Airland Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Domain Battle

Perspective

C O R P O R A T I O N Expert insights on a timely policy issue

August 2018 Shared Problems

The Lessons of AirLand Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Domain Battle

David E. Johnson

ince the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army and the U.S. doctrine were similarly focused on closer Army and Air Force Air Force have pursued separate and sometimes competing cooperation to counter a perceived overmatch in Warsaw Pact capa- Svisions of how air and ground power should be employed bilities. How did these efforts proceed? Why did they not continue? to win wars. This interservice rivalry was allowed to sim- What lessons do they offer for today’s Multi-Domain Battle? mer while the nation focused on low-intensity counterinsurgency operations and did not face a peer adversary. However, the emer- Multi-Domain Battle gence of Russia and China as great-power competitors has brought Multi-Domain Battle is intended to wrest the advantage from new urgency to the question of how the United States leverages its potential adversaries and restore a credible conventional deter- air and ground—not to mention sea, space, and cyber—power to rent and warfighting capability against peer competitors.2 General prevail against a formidable adversary. The National Security Strat- David G. Perkins, until recently the commander of the U.S. Train- egy and National Defense Strategy envision the need for greater ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and General James coordination across warfighting domains to meet future threats. M. Holmes, commander, Air Force Combat Command (ACC) The Army, in collaboration with the Air Force, is developing the coauthored the article “Multidomain Battle: Converging Concepts concept of Multi-Domain Battle to better coordinate air and Toward a Joint Solution,” stating that “TRADOC and ACC are ground forces to meet shared challenges.1 Yet this is not the first working collaboratively today to blend their warfighting concepts time that the Army and the Air Force have sought closer collabora- into a joint doctrine for the future.”3 In an earlier article, “Multi- tion: In the 1980s, the Army’s 31 Initiatives and AirLand Battle Domain Battle: The Advent of Twenty-First Century War,” General Perkins, pointing to a way forward in developing Multi-Domain Development Process,” commonly referred to as the 31 Initiatives.6 Battle, highlighted the need for interservice collaboration “in the The opening paragraph makes clear the breadth of the agreement: spirit of the 31 Initiatives” from the 1980s.4 Given the importance The Army and the Air Force affirm of the 31 Initiatives as a precedent for current efforts, it is worth that to fulfill their roles in meeting the understanding their history. national security objectives of deterrence and defense, they must organize, train, The Origins of the 31 Initiatives and equip a compatible, complementary, The 31 Initiatives arose from a mutual understanding between and affordable Total Force that will the Army and the Air Force that they were not prepared for the maximize our joint combat capability to military challenge that the Warsaw Pact posed for NATO. This execute airland combat operations. To problem became glaringly apparent during the 1973 Yom Kippur that end, broad, across-the-board, war- War, when Syrian and Egyptian forces, armed with Soviet equip- fighting issues have been addressed.7 ment and following Soviet doctrine, put the state of Israel and its vaunted defense forces in peril. The sudden realization of how some As the historian Harold Winton observed astutely, the close Soviet offensive capabilities had evolved while the United States collaboration between the Army and the Air Force from 1973 to was focused on Vietnam galvanized the Army and the Air Force 1990, which included the 31 Initiatives, was a product of a specific around meeting the challenge of the defense of NATO.5 unifying problem: “the ability to defeat a Warsaw Pact invasion of Defending Western Europe, conventionally, from Soviet western Europe below the nuclear threshold.” This problem offered 8 aggression was a particularly acute problem for the Army and the “the unifying effect of the NATO defense mission.” Winton also Air Force in the 1970s and 1980s. The Warsaw Pact had significant noted that other factors were in play, including “the close coopera- quantitative advantages and, as the 1973 war had demonstrated, tion of personalities at or near the top of each service,” the ascen- some overmatching capabilities. And this mutual understanding dance of fighter pilots to top Air Force leadership positions, and that the Warsaw Pact posed a shared problem that could not be “the clarity of the Army’s vision of how it intended to fight a future 9 resolved independently by the Army or the Air Force resulted in war that tended to pull the Air Force in its wake.” All of these perhaps the one moment in Army and Air Force history when there factors combined to temporarily assuage the deep cultural antipa- was consensus regarding the need for fundamental collaboration. thies and fundamental conceptual differences between ground and To address the shared problem, on May 22, 1984, Gen- air officers about how to win wars that had existed since the days eral John A. Wickham, Jr., U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and Gen- of Billy Mitchell, the famous post–World War I advocate for an 10 eral Charles A. Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff, signed a memo- independent U.S. air arm. randum of agreement, “U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Joint Force

