Chapter 7 Soviet Responses to FOFA CONTENTS

Page Political Responses ...... 103 Military Responses ...... 105 Chapter 7 Soviet Responses to FOFA

Soviet writings suggest that FOFA has be- This chapter examines what the Soviets are come an important issue in the U. S. S. R., one now saying about FOFA, what Soviet politi- that might generate important political and cal and military responses to FOFA may al- military responses. Soviet planners are clearly ready have been, and what possible responses concerned about FOFA, both as a strategy for we might see in the future. It is important to the West, and as a reflection of a new set of keep in mind, however, that the Soviets view NATO capabilities they call reconnaissance FOFA primarily against the backdrop of a big- (“recce”) strike complexes, or RSCs. The So- ger whole, as another piece in the overall U. S./ viets have launched a propaganda campaign, NATO military strategy. Soviet responses to at home and abroad, to counter FOFA and to FOFA, therefore, should be viewed as responses use the controversy FOFA has generated to to the whole changing nature of a possible drive a wedge into NATO. They have also dis- East-West confrontation, and not necessarily cussed changes in military operations that just to FOFA per se. could well change the threat that FOFA is re- sponding to.

POLITICAL RESPONSES The Soviet political response to FOFA has military systems in response. Ultimately, the been strong since the U.S. Army’s adoption Soviets hope to use these arguments to delay of AirLand Battle in 1982 and the approval or prevent NATO from acquiring FOFA sys- of FOFA by the NATO Defense Planning Com- tems. Within the U. S. S. R., these arguments mittee in 1984. Although FOFA has not be- justify further military buildup as a necessary come as big a political issue in the U.S.S.R. defensive response to U.S. aggression, and aim as arms control or SDI, the Soviet press, both to rally domestic support behind the current domestic and foreign, has been replete with Soviet leadership. articles and statements about the destabiliz- Thus, the Soviet press consistently depicts ing effects of FOFA and its dangers for all FOFA as offensive and aggressive; as repre- mankind. senting an attempt by the United States to This portrayal addresses several Soviet goals gain conventional superiority and give NATO both abroad and at home. Abroad, it allows forces a “first strike” capability; and as hav- the Soviets to play on already existing Euro- ing the potential to lower rather than raise the pean apprehensions about the feasibility and nuclear threshold by bordering on the capa- cost of FOFA and the possible negative im- bilities of theater nuclear weapons. As dis- pact of FOFA for deterrence and arms control. cussed in the Soviet military newspaper Red By so doing, it works toward two ends: to drive Star, for example: a wedge between the United States and Europe; In a word, this weapon [recce strike com- and, by painting the United States as the clear plex] relates to the offensive with the goal of aggressor threatening world peace, to present achieving military superiority over govern- a more peace-loving image of the U.S.S.R. This ments of the socialist commonwealth, and se- “peace offensive “ is laced with threats that, curing with military strength a one-sided su- should such a clearly offensive and aggressive periority by the application of sudden strikes NATO strategy be adopted, the U.S.S.R. un- and the conduct of protracted military ac- fortunately would be forced to build yet more tivities.

