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1 2 Global Witness 2005 10 1 1 ● ● ● ● ● ● SPDC ● ● ● ● ● a 1989 "Burma" "Myanmar" Global Witness "Burma" "Myanmar" b c 2004 10 2 (CITES) 13 2005 1 1 2001 9 (FLEG) 1 ● ● FLEG (Regional ● Taskforce on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance) ● ● ● FLEG ● 13 1 89-91 ● SPDC SPDC SPDC ● SPDC ● ● 2 2 2 9.2 43-46 9.2.1 43-44 1 1-2 9.2.2 44 2 3 9.2.3 44 3 5-6 9.2.4 44-45 4 7-8 9.2.5 45-46 5 9-10 9.2.6 Tze Tze 46 9 9.3 47-49 9.3.1 47-48 11-36 9.3.2 48 6 11-19 9.3.3 Ban Li 48 2 Khin Nyunt 13 9.3.4 49 6.1 9.3.5 Car Zan 49 14 9.3.6 49 3 15 9.3.7 49 6.2 10 50-69 16 10.1 50-51 6.3 HIV 16-18 10.2 51-52 6.4 18-19 10.3 53-54 7 19-28 9 54 7.1 20 10.4 55-69 7.2 10.4.1 56 21 10.4.2 KIO 57-58 4 21 10 59 7.3 10.4.3 NDA(K) 60 21-23 10.4.4 KIO NDA(K) 61-62 7.4 10.4.4.1 61-62 23-25 10.4.4.2 NDA(K) 7.4.1 62 25 10.4.5 SPDC 63-65 5 26 10.4.6 N’Mai Hku 66-67 7.5 10.4.7 27 68-69 6 28 11 70-71 8 28-36 12 72 7 28 8.1 73-94 29-30 13 I 73-78 8.2 30-31 11 75 8.3 32-34 13.1 76-78 8.3.1 33-34 13.1.1 76-78 8.4 34-36 13.1.2 78 35 14 II 79-88 8.4.1 36 14.1 81-83 14.2 84 14.3 85 GLOBAL WITNESS 37-72 14.4 9 37-49 87-88 9.1 39-42 15 (FLEG) 9.1.1 39 FLEG 89-91 9.1.2 40 16 IV 2005 G8 9.1.3 41 92-94 9.1.4 42 17 GLOBAL WITNESS’ 95 18 96-98 3 SICHUAN PROVINCE BHUTAN KACHIN STATE INDIA Myitkyina YUNNAN PROVINCE BANGLADESH SAGAING CHINA DIVISION 缅甸 Lashio Haka Sagaing Mandalay 掸邦 CHIN STATE Keng Tung MANDALAY DIVISION Taunggyi LAOS Sittwe RAKHINE STATE Pyinmana Loikaw MAGWE 克伦尼邦 DIVISION Toungoo PEGU Bay DIVISION KAREN of STATE Bengal Pegu Bassein 仰光 Pa’an IRRAWADDY THAILAND DIVISION Moulmein 仰光 MON DIVISION STATE Andaman Sea Tavoy TENASSERIM DIVISION Mergui 0 50 公里 050 英里 Gulf of Thailand Kawthaung 4 3 / 3 (AQSIQ) 7.4 , 23-24 CITES (SFA) 11-36 KNA KNCA AAC KNA ADB KSC AFPFL MCSO AIDS MEC APEC MoF ATS MI AQSIQ MTE ASEAN NATALA ASEM NCFP BOCOG 29 NCGUB BSPP NDA(K) CEP NDF CPB NGO CPC NLD CITES OSS DDSI PRC DZGD RWE EIU SFA ESIA SLORC FLEG SPDC FSC SSA(S) GDP SSNA GMS UMEHL HIV UNAIDS IFI UNDCP IFM USDA ITTO UNODC KDA UWSA/P / KIA KIO WHO KIO 5 3 Global Witness 2004 2005 Global Witness Global Witness Global Witness Global Witness (RWE) 1 1 1.8 2.3 1 2004 6 4 4 2 Than Shwe 1993 10 Arakan Yoma Bilauktaung 3 7 4 2004 2005 A Conflict of Interests - the uncertain future of Burma's forests A Conflict of Interests Global Witness 37-72 Global Witness A Conflict of Interests 73-88 8 5 5 1984 4 1996 1998 100 ...... 4 Chenwen Xu 1993 1 Global Witness KIA/O • 2003 2004 1987 • 2004 2005 SPDC 1989 NDA(K) 4.2781 1988 15% • 2003 2004 130 m3 RWE -- (MoF) • • 3 • 2003 SPDC 96% Tatmadaw NDA(K) KIA/O • 130 m3 RWE 98% 7 19-28 Global Witness • 2001 2004 60% • 800,000 1,000,000 m3 • SPDC 9 5 d SPDC 2004 12 14 The New Light of Myanmar 2001 12 14 d (World Commission on Environment and Development) 10 G8 e 6 44 2004 Myitkyina Lashio 2003 10 1.7 9 5 2004 110 2003 6.3% 6 SLORC/SPDC e G8 11 1988 1989 12 11 1991 SLORC KIA/O NDA(K) 2001 12 7 7 5 21 8 2005 Kambiati Washawng Myitkyina 7 4 SPDC Maung Maung Swe NDA(K) Zakhung Ting Ying 2004 10 19 2.9 2005 15 9 2004 SPDC 4 2003 25% 2.4 Than Shw Maung Aye 1.6 14, 15 2005 4 2003 100 3 1 5 8 10 2004 7 Khin Nyunt 8 