IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI Parliament |National parliaments |Democratic legitimacy |EUinstitutions |European the Union’s democratic deficit. discuss specific reform options and what they may imply for capture thepresent challenges facingtheEU. In thelastpartI These arepresented andassessed in terms of how well they several possible democratic decision-making configurations. In order tobestcapture thesechanges,it isuseful toapply altered thedemocratic-legitimacy problems facing theEU. have not only exacerbated but toa considerable degreealso transformed theEU. Themany crisesandtheirhandling highlighted. Next, Idiscusshow thecontext of crisishas the institutional-constitutional, andthesocio-cultural, are legitimacy problem facing themultilevel EU. Two dimensions, In thispaper, Istartbyspecifyingthenature of thedemocratic- but thereisnoagreement on thespecific nature of thisdeficit. It iswidely heldthat theEUsuffers from ademocratic deficit, ABSTRACT by John ErikFossum Challenges andOptions andLegitimacy intheEU: keywords IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI 2 624, https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/deficit.pdf. 624, Union”, of CommonEuropean Market Studies Journal in the in Legitimacy Reassessing Deficit’: ‘Democratic of the Defence “In Moravcsik, Andrew See approach. amisguided is perspective ademocratic it from assessing so organisation, purpose alimited- is EU the that claiming that, opposed strongly has particular in Moravcsik Andrew * 1 democratically-deficient, But even among thegreat majority of analysts that chargetheEUwith being EU againstdemocratic legitimacy norms. a gap is an acknowledgement of the fact that we can or should assess the multilevel the notion that thereisagap betweenfactsandnorms. Thevery invocation of such decision-makers andpublics lambasttheEUfor its democratic deficit, theyinvoke deficit. By “deficit” wegenerally refer to adeficiency ora shortfall. When analysts, There isawidely-held view totheeffect that theEUsuffers from ademocratic Introduction by John ErikFossum* Challenges andOptions Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions . [email protected]. specify more precisely the nature of the democratic legitimacy problem facing the views astothelevel of governance that isparticularly hit, underlinestheneedto The factthat therearesuch different views of what causes adeficit, anddifferent meaning that it hasnotintegrated enough). the EU’s deficit stemsfrom thefactthat it hasnotmade up for these(generally the inadequacies of national democracy inanincreasingly interdependent world; analysts argue that theEuropean integration process isnecessarytomake up for democracy, andits ills areinturninflicted upon national . Other democracy. Theyclaimthat theEuropean integration process isinhospitable to causes it. Some argue that the European integration process undermines national Copyright © Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Centro Studi sul Federalismo (CSF). sul Federalismo Studi Centro and (IAI) Internazionali Affari © Istituto Copyright Programme. Affairs International Paolo, San di Compagnia with partnership strategic of the framework of the in (CSF) sul Federalismo Turin Studi Centro and (IAI) Internazionali Affari Paper prepared within the context of “Governing Europe”, a joint project led by the Istituto Istituto the by led Europe”, ajoint project of “Governing context the within prepared Paper John Erik Fossum is professor at ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. E-mail: of Oslo. University Studies, for European Centre at ARENA professor is Fossum Erik John

Prior to the crisis, at least, some analysts disagreed that the EU harboured a democratic deficit. deficit. ademocratic harboured EU the that disagreed analysts some at least, crisis, to the Prior 1 thereisdisagreement astowhere thedeficit lies, and what , Vol. 40, No. 4 (November 2002), p. 603- p. 2002), , Vol. No. 4(November 40, IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI 3 that theEUisunfit for democracy. Theargument isthat thereisno European the more disconnected tothecitizens theEUwill be.Behindthislurks thenotion articulated bytheeurosceptics. Theyargue that themore integration proceeds, The firstchallenge hasdirectbearings on the second, which ismost forcefully entrenching representative democracyat theEU-level. weight andcredenceof established democratic procedures shape theefforts at already established democracies. Thus, even if the EU is a novel typeof entity the and justifythesystemtocitizens. EUdemocratisation takes placeinacontext of with democratic precepts; render the system transparent; and find a way to explain control; obtainadecision-making presence,formally andsubstantively, inline catch up; reininandrenderthesystemsubject toparliamentary oversight and European) have – with some success at least prior to the crisis – been trying to experts. Popularly-elected bodies at all threemainlevels (regional, national and components of this systemthat areparticularly designed tocater toexecutives and the recent institutionalisation of theEurozone, tomention anumber of thekey the Commission’s “expert role”, theComitology system,agencification, and the Council Secretariat. Executives andexpertsenjoy aprivileged role through increased salience of theEuropean Council andthebuild-up of competence in in theMaastricht pillars IIandIII),have seentheirrole strengthenedwith the the prominent role of theCouncil configurations inEUdecision-making (especially experts. Executive officials have long enjoyed privileged process-access through “catching up” with an integration process that has been driven by executives and point isthat EUdemocratisation hasfrom theEU’s very inception, beenamatter of The firstchallenge could besaidtobuilt into theintegration process itself. The institutional-constitutional, andthesecond isbroader and more socio-cultural. The focus ison two central democratic legitimacy challenges. Thefirstis problems facingtheEU. exacerbated but also to aconsiderable extent altered thedemocratic legitimacy handling. Thereason for focusing explicitly on thecrisisisthat it hasnotonly the EU, andthereafterfocus on theproblems emanating from thecrisisandits In this section I first briefly spell out the democratic legitimacy problem facing distortive? 