january 1937

Neutrality and Peace

Halvdan Koht

Volume 15 • Number 2

The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.©1937 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express written consent of Foreign Affairs. Visit www.foreignaffairs.com/permissions for more information. NEUTRALITY AND PEACE

The View of a Small Power

By Halvdan Koht

was HEN the world preparing in ?898 for the first at Peace Conference The Hague, the Norwegian Government as one coun w put forward plank of their a try's program claim to obtain permanent neutrality, this to be all formally recognized by foreign governments. A petition sup was names. porting this program quickly signed by fifty thousand Four in the same claim was years later, 1902, unanimously adopted by the Storting. At that time, however, the union with so Sweden still prevailed, that Norway could not carry on an independent foreign policy; and the Government and the Riksdag of Sweden refused to agree with the Norwegian desire. The question therefore did not appear on the agenda of the Hague Conference nor did it attract attention in any of the international discussions of the day. But the program was in even keeping with the traditions of Norwegian policy, and it to helped strengthen Norway in her struggle to take into her own hands the control of her foreign affairs. was It in those days that the uncrowned king of Norway, the poet-politician Bj?rnstjerne Bj?rnson, put forth the slogan that when the time came for the to set an country up independent foreign office the object of that office ought to be to have no at foreign policy all. Of course, Mr. Bj?rnson, perfect poet too though he was, had much insight in international affairs to a propose such program literally. What he intended was to set himself against the tendency in contemporary politics to seek means of alliances with countries. security by military foreign? In fact, there was a current belief at that time I ? unfounded, am inclined to think that the Swedish Government (and was particularly the King) striving to bring the two United a Kingdoms into defensive alliance with Germany. What Bj?rn son wanted for was absolute He wanted her Norway neutrality. not to take sides in the formation of opposite blocs then pro so to ceeding in Europe, and keep clear of all political rivalries. an He had made himself the champion of the demand for inde pendent Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to

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an provide his country with effective instrument for defending a such policy of neutrality, and he clearly understood that this to or even policy had be accompanied by, founded on, construc tive action for the formation of a universal peace organization. at This attitude taken the opening of the century has been to basic all the foreign policies of Norway since that time. I in essence it think, moreover, that is representative of the politi cal aims of every small country in Europe. Historical conditions more may have implanted them deeply in the mind of the Nor case an wegian people than elsewhere. In any it is impressive fact to a that since 1720, that is say during period of 216 years, seven Norway has had but years of war; and during the last 122 no years Norwegian soldier has had to fight. It may also be taken into consideration that during several centuries the direc tion of Norwegian foreign affairs was in the hands of a govern ment situated outside the country, in Denmark or in Sweden. That condition may have influenced the development of the nation in root many unfavorable ways; but certainly it helped out of the soul or Norwegian any military ambitions any aspira tions for political domination. Norwegians have set their minds on the honorable of achievements peace; their policy throughout has been and is for peace. But the maintenance of neutrality in the world of today raises more more and difficult problems. It already required a remark measure of us to able prudence and balance for escape being drawn into the War of World 1914. You may think of Norway as a on not country the periphery of Europe, directly touched by waves of the European storms; but the fact is that, militarily it is situated on the border line between Great Britain speaking, ? and Germany, and in addition it has a mercantile marine the or ? third the fourth of the world spread over all the seas of both hemispheres, and consequently extremely vulnerable in all cases of disturbance. one can Finally, since the peace of 1919 hardly think of as any country being p?riph?rie. All European countries have been brought into the political unity created by the League. That means a of the change whole notion of neutrality; the problem of remaining neutral has not only become more diffi was cult than it formerly, it has become quite different. In the last of the on Assembly League of Nations, September 28, 1936, the first delegate of the Soviet Union, Mr. LitvinofF, some even spoke with harshness, contempt, of the countries 282 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

