Introduction: a Great Reversal?

Notes

Introduction: A Great Reversal?

1. In their Die Xenien (1797) Schiller and Goethe have some verses which appear to be satirizing a Kantian moral conscience as plagued by the fact that “Gladly I serve my friends, by alas I do it with pleasure”, whereupon it decides that its only resource is “to despise them entirely, and then do with disgust what your duty demands” (Carus, ed., pp. 122–23). If really directed at Kant himself this badly misrepresents his view that the source of an action’s moral worth can most easily be perceived in cases where duty is followed in spite of the subject’s discomfort, which neither implies, nor was taken by Kant to imply, that there is anything necessarily morally compromising in enjoying what duty bids us do. 2. See the Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 114–17 [110–13] and 128–35 [124–31]. 3. Ameriks speaks of Kant’s “great reversal” in Ameriks 1982, p. 226. 4. Julian Young (2005, p. 35) so describes the quest to defend “Kant’s elevated conception of practical reason” after noting with apparent approval Schopenhauer’s view that to think immorality or amorality is inherently irrational is “just silly” and reminding us that Schopenhuaer would have cited Jesus Christ (“a paradigm of rationality?”, Young, p. 35) and Machiavelli (“a paragon of virtue?”, Young, p. 35) as obvious counterexamples. Now there is no doubt that Schopenhauer, like Hume, tended to regard practical irration- ality purely as a matter of failing to take means to gain ends acknowledged as such by the agent, rather than a failure to perceive non-instrumental reasons for not pursuing those ends in the first place (though why that should particularly cast doubt on Christ’s rationality remains unclear to me). Even so, by Schopenhauer’s and Young’s own reckon- ing, citing Christ and Machiavelli is irrelevant here, since this could at best suggest that moral virtue is not a matter of the ability to undertake ordinary instrumental reasoning, whereas the point at issue was Kant’s claim that practical reason involves far more than any such capacity. In any case, I shall be attempting to defend Kant’s view that, as Young (Ibid. p. 34) summarizes it, “there are certain ends, specifically the ends of morality, that one has to have purely in virtue of being rational” without following him in positing special non-empirical, transcendental ends of “pure” reason whose practical force is entirely independent of our natures as instrumental reasoners. That is, I shall maintain that the crucially overlooked option here is that it is possible for one’s own nature as an instrumental reasoner whose ends are given only empirically to be such as to ensure that one has a reason to be moral irrespective of any specific such ends that oneself or others may possess. While Kant, therefore, may have over-elevated practical reason, a position of mid-elevation, some- where above Hume’s and Schopenhauer’s conception of it, was available to him and can, I shall argue, be the basis of a defence of the categoricality of his moral law that has recog- nizably Kantian bite in its implications for moral theory. 5. Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism holds that space and time and causation, as well as various other very fundamental aspects of the world we experience, are not features of things as they are in themselves, which he also called “noumena”, but only of “phenomena”, that is, things as they appear to subjects of consciousness. Hence, though empirically real they are transcendentally ideal. While broadly consistent with this doctrine, my reconstruction of Kant will not positively presuppose it, and will therefore hopefully have a potentially broader appeal on that account, though something of it will survive in the ontological duality of universal and particular that is crucial to my argument.

388 Notes 389

6. Wood (2008, p. 134) has opined that “we do not necessarily have to see Kant as changing his mind” between the Groundwork and the second Critique. 7. The terminology is Kant’s own, as we shall see, but there is an element of over-simpli- fication if not outright distortion in using it to mark the distinction I make in the text. Wood, for instance (2008, pp. 124–7), in effect ascribes to Kant the view that what I term “practical freedom” is “practical freedom in the negative sense” and implies that he regarded as positive practical freedom what I term “transcendental freedom”. I follow Allison’s usage mainly on the grounds that it registers a bit more sharply the philosophical distinction I want to get at, but there is no denying that Kant’s actual employment of these terms developed in a rather messier and more complicated way, as Allison’s own (1990) account makes amply clear. 8. Kant argues for this “Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of Causality”, more commonly referred to as “the second analogy”, in chapter II of The Analytic of Principles” which constitutes Book II of that “first division” of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled Transcendental Analytic”. 9. See Wood (2008, p. 138): “We should believe we are practically free – but we are not justified in holding any beliefs about the noumenal world in connection with this. In short, once the idea of noumenal freedom has played its role in the fictional narrative that shows freedom to be logically consistent with natural law, it should thereafter be quarantined from Kantian ethics just as strictly as if it carried the plague.” 10. Thomas Scanlon tells Alex Voorhoeve that “you might say ‘I’m Kant on the cheap’ ” at the end of her interview with him for The Philosophers’ Magazine (Autumn 2001, Issue 6) entitled “Kant on the Cheap”. I might add that no form of moral realism which pos- its special, irreducibly moral properties could, in my view, constitute a legitimate way of avoiding the charge of metaphysical cheapness I have in mind – an issue to which I shall return in the final chapter. 11. Michael Rosen, begins his review of Wood’s Kantian Ethics (TLS, 17th October, 2008) by attributing to Derek Parfit the division of “Philosophers who study the history of philosophy” into “archaeologists and grave-robbers”, and remarks that “As with most good jokes (and everything that Parfit has to say) this bears thinking about”. 12. One thinks of Crispin Wright’s verdict that “Kripke’s book, whatever its shortcomings as philosophical scholarship, seems to me to be superior as philosophical interpretation” (Wright 1989, p. 298). Wright is comparing Kripke’s treatment of Wittgenstein here with that of McGinn (1984). 13. Schopenhauer’s principal work The World as Will and Representation is still frequently dismissed as fundamentally incoherent on account of starting out from the Kantian claim that all knowledge is knowledge of phenomena and then, apparently forgetting this Kantian premise, telling us that the thing-in-itself is will – an identification which in any case is held to be clearly incompatible with Schopenhauer’s own conception of salvation by denial of that very same will. Young has claimed that Schopenhauer’s main argument for the identification rests upon a confusion between two senses of “representation” that “is, in fact so bad as to constitute a sufficient ground for failing ‘Kant 101’ ” (Young 2005, p. 92). That is, I fear, only a particularly egregious instance of an all-too-typical tendency, at least among English-language philosophers, to write off prematurely, or badly to underestimate, the core metaphysical insights Schopenhauer has to offer us. Things have somewhat improved in this respect over the last couple of decades, but a book that really measures up to Schopenhauer’s philosophical achieve- ment has yet to be written.

1 Justifying Morality

1. Cf. Basil Mitchell (1980, p. 122): “There are, of course, good utilitarian reasons for the existence in all societies of a general prohibition upon taking life, since a society which 390 Notes

lacked this restriction would be unlikely to survive for long. So it finds its place in Strawson’s ‘basic social morality’ and Hart’s ‘minimum content of natural law’. But this sort of justification is compatible with attitudes and practices which must be abhorrent to any sensitive conscience. Societies have survived which treated the lives of foreigners as of comparatively little account, and slavery as an institution has flourished throughout the centuries. To kill the weak and the old may even promote survival. Indeed, the very emphasis upon the preservation of society as a reason for respecting human life can easily result in subordinating the individual’s life to the interests of society where this is thought to be necessary.” (I think that by “utilitarian” here Mitchell really means to refer to a certain kind of consequentialism since what is in question is a certain minimum level of social stability, not happiness maximization). The phrases Mitchell asso- ciates with Strawson and Hart belong respectively, to the former’s 1961 and the latter’s 1961. Mitchell goes on to quote Kenneth Dover’s verdict, in his study of Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (p. 158) that whereas this sort of subordina- tion to a function or a purpose was, for the Greeks, the source of an individual’s moral value, by contrast “In Western Europe and America a great many people have become accustomed for a very long time to regard the law and the state as mechanisms for the protection of individual freedom” an attitude which, Dover adds, “has been reinforced by Christian emphasis on the individual’s relation to God” and which means that “We do not take kindly to the notion that there is no religious, moral or domestic claim on the individual which has precedence over the community’s claim on his efforts to promote its security and prosperity vis à vis other communities”. 2. Cf. Warren Quinn (1993, pp. 44–7), who after noting “the common division of morality into what are often called the spheres of “justice” and “benevolence” (though he remarks that “these particular headings can be misleading”) writes “I follow a Kantian tradition in thinking that one important part of morality is made up of constraints on our behaviour toward others that spring from our recognition of others as mature agents on an equal moral footing with ourselves. The fundamental attitude underlying virtuous action of this type seems to be respect for what can be thought of as the moral authority of others”. However, after recognizing this, as he terms it, morality of respect, he goes on to acknowledge the independent importance of another “relevant area of morality” (Quinn is discussing “Abortion: Identity and Loss”) which “is quite different and, in one way, much easier to understand. The constraints that arise in it are not grounded in the will of others but in consideration of the good and evil that our actions may do them. Since the basic motivation of virtuous action here is concern for the well-being of others, I shall call this the morality of humanity”. 3. Such individual departures from a broadly Kantian morality need to be added to the sort of institutional shortcomings that Mitchell cites as being compatible with a high degree of social order. These also need not greatly matter functionally; but they matter profoundly to the moral consciousness whose justification we are attempting. I shall discuss later a vivid fictional example: the case of Judah, from Woody Allen’s film Crimes and Misdemeanours. 4. From his poem “The Second Coming”, written 1919–20. 5. This is the title of Book One of The Will to Power, published in 1901, the year after Nietzsche’s death. While the authenticity of this work is still the subject of much controversy, what is not controversial is that Nietzsche thought Europe faced a crisis of nihilism brought about by the death of God, which, famously, he announced in his parable of the madman in Book Three of The Gay Science (first edition published in 1882). For a useful discussion of what Nietzsche understood by nihilism, and how he thought the demise of serious belief in God would encourage it, see Reginster (2006). 6. Beyond Good and Evil (sec. 257). 7. Moral realism holds moral statements to be both truth-apt and such as can be known to be true. If the truth of a moral statement is held to consist in its tracking a judgment-independent moral fact then the realism in question will be an instance of Notes 391

what Christine Korsgaard (1996, p. 35) calls “substantive realism” and Miller 2003 (Introduction) calls “strong cognitivism”. Otherwise the realism will be “procedural” (Korsgaard) or weakly cognitivist (Miller). That is, it will suppose that there are correct answers to moral questions because there are correct procedures for answering them, but not that the correctness of those procedures is itself certified by tracking independent moral facts (see Korsgaard 1996 pp. 36–7). Classic statements of non-cognitivism are Ayer’s 1946 (chapter 6) defence of emotivism and Hare’s defence of prescriptivism (1952 and 1981). A quasi-realism theory is developed by Blackburn 1984, 1993 and 1998. Moore 1903, Prichard 1912 and 1929 (repr. in Ross and Urmson, 1968) and Ross (1930) are commonly known as (strongly cognitivist) intuitionist, non-naturalist realists; more recently McDowell has defended a highly influential form of non-naturalist (substantive) realism in various essays collected together in his 1998. Railton presents an argument for (substantive) naturalist reductionist realism in his 1986. A very useful overview of all these varieties of meta-ethical theory, their merits and defects, is given by Miller 2003 (Introduction), which has separate chapters devoted to (amongst others) Ayer and Moore, Blackburn, Railton and McDowell. 8. It is her sound allegiance to this principle that prompts Korsgaard (1996, p. 39) to declare: “And that is the problem with realism: it refuses to answer the normative question. It is a way of saying it cannot be done. Or rather, more commonly, it is a way of saying it need not be done.” By “the normative question” she means effectively the question of why we should adhere to the PMA. By “realism” she has in mind the substantive non-reductive, “intuitionistic” realism of Moore and Prichard. Hussain and Shah (2006) have taken her to task for this on the grounds that she here allegedly mixes up two very different issues, namely the tenability of normative realism as a meta- ethical theory which addresses the question of (i) what our normative claims mean (e.g. whether they involve a referential semantics), whether they involve given metaphysical commitments, whether and/or how they can be known to be true, and (ii) the issue, which belongs to normative moral theory, of whether and/or how such claims can be “placed” or “located” “within practical reason”. (2006, pp. 267–9). According to them, her conflation of these different issues causes Korsgaard “to misunderstand the aims of Prichard and Moore’s meta-ethical views and to reject them on the spurious grounds that they fail to answer questions within normative ethics”. (2006, p. 270.) It would seem, however, that Hussain and Shah have themselves misunderstood Korsgaard’s principal point here when they go on to say that “whatever one thinks of [Prichard’s] response to the question ‘why be moral?’, it expresses a position about the status of morality within practical reason and does not by itself commit him to a position about the semantics, metaphysics, or epistemology of moral judgment”. (Ibid.) This gets the matter precisely the wrong way round. Korsgaard’s objection to Prichard is not that his moral foundationalism with regard to the normative question commits him to a realist meta-ethical account of moral claims, but rather that his brand of meta-ethical realism commits him to a form of moral foundationalism that prevents him from being able to say anything helpful in answer to someone for whom the normative question is genuine and pressing. For in supposing that moral claims involve commitment to the simple, sui generis, unanalysable property of moral goodness (in the case of Moore) or to intrinsically normative, underivable moral obligations (Prichard), these philosophers make it impossible to “place morality within the space of practical reasons” in the sense of saying anything at all by way of rationally persuading the T-Egoist that such claims should ever override the demands of egoistic practical reasons, or indeed of how there can be any categorical moral reasons at all. All they can ultimately offer to anyone who wonders how there can be such reasons, or who fails to see why these should ever override the reasons grounded in their own desires or needs, is that they just do. Furthermore, she wants to insist that the inability of a meta-ethical theory to contribute an answer to the normative question must, given the normative force we normally suppose to be carried by moral claims, be regarded by anyone who accepts 392 Notes

such claims as, pro tanto, a deficiency in that meta-ethical theory in a way at least makes reasonable the attempt to find an alternative account that does better in this regard. This aspect of her approach will surely not be challenged by anyone whose moral starting-point is at least broadly Kantian in the sense I have explained, that is, whose respect for persons as such, i.e. as rational beings, will entail a preference, other things equal, for an account of the basis of morality capable of reaching and rationally persuading the T-Egoist, if someone with this starting-point also supposes that TE is an intelligible and not obviously unreasonable stance. That this supposition is justified is what I shall argue next. 9. Cf. Railton (1986): “It would be hard to make much sense of someone who sincerely claimed to have certain ends and yet at the same time insisted that they could not provide him even prima facie grounds for action. (Of course, he might also believe he has other, perhaps countervailing grounds).” William James (1956, p. 195; orig. 1897) makes essentially the same point, though more emphatically: “Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make. Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied? ... Any desire is imperative to the extent of its amount. It makes itself valid by the fact that it exists at all.” After conceding the possibility of arguing for James’s view on the grounds that unsatisfied desires involve frustra- tion, which is unpleasant, and that there is always “a presumption in favour of mini- mizing unpleasantness” Frankfurt (1998, p. 112) nevertheless cautions that this only shows at most “that there is a prima facie case against the desirability of any state of affairs in which someone has an unsatisfied desire”, which “differs substantially from a presumption in favour of the satisfaction of the desire, because a satisfied desire is not the only possible alternative to a frustrated one ... a person also avoids frustra- tion when ... he gives up or loses his desire without satisfying it.” (Ibid.). In effect, then, Frankfurt seems prepared to acknowledge at most the inherent rational force of instrumentalism as a consistency principle – what I called “IP-2” in my earlier discussion of Darwall. But this seems weak. Certainly if a desire is what Frankfurt elsewhere in the same paper (“Necessity and Desire”) calls a “voluntary desire” that simply reflects someone’s decision to pursue something, then ditching it might provide a ready alternative to pursuing its satisfaction. But many desires are impulses or inclinations that are involved in being alive at all. A creature who wants to carry on living must thus regard them as generating prima facie reasons to pursue the means of satisfying them. There would only be a defeating condition of all such prima facie reasons if it were better not to exist at all – but even then, as we shall see shortly in our discussion of Darwall’s attack on Default TE, it is obscure what appeal that Schopenhauerian view could have for someone otherwise than on the basis of their non-voluntary desire to avoid the stress and suffering bound up with being a creature who has first-order (non-voluntary) desires. 10. Williams (1985, p. 34) implicitly makes a similar point when, commenting on the Socratic view that the good man cannot be harmed by bodily injuries, he remarks that “It is a problem for this view that, in describing ethical motivations, it takes a very spiritual view of one’s own interests, but the subject matter of ethics requires it to give a less spiritual view of other people’s interests. If bodily hurt is no real harm, why does virtue require us so strongly not to hurt other people’s bodies?” 11. As Richard Norman (1998, p. 106) has put it, Mill’s argument here is as “entirely fal- lacious” as “the argument that, if each husband ought to love his own wife, every husband ought to love everyone else’s wife”. 12. See Norman pp. 103–4 who, after quoting from Utilitarianism (IV.1) where Mill makes it clear that his strategy is to appeal to our experiences of desire as sources of evidence for what is desirable in the way that we appeal to our senses as evidence for what is visible, illustrates the point thus: “one normally convinces people that something is visible by appealing to their experience of seeing it, and if this experience consistently supports the claim, it provides the best evidence we could possibly have. Similarly, if one wants Notes 393

