DOCSLIB.ORG

New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack (Part 9 Of

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack (Part 9 Of Chapter 7 Soviet Responses to FOFA CONTENTS Page Political Responses . ..... 103 Military Responses . ................105 Chapter 7 Soviet Responses to FOFA Soviet writings suggest that FOFA has be- This chapter examines what the Soviets are come an important issue in the U. S. S. R., one now saying about FOFA, what Soviet politi- that might generate important political and cal and military responses to FOFA may al- military responses. Soviet planners are clearly ready have been, and what possible responses concerned about FOFA, both as a strategy for we might see in the future. It is important to the West, and as a reflection of a new set of keep in mind, however, that the Soviets view NATO capabilities they call reconnaissance FOFA primarily against the backdrop of a big- (“recce”) strike complexes, or RSCs. The So- ger whole, as another piece in the overall U. S./ viets have launched a propaganda campaign, NATO military strategy. Soviet responses to at home and abroad, to counter FOFA and to FOFA, therefore, should be viewed as responses use the controversy FOFA has generated to to the whole changing nature of a possible drive a wedge into NATO. They have also dis- East-West confrontation, and not necessarily cussed changes in military operations that just to FOFA per se. could well change the threat that FOFA is re- sponding to. POLITICAL RESPONSES The Soviet political response to FOFA has military systems in response. Ultimately, the been strong since the U.S. Army’s adoption Soviets hope to use these arguments to delay of AirLand Battle in 1982 and the approval or prevent NATO from acquiring FOFA sys- of FOFA by the NATO Defense Planning Com- tems. Within the U. S. S. R., these arguments mittee in 1984. Although FOFA has not be- justify further military buildup as a necessary come as big a political issue in the U.S.S.R. defensive response to U.S. aggression, and aim as arms control or SDI, the Soviet press, both to rally domestic support behind the current domestic and foreign, has been replete with Soviet leadership. articles and statements about the destabiliz- Thus, the Soviet press consistently depicts ing effects of FOFA and its dangers for all FOFA as offensive and aggressive; as repre- mankind. senting an attempt by the United States to This portrayal addresses several Soviet goals gain conventional superiority and give NATO both abroad and at home. Abroad, it allows forces a “first strike” capability; and as hav- the Soviets to play on already existing Euro- ing the potential to lower rather than raise the pean apprehensions about the feasibility and nuclear threshold by bordering on the capa- cost of FOFA and the possible negative im- bilities of theater nuclear weapons. As dis- pact of FOFA for deterrence and arms control. cussed in the Soviet military newspaper Red By so doing, it works toward two ends: to drive Star, for example: a wedge between the United States and Europe; In a word, this weapon [recce strike com- and, by painting the United States as the clear plex] relates to the offensive with the goal of aggressor threatening world peace, to present achieving military superiority over govern- a more peace-loving image of the U.S.S.R. This ments of the socialist commonwealth, and se- “peace offensive “ is laced with threats that, curing with military strength a one-sided su- should such a clearly offensive and aggressive periority by the application of sudden strikes NATO strategy be adopted, the U.S.S.R. un- and the conduct of protracted military ac- fortunately would be forced to build yet more tivities. 103 104 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack The arguments of NATO leaders, that with Soviet Cartoon Depiction of the “Rogers Plan” the application of a new concept they would diminish the danger of nuclear war in Eur- ope, lack any basis and are deliberate lies. As shown by the press, the new forms and sys- tems of common types of weapons . ap- proach the destructive potential of low-yield nuclear munitions. Moreover, with the accept- ance of these concepts, Pentagon and NATO strategies do not at all reject the possibility of applying nuclear weapons first. Witness the deployment in Europe of American first- strike missiles.1 FOFA is also painted as a “provocative es- calation, creating a new and expensive arms race: Hiding behind false references to a “Soviet I *.J military threat, ” the U.S. administration is “They are taking aim ., .“ initiating a new, dangerous spiral in the arms A caption with the cartoon reads: “In Brussels, the Military race, of which the illusory objective is to Planning Committee of NATO has embraced a new aggres- achieve superiority over the armed forces of sive concept—the so-called ‘Rogers Plan’. The plan foresees the socialist fraternity. This is why the Pen- a strategy of striking deep into the territory of the enemy— i.e., the territory of the socialist countries—in the event of tagon foresees creating qualitatively new re- a ‘crisis situation ’.” sources of armed conflict, besides improving 2 SOURCE Krasrra/a Zvezda (Red Star), Nov 13, 19S4, p 3 Reprinted with permls. nuclear weapons. sion of the Embassy of the U S S R , Washington, DC It is painted as militarily dangerous and States to manipulate its NATO Allies into be- destabilizing, in that the Warsaw Pact would ing tied not only to a U.S. strategy, but to U.S. be unable to distinguish between a conven- technology: tional and nuclear strike and would be forced to respond with a nuclear barrage: Europe has been