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The Infantry Battalion

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The Infantry Battalion FM 7-20 THE INFANTRY BATTALION HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. FM 7-20 C1 CHANGE 1 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, DC, 29 DECEMBER 2000 1. Change FM 7-20, dated 6 April 1992, as follows: REMOVE OLD PAGES INSERT NEW PAGES None G-1 through G-53 2. A star (¶) marks new or changed material. 3. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication. DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: ERIC K. SHINSEKI General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0031906 Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 110079, requirements for FM 7-20. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION irLand Battle doctrine has produced great changes in the Army. It Ahas affected everything from equipment to the way we fight. Commanders need to understand these concepts and how they affect the employment of an infantry battalion. This chapter introduces AirLand Battle doctrine and explains its effect on battalion-level tactical doctrine. Section I THE ROLE OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION The infantry battalion serves many roles on the airland battlefield. It engages most often in close battles and may conduct raids or stay-behind operations as part of deep operations. The battalion may participate in rear battle as part of a tactical combat force. Also, due to their rapid deployability by air, infantry units are ideally suited for executing strategic contingency plans and establishing lodgements. Limited visibility is the basis for infantry battalion operations. It is the environmental condition that the US military seeks to take advantage of its technology and training. Darkness, fog, heavy rain, and falling snow all limit visibility. A combination of technical ability (afforded by NVDs) and tactical prowess (afforded by training) allows the infantry battalion to operate routinely during these conditions. Limited visibility operations strike the defender when the range of his weapons and the mutual support between his positions are reduced. 1-1. THE AIRLAND BATTLE maneuver at all levels and tries to use the full Infantry forces can operate effectively in potential of US forces. It is offensively oriented low-intensity, mid-intensity, or high-intensity so commanders may go to the offense as soon as conflict and in most terrain and weather possible. No matter what level the conflict, the conditions. side that keeps the initiative through offensive a. Infantry may dominate in low-intensity action forces the other side to react rather than conflicts due to its rapid strategic deployability to act. The thrust of AirLand Battle doctrine is and its ability to meet the enemy on equal terms. to disrupt the enemy’s synchronization, b. Mid-intensity to high-intensity conflicts preventing him from applying combat power at a may be chaotic, intense, and destructive. Such decisive point; and to create opportunities for US operations rarely maintain a linear character. forces to destroy his force. The speed with which forces can concentrate and the high volumes of supporting fires they can 1-2. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE AIRLAND bring to bear make the mixing of opposing forces BATTLE almost inevitable. FM 100-5 states that success on the modern c. The AirLand Battle is the doctrinal basis battlefield depends on commanders at all levels for meeting these challenges. It involves understanding and implementing the basic tenets 1-1 FM 7-20 of AirLand Battle doctrine: initiative, depth, The commander and his subordinates rely on agility, and synchronization. IPB, a sound R&S plan, and accurate reports to a. Initiative. This is the ability to set or quickly understand enemy intentions. change the terms of battle through action. It (2) Reaction time is reduced by rehearsing requires commanders to maintain an offensive SOPs and drills, by choosing sound initial spirit. It means that, when an opportunity positions for dismounted units that simplify their presents itself, the commanders may depart ability to maneuver. Assets from CS and CSS are from planned actions to hasten mission positioned to sustain the main effort and to accomplishment. To do this without jeopardizing provide flexibility to the plan. Complexity the higher plan requires that the commander reduces agility. understand and work within the intent of the d. Synchronization. This is the arrangement commander two levels up. This implies a degree of of battlefield activities in time, space, and independence and risk. Commanders translate purpose to produce the greatest possible relative their initiative into action by issuing mission-type combat power at the decisive point. orders. These orders in turn give subordinate Synchronization is both a process and a result. commanders the flexibility, within the scope of (1) Synchronization extends from planning their commander’s intent, to improvise and act the maneuver to integrating CS and CSS assets