to convince people that something is desirable as an end in itself, the appropriate way of doing it is that they do in fact desire it.” And if, we may add to complete the thought, their experience consistently supports this claim by failing to yield any desires whose fulfilment clashes with the desire in question, then, as Norman notes, while “This will not, strictly speaking, prove that it is desirable” it will provide, as Mill says, “all the proof which the case admits of, and all of which it is possible to require”. Similarly, according to Wood (2008, p. 89) Mill’s assumption is that “when we form preferences, set ends, and make decisions” this is “best understood” as way of ascribing to ourselves “judgments of ultimate value” – not because no other explanation is logically possible but because this is “the most reasonable way of understanding what we are thinking and doing”. 13. Hobbes writes “But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evil ... For these words of Good, Evil ... are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves ...” (Leviathan Part I, chapter VI, p. 120). According to Spinoza “we endeavour, will, seek, or desire nothing because we deem it good; but on the contrary, we deem a thing good because we endeavour, will, seek, or desire it” (Ethics Part Three, Proposition IX Scholium). 14. See Miller (2003 chapter 9, sec.8) for a defence of this analysis of non-moral good from certain objections raised by Sobel (1994). 15. For classic responses to this view of morality as being significantly more undecidable in accordance with agreed standards than, say, the sciences, see Bambrough (1979) (esp. Chapter 2) and Putnam 1981 (esp. “Fact and Value”). 16. Two of the most prominent twentieth-century attacks on non-reductionist moral realism (published, as it happens. in the very same year) are Gilbert Harman’s “Argument from Explanation” (see Harman, 1977, chapter 1) which contends that irreducible moral properties cannot figure in the best explanations of our moral responses (these being provided, rather, by our moral feelings or sensibilities) and John Mackie’s ‘Argument from Queerness’ (see Mackie 1977, pp. 38–42) according to which such properties, conceived of as categorically prescriptive would be unac- ceptably strange and mysterious entities. Both seem ultimately to rely on the per- suasiveness of the “Argument from Motivation” which Hume stated in his Treatise of Human Nature (Book III, Part 1, Section 1) thus: “Morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.” By “reason” here Hume is standardly taken to mean just our cognitive faculty, and more specifically beliefs (though see Noonan 2007, pp. 148–9 for the view that in fact Hume himself “did not accept the Humean theory of motivation” thus construed, and that “his thesis that reason alone never motivates is thus not a thesis about the inefficacy of the products of reasoning – beliefs – but rather about the inefficacy of the process of reasoning”). The connection with Mackie’s argument is particularly clear since Mackie explicitly repudiates the intention of arguing that categorically prescriptive moral facts are “queer” simply on account of offending the canons of classical empiricism. He objects instead to the idea of any end or goal having “to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it” (Mackie 1977, p. 40) in a way which suggests that what he really finds problematic is the thought that moral “facts” might furnish action-guiding reasons in the absence of some grounding in our desires of the sort Hume too is standardly taken to be arguing must be present and which TE insists is the precondition for our having any reasons to do or pursue anything. That the debates surrounding Hume’s argument have been so intense and apparently irresolvable in itself suggests that TE cannot simply be dismissed as unreasonable or arbitrary. See Goldman (2010) for a recent restatement of the case for “reasons-internalism”. 17. See Prichard (1912) reprinted in Ross and Urmson (1968). 394 Notes

18. Williams (1985, p. 32) makes a related point about the ethical outlook of Plato and Aristotle when he notes that while “Their outlook is formally egoistic, in the sense that they suppose that they have to show to each person that he has good reason to live ethically; and the reason has to appeal to that person in terms of something about himself, how and what he will be if he is a person with that sort of character” nonetheless they do not “try to show that the ethical life serves some set of individual satisfactions which is well defined before ethical considerations. Their aim is not, given an account of the self and its satisfactions, to show how the ethical life (luckily) fits them. It is to give an account of the self into which that life fits.” Hume’s stress on our capacity to be motivated altruistically by feelings of natural benevolence based on sympathy owes much to Francis Hutcheson, whose Illustrations of the Moral Sense (Part II of his An Essay on the Nature and conduct of the Passions and affections with illustrations on the Moral Sense of 1728) is quoted at length by Korsgaard (1996, p. 64) to demonstrate her contention that Hume “got this idea of normativity” (i.e. of justifying moral normativity on the basis of what she calls “reflective endorse- ment”) from him. 19. See especially Hume (1978, pp. 581–2), where he likens the naturally variable strength of our sympathetic reactions to the variable appearances unchanging objects present to us, and suggests that just as we allow for the latter by correcting in the light of reflection based on our knowledge of perspective so, in the moral sphere, “In order to ... arrive at a more stable judgment of things”, we fix on some general and steady points of view, and always in our thoughts place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation.” 20. Hare (1981) presents a classic defence of such two-level consequentialism. Williams in effect anticipated this move when he followed up immediately on the passage just quoted by complaining about the idea “that the processes of practical thought are transcendental to experience and do not actually take up any psychological room. But in fact to think one way rather than another about what to do is to be empirically different, to be a certain kind of person. And it is not possible to combine all kinds of reflection with all kinds of disposition. Utilitarians neglect this to some extent at the level of the individual, but they have made a speciality of neglecting it at the social level, supposing that there could be an élite of utilitarian moral thinkers who possessed an esoteric doctrine unknown to others, without there being specified any form of social organization to make this structure a social reality”. 21. In Book II, Part I, Section XI (p. 317) entitled Of the Love of Fame Hume appeals to a sympathy-generating process according to which my idea of the outward effects of “affections” in another gets converted into an impression “that acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produces an equal emotion, as any original affection.” It seems clear, however, that he cannot really mean that last remark to imply that I “experience” the emotion of others as strongly as they do, or as strongly as my own emotions, since as he goes on to explain ‘Tis evident, that the idea or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that ‘tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, according to the foregoing principles; and tho’ this relation shou’d not be so strong as that of causation, it must still have a considerable influence. Resemblance and conti- guity are relations not to be neglected ... Now ‘tis obvious that nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human creatures ... and that resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others, and embrace them with facility and pleasure”. That by a “like vivacity of conception” Hume does not mean an “equal” degree of vivacity should be sufficiently indicated by his later (Ibid. p. 487) – and surely questionable – claim that “each person loves himself better than any other Notes 395

single person”. The qualification “single” here, interestingly, suggests that Hume may be wanting to accommodate within his account the possibility of self-sacrifice for the sake of a number of others, whose less than total resemblance to the self when taken severally might nonetheless generate, within the terms of that account, a degree of vivacity in combination greater than that of any single affection otherwise experi- enced by that self. But the point remains that for a reflective Humean it is hard to see how there could be a corresponding overridingly strong reason to act on such a self- sacrificial drive inasmuch as the overwhelming vivacity of the affection prompting such a noble inclination itself derives from that very vivacity with which we experience our own persons – a vivacity beyond which, Hume has already told us, we cannot imagine anything of greater strength. 22. This is not to exclude, however, the possibility of a perfectly coherent divine command theory of moral obligation, as opposed to the sort of moral goodness or badness that corresponds to the existence of moral reasons. The issue – and the bearing of Kant’s views on the issue – is actually much more complicated than might be apparent from a consideration of much contemporary discussion of this issue, which often appears to assume that a simple application of the Euthyphro Dilemma can quickly dispose of all forms of moral divine command theory. 23. Nor, relatedly, as Williams (1985, pp. 5–6) has noted, can it be assumed that when an agent asks the question “What should/ought I (to) do?” or “What is the best way for me to live?” or “What I have I most reason to do?” then we must first disambiguate the question, and decide whether what is being asked for is a moral or a non-moral or egoistic sort of reason/should/ought/bestness/goodness and so on. In his words: “The analysis of meanings does not require “moral” and “nonmoral” as categories of meaning. Of course, if someone says of another “He is a good man”, we can ask whether the speaker means that he is morally good, as contrasted, for instance, with meaning that he is a good man to take on a military sortie – but the fact that one can give these various interpretations no more yields a moral sense of “good” or of “good man” than it does a military sense (or a football sense, etc.). 24. Quoted by Williams (1985, p. 62). The quote comes from Stirner 1982 (orig. 1845) p. 128. 25. This is the title of an influential book of Nagel’s, published in 1986. 26. It’s all very well setting out, in Rawls’s own description of his project, to “detach [the force and content of Kant’s doctrine] from its background in transcendental idealism” so as to respect “the canons of a reasonable empiricism” (Rawls, 1977, p. 165) but not if, as in the case of the view he thence arrives at, we only succeed in leaving it utterly obscure why we should regard ourselves as the “unencumbered selves” of the original position, and thus why we should embrace the principles of justice that we would, according to him, agree upon in such a situation. The phrase “unencumbered selves” is used by Michael Sandel (1984) in the course of his characterization of the Rawlsian aim as being “to preserve Kant’s moral and political teaching by replacing Germanic obscurities with a domesticated metaphysic more congenial to the Anglo- Saxon temper” (p. 18; Avineri and de-Shalit, 1992). What is particularly interest- ing, however, is that Sandel’s description of Kant’s “strange foundation for a familiar ethic” (Sandel, 1984, p. 17) seems to presuppose a reading of him that is very sug- gestive of the reconstruction I shall be proposing (I am grateful to my colleague Iain Law for bringing this to my attention). Sandel writes (Ibid. p. 16): “The moral law, after all, is a law we give ourselves; we don’t find it, we will it. That is how it (and we) escapes the reign of nature and circumstance and merely empirical ends. But what is important to see is that the ‘we’ who do the willing is not ‘we’ qua particular persons, you and me, each for ourselves – the moral law is not up to us as individuals – but ‘we’ qua participants in what Kant calls ‘pure practical reason’, ‘we’ qua participants in a transcendental subject.” 396 Notes

2 Groundwork III: An Enigmatic Text

1. Allison (1990, p. 214) describes the Groundwork as “one of the most enigmatic of the Kantian texts”. 2. It can easily look like Kant’s focus in Groundwork III is primarily upon establishing the possibility of the freedom necessary for us to be capable of being bound by the moral law, and upon exhibiting the necessity with which, as rational agents, we must regard ourselves as free, or in other words that his focus here is upon showing that our freedom is a practical postulate for us qua rational deliberators, and not upon showing that freedom is a sufficient condition for being governed by the moral law, this latter being something he takes himself to have established by the end of Groundwork II. This interpretation can be encouraged by a cursory reading of the end of Groundwork II and by the fact that much of Groundwork II concentrates upon invoking the first Critique’s distinction between the “two standpoints” from which we can regard ourselves, i.e. as phenomena or appearances and as noumena, what we are in ourselves and not just as we appear to ourselves – which would certainly be consistent with supposing that Kant is chiefly concerned to show that our apparent unfreedom when regarding ourselves as phenomena does not exclude the possibility that we are free as noumena. Moreover, Kant can sometimes be read as though he thinks he has already, in Groundwork II, shown that our freedom would be enough to bind us to the moral law. See again e.g. Gr. 4:445 quoted earlier where Kant says he has now established that autonomy of the will is “unavoidably bound up with” morality as its “very foundation”, which might seem to support Paul Guyer’s view that Groundwork III simply continues “the analytic project of Section II, still trying to prove that the conception of free and rational agency really does give rise to the categorical imperative” (Guyer, 1998, xxxix). If that were so then, once again, we should have to see the distinctive contribution of Section III as restricted to securing the theoretical possibility and practical necessity of freedom But I believe Seiriol Morgan (2005, n.6) has succinctly explained why this is a mistake. As he has put it: “... Kant was never trying to show in Groundwork 2 that a free agent is rationally committed to morality. Rather, he was trying to show that moral action requires acting on the categorical imperative, and that the categorical imperative presupposes autonomy of the will. It is true that the early pages of Groundwork 3 contain an argument which is purely analytic, but the concepts under analysis in the two sections are different; in Groundwork 2 it is morality, in Groundwork 3 it is freedom. Admittedly, Kant thinks that the two concepts reciprocally imply one another. But this biconditional is something he needs to demonstrate, and it seems that nothing he says in Groundwork 2 is intended to do so.” Section II, in other words, gives us the implication going in one direction, from morality to freedom, but it is only in Section III that we are given the implication that goes in the other direction. That may not be all Section III does, by any means, but it does at least also do this in a way that would make no sense if Kant’s overall objective there were not as we have described it. 3. The “ought implies can” principle is, in effect, stated by Kant in the first Critique thus: “For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place.” Equally, an “ought implies can not” principle seems to be implied by his claim at Gr. 413/38 that imperatives (ought statements) “say that something would be good to do or leave undone; only they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it has been informed that this is a good thing to do”. 4. See Korsgaard (1996, pp. 226 ff.). We shall see in the next chapter that Korsgaard builds on this observation to extract a more impressive, though still ultimately unsuccessful, argument from (1)–(3) to (5) than I am countenancing here. Of course, Kant goes significantly beyond Hume in the Critique of Pure Reason by arguing that the necessity of the causal nexus, while not itself observable, is nonetheless grounded in the impossibility of our making any objective judgments about our experience without bringing it under the category of causal law. Notes 397

5. Aune (1979, pp. 29–30, 86–9) and Wood (1974 and 1990, pp. 135–6, 161–7) read Kant as mounting what I have called the “short-cut” argument, and both in effect urge its insufficiency for the reason just given, as do Harman (1977, pp. 76–7) and Norman (1998, pp. 85–7), though they make no serious attempt to interpret Kant himself as actually offering the argument. 6. Allison (1990, p. 217) notes that Kant’s preparatory argument for the freedom of rational agency is “quite close to the brief anti-fatalism argument, which [he] mounted in his ‘Review of Schulz’s Theory of Ethics’ (8: 14), published shortly before the Groundwork. 7. Interestingly, Schopenhauer does not take the possibility of deliberating about whether to commit suicide to constitute such a ground since he claims (WWR I, p. 398) that “The suicide wills life and is dissatisfied merely with the conditions on which it has come to him. Therefore he gives up by no means the will-to-live, but merely life, since he destroys the individual phenomenon”. Where genuine denial of the will-to-live is involved, however, Schopenhauer thinks there is no longer any question of deliberation, rational or otherwise (see WWR I, esp. pp. 403–4). 8. The question of whether we are “subject to” categorical imperatives in the sense of having, just qua rational agents, moral reasons to act, seems to be quite distinct from the question of whether such reasons are binding in the sense of being automatically overriding or obligatory. 9. Allison (1990, p. 206). He continues “In fact, not only does Kant not attempt to deduce the moral law from this concept, but he also explicitly rejects the possibility of doing so. This is because Kant realized that for all we can learn from its ‘mere concept’, practical reason might involve nothing more than the capacity to determine the best possible means for the satisfaction of one’s desires”. Allison cites in support a footnote from Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (6: 26n; 21). 10. This ambivalence is what we should expect if, as we saw Allison claiming earlier, it was only in the second Critique that Kant became explicitly clear about the distinction between the two forms of freedom and therewith potentially sensitive to the ambiguity of formulations like “independent of determination by causes in the sensible world” which recur throughout Groundwork III.

3 The Second Critique

1. Beck (1965, pp. 202–4). For the distinction between and a fact of and a fact for reason see Beck (1960, p.168 and 1965, pp. 210–11). 2. “Analytic” as it occurs in the title of Book 1 of Part One of the second Critique contrasts with the “Dialectic” of “Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason” which is the title of Book 2 of that Part, not with “synthetic” as a methodological term. The contrast intended is the substantive one holding between the two chief parts of the first Critique, the first, “Analytic” part of which deals with metaphysics as the legitimate study of the a priori principles governing experience, followed by the “Dialectic” which treats of what Kant considers to be the illegitimate projection beyond experience resulting in traditional metaphysical claims about matters such as God, the soul and immortality, which are supers-sensible and so (according to Kant) beyond the bounds of possible knowledge. In the case of the second Critique, however, such claims are rehabilitated as “postulates of practical reason”, directly necessary for the applicability of the moral law itself (in the case of freedom) or, Kant argues, for the attainability of an end – the “highest good” in which happiness is proportioned to moral virtue – that morality itself requires us to strive for. 3. Ibid. As Allison explains (1990, pp. 129–30) “Although it is already operative in the Critique of Practical Reason and plays a major role in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant first officially formulates this crucial distinction in the Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals” – published 12 years after the Groundwork. 398 Notes

