1 Introduction 2 Conceptual and Methodological Issues
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Notes 1 Introduction 1 For the pioneering treatment of this concept, see Aubert, 1965. See also Marx, 1984, for the first systematic elaboration of what he calls the `hidden and dirty data problem'. He defines `dirty data' as `information which is kept secret and whose revelation would be discrediting or costly in terms of various types of sanctioning' (p. 79). 2 This thesis was first elaborated in a lecture presented by Maria èos in the Summer of 1988 at the Wilson Centre for International Scholars, Washing- ton, D.C. 3 The nomenklatura principle involved the Communist party's exclusive right to nominate managers and officials at all levels of economic and public administration, education, culture, the military, the criminal justice system and so forth. This gave rise to a large social stratum we call the nomenklatura class. The overall number of posts encompassed by secret nomenklatura lists has been estimated to be in the range of 100 000 to 200 000. (General Jar- uzelski claimed that by 1988 it had reached 270 000; Perzkowski, 1994:43.) 4 The Polish United Workers' Party ± hereafter the Party or the Communist party. 5 Apparently, some members of the opposition, especially in Gdan sk, Solidar- ity's birthplace, were deliberately included in this process by the Communist eÂlite, but their numbers were not great (Kaczyn ski, J. n.d.:25±6; Kaczyn ski, L., 1996:44±5). 6 Staniszkis comments on this predicament: `The clarity of categories used to describe the world and one's place in it ± so characteristic of Solidarity ± has vanished; gone is the shared fundamentalist dream that nurtured the faith in one miraculous panaceum against all problems (``own, independent trade union''); no more ± so prominent in Solidarity ± didacticism and hope to construct a value-based world . .One is struck by a postmodern attitude towards action as a goal in itself, . rejection of the fundamentalist distinc- tion between ``good'' and ``evil'' . , and silence ± so contrary to the Solidar- ity's infatuation with ``speaking the truth'' ' (1989:134±5). 2 Conceptual and Methodological Issues 1 The specific focus of our work prevents us from exploring conspiracy theories in terms of a popular discourse that allows people to make sense of threaten- ing or incomprehensive situations and posit human agency rather than an anonymous `system' as the source of the problem. See e.g. Austin, 1994, for her analysis of anti-black conspiracy theories in the United States as a pop- ular discourse among African-Americans. We believe that this type of approach would be also useful with respect to post-communist societies. 232 Notes 233 2 We use the term `secret services' as an umbrella category that encompasses intelligence, counter-intelligence, the political police and special forces. 3 For example, according to Holmes (1993), `there is no question that on balance in the communist world, the trend during the 1980s was for [the] role [of security police forces] to decline' (277). 4 An excellent example is provided by a special issue of Social Research (Summer 1996) devoted to the question of gains and losses/winners and losers of the post-communist transition to democracy. None of the authors has even acknowledged the secret services as possible actors who had something to gain or lose as a result of systemic change. 5 When, a year after the collapse of communism in Poland, the first democratic chief of the new political police (the State Protection Agency ± UOP) was installed, one of his first moves was to check the logbook of telephone conversations between the Soviet Embassy and the Ministry of the Interior. Their daily average was between 200 and 300 (Kozøowski interview, in Janus- zewski and Stre,kowski,1996:204). 6 For example, Barron, 1985; Corson and Crowley, 1986; Dziak, 1988; Freemantle, 1982; Knight, 1990; Rositzke, 1982; Waller, 1994; Yost, 1989. 7 Although it was acknowledged by Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney (1982:109) and Andrew and Gordievski (1990:551), it was done only in passing. Moreover, Amy Knight (1990) briefly mentions the KGB interest in economic crime, while Evgenia Albats (1994) merely notes the existence of the economic branch of the secret services. 8 They are: Beres and Burnetko, 1991; Beres and Skoczylas, 1991; Bosak, 1992; Dominiczak, 1994; Dronicz, 1997; Jaruzelski, 1992; Golimont, 1992; Moracz- ewski, 1996; Ochocki, 1992; Piecuch, 1993, 1996b; Szlachcic and Mac, 1990; Widacki 1992. 9 Conducted for his 1993 book, published in Polish. 10 Including former Minister of the Interior (1992±5) Andrzej Milczanowski, former chief of the civilian Counter-intelligence (1990±5) Konstanty Miodowicz and former chief of the civilian Intelligence (1992±4) Henryk Jasik. 11 Please see an illuminating essay by G. T. Marx (1984) on an emerging `dirty data' methodology and related conceptual problems. 