there may be other latent problems that will come to light in the near future.” 399 Sea King BOI Report, 2007, Executive Summary, p. 4; Chapter 9, p. 35. 401 Philip Machin, Series of Errors in Sea King Crash, 2 July 2007, viewed 26 September 2012, at 77 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The same phenomena apparent in the lead up to Shark 02 repeat themselves in different circumstances, and the NASA Challenger and Columbia disasters reveal just that.
Columbia and other cases have shown that, usually, there are fundamental organisational causes, which lie at the heart of many major accidents.402
NASA Challenger
On 28 January 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated seventy three seconds after lift off.403 The Rogers Commission was formed to investigate the accident and determined that the physical cause was “a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right solid rocket motor. The specific failure was the destruction of the seals (O-rings) that are intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor.”404
Of greater significance, the Commission deemed that the organisational culture at NASA was a key causal factor. NASA managers had known for nearly ten years that the contractors’ (Morton Thiokol) design of the O-rings for the solid rocket boosters contained a potentially disastrous flaw. 405 Thiokol managers did not address the issue properly and ignored repeated warnings406 from their engineers http://www.navy.gov.au/Series_of_errors_in_Sea_King_crash. Original emphasis. 402 Charles Haddon-Cave QC, The Nimrod Review: An independent review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006 (The Haddon- Cave Report), The Stationery Office: London, 28 October 2009, p. 447. 403 The Report on The Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Accident (The Rogers Commission Report), Volume One, Chapter III, 1986, p. 19. 404 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter IV, 1986, p. 40. 405 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter IV, 1986, p.p. 41, 55-59, 72: “The Commission concluded that the cause of the Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The failure was due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of materials, the effects of reusability, processing, and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading.”; Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, 1996, p.p. 77, 408. 406 Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, 1996, p. 6: On the eve of the launch, Thiokol expressed concern about the low temperatures to NASA managers. “We have to make a management decision, thus excluding Thiokol engineers from decision-making.” At the vote, one Thiokol manager who was hesitating (as he supported the engineers position to not launch) was asked to “Take his engineering hat off and put on his management hat.” He subsequently voted in favour of the launch, with the rest of the managers. 78 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
about the heightened risk of the defective O-ring, and their warnings against launching in low temperatures.407 The most substantial failure of both NASA and Thiokol was their inadequate response408 to the hazard posed by the deficient joint design. Instead of fixing the design of the joint, they defined the issue as an ‘acceptable flight risk’.409 The Commission wrote
The space shuttle’s solid rocket booster problem began with the faulty design of its joint and increased as both NASA and contractor management first failed to recognise it as a problem, then failed to fix it and finally accepted it as an acceptable flight risk.410
The Commission also cited worrying lapses in judgment, decision-making and communication. An unwillingness to communicate bad news resulted in Thiokol not satisfactorily reporting their concerns ‘upwards’. They did not discuss the problem outside of their internal reporting channels, which was a violation of NASA regulations and reveals non-compliant behaviour. They did not want to communicate bad news to outsiders.411 This failure in communication led to a launch “based on incomplete and misleading information.” 412 Decision-making was flawed; it “was a kind of Russian roulette.”413 The ‘go/no go’ launch decision makers were not fully aware of all the problems associated with the O-ring, and certainly were not aware of the Thiokol engineers continued disagreement about launching due to the cold temperatures. The Commission noted
407 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter VI, 1986, p.p. 43, 59, 61: “If the temperature is low, resiliency is severely reduced and the O-ring is very slow in returning towards its original shape”; p. 70: “The ambient temperature at time of launch was 36 degrees Fahrenheit, or 15 degrees lower than the next coldest previous launch.”; Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, 1996, p. 10: “O-ring resiliency was impaired by unprecedented cold temperatures.” 408 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter VI, 1986, p. 148: “Neither Thiokol nor NASA responded adequately to internal warnings about the faulty seal design.” 409 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter V, 1986, p. 84; Chapter VI, p. 136: Managers had previously issued and waived six launch constraints related to the O-rings; p. 148: “Thiokol and NASA management came to accept erosion and blow-by as unavoidable and an acceptable flight risk.” 410 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter VI, 1986, p. 120. Emphasis added. 411 Winsor, Communication Failures, 1988, p. 10: “Failure to believe bad news is caused by a number of factors, including reluctance to admit that one was wrong, fear of practical consequences such as expensive redesign, and a kind of intellectual inertia that makes it easier to persist in an already established belief than to change it.” 412 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter V, 1986, p. 82. 413 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter VI, 1986, p. 148. 79 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The decision to launch was flawed. If the decision makers had known all the facts, it is highly unlikely they would have decided to launch.414
The Commission labelled the Challenger tragedy “an accident rooted in history.”415 NASA accepted appalling risks “because they got away with it last time.”416 The absence of accident had inadvertently increased their willingness to accept risk. NASA should have observed these lessons post the Challenger tragedy, however seventeen years later the Columbia disaster reveals that these ideas were still evident within NASA organisational culture. The ‘get the mission done’ and ‘the astronaut pilot is king’ type of culture continued to operate and asphyxiated the concerns of engineers who were marginalised and powerless.
NASA Columbia – ‘The second kick of the mule’417
In our view, the NASA organisational culture had as much to do with this accident as the foam.418
On 01 February 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia broke up on re-entry to Earth’s atmosphere. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board419 (CAIB) revealed that the physical cause of the accident was a piece of insulating foam. It had detached from the fuel tank during lift off, and had struck the left wing and breached the thermal protection system. Upon re-entry, superheated air penetrated the damaged wing, resulting in weakness to the structure and causing the break up of the shuttle.420
Paralleling the Rogers Commission, the CAIB concentrated on examining the
414 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter V, 1986, p. 82. 415 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter VI, 1986, p. 120. 416 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter VI, 1986, p. 148. 417 Robert Gregory, Scott Marcellino and Seth Moyer, Analysis of Nasa’s Post-Challenger Response and Relationship to the Columbia Accident and Investigation, Naval Postgraduate School: Monterey, California, September 2006, p. 56: Quoting Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings, who remarked during a Senate Commerce Committee hearing on the results of the CAIB report, “There’s no education in the second kick of a mule. I’m hearing the same things I listened to seventeen years ago.” 418 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 97. 419 The CAIB was set up by President George W. Bush to investigate the loss of the NASA Space Shuttle Columbia. 420 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 9. 80 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
organisational causes of the accident. The Board found “the causes of the institutional failure responsible for Challenger have not been fixed…the same flawed decision making process”421 was responsible for Columbia's destruction.
The accident was probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather likely rooted to some degree in NASA’s history and the human space flight program’s culture.422
The human space flight program’s culture and language423 echo Tom Wolfe’s The Right Stuff. These pilots were heroes; they accomplished missions and nothing stood in their way. Safety was “viewed as a constraint to be observed rather than a goal to be improved.”424
Post the Challenger disaster the perception was that a similar catastrophic event could not occur. Reliance on past success was used as justification for decisions and actions, and a sense of invulnerability existed which led to lapses in critical safety systems.
Let me assure you that, as of yesterday afternoon, the Shuttle was in excellent shape, mission objectives were being performed, and there were no major debris system problems identified.425
The Shuttle has become a mature and reliable system…about as safe as today’s technology will provide.426
This sense of invulnerability saw NASA succumb to accepting and normalising the previously unacceptable. Foam shedding and debris impacts had become part
421 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 195. 422 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 9. 423 William Ocasio, The Opacity of Risk: Language and the Culture of Safety in NASA’s Space Shuttle Program, p.p. 101-21, in Starbuck and Farjoun (eds), Organization At The Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Disaster, 2005, p. 102: “While vocabularies are but one aspect of an organisation’s culture they are a critical part…Values and assumptions are expressed through language.” 424 Ocasio, The Opacity of Risk, 2005, p. 119. 425 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 101. Comment from a NASA official, following the Columbia launch and after significant debris strike had been identified. 426 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 108. Advisory Panel Kraft Report, March 1995. 81 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
and parcel of shuttle flights. The actual risks associated with this deviation were never properly investigated. Successful landings reinforced optimistic belief and the shedding of foam became normalised. The continued acceptance of risk and normalisation of deviance is revealed in the following statements:
With no engineering analysis, Shuttle managers used past success as justification for future flights.427
Debris impact on port wing edge appears to have originated at the External Tank forward bipod – foam? If so, it shouldn’t be a problem.428
A lack of a safety focus was apparent and is confirmed in the following statement from the head of NASA:
When I ask for the budget to be cut, I’m told it’s going to impact safety on the Space Shuttle…I think that’s a bunch of crap.429
Statements like these are impactful on organisational culture, especially when they come from someone at the top of the hierarchy. People are less likely to highlight safety concerns when they perceive senior leaders or management are not interested. And, worse still, people imitate attitudes and behaviour they hear and see from above. Another cultural issue alluded to in the CAIB report was the lack of effective communication.
In my humble technical opinion, this is the wrong (and bordering on irresponsible) answer…not to request additional imaging help from any outside source. The engineering team will admit it might not achieve definitive
427 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 125. 428 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 142. Excerpt in Shuttle Managers Handover Notes, 17 January 2003. 429 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 106. Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator 1994. Also p. 170: “Safety personnel were present but passive and did not serve as a channel for the voicing of concerns or dissenting views. Safety representatives attended meetings of the Debris Assessment Team, Mission Evaluation Room, and Mission Management Team, but were merely party to the analysis process and conclusions instead of an independent source of questions and challenges. Safety contractors in the Mission Evaluation Room were only marginally aware of the debris strike analysis. One contractor did question the Debris Assessment Team safety representative about the analysis and was told that it was adequate. No additional inquiries were made. The highest-ranking safety representative at NASA headquarters deferred to Program managers when asked for an opinion on imaging of Columbia. The safety manager he spoke to also failed to follow up.” 82 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
high confidence answers without additional images, but, without action to request help to clarify the damage visually, we will guarantee it will not…Remember the NASA safety posters everywhere around stating, “If it’s not safe, say so?” Yes, it’s that serious.430
The e-mail above, while drafted and hand circulated around the engineering peer group, was never sent ‘upward’. They had requested satellite photo imaging of the wing damage, but NASA management did not approve it. Extra imaging may have revealed the damage. The CAIB report suggests that the following contributed to this breakdown in communication: management mentality was that foam strikes were not a problem and talk to the contrary was discouraged; ‘bad news’ was not encouraged and chain of command communications were emphasised; and, consensus was encouraged, which saw dissention tacitly discouraged. People were intimidated and wary of speaking up and established protocol, procedures, and norms served to discourage honest communication. The culture was one in which negative information and bad news was routinely submerged or altered in order to avoid any displeasure from top management (that is, ‘Aircrew’).431 The CAIB report concluded:
Failures in communication...resulted in a decision to launch based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.432
NASA – The Organisation
NASA had undergone numerous management reforms post the Challenger disaster, however the reality was, not much had changed.433 The parallels between the cultural deficiencies that contributed to both NASA accidents are compelling. They include: a lack of safety oversight (silent safety culture); ambitious
430 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 157. E-mail from a Shuttle Engineer, 22 January 2003. 431 The CAIB Report, 2003, p.p. 180-1. 432 The Rogers Commission Report, Volume One, Chapter VI, 1986, p. 82. 433 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 101. “Cultural norms tend to be fairly resilient...The norms bounce back into shape after being stretched or bent. Beliefs held in common throughout the organisation resist alteration. By the eve of the Columbia accident, institutional practices that were in effect at the time of the Challenger accident…had returned to NASA.” 83 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
scheduling driving decision-making; relying on past performance vice technical expertise; normalisation of deviance; and, bureaucracy and hierarchy preventing effective communication. Hal Gehman (the Chairman of the CAIB) explained the underlying realities of NASA:
They claim that the culture in Houston is a ‘badgeless society’, meaning it doesn't matter what you have on your badge – you're concerned about shuttle safety together. Well, that's all nice, but the truth is that it does matter what badge you're wearing…when you look at how it really works, it's an incestuous, hierarchical system, with invisible rankings and a very strict informal chain of command. We have plenty of witness statements saying, “If I had spoken up, it would have been at the cost of my job.” And if you're in the engineering department, you're a nobody.434
To understand how this culture developed, exploring NASA history is prudent. The inception of NASA began with grand goals (and budgets) set by Presidents who wanted to win the ‘space race’. However, from the start compromises were made, and this was followed by “years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities and schedule pressures.” 435 Communication was stifled by organisational barriers, which suppressed differences of opinion.436 Social norms and organisational practices detrimental to safety developed, including a reliance on past success vice sound engineering practices (which encouraged a false sense of security). A ‘can do’ culture developed, and the successes of the Apolla era drove attitudes. When national priorities shifted, budgets were cut, without change in the scope of responsibilities for NASA. This drove the reliance on outsourcing to contractors. In endeavouring to ‘do more with less’, they adopted the motto ‘faster, better, cheaper.’437 Overly ambitious goals in an organisation struggling for resources, meant NASA’s technical culture turned into a ‘culture of production’; a culture that was characterised by “cultural mandates for
434 William Langewiesche, ‘Columbia's Last Flight’, Atlantic Magazine, 2003, viewed 08 September 2012, at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/11/columbias-last-flight/304204/. Emphasis added. 435 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 9. 436 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 9. 437 James O. Westgard and Sten Westgard, ‘It’s not Rocket Science’, Westgard QC, viewed 14 June 2012, at http://westgard.com/guest25.htm: Citing Sally Ride, former astronaut, first woman in space and participant in both the Challenger and Columbia accident investigations: “Faster, better, cheaper…was not a productive concept. It was a false economy.” 84 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
businesslike efficiency, production pressures, allegiance to hierarchy, and rule following.” 438 The result was a slippery slide into the normalisation of deviant practice.
The circumstances surrounding the disasters point to an organisational culture that was characterised as overly bureaucratic and mechanistic, where dominance of one group over another existed.
NASA’s culture of bureaucratic accountability emphasised chain of command, procedure, following the rules, and going by the book. While rules and procedures were essential for coordination, they had an unintended but negative effect. Allegiance to hierarchy and procedure had replaced deference to NASA engineers’ technical expertise.439
The managerial mindset within NASA was consistent with this cultural pattern. Individual maintainers subordinated their own values and adopted the espoused values of their superiors (typified as ‘Aircrew’), thereby reducing the risk of confrontation and retaliation. They were scared and intimidated, marginalised and oppressed.