4. This is primarily because the meta-principle of acting on a “law” which Korsgaard describes in the passage quoted from her publication (1996, p. 98) as the “categorical imperative” that is constitutive of free choice is not in fact, as we shall see, really the moral law as Kant understands this. 5. Korsgaard (1996, p. 98). See also page 220 of the same work where she says that “since the categorical imperative tells us to choose a maxim that has the form of a law, and that is what an autonomous will by its very nature must do – it must choose a law for itself”. 6. Hard, but not necessarily impossible – I am far from wanting to deny outright that cognitive defects may be the expression of a morally culpable character, but the case would need to be made out convincingly in detail. 7. Sidgwick (1907, bk1, chapter 5, sec. 1), echoed by Nagel (1986, p. 237), urges that Kant faces a serious problem in accounting for responsible immoral action. Kant attempts to deal with the problem in Book 1 of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone where it seems that he holds the source of imputable evil to lie in a free act of one’s Willkür to sub- ordinate to self-interest the moral dictates of one’s Wille. However, as we shall see shortly, nothing Kant says in this later work convincingly pre-empts Sidgwick’s criticism. 8. Korsgaard (1996, p. 220). Since, as we noted earlier, Korsgaard goes on to distinguish explicitly between the moral law and the categorical imperative, she is not, like Allison, really stuck with the problem of imputable immoral action that afflicts Allison’s defence of the Reciprocity Thesis; but she still has no real way to justify describing as a categorical imperative in Kant’s sense the principle she claims he could justifiably have maintained to be constitutive of autonomous choice. 9. Sidgwick (1907, Appendix 1), distinguishes between a morally normative conception of freedom, what he calls “Good” or “Rational” freedom on the one hand, and the “Neutral” freedom with which one must be said to freely choose between good and evil on the other, complaining that Kant’s use of “freedom” is insufficiently sensitive to the difference between the two conceptions. One might suggest that there is a related normative/non-normative ambiguity in Kant’s use of the phrase “standing under” when he speaks of rational wills as standing under the moral law. 10. See, for example, Rel. 6: 29; 24 where he distinguishes a propensity from a pre-disposition as something which “can be regarded as acquired (if good) or brought by man upon himself (if evil)”. Morgan (2005) attempts to give the “missing formal proof of humanity’s radical evil” Kant evidently thought was possible (but unnecessary in view of the “multitude of crying examples which the experience of the actions of men puts before our eyes”, Rel. 6: 33; 28) by keeping more firmly in his sights than Allison (1990, pp. 152–9) the need to show how this follows from our natures as free rational wills, arguing that we try to affirm our spontaneity by embracing an ideal of lack of restraint in indulging “anything and everything” we might will, and so refuse any constraint on this posed by the wills of others, thus reflecting in a certain way what is indeed the negative aspect of freedom as Kant characterizes this, namely the absence of determination of the will by alien causes. As Morgan himself notes, however, this fetishization of “outer freedom” is a distorted, partial and thus “erroneous representation” (2005, p. 79) of freedom which overlooks its positive dimension as autonomy in the sense of self-government by a law of pure reason (the moral law). It thus represents what is, in Morgan’s own words, a “tragic blunder” (p. 83). Yet that brings us back to the question of how one can be morally responsible for a mistake. 11. Allison (1996, p. 117). He cites Gr. 4: 424; 91 and Rel. 6: 35–6; 31. 12. See Rel. 6: 38; 33 where Kant says this “radical perversity of the human heart” involves “deliberate guilt (dolus)” and “a certain insidiousness of the human heart (dolus malus) which deceives itself in regard to its own good and evil dispositions”. 13. See Geuss’ “Morality and Identity” in Korsgaard (1996, pp. 192–3), where he cites Schlegel’s Lucinde and “Fragmente” and Hegel 1821, section 140. One thinks also here Notes 399

of the insistence of Dostoyevsky’s man from the underground that “What a man needs is simply and solely independent volition, whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead” (1981, p. 34). 14. Korsgaard acknowledges (pp. 98–9, Ibid.) that she here makes a distinction not made by Kant himself. 15. See Gr. 4; 436 where he describes these as “three modes of presenting the principle of morality” that “are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law”. That is not, of course, to deny that these are indeed significantly different presentations of the moral law, or that the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends is in some ways the fullest and most explicit such formulation. 16. For Kant’s motivational agnosticism see especially the MM 392 and 447. Allison himself mentions Kant’s “familiar doctrine of the ineliminable uncertainty regarding our own motivation” (1990, p. 176) and recalls this (1990, p. 240), in the course of offering his defence of the second Critique approach to the justification of the moral law. On pages 158–9 he stresses the role played by systematic self-deception in Kant’s account of “radical evil” in Rel. (6: 29–30; 24–5, 6: 37; 32 and 6: 38; 33).

4 Rational Nature as an End in Itself?

1. Paton 1948 refers to it thus in his own (sub-) section headings. Denis (2005, Introduc- tion), and also Korsgaard (1996) and Wood (2008), call it the “Formula of Humanity”. 2. Kant did not himself, of course, have Schopenhauer (an unknown teenager when Kant died in 1804) in mind at this point, but most probably the view of the ancient Cynics (as noted by Wood 2008, p. 90). Nor, it should really go without saying, is he endorsing that view insofar as this actually advocated eradicating one’s desires, and thus by implication that they possessed no extrinsic value either. According to Wood (Ibid.) “We capture Kant’s real views here if we expand what he says a little: “Our inclinations themselves are so little of absolute worth, to be wished for in themselves, that there was even an influential school of ancient ethics that taught that the best means to happiness was to be entirely rid of them”. 3. I here use Frankfurt’s (1998, p. 16) account of a “second-order volition” as not just a second-order desire (to have a given first-order desire), but a second-order desire that one of one’s first-order desires be one’s will i.e. be the desire one acts on. 4. Darwall, after noting that Korsgaard in her 1996a (pp. 259–62) advances a “Regress Argument” for the FEI that is vulnerable to the criticism that “It is not logically necessary that the condition of a thing’s value be valuable itself, either conditionally or unconditionally” (he cites Kerstein 2001 and Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen 2000 as having advanced this objection) goes on to treat her 1996 argument, which he terms her “Practical Identity” argument, as a development which evades the objection (though susceptible to others). 5. This point is also made by Cohen in Korsgaard 1996 (p. 185). 6. Railton himself (in his 1986, p. 175) describes this “reduction basis” as “the constella- tion of primary qualities that make it be the case that [an agent] has a certain objective interest”. He elaborates the point in connection with his example of a traveller, Lonnie, having an objective interest in drinking clear liquids, and not milk (as he in fact desires to do) in order to overcome his dehydration: “That is, we will say that Lonnie has an objective interest in drinking clear liquids in virtue of this complex, relational, dispo- sitional set of facts. Put another way, we can say that this reduction basis, not the fact that Lonnie-Plus [Railton’s term for idealized Lonnie who has full information] would have certain wants, is the truth-maker for the claim that this is an objective interest of Lonnie’s. The objective interest thus explains why there is a certain objectified interest, not the other way round”. 7. Wood here has a footnote (no.4) referring to Korsgaard (2005, pp. 92–3). 400 Notes

8. This point about the demonstration of the unconditional value of truth in its own right requiring a demonstration not just that truth is worth having, but that it is worth having just qua a truth, seems to me to be the Achilles heel of the ‘retorsive’ argument for the good of truth as an instrinsic value on a par with that of life itself that is presented by John Finnis in his paper ‘Scepticism, Self-Refutation and the Good of Truth’ (in Hacker and Raz, 1977). It is not that Finnis’s argument fails to establish that denial of the good of truth is in a certain sense (as he puts it) “operationally self-refuting”, but that this fact alone cannot automatically impugn, as Finnis wants it to, the view of H.L.A. Hart that (as Finnis summarizes it) “knowledge is more disputable ... as an aspect of the good for man than survival.” (Finnis 1977, p. 248) The problem arises with what Finnis himself (Ibid., p. 262) describes as “the crucial step” of his argument, according to which “I assert that p” entails ‘I believe that truth is ... worth knowing’ ” which he derives from: “ ‘I assert p’ entails ‘I believe that p is worth asserting qua true’ ”. The difficulty is not with the claimed entailments but rather with the fact that until Finnis can show why it is solely qua truth that I must find any p that I assert to be worth asserting, then he cannot show, contra Hart, that truth is valued for itself alone, and not merely as an aid to achieving some other end (in this case survival). 9. Finnis notes that “Augustine conjoined with his well-known ‘Si fallor, sum’ [if I am in error then I am] the further claim that one is secure from the arguments of the Academic sceptics, not only in respect of ‘we are’ and ‘we know that we are’, but also in respect of ‘we love to be and to know that we are’ – which, being translated out of Augustine’s terminology of ‘love’, is to say: we are secure in affirming that our life is of value, and our knowledge of it likewise. But he makes no attempt to work out any explicit argument for this” (Finnis 1977. p. 257). Finnis cites Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, XI. 6.). Finnis himself, it may be worth adding, is not attempting to defend the Kantian view that only rational nature is an end in itself (if only as a capacity for knowledge of the truth), claiming rather that “both life and truth are instrinsically, underivatively, fundamentally good, and there is no priority, ranking, or hierarchy of the fundamental forms of the human good” (1977, p. 249).

Part II How Kant Should Have Justified His Categorical Imperative

1. Schopenhauer, 1958, p.113. The account of the basis of morality Schopenhauer himself built on this principle, with its emphasis upon compassion as a form of intuitive insight into the identity in all phenomena of the metaphysically primary and fundamentally non-rational nature of “Will”, apparently diverges – and was certainly taken by Schopenhauer himself to diverge – sharply from the ethical rationalism that must characterize any moral philosophy properly describable as “Kantian”. But there is no need to comment at this stage on the significance of the deeper metaphysical and epistemological differences between Kant and Schopenhauer for the purpose of exploring how the former might in this respect have structured his grounding of morality in the same way as the latter. In any case, as the argument develops it will emerge why I think that much more convergence between their moral philosophies is possible than Schopenhauer himself evidently believed. 2. This follows by contraposition from Kant’s “second analogy” principle according to which, in effect, all phenomenal events must be causally predetermined. Why the phrase “phenomenal event” is not simply pleonastic in this context will be explained in Chapter 6

5 From Rational Agency to Freedom

1. One might be tempted to try to reconcile Premise (I) with Kant’s epistemology by suggesting it is only because the freedom that he really wanted to reach via his Notes 401

preparatory argument was the absolute spontaneity of transcendental freedom, and thus a form of freedom belonging to the intelligibelen Welt as opposed to the “merely” relative spontaneity of the Verstandeswelt, that his more cautious formulation was appropriate, since only the former (which, it will be recalled from Chapter 2, is the noumenal world positively conceived as more than merely what is non-sensible) would be something his own doctrines would preclude him from claiming knowledge about. And since I am proposing now to develop the preparatory argument solely to establish practical freedom, involving only the kind of relative spontaneity that is possessed by something Kant tells us a great deal about in the first Critique, namely the Understanding, then it might seem that Premise (I) does not conflict with the necessary limitations on our knowledge of the noumenal Kant really wants to insist upon. As against that, however, he repeatedly stresses that we can have knowledge only of appearances/phenomena in a way that does seem, in conjunction with his second analogy principle, to preclude our right to claim knowledge of any kind of indeterminism. 2. This is a neo-Kantian view, not a view of Kant’s, because, as Wood (2008, n.5 pp. 290–1) notes, “Kant is not in agreement with those approaches [Wood goes on to cite Korsggard and Bok] that think we are to regard ourselves as free only from the ‘standpoint of the agent’ or the ‘first person’ ”. Wood makes the case by quoting Gr. 447, which tells us that “It is not enough to ascribe freedom to our will, on whatever ground, unless we have sufficient reason for attributing the same reason to all rational beings as well”. Certainly it is not enough if one’s aim is to ground morality in our respect for others as bearers of freedom. Wood also quotes the passage from Gr. 448, which I shall, in a moment, give in the main text. 3. Bok has a footnote here which refers us Gr. 448 and Korsgaard (1996a, pp. 162–3). 4. In his Review of Shulz’s Attempt at an introduction to a doctrine of morals Kant employs this Epicurean argument against the unrestricted fatalism propounded by J.H. Shulz, in a way that clearly echoes the preparatory argument of Groundwork III: “Although [Shulz] would not himself admit it, he has assumed in the depths of his soul that understanding is able to determine his judgment in accordance with objective grounds that are always valid and is not subject to the mechanism of merely subjective deter- mining causes ... ; hence he always admits freedom to think, without which there is no reason.” (Ak. Vol. 8, p. 14. Wood, 2008, p. 131 quotes this passage from Kant’s book review and I follow his translation here). How that “hence” might be justified is, of course, the crucial question we shall be investigating in the present chapter. 5. See my 2003b. I shall return the problem of bodily action in Chapter 7. 6. See, for example, Schopenhauer’s attack in the Appendix to WWR I pp. 480–8 on the principle which according to Kant (KPR A497/B525) is at the root of “the whole antinomy of pure reason”, namely: “If the conditioned is given, the entire series of all its conditions is likewise given.” Kant himself, of course, also criticizes the use of this principle as a tool for the demonstration of the existence of an uncaused cause or a God, but he agrees that the demand for an unconditioned is essential to the nature of reason, as an Idea which sets it the task of completing the series of conditions, whereas Schopenhauer denies that the demand is really made by reason at all in a way that requires “a critique of reason by means of antinomies and their solution” (WWR I p. 483). 7. Actually, our starting point could be the even more minimal “There are judgements” since as will emerge in Chapter 8 – see esp. n.5 on Williams’s 1978 discussion of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am) – the truth-aimedness and thus inherent consistency-sensitivity of thought requires the relativization of judgements to the “thought-world” of a single thinking “I”. Such an ultra-minimal base-point is, however, hardly required for the purpose of justification of morality primarily directed at total ego-ism. 8. The following section summarizes arguments I have developed more fully in Walker (1996, 1998 and 2001a). 402 Notes

9. For a classic statement of this argument see Bernard Williams’s paper “Deciding to Believe”, reprinted in his 1973 collection Problems of the Self. 10. See Bennett (1990) for a discussion of the involuntary nature of dispositions and Cohen 1992 Ch.1 on beliefs as credal feelings. 11. See Audi (1986, p. 78) on the distinction between practical reasoning and acting for a practical reason. 12. Kenny (1975) argues that practical inference is governed by a logic of “satisfactoriness”, not of “satisfaction”. 13. McDowell (1994, p. 26) argues that that things are thus and so can be the content of an experience which is not a judgement. 14. See the discussion in Ricketts 1996 (esp. pp. 129–31) of a closely related argument of Frege’s against the definability of “truth”. 15. Stein (1997, p. 181) suggests that truth-aimedness might be analysable as a disposition to withdraw assent in the face of counter-evidence. 16. As McDowell 1994 (pp. 11–12) has nicely put it: “the capacities that are drawn on in experience are recognizable as conceptual only against the background of the fact that someone who has them is responsive to rational relations, which links the contents of judgments of experience with other judgeable contents. These linkages give the concepts their place as elements in possible views of the world.” 17. I have argued this at greater length in my 2001b. 18. This section is drawn largely from my 2001a and my 2003a, though supplemented by some new material in defence of what I call the “Insight Condition”, and also concerning the extension of the argument to cover both non-inferred judgements and decisions. 19. Following Dennett (1973), I use the term “mechanistic” here to mark any form of explanation that is not purposive or such as to involve taking up what Dennett describes as the “Intentional Stance”. Deterministic explanations are thus a species of mechanistic explanation, as are certain sorts of probabilistic explanation. 20. This is very definitely to be distinguished from the ordinary usage of the term, whereby what is “rationalized” merely appears to be done on the basis of reasons (or such-and- such reasons) but is really being motivated by non-rational factors (or other, hidden reasons). 21. Cf. Darwall (1983, p. 205 and pp. 206–7). 22. So much is suggested by the way we should normally react to the discovery that an apparent “reasoner” was in fact just copying someone else. If we were prepared to allow that the copier was engaging in any inference at all, this would, typically, only be because we took her to be relying upon the authority of her source, in which case, as we saw, the inference we would then ascribe to her would differ from what we had originally taken it to be, precisely because she could then at best be supposed to have had logical insight into the way a proposition is probabilified by an authority’s assent to it, and not into those propositions which motivated that assent. See Wick (1964) for a fuller elaboration of this kind of point. 23. Cf. Kenny (1975 p. 99): “... if we are to attribute intention at some deeper level than that of everyday consciousness, we must attribute awareness at the same level at which we attribute intention.” 24. Perhaps “animalistic” is misleading, though, given that someone might simply, say, feel that a quite sophisticated proposition was true without in any way being disposed to think that there is any evidence for that belief. But in that case they would not be judging it to be true in the sense relevant to my argument. 25. See Williams (1973 p. 138) for a distinction between “taking” something to be so and the more pompous “believing” it to be so. Small children and certain animals, by the same token, may well be capable of taking themselves to have reasons to act without being able to believe (in the relevant sense) that they do. Notes 403

26. I refer to the story told by Lewis Carroll in his 1894, which precisely illustrates the absurd consequences of treating LI as just another premise-judgement. It is perhaps worth adding that nothing I say here commits me to endorsing Ryle’s complaint, in his 1950, that the standard account of modus ponens as “If p then q; p; therefore q”, by making the hypothetical a premise coordinate with “p”, generates Carroll’s regress, and so should instead be construed as a licence to perform the inference “p therefore q”. For as Geach (1972; orig. 1965 – pp. 257–8) notes, “Particular readings of ‘p’ and ‘q’ may make ‘p, therefore q’ into a logically valid argument; but it is not in general logically valid, and if not, no power in heaven and earth can issue me a ‘licence’ that makes it logically valid. On the other hand, ‘if p, then q; but p; therefore I’ is logically valid; and this means precisely that the two premises ‘if p then q’ and ‘p’ are sufficient to yield the conclusion ‘q’, so that there is no place for introducing an extra premise, and a regress never gets started”. My point is rather just that someone’s LI into the validity of modus ponens, in its conventional two-premise form, cannot itself be represented as their assent to a third premise, on pain of generating the regress in question. 27. The postulation of two kinds of “insight” into one’s reasons for acting, or in other words of two different ways of “taking X to be a reason for me to ϕ”, in order to square the occurrence of akrasia and other deviant cases with the Insight Condition seems to me to be no more open to a charge of trivialization or of blithely setting apparent counter-examples to one side by dumping them in a different category of non- motivating beliefs about what there is reason to do, than the well-known disjunctive analysis of perception (as defended by e.g. Hinton, 1967 and 1973; Snowdon, 1981 and McDowell, 1982) can be assumed to simply define away the sceptical problem apparently presented by the argument from illusion when it distinguishes between perceptual experiences which are “mere appearances” (as in the case of certain halluci- nations) on the one hand, and veridical perceptions in which the object of experience is, as McDowell (1982 in Dancy, 1988, p. 211) puts it, “the fact itself being disclosed to the experiencer” on the other. And just as this implies that in veridical perception “appearances are no longer conceived as in general intervening between the experiencing subject and the world” (Ibid.) but as it were directly connect that subject up to the world, similarly Required Insight is a sort of intrinsically motivating bridging state which directly connects a subject’s PJs with their rationalized actions (CJs). Finally, insofar as the disjunctive analysis of perception is legitimated by the fact that without it we are unable to ward off an intolerable form of scepticism about the extent to which we possess perceptual knowledge, then a disjunctive analysis of “taking oneself to have a reason to act” is legitimated by the fact that it supports the Insight Condition that is needed to make room of the fact that we can act for reasons in the way already elaborated that is that reasons as such, that is, qua normative, can play a role in the explanation of action even when they in fact fail to justify that action. 28. I have in mind the distinction between causal efficacy and causal relevance elaborated by Jackson and Petit (1990). Their concept of a causal non-efficacious factor’s being causally relevant because figuring indispensably in what they term a “program explanation” would apply in this context thus: a given instance of Required Insight would reflect that PJ–CJ nomic connection which programs the PJs to be causally efficacious in the production of the CJ, and thus that Insight would itself be causally relevant to the production of the CJ. 29. Davidson’s objections (in his 1993) to talk about causation occurring in virtue of such- and-such features are, I believe, convincingly rebutted by McLaughlin (1993, pp. 30–4). 30. I refer to the arguments advanced by Davidson 1980 (particularly in his “Actions, Reasons and Causes” and his “Mental Events”) for what he has called “anomalous monism”. For a useful critical discussion of these arguments see Lycan (1988 ch.2). 31. The phrase is McDowell’s (see his 1994 passim.) 404 Notes