war which in face of the dangers of threatening from aggressive Powers "strove to seek salvation in neutrality." He reminded them that the recent lessons of history as to violations even of neutral positions which had been internationally recognized ought to make clear that it was not sufficient to write the word on a "neutrality" frontier. This scoffing tone might have been to were perfectly justified if the countries which he alluded really to a sense planning observe neutrality in the old of the word in case a new war should set the world ablaze. But that sort of neutrality had already become impracticable in essential respects during the World War, and with the organization of the League of Nations it has become absolutely unthinkable. out1 Professor Shotwell has recently pointed the complete reversal of the old ideas of neutrality internationally recognized by the Declaration of Paris of 1856. At that date the rights of were as neutrals defined the privilege of maintaining commerce a war. war with both parties in During the of 1914-1918 the was neutral nations found out that this privilege put under severe restrictions. And the Covenant of the League of Nations an to definitely put end it by laying down the quite opposite rule that all the members of the League had the duty to sever all commercial and other relations with an aggressor. That was the as mem end of neutrality formerly conceived. Now all League bers are bound to come to the assistance of the nation recognized as as having been unjustly attacked, inasmuch they would be to their commerce with this allowed maintain only party. a Since 1919, then, the problem of neutrality is exclusively as military one. But such it still exists. Originally, by the first draft of the Covenant, the victorious Powers of the World War to had intended to bind all members of the League participate in as military coercive measures, later better known "military the state. But the Scandinavian sanctions," against aggressor governments in particular protested against the imposition of new military duties, and the final form of Article 16 of the Cove as to nant left the decision the application of military sanctions to the judgment of each government. One might say that such was case even as the of commercial sanc the regards adoption no common tions, as the said article provided for kind of action mem but left all initiative and responsibility with the individual no bers. In fact, however, government could think of adopting i "On the Rim of the Abyss," Macmillan, 1936, NEUTRALITY AND PEACE 283 must commercial sanctions entirely independently; such action usually be doomed to be ineffective. On the only occasion when was a to measures of there manifest desire put this character into the of the made haste to create a com effect, Assembly League mon organ of deliberation, a "Committee of Coordination." On the other hand, military sanctions might easily be imagined as on independent actions; their efficacy would simply depend so the power of the governments resorting to such action, that to each nation's liberty in this respect would appear be quite real. en Switzerland reserved her neutrality from the moment she tered the League of Nations; and she even succeeded in obtaining a commer recognition of limitation of her obligations in regard to were cial sanctions when, for the first time, they brought into a play in the Ethiopian conflict. The idea of such limitation was put forward by the Scandinavian governments during the first years of the League's existence. Indeed, they succeeded in 11 having it included in the Geneva Protocol of 1924, Article of which introduced the idea that the geographical situation of each country should be considered when enforcing sanctions. I think I am was right in saying that Denmark in particular strongly in terested in seeing this limitation recognized. The deliberations over the Protocol afforded at the same time the only extensive discussion that has taken place inside the League of Nations about the military duties of its members. Con flicting views were expressed. Some delegates asserted that all were or members of the League obliged, ought to be obliged, to even participate in military sanctions. But the delegates of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands firmly maintained that only by their voluntary decision might they become parties on to military actions behalf of the League. In the end their con was tention upheld by the Assembly, the Protocol formally stat was ing that each member pledged to cooperate in the execution so as of sanctions only in far its particular conditions allowed. As the Geneva Protocol was never ratified it is not legally bind re ing. The problem involved may therefore be said not to have ceived any formal solution. But the Powers which then defended use their liberty of judgment regarding the of military sanctions ever have asserted it with unalterable determination since. Only recently (July 1, 1936) the Foreign Ministers of all the northern countries, Finland included, meeting in Geneva with those of a common Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland, published 284 FOREIGN AFFAIRS as declaration to the effect that so long the Covenant of the was a League of Nations applied in defective and inconsistent account way they had to take this fact into in applying the article to regarding sanctions. In particular, they pointed the non-ful filment of the engagement to disarm, thus emphasizing the existence of a close connection between the general limitation of to armaments foreseen by the Covenant and the obligation apply measures an offender. The conclusion be coercive against would were to that if all the provisions of the Covenant be carried into full effect, the small nations named would be willing to fulfil all the duties foreseen therein, but that until such time they were reserving their power of free decision. as an Now, all this may hold good interpretation of the Cove seems nant, and in theory it unobjectionable. But the question not not a involved is exclusively, perhaps primarily, theoretical to one. Of course, it would be of great importance the said Powers to be able to prove that their attitude was consistent with a to to the Covenant if at given moment they should have refuse measures. event cooperate in military But in the that sanctions were to adopted and applied by the League of Nations in order a be than and there al stop war, facts might stronger theories, war ways will be a chance that one might be drawn into the own even against one's wish and will. This possibility is foreseen a of in particular provision of the Covenant the League, which are to prescribes that the members of the League obliged support one "in measures aimed another mutually resisting any special at one of their members by the Covenant-breaking State." The was to atten practical implication of this provision brought the a in the tion of certain number of the League governments when, autumn of 1935, Great Britain addressed herself to all the Medi to terranean countries and their allies, asking them declare come whether they were ready to to the assistance of the British fleet in the Mediterranean if in the fulfilment of its duties in en were forcing sanctions it attacked by Italy. Almost all the govern ments so addressed declared their readiness to act in accord with their under the and some even obligations Covenant; governments to a thought it their duty give similar declaration spontaneously. None of them was called upon to take action in execution of their not attack Great Britain. promise, because Italy did Certainly such an act on the part of the nation hit by sanctions might have to a even the small Powers. led general war, involving NEUTRALITY AND PEACE 285 war was During the Ethiopian it very often said by the oppo-. nents of that even economic sanctions involved sanctions purely a of war for the and this was made an danger participants, argu now we ment for withdrawing from the League of Nations. If are a war entitled to draw conclusion from the experiences of this so with we are forced to (the only experiment, far, sanctions), state do not to war. But that economic sanctions necessarily lead at once it must be added that the experiences of the Ethiopian war not do furnish sufficient proofs in this respect, chiefly be cause were the sanctions applied relatively weak ones, falling far one short of the measures presupposed by the Covenant. Further, was of the parties in the war, the nation which the object of ag was to was gression and which be helped by the sanctions, by its so cut geographical situation completely off from the outside no world that assistance could reach it. For that reason any col lision between the aggressor and the sanctionist Powers was encounters virtually precluded. The danger of military might otherwise have been considerable, and a small country like Nor over way, which sends her ships all the world, might have been at as to as least much exposed the danger any of the big nations. recent seem to have a to Actually, developments tendency wars more ever make likely to become universal than before. We on may discern this tendency clearly in what is going in Spain. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Se?or Alvarez del Vayo, at representing his government the last Assembly of the League wars of Nations, formulated his conception of future in his speech era of September 25. "The of national wars," he said, "the classic war one state form of by the attack of upon another, is steadily war assume vanishing. The of the future, although it may the ap a two a con pearance of conflict between States, will, in fact, be a a flict, collision, clash in the drama of history, between two two two ideologies, mentalities, different conceptions of life. Just as in the of the sixteenth men took sides and Europe ? century for two ideals Catholicism and Protestantism ? fought religious so men be said to be divided two ideals ? today may by political to democracy and oppression." Possibly others would prefer define the opposed ideals by other words, for instance, Commu nism But that not matter con and Fascism. does in the present wars nection. What is important is the conception of of opposed the civil war in ideologies. Manifestly Spain has ranged peoples on in opposite sides accordance with their political sympathies, 286 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