allotted the role of a fig- ure intended to be sacrificed in another proj- . But the main danger with which the im- ect . Rogers declares that this [equipping plementation of this concept is fraught for NATO with FOFA weapon systems] will re- Europe lies somewhere else: It is utterly im- quire from the European countries an addi- possible to tell the difference between cruise tional military spending of 30 billion dol- missiles with conventional warheads and cruise lars . The USA will naturally be the chief missiles with nuclear warheads. Therefore, purveyor of the new weapons systems.4 with the approach of these missiles to “second- echelon targets, ” the side subjected to an at- Ultimately, FOFA is presented as not just tack will have no other option than to launch militarily destabilizing, but politically coun- a retaliatory nuclear strike necessitating a 3 terproductive to the overall East/West rela- switchover to automatic well in advance. tionship. According to Mr. A. Kokoshin, of the And in economic terms, FOFA is painted as USA-Canada Institute in Moscow, “the imple- clearly American, an attempt by the United mentation of the Rogers Plan can undermine all chances for success of the negotiations on ‘Lt. Col. A. Sergeev, “Pazvedyvatel’noudarnye kompleksy: the reduction of armed forces and arms in cen- Rasskazyvaem po pros’be chitatelei” (“Reconnaissance Strike Complexes: Discussion at the Request of Readers”), Krmmu”a tral Europe and seriously hinder a construc- Zvezda, Feb. 14, 1986, p. 3. tive solution to the problem of confidence build- 2Maj. Gen. M. Belov and Lt. Col. V. Shchukin, “Razvedy- ing measures . ."5 vatel’noporazhaiushchie kompleksy armii S. Sh.A, ” (“Recon- naissanceFire Complexes of the U.S. Army”), VoennV” Vestnik, ‘Ibid. No. 1, January 1985, p. 86. ‘A. Kokoshin, “The Rogers Plan: Alternative Defense Con- ‘Nikolai Portugalov, “FOFA and Other Atlantic Monsters, ” cepts and Security in Europe, ” IWonomilm, Politikq 1deolo@”a, Moscow IVews, Dec. 30, 1984, p. 5. Aug. 13, 1985, pp. 3-14. Ch. 7—Soviet Responses to FOFA ● 105 MILITARY RESPONSES Beyond politics, the Soviets view FOFA as Indeed, FOFA might well force the Soviets to presenting real, if not potentially “revolution- mobilize earlier and more overtly. If the Soviets ary” military challenges. “Such a qualitative were convinced that the West had the capa- leap in the development of conventional weap- bility to attack their forces on roads and/or rail- ens, ” Marshal Ogarkov writes, “inevitably en- roads, it would force the Soviets to choose be- tails a change in the nature of preparing and tween surprise and an assured ability to bring conducting operations."6 their forces forward. Should they decide to bring them forward before the war starts, the Soviet concerns with FOFA are twofold: the West would be provided with a more unam- concept itself, and the development of new biguous warning of their mobilization and in- weapons systems associated with, but not nec- tentions. essarily restricted to implementing those con- cepts. The Soviet press indicates that Soviet Alternatively, the Soviets could attempt to responses are also twofold: to modify their tac- increase the strength of existing units already tics and field new weapons to lessen the vul- forward, such as through changes in organiza- nerability of their follow-on forces to attack— tion and equipment, or by placing more Soviet i.e., by increasing the combat power of the first (as opposed to East European) divisions up echelon, increasing protection of the rear troops, front.8 According to some Western observers, and focusing more attention in speeding up the the Soviets have already been doing the former command and control process; and to develop over the past several years and might well in- the capability to preemptively attack these crease their efforts. The U.S.S.R. has had a con- NATO reconnaissance (“recce”) strike com- tinuing program to modernize ground forces plexes, or RSCs. in Central Europe, apparently adding a new As a concept, the Soviets are concerned that generation of tanks and fielding new artillery, infantry combat vehicles, anti-tank weapons, FOFA will extend the battle into their rear: and close support aircraft and helicopter gun- The emergence in the armies of the devel- ships.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Blitzkrieg: the Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht's
    East Tennessee State University Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works 8-2021 Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era Briggs Evans East Tennessee State University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Evans, Briggs, "Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era" (2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3927. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/3927 This Thesis - unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era ________________________ A thesis presented to the faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in History ______________________ by Briggs Evans August 2021 _____________________ Dr. Stephen Fritz, Chair Dr. Henry Antkiewicz Dr. Steve Nash Keywords: Blitzkrieg, doctrine, operational warfare, American military, Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, World War II, Cold War, Soviet Union, Operation Desert Storm, AirLand Battle, Combined Arms Theory, mobile warfare, maneuver warfare. ABSTRACT Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era by Briggs Evans The evolution of United States military doctrine was heavily influenced by the Wehrmacht and their early Blitzkrieg campaigns during World War II.