1. What istheEU’s democratic problem: Is it unfit, inadequate, or options (intermsof rectifyingmeasures)theygive riseto. the present challenges facingtheEU. In thelastpartIdiscusswhich specific reform decision-making configurations. I discuss how relevant and how well they capture problem facingthemultilevel EU. After that, Ispell out several possible democratic In thefollowing, Istartbyspecifyingthenature of thedemocratic legitimacy in thenature andthemagnitude of theirdemocratic shortfalls. EU. Many political systemsaredemocratically-deficient; yet theydiffer considerably Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI 4 should bepartof thepeople. It becomes aninfinite regress. people. That inturnbegsthequestion of who selects thosethat determinewho theoretical problem is to establish who determines who should form part of the to beaparticular historical moment or instancewhereby apeople isformed. The the authors of thelaw or thedemocratic demosshould be,with theneedfor there theory, namely that democracyhasnodemocratic procedure for establishingwho “No-demos” adherents tendtoconflate acentral problem plaguingdemocratic which people-forming isapolitical process that canbeinstitutionally-entrenched. elected institution topress for astronger say inEUpolicy-making.” employs its institutional levers anddemocratic credentials astheEU’s only directly he history of theEPisa history of astruggle for recognition andpower […]theEP It isthisrole that theEPhasassumedinEU. As BertholdRittberger notes,“[t] itself byshowing tothoseaddressedthat theclaim canbeproperly substantiated. the citizens asEuropean citizens. Thentheissue will befor thesystem toredeem a minimum therehastobeaEuropean-level entity that claimstobespeaking of self-bind;such aprocess isunlikely toproduce aviable democratic system.At will beobvious limits tothedegreewhich some states will succumb toasystem open-ended because eachstate will needtoconsent tothemeasurestaken. There central role tostates ascollectives, i.e.confers veto on eachstate, isboundtobe of democratisation that professes tobedemocratic inthesensethat it affords a capable of making the transition to a viable democracy is another issue. A process governance cannotbecome democratic. WhethertheEUinits present state is In extension of this,thereisnothingtosuggest that asupranational systemof addressed asthepeople must consistently beable toredeemthat claim. themselves toasystemof rule. People-forming isanongoing matter because those and willing toredeemsuch aclaimbyseeingthemselves asapeople andsubjecting the people, andthepeople takes shape when thoseaddressedbytheclaimareable in people-forming. People-forming isafunction of someone claimingtorepresent forming isapolitical act,andrepresentation plays afundamental constitutive role p. 645. p. 2 of thepeople isnotahistorical event. It isanongoing claimthat wemake.” The conflation, however, isunwarranted. As Sofia Näsström puts it:“The constitution “no-demos” thesis,but also thedemoicracy approach, entity that canhelp todevelop such. In my view, thisisnotacredible assertion. The democratic demos andnoEuropean public sphere,andtheEUisnottypeof Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 5 4 3 274. UnionPhilosophical of Foundations European Law (eds.), Eleftheriadis Pavlos and Julie Dickson in Demoicracy”, of Idea European “The Nicolaïdis, Union”, of Common Market Studies Journal in The Journal of Political Philosophy Political of Journal Group Rights”, The through in

Berthold Rittberger, “Integration without Representation? The European Parliament and the the and Parliament European The Representation? without “Integration Rittberger, Berthold Claus Offe, “‘Homogeneity’ and Constitutional Democracy: Coping with Identity Conflicts Conflicts Identity with Coping Democracy: Constitutional and “‘Homogeneity’ Offe, Claus Francis Cheneval and Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Case for Demoicracy in the European European the in for Demoicracy Case “The Schimmelfennig, Frank and Cheneval Francis Political Theory thePeople”, in Political of Legitimacy “The Näsström, Sofia , Vol. 51, No. 2 (March 2013), p. 334-350; and Kalypso Kalypso 334-350; p. and 2013), , Vol. No. 2(March 51, , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 247- p. 2012, Press, University Oxford , Oxford, , Vol. No. 113-141. 2(June p. 6, 1998), 2 understate themannerin , Vol. 35, No. 5 (October 2007), 2007), , Vol. No. 5(October 35, 3 5 4 People- IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI 5 185. Journal Law European in Parliament?”, European for the Place 6 2014), 1175. p. (November of Common Market Studies Journal EU”, in the in Governance of Economic Reform given powers tofill thegap. see theirfiscal sovereignty beingseverely constrained, andtheEPhasnotbeen control at all three key levels: EU, member state, and regional. National parliaments The crisisandits handling have weakened democratic systemsof monitoring and 2. Thecrisis–Atransformed EU? distinct challenges, asIwill show inthebelow. which neednotbemutually compatible. That presents thedemocratic bodies with the democratic bodies will find themselves simultaneously pulled in two directions whilst at thesametimetryingtocatch up with theintegration process. In that sense both challenges simultaneously. Thedemocratic bodies must connect tocitizens The EU’s needtoconnect with thecitizens isamatter of somehow dealing with such amannerastobeconvincing tocitizens. compelling narrative that iscapable of justifyingtheEU, andthat isput across in public sphere.And it isanintellectual issue aswell: toprovide anadequate and to foster asenseof attachment totheEUthat will permeate civil society andthe Connecting tothecitizens also hasanimportant emotional-symbolic dimension: a step forward, inthat EP elections become more visibly matters of political choice. and policy substance. In that sensethelatest EPelection with Spitzenkandidaten is interests areadequately represented andreflected, intheEU’s symbols,procedures understand themselves to be members of the community and that their views and that it requiresbuild-up of theinstitutional hardware that isrequiredfor citizens to process to connect properly to the citizens. This is an institutional matter in the sense The second challenge istherefore theneedfor theEUsystemandfor theintegration Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 7 problematic in the sense of who represents whom. of who represents sense the in problematic highly accountability and transparency it renders for manipulation; space up considerable opens This relate. they which to audiences different the to messages different communicate can they that is implies that What constituency. European promote the as well as constituencies national to accountable be and represent mandate: adual have York,New They 52-68. p. Routledge, 2014, of Crisis? in Times in the Democratic Union. European Political Representation Still (ed.), Kröger Sandra in Crisis”, the and Representation of EU Structure “The Fossum, Erik John see term this For bodies.” shape-shift “institutionalised are configurations Council the and Council have beenreconfigured through thecrisis. how power relations andpatterns of democratic authorisation andaccountability the citizens. How thesechallenges aretobeaddressedrequirespaying attention to with executives and experts; the same applies to the question of connecting with the crisishasaltered theterms underwhich democratic bodies areable tocatch up has beentheEuropean Parliament, which wassidelined inthecrisisresponse. Thus,