Nimrod XV230
On 2 September 2006, while on a reconnaissance mission over Helmand Province in Afghanistan, RAF Nimrod XV230 suffered a catastrophic fire and crashed not long after refueling in mid-air. Tragically, of the fourteen crew members on board there were no survivors.440
The Board of Inquiry concluded that the loss of Nimrod XV230 was caused by the escape of fuel during air-to-air refueling.441 Upon release of the Board of Inquiry report, a review was announced to examine the wider issues relating to the
438 Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight, NASA: Washington DC, 2006, p. 345. 439The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 200. Emphasis added. 440 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 9. 441 Royal Air Force, Board of Inquiry into the accident involving Nimrod MR 2 XV230, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, 03 December 2008, p.p. 2-44, 2-45. 85 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
accident. 442 The Haddon-Cave report draws significant parallels between the organisational causes of both NASA Challenger and Columbia disasters and the crash of Nimrod XV230. 444 It found that complacency, the normalisation of deviance, organisational change, financial pressure, bureaucracy, and missed opportunities were all contributors to the accident. Significantly, this case reveals how unconstructive ideas of power surface in ‘cosy’ cultures, which contribute to making ‘Other’ (those not part of the in-group) subservient. The attraction of ‘fitting in and getting on’ is just too great. In this case too there was a fundamental failure in leadership. There was a distinct lack of leadership, which manifested itself in relation to the way in which the Nimrod Safety Case was handled. Warning signs and trends were not spotted, and there was a weakening of the airworthiness system and the safety culture.445 The Haddon-Cave Report reveals leadership suffocated by bureaucracy, where a culture of ‘cover ups’ and keeping up appearances was prevalent. This, coupled with complacency and optimistic belief,446 exposes the insidiousness of risk denial.
There was no doubt that the culture at the time had switched. In the days of Sir Colin Terry you had to be on top of airworthiness. By 2004, you had to be on top of your budget, if you wanted to get ahead.447
The scale, pace and variety of organisational change that took place in the lead up to this accident was vast. A shift in structure occurred from purely ‘functional’ to project-oriented lines. Organisations combined to create larger, joint, ‘through- life’ management structures, and there was an increase in ‘outsourcing’ to industry.448
Financial pressures and cuts drove numerous organisational changes, which led to a dilution of the airworthiness regime and culture within the Ministry of Defence, and detracted from the focus of safety and airworthiness issues as the top priority. There was a shift in culture and priorities in the Ministry of Defence towards
442 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 6 444 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p.p. 13, 446, 450, 571, 575. 445 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 491. 446 The CAIB Report, 2003, p. 180. 447 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 355. Quoting a former Senior RAF Officer, 2008. 448 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 11. 86 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
‘business’ and financial targets, at the expense of functional values such as safety and airworthiness.449
Common sense and responsible and diligent leadership requires that prudent thought be given to the impact of decisions that could potentially affect safety. This includes decisions that give rise to changes in organisational structure or resources which might affect safety.450
The most significant missed opportunity was the Nimrod Safety Case – it was a lamentable job from start to finish, riddled with errors, and it missed the key dangers.451
The Nimrod Safety Case was conducted between 2001 – 2005 by BAE Systems, a Nimrod Integrated Project Team and an independent contractor as an advisor (QinetiQ). Safety Cases are supposed to identify, assess and mitigate serious risks – it was the best chance to catch the design flaws, which were present yet not recognised in the Nimrod fleet. The Safety Case was supposed to eliminate the latent conditions that existed. Commissioner Haddon-Cave was scathing in his findings of all groups involved. The Commissioner ‘names names’ in his report – people whose conduct, he feels
Fell well below the standards which might reasonably have been expected of them at the time, given their rank, roles and responsibilities, such that, in my view, they should be held personally to account.452
He found “BAE systems bears substantial responsibility for the failure of the Nimrod Safety Case.” 453 They presented a lax attitude, were complacent and cynical and presumed that the Nimrod was safe as it had been flying for many years without a major incident. Managers at BAE Systems did not bear the responsibility of their positions and they “failed to implement an adequate or
449 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 12. Original emphasis. 450 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 375. 451 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 161. 452 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 8. 453 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 259. 87 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
effective culture, committed to safety and ethical conduct.” 454 Commissioner Haddon-Cave also commented on their behaviour post the accident. They were supposed to be assisting the Review and providing evidence, yet they presented a “wall of denial and obfuscation which the Review had to dismantle, brick by brick.”455
The Integrated Project Team too were considered to bear substantial responsibility. A complacent attitude, concern about positional power, influence and self-interest saw senior leaders within the Integrated Project Team delegate the Safety Case to a junior person. They then failed to institute appropriate oversight and supervision, displaying indifference and disinterest. They did not read reports diligently and failed to check BAE Systems’ work, signing off where it was not correct to do so.456
The culture in operation was one of cosiness and complacency, resulting from an overly bureaucratic culture. It was not however a fully trusting or accepting environment, and there was too great a risk involved to admit failure, confusion or uncertainty. Fitting in and getting on was key. Unconstructive ideas of power surface in cosy cultures, where those who are not part of the in-group feel intimidated and can succumb and conform to go along with the majority. This is evident in the testimony of a witness who attended an Acceptance Conference as a ‘stand in’. He initially did not support the completion of a task by BAE Systems on the grounds that he was only ‘standing in’ and had not seen any of the key deliverable documents. He said he felt like ‘a fish out of water’; he was intimidated and embarrassed at being heckled.
The other attendees booed me and muttered things along the lines ‘bloody safety engineers’.457
Thus, he succumbed to the pressure as he did not want to stand in the way of what
454 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 261. 455 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 261. 456 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 261. 457 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 327. Emphasis added. 88 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
was clearly the strong ‘mood of the meeting’.458
The Nimrod Safety Case amounted to a missed opportunity. If it had been completed properly and with due diligence, flaws would have been spotted and the accident would not have happened. Regrettably, the features of the four year Nimrod Safety Case were “high levels of incompetence, complacency and cynicism by the organisations and key individuals involved.”459 All of the people involved in this case fell pray to the false assumption that the Nimrod was safe – the absence of accident inadvertently drove up complacency and therefore risk.
So what?
The NASA Culture was characterised by unconstructive ideas of power. Quite apart from formal organisation hierarchies, the ideas of cachet and value which carried weight, reflected ideas of operational effectiveness. In the RNZAF, these ideas are tinted by the importance of ‘Aircrew’. At NASA the most important people were seen to be the bureaucratic managers. Their language, their ideas and their expectations were seen to be in vogue and credible beyond all other views. The corollary was the marginalisation of engineers and maintenance personnel. These same ideas were also revealed in the organisational cultures of the other cases explored in this chapter.
Not unlike other organisations, one of the challenges facing the military is the requirement to ‘do more with less’. Known as ‘managerialism’, the resultant effect is that emphasis is placed on results rather than procedures and process – the focus is on outputs and the achievement of results.460 The downside of this ‘ends oriented’ approach is “corners being cut or liberties being taken with standard operating procedures”, 461 which “creat[es] unnecessary risks and
458 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 327. 459 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p. 259. 460 Owen E. Hughes, Public Management and Administration, Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1994, p.p. 69, 77. 461 Margaret H. Vickers and Alexander Kouzmin, ‘New managerialism and Australian police organizations – A cautionary research note’, The International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2001, p. 14: citing Wanna, J., O’Faircheallaigh, C. and Weller, P., Public Sector Management in Australia, Macmillam: Melbourne, 1992, p. 206. 89 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
vulnerabilities.” 462 There are problems with adopting flatter structures (‘matrixing’) where “expertise is assumed at lower levels of the hierarchy”463 and which might not actually exist. The drive for civilianisation, the push for streamlining, relocating the ‘back and middle’ to the ‘front’, invariably results in the initial ‘bottom line’ outcome being improved. However, over time as corporate memory is lost the organisation may find itself in a position of not being able to respond appropriately, of being “unable to provide itself with sufficient expertise to make critical technical decisions.”464 Coupled with this, the tenets espoused by ‘managerialism’ are control and coercion, and these can lead to a loss of voice by members, which makes exposing the truth very difficult.465
According to Locke, ‘managerialism’ is “what occurs when a special group, called management, ensconces itself systemically in organisations and deprives employees of decision-making power…justifie[d] on the grounds of the group’s education and exclusive possession of the codified bodies of knowledge and know-how necessary to the efficient running of organisations.”466 It is associated with a market orientation and as evidenced of late in the RNZAF, it is about maximising organisational performance through cost-cutting, increased regulation, civilianisation, and evidence-based (aligned with Peter Drucker’s ‘what you cannot measure, you cannot manage’ mantra) management.467
The cases explored in this chapter prompt the questions: Has the RNZAF entered into an era where efficiency and cost are valued more than quality? There are parallels with the major structural changes that occurred ten years ago in the
462 Vickers and Kouzmin, ‘New managerialism and Australian police organizations’, 2001, p. 14: citing Kouzmin, A., Korac-Kakabadse, N., and Jarman, A.M.G., ‘Economic rationalism, risk and institutional vulnerability’, Risk, Decision and Policy, Vol. 1, No. 2, p.p. 229-56. 463 Vickers and Kouzmin, ‘New managerialism and Australian police organizations’, 2001, p. 14: citing Wanna, J., O’Faircheallaigh, C. and Weller, P., Public Sector Management in Australia, Macmillam: Melbourne, 1992, p. 205. 464 Vickers and Kouzmin, ‘New managerialism and Australian police organizations’, 2001, p. 16: citing Mintzberg, H., Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations, Prentice-Hall International Editions: Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1983, p. 15. 465 Vickers and Kouzmin, ‘New managerialism and Australian police organizations’, 2001, p. 20. 466 Robert Locke, ‘Managerialism and the Demise of the Big Three’, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 18996, Dec 2009, p. 1. 467 Ann L. Cunliffe, A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book About Management, SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008, p. 18. 90 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
RNZAF, 468 and organisational changes that occurred prior to the Nimrod and NASA disasters. Is the approach of ‘doing more with less’ (informed by the Defence Transformation Programme,469 the Value For Money Review,470 and the Strategic Reform Programme 471) in the NZDF/RNZAF any different from the ‘faster, cheaper, better’ NASA mantra? What impact do workforce reductions, outsourcing, culling the layers of experience and systems that provide capacity for oversight, competing job priorities and the lack of prestige seen to be involved with working within the safety area have? Could they be shortcutting, chipping away at vital safety systems that will fail them one day? Safety systems reliability is strongly predicated on the human processes used to develop it – the decisions of the people working within it who collectively determine the level of risk. Leadership must be shown from those in positions of power; those who have rank must take personal control and responsibility for all critical decisions. 472 Responsibility comes with rank in the Air Force, and senior leaders need to fully
468 David Fisher, ‘Air Force danger cargo sent on Air NZ jet’, The New Zealand Herald, 16 October 2012, viewed 16 October 2012, at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10840785: In a summary of the ANZAC Day crash court of inquiry findings, a senior RNZAF officer wrote: “When considering this report, I could not help thinking that the genesis of this accident goes back some ten years when changes to RNZAF command and control were made in an attempt to make our operations more efficient and cost effective.” Two layers of command and supervision were removed, and “nobody at the time realised the real impact the changes would make.” 469 Annual Report 2011, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, p.p. 37/8, viewed 12 September 2012, at http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public- docs/2011/nzdf-annual-report-2011.pdf: The Defence Transformation Programme was an internal efficiency programme initiated to take a strategic look at the overall support functions of the NZDF. It commenced in 2008 and official completion was 30 June 2011. Its aim was to better deliver military capability through more effective and efficient support services while freeing up military personnel from non-military roles so resources could be redeployed to the frontline. Three key areas were targeted for change: Human Resource Management, Logistics and NZDF Headquarters. This resulted in a new Defence Logistics Command, a new Human Resources organisation, a new Training and Education Directorate, a new Defence Capability Branch, and a new way of structuring and working in Headquarters. 470 Roderick Deane, Value For Money: Review of the Defence Force, Ministry of Defence, New Zealand, 30 July 2010, viewed 14 September 2012, at http://www.defence.govt.nz/pdfs/defence- review-2009-released-value-for-money-report.pdf: The Value For Money Review was a comprehensive and independent review commissioned by the Minister of Defence on 23 March 2010 to help identify efficiencies, seek to identify shifting resources to frontline activities, and provide assurances and options around the cost effectiveness and sustainability of the NZDF. 471 Statement of Intent 2011-2014, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, 21 April 2011, p. 5, viewed 14 September 2012, at http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/D64511DF-9262-41B7-A3BF- CF353438EC5E/192694/DBHOH_PAP_21462_NewZealandDefenceForceTeOpeKatuaoA.pdf: A reform campaign aimed at reducing costs in Logistics, Human Resources, Training and Education; optimising infrastructure; a ‘Total Defence Workforce’ approach – improve ratio between deployable and non-deployable personnel and right balance between full-time and part-time and uniformed and civilian personnel; strengthen corporate management of Headquarters – focus on innovation and continuous improvement. 472 The Haddon-Cave Report, 2009, p.p. 477-8. 91 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
understand and comprehend their responsibilities regarding airworthiness. They also have a responsibility for ensuring they engender an environment where people tell the truth, without fear of reprisal.
We can hope that what happened to the RAN, NASA and the RAF could not possibly happen to the RNZAF. However, the experience of the RAN during Operation Sumatra Assist II demonstrates how it would be foolhardy for the RNZAF to misread the absence of accident as the absence of risk. They must remain constantly aware that the absence of accident does not equate to a safe organisation; it pays to keep in mind the old cliché “We have met the enemy, and they are us!”474
Conclusion
This chapter explored the risk associated with unconstructive ideas of power and the effect on relationships with other groups, specifically maintenance engineers (‘Maintenance Crew’) by ‘Aircrew’. The accidents examined in this chapter highlight that unconstructive ideas of power suffocate effective maintenance cultures and increase the risk of accidents. Similar organisational cultural causal factors were revealed, where the cultures had become complacent. These cases highlight that the false sense of security that a perception of invulnerability invites increases organisational risk. The risk of normalising deviant practices serves to heighten risk associated with highly technical organisations that rely on systems process to decrease failure. Failure is normally the outcome of a chain of events, but the root causes and factors that contribute to it are social or psychological.475 These failures resulted from people falling prey to overconfidence, where increasing “warning signals were systematically ignored or met with denial, evidence avoided, cast aside or selectively reinterpreted, dissenters discouraged and shunned.”476
474 Stephen B. Johnson, ‘Success, Failure, and NASA Culture’, Ask Magazine, 2008, p.p. 52-6, p. 56. 475 Johnson, ‘Success, Failure, and NASA Culture’, 2008, p. 55. 476 Roland Bénabou, Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets, Princeton University, December 2011, p. 1, viewed 12 September 2012, at http://www.princeton.edu/~rbenabou/papers/Groupthink%20IOM%207p%20paper.pdf 92 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The risk associated with failures in communication highlights the powerlessness that can be felt by members of an organisation when they feel they are undervalued due to overly-hierarchical structures, and the part that status and unconstructive ideas of power play. Aggregated risk increases the less ‘Maintenance Crew’ are valued and the more they are marginalised, which in turn negatively impacts organisational performance. Social exclusion means they are less inclined to speak up about concerns they may have, and organisational risk increases. The four accidents discussed in this chapter reveal how operations may suffocate other very important measures, and the dominant myths obscure the capacity to manage risk.
93 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Chapter Five
‘Support Crew’ – The Non-Warrior
Informed by the ideas of political and social equality, which find expression in Article One of the Universal Declaration, this chapter challenges the imbalanced stature of women in the RNZAF. Discussion parallels and augments the previous chapter, which focused on the ‘Aircrew’ myth and the engineering risk which follows in the wake of its exaggeration. In this chapter, less tangible, yet no less unconstructive ideas of bias and inequality are seen to be enabled by organisational beliefs relating to ‘Support Crew’, which represents all ‘Other’ groups. However, since this is too broad an area to be contained by this thesis, the focus in this chapter is on the largest minority group that is yet to be fully ‘included’ in military life – women.