2 This shared approach to solving the problem of defending NATO was more than a convergence of air and ground concepts: Many of the capabilities that evolved from It resulted in new concepts, including the Army’s AirLand Battle the 31 Initiatives would prove their worth doctrine, joint suppression of enemy air defenses, battlefield air after the Cold War, particularly in Kosovo, interdiction, and clarifications of close air support. Indeed, the Iraq, and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, as the integration of Army and Air Force capabilities was fundamental to AirLand Battle doctrine. Furthermore, some Army and Air Force Army and the Air Force grew more capable, programs were canceled or realigned to eliminate duplication of they also began drawing apart as each tried effort, and new capabilities were fielded more rapidly, such as the to demonstrate its unique utility in winning Joint Tactical Missile System and the Joint Surveillance Target wars. Attack Radar System.11 Finally, the 31st initiative showed the seriousness of the effort by instituting cooperation to decide budget priorities: “The Army and Air Force will formalize cross-service thinking and doctrine evolved in the 1970s and 1980s, with an participation in the POM [Program Objective Memorandum] increasing focus on the operational level of war. AirLand Battle development process.”12 Interestingly, this cooperation began in was the final maturation of Army concepts and was reflected in the 1970s, when budgets were tight, and was not forced by outside the 1986 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Although pressures, as was the case with the Goldwater-Nichols Department the manual recognized the value of air power against the Soviet of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Soviet problem was heartland, a role that the Air Force believed was decisive, it dire enough to demand a joint approach. argued that the best use of air power was against the enemy’s land Many of the capabilities that evolved from the 31 Initia- forces.13 The Army maintained that effects of strategic air “may tives would prove their worth after the Cold War, particularly in be delayed because of the inherent momentum of forces actively Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, as the Army and the engaged in combat and those reserve forces ready to enter the Air Force grew more capable, they also began drawing apart as each action.”14 In other words, the Soviets would win the land war tried to demonstrate its unique utility in winning wars. before conventional strategic air attack could be decisive, much as the Army believed was the case in World War II in Europe, when The Unraveling of Army–Air Force Cooperation: the German Army had been overrun before air power ended the AirLand Battle Becomes Air and Land Battles war.15 Thus, the Army maintained that, as a first priority, “an air The interservice cooperation that undergirded the Army’s AirLand commander must exploit the devastating firepower of air power to Battle doctrine began fraying as service cultures and views about disrupt that momentum and place an enemy’s land forces at risk.”16 warfighting clashed during Operation Desert Storm. The Army’s This language also reflected a deeply held Army cultural credo, as