Cristina Fasone, “European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Representation. What What Representation. Parliamentary and Governance Economic “European Fasone, Cristina Consider for instance the accountability problems associated with the fact that the European European the that fact the with associated problems accountability the for instance Consider 7 In effect, it would appear that one of themain losers 6 , Vol. 20, No. 2 (March 2014), 164- p. , Vol. No. 20, 2(March , London and and , London , Vol. 52, No. 6 , Vol. 52, IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI 6 Journal of Common Fight MarketStill Studies Journal Back?”, in SpecialFull-Issue.pdf. Journal PaperProposal/281383a5-0285-4417-a613-eed8cd5d36bd.pdf. https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/ 2015, 26-29 August Montreal, Conference, General ECPR the oversight andcontrol. to an executive-dominated that is quite impervious to parliamentary (notably betweenGermany andFrance). Thesedevelopments areseenasgiving rise in theEconomic andMonetary Union) andinformal intergovernmental bargains as intergovernmental treaties (cf.Treaty on Stability, Coordination andGovernance Council playing acentral role (theso-called Union method),through measuressuch has beenlargely dealt with through intergovernmental means,with theEuropean handling of it have usheredinashiftthelocus of decision-making asthecrisis EU’s intergovernmental components. have underlinedasecond outcome, namely aconsiderable strengtheningof the the supranational component appears paradoxical given that numerous analysts economic monitoring andcontrol. Thenotion that thecrisishasstrengthened sanctions hasbeengreatly lowered, coupled with amuch tighter systemof macro- ushered ina“hardening”of EUgovernance, inthat thethresholdfor instituting 11 10 9 8 to reassertthemselves. off on national parliaments, where weseestrong asymmetries intheirabilities (notably thosehaving received bail-outs), andwithin debtor-states. Thisalso rubs domination, with the main divisions being between creditor- and debtor-states In theaftermath of thecrisisweseeinEurope newforms of inequality and Central Bank(ECB)hasbeenconsiderably enhanced. and bankingregulation, inwhich therole of theCommission andtheEuropean EU’s supranational component, notably intheareasof macroeconomic policy EU asasystemof governance. Oneposition argues that it hasstrengthenedthe democratic legitimacy, but theydiffer inhow and what thecrisishas done tothe on theEUinstitutional system.All underlinethat thecrisishasweakened theEU’s If welook at theliterature, assessments differ interms of theeffects ofthecrisis Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 13 12 Unfortunate Configuration”, in Constellations in Configuration”, Unfortunate Crisis Union? European Which the Euro After 1003-1029; Europe p. Fabbrini, 2013), Sergio (September Studies Political Comparative in Crisis”, Euro to the Union’s Answer European the Assessing Its Limits: and “Intergovernmentalism Fabbrini, Sergio 2015; Press, University Era in Actors and the Post-Maastricht Supranational States Intergovernmentalism. heading of de-constitutionalisation. led toageneral weakening of thelegal basisfor integration. 51, No. 4(July 614-630. 51, p. 2013), of Common Market Studies Journal in of Democracy?”, Cost at the Euro the “Saving Crum, Ben

The New New The (eds.), Uwe Puetter and Hodson, Dermot J. Bickerton, Christopher Renaud Supranationalism New Dehousse, The German Law Union”, Law European German of the in Crisis Existential “The Menéndez, José Agustín Katrin Auel and Oliver Höing, “Parliaments in the Euro Crisis: Can the Losers of Integration of Integration Losers the Can Crisis: Euro the in Höing, “Parliaments Oliver Auel and Katrin Christian Joerges, “Law and Politics in Europe’s Crisis. On the History of the Impact of an of an Impact of the History the On Crisis. Europe’s in Politics and “Law Joerges, Christian The Crisis of the Union. European AResponse Crisis The Habermas, Jürgen , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015. Press, University Cambridge , Cambridge, , Vol. 14, No. 5 (2013), p. 453-526, http://www.germanlawjournal.net/s/PDF_Vol_14_No_05_ , Vol. 453-526, p. 14, No. 5(2013), 10 13 Thesedevelopments cannotbut beconsidered underthe Arthur Benzhasshown that creditor-state parliaments 11 Concerns have beenraisedthat thecrisishas 9 , Vol. 21, No. 2(June, Vol. 2014), 21, 249-261. p. Theargument isthat thecrisisandEU’s , paper prepared for presentation at for presentation prepared , paper , Vol. 52, No. 6 (November 2014), No. 1184- p. 6(November , Vol. 52, , Cambridge, Polity Press, 2012; 2012; Press, Polity , Cambridge, 8 Thechangeshave also 12 , Vol. 46, No., Vol. 9 46, , Oxford, Oxford Oxford , Oxford, , Vol. IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI 7 Policy may have beguntocreate theirown forms of domination. parliamentary involvement that weresetup toameliorate democratic problems implications for citizens’ ability togovern themselves. Thus, forms of national bounds andprocedures, whilst at thesametimedelimiting others’, with profound state-parliaments’ decision-making abilities extendwell beyond theirauthorised 15 14 Vol. No. 3(2014), 6, 1-41, p. http://on-federalism.eu/index.php/component/content/article/194. on Federalism of concern”, is Perspectives in this to extent what and EU. Why the in Parliaments National among Asymmetries’ non-Eurozone ‘Troubled “Eurozone, and Fasone, Cristina 1193; with thepossibility of norms beingadapted tochangedfactual circumstances.” never crystallises into a‘once andfor all’ agreement but isongoing andrevisable constant ‘backandforth’ betweenthe EU andnational levels […]decision-making decision-making iscoordinative inthat it isformed asapolicy cycle basedon a system that Mark Dawson hastermedthecoordinative method:“EUeconomic both. Thecombination manifests itself inadistincttypeof decision-making- method nor with theintergovernmental method,but incorporates elements of intergovernmental components. It isneither consistent with the Community that hasemergedfrom thecrisisrepresents acombination of supranational and in which levels arequite tightly interwoven. Thesystemof economic governance of decision-making hasbeenreconfigured, because theEUisa multilevel system across levels of governing. It isalso