32. I use the term “induction” loosely here to include what would technically be called “abduction” that is inference to the best explanation. 33. I am grateful to an IJPS referee for this apparent counter-example to my application of Leibniz’s Law. 34. Elliot Sober (1982) has argued that the property of being a three-sided plane figure is not the property of being a three-angled plane figure, even though the one is necessarily coextensive with the other. 35. Armstrong (1978, pp. 42–3 and 1989, pp. 28–9) has argued that the fact that we take properties to bestow causal powers upon the items which possess them, coupled with the fact that the other members of the class to which something belongs are extrinsic to what gives it its causal powers, entails that the identification of properties with classes of their instances must be rejected. 36. What of a third possibility, namely that the linkage is in principle unknowable? But, even setting aside anti-realist qualms about such possibilities, it is hard to make sense of the supposition that such unknowability could simply be a brute fact about the linkage in question. And while the Openness Requirement itself establishes that any specific subject could not know that they were instantiating any specific such linkage, Mech-RJ(2) makes a quite general claim about a necessary connection between two finely distinct types. 37. Since the predetermination of the CJ by the PJs would thus go via the logical insight, as opposed to deriving directly from PJ–CJ laws, this would, strictly speaking, imply a modified form of Mech-RJ(2) (as initially formulated). 38. We must be careful of being misled by superficial analogies here. E.g. while it is true that a nomic connection between C’s and E’s which was itself entirely why-inexplicable could nonetheless underpin the causal necessitation of E by C, logical insight (as a form of awareness) is more comparable to the nomic connectedness of a particular C to a particular E, than it is to the nomic connection itself. And any such instance of nomic connectedness must be why-explained by the particular C in that it is because, and only because, that C instantiates a property/type which figures in a nomic connection, that its nomic connectedness to an E obtains. 39. The assumption that the putative first-order PJ–CJ laws are logically contingent seems justified by the standard view that logical necessitation is defined over propositions as opposed to propositional acts (judgements). Again, in any world where subjects are embodied, quite specific physiological conditions must be satisfied if the makers of any given set of PJs are to go on to make any CJ at all. And the consequent requirement that such conditions figure in any faintly plausible strict deterministic PJ–CJ laws surely entails the contingency of those laws as well. In any case, Mech-RJ (3) could not be affirming the mechanistic causation of the CJ by the PJs unless this was so, given our understanding of such causes as being, by definition, logically separable from their effects. 40. Davidson has suggested that the intentional non-nomologically or only “weakly” supervenes upon the physical, which I discuss shortly in the text. For now, though, it might be worth noting how my reductio argument against Mech-RJ (3), differs from Davidson’s argument against the possibility of strict psychological laws. These might easily be confused, since Davidson too appears to argue against the possibility of such laws on the grounds that they might conceivably entail our having to make absurd ascriptions of propositional attitude. The difference, however, is that Davidson does not allow that propositional attitudes as such can enter into any strict nomological connections at all, whereas my reductio of Mech-RJ (3) is, in itself, consistent with there being such connections. Davidson seems to think that these might force us to ascribe propositional attitudes to subjects we could not radically interpret as having them, apparently assuming that the possibility of ascribing such attitudes in accordance with the constraints of radical interpretation is constitutive of what it is for subjects to have them. My reductio, on the other hand, does not presuppose that the impossibility of radically interpreting someone as making a given judgement implies they could not be making them. Indeed it allows that any judgement J might be made because of any Notes 405

other given judgement(s). What it does not allow, however, is that J might thereby be rationalized by that/those judgement(s). I deny this because I deny that it is possible for someone to have certain insights into their judgements, and not because they could never be radically interpreted thus. 41. For the distinction between strong and weak supervenience see Kim (1984a). I have not considered the hypothesis that logical insight “globally” supervenes on the suggested bases, primarily because I remain unconvinced that this sort of supervenience can be sufficiently distinguished from strong supervenience (see Heil 1996 ch.3, sec.4 for a defence of Kim’s claim (1984a) that these are, to all intents and purposes, equivalent). Seager (1988) argues that weak supervenience might be strong enough to support the required counterfactuals. My reasons for denying this build on those given by Heil (1996, pp. 81–2). In his “Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation” (Macdonald and Macdonald, 1995, p. 136) Kim tentatively suggests the possibility of a weaker form of strong supervenience defined in terms of non-strict, ceteris paribus laws linking the subvenient base properties to the supervening properties. If this is to amount to more than just a disguised form of the stronger, strict-law based supervenience already considered, however, the ceteris paribus clauses of the relevant laws must really be undischargeable in principle; but then, even allowing that the laws in question would not be thereby trivialized, it would no longer be clear that in the absence of the supervenient term (in this case logical insight) the subvenient base term would be absent as well (so that the satisfaction by the logical insight of NCCE would still not be secured) – a point that can be resisted only at the risk of rendering the posited ceteris paribus supervenience of logical insight upon PJs (or on the relevant first-order nomic connections) vulnerable to the sort of reductio which undermines Mech-RJ (3). 42. That much is surely right about Martin Hollis’s (1977, p. 140) claim that “False consciousness has causes; true consciousness is its own explanation.” 43. That even mistaken “insights” must be intelligible in this way is indicated by the following remark of Wittgenstein’s from On Certainty (Sec.74): Can we say: a mistake doesn’t only have a cause, it also has a ground? That is, roughly: when someone makes a mistake, this can be fitted into what he knows aright. We might explicate the point in his terms by saying that a genuine mistake, as opposed to a mental disturbance involving no real thought at all, presupposes mastery of a language-game within which alone it can occur. A mistake can only be located by reference to certain rules that the person making the mistake was actually trying to follow – rules which we could suppose they were trying to follow only if we could suppose them to be actually following other, more fundamental rules. Bad reasons, in short, are still reasons, and bad reasoning is still reasoning – which means that it cannot be so totally irrational as to leave us with no explanation at all from the constitutive interconnections between the propositional contents of the PJs and the subject’s logical insight. Indeed, it seems to be precisely this that is being implied by Davidson when he notes that “... the more things a believer is right about, the sharper his errors are. Too much mistake simply blurs the focus”(1984, p. 168); and more explicitly: there is a certain irreducible – though somewhat anaemic – sense in which every rationalization justifies: from the agent’s point of view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action. (1980, p. 9) But nothing I have claimed need be taken to exclude the possibility of all mechanistic influences upon reasoning. Rather, we should have to regard the freedom of specific judgemental outcomes of deliberation as a freedom only within parameters which are in principle specifiable by generalizations stating nomic connections between causal factors such as oxygen or alcohol level, degree of fatigue, degree of liver malfunction etc. on the one hand, and general features of deliberation such as degree of concentra- tion, duration of attention, tendency to cross-wire different inferential lines etc. on the other. 406 Notes

44. This account of the nature of the supposed difference between biological and mechanistic explananda is basically that advanced by Fred Dretske in his “Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behaviour” (Heil and Mele, 1995). 45. Relatedly, it is a confusion to suppose that mental content externalism needs to posit the global as opposed to the strong supervenience of the mental upon the physical. See Heil (1996, p. 84). 46. The Macdonalds do seem to suppose this, which is why I described their account as being only “broadly” Davidsonian. 47. This reason for rejecting any account of rationalization, which sees as it as being strongly analogous to biological functional explanation, is a fortiori one more reason for rejecting accounts which actually regard it as a species of such explanation. For a summary of some other problems with such “stronger” accounts see Graham Macdonald’s “The Biological Turn” (Macdonald and Macdonald, 1995). 48. See my 1998, my 2001a (pp. 71–4) and my 2001b (pp. 205–6) for a defence of the claim that the truth-aimedness of a judgement requires that it was either made on the basis of the subject’s taking his/her PJs to justify that judgement, or that it was made because the subject was disposed to make certain judgements (potential PJs) which she would take to justify the judgement in question – so that their truth-aimedness implies that judgements be either rationalized or, at least, rationalizable. 49. It may seem that a more straightforward basis for this sort of objection is offered by Anscombe when she challenges the assumption that “ ‘the explanation’ is everywhere the same one requirement” by pointing out that “ ‘Reasons’ and ‘motives’ are what is elicited from someone whom we ask to explain himself. Of course we may doubt that a man has told, or even made clear to himself, his real reasons and motives; but what we are asking for if we say so is a more searching consideration, not an investigation into such a question as: ‘Is this really an instance of the causal law which I have applied to it?’ – and that is true even though, as is possible, we doubt him on grounds of empirical generalizations which we have made about people’s motives and reasons” (1981, pp. 228–9). All this would appear to come to, however, is the observation that what we often want from someone when we ask “why” they think something is just a justification for what they think, and not really any kind of why-explanation of their thinking it at all. 50. These objections to the pragmatic analysis of reasoning and, more generally, of thought, are well put by Blackburn (1984, p. 136) and Brown (1989, p. 30). Relatedly, as Wright (1998) has put it: “It is not just difficult to think of the most ingrained elements of one’s own self-conception as accepted merely as the components in a self-directed ‘stance’; it is not even coherent to do so. For is not such a stance itself individuated by its content – by the attitudes one ascribes to oneself? And does not the Dennettian take it as a matter of real fact that – when one is - one is taking such a stance? If not, what? – a second- order stance? It is one thing to take a broadly instrumentalist view of a particular type of theory; quite another to be implicitly told that one must also take an instrumentalist view of the taking of the instrumentalist view. Self-consciously to deploy a complex of supposed fictions in the Dennettian manner is already to engage in a complex attitu- dinal state ... which there is then no remaining room to construe as fictional or merely instrumental.” In fact Dennett’s remark in his (1981, p. 238) that “The success of the [Intentional] stance is of course a matter settled pragmatically, without reference to whether the object really has beliefs, intentions, and so forth” seems to suggest that he himself does not actually embrace any such general instrumentalist account of thought or reasoning. On the other hand in his 1987, p. 29 he claims that “all there is to really believing that p... is being an intentional system for which p occurs as a belief in the best ... interpretation”. The obscurities and tensions within Dennett’s overall position are explored by McCulloch (1990). 51. Kenny (1975, pp. 101–3) discusses the sense in which practical logic is looser or more open than theoretical logic. O’Connor (1971, pp. 45–6) is guilty, I think, of taking this Notes 407

to create a special difficulty for the “theoretical” indeterminist. That it does not do so is implied by what I say in my 1996 pp. 111–6 and my 1998 (sec.II) against a related argument for belief-involuntarism put forward by H.H.Price 1966 (orig.1954). Honderich (1990, p. 371) illustrates how the temptation arises from considerations pertaining to doxastic direction-of-fit and the nature of knowledge. In my 1996 (pp. 108–9) I reject the “direction of fit” argument for judgement-involuntarism, as advanced by Colin McGinn, and what I say also undermines the reasons Honderich gives for supposing that there is a presumption in favour of belief-determinism. The fact that we need to admit a causal element in the analysis of knowledge does not, I should argue, require us to posit a form of mechanistic, let alone deterministic, world-to-judgement causation. (Cf. Paul Snowdon’s point in his 1981 that the causal assumption required to make sense of the reliability of perception, namely “that when an object is seen, its being seen a certain way (that is, how it looks) causally depends on the nature of the object ... amounts in no way to the view that what it is for the object to be seen (a certain way) is for it to affect the viewer” any more than the fact that “whether A is heavier than B is, in part, causally determined by (say) A’s previous history” entails that “A’s being heavier than B is a matter of A ... having an effect on B” (Dancy, 1988 p. 196)). As we shall see in Chapter 7, while acts of judgement are not themselves causal products of our interaction with the world, the brain-events which instantiate those acts certainly are.

6 From Freedom to the Non-Phenomenal

1. Notable defenders of the ‘two-aspect’ view of the noumenon/phenomenon distinction, according to which this merely marks an epistemological distinction for Kant, are H.E. Matthews (1969), Gerold Prauss (1974) and Allison (1978 and 1983). The case for a ‘two-object’ reading of Kant, whereby he should be interpreted as identifying phenomena with a distinct class of mind-dependent entities is advanced by Janaway 1989 (pp. 67–84) though he concludes, as did Schopenhauer, that Kant’s view is ultimately confused and internally consistent (1989, p. 76). Langton (1998, chapter 1) rejects the two-aspect reading on the ground that it trivializes Kant’s claim that we cannot know what things-in-themselves are like, but she also denies the two-object reading. I shall say more about Langton’s account in the next chapter. 2. Exactly what Kant means here by “immediacy” is a moot point (see Parsons in Guyer ed. 1992, esp. pp. 62–66) and his description of intuitions as “singular representations” (in the Logic ed. Jasche, Sec.1 (9; 91) cited in Parsons 1992, p, 91) is also not unproblematic, given that, as Allison (1983 p. 67) notes, he also famously maintains (KRV A50/ B74) that an unconceptualized sensible intuition alone cannot yield the representation of any object. But it is at least clear that Kant holds it to be intuitions that supply the particularizing element in our perceptual cognition of objects, which enables us to gain knowledge of particular objects expressible in demonstrative reference of the form ‘this F is G’; and that the class of phenomena, being sensible appearances, and thus given through sensible intuitions, must thus be identical with the class of spatio– temporal particulars. 3. Armstrong (1978) and (1989) uses the term £immanent realism” for the conception of universals, traditionally described as universalia in rebus, often attributed to Aristotle. 4. For a discussion of the relation between predicable and non-predicable universals see Nicholas Wolterstorff’s classic essay “On the Nature of Universals” in Loux (1976). Wollheim 1968 (secs.5–8 and secs.35–7) defends the thesis that certain works of art, such as novels, poems, and pieces of music are what I term non-predicable universals, though he calls them types, and distinguishes types from universals proper, and from classes, within the category of what he terms generic entities which have various kinds of element falling under them: tokens, instances and members respectively (Ibid. p. 91). 408 Notes