3 noted in Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 1, The Army Colonel John Warden’s 1988 book, The Air Campaign: Planning for Profession: “Since 1775, our Army’s vital, enduring role has been to Combat, which emphasized that air power could independently win fight and win our Nation’s wars.”17 wars by attacking the enemy’s system from the inside out.22 Warden Making air power subordinate to a ground commander was was also a “catalyst for the emerging view within the Air Force at the ultimate heresy for an air force whose very independence had the end of the Cold War that ‘the application of air power could, hinged on two tenets that were first promulgated in the 1943 Field and perhaps even should, be thought of as being independent of Manual 100-2, Command and Employment of Air Power, which ground operations.’”23 proclaimed in all capital letters that “LAND POWER AND Capability developments on the ground side were also driv- AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT ing a reconsideration of the Army’s view of the role of air power. FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER.”18 Previously, the relatively short range of the Army’s field artillery Furthermore, “CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER had been the basis for how the battlefield was segmented between MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE ground and air components. As the Army fielded new weap- THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER IF THIS ons with far greater ranges—the Army Tactical Missile System INHERENT FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER (ATACMS), the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), and the A DECISIVE BLOW ARE TO BE FULLY EXPLOITED.”19 A Apache helicopter—they extended the area that a ground com- 1948 Army study, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle mander could affect with fires from ten to fifteen kilometers Team Including Light Aviation, noted that Field Manual 100-2 was beyond the front lines to one hundred kilometers or more. The published “without the concurrence of General McNair [head of extended ranges changed where the Army wanted the placement Army Ground Forces] . . . and viewed with dismay by the Ground of the fire support coordination line, the demarcation of where air Forces—as the Army Air Forces’ ‘Declaration of Independence.’”20 could operate without coordinating attacks with ground forces.24 The 1984 version of Air Force Manual 1-1,Basic Aerospace In the view of the Air Force, moving the fire support coordination Doctrine of the United States Air Force, referred back to the 1943 line would significantly restrict its operations within what was now manual, reiterating its fundamental tenets, including the impor- Army-controlled battlespace, thus hampering air interdiction and tance of centralized control for air power, the need for air power “potentially allow[ing] enemy forces to escape attack by friendly air to operate independently of land and maritime forces, and the formations.”25 belief that “aerospace power can be the decisive force in warfare.”21 The end of the Cold War removed the shared problem of a Thus, again at center stage were the fundamental issues about the peer adversary as a scenario that required collaboration between control of air power and its best use that had led airmen to fight the Army and the Air Force. Their inherently different views were for an independent air force after World War I. On the eve of reflected in air and ground operations during both Operation Operation Desert Storm, this air-centric thinking was reiterated in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom: “At stake was which

4 service would ultimately have the lead in destroying the enemy at Momentary spurts of interservice angst, the operational level of war—a fundamental question in deciding the relative roles of ground and air power in American warfighting particularly on the part of the Army, also practice.”26 Additionally, in both Iraq wars, the Air Force believed flared following operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, that its operational and strategic air efforts were fundamental to Afghanistan, and Libya, when air power the outcome, while the Army touted the centrality of ground forces advocates asserted that air attack, particularly in defeating Iraqi ground forces.27 This Army perspective is perhaps best seen in a quote from Robert H. Scales’s Certain Victory: when directed by special operations forces, The U.S. Army in the Gulf War: “The defending Iraqi commander could win wars independently. later remarked that after losing 2 of his 39 T-72s in five weeks of air attack, the 2d Cavalry had annihilated his entire command in and Russia and China, the potential for a full-fledged relapse into fewer than six minutes in what later became known as the Battle of interservice competition and discord is eminently possible. Indeed, 73 Easting.”28 creating concepts for multi-domain operations will be harder than Momentary spurts of interservice angst, particularly on the for AirLand Battle for many reasons. part of the Army, also flared following operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, when air power advocates asserted Why Multi-Domain Will Be Harder Than AirLand that air attack, particularly when directed by special operations Battle forces, could win wars independently.29 Nevertheless, it was during The history of the 31 Initiatives and the interservice disagreements and after Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom I that erupted afterward offer three key lessons for efforts to develop in Iraq that the most interservice discord occurred. This is not multi-domain concepts: There is more than one problem that the surprising, given that these were the only post–Cold War conflicts joint force must solve, no four-star joint agency is responsible for when there were large-scale ground and air operations at the outset. joint concept development and experimentation, and new concepts In the aftermath of operations in both conflicts, there was a vigor- are about culture as much as convergence. ous debate over whether air or ground forces made the greatest con- tribution to Saddam Hussein’s defeat in 2003. As Iraq descended There Is More Than One Problem to Solve into chaos, the debate went into remission. Both Army and Air A key strength of 31 Initiatives and AirLand Battle was that they Force operations and thinking were dominated by the absence of a were designed to solve one problem: the defense of Western Europe peer competitor, the demands of counterinsurgency, high-value tar- against the Warsaw Pact. This enabled the Army and the Air Force get hunting, and the fight against the Islamic State. However, with to focus their concept- and capability-development efforts on a the return of great-power competition between the United States