    [Show full text]
  • From Airland Battle to Airsea Battle: the Image of War in the United States Army and Air Force from 1980 to 2012
    Zurich Open Repository and Archive University of Zurich Main Library Strickhofstrasse 39 CH-8057 Zurich www.zora.uzh.ch Year: 2016 From AirLand Battle to AirSea Battle: the image of war in the United States Army and Air Force from 1980 to 2012 Fuhrer, Daniel Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-204544 Dissertation Published Version Originally published at: Fuhrer, Daniel. From AirLand Battle to AirSea Battle: the image of war in the United States Army and Air Force from 1980 to 2012. 2016, University of Zurich, Faculty of Arts. From AirLand Battle to AirSea Battle: The image of war in the United States Army and Air Force from 1980 to 2012 Thesis Presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of the University of Zurich for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Daniel Fuhrer Accepted in the fall semester 2015 on the recommendation of the Doctoral Committee: Prof. Dr. Rudolf Jaun (main advisor) Prof. Dr. Sven Trakulhun Zurich, 2016 Index Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 7 Topic .............................................................................................................................................. 7 Question and limitation ............................................................................................................... 11 State of research ........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle
    After you have read the research report, please give us your frank opinion on the contents. All comments—large or small, complimentary or caustic—will be gratefully appreciated. Mail them to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. Synchronizing Airpower and Laughbaum Firepower in the Deep Battle Thank you for your assistance COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH, AND EDUCATION AIR UNIVERSITY Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle R. KENT LAUGHBAUM Lt Col, USAF CADRE Paper Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6610 January 1999 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. ii CADRE Papers CADRE Papers are occasional publications sponsored by the Airpower Research Institute of Air University’s College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE). Dedicated to promoting understanding of air and space power theory and application, these studies are published by the Air University Press and broadly distributed to the US Air Force, the Department of Defense and other governmental organizations, leading scholars, selected institutions of higher learning, public policy institutes, and the media. All military members and civilian employees assigned to Air University are invited to contribute unclassified manuscripts. Manuscripts should deal with air and/or space power history, theory, doctrine or strategy, or with joint or combined service matters bearing on the application of air and/or space power.
    [Show full text]
  • The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare
    No. 109 JUNE 2016 The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare Michael B. Kim The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare by Michael B. Kim The Institute of Land Warfare ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of ILW’s editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER No. 109, June 2016 The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare by Michael B. Kim Major Michael B. Kim currently serves as the Squadron Executive Officer for the 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division. Prior to his current position, he graduated from the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and completed the Art of War Scholars Program.
    [Show full text]
  • Airland Battle and Modern Warfare
    AirLand Battle and Modern Warfare Carter Malkasian This paper is about AirLand battle and its application in modern warfare. The topic of AirLand battle has lain dormant for over a decade, as the United States has been immersed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the theory is again under consideration. This is happening for three reasons. First, the rise of competitors for the United States means that future wars will not simply be irregular. How to fight a conventional war is again a major question. Second, in this context, the US Army is reconsidering its role in US defense and reassessing its doctrines. Third, AirLand Battle has received increased attention because of the introduction of a sister doctrine—AirSea Battle—which attempts to use some aspects of AirLand Battle. This paper will explain AirLand Battle and its applicability to the current strategic environment. It will also discuss whether amphibious warfare fits the current strategic environment, specifically because certain forms of amphibious warfare are similar to AirLand Battle and AirSea battle raises the possibility of amphibious operations. After this section, the paper will discuss the possible uses of AirLand battle and amphibious operations in East Asia. Finally, the paper will discuss AirSea Battle. The main points of the paper are: 1) AirLand Battle is unsuited to the modern strategic environment 2) Amphibious operations will be used in a very limited fashion in the future 3) In East Asia, both AirLand Battle and amphibious operations are suited for very limited or defensive operations. 4) AirSea Battle makes sense as a means of degrading the systems of an enemy on the offensive.