The specific focus of this chapter on unconstructive bias against women is vindicated and informed by two significant investigative Australian Government Reports – the DLA Piper Report (an investigation into allegations of abuse in the ADF),478 and The Broderick Report (an investigation into the treatment of women in the ADF).479 Each of these reports reveals how the ‘warrior culture’ reinforces obstructive ideas of power and contributes to organisational reluctance to advance cultural change. Two case examples – Tailhook ‘91 and HMAS Success 480 – demonstrate the appalling culmination of an organisational culture built on unconstructive ideas of power.
The military is steeped in tradition and the practice of aggressive masculinity, where unconstructive ideas of power are promoted. Numerous writers support the idea that the military promotes stereotypically masculine traits, 481 and that the
478 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p.p. 80-91. 479 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 1. 480 The two cases have been purposefully chosen as they occurred seventeen years apart, yet significantly they reveal similar themes. 481 Madeline Morris, ‘By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 45, 1996, p.p. 651-781: Portrays the military as a masculine institution that encourages attitudes that correlate with a rape propensity; Linda Bird Franke, Ground Zero: The Gender Wars in the Military, Simon and Schuster: New York, 1997, p. 18: A narrative of the “cultural and biological forces within the military culture that divides the sexes, dictate women’s harassment, and demeans their achievements”; Enloe, Does Khaki become you?,1983, p.p. 7-8: A feminist analysis of the Army’s 94 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
engendering of the manly ‘warrior’ image invariably involves disassociating men from women and encourages antipathy toward feminine characteristics. Recalling Lord Flasheart, we find he is preserved in more ways than the story of Bud Holland. Perpetuated in the traditional and notorious ‘Mess Dining Ins’, where this type of behaviour is seen as ‘cool’, the longevity of Flasheart is clearly depicted in the DLA Piper Report.
The DLA Piper Report
Sparked by the ‘ADF Academy Skype Scandal’483 the legal firm DLA Piper was engaged to review allegations of abuse484 (to personnel of both genders) in the ADF. Initial assessment of the allegations found that “the overwhelming majority of them are plausible and probably substantially accurate.” 485 The review determined that there were high levels of underreporting, high levels of dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the military justice system, and low levels use and abuse of women. Enloe asserts, “The military, even more than other patriarchal institutions, is a male preserve, run by men and for men according to masculine ideas and relying solely on man power.” Further, she asserts that it is this assumption that has made the armed forces almost immune to feminist investigation, and allows it to escape analytical scrutiny, partly due to deliberate technocratic and bureaucratic obfuscation; Dunivin, ‘Military Culture: A Paradigm Shift’, 1997, p.p. 1-37: Explores the struggle between the military’s traditional and exclusionary combat, masculine- warrior paradigm and the contradictory evolving model of military culture characterised by egalitarianism and inclusiveness; Belkin, Bring Me Men: Military Masculinity and the Benign Facade of the American Empire 1898 – 2001, Columbia University Press: New York, 2012: Explores the contradictions in military masculinity, such as, in order to attain masculinity a warrior must renounce the things in his life that are unmasculine. Yet, in practice, warriors are asked to do the opposite; Regina F. Titunik, ‘The Myth of the Macho Military’, Polity, Vol. 40. No. 2, 2008, p.p. 137-163, p. 147: Agrees with Belkin asserting, “The qualities required for warfare rewarded as ‘manly’ are not aggression and bloodlust, but paradoxically, feminine characteristics such as teamwork, submission, obedience and self-sacrifice.” 483 The incident commonly referred to as the ‘ADFA Skype Scandal’ occurred in March 2011. Consensual sex between two Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) cadets was secretly filmed by the male cadet and telecast, via Skype, without the female cadets knowledge. This was collusion for mateship and bonding purposes at another (female) colleague’s expense. 484 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. xix: “…allegations across every decade from the 1950’s to date. The earliest date of alleged abuse is 1951 [and] we have allegations of events during 2011.” 485 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. viii: Australian Minister of Defence, Stephen Smith, stated “The Review received communications in relation to allegations of past abuse from over 1000 people and has identified allegations from 775 people which fell within the Review’s Terms of Reference, the overwhelming majority of which are said to be plausible allegations of abuse.” viewed 13 September 2012, at http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/issue/4/articles/4.html; Chief of Defence Force, Major General Hurley stated “DLA Piper determined that 775 allegations of the allegations the review team received were plausible. Some of the allegations date back to the 1950s but others are as recent as last year. It would be easy to dismiss the contents of the executive summary and blame it on a few bad apples, but we must acknowledge that this is a significant document that highlights some serious issues, which must be addressed. While it cannot describe the organisation completely, it does point out that at times in the past, some people in Defence and the ADF may have acted in a manner that has harmed people.” 95 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
of prosecutions.486 The review revealed that in only 53 percent of cases examined did the ADF investigate or manage complaints of abuse. Only one quarter were managed appropriately. A third were not managed appropriately, and in almost half of the cases the complainants stated further investigation was required.487 The subtext of these findings is that the ADF is not ‘tough enough’; in fact it could be perceived as being in denial.
The DLA Piper Report discussed the impact of hierarchy commenting “The chain of command structure in Defence lends itself to superiors abusing juniors with impunity.”489 The report states that the phenomenon of bastardisation was rife in the ADF until very recently. Of particular significance, most of the alleged abuse that the review examined occurred at ab initio training schools, where the power gradient is amplified; exaggerated by things such as gender, rank, experience, familiarity with organisational quirks, the uncertainty of those who are junior – and particularly junior women. The report states, “It should be noted that the conduct engaged in was very frequently brutal and would have been likely to attract criminal sanctions if practised in the civil community.” 490 This is significant because toleration (and often the reward) of this type of behaviour is indicative of a certain unhealthy mindset.
Members of minority groups are at greater risk of abuse merely because the dominant group does not accept them.491 Dr Ben Wadham of Flinders University provided the following perspective in his submission to the DLA Piper Review:
Abuse emerging from military culture, and within the organisation, is both general and diverse. The common theme of fraternity is structured by regimentation, hierarchy, chain of command and the development of a capacity for violence. The intensity of fraternity generates a hierarchy of oppositions…[which] establish[es] the potential for abuse and inappropriate conduct.492
486 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. xxxi. 487 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p.p. 44-5. 489 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. xxiii. Emphasis added. 490 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. xxx. 491 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. 19. 492 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. 27. 96 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The review also references the Grey Report, 493 which provided an unpleasant account of a dominant male group treating females as being ‘Other’. Not only were females not entitled to the protection of the group, but they also became a target for abuse by males.494 Significantly, the report noted that being female is enough to be placed on the fringes of the group and therefore potentially excluded.495 The DLA Piper Report recalls too the HMAS Swan496 incident, and in particular hostility towards women and the existence of a misogynistic society. The then Chief of Navy cited the ‘warrior culture’ as a reason for “the misogynistic culture and the root cause of hostility towards women in the Navy.”497 The Swan inquiry concluded “The Navy climate has appeared in the past to condone, if not encourage uncouth behaviour, liberal use of alcohol and a degree of misogyny.”498 Signifying a resistance to cultural change, this climate was seen to be prevalent some seventeen years later in the case of HMAS Success. In a similar vein too, to the case of HMAS Success, the Swan inquiry found “among the officers of the SWAN, a ‘disturbing’ degree of defensiveness and protectiveness of one another.”499 These ideas were also prevalent in the case of Tailhook ‘91.
Tailhook ‘91
The employment of women in the military changed radically throughout the 1990’s. During this period a number of scandals500 occurred, one of the most
493 A Review into policies and practices to deal with sexual harassment at the ADFA, published in 1998 and known as the Grey Review. It revealed a high level of unacceptable behaviour, including sexual harassment and sexual offences, and identified twenty four cases of rape, of which none have been to trial. 494 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. 19. 495 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. 22. 496 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. 62: Allegations of sexual assault and harassment aboard HMAS Swan during and after an exercise in South East Asia in 1992, prompted a Senate inquiry that resulted in the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Report, ‘Sexual Harassment in the Australian Defence Force’ (SWAN FDAT Report), Commonwealth of Australia, August 1994. 497 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. 62. 498 SWAN FDAT Report, 1994, p. 75. 499 SWAN FDAT Report, 1994, p. 129. 500 William L. O’Neill, ‘Sex Scandals in the Gender-Integrated Military’, Gender Issues, Winter/Spring 1998, p.p. 64-85; Jessica A. Turchik and Susan M. Wilson, ‘Sexual Assault in the U.S. Military: A review of the literature and recommendations for the future’, Aggression and Violent Behaviour, 2010, p.p. 267-77: Incidents include: The Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 97 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
notorious being Tailhook ‘91. 501 As a professional body dealing with carrier aviation, the Tailhook Association and the annual conventions they organised played a valuable role. There was however a less respectable convention known as the Tailhook symposium, notorious for a longstanding tradition of drunken revelry in ‘hospitality’ suites, each sponsored by a different aviation squadron. 502 The suites were on the third floor of the Las Vegas Hilton Hotel503 and in the evenings the hallway connecting the suites was overrun with people socialising. While numerous improper activities504 occurred during Tailhook ‘91, one of the most unsavoury traditions on the third floor was ‘the Gauntlet’.505 Large numbers of men crowded the hallway and when a woman walked through she would be grabbed and ‘man-handled’.506 One witness described how
The men would quiet down and create an opening in the crowd that unsuspecting women might think to use as a passageway…[Then they would be] suddenly surrounded by the Gauntlet participants who groped them and prevented their exit.507
Post the symposium the Tailhook President sent a letter to the aviation squadrons
USA, sexual assaults of young females who had just graduated basic training in 1996; and, the Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Jackson and Fort Sam Houston sexual misconduct incidents. 501 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 1: The Tailhook Association is a non-profit organisation that holds an annual symposium to promote and foster esprit de corps among naval aviators. Members who attend range from junior officers though to very senior officers, and the overall tone is relaxed and informal. About 2,100 attendees registered for the professional aspects of the 05-08 September 1991 symposium, and over 4,000 people attended the social events. 502 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 32: “Over $35,000 was spent on alcohol for the weekend, most of it funded privately by the squadrons and consumed in the vicinity of the hospitality suites.” 503 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 30: “The damage to the third floor after each Tailhook symposium was substantial and the Hilton routinely replaced the carpet after each event. After Tailhook ‘91, the Association paid the Hilton $23,000 for damages.” 504 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p.p. 59-74: Activities cited include: Streaking (p. 59 - “Males who removed their clothing and walked or ran nude past onlookers”); Mooning (p.p. 60-1 – “Individuals baring their buttocks within view of others”); Ball walking (p.p. 61-5 – “Naval aviators publicly exposing their testicles”); Leg shaving (p.p. 67-9 – the shaving of women’s legs and pubic areas by male aviators”); Belly and naval shots (p. 69 – “The practice of drinking alcohol out of people’s navels”); Pornography (p.p. 69-70 – “Various types ranging from ‘soft core’ to ‘hard core' videos and slides, plus wall posters of nude or scantily clad females”); Butt-biting (p.p. 70-1 – “Individuals biting attendees on the buttocks, also known as sharking”); Zapping (p.p. 71-3 – “Placing stickers imprinted with a squadron logo on people, usually women, to symbolise the presence of a particular squadron”); Strip tease act; and, consensual public sex acts. 505 In some publications it is referred to as the ‘gantlet’. See William L. O’Neill, ‘Sex Scandals in the Gender-Integrated Military’, Gender Issues, Winter/Spring, 1998, p. 65. 506 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 46: One aviator commented that the Gauntlet “looked like a pinball machine with each guy getting his shot in.” 507 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 40. 98 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
responsible for the suites, expressing serious concern about the after-hours activities. He addressed the practice of ‘the Gauntlet’ specifically:
Finally, and most serious, was ‘the Gauntlet’ on the third floor. I have five separate reports of young ladies, several of whom had nothing to do with Tailhook, who were verbally abused, had drinks thrown on them, were physically abused and were sexually molested. Most distressing was the fact an underage young lady was severely intoxicated and had her clothing removed by members of ‘the Gauntlet’.511
Following investigations512 the official report was released in April 1993. It found that eighty three women and seven men513 were subject to indecent assault during the symposium. In a similar way to the case of Czar 52, whereby senior leaders themselves had become captured by the myth of ‘Aircrew’, the Tailhook report questioned the role that leadership played:
The various types of misconduct that took place in the third-floor corridor and in the suites, if not tacitly approved, were nevertheless allowed to continue by the leadership of the naval aviation community.514
The investigation into Tailhook ‘91 revealed an attitude of contempt toward women. Leaders did not take reports of incidents seriously and the perpetrators and others aware of incidents obstructed investigations. For nearly a decade prior to Tailhook ‘91 attendees had witnessed drunkenness, nudity, consensual public sex acts and other equally appalling behaviour. ‘Aircrew’ were allowed to fondle and assault women for the very reason that they were ‘Aircrew’; this reinforces the power of dominant cliques. It was ‘the ways things were done’ at Tailhook. Those who behaved inappropriately stated a number of reasons for their behaviour, ranging from ‘it’s tradition’ to the ‘Top Gun mentality’. Many even
511 William H. McMichael, The Mother of All Hooks: The Story of the U.S. Navy’s Tailhook Scandal, Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, 1997, p. 50. 512 O’Neill, ‘Sex Scandals in the Gender-Integrated Military’, 1998, p.p. 64-85: “There were three separate investigations, two by Navy, which were completely botched, and a third and more sweeping one conducted by the Department of Defense’s Office of the Inspector General.” This investigation resulted in The Tailhook Report, used throughout this synopsis. 513 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p.p. vii, xiii, 2. 514 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 86. Emphasis added. 99 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
reasoned that their behaviour was expected. The report discussed how the introduction of women into combat roles might have been influential. One female lieutenant reflected:
This was the woman that was making you change your ways. This was the woman that was threatening your livelihood. This was the woman that was threatening your lifestyle. This was the woman that wanted to take your spot in the combat aircraft.515
The influence of the movie Top Gun cannot be underestimated.516 In the movie, the lead actor Maverick even got to sleep with his boss. Initially cast as an enlisted female, her role was changed to a civilian due to military laws and rules around fraternisation. Tacitly however, the message was clear – the dominant pilot can even dominate his superiors (reminiscent of Czar 52), especially women. Top Gun tapped into established norms of masculinity and projected this masculinity in images of power. In the film, clichéd images of “semi-nude pilots, planes taking off with enormous thrust, gunners locking on to targets and blasting them out of the air, repeat again and again, that sex is power and power is aggressive use of force”517 coincide with broad-brush public expectations. The masculine paradigm, which sees women as objects rather than human beings, characterises the Tailhook investigation and reflects a stereotype promoted by the traditional male myth. This myth was apparent in the wake of the Tailhook scandal when one officer commented “Curbing Navy pilots’ sexual feistiness (would) remove the edge (naval aviators) need for combat.”518
Another reason cited for the indecent behaviour was that senior officers often referred to junior officers as ‘the kids’. A fundamental difference between pilots and ‘Other’ is that pilots do not follow a path of command early in their careers. They do not get the opportunity to bear the responsibilities of leadership until
515 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 83. 516 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 83. 517 Anne Marie Barry, ‘Tailhook “Top Guns”: Visual Templates in the Use and Abuse of Power’, Journal of Visual Literacy, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1994, p.p. 51-60, p. 55, retrieved 10 July 2012, at http://www.ohio.edu/visualliteracy/JVL_ISSUE_ARC HIVES/JVL14(1)/JVL14(1)_pp.51-60.pdf. 518 Blake E. Ashforth and Vikas Anand, ‘The Normalisation of Corruption in Organisations’, Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 25, 2003, p.p. 1–52, p. 21. 100 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
relatively late in their careers. This invariably leads to a culture of treating junior pilots as ‘children’; and if you treat people like ‘kids’ they will invariably behave as such.