aggressively to accomplish assigned missions and to ensure mission accomplishment. defeatt the enemy. In addition to understanding the (2) Leaders at all levels must understand scope of their commander’s intent, each leader friendly and enemy capabilities. They must must understand his unit’s part in the commander’s know how to relate these capabilities to time and concept (as the main or a supporting effort), so that space to produce synchronized plans that satisfy he may confidently and boldly exploit success. the commander’s intent. b. Depth. This is measured in time, distance, (3) Synchronization begins in the mind of and resources. At battalion level, depth is achieved the commander with his concept of operations. by positioning forces to deny the enemy the ability The concept must clearly focus the main effort at to maintain mass, momentum, and mutual support. a decisive point and must clearly designate the The battlefield is no longer a one-dimensional or effects (tasks and purposes) of the subordinates. two-dimensional entity. The commander must Understanding and using a common doctrine and understand how he and the enemy fit into the military language enhances synchronization. higher commander’s deep, close, and rear battles. (4) The commander creates synchronization When possible, reserves are employed. This by developing, issuing, and rehearsing clear, gives depth to the battalion and provides the succinct orders supplemented by well-established commander with a form to counterattack and SOPs. Using SOPs enables the commander to completely destroy the enemy. rapidly employ assets and to seize tactical c. Agility. This is the ability to think and act opportunities without lengthy explanations and faster than the enemy. It involves mental, orders. command and control, and organizational abilities to adjust rapidly and to use the situation, 1-3. COMBAT POWER terrain, and weather to defeat the enemy. The Combat power is the ability to fight. It is relative, plan must be simple, yet flexible enough that the not absolute, because it has meaning only as commander can react when an opportunity compared to the combat power the enemy can presents itself. generate. Combat power includes the numbers (1) Mobility, flexibility of task organization, of weapons systems and soldiers; the unit’s state timely intelligence, and rapid decision-making of training, cohesion, discipline, and morale; and enable the commander to cause the enemy to the leader's and soldiers’ tenacity, competence, react, which sets the terms of the battle. At the and boldness. It measures the effect created by battalion level, these terms are often simplified combining maneuver, firepower, protection, and by positioning the command group well forward leadership in combat actions against an enemy. so they can see the battlefield, recognize Friendly combat power is relative to that of opportunities, and rapidly seize the initiative. enemy forces committed at the point of decision; 1-2 FM 7-20 therefore, any actions taken to degrade enemy Leaders must instill an awareness of individual firepower, protection, maneuver, and leadership safety in all subordinate leaders and soldiers. increase friendly relative combat power. Soldiers must be constantly alert for and avoid a. Maneuver. This is the movement of situations that may result in injury or death. forces, relative to the enemy, to secure or retain Also, leaders must verify the soundness of all a positional advantage. Combat units must tactical operations to prevent fratricide. This maneuver to win. Unit commanders boldly includes using appropriate control measures, maneuver their forces at the critical times and conducting rehearsals, and ensuring soldiers places to attack enemy weaknesses, gain understand the rules of engagement. favorable positioning, and exploit success. The d. Leadership. This is the component on effects of maneuver may also be achieved without which all others depend. The main purpose of movement of friendly forces by allowing the leadership in battle is to inspire and motivate enemy to move into a bad position such as into soldiers to perform difficult tasks under trying an ambush or a stay-behind operation. circumstances. Before the battle, only b. Firepower. This is the intelligent use of capability or combat potential exists. direct and indirect fires (FA, mortars, and CAS), However, a skillful leader, using the right as well as other combat multipliers (ADA, EW, combination of maneuver, firepower, and AHs, and engineers) to support the scheme of protection within a sound operational plan, maneuver. Firepower provides the destructive can turn combat potential into real combat force vital to realizing the effects of maneuver. power. Confident, competent leaders are To be effective, firepower must be distributed needed at all levels to train, discipline, and and controlled at the critical time and place. motivate units to achieve superior combat Soldiers should be committed only when power. Leaders must set the example in all firepower alone is insufficient to accomplish areas.
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