5 A clash of fundamental Army and Air Force No Four-Star Agency Is Responsible for Joint Concept Development and Experimentation warfighting cultures caused the demise of AirLand Battle and the 31 Initiatives were biservice efforts that AirLand Battle as a shared doctrinal approach. predated Goldwater-Nichols and were thus unencumbered by Ironically, this resulted mainly from the the joint concept development process and the Joint Capabilities Army’s fielding of new capabilities to fight Integration and Development System (JCIDS). Furthermore, since 2011, the ability of the U.S. joint force to develop concepts to serve AirLand Battle more effectively and to continue as the basis for joint doctrine has been greatly diminished by the to evolve its operational doctrine to incorporate disestablishment of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).30 them. For all its warts, JFCOM was the only four-star command focused on developing joint concepts and conducting experimentation for the future. Concepts are now supposed to be developed through a known enemy, in a specific place, with understood weapons. By deliberative, consensus-based process that is managed by the Joint contrast, the various multi-domain concepts now under develop- Chiefs of Staff, J-7 (Joint Force Development).31 Absent JFCOM, ment are generic. They focus on domains rather than adversaries. If it is not surprising that there is no joint force concept, much less these concepts are to solve the challenges identified in the National a common lexicon, for multi-domain concepts. Instead, there Defense Strategy, they will instead have to focus on Russia and are multiple competing concepts: Multi-Domain Battle, Multi- China—which present very different problems for the joint force. Domain Operations, Multi-Domain Command and Control, Although some concept and capability solutions may be relevant and Multi-Domain Maneuver, and more are likely in the offing as in both theaters, there will surely be unique needs, as there were the services vie to solve challenges posed by Russia and China in in World War II in the Pacific and in Europe. The challenge of ways that are in keeping with their respective service institutional two peer adversaries will be particularly vexing for the Air Force ethos. As an additional complicating factor, concept development because air and space power will be in heavy demand in both for multi-domain operations might require interagency consensus, theaters. Given the nature of the adversaries and the battlespace, given the authorities and capabilities for cyber that reside outside the Navy and the Marine Corps will be more focused on the Pacific the Department of Defense. Joint consensus is hard; interagency is and the Army on Europe, just as they were in World War II. With really hard. the addition of space and cyber to multi-domain warfare, the roles of the services in these two very different theaters will require New Concepts Are About Culture as Much as Convergence extensive collaboration to design adversary-relevant concepts. A clash of fundamental Army and Air Force warfighting cultures caused the demise of AirLand Battle as a shared doctrinal

6 approach. Ironically, this resulted mainly from the Army’s fielding To be successful, this new multi-domain of new capabilities to fight AirLand Battle more effectively and to continue to evolve its operational doctrine to incorporate them. concept will have to address the fundamental In Army doctrine, the new capabilities resulted in the allocation questions of each service’s culture and deeply of battlespace in areas of operations (AO) and changes in which held views about warfighting. one component was supported or supporting. In 2001, the Army’s operational doctrine stated: “AOs should also allow component commanders to employ their organic, assigned, and supporting standing of battlespace management, service and intergovernmen- systems to the limits of their capabilities. Within their AOs, land tal domain relationships, and capability allocation (if allocation is and naval commanders synchronize operations and are supported relevant in the future) from the homeland through the close fight. commanders.”32 During Operation Iraqi Freedom, this meant that the V Corps AO could be extended to the range of ATACMS Final Thoughts and Apache helicopters.33 Army and joint operational doctrine The Army and the Air Force are beginning the much-needed published in 2017 uses language for areas of influence similar to dialogue to develop a new warfighting concept, similar to what that of the Army 2001 definition for an AO. It defines area of happened in the 1970s and 1980s, to address the challenges of influence as a “geographical area wherein a commander is directly multi-domain conflict against peer competitors. To be successful, capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support this new multi-domain concept will have to address the funda- systems normally under the commander’s command or control.”34 mental questions of each service’s culture and deeply held views Consequently, the friction between Army and Air Force compo- about warfighting. Convergence is necessary but not sufficient. nents experienced in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Understanding the positive lessons from the 1970s and 1980s Freedom could be amplified by the fielding of Army long-range from the 31 Initiatives—as well as why AirLand Battle ultimately precision fire systems, some of which are envisioned to have ranges caused a divergence between the Army and the Air Force, rather to 500 kilometers. Importantly, these long-range Army fires can than a convergence—is an important place to start. Ultimately, play a key role in countering adversary anti-access and area denial the key lesson of the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Domain Battle is this: systems to facilitate the use of air and space power and other joint When the Army and the Air Force work closely to solve a shared force capabilities.35 Nevertheless, for all multi-domain capabilities problem—and derive mutually agreed-upon solutions—much can to operate in concert, the services must develop a mutual under- be accomplished.