important toestablishwhether theprocess it is not enough to establish whether the crisis has reconfigured power relations When weassesstheimplications of thecrisisfor democracyinthemultilevel EU, state parliaments (notably Greece,Portugal, andIreland). (notably Germany’s) defactodeterminemany of theoperating conditions of debtor Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 16 of Common Market Studies Journal in Governance”, Economic EU of ‘Post-Crisis’ Structure Accountability Political and Legal 2015 Report Governance The European Union European andThe Beyond of Inter-Parliamentary Practices Politics. in (eds.), International Coordination Fossum Erik John and obtained afreerrole andareless encumberedbylegal anddemocratic controls. The crisisresponse hasreinforced , inthesensethat expertshave of extremepopulism (andthemannerinwhich thetwo may reinforce eachother). particularly thorny, namely what wemay labeltheriseof technocracyandtherise between theEUsystemandcitizens. Two developments render thischallenge more pressingandmore intractable. Thesameapplies tothedisconnection Post-crisis, the challenge of catching up with executives and experts has become that arenotalready covered byit. can berestored simply byextendingtheCommunity methodtothepolicy areas Community methodof integration. It istherefore quite unlikely that thesystem making combination that areemergingsubverting the Community andthe Equally important is that the institutional changes and the particular decision-

Journal of European Public Public European of in in Journal Europe”, Differentiation and “Democracy Fossum, Erik John The The Politics”, in and Law of EU Its Transformation and Crisis Euro “The Dawson, Mark Arthur Benz, “An Asymmetric Two-Level Game. Parliaments in the Euro Crisis”, in Ben Crum Crum Ben in Crisis”, Euro the in Two-Level Parliaments Game. “An Asymmetric Benz, Arthur , Vol. 22, No. 6 (2015), p. 799-815. p. No. 6(2015), , Vol. 22, , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 53. See also Mark Dawson, “The “The Dawson, Mark also See 53. p. 2015, Press, University Oxford , Oxford, , Vol. 53, No. 5 (September 2015), p. 976-993. p. 2015), , Vol. No. 5(September 53, , Essex, ECPR Press, 2013, p. 125-140. p. 2013, Press, ECPR , Essex, 15 14 Thus, some member , 16

IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI 8 general publics. unacceptable or at least aredifficult for parliaments torenderunderstandable to They expoundworld-views andprofessional stancesthat may either appear peoples. Expertsandtechnocrats may also renderdemocratic catch-up difficult. citizens. Instead, theyposit themselves astheauthentic expression of Europe’s with executives andexpertsbecause theywill argue that it will fail toconnect to representative bodies isthat populists will challenge thevery merit of catching up attacked andconstrained from two angles: above andbelow. Theproblem facing Representative government at theEU-level andinthememberstates may thenbe wherein populists lambasttheEUfor beingco-opted bythetechnocrats. integration. But thereisalso thepossibility of apopulist-technocratic standoff integration process, andamore comprehensive debate on themerits of European hostile toexpertise andrepresentative democracy. Thereisapoliticisation of the attacks. We seetheriseof aeurosceptic left- andright-wing that is might beamatter of politicians wanting toshelter expertisefrom hostile populist The New Supranationalism New Dehousse, The Renaud See bodies. and mechanisms depoliticised demanded countries creditor particular in of representative bodies, wherein therelations among themareconstitutionalised the federal system,the two channelsareincorporated in anintegrated structure providing for asecond channelof representation that runsthrough thestates. Within level, whilst at thesametimeautonomy of its component partsisrecognisedby The model posits that a provides for a representative body at the federal way of doing so,normatively speaking. way of representing citizens, but it has come to be known as the most acceptable the two mainlevels that make up thepolitical system.Thisisof coursenottheonly two vertical channelsof representation that linkcitizens andthegovernments at of its time,citizens’ democratic expectations have beentailored tothepresence of establishment of theAmerican federation asamajor federal-democratic innovation so centrally inthenormative accounts of multilevel democracy. Since the standard federal approach. It isnecessarytoinclude thisbecause it figures The firstdemocratic decision-making configuration is what we may termthe following Ispell out several relevant democratic decision-making configurations. which therepresentative democratic dimension isinstitutionally configured. In the of democratic decision-making configurations, which refer tothemannerin experts andconnect with thecitizens, weneedtolook at thenature andavailability In discussinghow representative democracymay catch up with executives and 3. Possible democratic decision-making configurations A caseinpoint istheECB.Thisneednotbeamatter of usurpation of power; Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 17

Renaud Dehousse underlines how increased mistrust led to a demand for reforms and where and for reforms to ademand led mistrust how increased underlines Dehousse Renaud , cit. , 17 it it IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI 9 Politics. The European Union European and The Beyond Politics. of Inter-Parliamentary Practices in (eds.), International Coordination Fossum Erik John and Crum Ben in Decision-Making”, of EU Scrutiny Parliamentary the and Networks Interparliamentary Best? the from Buzogány, “Learning Aron See adopted. have states Nordic the that systems scrutiny Coordination in International Politics. The European Union European and The Beyond Politics. in International Coordination of Inter-Parliamentary Practices (eds.), Fossum Erik John and Crum 2 (July Ben 249-271; p. 2009), Review Political Science European EU”, in the in Democracy Representative Theorizing 19 18 them. that themultilevel EUconfiguration fuseslevels of governing rather thanseparates parliamentary collaboration andcoordination necessary. In effect, wecould argue competencies coupled with elaborate systems of co-decision renders multilevel the EUit iswidely recognisedthat thelargescope of sharedandoverlapping The EUsystemdeviates incertainrespectsfrom thisinstitutional template. In and betweenstates in theUS,for instance). representative bodies at thesamelevel (asthereisbetweenprovinces inCanada member-state jurisdiction. Thereislittle or nohorizontal coordination between from citizens totheirrespective member-state government inthesubjects under citizens totheirfederal government inthesubjects