[The] use of this term [kids] symbolised an attitude where irresponsible behaviour and conduct were accepted manifestations of high-spirited youth.520
Many believed Tailhook was a ‘free fire zone’521 where rank and decorum held no regard. They could behave as they wished without fear of consequence. The old military adage of ‘what happens on tour stays on tour’522 served to promote the attitude and belief that people could behave badly and get away with it. As a consequence, people were misled; they became trapped by the myth.
Sexism and misogynistic behaviour was evident at Tailhook ‘91, most tellingly portrayed by a t-shirt worn by many male officers. On the back were the words ‘WOMEN ARE PROPERTY’, and on the front ‘HE MAN WOMAN HATER’S CLUB’. 524 Badges with the slogan ‘NOT IN MY SQUADRON’ 525 were also worn. These items suggest a disdain for women and “specifically the desire to maintain the combat exclusion with respect to women.”526 The events of Tailhook are similarly revealing, evidence perhaps that the “behaviour demonstrates that the male-dominated military culture fosters an inclination to demean and assault women.”527 Responses to inappropriate behaviour have run from ‘boys-will-be- boys’ through to ‘none-of-my-business’ to ‘you have the right to remain silent.’528 This culture continues to play out in the military,529 as seen in the RAN recently,
520 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 83. 521 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 82. 522 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 84. 524 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 85. 525 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 85. 526 The Tailhook Report, 1993, p. 85. 527 Titunik, ‘The Myth of the Macho Military’, 2008, p. 142. 528 Robert Timberg, ‘The Tailhook Legacy’, United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, Vol. 133, No. 9, 2007, p. 4. 529 Refer recent sexual assault cases: Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio – the USAF basic training facility; David Lerman, ‘Sexual Assaults Plague Military after decades of reform’, Businessweek, July 26 2010, viewed 04 September 2012, at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-26/sexual-assaults-plague-military-after-decades-of- reform; Alleged sexual assault at Royal Military College Duntroon, Australia, April 2012, viewed 19 September 2012, at http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Speeches-and-transcripts/Alleged-Sexual- Assault-at-RMC; the U.S. Army have recently charged a Brigadier General with sexual assault, 101 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
in what is now known as the case of HMAS Success.
Acknowledging that Air Force and Navy are different, unconstructive ideas of power evident in Tailhook ‘91 and in the case of HMAS Success find analogues within Air Force squadrons. These ideas are amplified by similar operating modalities. Just as Commissioner Gyles attributed debauchery aboard HMAS Success to the fact that it was an ‘orphan’530 ship, so too in Air Force, personnel are invariably ‘typed’ to a squadron, an aircraft, a platform, and often spend many years on the one squadron, if not their entire careers.
HMAS Success
HMAS Success, an auxiliary oil replenishment vessel, left Sydney on 27 March 2009 bound for South East Asia and China.531 On 26 April 2009 while underway from Qingdao, a senior Petty Officer approached the Executive Officer to report concerns about an incident that had occurred in a local bar the night before.532 Public sex acts (including intercourse and oral sex) between two crewmembers, a male marine technician and a junior female sailor, had taken place while fellow crewmembers observed. 533 The Executive Officer met with the Commanding Officer and relayed her concerns regarding the behaviour and the culture on board, in particular the predatory sexual behaviour, abuse and intimidation
Mark Thompson, ‘Military Misbehavin’, Time, 01 October 2012, viewed 14 October 2012, at http://nation.time.com/2012/10/01/military-misbehavin/; statistics for the NZDF reveal that between July 2007 and July 2012 there were 14 allegations of rape made by NZDF personnel. From that, there were two convictions and two discharges from service. Three personnel are awaiting trial for rape. Four claims were not substantiated and one was withdrawn. Twenty-four allegations of assault were made over the same period. Half were substantiated. The results of 132 are unknown or pending because they are before a civil court. One person is awaiting trial in a criminal court. Just twenty cases were not substantiated. Amanda Gillies, ‘Rape growing issue in the New Zealand Defence Force’, 3 News, 14 October 2012, viewed 03 November 2012, at http://www.3news.co.nz/Rape-growing-issue-in- DefenceForce/tabid/423/articleID/272686/Default.aspx. 530 Meaning ‘one-of-a-kind’; the only one of its type in the fleet. 531 Roger Gyles QC, HMAS Success Commission of Inquiry: Allegations of Unacceptable Behaviour and the Management Thereof, Part One: The Asian Deployment and Immediate Aftermath (HMAS Success COI), Ministry of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia, January 2011, p.p. xii, 20: A number of port visits were included in the deployment: Darwin (replenish), Manila (goodwill visit), Qingdao (Fleet Review), Hong Kong (replenish) and Singapore (partake in Exercise Bersama Shield). 532 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p.p. vii, 33, 70. 533 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p.p. vii, 33, 68, 69, 77, 183, 312. 102 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
(including ‘bounties’) towards female crewmembers.534 The Commanding Officer contacted Fleet Headquarters and followed up via e-mail 535 expressing his concerns. In response Fleet Command sent an Equity and Diversity ‘tiger’ team to join HMAS Success in Hong Kong to conduct a ‘health check’.536 They furnished an unfavourable report.
On 09 March 2010 Roger Gyles, AO QC, was appointed to lead a Commission of Inquiry.537 Commissioner Gyles found that the behaviour of HMAS Success crew members during shore leave was “out of control.” 538 There were significant incidents and concerning themes that depicted an unhealthy culture aboard HMAS Success, including: physical damage to two bars in Manila; a public sex act and damage to property in Qingdao; a ‘robe run’ and other inappropriate ‘fancy dress’ incidents; several alcohol-related incidents in Hong Kong; and, numerous instances of verbal and physical confrontation between male and female crewmembers, in public, in all ports.539 No disciplinary action was taken at the time for any of the violations and infractions. The Commission found that this culture had “developed over some years”540 and that it was not limited to just the marine technical sailors or one department,541 but rather it involved the whole ship, and significantly was seen to be related to the wider cultural challenges within the ADF.542
534 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p.p. viii, 34; Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Incidents onboard HMAS Success between March and May 2009 and subsequent events’ (Success FADT Report), Commonwealth of Australia, September 2011, Part II, p. 10-2. 535 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 35. Excerpt from the Commanding Officers’ e-mail to Fleet Command: “As I have spoken to you over the telephone in recent days I believe there is a significant cultural issue on HMAS Success…I believe there is currently a number of ‘bounties’ placed on the very junior female members of my ship’s company…There have been instances of junior female sailors being abused, intimidated and threatened ashore. The sailors in question are currently not willing to come forward due to potential for incrimination and potential recrimination.”; Success FADT Report, 2011, Part II, p. 7-9. 536 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 35. 537 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 1, and Appendix A, p. 385. 538 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 380. 539 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 380. 540 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p.p. 160, 384. 541 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 381: “Serious misbehaviour was by no means limited to the marine technical sailors.” 542 Success FADT Report, Part II, p. 4: “…in trying to promote a culture of responsible reporting of wrong doing, especially of unacceptable behaviour, and of stamping out bullying and harassment in the ADF, it was of the view that it must again draw attention to this broader cultural issue in the ADF.” 103 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Aside from the wilful disregard of orders and obvious drunken and debauched behaviour,543 the Commission was made aware of numerous instances of abusive and insulting language towards female sailors. The term ‘WRAN” was frequently used in a derogatory and offensive manner;544 meaning a ‘Whore of the Royal Australian Navy’.545 This type of behaviour was accepted as normal and was an entrenched part of life on HMAS Success.548 Reflecting on Chapter Two, ideas of social ordering and tribalism were prevalent on board HMAS Success. An entrenched tribal culture allows for insidious behaviour to take root, such as a ‘culture of silence’,549 the mutual protection of ‘own’, and the intimidation and bullying of ‘Other’.550 A tribal culture leads to the creation of a ‘pack mentality’551 where ideas of ‘Othering’ become prevalent.
Just as Air Force culture is subordinated to the controlling motifs of ‘Aircrew’, so the marine technicians aboard HMAS Success are acknowledged by the public
543 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 80: The Commission heard that while alongside in Hong Kong, marine technical sailors stayed at the Renaissance Hotel for the “biggest piss up I’ve ever done 3 days of constant pub and club hopping.”; (p. 83), A number of them participated in what is known as a ‘robe run’ – going out ‘on the town’ scantily clad, wearing a bathrobe. A contemporaneous e-mail from one of the participants to his girlfriend throws some light on the incident: “We did a robe run it was the best apparently I was in the club dancing on a platform with my robe open and I was naked and everyone could see my dick but I didn’t close my robe cause I was whaled…”; (p. 85), On yet another night, a group (including senior sailors) went out dressed in construction worker outfits, complete with safety helmets and fluoro vests. In this instance they were seen by Senior Officers (including the Commanding Officer) who appeared turn a blind eye; (p. 88), On the second to last night in Hong Kong, one-piece lycra suits and frilly dresses were worn, giving the appearance of Snow White and school girls. All of these outfits were “in breach of the relevant directive relating to dress. The robe run and the schoolgirl and Snow White costumes bordered on the offensive.” 544 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Sexual Harassment in the ADF’, Commonwealth of Australia, August 1994, p. 139: Not too dissimilar to language used aboard HMAS SWAN seventeen years previously, where females were referred to as ‘SWOD’ – ‘sailors without dicks’. This term was “used with intent to offend” in combination with words such as “no good and useless”. 545 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p.p. 231-2. 548 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 226. 549 Success FADT Report, 2011, Part II, p. 3: “The most disturbing revelation was that a culture of silence existed onboard Success, which meant that members of the ship's crew were reluctant to report wrongdoing or unacceptable behaviour. In particular, the most vulnerable members of the crew, young female sailors, were subjected to verbal abuse but were reluctant to report such conduct.” 550 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 225: Commissioner Gyles noted, “The overwhelming impression I gained from the evidence about the behaviour of marine technical sailors on HMAS Success was one of a fiercely tribal culture…and tight-lipped customs… ‘The marine technical branch has to stick together, it doesn’t matter that one of our boys is in the wrong, we all stick together.’…The culture of silence and mutual protection backed up by intimidation of those who implicated marine technical sailors, leading to a fear of repercussions on their part, was powerful and it gave cover to marine technical sailors who were involved in unacceptable behaviour.” 551 A dangerous phenomenon as it involves people encouraging each other to reject normal standards of decency. 104 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
record to have assumed the mantle of ‘elitism’, and to have run ‘as a pack’.552 In a similar way to ‘Aircrew’ they “were classed as untouchables.” 553 The lack of action by senior leaders regarding breaches of rules and regulations and instances of unacceptable behaviour, reinforced the perception the marine technical sailors were not subject to normal restraints. This failure by formally appointed leaders to intervene was seen as approval and it reinforced that the marine technical sailors had free reign.554 An earlier incident in Cairns (on a previous deployment) where two sailors were arrested was not dealt with expeditiously. The lack of repercussion led the Equity and Diversity team to state (and the Commissioner agreed) that the “perception amongst the crew is that, the two sailors did not receive a punishment as they belong to the ‘protected pack’ of marine technical sailors.”555 This lack of action contributed to the culture of silence and mutual protection among marine technical sailors and instilled in them a sense of ‘top cover’, of being ‘untouchable’ or ‘a protected species’.556
The culture aboard HMAS Success was one based on fear, where “complainants were reluctant to come forward for fear of repercussions,”557 because the marine technical sailors “use stand over techniques to get what they want, they intimidate and bully.”558 A toxic culture was prevalent on board HMAS Success, which was
552 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 320: “When new sailors join Success, they either join the pack, or they are excluded from the pack. The pack work together, live together and step together. If new sailors choose not to participate in their unacceptable behaviour then they are locked out of the pack, bullied and belittled.” Other examples include “The pack also offers protection and goes into shutdown mode when there are any allegations of unacceptable behaviour. They will all lie for each other to ensure that no dirt sticks,” and, “People are reluctant to come forward. The main reason for this is that they feel they will not be believed, that no action will occur, and then their life will be made a living hell.” 553 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 113. 554 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 88. 555 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 56. 556 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 318: Random Breath Testing post shore leave was part of ship life. However, the marine technical sailors had a ‘system’ in place that protected their own. A senior marine technical sailor would give the junior marine technical sailors a ‘heads-up’ and encourage them to “stay down the hole.”; p. 50: Regarding the warning system the Commissioner stated “Such behaviour could not be tolerated; it was destructive of ship-wide command and discipline; it was known about by other members of the crew and could not help but diminish morale and respect for command; it underlined the impression that marine technical sailors were untouchable.”; and, p.p. 57, 320: “They are known throughout the ship as the untouchables. They believe they can do whatever they want and get away with it.” 557 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p.p. viii, 135: The Commissioner found personnel were “reluctant to use their chain of command or divisional system to make complaints for fear of repercussion. Marine technical sailors had a reputation for being ‘untouchable’ because their chain of command would turn a blind eye to unacceptable behaviour.” 558 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 320. 105 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
maintained and sustained by threatening behaviour, such as bullying and verbal abuse. 559 The Commission heard evidence of physical abuse being used to intimidate.560 This, combined with the “perception of a macho culture [which] was exaggerated because of the presence of some physically formidable marine technical sailors,”561 led to a culture of silence.