7 Endnotes war noted: “Although it brought the economy which sustained the enemy’s armed forces to a virtual collapse[,] . . . the full effects of this collapse had not reached 1 When this Perspective was written, the Army was using the term Multi-Domain the enemy’s front lines when they were overrun by Allied forces.” Battle. The Army has since renamed the conceptMulti-Domain Operations. The substance of this Perspective is, however, unchanged. 16 Field Manual 100-5, 1986, p. 47.

2 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of 17 Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1, The Army Profession, Washington, Combined Arms for the 21st Century: 2025–2040, Fort Eustis, Va., December 2017. D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2015, Foreword. 3 David G. Perkins and James M. Holmes, “Multidomain Battle: Converging Con- 18 Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, Washington, cepts Toward a Joint Solution,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 1, 2018, p. 57. D.C.: U.S. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 1944, p. 1. 4 David G. Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle: The Advent of Twenty-First Century 19 Field Manual 100-20, 1944, p. 2. War,” Military Review, November–December 2017, p. 13. 20 Kent Roberts Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team: 5 David E. Johnson, “An Army Trying to Shake Itself from Intellectual Slumber, Including Light Aviation Historical Section, Fort Monroe, Va.: Historical Section, Part I: Learning from the 1970s,” War on the Rocks, February 2, 2018. Army Ground Forces, Study No. 35, 1948, p. 47. 6 Richard I. Wolf, The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and 21 Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Missions, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1987, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, 1984, pp. 1–3. pp. 415–423. See also Richard G. Davis, The 31 Initiatives, Washington, D.C.: 22 John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1987. D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988. 7 Wolf, 1987, p. 415. 23 David E. Johnson, Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power 8 Harold R. Winton, “An Ambivalent Partnership: US Army and Air Force Per- and Air Power in the Post–Cold War Era, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpora- spectives on Air-Ground Operations, 1973–1990,” in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The tion, MG-405-1-AF, 2007, p. 19, quoting Harold R. Winton, “Partnership and Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Tension: The Army Between Vietnam and Desert Storm,”Parameters , Spring Air University Press, 1997, p. 430. 1996, pp. 100–119.

9 Winton, 1997, p. 430. 24 Winton, 1996.

10 David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 25 Winton, 1996. 1917–1945, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998. 26 Johnson, 2007, p. 40. 11 Wolf, 1987, pp. 417–423. 27 Johnson, 2007, pp. 21–64, 123–136. 12 Wolf, 1987, p. 423. 28 Robert H. Scales, Terry L. Johnson, and Thomas P. Odom,Certain Victory: The 13 Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department U.S. Army in the Gulf War, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. of the Army, 1986, p. 47. Army, 1993, p. 262. 14 Field Manual 100-5, 1986, p. 47. 29 Johnson, 2007, pp. 48–103; Karl P. Mueller, ed., Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-676-AF, 15 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys 2015. (European War) (Pacific War) (1945–46), Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1987, p. 37. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey for the European

8 30 Hugh Lessig, “JFCOM Dissolves, but Many Functions Remain,” Daily Press, 33 Johnson, 2007, p. 134. August 4, 2011. 34 Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of 31 The process is described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction the Army, 2017, pp. 1–29; Joint Publication 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.: 3010.02E, Guidance for Developing and Implementing Joint Concepts, Washington, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017, p. GL-6. D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 17, 2016. 35 Sydney J. Freedburg, Jr., “Army Will Field 100 km Cannon, 500 km Missiles: 32 Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of LRPF CFT,” Breaking Defense, March 23, 2018. the Army, 2001, p. 4-19.