underfederal jurisdiction, and lines of authorisation andaccountability areconfigured on a vertical basis:from represents citizens intheirfederal andmember-state capacities, respectively. The with aclear division of tasks.In that sense,thecomposite of representative bodies Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 20 Institutional Fusion? Institutional Union Towards European States. and The Member (eds.), Wolfgang Wessels and Rometsch of Common Market Studies Journal in Processes”, which hasbeentermedamultilevel parliamentary field –adistinctconfiguration. In effect, theseandother features give risetothesecond representative system, multilevel EUsystem. of levels is increasingly rubbing off on parliaments andtheir interaction inthe with considerable fusion of levels). Theimportant point isthat theEU’s fusion (Germany beingsomewhat of anexception because it isalso asystem towards eachotherandcopy, emulate andlearn from eachother. parliamentary interaction. Parliaments intheEUincreasingly orient themselves increasingly oriented towards eachotherthrough COSAC andothermeansof inter- Since theTreaty of Amsterdam weseethat national parliaments have become (meaning samelevel of governance) component totheactivity of parliaments. to include what intheEUhasemergedasanincreasingly important horizontal across institutions andlevels of governance. The notion of MLPFenables us namely that of representing theircitizens. In addition, theyarelinked andinteract governance. Parliamentarians andparties sharethesameoverarching function, share certainstructural similarities andareconnected across states andlevels of By multilevel parliamentary field (MLPF) it ismeant that parliamentary systems a mechanism that involves theminacollective capacity inEU-level decision-

Ben Crum and John Erik Fossum, “The Multilevel Parliamentary Field: A Framework for Field: AFramework Multilevel Parliamentary “The Fossum, Erik John and Crum Ben Wolfgang Wessels, “An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration View on Integration Macropolitical Fusion? ADynamic “An Closer Ever Wolfgang Wessels, Parliaments across Europe have copied (more or less faithfully) the models of parliamentary of parliamentary models the faithfully) (more or copied less have Europe across Parliaments 18 Thesestructural features clearly settheEUapart from moststate-based , Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996. Press, University Manchester , Manchester, , Essex, ECPR Press, 2013, p. 17-32. p. 2013, Press, ECPR , Essex, , Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1997), p. 267-299; p. , Vol. No. 2(June 35, 1997), Dietrich , Essex, ECPR Press, 2013. Press, ECPR , Essex, 20 Thereisalso , Vol. 1, No., Vol. 1, 19

10 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI formal horizontal mechanismswherein political parties also played arole. diversity across parliaments intheEUandmarked more byinformal rather than the EUwasasomewhat uneven andrather loosely-composed field, marked bygreat representative democratic structure before thecrisisstruck. What wethensaw in as aheuristic device tocapture thedistinctive features of themultilevel EU’s Ben CrumandIformulated thenotion of themultilevel parliamentary field parliaments may become toofocused on eachother). between theEUsystemandits citizens (even insuch aloosely-coupled system is less certain, however, that it is capable of sufficiently improving the connection fledged systemmay oversight that engendersprovide additional elements of accountability. Afull- among parliaments. Whatever additional information andwhatever learning and Inter-parliamentary interaction exposes citizens tothedynamic interaction delineated constituencies (national andEuropean). vertical process that connects therepresented andtheirrepresentatives inclearly- manner inwhich democratic authorisation andaccountability unfold: asabasically a multilevel parliamentary field modifies but to its constituency (beit European, national, or regional). We may say that such the basic structure remainsvertical inthesensethat eachparliament responds locked into a system of joint decision-making. In democratic accountability terms, other to improve their respective legislative and scrutiny functions, but are not is a pattern of interaction wherein learning is voluntary; parliaments look to each decision-making, internal organising, relations tocitizens etc.Alearning structure to learn from eachotherbyadopting bestpractices of parliamentary scrutiny, insofar asthereareexplicit efforts byparliaments, parliamentarians andparties democratic self-improvement. We may deemsuch asystem“learning structure” Inter-Parliamentary Politics in International Coordination 21 to prevent deviations; the transfer of bestpractices; providing external checkson individual parliaments structure bent on learning andemulation, asproviding asetof mechanismsfor the EUwhich is besetwith deficiencies), wemay think of theMLPFasadeliberative properly-functioning multilevel parliamentary field (andnot what weactually seein From ademocratic perspective, ifweseektodiscerndemocratic merits from a making, namely theEarly Warning Mechanism (EWM). Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 22 Essex, ECPR Press, 2013, p. 105-124. p. 2013, Press, ECPR Essex, of Inter-Parliamentary Union European and The Beyond Politics. in International Coordination Practices (eds.), Fossum Erik John and Crum Atalanta”, Ben in Water’s Naval Mission EU’s Edge: The at the “Parliaments Glahn, Wolfgang Cosima Wagner and Peters, Dirk See parliaments. countries’ from other it obtain sometimes can they withheld are information important of sources that find parliamentarians When information. supply of to critical the pertains aspect Another policies. their justify and to explain parliaments to other invited be also can parliamentarians and Leaders COSAC. as such networks and meetings through and parliaments, countries’ other in debates