103 104 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The arguments of NATO leaders, that with Soviet Cartoon Depiction of the “Rogers Plan” the application of a new concept they would diminish the danger of nuclear war in Eur- ope, lack any basis and are deliberate lies. As shown by the press, the new forms and sys- tems of common types of weapons . . . ap- proach the destructive potential of low-yield nuclear munitions. Moreover, with the accept- ance of these concepts, Pentagon and NATO strategies do not at all reject the possibility of applying nuclear weapons first. Witness the deployment in Europe of American first- strike missiles.1 FOFA is also painted as a “provocative es- calation, creating a new and expensive arms race: Hiding behind false references to a “Soviet I *.J military threat, ” the U.S. administration is “They are taking aim ., .“ initiating a new, dangerous spiral in the arms A caption with the cartoon reads: “In Brussels, the Military race, of which the illusory objective is to Planning Committee of NATO has embraced a new aggres- achieve superiority over the armed forces of sive concept—the so-called ‘Rogers Plan’. The plan foresees the socialist fraternity. This is why the Pen- a strategy of striking deep into the territory of the enemy— i.e., the territory of the socialist countries—in the event of tagon foresees creating qualitatively new re- a ‘crisis situation ’.” sources of armed conflict, besides improving 2 SOURCE Krasrra/a Zvezda (Red Star), Nov 13, 19S4, p 3 Reprinted with permls. nuclear weapons. sion of the Embassy of the U S S R , Washington, DC It is painted as militarily dangerous and States to manipulate its NATO Allies into be- destabilizing, in that the Warsaw Pact would ing tied not only to a U.S. strategy, but to U.S. be unable to distinguish between a conven- technology: tional and nuclear strike and would be forced to respond with a nuclear barrage: Europe has been allotted the role of a fig- ure intended to be sacrificed in another proj- . . . But the main danger with which the im- ect . . . Rogers declares that this [equipping plementation of this concept is fraught for NATO with FOFA weapon systems] will re- Europe lies somewhere else: It is utterly im- quire from the European countries an addi- possible to tell the difference between cruise tional military spending of 30 billion dol- missiles with conventional warheads and cruise lars . . . The USA will naturally be the chief missiles with nuclear warheads. Therefore, purveyor of the new weapons systems.4 with the approach of these missiles to “second- echelon targets, ” the side subjected to an at- Ultimately, FOFA is presented as not just tack will have no other option than to launch militarily destabilizing, but politically coun- a retaliatory nuclear strike necessitating a 3 terproductive to the overall East/West rela- switchover to automatic well in advance. tionship. According to Mr. A. Kokoshin, of the And in economic terms, FOFA is painted as USA-Canada Institute in Moscow, “the imple- clearly American, an attempt by the United mentation of the Rogers Plan can undermine all chances for success of the negotiations on ‘Lt. Col. A. Sergeev, “Pazvedyvatel’noudarnye kompleksy: the reduction of armed forces and arms in cen- Rasskazyvaem po pros’be chitatelei” (“Reconnaissance Strike Complexes: Discussion at the Request of Readers”), Krmmu”a tral Europe and seriously hinder a construc- Zvezda, Feb. 14, 1986, p. 3. tive solution to the problem of confidence build- 2Maj. Gen. M. Belov and Lt. Col. V. Shchukin, “Razvedy- ing measures . . ."5 vatel’noporazhaiushchie kompleksy armii S. Sh.A, ” (“Recon- naissanceFire Complexes of the U.S. Army”), VoennV” Vestnik, ‘Ibid. No. 1, January 1985, p. 86. ‘A. Kokoshin, “The Rogers Plan: Alternative Defense Con- ‘Nikolai Portugalov, “FOFA and Other Atlantic Monsters, ” cepts and Security in Europe, ” IWonomilm, Politikq 1deolo@”a, Moscow IVews, Dec. 30, 1984, p. 5. Aug. 13, 1985, pp. 3-14. Ch. 7—Soviet Responses to FOFA ● 105

MILITARY RESPONSES Beyond politics, the Soviets view FOFA as Indeed, FOFA might well force the Soviets to presenting real, if not potentially “revolution- mobilize earlier and more overtly. If the Soviets ary” military challenges. “Such a qualitative were convinced that the West had the capa- leap in the development of conventional weap- bility to attack their forces on roads and/or rail- ens, ” Marshal Ogarkov writes, “inevitably en- roads, it would force the Soviets to choose be- tails a change in the nature of preparing and tween surprise and an assured ability to bring conducting operations."6 their forces forward. Should they decide to bring them forward before the war starts, the Soviet concerns with FOFA are twofold: the West would be provided with a more unam- concept itself, and the development of new biguous warning of their mobilization and in- weapons systems associated with, but not nec- tentions. essarily restricted to implementing those con- cepts. The Soviet press indicates that Soviet Alternatively, the Soviets could attempt to responses are also twofold: to modify their tac- increase the strength of existing units already tics and field new weapons to lessen the vul- forward, such as through changes in organiza- nerability of their follow-on forces to attack— tion and equipment, or by placing more Soviet i.e., by increasing the combat power of the first (as opposed to East European) divisions up echelon, increasing protection of the rear troops, front.8 According to some Western observers, and focusing more attention in speeding up the the Soviets have already been doing the former command and control process; and to develop over the past several years and might well in- the capability to preemptively attack these crease their efforts. The U.S.S.R. has had a con- NATO reconnaissance (“recce”) strike com- tinuing program to modernize ground forces plexes, or RSCs. in Central Europe, apparently adding a new As a concept, the Soviets are concerned that generation of tanks and fielding new artillery, infantry combat vehicles, anti-tank weapons, FOFA will extend the battle into their rear: and close support aircraft and helicopter gun- The emergence in the armies of the devel- ships. Some believe this indicates that the So- oped capitalist countries of new, and espe- viet Union already “has quite significantly cially high-precision weapons, is greatly downgraded the strategic importance of follow- changing the “face” of modern combat by constantly raising the intensity of the fire 8See Boyd D. Sutton, “Deep Attack Concepts and the Defence struggle. Whereas in past wars the predomi- of Central Europe, ” Survival, March/April 1984, pp. 64-65. nant place belonged to a close exchange of fire, present conditions have seen a sharp in- crease in the significance not only of the close exchange of fire, but also of the long-range exchange of fire-that is, simultaneous fire against practically the entire depth of the enemy’s combat formation.7 One Soviet response might be to increase the combat power of the first echelons by reallocat- ing units from the second to the first echelons, such as by bringing more divisions forward.