9 References ———, Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post–Cold War Era, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-405- Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 1-AF, 2007. As of April 16, 2018: Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, 1984. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG405-1.html Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1, The Army Profession, Washington, D.C.: ———, “An Army Trying to Shake Itself from Intellectual Slumber, Part I: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2015. Learning from the 1970s,” War on the Rocks, February 2, 2018. As of April 16, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02E,Guidance for 2018: Developing and Implementing Joint Concepts, Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/ Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 17, 2016. army-trying-shake-intellectual-slumber-part-learning-1970s/

Davis, Richard G., The 31 Initiatives, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force Joint Publication 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, History, 1987. 2017.

Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of Lessig, Hugh, “JFCOM Dissolves, but Many Functions Remain,” Daily Press, the Army, 2001. August 4, 2011. As of April 16, 2018: http://articles.dailypress.com/2011-08-04/news/dp-nws-jfcom- Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of closing-20110804_1_jfcom-functions-joint-forces-command-military-spending the Army, 2017. Mueller, Karl P.. ed., Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-676-AF, 2015. As of April 16, of the Army, 1986. 2018: Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, Washington, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR676.html D.C.: U.S. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 1944. Perkins, David G., “Multi-Domain Battle: The Advent of Twenty-First Century Freedburg, Sydney J., Jr., “Army Will Field 100 km Cannon, 500 km Missiles: War,” Military Review, November–December 2017, pp. 8–13 LRPF CFT,” Breaking Defense, March 23, 2018. As of April 16, 2018: Perkins, David G., and James M. Holmes, “Multidomain Battle: Converging https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/ Concepts Toward a Joint Solution,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 1, 2018, army-will-field-100-km-cannon-500-km-missiles-lrpf-cft/ pp. 54–57.

Greenfield, Kent Roberts, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team: Scales, Robert H., Terry L. Johnson, and Thomas P. Odom,Certain Victory: The Including Light Aviation Historical Section, Fort Monroe, Va.: Historical Section, U.S. Army in the Gulf War, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Ground Forces, Study No. 35, 1948. Army, 1993.

Johnson, David E., Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution 1917–1945, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998. of Combined Arms for the 21st Century: 2025–2040, Fort Eustis, Va., December

10 2017. As of April 16, 2018: Winton, Harold R., “Partnership and Tension: The Army Between Vietnam and http://www.tradoc.army.mil/multidomainbattle/docs/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf Desert Storm,” Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 100–119. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys ———, “An Ambivalent Partnership: US Army and Air Force Perspectives on (European War) (Pacific War) (1945–46), Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Air-Ground Operations, 1973–1990,” in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of University Press, 1987. Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997, pp. 399–442. Warden, John A., III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988. Wolf, Richard I., The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1987.

11 About This Perspective Acknowledgments This Perspective was conducted jointly within RAND Arroyo Center and The author is grateful to Tim Bonds, director of the Arroyo Center, and RAND Project AIR FORCE. RAND Arroyo Center and RAND Project AIR Ted Harshberger, director of Project AIR FORCE, for their support of this FORCE, both part of the RAND Corporation, are federally funded research research. This Perspective also benefited from the insightful reviews provided and development centers (FFRDCs) sponsored by the U.S. Army and U.S. by RAND colleagues David Ochmanek and Michael Mazarr. The guidance Air Force, respectively. from the communications analyst Robert Guffey is also appreciated. RAND Arroyo Center is the United States Army’s only FFRDC for stud- ies and analysis. Its mission is to conduct objective analytic research on About the Author major policy concerns, with an emphasis on mid- to long-term policy issues; help the Army improve effectiveness and efficiency; provide short-term assis- David E. Johnson is a principal researcher at the RAND Corporation. He is tance on urgent problems; and be a catalyst for needed change. Research the author of Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, is conducted in three programs: Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources; Forces 1917–1945 (Cornell University Press, 2003; selected for both the Chief of and Logistics; and Personnel, Training, and Health. For more information Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Army professional reading about RAND Arroyo Center, visit our website at www.rand.org/ard. lists) and Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) provides the Air Force with indepen- Air Power in the Post–Cold War Era (RAND Corporation, 2007; selected dent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force professional reading list). combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Strategy and Doctrine; Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Train- ing; and Resource Management. The PAF portion of the work presented Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000. Additional informa- This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representa- tion about PAF is available on our website: www.rand.org/paf. tion of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthor- RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) ized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research docu- Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the ments for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. The views public interest. of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. Government. sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/PE301. research clients and sponsors.

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