Introduction: a Great Reversal?
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Notes Introduction: A Great Reversal? 1. In their Die Xenien (1797) Schiller and Goethe have some verses which appear to be satirizing a Kantian moral conscience as plagued by the fact that “Gladly I serve my friends, by alas I do it with pleasure”, whereupon it decides that its only resource is “to despise them entirely, and then do with disgust what your duty demands” (Carus, ed., pp. 122–23). If really directed at Kant himself this badly misrepresents his view that the source of an action’s moral worth can most easily be perceived in cases where duty is followed in spite of the subject’s discomfort, which neither implies, nor was taken by Kant to imply, that there is anything necessarily morally compromising in enjoying what duty bids us do. 2. See the Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 114–17 [110–13] and 128–35 [124–31]. 3. Ameriks speaks of Kant’s “great reversal” in Ameriks 1982, p. 226. 4. Julian Young (2005, p. 35) so describes the quest to defend “Kant’s elevated conception of practical reason” after noting with apparent approval Schopenhauer’s view that to think immorality or amorality is inherently irrational is “just silly” and reminding us that Schopenhuaer would have cited Jesus Christ (“a paradigm of rationality?”, Young, p. 35) and Machiavelli (“a paragon of virtue?”, Young, p. 35) as obvious counterexamples. Now there is no doubt that Schopenhauer, like Hume, tended to regard practical irration- ality purely as a matter of failing to take means to gain ends acknowledged as such by the agent, rather than a failure to perceive non-instrumental reasons for not pursuing those ends in the first place (though why that should particularly cast doubt on Christ’s rationality remains unclear to me). Even so, by Schopenhauer’s and Young’s own reckon- ing, citing Christ and Machiavelli is irrelevant here, since this could at best suggest that moral virtue is not a matter of the ability to undertake ordinary instrumental reasoning, whereas the point at issue was Kant’s claim that practical reason involves far more than any such capacity. In any case, I shall be attempting to defend Kant’s view that, as Young (Ibid. p. 34) summarizes it, “there are certain ends, specifically the ends of morality, that one has to have purely in virtue of being rational” without following him in positing spe- cial non-empirical, transcendental ends of “pure” reason whose practical force is entirely independent of our natures as instrumental reasoners. That is, I shall maintain that the crucially overlooked option here is that it is possible for one’s own nature as an instrumental reasoner whose ends are given only empirically to be such as to ensure that one has a reason to be moral irrespective of any specific such ends that oneself or others may possess. While Kant, therefore, may have over-elevated practical reason, a position of mid-elevation, some- where above Hume’s and Schopenhauer’s conception of it, was available to him and can, I shall argue, be the basis of a defence of the categoricality of his moral law that has recog- nizably Kantian bite in its implications for moral theory. 5. Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism holds that space and time and causation, as well as various other very fundamental aspects of the world we experience, are not fea- tures of things as they are in themselves, which he also called “noumena”, but only of “phenomena”, that is, things as they appear to subjects of consciousness. Hence, though empirically real they are transcendentally ideal. While broadly consistent with this doc- trine, my reconstruction of Kant will not positively presuppose it, and will therefore hopefully have a potentially broader appeal on that account, though something of it will survive in the ontological duality of universal and particular that is crucial to my argument. 388 Notes 389 6. Wood (2008, p. 134) has opined that “we do not necessarily have to see Kant as chang- ing his mind” between the Groundwork and the second Critique. 7. The terminology is Kant’s own, as we shall see, but there is an element of over-simpli- fication if not outright distortion in using it to mark the distinction I make in the text. Wood, for instance (2008, pp. 124–7), in effect ascribes to Kant the view that what I term “practical freedom” is “practical freedom in the negative sense” and implies that he regarded as positive practical freedom what I term “transcendental freedom”. I follow Allison’s usage mainly on the grounds that it registers a bit more sharply the philosophical distinction I want to get at, but there is no denying that Kant’s actual employment of these terms developed in a rather messier and more complicated way, as Allison’s own (1990) account makes amply clear. 