‘Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, “Zashchita sot- sialisma: opyt istorii i sovremennosti ” (“The Defense of Social- ism: The Experience of History and the Present Day’ ‘), Kras- nm”a Zvezda, May 9, 1984, pp 2-3. 7Maj. Gen. I. Vorob’yev, “Sovremennoe oruzhie i taktika” (“Modem Weapons and Tactics”), Krasnm”a Zvezda, June 20, 1984, p. 2. 106 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Photo credit: U S Department of Defense Example of a camouflaged military vehicle. on conventional forces precisely at the moment the survivability and reliable protection of 11 when some in the West are trying to persuade units . . . us that we should divert large resources to at- 9 Soviet doctrine and writings consistently tacking them.” emphasize the importance of maskirovka--a In addition, Soviet writings emphasize the term encompassing the concepts of deception, need for “significant changes in tactics”10 and camouflage, and the masking effects of ground, increased protection of forces in the rear through smoke, dazzling light, etc. Commanders in the increased air defense and camouflage. Previ- rear must devote greater efforts to “the skill- ously, Soviet combat forces moving up in the ful utilization . . . of natural features of the lo- rear were not in a combat environment. With cal terrain, the careful preparation of field FOFA, they would have to deal with being in defenses, the implementation of deception a combat situation possibly from the beginning: measures, and to misleading the enemy with regard to the unit true location."12 Likewise, High-precision weapons considerably in- the Soviets may also change timing, spacing, crease troop vulnerability and, accordingly, modes of transportation, or build more redun- generate increased requirements for ensuring —— . . . . —-—. ‘Col. Jonathon Alford, “NATO, ET and New Conventional “Major General 1. Vorob’yev, “Sovremennoe oruzhie i tak- Strategy,” Atlantic Quarterly, vol. II, No. 4, winter 1984, p. 297. tika, ” op cit. ‘“Major Gen, I. Vorob’yev, op. cit. 1’Ibid. Ch. 7–Soviet Responses to FOFA 107