5. Donagan (1963) denies, to my mind persuasively, the charge of incoherence often lev- elled at realists who want to ascribe spatio–temporal locations to universals, a charge which typically invites us to dismiss as unintelligible the thought that something could be spatially divided from itself or could be simultaneously drawing closer to and receding from itself. David Lewis, though himself a prominent nominalist, effectively acknowledges Donagan’s main point when he remarks that though “by occurring repeatedly, universals defy intuitive principles”, nevertheless “that is no damaging objection, since plainly the intuitions were made for particulars” (1983, p. 345). More recently Parsons 2004 (p. 3) has nicely distinguished between something’s being wholly located at a place (when it has “no parts not located” at that place) from its being entirely located at a place (i.e. there being nowhere else it is located) before noting that whereas it is self-contradictory to claim that anything could, at a single time, be entirely located at two different places, the same is not true of the claim that something can, at one and the same time, be wholly located at two different/disjoint places. Immanent realism about universals affirms only the latter, 6. Paton (1936, 2: 224–5) suggests that Kant actually offers six different Second Analogy proofs. So does Norman Kemp Smith (1962, p. 363). For a useful survey of the various interpretations and reconstructions commentators have given of this section of the first Critique see Hudson (1994, chapter 4). 7. The first edition principle is also potentially less misleading because more capacious given that one might naturally understand what “begins to be” to include any ordinary phenomenal object, and not just some new state of such an object. After all, as Bennett 1966 Ch.13 sec.47 notes, Kant is really committed to regarding the “existence-changes” whereby objects come to be and cease to be as alterations in a permanent underlying substance proper, so that these objects must properly be described as complex states of affairs of that underlying substance. In other words, there is really, for Kant, only a single substance – and that is what one should expect given that substance in the First Analogy is supposed to represent the unperceivable fact that all events occur at moments which continue a single, permanent time. 8. For Strawson’s account of Kant’s argument see his 1966, pp. 133–140. 9. As Hudson (n.28) explains, this is the term used by James van Cleve 1973 (71–87) for “the following conditions: (a) an effect cannot precede its cause in time; b) the perception of an item is the effect of that item; (c) a is a perception of A and b of B; (d) there is no relevant difference in the modes of causal dependence of a on A and of b on B.” 10. Though it is worth stressing that the causal theory of perception is in itself quite compatible with our perceiving events in a different order from that in which they occur. Allison 1983 p. 225 quotes Robert Paul Wolff (1963 p. 268) pointing out that “It is not true that we must perceive the boat at B after we have perceived it at A. We might hear its whistle at A after we see its smoke from B” and “By the same token the accidents of my perceptual situation might make it objectively impossible for me to view the house in more than one order”. 11. Allison makes these two points in his 1983, pp. 224–5. 12. This is anticipated at A193/B238 where Kant insists that “we must derive the subjective succession of apprehension from the objective succession of appearances. Otherwise the order of apprehension is entirely undetermined, and does not distinguish one appearance from another”. Allison 1983, p. 225 notes that Strawson’s interpretation commits Kant “to the very empirical idealism which ... he adamantly rejects”. (N.B Kant’s target in the “Refutation of Idealism” section is empirical, not transcendental idealism). Guyer 1987 pp. 254–56 draws the point out especially helpfully in a way which also effectively disposes of C.D. Broad’s (1925–6 p. 208) objection that “If I perceive that x is now in a certain place and I remember that it was in a different place, I know, without any appeal to causation, that it must have changed its place”. For as Guyer remarks (1987 p. 254) “at any moment in which we reflect on what is apparently a present perception plus a memory of a prior one, it is not actually given which is the present perception and which Notes 409

is the prior one. For all that can be given in one moment is a present representation of the contents of two (or more) possible perceptions, but not both the present representation and the past representation itself. Which is the present representation and which the past is something which itself must be judged. And ... this inference requires precisely a law of the form that one state of affairs can only succeed the other, which would entail, other things being equal, that the perception of the one can only succeed the perception of the other, and thus must be the present, as opposed to the past, representation”. 13. Bennett (1966, p. 229) speculates that Kant may be concerned at this stage of the first Critique with the analysis of “objective experience” not only in the narrow sense of experiencing what is “other than oneself” but as encompassing whatever admits of the “seems/ really is” distinction. The implication of Allison’s (and, we shall see, of Melnick’s) account is that Kant’s concern in the section on the Second Analogy is with the preconditions of our experience of an objective time-order in this second, broader sense, that is with “the formal conditions of empirical truth” (as Allison 1983, p. 219 puts it drawing upon Kant’s own words at A191/B236) and thus, I take it, with the possibility of applying any “is/seems” distinction in judgements about temporal order. 14. To avoid circularity Melnick must presumably be referring in these parentheses to the objective-content conferred upon the reactions by their being regulated by rules, for prior to such regulation his point is that, for Kant, they could have no clear objective content of the kind involved in referring to ships and streams. 15. Melnick refers here to the passage early in the Second Analogy section that culminates in the claim that “The object is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension” (A191/B236). His analysis also makes particularly good sense of Kant’s claim at A197/B242 that “If we enquire what new character relation to an object confers upon our representations, what dignity they thereby acquire, we find that it results only in subjecting the representations to a rule, and so in necessitating us to connect them in some one specific manner; and conversely, that only in so far as our representations are necessitated in a certain order as regards their time-relations do they acquire objective meaning”. The basic move Kant is making here, then, seems analogous to the construction of a notion of truth out of raw materials con- sisting solely of beliefs, by appealing to relations of coherence between those beliefs rather than some form of correspondence relating them to “the world” conceived of as something entirely mind-independent. And indeed, there is more than just a formal analogy involved here, since in the earlier passage (A191/B236) Kant actually describes his problem as being that of explaining, as he puts it, “the formal conditions of empirical truth” in view of the fact that “truth consists of agreement of knowledge with the object” – this being a problem for him just because his transcendental idealism precludes him from explaining such “agreement” in terms of an unusable norm of correspondence between representation and that which is not representation. 16. As Melnick goes on to stress, Kant’s famous claim at KRV, A111 that “The a priori conditions of a possible experience is general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects”, when properly understood, is itself precisely a statement of Kant’s denial of phenomenalism, implying indeed that phenomenalism is actually incoherent since “in order to represent the full scope of possible perception, substantial entities are necessary”(Melnick 2006, pp. 223–4) – this being the import of Kant’s First Analogy principle that “In all change of appearances substance is permanent”. Melnick notes that this principle is grounded, for Kant, upon the fact that “to represent a proper past reaction as in past extensive time requires representing it as a reaction at an initial stage of a procedure of tracking what is present (which procedure we are now in the course of rather than at the initial stage)” so that “The proper reaction ... has to be represented as a reaction to what is presently real, only not now, but formerly”, and “concepts of objects (the relational categories) are necessary conditions of representing possible experience”. (2006, p. 224) Hence, Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Categories’ as necessary features of the way in which the subject brings “all proper 410 Notes

reactions (appearances) to the unity of apperception” (Melnick 2006, p. 224) – a unity that is, according to Kant, the fundamental a priori constraint upon all possible experience. For Melnick’s full account of Kant’s First Analogy argument see his 2006, sec.6 on “Kant’s proof of substance”. 17. The partial causal theory of time Melnick attributes to Kant holds that it is only the necessary advance of time that is constituted by necessitating causation, not the relation of succession holding between earlier and later per se, which according to Melnick, is, for Kant, a function of pure construction. That is (see Melnick 2006, pp. 213–4) just as Kant was a constructivist about numbers, which he regarded as “only the termini of counting procedures” so he thinks that only if time is constructed in a “flowing procedure” like “sweeping out a line” in the manner of the conductor of an orchestra – who thereby “temporizes” – can temporal expanses or periods be “seamless” or “continuous” in the sense of existing as wholes that a priori to their parts, as Kant insists they do at KRV A25/B39. And because he denies that such temporizings are composed of any “cuts” or “stops” that (in Melnick’s words) “construct parts of the flow” its turns out that moments of time are, on the contrary, the result of such “cuts” whose serial order is thus a feature of the construction itself, so that as Melnick puts it “Succession (the schema) is applied ... alongside ... the pure atemporal notion of determination (the concept of ground and consequent expressed in the hypothetical judgement)” (2006, p. 211). Hence, Kant can avoid the charge of circularity apparently invited by the fact that he regards causation itself to be understandable only in terms of the earlier-to- later relation. It is only causation as the schematized ground-consequent category that presupposes serial order. But it is that pre-schematized category itself which introduces the necessary-determination aspect into the relation between all objective occurrences in time (see Melnick, 2006, pp. 211–13). And it is the necessary advance of time that entails the asymmetry of the causal relation, the fact that it has a necessary direction from earlier-to-later, so that “Mackie is exactly wrong ... when he says [1974, p. 90] ... ‘Surprisingly in view of the importance it would appear to have for his thesis that objective time-order depends upon causation, Kant has little to say about causal priority.’ ” (Melnick 2006, p. 227) 18. Cf. Kant’s words at KRV, A201/B246-7: “If ... my perception is to contain knowledge of an event, of something as actually happening, it must be an empirical judgment in which we think the sequence as determined; that is, it presupposes another appearance in time, upon which it follows necessarily, according to a rule. Were it not so, were I to posit the antecedent and the event were not to follow necessarily thereupon, I should have to regard the succession as a merely subjective play of my fancy; and if I still represented it to myself as something objective, I should have to call it a mere dream”. 19. The objection to Berkeley, who suggests a number of constitutive criteria for when ideas could be regarded as objects (such as coherence, vividness and clarity, being such as to inspire faulty inferences etc.) is that these criteria are vague, contingent matters of degree, which may differ from individual to individual. 20. Guyer’s (1987, p. 240) claim “that it is not part of Kant’s argument that the kind of rule according to which one state can be determined to follow another must be fully deterministic, as opposed to, say, probabilistic” is ambiguous. If it means that our best scientific principles might not enable us to know, and in that sense “determine” for sure the cause of a given objective event i.e. succession of states, or indeed whether a given event has occurred at all then we need not demur. But if it means that nothing in Kant’s argument requires him to deny that an objective succession of states could be represented as occurring if regarded as being only probabilified, as opposed to being causally necessitated by prior conditions, then, for the reasons already given, that flies in the face of the interpretation of Kant’s argument we have been advancing. 21. Schopenhauer makes his criticism in his 1974a (orig.1813) pp. 126–7. Allison 1983, p. 230 (also Guyer 1987, pp. 259–60) makes the point that Schopenhauer’s famous Notes 411

criticism of Kant is based upon a misinterpretation, and that consequently Kant cannot be accused of falling into the “opposite error” of Hume by supposedly treating all sequence as consequence, as Schopenhauer claimed (1974a, p. 129). 22. Guyer (1987, p. 253) invokes a similar move against the objection that event-recognition need not, pace Kant, require any assumption about causation so long as our representations are of incompatible states of affairs, for these could only obtain succes- sively and so must imply the occurrence of an event. But “The kind of incompatibility ... typically ... involved in an event is not logical incompatibility ... but real opposition” and thus, for Kant, “is engendered by nothing other than causal laws”. In any case, notes Guyer, “even if the incompatibility of two states of affairs could be known independently of any knowledge of causation, it could tell us only that some event has taken place, but not which”. 23. Hudson 1994 (pp. 141–2) cites these passages of the first Critique in favour of the strong interpretation. My next paragraph draws heavily on the discussion in the final section of his 1994, chapter 4. 24. Melnick cites these passages against the “secondary argument” analysis of commentators like Kemp Smith 1962 (orig.1923) pp. 363 and 375, Suchting 1969 ed. Beck, Ewing 1924 p. 73 and Allison 1983 p. 222. 25. According to the Copenhagen interpretation associated with the names of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, the measurement made by an observer indeterministically collapses a wave-function containing a range of possible outcomes relating to the position and momentum of a particle each one of which can in principle be assigned only a certain chance or probability of occurring. See Griffiths 2004. For an account of the best-known of the (non-local) hidden variables theories to challenge von Neumann’s theorem denying that the postulation of any hidden variable could enable us reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics, see Bohm and Hiley (1993). 26. For Melnick’s discussion of Kant’s constructivism about time see esp. his 2006, pp. 213–5. The “many-worlds” interpretation, first promulgated by Hugh Everett in the 1950s holds, contrary to the Copenhagen interpretation, that there is no inherently random collapse of the wave-function provoked by observation but that all possible outcomes are realized in a series of largely independent parallel universes (the “multi- verse”). See Griffiths 2004. 27. If Guyer means just our judgements “that some states succeed others” then this is crucially ambiguous as between a general judgement about which events (in themselves successions of state) succeed merely probabilifying causes of a given kind, a judgement about whether a given event-succession has succeeded a given singular cause and a judgement that some event (A–B succession) itself has occurred at a given time. In the latter case, which alone is relevant here, I gather Einstein argued that a time–energy uncertainty principle follows from the Copenhagen interpretation such that any reduction in the uncertainty in energy measurement entails a corresponding increase in the uncertainty of the time of the measurement; but that hardly follows obviously from anything Kant says. 28. See Parsons (2004) on the ontological implications of the “superposition of states” that must apparently be attributed to particles to account for the way the effect known as “single-particle interference” is blocked by alterations in certain experimental set-ups. 29. Ralph Walker (1978 p. 101–2) mentions “the change of seasons, the rising and setting of the sun, the movements of a pendulum” and claims that “there is no need to suppose that anything causes these regularities” in order to “set up a public dating system” by directly observing how some given events “relates to the members of the regularly recurring series”. 30. I reproduce here Hudson’s quotation of these lines (Hudson 1994 p. 131). 31. This is pretty much how Hudson, basing himself on Melnick 1973 pp. 85–6 sums up Kant’s argument at A199–201/B244–6. 412 Notes

32. Mellor (1981, p. 67) makes this point before going on to explain why it is a complete misunderstanding of relativity theory to suppose that it makes no distinction between space and time (see esp. pp. 68–70). 33. My thanks to Hud Hudson for tentatively proposing, in correspondence, a reconstruction of Kant’s argument along these lines 34. So I am not, like Kant, thinking of ‘p-events’ only as changes of state or alterations of properties. Nor, by a “property-instantiation” do I necessarily mean only “bare” property-instances in a sense exclusive of distinct substances or substrata, as affirmed by e.g. bundle theorists of substance. I want as generous and non-question-begging notion of a “p-event” as possible. Thus, a p-event will “occur” whenever some region of space and/ or time is in some state or is characterized by some property, whether that region be continuous or discontinuous (and taking it that if all the continuous subregions of a discontinuous p-event fall under MERP then so must the sum of those regions). Therefore I am happy to accept that p-events can be or be caused by not only “events” in the Kantian and everyday sense, but that they themselves can be or can be caused by “objects” or “agents” or “substances”, as these terms would ordinarily be understood. 35. See, again, Armstrong 1989 for a brief discussion of “transcendent” versus “immanent” realism about universals. A more in depth treatment is given in his 1978 (Vol.1, ch.11 and Vol.2, chs.13–7). In Vol.1, ch.10 he discusses and dismisses a form of “relational” immanent realism. 36. See, for example, Kretzmann 1997 Vol.1, ch.3 and Vol.2, ch.2 and Cross 1999 ch.2 for how, respectively, both Thomas and Scotus distinguished between essentially and accidentally ordered series of causes and how their most persuasive arguments against an infinite regress of causes applied only to sustaining causes ordered in the first way, that is, so to speak, vertically with respect to a horizontal series of causes in time whose possible infinity both could allow. 37. See e.g. Woolhouse 1993 ch.3 for why Spinoza can at most be classified as a sort of pan-en-theist. See also Gilson 1991 esp. ch.2, for an account of the typical medieval philosophical identification of God with “the pure act of existing” (p. 52) or as “Being” itself (p. 51), and thus not a being, in terms which thus far apply to Spinoza. Scotus’ “modal” argument for a necessary first cause turns on a move from the possibility of an essentially uncaused being to the necessary existence of such a being (see Cross 1999 pp. 19–23) in a way that seems to me to closely resembles Spinoza’s inference of “existence pertains to the nature of substance” (Ethics, Pt.I, Prop. 7) – this substance being what he will go on to identify with God – from the impossibility of substance being caused (Prop. 6). 38. Summa Contra Gentiles 38.1118. At this point Aquinas has already attempted to deal with the arguments of those like Aristotle (in Physics VIII) to the effect that a begin- ningless creation must be entailed by an eternal God since (as Kretzmann 1999 p. 161) summarizes it, “creating is an act of God’s will, and since an absolutely simple, immov- able, eternal creator could not have begun to will the existence of other things, could not will it after not willing it, the world could not have begun to exist but must have existed forever”. Aquinas’s reply to that involves distinguishing between willing at t that things exist then and willing changelessly that they begin to exist t, and insisting that nothing prevents God from willing the latter. The passage quoted is thus part of his response to the further question, which grants that possibility, but then asks why God would timelessly will a merely finite world. 39. I borrow the term “big crunch” from Kretzmann Vol.2, 1999 p. 184 n. The worry that this might be impossible on the grounds that a p-event that was the effect of a prior p-event would ipso facto be a different p-event from the phenomenally uncaused first p-event, because occupying a different place in the time-series, is blocked by the point that any actual first event must owe its identity as a p-event solely to its position in relation to its immediate effects; and this relation could be preserved in a world in which it was itself caused by a temporally prior p-event. And while Aquinas himself Notes 413

does appear to have thought that while the same cause could have different effects, an individual effect could not have been differently caused (see Martin 1997 pp. 20–1) this does not in itself commit him to denying that a phenomenally uncaused p-event i.e. a p-event that is not in fact an effect of a p-event, might not have been such an effect. Of course, if Aquinas is right, then it is not a contingent fact that we do not live in an endlessly expanding and contracting universe, but that still allows the logical possibility of any of an infinite range of finite concertina’s having this form. 40. Similarly, Schopenhauer’s dictum that “It is improbable that the improbable never happens” (WWR Vol.2 p. 522) does not entail that it is possible for us to have a probabilistic explanation of the instantiation of the determinable “improbable event”, each of the determinates (specific improbable events) of which are by definition inexplicable. For Schopenhauer (who followed Kant in thinking, albeit for somewhat different reasons, that all phenomena were necessarily predetermined) was simply making the point that given the hidden complexity of the world in relation to the surface regularities with which we are familiar, it is very likely (predictable) that unexpected events will occur from time to time – and that is perfectly compatible with the phenomenal explicabil- ity, indeed with the m-causation, of each such event. 41. Compton (1935, pp. 48–52). Anscombe (1971) cites Feynman, who gave the example in his 1965, p. 147. 42. Nor, conversely, should the fact that a given rationalized act of, say, judgement might be “random” in relation to its reason-explainers in the sense relevant to Scriven-type explanation, namely explanation of why this rather than some other equally reason- explicable judgements was formed, make us suppose that it is random in the sense of there being no more explanation for its formation than its non-formation. 43. See Critique of Judgment, Introduction to Pt. II, p. 5 (361). 44. Cf. Geach 1977, p. 10. Martin 1997, ch.13 (p. 181 and p. 183) in effect registers the distinction by discriminating between “things’ being for a point” and their having a “purpose”, with only the latter implying intentional design. 45. 1st Introduction, sec.VII. When Kant says, in Part II, sec.17, p. 69, that “each mode of explanation excludes the other” he surely just means that they are distinct explanatory modes that shouldn’t be jumbled up together in one explanation. The section in question is, after all entitled ‘The union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the technic of nature’. 46. Genetic mutations are “random” according to Darwinian theory simply in the sense that they are unaffected by what an organism requires in order to cope with or better adapt to its ecology. 47. Schopenhauer, ch.XXVI, WWR II is a treasure-trove of further examples illustrating the compatibility of explanations from efficient and final causes. 48. Surely not from anything quantum mechanics might tell us, since, to repeat, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle excludes the possibility of our getting a determinate specification of any quantum “event” on account of measurement interference, which ensures that if we fix C’s position then we can only ascribe it a range of momenta, and vice versa. For a succinct explanation of why this occurs see Hawking (1988, pp. 54–5). 49. This is the position taken by Quine (1985), and a classic argument against the existence of “fuzzy objects” and, to that extent, in favour of a “semantic indecision” account of vagueness, can be found in Gareth Evans 1978. For a more recent defence of the standard view in the context of a discussion of theories of personal identity, see Noonan (2003, chapter 6). 50. This is often known as Kolmogorov’s 3rd Axiom of Probability. Where “P(x)” means “the probability of x” this can be put a bit more formally thus: P(a or b) = P(a) + P(b) – P(a and b). See Kolmogorov (1950). 51. Always remembering, of course, that we are talking here only about objectively explanatory probability and not of probability as a measure of “credibility” understood as 414 Notes