One aspect is moral suasion, which can take place through parliamentary investigations and and investigations parliamentary through place take can which moral suasion, is aspect One Practices of Practices (eds.), Fossum Erik John and Crum Ben in contributions various the See enable parliaments tocatch up with executives andexperts;it 21 andproviding forums for democratic reflection and does not abrogate the conventional , cit. Note that whereas the role of the whereas Note that , cit. 22 Thisis , 11 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI to understand partisan interaction. partisan to understand required is attention more systematic quite alot of attention, gaining is interaction parliamentary and theEWM. and joint decision-making, especially inconnection with theEuropean Semester from aMLPFbasedon learning toamultilevel systemwith elements of coordinated Recent developments appear togive grounds for arguingthat theEUismoving strengthen or weaken democracyinthemultilevel EUsystem. whether increasedinter-parliamentary EUinvolvement andcoordination will appears necessary(andisalso listedinArticle 13intheTSCG).Theproblem is increasingly integrated joint-decision structure, inter-parliamentary coordination decision-making system.If parliaments aretore-assertthemselves insuch an The question is whether that must also be reflected in the structure of the democratic changes. broader structure within which parliaments operate isundergoing significant the close interaction between levels ineconomic governance suggest that the importance of supranational bodies, thegreater focus on tight coordination, and handled intheEUarealtering theEU’s decision-making structure. Theincreased In theabove Ihave shown that thecrisisandmannerinwhich it has been credentials areweakindeed. with democratic-representative systemswhose actual operational democratic to thosewefindinfull-fledged democracies. Thereare alsomemberstates factors entail that thedynamics of executive-legislative relations arenotequivalent at theEU-level on theother.Another lies inthe(non-elected) Commission. These between the EP’s remit of action on the one hand, and the issues that are settled fledged parliament. Onemaindeviation lies inthefactthat thereisadiscrepancy a lopsided anddemocratically-deficient Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 23 Innsbruck, StudienVerlag, 2015. of the Taking Post-Lisbon Stock Parliaments in System. Era Multilevel the Parliamentary EU Subnational Eppler (eds.), Annegret and Abels Field”, Gabriele in Multilevel Parliamentary inclusion of lower-level parliaments indecision-making processes at thecentral different levels interact with eachother’s core activities, especially through the there would beastrong horizontal and“diagonal” logic inthat parliaments on and isdeveloping into asystemof joint decision-making. In such aconfiguration field but which is no longer simply a structure of deliberation and voluntary learning, configuration, which is also configured along thelines ofa multilevel parliamentary If so,wemay beseeingtheemergenceof arepresentative systemof unique configured asajoint decision-system at theexecutive level. to say that aqualitative changeisafoot, especially given that theEUisincreasingly that afull-fledged transition hastaken place,but theymay besignificant enough see emergingout of thecrisis.Obviously, theseelements arenotsufficient toclaim appear to bearesponse tothecoordinative methodof EUdecision-making that we

See also John Erik Fossum, “Reflections on the Role of Subnational Parliaments in the European the European in Parliaments the Role Subnational of on “Reflections Fossum, Erik John also See 23 Such amannerof representative democratic catching-up would structure. TheEPhardly qualifies asafull- , 12 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI to much interms of thestability or legitimacy of theoverall system.Aproposal even areform that represents animprovement inone measuremight not amount for two mainreasons. Oneisthat theEUissuch acomplex andcomposite systemthat I discusstheoptions with reference todemocratic decision-making configurations c) b) a) reforms: speaking, theliterature appears tofocus on threesetsof democratic-institutional making configurations with themainproposals for institutional reforms. Generally In assessingthepossible options, Iconnect thedifferent democratic decision- 4. What aretheoptions? democracy, ajoint-decision systemless so. versions that aredistinctive totheEU. Alearning systemappears compatible with normative imagination of analysts andcitizens; thelatter two areexperimental in play. Thefirst–thestandard federal one –occupies a dominant role inthe We seethat thereareseveral different democratic decision-making configurations system-defining country such asGermany). that it will lead tochangesinpolicy (unless thisoccursinaparticularly strong or leaders arekicked out inone parliament inthesystem,thereislittle assurance actors implies, would come at thecostof accountability. And even ifpolitical The assumedgreater representativity that thebringing togetherof parliamentary cooperate inajoint-decision structure beaccountable? they do so.Can to thecitizens who may nolonger know who represents themandinwhat respect states alike would thus bedirectly challenged, with directimplications for thelinks of representation andaccountability that ischaracteristic of federal andunitary authorisation andaccountability. Thevertical orientation of democratic systems but would represent adirectchallenge tohow weconceive of democratic no longer simply operate along vertical linesof authorisation andaccountability, on legislative-executive relations at thenational level). Such aconfiguration would national parliaments intervene in EU decision-making processes, with bearings configuration would affect legislative-executive relations at all levels (wherein From ademocratic perspective, suchFrom ademocratic perspective, such a and seeksamore prominent role. national parliaments may besaidtoincluded here.TheEPisalso beingconsulted level. Since the EU-level isincreasingly coordinating economic governance, the Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions developing aEurozone government. making; and strengthening national parliamentary involvement inEU-level decision- role of theEP; strengthening theexistingsystemof supranational governing, especially the anon-centralised systeminwhich theparliaments coordinate and 13 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI b) ismore complicated because it introduces thecollective of national parliaments about thetwo-channel structure wearefamiliar with from federal systems.Option Reform options a)andb)refer todifferent forms of citizen incorporation. Option a)is whether that –even ifpossible –will improve authorisation andaccountability. and security policy would seem torequireapronounced NProle; thequestion is in EU-level decision-making. The present situation of the EP’s weak role in foreign more comprehensive therole of theEP, theless important directNPinvolvement is level patterns of authorisation andaccountability. In general, wecansay that the and how theyareconfigured (exclusive/shared), andtheimplications for national- at least three sets of considerations: the relations to the EP, the EU’s competencies making. In order to establish the democratic implications, it isnecessarytoconsider Reform option b)would be to increaseNPdirectinvolvement inEU-level decision- problem isthat either option isvirtually politically impossible intoday’s EU. two