12 After Jeffrey Ian Ross, we define `state crime' as activities carried out by the state or on behalf of some state agency that involve `coverups, corruption, disinformation, unaccountability and violations of domestic and/or international law. [State crime] also includes those practices that, although they fall short of being officially declared illegal, are perceived by the majority of the population as illegal or socially harmful' (Ross, 1995:5±6). For useful discussions of this concept see other articles in Ross, ed., 1995; and also Barak, ed., 1991; Chambliss, 1989; and Clinard and Quinney, 1978. 13 For earlier findings in support of our thesis, see Zybertowicz, 1993:125±9. 3 Anatomy of the Police-State 1 Malinowski, 1992:72. 234 Notes 2 In a few political science lexicons recently published in Poland one cannot find a single trace of the category of the `police state'; the notions of police, coercion and violence are also absent (for example, Antoszewski and Herbut, eds, 1995). One is tempted to ask if this is one example of the heritage of communism in the social sciences. 3 For example, Bamford, 1982; Donner, 1980; Wise, 1976. 4 Soviet nationals who were made to assume foreign identities and false bio- graphies `by taking over the papers of either a real person who had died or a fictitious one' (Gordievsky, 1995:135). 5 They included Gen. Michaø Janiszewski, who was the minister in charge of the Office of the Ministerial Council (URM) throughout the 1980s, first in General Jaruzelski's cabinet (1981±5), subsequently in Zbigniew Messner's (1981±9) and, finally, in Mieczysøaw Rakowski's (1988±9). 6 DU, 1981, No. 38, pos. 172. 7 In Polish secret-service terminology: kontrola operacyjna. 8 Much of the information on the MSW's structure and functions comes from Dominiczak, 1994. The author is a historian and former high-level function- ary of that ministry. 9 Another source gives numbers from 600 to 1000 (Snopkiewicz 1992:157). 10 Zybertowicz's personal communication with a former operative. 11 This number includes the MSW's Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence forces. 12 The population of Poland was around 38 million. 13 Zybertowicz's personal communication with a former operative. 14 The SB had several distinctive categories of collaborators. The fully registered, regular agents were called `secret collaborators' or `agents;' less formalized co- operation was provided by `operational contacts' or `confidential contacts' (they included many Party members); yet another group was comprised of persons who had a duty to provide confidential information to the SB because of their managerial positions. There were also those who agreed to the SB's use of their apartments, telephone numbers, mail boxes and so forth (Grocki, 1992:20±1). 15 According to a statement made by Interior Minister Mirosøaw Milewski in 1980±1, at a conference of the MSW leadership (Dominiczak, 1994:506, 667). 16 The statute of the Team is published on pages 482±6. 17 Zybertowicz's personal communication with a former operative. 18 Our assessment, based on the principle that every operative was ordered to have 10 to 12 informers. 19 In Polish Kolegia do spraw wykroczen . 20 The claim by former Communists that Intelligence (Department I) was excluded from this penetration is difficult to verify. 21 A number of memoirs of former high-level MSW functionaries have been published and many documents have been leaked, but as far as the military services are concerned there have been only two books published, one on Intelligence (Moraczewski, 1996) and one on Counter-Intelligence (Kamin ski, n.d.; some useful information can be also found in Piecuch, 1993 and Dronicz 1997). 22 Zybertowicz's personal communication with a former operative. 23 Zybertowicz's personal communication with a former operative. 24 In Polish in the services' jargon: zadaniowanie, i.e. wyznaczanie zadan . Notes 235 25 Zybertowicz's personal communication with a former member of the Secret- ariat of the Central Committee. 26 To what extent the principle of task allocation operated smoothly, and under what conditions things were likely to get out of hand of the Centre (i.e. an informal group composed of a few members of CC secretariat and the Polit- buro) remains to be explored. Another open issue is whether Jaruzelski and his most trusted comrades ± General Czesøaw Kiszczak, General Florian Siwicki (Minister of Defence since 1983 to July 1990) and General Michaø Janiszewski ± could routinely issue orders for the services omitting both the central and regional party organizations. 27 Zybertowicz's personal communication with a former operative. 28 Throughout the 1970s there were 17 such promotions; Dominiczak, 1994:385. 29 We are indebted to Michael D. Kennedy for his suggestion to use this concept. 30 Bentham's Panopticon was an architectural idea of a circular prison building with a tall tower in the middle. All cells would have windows in both the front and back walls.