The commissioner concluded, “There was a powerful culture of silence and mutual protection among the marine technical sailors. [The] culture was acquiesced in – if not encouraged.”562 Denials under oath during the Commission illustrate the strength 563 of the prevailing culture of silence. 564 The lack of disciplinary action for incidents indicates a dearth in supervision and discipline. Clear messages were sent – “No material repercussions for serious breaches of discipline by marine technical sailors and that such matters would be kept in- house and dealt with informally or not at all.”565 The Commission found that the handling of the public sex act in Qingdao smelled of a
Cover-up of a marine technical sailors misbehaviour by other marine technical sailors – including senior sailors and an engineering officer…and failure of a discipline system…where the lack of adverse consequences led to a feeling of immunity…and a perception among the rest of the crew that misbehaviour by marine technical sailors would be condoned.566
The depth of the cultural problem is illustrated by the fact that “when giving evidence the marine technical chain of command stubbornly refused to find fault with what occurred – even in retrospect.”567 This, coupled with repeated lies and denials of even being present at some of the incidents while under oath, intimate
559 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 104. 560 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 113. 561 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 227. 562 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 40. 563 Mark Thompson, ‘Military Misbehavin’, Time, 01 October 2012, viewed 28 October 2012, at http://nation.time.com/2012/10/01/military-misbehavin/: An article regarding the latest allegations of United States military sexual assaults refers to Aberdeen Proving Ground and Lackland Air Force Base assaults: “The ‘circle-the-wagon’ mentality shared by those on the inside can make such rings tough to crack.” 564 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 47. 565 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 56. 566 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 80. 567 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 88. 106 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
just how deep rooted this culture of silence and protection was.568 The culture was one of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’569 or ‘what happens on tour, stays on tour.’570
Numerous incidents of predatory behaviour pointed to a misogynistic culture aboard HMAS Success. Women were barely tolerated, they were ‘guests at best’, and behaviour towards them reeked of sexism. Female sailors were regularly targeted or ‘hit on’ by marine technical sailors.571 The Commission noted “Cold- blooded targeting, not because of attraction but because of a contest or to obtain kudos or the respect of fellow sailors, can be properly described as predatory and unacceptable.” 572 Deviant practices became the norm aboard HMAS Success. Predatory sexual behaviour (involving senior male sailors taking advantage of junior female sailors) was tolerated; it became an entrenched part of life. Verbal abuse was accepted. Binge drinking and drunkenness were accepted. Violations of dress regulations were tolerated. Public sexual acts and fraternisation between shipmates were tolerated. Damage to public property was tolerated. What would previously and in any other situation, be perceived as unthinkable and debauched behaviour became the accepted social norm. The degradation and extent of deviant behaviour is demonstrated by accounts that a ‘sex ledger’ existed on board HMAS Success. While no evidence was found, the fact that reports of this type are synonymous with ship life and that terms such as bounty, tab, kitty, price, bet, competition, fresh meat, prize were part of everyday language and were readily
568 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 66: Evidence given by several sailors concerning the night in the Manila Hotel was misleading, except for one account. “The approach of the two Petty Officers was to conceal the truth by making evasive denials.” 569 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 67. 570 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p.p. 236-7: Clear messages that no adverse disciplinary or administrative action would be taken is seen in the ‘sweeping under the carpet’ of the two incidents of property damage in Manila. (p. 381): Senior leaders (approved by the Commanding Officer) were involved in this ‘cover up’; the ship’s welfare fund was used in one instance to pay for the damages (later being reimbursed by anonymous donations from the crew). This action appeared to condone the behaviour and reinforced that what happened ashore stayed ashore or ‘what goes on on the piss stays on the piss.’ 571 The Commission drew a distinct line between what is considered normal and acceptable (courting) behaviour, at the same time acknowledging that it is difficult to distinguish. 572 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 159: “Marine technical sailors preying sexually on female junior sailors in various ways such as bullying, coercion and causing and taking advantage of intoxication – this can easily be categorised as predatory.” 107 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
recognisable is telling.573 Of significance, there was never any investigation into the existence of or search for such a ‘ledger’.574
There was a clear and distinct failing in leadership aboard HMAS Success. Senior leaders tacitly condoned and endorsed abhorrent behaviour by standing by and doing nothing. If they had acted decisively with earlier behavioural infringements, then clear messages about acceptable behaviour would have been sent and the slippery slide into the debauched behaviour that occurred later in the deployment would have been stemmed. The Commission heard of numerous instances of failures in leadership, and the inability of senior sailors and Officers to set the right example and tone of appropriate behaviour for the ship.575
The failure aboard HMAS Success was a leadership failure – those who had the ability to ‘change course’ did not do so. In a similar way to the senior leaders in the case of Czar 52, they lacked the morale courage – the intestinal fortitude to do ‘what is right’. They themselves fell into the trap of the culture they were immersed in. The failure aboard HMAS Success (which alarmingly echoes the HMAS Swan inquiry seventeen years earlier) underscores just how difficult it has been to fully integrate women into the military. Craig Orme, in the ADF Personnel Conduct Review Beyond Compliance, states that the recent cases of inappropriate behaviour in the ADF were “instances of one clique of individuals (generally males) attempting to express their dominance through their disrespect to a lesser community (often females.)”576 This thesis discusses the case of HMAS Success as it demonstrates how social ordering and tribalism foment elitist cliques, which operate to galvanise a pack mentality at the expense of ‘Other’. In such a milieu, the ‘brotherhood’ or ‘old boys’ club’ is seen to be alive and well. This
573 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p.p. 163-72, 274, 311; Success FADT Report, 2011, Part II, p. 40. 574 Success FADT Report, 2011, Part II, p. 53. 575 HMAS Success COI, 2011, Part 1, p. 319: Examples include “A common perception amongst junior ranks is that not all senior sailors and Officers set a good example, or act as good role models. The most common issues raised were in the area of alcohol consumption, inappropriate relationships and dress and bearing while ashore”; and, “A number of individuals explained how they had on occasion escorted Officers to bed because they were too intoxicated to get to their messes”; Success FADT Report, 2011, Part II, p. 11. 576 Orme, Beyond Compliance, 2011, p. 17. 108 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
thesis considers that the case of HMAS Success illuminates analogues which are conspicuous in the RNZAF.
The Broderick Review
There is an urgent and compelling need for change…Increasing the representation of women and improving their pathways into leadership goes to the very heart of the sustainability and capability of the Australian Defence Force.577
The Broderick Review was initiated by incidents relating to the sexual commodification of women in the ADF. The Review’s terms of reference enabled an interrogation of underlying cultural structures, which in the ADF operated to disenfranchise and disadvantage women. The eighteen-month review included conversations with 2000 ADF members of all ranks from around the globe, and resulted in twenty one recommendations 578 for cultural change in the ADF.579 While there were many positive stories the Commission also heard “deeply distressing stories of extreme exclusion, of harassment and bullying, of sexual assault and victimisation.” 580 Commissioner Broderick concluded, “Despite progress over the past two decades, I am not confident that women can and will flourish in all the varied workplaces that comprise the ADF.”581
577 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 20. Emphasis added. 578 The Broderick Report, 2012, p.p. 24-7: Recommendations include: “(1) The Chiefs of Services Committee should take direct responsibility for the implementation of the Review’s recommendations, make decisions, monitor key metrics and take corrective action. (2) They should articulate and communicate a strong and unambiguous commitment to the effect that: Targets are required to create an environment that is optimal for, and takes full advantage of, the strengths of both men and women; Leaders will be held to account for the wellbeing and culture of their teams; Every sexual offender and harasser will be held to account together with leaders who fail to appropriately address the behavior; Flexible working arrangements underpin capability and are an important recruitment and retention tool; and, women are essential to the sustainability and operational effectiveness of the ADF because they contribute to a diverse workforce which strengthens the ADF’s ability to be an effective, modern, relevant and high performing organisation. (3) They should publish a “Women in the Australian Defence Force” report each year, as a companion document to the ADF Annual Report. (5) They should review and redesign the custom and practice of selecting the most senior strategic leadership positions in the ADF from combat corps codes with the object of selecting from a broader group of meritorious candidates, particularly women.” 579 Elizabeth Broderick, ‘A new review would help make the ADF a model employer’, The Canberra Times, 30 November 2012, p. 13. 580 Broderick, ‘A new review would help make the ADF a model employer’, 30 November 2012, p. 13. 581 Elizabeth Broderick, ‘ADF needs to change to survive’, The Canberra Times, 22 August 2012, 109 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The review revealed that the ADF is not a true reflection of society. Comprised predominantly of white men, 582 occupational segregation and promotion ‘pathways’ (restrictions over posts) perpetuate gender stereotypes. Gender equality, in particular the number of women holding senior leadership positions is low. Those that occupy the most senior ranks are often drawn from typically male dominated ‘war-fighting’ roles – this has resulted in very few women in leadership positions.583 While women comprise 13.8%584 of Regular Force serving personnel, they are under-represented at the senior levels of the organisation (with less that 5% representation at Star rank level, and less than 8% at Warrant Officer level). 585 This is due to what Commissioner Broderick argues are traditional structures in which women are precluded. The Commissioner suggests that pathways for leadership, through non-combat categories are required. This recommendation challenges the so-called ‘warrior culture’ and it is predicted, “it will be met with bitter resistance.”586 Commissioner Broderick concludes that in the past “some well-intentioned initiatives have been ineffectual because of ‘cultural resistance’.”587 There exists institutional resistance to any change to the ‘brotherhood’, where rituals and traditional structures underlie the mistreatment, marginalisation and exclusion of women.
I suppose in a sense you are going to the heart of masculinity, or macho-ism, when you go in looking at cultural reform in the military.588
Coupled with this, women are reluctant to set themselves apart. Doing so, they perpetuate the ‘us versus them’ distance, which sequesters them psychologically and materially from their male colleagues.589 This explains why recommendations
viewed 22 August 2012, at http://www.canberratimes.com.au/opinion/adf-needs-to-change-to- survive-20120822-24lef.html 582 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 26. 583 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 178. 584 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 91. 585 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 26. 586 Snow, ‘Broderick has military revolution in mind’, August 22, 2012. 587 Deborah Snow, ‘Forced to confront gender divide (again)’, The Canberra Times, 25 August 2012, viewed 25 August 2012, at http://www.canberratimes.com.au/opinion/forced-to-confront- gender-divide-again-20120824-24rh4.html 588 Snow, ‘Forced to confront gender divide (again)’, 25 August 2012. 589 Titunik, ‘The Myth of the Macho Military’, 2008, p. 141. 110 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
of targets and quotas, such as Commissioner Broderick announced, are generally met with disdain and criticised by women. The review uncovered some deep and systemic contradictions. There is an organisational mantra to ‘treat everyone the same’; everyone wears the same uniform, is assessed on performance and promoted on merit, and there are compelling organisational pressures to treat women and men identically. However, it is only appropriate where gender differences are not relevant. When existing policies and practices appear to be neutral, but they are actually embedded in a ‘male norm’, 590 Commissioner Broderick recommends that targets are required.
In the review, women spoke about the pressure to succeed and feeling that they need to work ‘twice as hard’ to be recognised for their efforts. This proclivity to work harder is prompted by the need to compensate for the underlying pervasive masculine, negative views; women have to work harder just to be considered equal. 591 Significantly Commissioner Broderick noted, “this is despite the fact that, in many cases, they function at a palpable disadvantage.”592 ‘Trail blazers’ face a significant burden and risk too;593 hence the general reluctance to enter trades that are male dominated (the culture, vice the function of the role is the deterrent).594 A lack of a ‘critical mass’ (deemed so important to gain any traction in a group),595 finds women choosing roles that have a large female base. The example below speaks volumes to the hidden bias, traditions and mindsets that allow gender-based inequities to flourish:
590 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 2. 591 Jim Mitchell, Alex Kristovics, Leo Vermeulen, Jan Wilson and Monica Martinussen, ‘How Pink Is The Sky? A Cross National Study Of The Gendered Occupation Of Pilot’, Employment Relations Record, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2005, p.p. 43-60, p. 56; The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 60. 592 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 78. 593 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 29. 594 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 302. 595 Catalyst, ‘Companies with more Women Board Directors Experience Higher Financial Performance according to Latest Catalyst Bottom Line Report’, October 2007, viewed 28 June 2012, at http://www.catalyst.org: A study that looked at three critical financial measures and “compared the performance of companies with the highest representation of women on their boards to those with the lowest” found that there is “a very strong correlation between corporate financial performance and gender diversity. Diversity well managed produces better results – more independence, innovation, and good governance.” Significantly, the study found that there was a “notably stronger-than-average performance at companies with three or more women board directors”; Orme, Beyond Compliance, 2011, p. 22: “A token one or two women is unlikely to be of significant benefit, which will generally not accrue until a ‘critical mass’ is present, which research indicates is said to be three or more.” 111 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
She said she wanted to be a pilot, and I said “why don’t you try?” She goes, “well you’re allowed to be, but it’s the ‘boy’s club’ you need to get through.”596
Commissioner Broderick comments on the role of leadership in cultural change and its importance in the direction of an organisation. There are many reasons why women are under-represented in leadership roles, including occupational segregation, work and family balance issues, and a rigid career continuum. The Commissioner contends that all of these can be modified or changed, resulting in a more representative spread of women throughout the ranks, especially at senior levels. Significantly, Commissioner Broderick warns that some recent cost saving moves could send women backwards. “The Strategic Reform Program aims to trim the budget by transferring some jobs from military personnel to civilians, but it could come at the expense of many positions held by ADF women.”597 This warning echoes the process of reform that has occurred over the past few years in the NZDF. Reform, aimed at reducing the numbers of personnel in uniform in support roles (where traditionally the concentration of uniformed women exist), has directly contributed to fewer women in uniform.
From the perspective of this thesis bureaucratic reform is fundamental deceit. The language of economic efficiency is merely a cover, under which women are excised from the Services. Positions, occupied predominantly by women in areas such as administration, are done away with. The work is civilianised, handed over to civil service functionaries. The abolition of these positions is explained away with phrases such as ‘non-core business’. The reduction in uniformed personnel is seen to be merely the matter of doing away with non-essential support roles. But some roles are never threatened. Inevitably, these are positions occupied in the main by men and they are described in affirming language as ‘crucial’ or ‘warfighting’, or perhaps as roles which define the ‘sharp end’. In this way reform has little effect upon the traditional rules-based, conservative, masculine military and creates challenges for undergoing cultural change, 598 where fundamentally talent, not gender, should be key.599 A lack of diversity perpetuates the perception
596 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 172. Original emphasis. 597 Snow, ‘Forced to confront gender divide (again)’, 25 August 2012. 598 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 175. 599 Broderick, ‘ADF needs to change to survive’, 22 August 2012. 112 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
that the military has a masculine culture, geared towards recruiting white men, and steers women away from joining.600
The Apple or The Barrel?
Valuing and leveraging diversity is an integral part of competent leadership.601
The military is renowned for being slow to accept, embrace and progress change. 602 The cases of Tailhook ‘91 and HMAS Success demonstrate how difficult the integration of women into the military has been and reveal the ubiquity of gender prejudice in the military mind. Each case demonstrates how sexist prejudice and laddism flourish where leadership fails. Underlined by the DLA Piper Report and The Broderick Report, each case illustrates how systemic failure to respond expeditiously and appropriately to transgressions can and does have a roll on effect. The prevalence of responses such as ‘Suck it up’, ‘It’s the military, what did you expect – you just need to adapt to reality’, signifies a ‘closure of the brotherhood’ and intimates a culture of secrecy, denial, and prevarication. The abhorrent behaviour revealed in both the reports and cases continued virtually unchecked. The ‘averting of eyes’, the ‘cloak of secrecy’, systemic dysfunction, institutional resistance,603 failure of leadership, the closed
600 The Broderick Report, 2012, p. 113. 601 Equal Employment Opportunity Trust Work and Life Awards, ‘Achieving Integration and Acceptance’, 2007, p. 7, viewed 11 August 2012, at http://www.gender.go.jp/kokusai-event/nz/bar- eng.shiryou.pdf. 602 Mark Corcoran, ‘Australia moves to buy $3b spy drone fleet’, ABC News, 4 September 2012, viewed 12 September 2012, at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-04/australia-moves-to-buy-spy- drones/4236544: Another recent example of the resistance to change is the acquisition of the Global Hawk. “Kym Bergmann, the editor of Asia Pacific Defence Reporter and a former defence industry executive who worked on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle projects, says Global Hawk should have been in Australian service years ago. He claims this did not happen because RAAF pilots feared Unmanned Aerial Vehicle’s would threaten their jobs and traditions. [They] preferred the idea of having a manned aircraft. It's because a manned aircraft is flown by guys with moustaches and flying allowances, rather than being operated by hyper intelligent nerds sitting in front of computer terminals. They’ve now become enthusiasts for the technology, when in fact for the previous decade they'd done everything that they could to resist it.” 603 The Sydney Morning Herald, ‘Cadets allegedly linked to historical sexual assaults remain in Defence ranks’, 20 November 2013, at http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political- news/cadets-allegedly-linked-to-historical-sexual-assaults-remain-in-defence-ranks-20131120- 2xubo.html: The reluctance of the Defence community of the past to address deep-seated problems of abuse finds its most awful expression in the tolerance of abusers. This article reveals that twelve former ADFA cadets allegedly linked to a series of assaults in the 1990s remain in Defence ranks. The assaults were never properly investigated at the time and the prospect of prosecutions now appears to be receding. 113 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
and parochial character of the military, the opprobrium of talking about transgressions, all combine to foster an endemic climate of mistrust where the most vulnerable (the ‘Other’ – in these incidents ‘Support Crew’) are at risk.