thus continuing, in fact, the movement started by the Russian Revolution. a In such war, neutrality in the old sense is impossible. The at so as authorities may agree to keep hands off, least far military events assistance to any of the parties is concerned. As the have demonstrated, even such a limited neutrality is very difficult to non maintain, and the mutual charges about violations of the come near to intervention agreement have perilously disturbing re the general peace. But apart from the official authorities and gardless of their admonitions, popular sympathy has found ways acts a of of expressing itself by of assistance in large number countries. In the of the classes particular, representatives working have formulated strong demands for the abandonment of neu to as a "fake trality, which, them, appears neutrality." can same Nobody conceal from himself the fact that the classes now of society which oppose the nationalist insurgence in Spain are war. think identifying dictatorship with They believe, and reasons they have strong for believing, that Fascism in Italy and a Naziism in Germany are fostering mentality that almost in to war. see no of evitably will lead They possibility maintaining want to arm neutrality toward such political systems and they themselves them. the most notable event result against Perhaps from this current of was the resolution on ing opinion ? adopted October 6 last, the British Labor a by ? Party against strong minority it is true in favor of rearmament. This remarkable on was change of policy the part of British labor expressly based are upon "the threatening attitude of dictatorships, which in their armaments at an inter creasing unprecedented rate, flouting to national law and refusing cooperate in the work of organizing On the other we hear the of dicta peace." hand, representatives want to torial countries demanding the union of all nations which a maintain what they call the principles of capitalism in struggle The first of the new against "Marxist revolution." very words, von German Ambassador to England, Herr Ribbentrop, arriving there at the end of October, contained a warning of the danger of Communism, resistance to which he described as being in the nearest interest of both countries. we can observe a to Even amongst the small nations tendency and an in wards a division along similar political and social lines, even to war to certain creasing willingness to go defend political ideals. But in these smaller countries any such desires are allayed NEUTRALITY AND PEACE 287 by their sense of military insignificance. In fact, many of them to to have had admit themselves that they would hardly be able own a to defend their independence in war with one of the greater Powers. How, then, could they think of plunging into foreign wars, even for the noblest of causes? If they want to to cause give their support what they think is the of justice, then to means they will have find other for acting than military power. to out war At the present moment, then, the will keep of pre seen vails in all the small countries. We have just it illustrated by on the speech made by the King of the Belgians October 14 last. not People who had observed the trend of Belgian politics very were closely surprised by the royal announcement, and several newspapers (some of them motivated by considerations of party to a a politics) tried give it misleading and sensationalist color. As was matter of fact, it the natural outcome of the changes in Euro pean politics effected by the German denunciation of the Locarno act at Treaties last spring. That struck hardest Belgium, laying bare its eastern frontier. Since that event, the Belgian Govern ment to has been forced reconsider the country's position, and a for couple of months in advance of the King's speech it had been clear that they contemplated abandoning their alliance with more or to France and reverting less their prewar policy. This was really the purport of the proclamation of October 14. It did not mean a to not and it could reversal the old neutrality; there was no or idea of retiring from the League of Nations of deserting the duties imposed by the Covenant. But Belgium, like Poland on not the other side, could help realizing the dangers of its situa tion between two great and hostile Powers. The Locarno Treaties had seemed to remove that danger. Now it presented itself again, even more threatening than before, and the Belgian Government became convinced that the alliance with France, far from averting even the danger, might increase it. "Our policy must solely aim," the King declared, "at placing us outside the quarrels of our war our neighbors and keeping from territory." Such must be in fact the policy of all small states. Even before the there was a rumor about a movement Belgian proclamation ? among the smaller states to form a block alluded European ? to as a neutral bloc as a to non-military counterweight the major Powers. The increasing prestige and influence of this bloc was seen at the Assembly of the League of Nations this past when it autumn, succeeded in upholding the general principles of 288 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