channels,totheirrespective member-state parliaments andtotheEP. The democratic authorisation andaccountability, namely asavertical process, along the Compound Union would bequite compatible with how citizens understand their mainconcerns would betheircitizens. BoththeParliamentary Union and would beoriented towards eachother inorder tolearn from eachother,but national parliamentary involvement inEUaffairs. In such asystemparliaments parliaments into amultilevel learning structure, but one that isnotbasedon direct German Bundesrat. Bothapproaches would leave spacefor theconsolidation of be therole of theCouncil, which might have tobereformed along thelinesof the entail moving furthertowards EU-level parliamentarisation. Theissue thenwould the lower houseof theUSCongress. Alternatively, strengtheningtheEPcould also institutions at theEU-level. TheEPwould thenhave to bereformed soastoresemble as alegislative chamberandspecifyingadistinctsphereof competence for the out bySergio Fabbrini, for instance. way of doing soistomove towards aCompound Union along thelinesspelled Reform option a)could move theEUtoward thestandardfederal approach. One spell out options underc). with reference tothedemocratic decision-making configurations, andthereafter categorically different from theEUundera)andb).Itherefore firstassessa)andb) a) andb).Thereareversions of reform option c)inwhich theresulting EUwill be The otherreason isthat reform option c)may bequite different from reform options approaches that consider how measuresinteract. more intractable, asweseeinthejoint-decision configuration. We therefore need weaken thecredibility of theEP;theymay also renderlinesof accountability even that increasetherole of national parliaments inEU-level decision-making may that backfire when thereform isput inawidercontext. For instance,measures that appears credible with regardstoasingle measuremight engendereffects Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 24

Which European Union?Sergio Fabbrini, European Which , cit. , 24 That also entails fashioning the Council 14 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI how toorganise relations with theNPs of non-Eurozone member states. the system susceptible to populism and technocracy). It also brings up issues of other andtheirinteraction –at theexpenseof citizens (which would also render risks of theinstitutions in theEurozone systembecoming overly focused on each inter-parliamentary cooperation andcoordination. Such asystemwould create Eurozone. That inturnwould requirenational parliamentary involvement and policy would represent a coordinated or joint decision-making systeminsidethe of NPs. Asystem basedon thepresent configuration of monetary andfiscal be thescope of action andcompetencies for theEP;otherwould be therole One question insuch adifferentiated EUwith Eurozone “ins”and “outs” would between theEurozone “ins”and“outs” (akindof weakpublic, only). could thenbereconfigured toa forum of information exchange andconsultations stronger theonus on developing aEurozone parliament. Thepresent-day EP Obviously, the more the centre of gravity were to be shifted to the Eurozone, the in theactivities of theEurozone (for instance,through aparliamentary committee). Eurozone, the other for the rest) to various ways of involving the EP more directly roles for thepresent-day EP, from atwo-parliament arrangement (one for the Eurozone membersareinstitutionally attached. Here weseedifferent possible within adifferentiated EU, wherein the Eurozone isthehardcore andthe non- Another, perhaps more likely, scenario would beconsolidation of theEurozone full-fledged federalisation would be gone. Such ascenario could befacilitated byaBrexit because thestrongest opponent of non-Eurozone states with astark andcategorical choice: inclusion or exclusion. democratic authorisation and accountability. Such a development would present The EUwould become afederal state, with a rather standardsystemof (vertical) Thus, thepresent imbalance of monetary andfiscal union would beeliminated. substantial directfundsthrough taxation, andfiscal andredistributive capacity. reconfiguration of competencies across levels, through which theEU would acquire federation. To gettherewould requireamajor treaty changewith aconsiderable course requireaclear delineation betweenmembersandnon-members of the a full-fledged federation andassuch replacethepresent-day EU. That would of making configuration were to be fully adopted, the Eurozone would become Eurozone, including aEurozone government. If thestandardfederal decision- Reform option c)refers tothefurtherdevelopment andentrenchment of the could beequally attentive tothecitizens’ concerns. decision-making; the question is whether parliaments in this situation would and parliaments areinvolved inasystemthat requiresthat theyall contribute tojoint and parliamentary interaction. Citizens are incorporated into a structure inwhich Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions 15 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI mind. theoretical-normative; andmonitor theEU’s furtherdevelopment with thesein the nature of theseseveral models;assesstheirrespective merits –practical and If that isnotpossible, it would seemtobeimportant toflesh out inmore detail closer toalearning systembasedinafull-fledged EPwith a taxandfiscal capacity. In my view it isnecessarytoconsider how furtherreforms might bringtheEU a similarly optimistic assessment. interdependent world. Thereislittle tosuggest that thestructure inplacewill yield valuable addition to how we think of in an increasingly within theambit of thestructure inplacewould bebeneficial andrepresent a might be expended. Before the crisis struck, it appeared that democratic reforms joint decision structure raisesthequestion of whether theexperimental licence be said of what is emerging out of the crisis. The EU system’s morphing into a experiment with considerable potential. It appears unlikely that thesame can We might say that the EU’s pre-crisis learning structure was a democratic which isdemocratically problematic. like a“learning structure” tosomething more resemblingajoint-decision structure, problems. In response tothecrisis,EUhasevolved from what initially looked bodies were able to reassert themselves in this structure, that might not solve the of thepreconditions for ensuringthat. On the otherhand,ifrepresentative crisis andits handling appear tohave weakened or perhaps even underminedmany multilevel parliamentary field. However, wemay on the one handargue that the The crisisandtheway it hasbeenhandled have created agreater needfor aviable states. different from the kind of multichannel system we are familiar with from federal had traits of amultilevel field with