This thesis posits that a ‘warrior culture’ is not necessary to maintain security and fulfil defence responsibilities. Warped senses of loyalty and failings in leadership allow a culture of mistrust and abuse to thrive; this pervasive culture destroys individuals and has a deleterious organisational effect. The underlying culture is dominated by masculinity and physicality, and alarmingly the failure of leadership where “those in power remain mute lest any scandal impede their own career and future promotion prospects”604 is evident.
It takes effective leadership to prevent abuse and to model correct behaviour. Acknowledging that there is a cultural issue is the first step. A culture of ‘blaming bad apples’ has been prevalent and reinforcement of the ‘bad apple’ belief stems from statements by very senior leaders, who in using the ‘one bad apple in the barrel’ analogy when referring to instances of abuse, immediately then contrast the outstanding operational performance of other units. 605 Blaming ‘one bad apple’ is known as the fundamental attribution error; 606 attributing events to individuals rather than situations, particularly if the consequences are severe. It is easier to demonise individuals and senior leaders routinely attempt to blame inappropriate behaviour on a ‘few bad apples’. 607 This stance has been the
604 Kathryn Spurling, ‘Our Proud Military Tradition is Tarnished’, 12 July 2012, viewed 13 October 2012, at http://newmatilda.com/2012/07/12/no-surprises-adf-report. 605 DLA Piper Report, 2011, p. 157. 606 Gilbert Harman, ‘Moral Philosophy meets Social Psychology’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 99, 1999, p.p. 315-31, p. 315: “The error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent’s distinctive character traits.”; Jerald M. Jellison and Jane Green, ‘A Self-Presentation Approach to the Fundamental Attribution Error: The Norm of Internality’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 4, 1981, p.p. 643-9, p. 643: “The general tendency to overestimate the importance of personal or dispositional factors relative to environmental influences.”; Philip E. Tetlock, ‘Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental Attribution Error’, Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 3, 1985, p.p. 227-36, p. 227: “To draw conclusions about the attitudes and personalities of others even when plausible external or situational causes for behaviour exist; the existence of systematic bias in this person-perception process: a pervasive tendency on the part of observers to overestimate personality or dispositional causes of behaviour and to underestimate the influence of situational constraints on behaviour.” 607 Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil, Random House, New York, 2011 (2007), p. 10: “…isolate the problem in order to deflect attention and blame away from those at the top who may be responsible for creating untenable working conditions or for a lack of oversight or supervision…the bad apple – dispositional view ignores the apple barrel and its 114 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
“hallmark of defence resistance to cultural change.” 608 However, it is the intertwined processes of institutionalisation, rationalisation and socialisation,609 which combine to normalise and perpetuate inappropriate practices so that the system comes up trumps. “When ‘bad apples’ produce a bad barrel through institutionalisation, the barrel itself must be repaired: only systemic responses can reverse systemic normalisation.”610 It is time to retire the ‘bad apple’ theory and concentrate on ‘the barrel’. The Australian Chief of Army in his address to the United Nations International Women’s Day Conference in New York in March 2013 stated that he is “no longer comforted by the cliché that a ‘few bad apples’ [are] undermining the great work of the majority”,611 and “that the ‘bad apple’ theory was a comforting self-delusion…and cultural problems…are systemic and ingrained, not the work of a few rogues.”612
The role of senior leaders in cultural change and transformation cannot be underestimated. What is required is active support from senior leaders, who have been slow to support in the past, or in fact have resisted or “approached [change] in a perfunctory, unsystematic and half-hearted manner.”613 Senior leaders need to demonstrate a strong commitment to equity principles and be aware of gender- based issues. Leadership plays a large role in the institutionalisation process, and leaders not only control many of the levers of institutionalisation, but they are also
potentially corrupting situational impact on those within it.”; Zimbardo, ‘The barrel that spoils the apple: How good people turn evil’, RSA Journal, Vol. 154, No. 5529, 2007, p. 61: “…good apples put in a bad barrel…corrupted by powerful, situational forces…the system gets off the hook by saying we never told them to do that.” 608 Ben Wadham, ‘ADFA Skype scandal: Smith’s reviews could help defence to change its culture’, The Conversation, 08 March 2012, viewed 16 October 2012, at http://theconversation.edu.au/adfa- skype-scandal-smiths-reviews-could-help-defence-to-change-its-culture-5751 609 Ashforth and Anand, ‘The Normalisation of Corruption in Organisations’, 2003, p. 1: “Deviant behaviour became normalised, that is, embedded in the organisation such that it was more or less taken for granted and perpetuated. Three mutually reinforcing processes underlie normalisation: (1) institutionalisation, where an initial deviant decision or act becomes embedded in structures and processes and thereby routinised; (2) rationalisation, where self-serving ideologies develop to justify and perhaps even valorise deviant behaviour; and (3) socialisation, where naive newcomers are induced to view the behaviour as permissible if not desirable. This helps explain how otherwise morally upright individuals can routinely engage in deviant behaviour without experiencing internal conflict.” 610 Ashforth and Anand, ‘The Normalisation of Corruption in Organisations’, 2003, p. 37. 611 Morrison, Speech to the United Nations International Women’s Day Conference, 2013, p. 2. 612 Morrison, Speech to the United Nations International Women’s Day Conference, 2013, p. 4. 613 Franklin C. Pinch, Diversity: Conditions for an Adaptive, Inclusive Military, in Challenge and Change in the Military, 2006, p. 179. 115 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
very potent role models.614 Senior leaders must set the premise for change – that is, they must create the “compelling case for change from what was or is to what is to be.”615 Senior leaders must take an active, positive role in championing organisational change. Rewarding, condoning, ignoring, or otherwise facilitating inappropriate behaviour sends clear messages. A leader who informally encourages or tacitly condones inappropriate behaviour is seen to be authorising it. Subordinates are expected to execute authorised acts; their duty is to obey. As illustrated by Milgram’s obedience experiments, 616 the reflexive impulse is to obey authority figures – the ‘habit of obedience’ is strong and pervasive in the military.
So what?
The cultures depicted in the cases in this chapter were characterised by unconstructive ideas of power. The ‘elite’ dominated the ‘Other’ – ‘Support Crew’. In the case of Tailhook ‘91 the most important people were seen to be the male aviators; in the case of HMAS Success they were the marine technical sailors. Their language, their ideas and their behaviour were seen to be in vogue, depicting the power of the ‘elite’. The corollary was the marginalisation women.
In 2007, the NZDF were recipients of a diversity award for their approach to gender integration. Endeavouring to change the traditions and mindsets that fostered gender-based inequity, a process of significant cultural change was undertaken, where the fundamental issue addressed was “the pervasiveness of masculinity in the military culture and the pressures put on women to conform to a masculine set of values and standards.”617 The NZDF, arguably a leader in gender- based integration in the military, eliminated all policy barriers to women being employed in combat roles in 2000. Flexible working arrangements and family
614 Ashforth and Anand, ‘The Normalisation of Corruption in Organisations’, 2003, p. 6. 615 Pinch, Diversity, in Challenge and Change in the Military, 2006, p. 182. Emphasis in original. 616 Thomas Blass, Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: New Jersey, 2000, p. ix: Psychologist Stanley Milgram conducted his experiments in the 1960’s and they revealed “the ease with which ordinary people can be induced by a legitimate authority to act with extraordinary cruelty against an innocent victim.” 617 Equal Employment Opportunity Trust Work and Life Awards, ‘Achieving Integration and Acceptance’, 2007, p. 6. 116 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
friendly policies quickly followed. A 2005 review (The Hanson-Burns Report618) found that “the NZDF had made substantial progress in the representation and distribution of women throughout the services.”619 There is now a new Diversity strategy, titled ‘Valuing Diversity: Leadership in Action’; the goal being to “optimise performance though strengthening the inclusive culture and recognising that this strength is partly derived from the differences individuals bring.”620
The case of Tailhook ‘91 occurred over 20 years ago and it could be argued development and progress since then have negated concerns. Recent statistics however connote a fall in the representation of women in the NZDF – down from 16.3%621 in 2011 to 15.9%622 in 2012. Of more concern, due to internal selection and systems that have a masculine social and cultural weighting,623 women are not well represented at the more senior echelons of the NZDF, especially when compared to the ADF (of which The Broderick Report is damning). The dearth of women in senior leadership roles, and in the preceding ranks that lead to these roles, is conspicuous. Across the NZDF (unlike the ADF which have star ranked women in all three Services), women fail to feature at star rank level (there has been only one in the past – a Brigadier).624 Current statistics (refer Figure Eight) reveal that the highest ranked woman in: the New Zealand Army is a Colonel (3.6%); the Royal New Zealand Navy is a Captain (14.3%); and, the RNZAF is a Wing Commander (6.4%) – notably one rank lower than the other two New
618 Janice Burns and Margaret Hanson, Review of Progress in Gender Integration in the New Zealand Defence Force, Department of Defence, New Zealand Government, August 2005, Foreword: “The Review was commissioned to assess the progress NZDF had made against the recommendations by Dr Claire Burton in the October 1998 ‘Report of the Gender Integration Audit of the New Zealand Defence Force’. The Review found that the NZDF had made significant and substantial progress in gender integration since the Burton Report. There was an improvement in the representation and distribution of women within the organisation, and personnel reported that it is easier to achieve a better work-life balance. The Review also found there was a reduction in the reported instances of harassment and discrimination, and the culture of valuing women equally with men had improved.” 619 Equal Employment Opportunity Trust Work and Life Awards, ‘Achieving Integration and Acceptance’, 2007, p. 7. 620 Viewed 04 November 2012, at www.nzdf.mil.nz. 621 New Zealand Defence Force, Annual Report (2011), p 13, viewed 14 August 2012, at www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2011/nzdf-annual-report-2011.pdf 622 Statistics sourced from Human Resource Services Cell, New Zealand Defence Force, 04 September 2012. 623 Pinch, Diversity, in Challenge and Change in the Military, 2006, p. 191. 624 In 2006, the first female Brigadier, Anne Campbell, was appointed. She has since retired. 117 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Zealand Services, and three ranks shy of the highest ranking RAAF female.625 One could argue that while receiving an encouraging report in 2005 and a diversity award in 2007, the NZDF is still some way off achieving fair representation. This assertion was supported by Dr Judy McGregor, the New Zealand Human Rights Commission Equal Employment Opportunities Commissioner, while speaking at the 2012 RNZAF Women’s Development Forum. She concluded
Overall, the representation of women within the NZDF has not improved significantly since 2005…626
ADF NZDF % women in Service 13.8 15.9 % women in Navy 18.5 21.6 % women in Army 9.9 13 % women in Air Force 17.1 16.8 Navy Commodore 5.4 0 Captain 9.7 14.3 Commander 10.8 8.8 Army Brigadier 7.7 0 Colonel 4.4 3.6 Lieutenant Colonel 10.5 9.4 Air Force Air Commodore 2.6 0 Group Captain 9.9 0 Wing Commander 11.8 6.4
625 Air Force News, Royal New Zealand Air Force, New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Government April 2010, p 7: Group Captain Mary Cox, the first and only RNZAF Group Captain, was appointed to the rank in 2001. She retired in 2010, after nine years of Service overseas in Defence Advisor and Attaché positions; The Broderick Report – Phase One, 2011, p. 107: There is one female Air Vice Marshal in the RAAF – equals 10% (one of nine). 626 Air Force News, December 2012, p. 30, ‘Growing For Success’. Keynote address at the RNZAF Women’s Development Forum 31 October – 01 November 2012. 118 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Figure Eight
The NZDF continues to strive for greater diversity and inclusion. Recent initiatives include the launch of the NZDF Women’s Steering Group on International Women’s Day in March 2013, followed by the NZDF Women’s Development Forum in June 2013. Post the Women’s Development Forum the New Zealand Chief of Army stated that the biggest challenge is to “create an environment that attracts women in the first place – an environment where challenge, respect for diversity, fairness and success, are hallmarks of a profession parents will feel comfortable promoting to their daughters, a profession that universally recognises and values the unique qualities that women bring to operations.” 627 For all the initiatives however, it is the continued attitude and behaviour towards women in the Services that contributes to deterring others from joining, and encourages serving women to leave. It could be argued that the recent reviews, in particular The Broderick Report, have been ‘overhyped’. The question is ‘Who stands to gain?’ from promotion of this assertion – the dominant, in this case ‘Aircrew’.