warrant or justification for believing, for as L. Jonathan Cohen (1989, p. 17) remarks: “in general, if the chance or relative frequency of A is n, the chance or relative frequency of not-A is the complement of n [that is, 1-n]. However, credibility ... is not necessarily governed by a complementational principle for negation ... On the basis of a rather jejune statement of supposed evidence the credibility of A and the credibility of not-A ... may both be rather low.” 52. To adapt Schopenhauer’s aphorism: It is possible that the improbable always happens! 53. Armstrong (1983, pp. 32–5) argues that inasmuch as propensities are introduced to save regularity analyses of irreducibly statistical laws from their failure, otherwise, to cope with the fact that, in his words “Probabilities permit distributions which do not reflect the probabilities involved” (p. 32) then they are, to say the least, weakly motivated, given that “they will suffice to deal with exactly one of the many difficulties faced by the [battered Regularity] theory” (p. 34). Furthermore, appealing to bare powers or chances that are “exhausted by their manifestations” (p. 34) and thus not separately identifiable by a posteriori investigation, seems peculiarly ill-suited to rescue an empiricist-inspired theory. 54. Cf. Noonan 1993 which utilizes a “Two List Argument” (TLA) to establish that object- dependent thoughts are redundant with respect to rationalization. The TLA goes thus: Suppose (to use Noonan’s example) S kicks out at a cat and that this action is intentional under some description denoting the cat. Suppose next that S does the same thing (performs the same bodily movements) except that s/he is only hallucinating a cat. Now if we draw up two lists, one containing the contents of S’s psychological states in the veridical situation and the other the contents of his states in the hallucinatory situation, then the second list, which contains nothing not already included in the first, and nothing which could be identified with an object-dependent thought about the cat, suffices to explain S’s action in both situations. So any alleged object-dependent content present in the first explanation was redundant in the rationalization of the action. 55. A closely related worry will occur to the theist in connection with p-events that s/ he believes to be directly created and/or sustained by God. While not, according to mainstream theism at least, conceived of as God’s or anyone else’s “bodily actions”, such p-events are, according to standard conceptions of God’s power, supposed to be, in anything, even more directly responsive to His rational will than the bodily movements of finite agents are to their rationalizing psychological states or acts.

7 From Non-Phenomenality to Universality

1. See, for example, Armstrong 1978, vol. 2, ch.22 for an argument against the existence of determinable, as opposed to determinate, universals, and thus for the view that while there are “such predicates as ‘coloured’ or ‘red’ there is no property, being coloured or being red.” (p. 117 ff.). 2. See his 1978, vol. 2, ch.22, sec.2 for Armstrong’s account of the partial identity of some universals, and sec.4 for his discussion of the related notion of “homogeneous classes” of universals. The suggestion that all assertions that p constitute a homogeneous class of universals seems to be warranted whether or not we regard the differing strengths of such assertions as pertaining directly to the degree of intensity of the propositional act itself, or, as I suggested in 5, as reflecting differently strengthed assignments of probability to some propositional content p. 3. Armstrong introduces the term “family predicate” in Armstrong 1978, vol. 2 , pp. 16–17, in recognition of Wittgenstein’s famous claim – in secs.66 and 67 of his Philosophical Investigations – that terms like “game” reflect not the existence of some special universal but rather merely just a complex set of “family resemblances” holding between particular games. Notes 415

4. Armstrong 1978, vol. 1, pp. 120–1 discusses “abstract particulars” such as visual and tactual cubes. 5. Schopenhauer’s memorable simile occurs on p. 110 of On the Basis of Morality. 6. Furthermore, contrary to the impression given by Janaway’s characterization of the quoted lines from Parerga as a “late little-noticed passage”, it is clear throughout the first volume of WWR that Schopenhauer is working with a distinction between particularity (as defined by his principium) and individuality, as when he tells us in sec.28 (p. 158) that “The character of each individual man, in so far as it is thoroughly individual and not entirely included in that of the species, can be regarded as a special Idea” (he means in Plato’s sense of a Form or universal); and again, at WWR I sec. 45 (pp. 224–5), after distinguishing between “the character of the species” and “the character of the individual, which is called character par excellence” and which is “a side of the Idea of mankind, specially appearing in this particular individual” we get his claim that “the human individual as such has, to a certain extent, the dignity of an Idea of his own”. 7. That Armstrong does not regard these as equivalent is sufficiently indicated when he responds to the fact that “different (‘abstract’) particulars might all have the same position” by noting that “this merely shows that the particularity of a particular does not completely determine that particular. For such a complete determination, we require its nature” (1978, vol. 1, p. 124). 8. Kenny 1968, p. 62, which also cites Oeuvres de Descartes ed. Adam and Tannery (III, 404) for the quotation from Hyperaspistes. 9. Armstrong 1978, Vol. I., p. 125. On p. 124 Armstrong cites Summa Theologica Part I, Q.50, Article 4, for Aquinas’s discussion of angels, and Scotus’s Ordinatio, II, Dist. 3, pars I, Q.7 for the latter’s disagreement with Aquinas. 10. Witness, for example, the very title of the final chapter of the “Transcendental Analytic”: “The Ground of the Distinction of All Objects into Phenomena and Noumena”. The plural “noumena” occurs throughout that chapter. 11. I here follow Ralph Walker 1978 pp. 106–8. 12. The point is well made by Michael Esfeld in his 2001 review of Langton’s book: “If properties are considered as properties of phenomenal substance, they cannot be relational properties; for there is nothing besides phenomenal substance relative to which phenomenal substance could have certain properties ... Consequently ... the argument from relational properties to unknowable intrinsic properties risks becoming a non- starter. Instead, we then get to a view of Kant’s philosophy of physics that is close to the field metaphysic which Bennett [1984] assigns to Spinoza.” (Esfeld, p. 403). 13. See Langton (1998, p. 39). 14. See John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) chs 1 and 3. In the “original position” envis- aged by Rawls, agents about to enter some society, who are both self-interested and yet ignorant of the position they will occupy therein and of all other morally relevant differences between themselves and other similarly situated “contractors”, frame the distributive rules they wish to be governed by. Rawls argues that principles of justice are defined by the rules thus arrived at. 15. See e.g. WWR I, pp. 34, 121–2, 125, 184–5; also WWR II Ch.XVII and esp. p. 599. 16. Paton (1958 p. 269). In a note to this point Paton directs us Gr. 462 (=126) “for the Idea of an intelligible world”. 17. Paton 1958, p. 270. By “humanity” or “personality” here is clearly meant “rational agency” in the explained in Part One. Paton comments that this tendency to describe as noumenon what results from abstracting from sensible characteristics “becomes more marked in Kant’s later works. For example legal possession is described [here Paton cites secs. 6 and 10, 251 and 259 of the “Doctrine of Right” of the Metaphysics of Morals] as possessio noumenon inasmuch as the concept abstracts from the empirical conditions which belong to the physical occupation or use of some object in time and space.” 416 Notes

18. This distinction between direct and indirect knowledge is the key to dissipating much of the confusion standardly thought to surround Schopenhauer’s identification in Bk. II of WWR (both volumes) of the ding-an-sich with what we find in ourselves as will (desire, appetite, longing). Superficially this appears to clash blatantly with his own Kant-based insistence in Book I that all we can ever know are representations or phenomena. But, as John Atwell 1995, ch.5 has convincingly argued, Schopenhauer is really operating with a crucial distinction between the thing-in-itself in appearance (in my terms, as it is instantiated in phenomena) and the thing-in-itself considered in abstraction from its realization in phenomena – as it were, the thing-in-itself in itself – and it is only the former that he describes as “will”; though even here, Schopenhauer reminds us that “of course we use only a denominatio a potiori by which the concept of will therefore receives a greater extension than it has hitherto had”, this being a case of having to “name the genus after its most important species, the direct knowledge of which lies nearest to us, and leads to the indirect knowledge of all the others” (WWR I., p. 111). Naturally, with another contrast in mind, he does not think there can be “direct” knowledge even of this will which lies “nearest to us” either, given, as he con- tinually reminds us, that I can only know the intelligible character of my will insofar as this is presented in my particular acts of will in time (see e.g. WWR I., p. 109). 19. Broad (1978) p. 128 rejects the identification of Kant’s transcendental objects with “the foreign things-in-themselves which [he] held to be the ultimate sources of our sense- impressions” and intriguingly suggests that “Kant ought to identify transcendental objects with the percipient himself as performing certain transcendental activities”. Kant himself comes close to saying as much when he declares at KRV A105 that “the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations”). When coupled with the more balanced account of transcendental objects offered by Walker 1978 pp. 106–8, which takes seriously Kant’s tendency to sometimes talk as if such objects were thing-in-themselves, this would not only suggests that Kant at the very least ought also to have identified “things-in-themselves” with the transcendental perceiver, but that his doing so would hardly have been inconsistent with the kind of ignorance of the noumenal he also wanted to insist upon. Since Broad’s conception of “foreign things- in-themselves”, supposedly held by Kant to be the “sources of our sense-impressions”, is itself hard to reconcile with the point often stressed by Schopenhauer that what is noumenal should, according to Kant, be beyond causation and so cannot be the causal source of anything, then it can hardly, be a major stumbling-block to this suggestion – a suggestion which, married to Broad’s further comparison (1978) with the way that “if one were a Berkeliean, one would have to identify the transcendental objects with God” fits well with our PI-based claim that there can only be one such percipient and so only one such noumenon (though Berkeley’s view of God’s will as the sustaining causal “source” of cohesion amongst sensible ideas would need to be replaced by something more like Schopenhauer’s notion of will as instantiated or objectified in phenomena). 20. Cf. McDowell 1994, p. 90, n.3: “... on this view intention cannot be more intimately involved in movements of an agent’s limbs than it is in, say, some fallings of trees. In both cases we can have an event conforming to specification framed by an agent, and occurring in consequence of the framing of the specification. Intention has only an external bearing on the event itself.” 21. See my March 2003 where I attempt to demonstrate this initially in connection with a certain sort of uncompleted bodily action. 22. See Davis (whose example I use here) 1979, p. 39. 23. As will emerge in the following chapter, there are some grounds for supposing, in the light of his own account of moral virtue as grounded upon an insight into the metaphysical identity of will in different phenomena, that Schopenhauer’s overstatement here may have been deliberate – a sort of instructive enactment of a deeply significant Notes 417

error to which all subjects of willing are prone. For my awareness that my will is “in” the representation of my own body in a way which cannot be explained by the latter’s nature just as representation (i.e. in German, Vor-stellung, that which stands before me in my capacity as knowing subject, and which thus, just as such, stands to me in exactly the same way as the representations of all other bodies with which I therefore to that extent do not identify myself) is crucially bound up with the way I naturally take myself to be that one particular body, and am thus naturally disposed to make a radical distinction between myself and others that Schopenhauer himself comes to insist in the final book of WWR is fundamentally mistaken, since in fact I am only “in” my body as a universal is “in” a particular instantiation of itself. 24. Schopenhauer cites this maxim in WWR II p. 508 and pp. 603–4 and also in On the Basis of Morality p. 111 where he attributes it to Pomponatius’ De animei immortalitate, and translates it as “What we do follows from what we are” – though of cause precisely not in a temporal sense of “follows”. The summary of Schopenhauer’s take on Kant’s solution to the Third Antinomy (and which at WWR I p. 501 he describes as “the point where Kant’s philosophy leads to mine”) offered in this paragraph is, however, drawn primarily from what he says in WWR I sec. 55. 25. Allison 1990, p. 142. Although first explicitly introduced in Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason Alone (1793), the notion is, as Allison notes (Ibid. p. 136) “already at work in the Critique of Practical Reason and is a key ingredient in his later account of virtue in The Doctrine of Virtue [which is the second major part of the Metaphysics of Morals of 1797]”. 26. WWR I, p. 106. For reasons which should no longer need elaborating, I think Kant is right and Schopenhauer simply mistaken on the question of whether “motives” ever “determine” acts of rational will in the pre-necessitating sense Schopenhauer intends here. They can never determine such acts in that way. That said, Schopenhauer himself is precisely stressing here that there is something even in such acts that is in no way predetermined by motives – by which, I repeat, he means simply perceptions or thoughts about phenomena – and that “the whole inner nature of my will cannot be explained from the motives”, so that “Only on the presupposition of my empirical character [which expresses that non-predetermined will] is the motive a sufficient ground of explanation of my conduct”. I have in effect been arguing that what he should have said is that it is the phenomenal p-events expressed by non-predetermined acts of will that are predetermined, since only they have a determinate place in a time- order. 27. Allison mentions in a footnote that Ralph Walker suggests this as a possible reading of Kant in Walker 1989. 28. See the defence of a “non-relational” form of immanent realism given by Armstrong 1978 vol. 1, esp. chs.10 and 11, in which this approach is linked particularly with the names of Aristotle and Duns Scotus. 29. Seneca Epistle LXXXI 14; quoted in On the Basis of Morality p. 187 and at various places in WWR and Parerga. 30. For Kant on radical conversion see Rel. (6; 49–66). For Schopenhauer’s view of morality as an intermediate stage between affirmation and denial of the will to live, and of the latter as this connects to Christian concepts of conversion through grace, see WWR I secs.67, 68 and 70. 31. Schopenhauer’s position is thus structurally similar to that of a “possible worlds” theo- rist who tells us that X could have done something or could have possessed different properties because X does it, or possess those properties, in some other possible world. 32. Rel. pp. 20–1. That Kant does indeed think of the adoption of the fundamental maxim as being “only one” and “applying universally” in the sense I have been urging is shown by the immediate continuation of the passage: “Further, the man of whom we say, ‘He is by nature good or evil’, is to be understood not as the single individual (for 418 Notes

then one man could be understood as good, by nature, another as evil), but as the entire race” (by which he means “species”). That clearly connects with his doctrine of the universal propensity to evil. 33. See Morgan 2005 for a version of how Kant’s “Missing Formal Proof” might have gone. 34. See again n.23 for a preliminary sketch of such an account. I might add that Schopenhauer’s attitude to the explanation of the general ground-choice will to live itself is actually more agnostic than might at first be suggested by the way he routinely refers to the PSR as the basic form of all explanation. That he only intends this to hold of what I termed, in the last chapter, phenomenal explanations of phenomena is clear from the way he regards his own metaphysic of will as “making sense” of the world philosophically and, as it were, hermeneutically (cf. his repeated comparison of the world to a “text” or “cryptogram” whose “hieroglyphics” we do not understand if we remain locked into the explanatory forms of the PSR. See esp. WWR I, p. 97 and II p. 183). So he does leave conceptual space for a possible explanation of will, and of its manifold forms, in terms of something deeper, even though he denies we could have ever have access to such an explanation. 35. Book VI “The Russian Monk”. I use the translation given by Richard Freeborn 2003, p. 126.