    [Show full text]
  • Air University Review: May-June 1984, Volume XXXV, No. 4
    The Professional Journal of the United States Hovv lhe Army got its AirLand Batile Who should conirol air assets in the Clausewitz, Jomini, Douhet, concept—page 4 AirLand Batile?—page 16 and Brodie—How are they linked to our curreni nuclear posture? Should vve move now to ballistic missile defense?— page 54 Attendon The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air University. Rather, the contents reflect the authors’ ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thought- ful and informed contributions are always welcomed. Al R UNIVERSITYrcuicw May-June 1984 Vol XXXV, No 4 2 T he Next War Editorial 4 T he Evoli tion of the Air L and Battle Concept John L. Romjue 16 T acair Si ppo r t for Air L and Battle Maj. James A. Machos, USAF 25 T he Q i est for Unitv of Comma nd Col. Thomas A. Cardvvell 111, USAF 30 I ra C. Eaker Essav Competition Second-Prize Win n er L eaüer ship to Match O i r T echnologv Lt. Col. Harry R. Borowski, USAF 35 EQL ALITV IN THE COCKPIT Li. Col. Nancy B. Samuelson, USAF 47 T he Air Forc:e Wif e— H er Per spect ive Maj. Mark M. Warner, USAF Differing views and provocaiive 54 C lassical Mil it a r v Stratecy and quesuons on the nuclear issues oí Ballistic Miss il e Defense lhe 1980s—page 81 Maj.
    [Show full text]
  • The Army and Multi- Domain Operations: Moving Beyond Airland Battle
    October 2019 The Army and Multi- Domain Operations: Moving Beyond AirLand Battle COL Dennis Wille Last edited on September 23, 2019 at 1:59 p.m. EDT Acknowledgments The author would like to thank the leadership, program directors, and staff of New America for their guidance and support throughout this inaugural Army fellowship opportunity. I am especially grateful for the mentorship of Peter Singer, Peter Bergen, and Sharon Burke as they shaped my overall experience. Thanks are also owed to two extraordinary members of New America’s International Security Program, Melissa Salyk-Virk and David Sterman, who provided constant administrative support and editorial review for this and other projects during the fellowship. Additional thanks to Phil Evans, Kelly Ivanoff, and the entire U.S. Army War College team for providing me with excellent support throughout the fellowship year. This paper, and the entire fellowship experience, would not be what it is without the extensive advice and help of so many people. All errors of fact or interpretation are, of course, the author’s alone. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/army-and-multi-domain-operations-moving-beyond-airland- 2 battle/ About the Author(s) Colonel Dennis Wille was a U.S. Army Fellow at New America. He has been an active duty member of the United States Army for more than 23 years. About New America We are dedicated to renewing America by continuing the quest to realize our nation’s highest ideals, honestly confronting the challenges caused by rapid technological and social change, and seizing the opportunities those changes create.
    [Show full text]
  • Theories of Warfare
    Theories of Warfare French Operations in Indo-China Author Programme Alexander Hagelkvist Officers Programme, OP 12-15 Tutor Number of pages Stéphane Taillat 71 Scholarship provider: Hosting unit: Swedish National Defence Report date: 2015-06-02 Écoles de Saint-Cyr University Coëtquidan (FRANCE) Subject: War Science Unclassified Institution: CREC (le Centre de Level: Bachelor Thesis Recherche des Écoles de Coëtquidan) Alexander Hagelkvist War science, Bachelor Thesis. “French Operations in Indo-China” Acknowledgements First and foremost I offer my sincerest gratitude to the Swedish Defence University for the scholarship that made my exchange possible. Furthermore to Écoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan for their hospitality, as well as le Centre de Recherche des Écoles de Coëtquidan. I wish to express my sincere thanks to Director Doare, Principal of the Faculty, for providing me with all the necessary facilities for the research. I also want to thank Colonel Renoux for constant support and availability with all the surroundings that concerned my work at the C.R.E.C. And to my supervisor, Stéphane Taillat, who has supported me throughout my thesis with his patience and knowledge whilst allowing me the room to work in my own way. I attribute the completion of my Bachelor thesis to his encouragement and effort and without him this thesis, would not have been completed. I am also grateful to Lieutenant Colonel Marco Smedberg, who has provided me with the interest and motivation for my subject. I am thankful and grateful to him for sharing expertise and valuable guidance. I take this opportunity to express gratitude to Guy Skingsley at the Foreign Languages Section, War Studies at the Swedish Defence University for his help and support on the linguistic parts of the thesis.