Coupled with this, the inability to ensure that justice is served hampers initiatives and efforts. Cornelia Weiss completed a paper in 2012 on human rights and the rule of law in the NZDF. While encouraged by the NZDF’s operational capabilities, behaviours and attitudes, she was critical of the NZDF’s record in dealing with sexual harassment stating, “Military members, anecdotally and from personal observation, are reluctant to speak out against sexual harassment in the NZDF, given the perception the NZDF is ineffective in addressing it.”628 Two of her recommendations were “Be a gender leader” and “Do not retain those NZDF members who fail to uphold the values of the NZDF.”629
Unsavoury allegations continue to come to light concerning the treatment of women in the military. For example, a senior NZDF officer was suspended from
627 Major General Dave Gawn, “Thirteen percent is not enough”, Army News, June 2013, p. 3. 628 Cornelia Weiss, “Respecting Human Rights and the Rule of Law: The New Zealand Defence Force”, Ian Axford (New Zealand) Fellowships in Public Policy, dated August 2012, p. 20, viewed 10 August 2013, at http://www.fulbright.org.nz/wp- content/uploads/2012/08/axford2012_weiss.pdf 629 Weiss, “Respecting Human Rights and the Rule of Law”, 2012, p. viii. 119 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
duty in April 2013 and in July 2013 was charged with allegedly abusing his power and rank by bullying a female workmate with whom he had allegedly been having an affair. 630 Off the back of this allegation, the Defence Minister ordered an investigation into gender discrimination and the treatment of women in the NZDF.631
The ADF have recently established a new office to assist victims of abuse. It aims to take a victim-oriented approach and will allow the reporting of incidents outside of the chain of command. This has been established post-Commissioner Broderick’s audit of the implementation of her recommendations from her earlier Review into Treatment of Women in the ADF. While finding good progress in many areas Commissioner Broderick declared that there is still some that need addressing, such as the implementation of sexual ethics training because “instances of sexual harassment, behaviour and attitude which are unwelcome, inappropriate or offensive continue to be present.” 632 A recent example of inappropriate behaviour is where a group of ADF male members (self-titled ‘the Jedi Council’) are facing allegations of sexual humiliation and denigration of female serving members. The Australian Chief of Army (who has been working closely with Commissioner Broderick and who is a ‘Male Champion of Change’)633 was quick to publicly decry this behaviour. In a video to his people he stated, “On all operations, female soldiers and officers have proven themselves worthy of the best traditions of the Australian Army. They are vital to us maintaining our capability now and into the future. If that does not suit you then get out.”634
630 He has subsequently been found guilty in a military Court Martial and has been dismissed from Service. It is now under appeal. 631 3 News, ‘Case raises gender issues in Defence Force’, dated 10 July 2013, viewed 10 July 2013, at www.3news.co.nz/defaultStrip.aspx?tabid=213&articleID=304512; The Ministry of Defence research project is titled ‘Maximising opportunities for women in the NZDF’. 632 Elizabeth Broderick, “Review into the Treatment of Women at the Australian Defence Force Academy”, Australian Human Rights Commission Audit Report, July 2013, p. 2. 633 Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Male Champions of Change’, May 2013: A group of influential and diverse male CEO’s and Chairpersons brought together to use their individual and collective influence to ensure the issue of women’s representation in leadership is elevated on the national business agenda, viewed 22 October 2013, at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/male- champions-change. 634 The Sydney Morning Herald, ‘Army Chiefs scathing warning’, viewed 10 August 2013, at http://media.smh.com.au/news/national-news/in-full-army-chiefs-scathing-warning-4489207.html 120 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Unconstructive ideas of power and an overly-masculinised ‘warrior culture’ continue to thwart efforts of full inclusion of ‘Other’, who have borne a disproportionate share of discomfort and conflict. Until these ideas are eradicated and until perpetrators are held fully to account, the full inclusion of ‘Other’ will remain a slow process.
Conclusion
This chapter explored the character of ‘Support Crew’ and discussion drew on two significant investigative Australian Government Reports – the DLA Piper Report and The Broderick Report. Both reports revealed how the ‘warrior culture’ reinforces unconstructive ideas of power and bolsters organisational reluctance to advance cultural change. The two cases of Tailhook ‘91 and HMAS Success were examined, each demonstrating the deleterious effects of a culture and relationships built on the misreading and misapplication of power. The chapter explored the cultural characteristics behind these two significant cases and examined why women are equal in Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, yet not so in the military.
121 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Chapter Six
Conclusion and Recommendations
Good, better, best, never let it rest, ‘til the good is better, and the better is best.642
This thesis makes a constructive contribution to the RNZAF narrative by interrogating the organisational myths which nourish the seeds of risk and underachievement. The investigation was structured around ‘Three Shades of Blue’, a motif representing the interleaved narratives of ‘Aircrew’, ‘Maintenance Crew’, and ‘Support Crew’. The study connected the air accidents, the decline in maintenance standards and the underrepresentation of women in the Service to the unconstructive ideas of power which perfuse Air Force folklore. Challenging the so-called ‘warrior culture’, this thesis exposed the risk associated with its continuance.
The evidence suggests that certain practical changes are incumbent upon the Air Force in order to mitigate causal linkages, that left unchecked could create failure. Some recommendations – ‘practical steps’ – that the RNZAF could consider are included in the following summaries of the key themes explicated in this thesis.
The culture of the military today is a product of the industrial age; a hierarchical system which operates with the deference and structure of a bygone time. 643 Culture influences behaviour, and importantly culture is learned – patterns of thought and behaviour are acquired by socialisation and acculturation. A significant portion of an organisation’s culture lies below the level of consciousness – “it is tacit, not tangible.”644 For this reason, organisational culture is difficult to describe, and difficult to change. When facing threats or failure, the people enmeshed in an organisation’s cultural lattice engage in rationalisation and
642 Scott E. Page, The Difference: How the power of diversity creates better groups, firms, schools, and societies, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2007, p. xxii: Page attributes this saying to Mrs Schad, his favourite grade school teacher. 643 English, Understanding Military Culture, 2004, p. 137. 644 Richard O. Mason, ‘Lessons in Organizational Ethics from the Columbia Disaster: Can a Culture be Lethal?’, Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2004, p.p. 128-42, p. 132. 122 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
denial, resisting change whilst perpetuating established thinking and practice.645
This culture of resistance to reform and change is due in large part to the persistence of long-standing, deeply entrenched and profoundly unconstructive ideas of power. Unsafe and mythologised, unconstructive ideas of power compromise the practice of leadership and overstate the principles of command. Unconstructive ideas of power are entrenched in military doctrine and established in the patterns of military fraternity – ‘the brotherhood’. Practically, this sees dominance masquerading as leadership in everyday life, and unhelpful ideas of power perpetuating and promoting a ‘warrior culture’.
Attempts to change culture often fail because “It's not easy to alter engrained behaviour, even when that behaviour is clearly counterproductive.”646 Therefore, it is imperative that change programmes are designed as a total package, emphasising the requirement of effective leadership. John Kotter in his book Leading Change asserts that successful organisational transformation requires seventy to ninety percent effective leadership, yet organisations traditionally think in terms of managing change.647 Kotter asserts that less management (‘pushing’) and more leadership (‘pulling’) enhances the likelihood of successful cultural change. 648 Leaders effect organisational culture, and their responsibility is to ensure that they have a constructive effect.649 They play a crucial role in shaping and reinforcing culture, by influencing how it develops through what they focus on. The evidence suggests that in order to repair the ‘cracks’ and sustain operational excellence and organisational performance, the RNZAF ought to consider focusing on developing robust doctrine, an appropriate culture, and on empowering its people (see Figure Nine).
645 Mason, ‘Lessons in Organizational Ethics from the Columbia Disaster’, 2004, p. 133. 646 Chris Argyris, Reasoning, learning, and action: Individual and organizational, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1982, p. 5. 647 John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Harvard Business School Press, Boston: MA, 1996, p.p. 26-7. 648 Kotter, Leading Change, 1996, p. 29. 649 Mason, ‘Lessons in Organizational Ethics from the Columbia Disaster’, 2004, p. 131. 123 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Figure Nine
In Chapter Two the concepts and themes that were central to the thesis were introduced and explored. Unconstructive ideas of power, suffusive in doctrine, were seen to find expression in the conversations, which pervade and structure Service life. Organisational culture, social ordering, tribalism and the proclivities of Service life were seen to legitimate doctrinal reasoning. The habits of acquiescence were seen to be causally relevant in the enabling of the normalisation of deviant practice.
Doctrine was established as a cultural artefact that formalises cultural ideas; it was revealed as more than formally written guidance. Doctrine makes a logical mistake – photographs, quotes and vignettes in Leadership in the Australian Defence Force reveal the confusion of the concepts of leadership and command. Unconstructive ideas of power are evident in published doctrine and inexplicit doctrinal ideas that inform Air Force culture. Doctrine’s hidden bias was revealed – the assumption that leadership in the military is invariably masculine. The Scherger vignette was highlighted as Scherger (mistakenly used to portray the character of a leader in Leadership in the Australian Defence Force) is the quintessential pilot – he embodies the masculine, technically proficient, dominant and daring pilot. The doctrinal example perpetuates the myth of masculinity, power and dominance and operates to disguise inappropriate behaviour.
This was a study of organisational culture. David Cannadine’s description of
124 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
dominant social metaphors highlighted how it was that social prestige and status overrode ethnicity and colour. Parallels were drawn between Cannadine’s work and the argument of Nicholas Keijzer, who in his work Military Obedience, described the 18th century military as being one based on status (nobility) and highlights submission. A similar idea was made apparent in reference to the work of Norman Dixon, who addressed The Psychology of Military Incompetence. Dixon revealed inter alia how ideas of social class and status came to overshadow other more important and practical elements of military life. The same phenomena, the overstatement of the figments of cultural elitism, were revealed to be critical to the loss of Czar 52. Drawing upon these cases and events, this thesis explained how the exaggeration of status and cultural hierarchy might entail the elevation of operational risk.
‘Aircrew’ – The Warrior
Exploring the relationship between cultural status and operational risk, this study described how the ‘Aircrew’ myth dominates the cultural narrative of Air Force life, at the expense of maintainers and women. The practical detriment of intangible cultural inequality was seen to lie in the normalisation of deviance and the aggregation of risk. The ‘Aircrew’ meme, obvious in the examples drawn from Flasheart, Top Gun and The Right Stuff, exposed the intricate cultural web of artefacts and myths, which enrich and embellish the meaning in everyday life. The Right Stuff revealed ideas of maleness and masculine courage, and the flagrant violation and disregard of rules and regulations. Technical mastery was seen as key in both Top Gun and The Right Stuff. These films each portrayed the mindset and identity of ‘Aircrew’ that has cultural currency in today’s Air Force.
The power of artefacts and myths, and ideas of masculinity and unconstructive ideas of power were revealed. The accident of Czar 52, a well-known case that highlights unconstructive ideas of power, established the connection of these ideas to individual and organisational failure. The case demonstrates the practical risks which follow from the myth of ‘Aircrew’. Seduced by the flying skill of the pilot in command of Czar 52, senior leaders were blind to intolerable risks. Senior leaders were captured by the myth, and the deeper meaning of organisational
125 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
culture and leadership failure were seen as key enablers of the accident. The prevalence of a culture of the normalisation of deviant airmanship, where rules were flexible and regulations were ignored, created a culture of non-compliance and senior leaders failed to ‘walk the walk’. The same causal factors were apparent in the USAF Sitka 43 crash that occurred sixteen years later, and were revealed as relevant to recent RNZAF accidents. The general cultural resonance of the ‘Aircrew’ myth was exposed. Unconstructive ideas of power serve to increase risk, which supports the central thesis of ‘Aircrew’ demonstrating dominance that has deleterious effects on flying safety, standards in aircraft maintenance and the representation of women in the Air Force.
In order to modify this culture, or at least mitigate the risk that flows from it, it is time to consider giving ‘Aircrew’ an alternative identity, one where they are not trapped in roles dictated by the heavy weight of legacy stereotypes and myths. Recognising that competitive advantage in the future is likely to come from innovation in training, education, personnel management and leadership development, as engines of reform and rejuvenation, military colleges and institutions for learning are critical. 651 They must foster the equity and independence of mind elemental to the conscientious decision and service of men and women in a democracy. Currently, inherited notions of unconstructive ideas of power are reflected in cultural expectation and doctrinal insistence upon instinctive conformance. This approach is borne out in military training, which owes much to indoctrination and little to education. Military culture, doctrine and institutions teach and reinforce myths of ‘Aircrew’ and an ascendant officer class. On the reciprocal of this myth lie expectations of submissive conformance – a part played by women and by those who serve in any ground-based capacity. Service personnel are infantilised by the military fetish for lock-step conformance, by doctrine’s repressive arguments and by the perpetuation of otherworldly fiction. In the Twenty-First Century, the Air Force cannot afford to be seen as a chauvinistic citadel. The nation and the RNZAF must expect more.
651 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2012, p. iii. 126 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Doctrine states that militaries “use development interventions to increase member’s self-esteem and self-confidence.” 652 This suggests that training and education opportunities are conducted in part to aid personal development and sense of self. Yet many military learning institutions operate by the ‘fear of failure, vice taste of success’, where hierarchy, status, discipline and reward (all externally controlled motivators) are prevalent. At the practical level this behoves learning establishments to undergo a philosophical cultural change, whereby ideas of power are demoted, and truly student-centric environments are fostered. Aware of the practice of pre-recruitment training,653 it is acknowledged that this mode of operation may be a sensible practical measure to assist in the management of expectations of people joining the military. It may also offer an opportunity to incorporate and operationalise some of the theoretical ideas identified by this study.
‘Maintenance Crew’ – The Warrior Enabler
Exploring the ‘Maintenance Crew’ allegory, this thesis illuminated ideas of subservience, acquiescence, marginalisation and powerlessness. The thematic analogues of unconstructive ideas of power were revealed in the fixation of organisational hierarchy and procedure, and the disregard of technical expertise. ‘Maintenance Crew’ symbolised the subservience or obsequiousness expected of those who are not ‘Aircrew’. ‘Maintenance Crew’ in all cases were marginalised and powerless, and therefore unable to stem the ‘slippery slide’. Underlying these ideas, discussion surrounding the four accidents pointed to the entrenched normalisation of deviance.
What was revealed was the dominance of ‘Aircrew’. Everyone else was seen to be the out-group or ‘Other’. In part, the cause of the accidents lay in the thinking of subordinates and in their inability to stand up to the dominance and power that exists in strict hierarchical systems, thus ‘Maintenance Crew’ are seen to reinforce
652 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 6-3. 653 The ADF (for indigenous Australians only), the RAF and the USAF run pre-recruitment programs (varied in duration – 3 days to 8 weeks), which aim to prepare people for joining the military. Subjects covered include: basic literacy and numeracy, self-confidence, leadership, teamwork, communication skills, self-discipline, respect for authority and core military values. 127 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
the culture. In the accidents ‘Aircrew’ were seen to make submissive ‘Maintenance Crew’. People were seen as reluctant to speak up and raise their concerns, especially outside of their ‘group’.
Fundamentally, unconstructive ideas of power inhibit sustainable organisational performance. The attitude of perceiving the absence of accident as the absence of risk traps good people; they become desensitised to risk and fail to perceive it for what it really is. Also, a lack of safety leadership and adequate safety focus means the priority is often placed on mission achievement vice safe working practices. The erosion of standards and procedure (normalised deviance) deceives people, and results in the unacceptable becoming routine and normal. Unconstructive ideas of power suffocate effective maintenance cultures and increase the risk of accidents. The false sense of security that a perception of invulnerability invites serves to increase organisational risk. These failures serve to remind us that one can never be too complacent regarding safety culture in a highly complex and high-risk organisation.
In order to ensure that the risk of the degradation of maintenance standards is minimalised, those who have rank must take greater personal control and responsibility for all critical decisions, and senior leaders need to fully understand and comprehend their responsibilities regarding airworthiness. The responsibility they bear includes the requirement for ensuring they engender an environment where people tell the truth, without fear of reprisal. Leaders have a responsibility for ensuring they encourage a culture where “frank and fearless advice is welcomed.”654
Schein’s most recent book Humble Inquiry asserts that communication is essential for healthy organisations and that leaders should practice the art of humble inquiry.655 Concurring with Schein’s premise, senior leaders in the military need to be more skilled at asking; they should “do less telling in a culture that
654 Sea King BOI, 2007, Chapter 21, p. 4. 655 Schein, Humble Inquiry, 2013, p. 21: Humble inquiry is defined as “the fine art of drawing someone out, of asking questions to which you do not know the answer, of building a relationship based on curiosity and interest in the other person.” 128 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
overvalues telling.”656 Senior leaders are often found or seen to be colluding in the maintenance of unconstructive ideas of power and they need to look at how they could change their own behaviour. As Schein asserts, they need to be open to “accessing their own ignorance.”657
Weightier burdens must be borne by those who command: these people must drive reform in military pedagogy and in the doctrine, which underpins the curriculum. Additionally, the NZDF and the RNZAF should develop doctrine espousing a distinctly New Zealand approach to military service, and the amplifying comment and pictures must be inclusive of ‘Other’.