8 The Identity of Persons

1. The concept of a “human being” as I shall understand this term in what follows, then, has the same sort of logical structure as the concept of a “symbol” in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. That is, a human being relates to a human body as what Wittgenstein means by a “symbol” relates to what he means by a “sign”, which he tells us at 3.32 “is what can be perceived as a symbol”. James Griffin (1964, pp. 128–9) has admirably summa- rized Wittgenstein’s conception of the relation of a sign to a symbol thus: “a symbol is more than but none the less includes a sign ... Wittgenstein speaks of what is essential in different symbols that can serve the same purpose ... since different symbols have the same sense, symbols must differ by having different signs. The sign must, therefore, be an essential part of the symbol, and symbols will be signs-plus-sense.” 2. See, for instance, Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy Part Two, Section 2, Ch.II, sec. C (3) on “The Idea of a Concrete Universal Unity”. 3. For classic statements of the view that identity is relative in the way just explained see Geach 1962 and 1967. The notion of a surman is Geach’s. I shall indicate later in the present chapter why I believe the relative identity theory should be rejected. For a discussion of the difference between “thick” and “thin” particularity, see Armstrong 1978 Vol. 1 pp. 111–16. Armstrong explains the distinction thus: “In the ...’thick’ conception a particular is a thing taken along with all its properties. But with respect to a particular in this sense we can distinguish between (but not separate) that in virtue of which it is a particular – its particularity [which Armstrong identifies with its spatio-temporal position] and its non-particular aspects – its properties. This yields us the ‘thin’ conception of a particular. It is a thing taken in abstraction from all its properties.” (p. 114). He goes on to add that if, in this way, “particularity plus universality yields particularity” in accordance with what he dubs the principle of the “victory of particularity” (p. 115) then, by the same token, much of the appeal of nominalism is exposed as spurious: “How easy, in these circumstances, to hold the view that everything is particular while overlooking that, in the sense in which this is true, the “particulars” involved already enfold universals within themselves.” And he claims that this “enfolding” entails that “the Realist ought to allow that two ‘numerically diverse’ [thick] particulars which have the same property are not wholly diverse. They are partially identical in nature and so are partially identical in nature.” (p. 112). Furthermore, he seems clear that Notes 419

what he is saying here has nothing to do with “relative identity” when shortly before on the same page he claims that “Partial identity, as when two things overlap but do no more than overlap, or when two things have some but not all the same properties so that their nature ‘overlaps’, can be understood readily enough. But identity is just identity”. To repeat, however, I am not necessarily committed to general realism about properties. So while I do want to identify human beings with thick or concrete particulars that are partially identical on account of instantiating certain non-predicable universals, this is only because I think all human beings are persons and that all persons must be partially identical. I leave it open whether or not human bodies are also a kind of (somewhat less) thick particular on account of instantiating real universal physical properties. 4. See Frege’s “On Sense and Reference” (1892) in Geach and Black ed. 1952, where the title is translated as “On Sense and Meaning”. 5. See Bernard Williams’s (1978, pp. 95–101) discussion of a well-known objection to Descartes’s cogito ergo sum. The objection maintains that Descartes had no right to assert “I am thinking”, but at most “Thinking is going on”. However, against this idea that thought can be given an impersonal formulation Williams notes (Ibid. p. 96) that from the occurrence of (T1): It is thought that p, and (T2): It is thought that q, it is unclear whether or not the thought (T3): It is thought: p and q, also occurs since T1 and T2 might occur quite separately. Similarly it is unclear, on the impersonal formulation whether or not (T4): It is thought that: it is not doubted whether q, is falsified by (T5) It is doubted; q? (Ibid., p. 97). He concludes (Ibid.) that “The obvious reaction to this problem is to relativize the content of T4 so that it refers only to its own thought- world”. The problem, I take it, is that unless judgements can be supported or falsified by – and thus consistent or inconsistent with – other judgements within a “thought- world” (whether the confines of that thought-world be determined by the activities of Cartesian “I” or a body) then, as we saw in Chapter 5, there can be no strongly purposive truth-aimedness and so no judgements at all. So relativization to a thought-world is intrinsic to the nature of judgement. 6. That “I” is “equivocal” seems at one time to have been the view of Wittgenstein, who is generally considered to have been influenced, at least in his early phase, by Schopenhauer. Peter Strawson 1959 p. 95 n.1, cites as evidence Moore’s articles in Mind (Vol. LXIV) on “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33” in which Wittgenstein “is reported to have held that the use of ‘I’ was utterly different in the case of ‘I have a toothache’ or ‘I see a red patch’ from its use in the case of ‘I’ve got a bad tooth’ or ‘I’ve got a matchbox’. He thought that there were two uses of ‘I’ and that in one of them ‘I’ was replaceable by ‘this body’... he also said that in the other use (... exemplified by ‘I have a bad toothache’ ...) the ‘I’ does not denote a possessor and that no Ego is involved in thinking or in having a toothache”. See Powell 1990, ch.6 for a useful Kant-oriented survey of post-Wittgensteinian discussions of the difficulty of settling on any clear rule of reference for “I” in light of its apparent immunity to reference-failure (with especial focus on Anscombe 1975, and the contributions of John Mackie and Strawson to Z.Van Straaten ed. 1980). More recently John Campbell (2002, p. 36) has urged that “there are two strands in the ordinary notion of the ownership of a thought”. 7. Another, not entirely dissimilar, way of dealing with the “too many deliberators” dilemma would involve invoking a distinction between an “I-user” as that which thinks “I”-thoughts on the one hand, and what those thoughts are about, or more precisely that which is referred to by “I”, on the other, along the lines suggested appealed to by Noonan (2003 ch.10, esp. pp. 209–11), in order to rebut, a “Two Many Minds” objection to psychological continuity accounts of personal identity. Noonan’s “I-using” human animal is the particular human body I have described as the subject of deliberation understood as the instantiator of thoughts (including, therefore also “I-thoughts”). What “I” refers to according to him, however, is just the psychologically continuous “person” thought of as a four-dimensionally extended particular, and so definitely not 420 Notes

a “person” as I understand it. It would take me too far out of my way to explain now why I do not think Noonan’s proposed rule of reference for “I” is forced on us (though the discussion of personal identity later in the present chapter has a bearing on this). In any case, for the purposes of my moral argument to come in the next chapter it will not matter whether we say that “I” refers to just the person (i.e. a certain kind of universal) or the human being, we need not press the matter here. But anything that can undermine the egoist’s assurance that “I” is a straightforwardly unproblematic concept is, to that extent, all to the good. 8. This, indeed, if it is not to be read as attributing an utter banality to Kant, is what I take to be implied by Keller’s account of “the basic, minimal idea that Kant tries to express with his notion of transcendental self-consciousness” namely: “When each of us refers to him- or herself by means of the expression ‘I’, each of us refers to him- or herself in a way that could, in principle, apply to any one of us.” (Keller 1998, p. 3) 9. One might mention also, in this vein, especially his summary of the fundamental mistake of rational psychology at KRV, B409: “The logical expression of thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical determination of an object”. There is also KRV, A381–2: “For in what we entitle ‘soul’, everything in is continual flux and there is nothing abiding except (if we must so express ourselves) the ‘I’, which is simple solely because its representation has no content ... This ‘I’ is ... the mere form of consciousness.” 10. See An Essay concerning Human Understanding bk.2, ch.27 sec.12, where Locke claims that a person’s awareness of being the same person “can be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances”. 11. Allison 1983 (p. 282), by contrast, regards Kant’s critique of “the Cartesian project” as centring upon the charge that Descartes “identifies [the] formal or transcendental ‘I’ with the real, or noumenal self” and that “as a result of this illicit identification Descartes erroneously believed that he had arrived by means of the cogito inference at a certainty with respect to his own existence as a particular thinking substance (res cogitans)”. I have no quarrel with the claim that Kant locates the key mistake of rational psychology in its confusion of our awareness of a formal, universal “I” with knowledge of a particular thinking substance. But why equate the latter, as opposed to the former, with what Kant regarded as the “real noumenal self”? After all, as Allison himself acknowledges (Ibid. p. 286), Kant’s own “official position” is that “the subject of apperception is identified simply with the noumenal or ‘real’ self”, and he goes on to quote Kant’s well-known Reflexionen (6001, Ak., XVIII, 420–1) which tells us that “The soul in transcendental apperception is substantia noumenon, hence it has no permanence in time, since this belongs only to objects in space” – which is exactly what we should expect Kant to say given, as we noted in the previous chapter, the way he reserves the term “noumenon” for whatever results from “making complete abstraction from our sensuous intuitions under the form of space and time” (to repeat the words we quoted from Paton), leaving us with what is “universal” or “essential” in particulars, and thus with something that is not “in” time at all in the sense of existing with any determinate duration. I shall shortly say a little more about Allison’s reasons for resisting the equation of the transcendental “I” with what is noumenal in any particular person – reasons which turn out to be far from nugatory, but which I believe can most fruitfully be accommodated by preserving that equation. 12. Commenting on the “transcendental subject = x” Kant talks about at KRV, A345–6/ B404) Keller says that “the dummy sortal x that stands in for different individual con- stants would be misunderstood if taken to mean than when we represent ourselves by means of I thoughts we are then mere bare particulars, or egos bare of any properties that one could come to know of through experience”. I agree with Keller that this would be a misunderstanding, but only because I don’t think the transcendental “I” is a dummy variable in the first place. Notes 421

13. By “this kind of solipsism” Collingwood must mean what, in Kantian terms, we should describe as “empirical solipsism” – the view that there is thought going on in only one particular body. That Kant’s position, as I have argued it ought to be interpreted, or at least reconstructed, implies the truth of “transcendental solipsism” seems equally clear – at least in the sense that the capacity of each embodied person to say truthfully that “I think” which, according to Kant, is transcendentally required as an a priori condition of all conceptualized representation, or thought, reflects the existence in each such person of one and the same universal “I”. 14. Not the least problematic aspect of this notion is that it is supposed to involve “an act of intuition” that “literally produces its own object” as Allison puts it (1983, p. 65). 15. Ibid. p. 66. Allison cites the CJ sec.77 Ak. VI, 407–410 (pp. 62–7 Meredith translation). 16. It may be wondered whether the distinction I appeal to here between empirical apperception and inner sense is really Kant’s. But while Kant often does run the two together (as e.g. when at KRV A107 he says that “Consciousness of self according to the determi- nations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed or abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense, or empirical apperception.”) Allison (1983, pp. 273–4) notes that he is “far from consistent in this matter”, citing A115, which characterizes empirical apperception as the “empirical consciousness of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were given, that is in recognition” as opposed to “Sense [which] represents appearances empirically in perception” and “imagination in association (and reproduction)”. This clearly alludes to the threefold synthesis of apprehension, imagination and (conceptual) recognition Kant has introduced a few pages beforehand and ties empirical apperception clearly to the latter, thus, as Allison observes, differentiating it from inner sense. In any event, I shall follow Allison in supposing that the “the contrast Kant really needs to draw is between a consciousness of the activity [of thinking] as it functions determinately with a given content and a thought of the same activity considered in abstraction from all content” and shall take empirical apperception to involve the former and transcendental apperception the latter. 17. Quoted by Allison 1983, p. 287, who cites the Anthropologie, sec. 7, Ak. 7, 142; and Die Fortschritte, Ak. XX, 270. 18. This account of how Kant thinks the apperceptive “I” relates to a human body is borne out by what he says in a passage from Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, pp. 324–5 which culminates in the claim that “my soul is as a whole in my whole body, and wholly in each part”. For something that can be wholly in a spatial whole and wholly in all its parts is a universal, as I am using this term. 19. After expressing the view that “What we may call the intelligible content of the judgement is the same in all judgements expressible as “that flash was before this bang”“ (1957 p. 63) Geach borrows this terminology from Aquinas (Summa Theologica Ia q. 86 art.1) who employed it in his account of “how we judge about sensible particulars” (Geach 1957, p. 65). What Geach here calls the “intelligible content” of a judgement cannot straightforwardly be equated with Fregean “sense”, which is supposed always to determine a reference, and in the case of the sense of a statement, a truth-value. We might therefore follow David Bell 1979 pp. 112ff. (who borrows the terminology from Wiggins 1971) in distinguishing between “input sense” and “output sense”, and reserve the former for the pre-conversio content of judgements proper and the latter for the truth-apt content of those p-event statement-tokens which achieve reference to particulars courtesy of the instantiation of universal judgements in some particular context. Thus, to use Bell’s example, your statement “I ate plum pudding today” and mine have different output senses – even if said on the same day - but the same input sense. In terms of the account of judgement developed in the last three chapters we might say that this is because the p-event which expresses your judgement generates a different statement from the p-event which expresses mine, even though those p-events instantiate the same act of judgement. 422 Notes

20. The distinction between being wholly and entirely located in a time or place is nicely deployed by Josh Parsons (2003 pp. 3–4). 21. The main options, if we discount the spatially divided survival of the original person in two half-brained bodies, are to conclude that (I) the original person fails to survive in either the fission or the single transplant case (the logic of Williams’s argument points to this); (II) s/he survives in the single transplant case but not in the fission case (Nozick 1981); (III) s/he survives in the single transplant case but if fission occurs then there will have been two persons occupying the one pre-fission body each of whom survives in a half-brained body (Lewis 1976; Noonan 2003); (IV) The original person might for all we know have survived in only one – but never two – of the half-brained bodies but we cannot know whether this is so or whether the original person has survived the single transplant operation (Butler 1736; Reid 1941, orig. 1785; Chisholm 1969; Swinburne (in Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984); (V) Identity is not what matters in survival (Parfit 1971 and 1984). All of these positions should, I take it, seem hard to swallow. The counter-intuitiveness of III (which none of its defenders deny) hardly needs labouring. But Noonan (2003) brings out very effectively the difficulties involved in (I), (II), (IV) and (V) as well. 22. In the Essay bk.2 ch. 27 sec.8 Locke says that “the same successive body not shifted all at once must ... go to the making of the same man” (i.e. human being) whereas in sec. 10, entitled “Consciousness makes personal identity”, he argues that personal identity depends only on sameness of consciousness. 23. See Geach 1962 and 1967. 24. Perry 1970 and Wiggins 1980 give this argument against relative identity. I borrow this handy formulation of it from Hughes 1989, p. 157. 25. This should already be clear for the reasons already given in the first section of this chapter. 26. Noonan 2003, pp. 87–93 draws the point out of Quine 1976. 27. In Leibniz 1989. 28. Ibid. p. 382. Johnston does not advocate the rejection of C but rather is arguing that surviving at a distance from oneself deserves to be treated as an option alongside those more common responses to the RA mentioned in n.21. 29. It may be objected that by indexing properties to times, places etc. in the way suggested by Johnston, we are forced to treat what surely are intrinsic properties like heat, shape, weight and colour, as really always relations between subjects and times or subjects and places/space-time regions/worlds. In which case, the perdurantist might

urge, if X’s being hot at t1 is not, absurdly, to be a matter of its bearing a certain relation to a certain time (t1) then we are going to have to acknowledge that it is a temporal part of X that has that property (see D. Lewis 1986, pp. 202–5). To avoid this argument we may follow Parsons 2004 in postulating, for any ordinary non-indexed property P (like heat or mass or colour), a “P-distribution” (p. 7). In the case of temporally indexed properties, for instance, Parsons avers that we may embrace four-dimensional space- time objects (contra “presentism” which supposes that only the present really exists) whilst denying the perdurantist view that these are aggregates of temporal parts, by

treating the difference between a poker which is hot at t1 and cold at t2 and one which is cold at t1 and hot at t2 as being a matter of the different heat distributions of two enduring objects. Coining the term “entension” for the spatial version of endurance (i.e. for an object’s being wholly present in all the parts of space over which it extends, thereby itself lacking proper spatial parts), he then proposes that a sphere which is red in one half and blue in the other might be regarded as an entending object which has

no particular colour but a colour distribution that makes it red at s1 (its left half) and blue at s2 (its right half). Similarly, he suggests, the Spinozist can treat the difference in mass between two material objects as a matter of the one entending substance having a mass-distribution that renders it more massive at one place than another “in just the same way as a hammer is more massive at its head than at its handle” – from which, Notes 423

of course, it no more follows that the Absolute is “more massive than itself” than the hammer is (2004, p. 7). In each case, Parsons claims, the given property-distribution is itself a property that is not relational or extrinsic in any objectionable way and is to be thought of as explaining why a given item is P at some times or places and not at others (or, in the modal case, why a trans-world individual is P in some of the possible worlds in which it exists and not in others). Johnston himself (1987) and Haslanger 1989 have also offered non-presentist accounts of endurantism. For a useful conspec- tus of the debate between presentists and “eternalists” and some discussion of how these positions relate to the issue dividing endurantists from perdurantists see Loux 1998, ch.6. 30. Since Spinoza’s view is that confusion and inconsistency and moral imperfection occur only at the level of finite modes he would consider himself to have pre-empted this objection as well, but it would take us too far out of our way to say anything useful about that here. 31. Schopenhauer 1965, p. 195. What Schopenhauer actually says at this point is that “responsibility can be found “only in the esse (what we are)” (my italicization of “only”); but that this is a piece of characteristic overstatement is indicated by his very next sentence: “It is true that the reproaches of conscience primarily and ostensibly concern what we have done, but really and ultimately what we are; for our deeds alone afford us conclusive evidence of what we are.” A vivid illustration, which may carry more weight with anyone for whom the views of Father Zossima, mentioned at the end of the last chapter, savour too much of the morally extreme or exotic, is the case of Captain Brierly in Conrad’s novel Lord Jim. The superbly competent and professional Brierly was one of the assessors at the official naval enquiry held to investigate the desertion of the Patna (carrying hundreds of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca) by Jim and the rest of the crew. Shortly after the hearing Brierly commits suicide by throwing himself overboard from a ship he is commanding. Marlowe, the narrator, comments that “he was probably holding silent inquiry into his own case. The verdict must have been of unmitigated guilt, and he took the secret of the evidence with him in that leap into the sea” (p. 95 Norton Critical Edition). That Conrad was especially preoccupied with Schopenhauer’s conception of character is convincingly argued by Norman Stinchcombe in his recent (currently unpublished) Ph.D. dissertation Understanding Ourselves: Character and Self- knowledge in Conrad and Schopenhauer. 32. Noonan 2003 pp. 188–9 challenges Williams’s argument by appealing (inter alia) to this distinction between different kinds of amnesia. 33. Cf. Millgram 1997 pp. 152–3: “One’s own beliefs, desires, ends, pleasures and practical judgments of other kinds enter into one’s thinking directly, that is, as a basis for inference. For example, if I belief that p, I am willing to infer things from p. But if I discover that Smith believes that p, no such inferences are directly underwritten ... If I want X, I may begin calculating straight off how to get X. That is, if I have a goal, I take the fact that bringing about such-and-such would be a way of attaining the goal to be a prima facie reason to bring about such-and-such: whereas if Smith has a goal, the correlative fact will seem to me to be no direct reason at all.” 34. I follow Parsons 2004 in using “entension”/”entending” as the spatial equivalent of “endurance”/”enduring” so that something “entends” when it is wholly occupies spatially disjunct regions at the same time. 35. The “feeling in” of genuine compassion is thus not just “feeling with” the other, which would reduce it to something like an infection which I could otherwise rid myself of by removing myself from the influence of the other. Rather, one directly enjoys the other’s pleasure and hates their pain in a way which expresses itself in the fact that one does not regard, say, that suffering simply as a source of unpleasant feelings in oneself which could be alleviated as well by forgetting about the other as by helping them. 36. The Lockean side of Schopenhauer’s account of conscience is very much to the fore in OBM (see esp. pp. 195–7). 424 Notes