8. Kant argues for this “Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of Causality”, more commonly referred to as “the second analogy”, in chapter II of The Analytic of Principles” which constitutes Book II of that “first division” of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled Transcendental Analytic”. 9. See Wood (2008, p. 138): “We should believe we are practically free – but we are not justified in holding any beliefs about the noumenal world in connection with this. In short, once the idea of noumenal freedom has played its role in the fictional narrative that shows freedom to be logically consistent with natural law, it should thereafter be quarantined from Kantian ethics just as strictly as if it carried the plague.” 10. Thomas Scanlon tells Alex Voorhoeve that “you might say ‘I’m Kant on the cheap’ ” at the end of her interview with him for The Philosophers’ Magazine (Autumn 2001, Issue 6) entitled “Kant on the Cheap”. I might add that no form of moral realism which pos- its special, irreducibly moral properties could, in my view, constitute a legitimate way of avoiding the charge of metaphysical cheapness I have in mind – an issue to which I shall return in the final chapter. 11. Michael Rosen, begins his review of Wood’s Kantian Ethics (TLS, 17th October, 2008) by attributing to Derek Parfit the division of “Philosophers who study the history of philosophy” into “archaeologists and grave-robbers”, and remarks that “As with most good jokes (and everything that Parfit has to say) this bears thinking about”. 12. One thinks of Crispin Wright’s verdict that “Kripke’s book, whatever its shortcomings as philosophical scholarship, seems to me to be superior as philosophical interpreta- tion” (Wright 1989, p. 298). Wright is comparing Kripke’s treatment of Wittgenstein here with that of McGinn (1984). 13. Schopenhauer’s principal work The World as Will and Representation is still frequently dismissed as fundamentally incoherent on account of starting out from the Kantian claim that all knowledge is knowledge of phenomena and then, apparently forgetting this Kantian premise, telling us that the thing-in-itself is will – an identification which in any case is held to be clearly incompatible with Schopenhauer’s own conception of salvation by denial of that very same will. Young has claimed that Schopenhauer’s main argument for the identification rests upon a confusion between two senses of “representation” that “is, in fact so bad as to constitute a sufficient ground for failing ‘Kant 101’ ” (Young 2005, p. 92). That is, I fear, only a particularly egregious instance of an all-too-typical tendency, at least among English-language philosophers, to write off prematurely, or badly to underestimate, the core metaphysical insights Schopenhauer has to offer us. Things have somewhat improved in this respect over the last couple of decades, but a book that really measures up to Schopenhauer’s philosophical achieve- ment has yet to be written. 1 Justifying Morality 1. Cf. Basil Mitchell (1980, p. 122): “There are, of course, good utilitarian reasons for the existence in all societies of a general prohibition upon taking life, since a society which 390 Notes lacked this restriction would be unlikely to survive for long. So it finds its place in Strawson’s ‘basic social morality’ and Hart’s ‘minimum content of natural law’. But this sort of justification is compatible with attitudes and practices which must be abhorrent to any sensitive conscience. Societies have survived which treated the lives of foreigners as of comparatively little account, and slavery as an institution has flourished through- out the centuries. To kill the weak and the old may even promote survival. Indeed, the very emphasis upon the preservation of society as a reason for respecting human life can easily result in subordinating the individual’s life to the interests of society where this is thought to be necessary.” (I think that by “utilitarian” here Mitchell really means to refer to a certain kind of consequentialism since what is in question is a certain mini- mum level of social stability, not happiness maximization). The phrases Mitchell asso- ciates with Strawson and Hart belong respectively, to the former’s 1961 and the latter’s 1961. Mitchell goes on to quote Kenneth Dover’s verdict, in his study of Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (p. 158) that whereas this sort of subordina- tion to a function or a purpose was, for the Greeks, the source of an individual’s moral value, by contrast “In Western Europe and America a great many people have become accustomed for a very long time to regard the law and the state as mechanisms for the protection of individual freedom” an attitude which, Dover adds, “has been reinforced by Christian emphasis on the individual’s relation to God” and which means that “We do not take kindly to the notion that there is no religious, moral or domestic claim on the individual which has precedence over the community’s claim on his efforts to pro- mote its security and prosperity vis à vis other communities”.