Suffice it to say: framed by doctrinal thinking, the individual moral interactions that populate operational routines and procedures would recognise, that were a commander to create an atmosphere such that people were marginalised, or hesitant or fearful to voice concerns, then the commander would be derelict in a duty, and could be held to account.
‘Support Crew’ – The Non-Warrior
Discussion in Chapter Five was informed by two significant Australian Government Reports – the DLA Piper Report and The Broderick Report. Both reports revealed how unconstructive ideas of power, which are critical to the ‘warrior culture’, underline the organisational defiance of change. The cases of Tailhook ‘91 and HMAS Success demonstrated the damaging effect of a culture that fails to disengage ideas of leadership and success from ideas of power and stature. The character of ‘Support Crew’ was revealed as a powerful signifier for the inherent bias against women in particular, who are seen to support the culture, yet are adversely affected by it.
The cases and reports revealed a clear failing of senior leadership – a systemic failure to respond to transgressions. Sexist prejudice and laddish behaviour flourished where there was cultural decay and a failing in leadership. The tacit
656 Schein, Humble Inquiry, 2013, p. 3. 657 Schein, Humble Inquiry, 2013, p. 34. 129 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
endorsement of abhorrent behaviour sent clear messages. Had leaders responded more decisively, properly bearing the responsibility that their positions dictated, the ‘slippery slide’ into inappropriate behaviour would have been stemmed. Unchecked it escalated, and senior leaders’ unwillingness to intervene, reveals that they too had become trapped by the culture in which they were immersed.
The ‘warrior culture’ reinforces myths and bolsters organisational reluctance to advance cultural change. Recalling Flasheart, Chapter Five revealed the continuance of his legend beyond the tragic resonance of his personality in the loss of Czar 52. The longevity of Flasheart, the lasting power of the myths he burlesques, was most evident in the DLA Piper Report. The examples also revealed a prevalence of sexist prejudice and a culture of denial. The cases of Tailhook ‘91 and HMAS Success revealed numerous incidents of predatory behaviour; women were barely tolerated, they were ‘guests at best’. The cases demonstrated how social ordering and tribalism foment elitist cliques, which then operate to galvanise a pack mentality at the expense of ‘Other’. They illuminated themes which are conspicuous in the RNZAF today. The cultures depicted are characterised by unconstructive ideas of power, and ‘Support Crew’ was revealed as a symbol for the dominance of cliques and disenfranchisement of ‘Other’ – the ‘warrior culture’ inhibits organisational ability to advance cultural change.
It is recognised that greater diversity is required to ensure a sustainable workforce now and into the future. Doctrine acknowledges that modern militaries must be representative of the society they defend, stating that they should “reflect as far as possible the cultural and gender diversity of society.” 658 This highlights recognition by doctrine of how things should be, but as yet are not. The RNZAF, indeed the NZDF, must find ways to break through the barriers that still exist. A Noah’s Ark, ‘two of each kind’ mentality is simply not enough.659 The RNZAF needs to move beyond that, be all-inclusive, and create a culture where ‘Other’ are truly welcomed and valued. A place, where it is not just the written doctrine, rules and policy which accept and embrace diversity, but where everyday actions and behaviour reinforce it.
658 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 5-1. 659 Laura Liswood, The Loudest Duck, John Wiley & Sons Inc., New Jersey, USA, 2008. 130 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The NZDF values teamwork, however the artefacts – performance reporting, which effects promotion/selection systems, and reward systems – are predominantly individualistic in nature. The NZDF espouses equity, diversity and inclusion, but conspicuous artefacts – lack of representation of women at senior levels, the disparity in opportunity for education and experience, and other forms of unwitting indirect discrimination (often predicated on unconscious bias) – suggest that assumptions based on pragmatism and rugged individualism are operating, and therefore determine attitude and daily behaviour.660
In the task focussed, technically complex, interdependent and diverse environment that the military operates in, communication is paramount. The key to effective communication is building mutually respectful and trusting relationships, and the key to relationship building is humble inquiry.661 Senior leaders must treat all people with respect, fairness, honesty and integrity. They ought to be concerned with the development, well-being and progress of all of those they lead. This is about positive role-modelling – a fundamental function of leading people. This should be conducted in a serious, deliberate and selfless manner, so that no-one in the organisation feels devalued, marginalised or powerless.662
This thesis acknowledges that the military approach to leadership works. The military is a potent and powerful instrument, thanks in large part to the practice of effective, directive and essentially strong leadership. However, the military can do better. The way forward will require acknowledgement of mistakes and misreading’s. This thesis makes a useful contribution in this way as it points to the manner in which cultural mores have been misperceived and overplayed.
Currently in the RNZAF, those that bear the responsibility for organisational decision-making are invariably men, and predominantly drawn from the ‘Aircrew’ group. The most senior positions – Chief of the Air Force, the Deputy Chief of Air Force, the Air Component Commander, the Assistant Chief of Strategic
660 Schein, Humble Inquiry, 2013, p. 54. 661 Schein, Humble Inquiry, 2013, p. 62. 662 Pinch, Diversity, in Challenge and Change in the Military, 2006, p. 181. 131 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Commitments and Intelligence, and the Operational Wing Commanders – are filled by men, and each of these men is ‘Aircrew’ and thus an emblem of the prevailing myth. This imbalance needs to be addressed in order to ensure equal access to, and full participation in the ‘power’ structure. Positive action is required. It is time to consider targets; at the very least a “fundamental, comprehensive, ‘disruptive’ approach [is required], so that everyone is placed on the same footing.”663 Investment in women is a requirement, but not as a guilty compensation for past discrimination. Once this gap is reduced and eliminated, there will be no excuse for maintaining the ‘opportunity gap’. The contemporary operating environment requires skill and dexterity, not muscular strength. Diversity of thought is inextricably linked to leadership – it targets inclusive practices and behaviours and it values difference in all its forms. In order to maximise full organisational potential, these ideas and this thinking needs to become the norm and be engrained in the culture. Until this imbalance is addressed, exposing senior leaders to their unconscious biases could prove beneficial, and until there is greater diversity at senior leadership levels, senior servicewomen should be included (not just as an ‘observer’ – they must have a ‘voice’) in all decision-making bodies.
Doctrine asserts that “Individuals destined for strategic leadership roles will not only have had structured opportunities to broaden their professional and formal education but will be exposed to a series of progressive staff appointments,”664 however this is yet to be widely accepted practice.665 A talent management system that identifies and develops personnel for senior leadership roles (not just those from the ‘Aircrew’ group) should be implemented. An expanded talent pool would see “more innovation and creativity, an enhanced organisational image [that is] attractive [to others], and improved satisfaction, morale, performance and productivity.”666
663 Pinch, Diversity, in Challenge and Change in the Military, 2006, p. 191. 664 ADDP 00.6, 2007, p. 4-12. 665 For example, of the 14 NZDF Defence Attache’s/Defence Advisor’s (roles deemed to be important growth opportunities/pathways to future strategic leadership posts), all are male and ten are representatives from the ‘Aircrew’ group. 666 Pinch, Diversity, in Challenge and Change in the Military, 2006, p. 187. 132 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
In order to mitigate the effect of unconscious bias and to ensure promotion and appointment selection systems are open, transparent and equitable, it is recommended that consideration be given to instituting ‘blind’ promotion and selection boards. This will ensure that there can be no accusation of bias and it will absolutely ensure that personnel are promotion cleared and selected for roles based on merit.
At the interactional level, there is a need to identify and change the “system of oppressive relations reproduced in and by social practice.”667 An examination of policy, procedures, work practices, norms, language and other informal patterns of everyday interaction is required. The upshot would be shared commitment, to an unequivocal, inclusive and morally supportable modus operandi. There would as well, be a shared awareness that no one in the Air Force deserves to be second- class. If these recommendations were supported and implemented, the RNZAF, a successful and well-respected organisation with a proud history, will be more successful, safe, and collaborative – a diverse workplace, where all personnel can thrive.
This thesis has established the dangers associated with the unwitting perpetuation of cultural stereotypes and revealed that a ‘warrior culture’ contributes to the unconstructive use of power. This thesis is not about advancing a claim of greater fairness, but rather it invites further scrutiny of common assumptions regarding the hidden, and often-unconscious bias against ‘Other’. For effective organisational performance, these attitudes must be eradicated, firstly by not condoning and accepting such thinking and behaviour, and secondly, by not unwittingly growing and promoting it. If the failures of the past are not learned and practical steps not taken to mitigate the risks, the RNZAF stands to repeat their mistakes, and be ‘kicked by the mule for the second time.’ Awareness leads to choice and the evidence suggests that it is time for the RNZAF to delve a little deeper and search for the hidden bias that may exist, to inspect ‘the barrel’, and to
embrace a culture where all Air Force members are treated with respect and where mistreatment of our people will not be accepted or ignored…to focus on
667 Pinch, Diversity, in Challenge and Change in the Military, 2006, p. 189. 133 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
people and creat[e] a safe, diverse, collaborative and inclusive work environment.668
Absent these recommendations, it is not clear that the RNZAF will remain accident free, that the maintenance culture will maintain high standards, and that women will be represented in higher numbers at senior levels. Without a conceptualised and focused effort, the path to full inclusion will be difficult and the organisation runs the risk of repeating mistakes from the past, negatively impacting operational excellence and organisational performance.
668 Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Defence Force, Australian Government, August 30, 2012, p. 2: Quoting Chief of Air Force, RAAF post the deliberation of numerous cultural reviews. 134 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
GLOSSARY
Authority
Authority is the power to command or right to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience.669
Combat Masculine Warrior
Unconscious basic assumptions truly define the nature of a culture and the military is best characterised as having a ‘combat, masculine-warrior’ orientation.
Command
Command can be defined as “the authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.”671
Compliance
In this thesis the term denotes “ethically passive and unthinking submission”.672
Culture/Organisational Culture
“Culture is a system of collectively held values”673 and is commonly seen as ‘the way we do things around here’.
Doctrine
The fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of their nations objectives. Doctrine is more than formal, written text. It is the
669 Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/authority?q=authority 671 ADDP 00.1, Command and Control, Department of Defence, Australian Government, 2009, p. 1- 2. 672 The Royal Australian Navy Leadership Ethic, 2010, p. 101. 673 Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work Related Values, Sage: Beverly Hills, CA, 1980, p. 224. 135 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
expression of culture and thinking, and some doctrinal ideas are not written down. This thesis understands that doctrinal ideas include the tacit, unwritten ‘rules’ of the organisation.
Ethics
Ethics are the moral principles that govern a person’s behaviour or the conduct of an activity.674
Influence
Influence is the ability “to have an effect on the character, development, or behaviour of someone or something or the power to shape policy or ensure favourable treatment from someone, especially through status, contacts, or wealth.”675
Leadership
Leadership involves influencing, motivating, directing and controlling, and most importantly it requires an ethical component, otherwise the ‘end may justify the means’.
Marginalisation
The social process of being relegated to the fringes; to treat a person or group as insignificant or peripheral.676
Military
674 Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ethics?q=ethics 675 Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/influence?q=influence 676 Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/marginalize 136 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
The military is seen to comprise three Services – Navy, Army and Air Force. Unless otherwise stated, the term is used in this thesis to denote both the Australian Defence Force and the New Zealand Defence Force.
Obedience
Responsible consent and good conscience typify obedience. Obedience involves respect for rules and authority, but it does not involve ethically passive or unqualified submission or the abandonment of moral courage or moral sense.677
Power
Power is defined as “the ability to carry out one's will despite the inertia or resistance of others; it is the ability to influence or control the actions of others even though there is no institutional sanction for this control.” 678
Powerlessness
Powerlessness is the sense that you have no ability, influence, or power.679 It is the thought that your own action will not significantly affect an outcome, or it is a perceived lack of control.
Power over/power with
Genuine power is power with, whereas pseudo power is power over.680 People will comply with authority and orders, but they will find it difficult to commit to a leader, or organisation when things are always done ‘the hard way’. Power over relies on coercion, intimidation, and punishment; it is involuntarily and imposed – people comply with others’ wishes to avoid punishment. It is not a stable type of power and the influencer is not respected. Contrast this with legitimate, voluntary
677 The Royal Australian Navy Leadership Ethic, 2010, p. 107. 678 Communications, American Sociological Review, 1960, p. 731-2. 679 Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/powerless?q=powerlessness#powerless__4 680 Mary Parker Follett, Creative Experiences, Longmans, Green and Co, New York, 1924, p 189. 137 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
and endorsed power – power with. Persuasion and coercion is not required; voluntary followership occurs out of respect for the leader and the leader’s position. This type of power is more stable.681 Power over is the prevailing model in the military. It is embedded in social systems, structures, rules and regulations – it is the predominant culture. Power over is efficient, it helps maintain control, and enhances ego. Power that is exerted through this model can “carry the day regardless of skill, know-how, the rightness of a cause, or the long-term impact on people and their potential.”682 Power with defies efficient standardisation; it takes time and effort. It requires as much emotional intelligence as cognitive intelligence and there is a need to subordinate ego to the collective good – to put service ahead of position, authority and self.683
Stereotype
Stereotypes are used in this thesis to derive deeper meaning. Similar to metaphor, defined as “A figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to a object or action to which it is not literally applicable; a thing regarded as representative or symbolic of something else,”684 stereotypes enhance meaning. In this thesis, the term stereotype is used synonymously with the terms metaphor, character, symbol, and emblem.
681 Larissa Z. Tiedens, ‘Anger and Advancement versus Sadness and Subjugation: The effect of negative emotion expression on social status conferral’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 80, No. 1, 2001, 86-94, p. 86. 682 Tom Terez, Power Over vs. Power With, Workplace Solutions, 2007, retrieved 16 August 2012, at http://www.betterworkplacenow.com/PowerWith-TomTerez.pdf. 683 Terez, Power Over vs. Power With, 2007. 684 Oxford Dictionary, retrieved 13 August 2013, at http://oxfoirddictionaries.com.definition/english/metaphor 138 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
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139 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
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140 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
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141 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
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Theses
Adams, Richard, ‘Strength and Power: Ideas of Moral Autonomy within Australian Doctrine’, University College, the University of New South Wales, 2012.
Duncanson, Claire, ‘Forces for Good? British Military Masculinities on Peace Support Operations’, The University of Edinburgh, 2007.
University Papers
142 Three Shades of Blue: Air Force Culture and Leadership
Bénabou, Roland, Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets, Princeton University, December 2011.
Riessman, Catherine Kohler, Narrative Analysis, Qualitative Research Methods Series 30, A Sage University Paper: Newbury Park, London & New Delhi, 1993.
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Newspaper Articles
Andrews, Louis, ‘ADFA Skype scandal trial set’, The Canberra Times, 28 February 2012.
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Fisher, David, ‘Air Tragedy: email warning’, The New Zealand Herald, 11 September 2012.
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Snow, Deborah, ‘Forced to confront gender divide (again)’, The Canberra Times, 25 August 2012.
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