astrong learning component andwasquite developed adistinct representative structure. That structure –before thecrisis– In thispaper Ihave argued that even before thecrisisstruck, themultilevel EUhad Concluding comments Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions Updated 8February 2016 16 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI Filestore/PaperProposal/281383a5-0285-4417-a613-eed8cd5d36bd.pdf at theECPRGeneral Conference, Montreal, 26-29 August 2015,https://ecpr.eu/ Renaud Dehousse, TheNew Supranationalism, paper preparedfor presentation (September 2015),p.976-993 EU Economic Governance”, inJournal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53,No. 5 Mark Dawson, “The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of ‘Post-Crisis’ The Governance Report 2015,Oxford, Oxford University Press,2015,p.41-68 Mark Dawson, “TheEuro CrisisandIts Transformation of EULaw andPolitics”, in ECPR Press,2013 Coordination in International Politics. TheEuropean Union and Beyond, Essex, Ben CrumandJohn ErikFossum (eds.),Practices of Inter-Parliamentary Review, Vol. 1,No. 2(July 2009),p.249-271 for Theorizing Representative DemocracyintheEU”, inEuropean Political Science Ben CrumandJohn ErikFossum, “TheMultilevel Parliamentary Field: AFramework Market Studies, Vol. 51,No. 4(July 2013),p.614-630 Ben Crum,“Saving theEuro at the Cost of Democracy?”, inJournal of Common p. 334-350 European Union”, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 51, No. 2(March 2013), Francis Cheneval and Frank Schimmelfennig, “TheCasefor Demoicracy inthe European Union and Beyond, Essex,ECPRPress,2013,p.17-32 (eds.), Parliamentary Scrutiny of EUDecision-Making”, inBenCrumand John ErikFossum Aron Buzogány, “Learning from the Best? Interparliamentary Networks and the Oxford, Oxford University Press,2015 Intergovernmentalism. States and Supranational Actors in thePost-Maastricht Era, Christopher J. Bickerton, DermotHodson, andUwe Puetter (eds.),TheNew ECPR Press,2013,p.125-140 Coordination in International Politics. TheEuropean Union and Beyond, Essex, in BenCrumandJohn ErikFossum (eds.),Practices of Inter-Parliamentary Arthur Benz,“An Asymmetric Two-Level Game.Parliaments intheEuro Crisis”, (November 2014),p.1184-1193 Integration Still Fight Back?”, inJournal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 52,No. 6 Katrin Auel andOliver Höing, “Parliaments intheEuro Crisis:CantheLosersof References Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions Practices of Inter-Parliamentary Coordination in International Politics. The 17 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI (October 2007),p.624-658 Sofia Näsström, “The Legitimacy of the People”, inPolitical Theory, Vol. 35,No. 5 deficit.pdf (November 2002),p.603-624,https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/ in theEuropean Union”, inJournal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40,No. 4 Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defence of the‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy PDF_Vol_14_No_05_SpecialFull-Issue.pdf Law Journal, Vol. 14,No. 5(2013),p.453-526,http://www.germanlawjournal.net/s/ Agustín José Menéndez, “TheExistential Crisisof theEuropean Union”, inGerman 249-261 of anUnfortunate Configuration”, inConstellations, Vol. 21,No. 2(June 2014),p. Christian Joerges, “Law and Politics inEurope’s Crisis.OntheHistory of theImpact Polity Press,2012 Jürgen Habermas,TheCrisisof theEuropean Union. AResponse, Cambridge, Times of Crisis?,London andNew York, Routledge, 2014,p.52-68 Kröger (ed.),Political Representation in theEuropean Union. Still Democratic in John Erik Fossum, “The Structure of EU Representation andthe Crisis”, in Sandra Stock of thePost-Lisbon Era, Innsbruck, StudienVerlag, 2015 (eds.), European Multilevel Parliamentary Field”, inGabriele Abels andAnnegret Eppler John ErikFossum, “Reflections on the Role of Subnational Parliaments inthe European Public Policy, Vol. 22,No. 6(2015), p.799-815 John Erik Fossum, “Democracy and Differentiation in Europe”, inJournal of index.php/component/content/article/194 Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 6,No. 3 (2014), p. 1-41, http://on-federalism.eu/ National Parliaments intheEU. Why andtowhat extent thisisof concern”, in Cristina Fasone, “Eurozone, non-Eurozone and‘Troubled Asymmetries’ among Journal, Vol. 20,No. 2(March 2014),p.164-185 Representation. What Placefor theEuropean Parliament?”, inEuropean Law Cristina Fasone, “European Economic Governance andParliamentary Cambridge University Press,2015 Sergio Fabbrini, Which European Union? Europe After theEuro Crisis , Cambridge, (September 2013),p.1003-1029 Union’s Answer totheEuro Crisis”, inComparative Political Studies, Vol. 46,No. 9 Sergio Fabbrini, “Intergovernmentalism andIts Limits: Assessing theEuropean Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions Subnational Parliaments in theEUMultilevel Parliamentary System. Taking 18 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI 1997), p.267-299 Integration Processes”, inJournal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35,No. 2(June Wolfgang Wessels, “An Ever Closer Fusion? ADynamic Macropolitical View on 1996 States. Towards Institutional Fusion?, Manchester,ManchesterUniversity Press, Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), Studies, Vol. 52,No. 6(November 2014),p.1174-1183 and theReform of Economic Governance intheEU”, inJournal of Common Market Berthold Rittberger, “Integration without Representation? TheEuropean Parliament and Beyond, Essex,ECPRPress,2013,p.105-124 of Inter-Parliamentary Coordination in International Politics. The European Union The EU’s Naval Mission Atalanta”, inBenCrumandJohn ErikFossum (eds.),Practices Dirk Peters, Wolfgang Wagner andCosimaGlahn,“Parliaments at theWater’s Edge: 2 (June 1998),p. 113-141 Conflicts through Group Rights”, inTheJournal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 6,No. Claus Offe, “‘Homogeneity’ andConstitutional Democracy:Coping with Identity Oxford University Press,2012,p.247-274 Eleftheriadis (eds.),Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law, Oxford, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “The Idea of European Demoicracy”, inJulie Dickson andPavlos Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions The European Union and Member 19 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 01 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-80-4 © 2016 IAI Latest IAIWORKING PAPERS Democracy andLegitimacy intheEU: Challenges andOptions www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo Brunetti, 9-I-00186 Rome, Italy and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects. 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