Concept Construction in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science

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Concept Construction in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN KANT'S METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE by Jennifer N. McRobert Department of Philosophy Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario December 1994 ©Jennifer N. McRobert 1994 THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION Chief Advisor Examining Board __________________________ _________________________ Advisory Committee _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ The thesis by Jennifer N. McRobert entitled Concept Construction in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Date _________________________ _________________________ Chair of Examining Board 1 ABSTRACT Kant's reasoning in his special metaphysics of nature is often opaque, and the character of his a priori foundation for Newtonian science is the subject of some controversy. Recent literature on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science has fallen well short of consensus on the aims and reasoning in the work. Various of the doctrines and even the character of the reasoning in the Metaphysical Foundations have been taken to present insuperable obstacles to accepting Kant's claim to ground Newtonian science. Gordon Brittan and Gerd Buchdahl, amongst others, have argued that Kant's stated aims in this case are not to be taken at face value, and that prior ontological commitments play a hidden but central role in Kant's special metaphysics. Michael Friedman (1992) has shown how Kant's stated aims can be taken seriously with his ingenious reconstruction of the Metaphysical Foundations as a demonstration of the a priori basis for our thinking bodies to be in true motion and in absolute space. However, Friedman does not address the issue of matter theory -- despite the importance of the issue to Kant. I argue that a strict reading of both the stated aims and doctrines of the Metaphysical Foundations is possible, since much of Kant's reasoning about the empirical concept of matter can be explained by his views on how the construction of empirical concepts is possible. Kant's quasi-mathematical constructions are pivotal in Friedman's interpretation. Constructibility is Kant's criterion of acceptability for the concepts of natural science. Yet Kant notoriously fails to construct the dynamical concept of matter, and accepts this failure with an equally notorious complacency. I argue that Kant's criteria of empirical concept construction, apart from any prior ontological commitments, are enough to generate his views on matter. Kant's failure to construct the requisite concept of matter can be ascribed to a missing law of nature, a law of the relation of forces the discovery of which Kant thought imminent. I conclude that matter theory is central to the Metaphysical Foundations, but that this does not undermine Kant's stated aim of giving the a priori ground of Newtonian science. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION ABSTRACT TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1 p. 4 Introduction (i) Physics and Metaphysics (ii) The Metaphysical Foundations and Newtonian Science (iii) Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Construction (iv) Concept Formation in the First Critique Conclusion Chapter 2 p. 30 Introduction (i) Kant's Construction of Quantity of Matter (ii) Kant's Constructions and Newton's Concepts and Laws (iii) The Construction of Quantity of Matter: The Problem of Constructing Intensive Magnitudes (iv) The Construction of Quantity of Matter and the Gap Problem Conclusion Chapter 3 p. 68 Introduction (i) The Paradox in the Critical Examination of Practical Reason (ii) The Appeal to Unity in Knowledge (iii) The Role of Unity in Relation to The Concept- Law Axis in Critical Philosophy Conclusion: Toward a Comprehensive Account of the Sense of Epistemic Warrant Along the Concept-Law Axis Chapter 4 p. 91 Introduction (i) Against Brittan's "Realist" Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations. (ii) Kant's Constructions: the Imitation of a Mathematical Method (iii) Mathematical and Metaphysical Arguments in Kant's Reasoning Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 114 (i) References and Translations for Kant's Writings (ii) General Bibliography VITA p. 118 3 Chapter 1 Introduction Kant's reasoning in his special metaphysics of nature is often opaque, and the character of his a priori foundation for Newtonian science is the subject of some controversy. Recent literature on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science has fallen well short of a consensus on the aims and the reasoning behind the work. Kant claims that his "special metaphysics" constitutes both an a priori grounding for Newtonian physics, and a case in concreto for the critical philosophy. Some have charged that the character of the reasoning which is to produce both (or either) results actually serves to make the achievement of one or the other of Kant's stated aims unachievable. I argue that a proper understanding of Kant's reasoning in the Metaphysical Foundations, and in particular an emphasis on the role of concept construction, allows us to read the work as a sincere attempt by Kant to carry out his stated aims. Michael Friedman's ingenious reconstruction of the Metaphysical Foundations as a demonstration of the a priori basis for our thinking bodies to be in true motion and in absolute space is a key inspiration for this dissertation. Pivotal in Friedman's interpretation is his emphasis on Kant's quasi-mathematical constructions in the Metaphysical Foundations. Constructibility is Kant's criterion of acceptability for the laws of natural science. While many have allowed that this is the role of constructibility, few have dealt with construction in so subtle and productive a way as has Friedman. Others have felt that the criterion was not rigorously applied by Kant, and have therefore tended to take the talk about constructions with a grain of salt. As a result, my dissertation goes into the role of mathematical 4 construction in more detail than has been common. Notable amongst those who do emphasize construction are Michael Friedman and Gordon Brittan. However Brittan sees the criterion of constructibility as leading to serious internal inconsistencies in the Metaphysical Foundations, in particular with respect to Kant's views on matter theory. I argue that the apparent inconsistencies Brittan detects are merely apparent, the result of Brittan's own faulty conception of Kant's constructions. Friedman dismisses the issue of matter theory as a central concern of the Metaphysical Foundations -- despite the considerable portion of the work explicitly devoted to the issue. Kant notoriously fails to construct the dynamical concept of matter, and seems to accept this failure with an equally notorious complacency; it is perhaps this complacency on Kant's part that Friedman takes to absolve him from addressing the issue of matter theory. Friedman is correct in his emphasis on and depiction of construction, so far as he goes. But I argue that much of Kant's reasoning about the empirical concept of matter can be explained by his views on how the construction of its mathematical features is possible. The point is to show that Kant's criteria of concept construction, quite apart from any prior ontological commitments, are enough to generate his unusual views on matter. Considered in this way, Kant's failure to construct the requisite concept of matter is ascribed to a missing law of nature -- and his assurance the result of his anticipation of the imminent discovery of -- a law of the relation of forces. I conclude that matter theory is central to the Metaphysical Foundations, but that this does not undermine his stated aim of giving the a priori ground of Newtonian science. I believe it is nearly impossible to write on some one aspect of Kant's critical philosophy in isolation, in such a way that there are no ramifications for the interpretation of other aspects of Kant's writings. This work is certainly no exception. Consider the relation between concept formation and laws of nature (the concept-law axis) which I delineate in the second and third chapters. My analysis of the concept-law axis in Kant's philosophy hinges on its foundation in the so called highest principle of understanding voiced in the first Critique, namely, that the principles of understanding follow given the satisfaction of the conditions of 5 schematism. The purpose of invoking the relation between concepts and laws in this work has to do with the proper understanding of Kant's treatment of the concept of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations. But Chapter 3 shows that this relation sheds light on Kant's moral philosophy as well, in particular the "law of nature" formulation of the categorical imperative. As for the philosophy of physics: most commentators have seen matter theory as a central issue in the Metaphysical Foundations. Friedman's reading is distinctive in that he downplays the importance of matter theory. While I find much to agree with in Friedman's interpretation of the Metaphysical Foundations, on the issue of matter theory, I part company with him. By more or less ignoring the issue, Friedman avoids what most commentators see as an especially problematic aspect of Kant's philosophy of physics, one that is rendered even more troubling by Kant's admission of failure to
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