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Airland Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Domain Battle

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Airland Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Domain Battle Perspective C O R P O R A T I O N Expert insights on a timely policy issue August 2018 Shared Problems The Lessons of AirLand Battle and the 31 Initiatives for Multi-Domain Battle David E. Johnson ince the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army and the U.S. doctrine were similarly focused on closer Army and Air Force Air Force have pursued separate and sometimes competing cooperation to counter a perceived overmatch in Warsaw Pact capa- Svisions of how air and ground power should be employed bilities. How did these efforts proceed? Why did they not continue? to win wars. This interservice rivalry was allowed to sim- What lessons do they offer for today’s Multi-Domain Battle? mer while the nation focused on low-intensity counterinsurgency operations and did not face a peer adversary. However, the emer- Multi-Domain Battle gence of Russia and China as great-power competitors has brought Multi-Domain Battle is intended to wrest the advantage from new urgency to the question of how the United States leverages its potential adversaries and restore a credible conventional deter- air and ground—not to mention sea, space, and cyber—power to rent and warfighting capability against peer competitors.2 General prevail against a formidable adversary. The National Security Strat- David G. Perkins, until recently the commander of the U.S. Train- egy and National Defense Strategy envision the need for greater ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and General James coordination across warfighting domains to meet future threats. M. Holmes, commander, Air Force Combat Command (ACC) The Army, in collaboration with the Air Force, is developing the coauthored the article “Multidomain Battle: Converging Concepts concept of Multi-Domain Battle to better coordinate air and Toward a Joint Solution,” stating that “TRADOC and ACC are ground forces to meet shared challenges.1 Yet this is not the first working collaboratively today to blend their warfighting concepts time that the Army and the Air Force have sought closer collabora- into a joint doctrine for the future.”3 In an earlier article, “Multi- tion: In the 1980s, the Army’s 31 Initiatives and AirLand Battle Domain Battle: The Advent of Twenty-First Century War,” General Perkins, pointing to a way forward in developing Multi-Domain Development Process,” commonly referred to as the 31 Initiatives.6 Battle, highlighted the need for interservice collaboration “in the The opening paragraph makes clear the breadth of the agreement: spirit of the 31 Initiatives” from the 1980s.4 Given the importance The Army and the Air Force affirm of the 31 Initiatives as a precedent for current efforts, it is worth that to fulfill their roles in meeting the understanding their history. national security objectives of deterrence and defense, they must organize, train, The Origins of the 31 Initiatives and equip a compatible, complementary, The 31 Initiatives arose from a mutual understanding between and affordable Total Force that will the Army and the Air Force that they were not prepared for the maximize our joint combat capability to military challenge that the Warsaw Pact posed for NATO. This execute airland combat operations. To problem became glaringly apparent during the 1973 Yom Kippur that end, broad, across-the-board, war- War, when Syrian and Egyptian forces, armed with Soviet equip- fighting issues have been addressed.7 ment and following Soviet doctrine, put the state of Israel and its vaunted defense forces in peril. The sudden realization of how some As the historian Harold Winton observed astutely, the close Soviet offensive capabilities had evolved while the United States collaboration between the Army and the Air Force from 1973 to was focused on Vietnam galvanized the Army and the Air Force 1990, which included the 31 Initiatives, was a product of a specific around meeting the challenge of the defense of NATO.5 unifying problem: “the ability to defeat a Warsaw Pact invasion of Defending Western Europe, conventionally, from Soviet western Europe below the nuclear threshold.” This problem offered 8 aggression was a particularly acute problem for the Army and the “the unifying effect of the NATO defense mission.” Winton also Air Force in the 1970s and 1980s. The Warsaw Pact had significant noted that other factors were in play, including “the close coopera- quantitative advantages and, as the 1973 war had demonstrated, tion of personalities at or near the top of each service,” the ascen- some overmatching capabilities. And this mutual understanding dance of fighter pilots to top Air Force leadership positions, and that the Warsaw Pact posed a shared problem that could not be “the clarity of the Army’s vision of how it intended to fight a future 9 resolved independently by the Army or the Air Force resulted in war that tended to pull the Air Force in its wake.” All of these perhaps the one moment in Army and Air Force history when there factors combined to temporarily assuage the deep cultural antipa- was consensus regarding the need for fundamental collaboration. thies and fundamental conceptual differences between ground and To address the shared problem, on May 22, 1984, Gen- air officers about how to win wars that had existed since the days eral John A. Wickham, Jr., U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and Gen- of Billy Mitchell, the famous post–World War I advocate for an 10 eral Charles A. Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff, signed a memo- independent U.S. air arm. randum of agreement, “U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Joint Force 2 This shared approach to solving the problem of defending NATO was more than a convergence of air and ground concepts: Many of the capabilities that evolved from It resulted in new concepts, including the Army’s AirLand Battle the 31 Initiatives would prove their worth doctrine, joint suppression of enemy air defenses, battlefield air after the Cold War, particularly in Kosovo, interdiction, and clarifications of close air support. Indeed, the Iraq, and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, as the integration of Army and Air Force capabilities was fundamental to AirLand Battle doctrine. Furthermore, some Army and Air Force Army and the Air Force grew more capable, programs were canceled or realigned to eliminate duplication of they also began drawing apart as each tried effort, and new capabilities were fielded more rapidly, such as the to demonstrate its unique utility in winning Joint Tactical Missile System and the Joint Surveillance Target wars. Attack Radar System.11 Finally, the 31st initiative showed the seriousness of the effort by instituting cooperation to decide budget priorities: “The Army and Air Force will formalize cross-service thinking and doctrine evolved in the 1970s and 1980s, with an participation in the POM [Program Objective Memorandum] increasing focus on the operational level of war. AirLand Battle development process.”12 Interestingly, this cooperation began in was the final maturation of Army concepts and was reflected in the 1970s, when budgets were tight, and was not forced by outside the 1986 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Although pressures, as was the case with the Goldwater-Nichols Department the manual recognized the value of air power against the Soviet of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Soviet problem was heartland, a role that the Air Force believed was decisive, it dire enough to demand a joint approach. argued that the best use of air power was against the enemy’s land Many of the capabilities that evolved from the 31 Initia- forces.13 The Army maintained that effects of strategic air “may tives would prove their worth after the Cold War, particularly in be delayed because of the inherent momentum of forces actively Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, as the Army and the engaged in combat and those reserve forces ready to enter the Air Force grew more capable, they also began drawing apart as each action.”14 In other words, the Soviets would win the land war tried to demonstrate its unique utility in winning wars. before conventional strategic air attack could be decisive, much as the Army believed was the case in World War II in Europe, when The Unraveling of Army–Air Force Cooperation: the German Army had been overrun before air power ended the AirLand Battle Becomes Air and Land Battles war.15 Thus, the Army maintained that, as a first priority, “an air The interservice cooperation that undergirded the Army’s AirLand commander must exploit the devastating firepower of air power to Battle doctrine began fraying as service cultures and views about disrupt that momentum and place an enemy’s land forces at risk.”16 warfighting clashed during Operation Desert Storm. The Army’s This language also reflected a deeply held Army cultural credo, as 3 noted in Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 1, The Army Colonel John Warden’s 1988 book, The Air Campaign: Planning for Profession: “Since 1775, our Army’s vital, enduring role has been to Combat, which emphasized that air power could independently win fight and win our Nation’s wars.”17 wars by attacking the enemy’s system from the inside out.22 Warden Making air power subordinate to a ground commander was was also a “catalyst for the emerging view within the Air Force at the ultimate heresy for an air force whose very independence had the end of the Cold War that ‘the application of air power could, hinged on two tenets that were first promulgated in the 1943 Field and perhaps even should, be thought of as being independent of Manual 100-2, Command and Employment of Air Power, which ground operations.’”23 proclaimed in all capital letters that “LAND POWER AND Capability developments on the ground side were also driv- AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT ing a reconsideration of the Army’s view of the role of air power.
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