as to international justice opposed the considerations of political opportunism urged by most of the great Powers. The events of this Assembly furnish sufficient evidence that the so-called neu no tral bloc has idea of abandoning international action in sup port of universal law. But it is also evident that the small nations no so united have intention of letting themselves be drawn into wars or which, in the last resort, might endanger destroy their own independence. The importance of the Belgian announcement lies in the fact that it signifies Belgium's adherence to the group of states which are determined to resist tendencies to divide Eu two rope and the world into hostile camps, whether the dividing are or lines determined by ideologies by the competition for a a power. Such division would lead fatally to new universal war. It must be openly admitted, however, that thus defined the states a new policies of small inevitably raise problem. If the small states declare themselves or unable to unwilling accept or military obligations for purposes of international justice peace, the question arises whether it is safe to leave the military defense of the principles of the League of Nations to the great Powers alone. That seems to be the only alternative. But I think it fair to a to a say that such delegation of power limited group of strongly armed states will awaken much distrust all around in the world. In the various conflicts that have occurred inside the League of we seen Nations have the great Powers acting in furtherance of own a to their interests. Nobody has right reproach them for pro nation tecting their interests; every has that duty. But it has been disillusioning to the small states to see how often the question of the balance of power has influenced the great nations when they must make decisions regarding the maintenance of international to a extent law. This disillusionment accounts great for the resolu so states not to tion of many small take any part in military even to measures, those destined defend the general peace. we a Today listen with certain degree of skepticism when the great Powers talk about the duties of collective security, because a cover we see them using it as for defensive alliances which are similar to the alliances of uncomfortably military? prewar days. I would not the or even the ? deny possibility perhaps probabil ity that honest purposes of peace lie at the base of such alli ances, and if they could be firmly linked up with the essential rules of the League of Nations they might be expected to serve the can a peace of the world. But when they embrace only small num NEUTRALITY AND PEACE 289 ber of the great Powers themselves, the dangers they provoke are more than the afford. apparent security they a state can never Generally speaking, small put its trust in Recent events have made us rather incredulous military power. wars to war. to even about stop We have reasons, too, fear that are not means to ensure armaments the best peace. Therefore, we when discuss the problem of peace and the reform of the of we are not inclined to rearmament League Nations, emphasize and military measures. Article 16 does not appear to us the most we important part of the Covenant. On the contrary, think much more war con of the articles regarding the prevention of through ciliation and peaceful action. Here lay the real purport of the summer proposals formulated last by each of the Scandinavian governments. All of them asked for stronger League activity to conflicts as a means to that more in prevent and, end, elasticity so as to the interpretation of the rules of the Covenant enable use the League to make better of its powers of mediation. one seems to me In the Covenant there is article that particu use an larly adapted for in the furtherance of active peace policy. That is the article which authorizes the Assembly of the League "from time to time to advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." It is astonishing that are members of the who announce there League solemnly that an as they would regard such action by the League hostile, and who protest against it with all their power. One might think that all the articles of the Covenant would be equally sacred to all the members. Instead, one finds that the mere mention of this article a (Article 19) is like putting one's hand in wasp's nest. In my opinion, hardly any other article in the whole Covenant is of such as this because it affords the of tak importance one, opportunity to ing up for peaceful discussion all the problems liable engender international conflicts. It seems to me essential in the work for at root peace to take the possible elements of conflict the and try to settle them before they have ranged nations against each other a seem to or in passionate fight for what them vital interests ques tions of honor. By proceeding in that way the League of Nations a truer more may become and powerful instrument of peace, and the need for military measures will gradually lessen. The small have no nations greater hope. Neither have the great Powers.