37. More fully and vividly: “... to the perpetrator of the wrong the knowledge presents itself that in himself he is the same will which appears also in that [other] body, and affirms itself in the one phenomenon with such vehemence that, transgressing the limits of its own body and its powers, it becomes the denial of the very will in the other phenomenon. Consequently, regarded as will in itself, it struggles with itself through its vehemence and tears itself to pieces. I say that this knowledge presents itself to him instantly, not in the abstract, but as an obscure felling. This is called remorse, the sting of conscience, or more accurately in this case, the feeling of wrong committed.” (WWR I, p. 335) 38. Earlier in the very same chapter of WWR II which ends with the characterization of sympathy just quoted we get: “Thus nature has her centre in every individual, for each one is the entire will-to-live. Therefore, even if this individual is only an insect or a worm, nature herself speaks out of it as follows: ‘I alone am all in all; in my mainte- nance is everything involved; the rest may perish, it is really nothing’ ” (p. 599). 39. Schopenhauer says this connection is made “everywhere” in Kant but gives a specific reference only to the Critique of Practical Reason “page 175, R.228” [Ak. 97]. 40. That “foreign” of course needs to be interpreted in the light of our distinction between strong and weak temporality (or spatiality) as putting the thing-in-itself beyond the former, not the latter. 41. Naturally no defence of Schopenhauer’s doctrine that compassion is a form of intuitive metaphysical knowledge that starts from what Kant says about the way I must represent other thinking beings is, to that extent, going to deliver the principle Schopenhauer thought applicable to all willing and not just all thinking creatures. I shall postpone until the next chapter any discussion of the question of how a reconstructed categorical imperative may relate to moral concern for animals that are not rational persons. That there is nothing inherently un-Kantian about making a notion of compassion central to the account of moral worth, whatever Schopenhauer may himself have thought, will also be argued in our final chapter.

9 Recovering the Categorical Imperative

1. Williams’ other main criticism of Kant, to recall our discussion from the last section of Chapter 1, is that he overlooks a crucial distinction between the standpoints of practical and theoretical deliberation since “Practical deliberation is in every case first- personal, and that the first person is not derivative or naturally replaced by anyone. The action I decide on will be mine, and ... its being mine means not just that it will be arrived at by this deliberation, but that it will involve changes in the world of which I shall empirically be the cause, and of which these desires and this deliberation will be the cause” (1985, pp. 68–9). But the judgements I decide upon in theoretical deliberation will also be mine and might also involve changes in the “world” (if that includes my brain, at least) even if I don’t express them publicly in speech or writing – for my theoretical deliberation will be, as expressed in various p-events, the empirical cause of these changes as well. As we saw in Chapter 5, the fact that I don’t explicitly mention myself when asking what is true, does not mean that I am not implicitly pursuing the truth-aim, and am thereby principally concerned to work out how I may collect a truth, just as in moral deliberation I need not be thinking explicitly of myself when I ask whether certain sorts of action are permissible. 2. Actually Korsgaard may have done this too, and there is a certain irony in the fact that she brackets both Gewirth and the Nagel of The Possibility Altruism together as offering neo-Kantian justifications that proceed in a similar way to the arguments offered by Hobbes, and neo-Hobbesians like David Gauthier, inasmuch as they “attempt to argue us from having private reasons into having public ones” (Korsgaard, 1996b, p. 135) in a manner that suggests that Prichard “would be right after all” about moral philosophy Notes 425

resting on a mistake. “These neo-Kantian justifications” she says (Ibid. p. 133) “charac- teristically begin by showing that you are rationally committed to a certain normative conception of yourself, or to valuing certain features of yourself. They then try to move from that conclusion to the further conclusion that you must hold the same normative conception of others, or value the same normative features in them, on pain of contradiction. Since I regard my humanity as the source of value, I must in the name of consistency regard your humanity that way as well”. That, too, sounds “a lot like” what Korsgaard herself thinks! 3. There is a further reason why especially Schopenhauer cannot be morally embarrassed by having to balance the thought that “In harming you I am harming myself” by the thought that “In benefiting myself I am benefiting you”. For Schopenhauer’s pes- simism is largely founded on the contention that pain is the primary, positive reality and that pleasure is merely negative, the cessation of pain. Hence for Schopenhauer no infliction of suffering on another for the purpose of one’s own pleasures could possibly be exonerated by the supposed neutralization of harms by benefits in the way suggested. 4. I am grateful to Harold Noonan for pressing this objection in correspondence. 5. One can, of course, be someone who enjoys both in equal measure but that is irrelevant to the point at issue, which is that if one is not like that, then this will typically not be something that one “ought” to try to alter about oneself. 6. This is why Nietzsche’s jibe at Schopenhauer in Beyond Good and Evil (sec.186) is so badly off the mark, when he rhetorically asks: “And by the way: a pessimist, a world denier and God-denier, who comes to a halt before morality – who affirms morality and plays the flute, affirms laede nemimen [harm no-one] morality: what? Is that actually a pessimist?” But Schopenhauer most definitely does not “come to a halt” before morality. The whole point of Book IV of WWR is precisely to portray morality as a transitional state en route to true salvation in denial of the will to life. This is made abundantly clear throughout the later stages of that book. We can perhaps let the following statement from Vol. II (p. 608) suffice: “The moral virtues are not really the ultimate end but only a step towards it.” It would be tedious to recount all other the instances where Schopenhauer states or obviously implies that the altruist has not seen into to the ultimate depths of the metaphysical nature of willing, but is in a sort of intermediate condition between affirmation and denial of the will. 7. Another, less gloomy and more life-affirmative way of accounting for the special value we readily attribute to radically selfless actions of the kind involved in cases of extreme self-sacrifice for other individuals would involve acknowledging the sense in which that value is indeed moral or ethical in nature, but of a supererogatory and thus not strictly obligatory kind. The “far, far better thing” which Dickens’s Sydney Carton does when, in A Tale of Two Cities, he goes to his death at the guillotine in place of Darnay out of his unrequited love for Lucie, may seem to suggest elements of Schopenhauerian turning away from life in the way it is coupled with the prospect of the “far, far better rest than I have ever known”. But it is surely only his own suffering he turns away from here without in any way ceasing to value the life he still loves in the guise of Lucie herself. And it is a morally better thing that he does just because he does it from a clear-eyed perception of others’ interests that do now outweigh his own, and precisely because their happiness cannot be outweighed by any happiness of his in remaining alive. In that respect he viewed the situation morally and in doing so did what we all have an obligation always to try to do; but it may sometimes be especially impressive to succeed in doing what one has an obligation to try to do, in a way which gives that success a supererogatory moral value, such that there could be no blame attached to failing to do it. Furthermore, having viewed the situation morally, Carton was not obliged to make the decision he did to go to his death, as though that decision simply reflected a balance of reasons that could have been clear to him in advance of making the decision itself. Rather, his taking that decision to stand in for Darnay simply out 426 Notes

of love for Lucie and her love for Darnay, and without any intervening thoughts about his own interests intruding, is itself inseparable from what makes it the case that his own desire to remain alive no longer counts for him. And the “rest” to which he goes is partly, one feels, a deep moral peace he already feels from the certitude he can now finally enjoy that at last he has, in this way, acted from a properly moral motive (to recall the “demonstration of value” point we have just made in the text). 8. Actually it is far from clear that Kant was thinking specifically of the Gospel commandment in the passage from the Critique of Judgment cited by Mitchell, which is from a footnote in sec.30 (91) (Meredith transl., Second Part, p. 146. Mitchell uses the Bernard translation, in which the note is attached to p. 410). But it is hard to imagine Kant wanting to disown Mitchell’s application of what he says there. 9. The situation here, indeed, seems to me to be similar to what happens when we find things funny or amusing. A certain kind of self-conscious reasoning is the death of a sense of humour, and yet, along with the possibility of belly-laughs and uncontrollable titters there must be what is actually a high-level intellectual capacity of a kind it is difficult to attribute to any non-human animals but which even very small children can possess, to “see” or “get” joke. While we may not, in advance of reflection, be able to articulate the nature of the incongruity we are responding to, this can nonetheless only be salient for a creature possessed of abstract concepts, however rudimen- tary these may be. Cf. Schopenhauer (WWR I, p. 59): “In every case, laughter results from nothing but the suddenly perceived incongruity between a concept and the real objects that had been thought through it in some relation; and laughter itself is just an expression of this incongruity.” 10. That, I take it, is what Bernard Williams had in mind when he complained about the tendency of utilitarianism to take the concept of what is morally right too far away from the notion of what we actually ought to be guided by in our particular actions (see e.g. his 1981, p. 53). 11. Wood (2008, p. 49) puts it well: “When we turn to ethical theory in the face of hard cases, we should ... be less interested in being told what to do than in being assisted in thinking better about what to do. On a theoretical level, this means understanding better the reasons not only why one should do one thing rather than another, but also why some moral decisions are difficult, and why there is no single, clearly right answer to some moral dilemmas.” See also his section on “Moral judgment” from the same chapter (3) where he makes the point that Kant was not only well aware of this but had indeed a concept of “judgement” as something we need to exercise in moral matters precisely because it is not possible to formulate in precise, hard-and-fast, general terms when exceptions are to be made to the most important moral rules. The idea that the categorical nature of particular moral rules meant, for Kant, that they are exceptionless obligations is based on “the crudest possible misunderstanding (Ibid. p. 63) since “A categorical imperative is unconditional in the sense that its rational validity does not presuppose any end, given independently of that imperative. But this is far from implying that the obligatoriness of particular moral rules is unconditional. For instance, respect for rational nature might normally require compliance with a certain rule, but there could well be conditions under which it does not, and under those conditions the rule would simply not be a categorical imperative at all”. This should, indeed, be evident from the fact that Kant recognized a class of “imperfect duties”, such as the duty to be charitable, that admitted of exceptions “in the interest of inclination” (Gr. 421; 53 n.) and yet which, when they apply, do so categorically on the basis of the FUL. A rule can be categorical in the sense that when it applies it does so unconditionally, that is, not because of some empirical desire or need which following it helps to satisfy. But that does not mean it is unconditional in the sense of “applying in all circumstances”. 12. A standard complaint about Kant’s derivation of a perfect duty not to commit suicide is that it relies on natural law assumptions about the function of “self-love” being “to Notes 427

stimulate the furtherance of life” (Gr. 422; 54) so that a maxim of ending one’s life for the sake of self-love (to reduce one’s unhappiness) could not be made into a law of nature without contradicting this purpose. 13. The Latin form in which Schopenhauer usually gives this is: Neminem laede, imo omnes, quantum potes, juva. (See for instance OBM p. 97) 14. C.S. Lewis (1955, p. 2) puts this nicely: “Quarrelling means trying to show that the other man is in the wrong. And there would be no sense in trying to do that unless you and he had some sort of agreement as to what Right and Wrong are; just as there would be no sense in saying that a footballer had committed a foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of football.” And, of course, agreement about the rules governing fouling or offside can hardly be meaningfully ascribed to people who disagree too often and too radically about what is and what is not a foul or is offside. If they did that on every conceivable occasion then one would have to conclude that they meant different things by the words “foul” and “offside”. 15. How can an interpretation of Christ’s injunction which has that corollary possibly be squared with, say, Luke 14; 26: “If anyone comes to Me and does not hate his father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, yes, and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple” (NKJV)? Leaving aside the point that my main concern has been to find a defensible interpretation of that injunction, and thus not necessarily an historically accurate one, I can only say that, as far as I am aware, the majority of biblical scholars would agree with F.F. Bruce’s (1983, p. 592) reading of the term “hate” here (for the Greek miseo) as reflecting a tendency in Semitic cultures to use the extreme language of absolutes to mark comparative preferences. Thus one is to “hate” one’s family merely in the sense of never preferring them to God (cf. “I’d hate to have beer when I could have a whisky”). This reading makes much better sense in light of e.g. Matthew 10; 37 “He who loves father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me. And he who loves son or daughter more than Me is not worthy of Me.” See also Genesis 29; 30–1, which speaks of Jacob “hating” his wife Leah when it is clear that what is meant is that he loved Rachel more, and that Leah was at most “unloved” by him in that sense (the NKJV uses this term instead of the Lit. hated). It is in any case consistent with my reading of “love thy neighbour as thyself” since Luke 14; 26 tells us to “hate” our “own lives” too – again meaning “in comparison with God”, to love whom above all is the first commandment with which that injunction is coupled (as we noted in Chapter 6). That Christ should be concerned to emphasize this is perfectly consistent with his primary goal of awakening, firstly, his own people, the Jews, to the fact that they had been giving too much preference to their “neighbours” and to themselves at the expense of wider moral concern for all others simply as children of God – and that in that sense they had not been properly morally motivated at all. “God” in this context would have to be looked for in the direction of that transcendental subject present in all which, as we saw in Chapter 6 in connection with the transcendental idealism that best makes sense of Kant’s Second Analogy argument, does in a certain manner underpin the very laws of nature itself. But that, of course, raises immense issues I cannot go further into here. 16. This is a significant theme in Part 4 of Spinoza’s Ethics. See also Bertrand Russell’s Political Ideals (p. 11) for the view that “The best life is one in which the creative impulses play the largest part and the possessive impulses the smallest” – where the latter “aim at acquiring or retaining private goods that cannot be shared, while the former ‘aim at bringing into the world or making available for use the kinds of goods in which there is no privacy and no possession’ ”. 17. See Spinoza’s Ethics, Part Four Prop. 72, and esp. the attached Scholium, for a very Kantian justification of the claim that “A free man never acts deceitfully, but always with good faith” – a claim that is all the more astonishing for Spinoza to make since he goes out of his way to insists that one should not lie even to save oneself from immi- nent death, despite having told us in Part 3 (Props. 6 and 7) that the conatus to preserve 428 Notes

itself in being is the actual essence of each thing and, subsequently, that all value derives from this essence. How he thinks he can square these two apparently starkly incompatible views would take far too long to discuss adequately here. Suffice to say Spinoza’s background argument for Ethics IV Prop. 72 seems in the end no more clear or compelling than Kant’s notoriously obscure and unconvincing digging in of heels (in his essay “On the Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives” in Beck transl. 1949) when replying to a criticism made by Benjamin Constant (in the Journal France for 1797, Part IV, No.1, pp. 123–4) of his view that (in Constant’s words) “it would be a crime to lie to a murderer who asked whether our friend who is pursued by him had taken refuge in our house”. Kant does not mention the FUL in this reply, concentrating rather on making various jurisprudential points in answer to Constant’s claim that it is a duty to tell the truth “only in respect to one who has a right to the truth. But no-one has a right to a truth which injures others”. It seems worth noting, however, that while making an exception to the duty to tell the truth in the interests of inclination might well, if universalized, lead to the sort of breakdown of general trust that would make it impossible for liars to achieve their selfish purposes in lying, it is far less clear that such a breakdown would ensue if, instead, the exception was made for the purpose of fulfilling the duty of benevolence towards the innocent. To that extent it is therefore also unclear that the FUL prohibits lying from a benevolent motive, whatever Kant himself thought. 18. Only actual, or actual and potential persons? For my purposes that question may be left open. Obviously, it brings us to some huge issues in moral theory and practical ethics which I cannot do justice to here, including the issue of whether, for example, human embryos should be regarded as simply non-persons, or whether, as potential persons, their interests should carry the same weight or sort of weight as those of actual persons, or at least much more weight than those of creatures who are not even potential persons. 19. I gather that this is a misattribution. If so, the explanation will presumably be clear. 20. This seems to be the clear implication of what Kant says in MM (p. 225; 429) in a section on “Lying” at the start of the chapter entitled “Man’s Duty to Himself Merely as a Moral Being”. Shortly before this (MM p. 216; 420) he describes lying, avarice and false humility as the vices that are directly contrary to “man’s duty to himself as a moral being only” and the virtue that is opposed to these vices as love of honour (MM p. 217). 21. Commenting on Charles Fried’s (1970) example of a man who can rescue only one of a group of survivors of a shipwreck, which includes his wife, Williams claims in his paper “Persons, character and morality” that there is a problem with requiring the man to save his wife on the grounds that doing so is permitted by a moral principle, for “this construction provides the agent with one thought too many. It might have been hoped by some (for instance by his wife), that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife” (1981, p. 18). 22. Cf. Michael Smith (1994, p. 75). 23. This very passage is also quoted, apparently with approval, by Bernard Reginster (2006, p. 169), as presenting a serious problem for Kant’s ability to account for our pre-theoretical intuitions about morality. 24. Michael Stocker (1976) introduced this much discussed example. Bibliography

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