    [Show full text]
  • Fm 6-20 Fire Support in the Airland Battle
    Field Manual *FM 6-20 No 6-20 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, DC, 17 May 1988 FIRE SUPPORT IN THE AIRLAND BATTLE TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE CHAPTER 1 FOUNDATIONS OF FIRE SUPPORT COMBAT POWER ...................................................................................... 1-1 MANEUVER ................................................................................................ 1-1 FIREPOWER .............................................................................................. 1-1 PROTECTION.............................................................................................. 1-1 LEADERSHIP .............................................................................................. 1-2 FIRE SUPPORT .......................................................................................... 1-2 FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM .......................................................................... 1-2 NATURE OF FIRE SUPPORT ..................................................................... 1-2 BASIC TASKS OF FIRE SUPPORT ........................................................... 1-3 FIRE SUPPORT AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR ................................... 1-5 FIRE SUPPORT AND THE AIRLAND BATTLE .......................................... 1-7 FIRE SUPPORT AND THE THREAT .......................................................... 1-7 FLEXIBILITY OF FIRE SUPPORT .............................................................. 1-8 CHAPTER 2 COMPONENTS OF THE FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM Section I FIELD ARTILLERY RESPONSIBILITIES...................................................
    [Show full text]
  • THE LAND WARFARE PAPERS Building the Army for Desert Storm
    -THE LAND WARFARE PAPERS No. 9 NOVEMBER 1991 Building the Army for Desert Storm By Charles E. Kirkpatrick A National Security Affairs Paper Published on Occasion by THE INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY Arlington. Virginia -�. BUILDING THE ARMY FOR DESERT STORM by Charles E. Kirkpatrick THE INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY ., AN AUSA INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER In 1988 the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) established within its existing organization a new entity known as the Institute of Land Warfare. Its purpose is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as a Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that AUSA agrees with everything in the paper but do es suggest that AUSA believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER NO.9, NOVEMBER 1991 Building the Army for Desert Storm by Charles E. Kirkpatrick Charles E. Kirkpatrick is an historian at the United States Army Center of Military History, where he is presently at work on a volume in the Army's official history of the Vietnam War. A retired soldier, he is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute and Command and General Staff College who served in Air Defense Artillery units in NATO and the United States and taught history at West Point.
    [Show full text]
  • Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress
    Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress March 18, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46725 SUMMARY R46725 Joint All-Domain Command and Control: March 18, 2021 Background and Issues for Congress John R. Hoehn The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of Analyst in Military its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the Capabilities and Programs department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new communications methods. Several agencies and organizations within DOD are involved in JADC2-related efforts. The following list highlights selected organizations and projects associated with JADC2 development: DOD Chief Information Officer: Fifth Generation (5G) Information Communications Technologies.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Capabilities and Multi- Domain Operations in Future High-Intensity Warfare in 2030
    Cyber Capabilities and Multi- Domain Operations in Future High-Intensity Warfare in 2030 Franz-Stefan Gady Research Fellow Cyber, Space and Future Conflict Division International Institute for Strategic Studies Alexander Stronell Research Assistant Cyber, Space and Future Conflict Division International Institute for Strategic Studies Abstract: Synchronised kinetic and cyber operations across domains that present ‘multiple dilemmas’ are a fundamental tenet of multi-domain oper- ations. Recent practice and study of the battlespace use of cyber capabilities in conjunction with kinetic operations, however, have shown the difficulties in creating joint effects due to insufficient synchronisation of operations or lack of coordination and control of cyber effects. This paper outlines three requirements needed to conduct integrated cyber and kinetic operations in a future high-intensity conflict involving NATO and a near-peer adversary: firstly, an internet of military things (IoMT) in conjunction with an artifi- cial-intelligence (AI)-enabled command and control (C2) capability for in- tegrated cyber and kinetic operations; secondly, multi-domain formations integrated with cyber commands or their respective organisational equiv- alents for coordinated theatre-wide cyber campaigns; and thirdly, a cyber mission command doctrine based on decentralised decision-making and de- centralised execution to enable an accelerated operational pace. The analysis presents three comparative country studies— the US, UK and Germany— to assess the status of the integration of cyber capabilities into multi-domain warfighting concepts for high-intensity conflict in 2030. It also offers a pre- liminary set of recommendations on technical capabilities, new organisa- tional structures and doctrinal changes required to facilitate the better inte- gration of cyber with kinetic capabilities.
    [Show full text]