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Russian Public Opinion 2012 2013 LEVADA ANALYTICAL CENTER «FROM OPINION TOWARD UNDERSTANDING » RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION 20122013 ANNUAL Moscow 2013 THE ANALYTICAL CENTRE OF YURY LEVADA (“LEVADACENTER”) Russian Public Opinion – 20122013. M.: LevadaCenter, 2013. – 205 pp. This twelfth edition of the annual “Russia Public Opinion 20122013” continues a series of publications which present the main findings of sociopolitical and socioeconomic research conducted on the basis of mass surveys. Published materials that previously appeared in periodicals are available on our web pages. Compiler and person responsible for the edition N. Zorkaya Formatting, layout –E. Tsvetkova Involved in preparation of materials N. Bondarenko, L. Gudkov, M. Krasilnikova, M. Plotko. © LevadaCenter, 2013 2 CONTENTS Page Preface .....................................................................................................5 1. Public opinion about the year 2012 ...................................................6 2. Public sentiments, expectations........................................................13 3. State and society.................................................................................18 3.1. Russian identity...........................................................................18 3.2. Russian prospects ......................................................................22 3.3. Russia and democracy ...............................................................26 3.4. Society .........................................................................................28 3.5. Political participation ..................................................................29 3.6. Citizens and the power ...............................................................32 4. Estimate of the actual economic situation........................................42 5. Living standard of Russian population .............................................47 5.1. Living standard of Russian population .....................................47 Index of consumer attitudes........................................................51 Ideas about levels of poverty ......................................................52 5.2. Personal savings.........................................................................53 6. Estimates of social problems and employment ...............................56 Evaluations of social problems ........................................................56 Social sentiment index ......................................................................58 Social sphere......................................................................................60 Taxes ...................................................................................................61 Employment........................................................................................62 Unemployment ...................................................................................65 Pension and pension reform.............................................................66 Social protests ...................................................................................67 7. Rating the performance of social institutions...................................70 7.1. Healthcare....................................................................................70 7.2. Education .....................................................................................74 8. Government institutions .....................................................................76 8.1. Overall assessment of institutions............................................76 8.2. Prime minister .............................................................................80 8.3. Putin President, Prime minister and President again..............81 8.4. Government .................................................................................87 8.5. State Duma ..................................................................................89 “Special” laws 2012......................................................................90 “Foreign agent” ............................................................................91 8.6. The Army......................................................................................93 8.7. Military service ............................................................................94 8.8. The law enforcement bodies......................................................97 Police...........................................................................................100 Magnitsky case...........................................................................102 9. Elections...............................................................................................104 9.1. Follow up to State Duma elections ...............................................104 9.2. President elections.....................................................................…107 3 Page 10. Political parties ...............................................................................111 «United Russia» .............................................................................112 Election law ....................................................................................112 11. Protest movement and opposition................................................113 “Bolotnaya square case” ..............................................................116 Persecution of opposition.............................................................117 Alexey Navalny...............................................................................120 Pussy Riot Trial ..............................................................................121 12. Authorities and business ...............................................................124 Trial of M. Khodorkovsky and P. Lebedev in YUKOS case........124 13. Corruption and corruption scandals among the top officials ....128 A. Serdyukov’s resignation...........................................................129 14. Constitution, Russian laws and human rights .............................131 15. Mass media .....................................................................................133 Television........................................................................................135 Internet............................................................................................137 16. Religion............................................................................................140 Religion and society ......................................................................142 The Lent and Easter.......................................................................148 17. Family...............................................................................................149 Family problems.............................................................................149 Leisure ............................................................................................150 Relationship in the family..............................................................153 18. Interethnic relations .......................................................................154 Nationalism.....................................................................................156 19. Chechnya and the Northern Caucasia..........................................160 20. Acts of terror in Russia ..................................................................164 21. Russia and the CIS countries........................................................167 Belarus............................................................................................168 Ukraine ............................................................................................169 Georgia ...........................................................................................171 South Ossetia and Abkhazia.........................................................172 22. Russia and the world .....................................................................173 Russia and the West......................................................................178 Middle East .....................................................................................179 Iran ..................................................................................................180 Syria ................................................................................................181 Russia – the USA ...........................................................................184 Russia and international organizations .......................................186 23. Memorable dates ............................................................................189 24. Celebrations ....................................................................................201 4 PREFACE The current edition of the annual “Russian Public opinion – 20122013” is the twelfth successive issue. Provided in it are the results of research into public opinion obtained in 2012, for questions, which are regularly asked, we have also added data trough August 2013. The findings of the research that were regularly published in specialised and mass publications are available on our web pages. The materials incorporated in this edition of the annual, from research led up to the end of August 2003, were obtained and published by FSUE VCIOM. In September the entire staff at VCIOM transferred to ANO (autonomous nonprofit organisation) the analytical Service of «VCIOM» (VCIOMA).
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