dancy or mobility into their system. They may As discussed in chapter 4, the Soviet C* well have to operate with troops highly dis- structure was designed according to certain persed and camouflaged-as if in a nuclear norms, and in such a way that the nature of environment—so as not to present easily de- the process itself would be somewhat adapt- stroyable targets, even though operating this ive to the time available. But if decision time way might significantly slow down their rate becomes too short, the Soviets emphasize, the of advance.13 And the Soviets continually dis- quality of decisions will greatly erode. Perhaps cuss the need for increased protection of their the greatest challenge from FOFA, therefore, rear forces through improved air defense and is that it cuts down on the time available for counter-air capabilities.14 decisionmaking, leading to a reduction in cy- cle time for planning and replanning an opera- Soviet writings, however, suggest that the tion. This may be viewed as only exacerbating Soviets may be less concerned about FOFA what the Soviets have seen as a long-standing as a concept than they are about the weapons challenge of improving their troop control sys- systems themselves, and in particular, the po- tem so that it can operate within the time avail- tential ability of quick-reacting and precision- able and still allow for sound decisions. guided weapons to act more quickly than their command and control cycle can respond: Soviet writings suggest that the Soviets see possible responses to this problem in two direc- The introduction of super-accurate self- guiding systems combining recce and strike tions. The first includes “technical’ responses, functions allows for very short times to ac- in terms of further automation of command quire the target, prepare and fire the weapon, and control systems. A great deal of effort is and hit the target. Systems such as Assault being devoted to streamlining and automat- Breaker, self-homing and laser-guided, in- ing C2 procedures both to speed the pace of frared or radio-seeking projectiles coupled decisionmaking and to improve the quality of with automated artillery fire control sys- decisions. In addition, the Soviets have empha- tems . . . allow engagement times to be re- sized “operational-tactical” responses, “relat- duced by a factor of 10-15. ing to the methods of work of commanders and The general speeding up of the battlefield has staffs, their training and the way they use C2 sharply curtailed the time available to com- means. ” This may indicate a rethinking of manders and staff for making and implement- some of the methods used to make decisions ing decisions. This has made it most important and plan, so that reactions can take place much to speed up the collection of intelligence, its faster. analysis, making a decision, giving orders, organizing cooperation and so on. The guide- Included here is the long-standing problem lines of the past are no longer appropriate. In of initiative. For some time now, the Soviet the Great Patriotic War, a regiment and a bat- system has been pulling in two directions. In talion often had up to 3-4 days to prepare for principle, the Soviet military system requires an offensive—now it is much less. 15 that a soldier be able to perform simple bat- ——.— — -. . tlefield tasks in any conditions on the battle- ‘3See, for example, Gen. V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika, Moscow, field. These are learned by drill, so that when 1984, and Michael J. Sterling, Soviet Reactions to NATO’s “initiative’ may be asked of soldiers, it is gen- Emer&”ng Technolo~”es for Deep Attack, The Rand Corp., N- 2294-AF, August 1985. erally restricted to initiating the appropriate “SEW, for example, Col. Gen. I. Golushko, “Tyl v usloviiakh drill under whatever circumstances he may prirneneniya protivnikom vysokotochnogo oruzhita” (“The Rear find himself. Area Under Conditions of the Enemy’s Use of High-Precision Weapons”), Tyl i Snabzhem”y, No. 7, 1984, pp. 13-17. With the sharp reduction in time which the “Maj Gen I. Vorob’yev, “Vrernia v boiu ” (“Time in Battle”), Krasnaia Zvezda, Nov. 9, 1985, p. 2. According to Vorob’yev, Soviets see for making and executing these de- “six to ten minutes are needed for the ‘search and destroy’ cy- cisions, however, Soviet writings are now re- cle of the RSC Assault Breaker to be performed. This amount flecting an apparent encouragement of greater of time limits troop operations. Troops must be able to move out from under a strike or use other defensive measures during initiative at lower levels, for example, for jun- this short time period. ” ior officers at the platoon, company, and bat- 108 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack talion level. For example, in addition to the con- FOFA be implemented. As Vorob’yev has cept of “initsiativa”—which suggests selecting noted: the right drill in the right circumstances-two It is believed that the use of high-precision concepts have received renewed emphasis in weapons will call for significant changes in Soviet parlance: “smekalka,” which implies do- tactics. . . . It will be more important to de- ing something unconventional in those situa- liver preemptive fire strikes to destroy high- tions where no drill may apply; and “tvor- precision weapons systems . . . chestvo, ” connoting a longer term solution, an 16 Success in a battle being waged with quick- imaginative choice of the correct drill. reacting, long-range, high-precision combat This not only complicates Soviet planning, complexes demands active reconnaissance in but Soviet commanders must also deal with order to detect the enemy’s preparations in time to inflict fire attacks, the maintenance of subordinates who are the products of a soci- units in constant readiness to repulse the ety where initiative has always been discour- enemy’s employment of new weapons systems, aged, if not penalized, and where reluctance and the concealment of measures undertaken to take on responsibility is strong. There will in preparation for the battle. It is important be major social and cultural hurdles to jump to ensure reliable air cover for the units, to un- over, not only for reconciling the notion of ini- dertake protective measures in a timely fash- tiative itself with Soviet command and con- ion, and to preempt the enemy in the opening 18 trol, but also to effectively imbue their fight- fire to immediately destroy his weapons . . . ing force with fundamentally new attitudes. As of now, the Soviets are apparently focus- Finally, the Soviets are discussing the need ing on using existing force elements for these to preemptively attack the weapons systems kinds of missions, combining existing recon- associated with FOFA, or Western recce-strike naissance assets with target assessment cen- complexes (RSCs), and allege that they may ters and then having a group of weapons “on be forced into developing their own “recce- call” to attack the targets as soon as they are strike” and “recce-fire” complexes17 should identified. Although apparently less sophisti- cated than Western efforts, Soviet capabilities “See, for example, Kh. Grishchenko, “Proiavliaia smekalku i smelost’ (’‘Displaying Native Wit and Boldness’ ‘), Voermyi in this area would undoubtedly grow as new Istoricheskie Zhurnal, February 1986, p. 39. technology becomes available. Although the “The Soviets make a distinction between recce-strike and Soviets have said that their RSCs area direct reccefire complexes. According to Maj. Gen. Belov, ‘‘if the strike element annihilates the target by fire (for example with con- response to FOFA, evidence suggests that ventional artillery or rockets) the complex is called a reconnais- they are an important part of Soviet military sance-fire complex, while if it does so by a missile strike (tacti- planning as it assesses the overall context of cal and army aviation, tactical and operational tactical missile launchers, ) it is called a reconnaissance-strike complex. There- a potential East-West military confrontation. fore reconnaissancefire complexes are more of a tactical resource while reconnaissance-strike complexes are operational re- sources. ” See Maj Gen A. Belov, op. cit. 18Maj, Gen 1. Vorob’yev, op. cit.