Maung Maung Shwe 11 Kon Ku Soe Win Khin Nyunt Chung 2004 12 2 6 (KIO) 4 (NDA(K)) (KDA) 16 11, 30 - 2005 5 Tin Naing Thein Sein Thein 17 30 11 Myitkyina 2005 2010 1.8 2100 Bhamo 2006 2800 300 Bhamo 12 2005 4 18 √D 13 12 2 KHIN NYUNT Khin Nyunt Khin Nyunt 286 SPDC Complete explanation on the developments (UWSA) Bao You Xiang in the country 2004 10 24 Khin Nyunt Pangsan 2004 10 19 Khin Nyunt Khin Nyunt (DDSI) Bao You Xiang MI (OSS) Bao You Xiang Tatmadaw 26 Soe Win 19 Khin Nyunt SPDC 2004 10 20 21 275 15 19 Myitkyina KIO NDA(K) 2004 10 19 Khin Nyunt MI MI 27, 28 SPDC Soe Win 20 Thura Shwe Mann f 29, 30 SPDC 21 10 24 2005 SPDC Khin Nyunt 31 Maung Aye 32 2005 4 Khin Khin Nyunt Nyunt 40 286 (MI) 20 100 33 Khin Nyunt 2004 10 Muse 100 MI Putao Khin Nyunt Than Shwe 2004 10 22 2005 7 5 Khin Nyunt 23 Than Shwe Insein Khin Nyunt g 2005 1 8 24 MI 300 24 2005 7 22 44 34, 35 Zaw Naing Oo Ye Naing Win 68 51 Than Shwe 2004 11 5 Khin Nyunt 36 Maung Oo U Thang Than Shwe 25 f Thura Shwe Mann Maung Aye g 13 6.1 2004 7 Khin Nyunt 9400 40 41 37 2004 7 Thura Shwe Mann Tatmadaw 42 20 3 h SPDC 43 44 38 50 39 2004 6 50 39 h 14 39 2004 6 Khin Nyunt 2004 7 1988 8 1948 SLORC 45 1950 6 8 1967 i 47, 48, 49 j 1989 12 CPB 10 1991 (CBP) CPB 20 50 KIA/O CPB KIA/O 20 90 12 KIA CPB 10 1976 50 1968 KIA/O NDA(K) KIA/O 1989 1994 CBP CPB 101 CPB NDA(K) NDA(K) KIA/O 1996 1998 10.3 53-54 20 80 / 46 i CIA j 1962 Ne Win 15 6.2 2 51 6.3 HIV/ ... HIV/ AIDS 52 2001 5 30 50 HIV 2004 338,000 2002 91% 53 SPDC 2.2% (UNAIDS) (WHO) 1998 1% 63,000 54 HIV/ 120 Myitkyina 90% HIV/ 55 1999 Muse 6.5% 56 2004 16 HIV/ 4/5 HIV 3/5 57 58 61, 62 Global Witness HIV/ 30-40 59 Council of Foreign Relations 2005 7 1 HIV/ HIV HIV/ 3/4 60 HIV/ HIV/ 1988 9.3.1 47-48 HIV 1989 2000 HIV 58 HIV/ HIV/ HIV/ Mandalay 17 6.4 63 (UNDCP) 20 80 64 1993 NDA(K) 67 2004 NDA(K) 1 5 19 KIO 2 1999 (UNODC) NDA(K) 65 ... 500 ... 67 NDA(K) 700 68 66 N'Mai Hku 10.4.6 N'Mai Hku 66-67 18 7 7 69 70 70 20 70 10 Khin Nyunt 70 Steven Law (Htun Myint Naing) Asia World 70 71 2004 4 5 ● 2001 2002 2003 2004 72 800,000 m3 98% ● Muse ● ● SPDC ● SPDC SPDC ● KIO 2000 6 6 73 SPDC 19 7 7.1 Malam Sambat Kaban 79 74 2005 1 ● ● 1/3 80 ● G8 77 2003 30 78 GDP 6.4 1978 31 75 9% 76 81 80 2003 4200 m3 RWE G8 77 / 77 82 1 98% 50 k 40 30 20 80% 50% 90% 90% 70% 90% 60% 10 70% 80% 70% 78 等量圆木体积 （百万立方米） 2005 4 0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 年份 k Global Witness 20 7 7.2 2001 9 13 15 FLEG III 89-91 2004 9 84 2005 3 2004 10 " 85 Global Witness -- -- 86 2005 1 -- 2003-04 3 -- 18,000 m 27,000 m3 88 2001 2004 80 m3 100 m3 83 2 2001-02 90 m3 RWE 2 m3 RWE 80 m3 RWE 98% 250 l 2 m l m 2001 8 21 7 2 SLORC/SPDC M3 RWE 87, o 1.4 1.2 官方出口 1.0 最低非法出口量 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 圆木等量体积（百万立方米） 0.0 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 年份 1. 2. SLORC/SDPC 3. 4. 2002 2003 SLORC/SPDC 3 n, 323, 324, o 2,000 其它国家和地区 1,500 中国 1,000 500 出口值（单位：百万缅元） 0 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 年份 4 p xx 2.5 世界其它国家 2.0 中国 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 等量原木体积（百万立方米） 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 年份 n 6 = 1 o 2002-03 2003-04 p xx 22 7 SPDC 2001-02 Global Witness 2003 19.9 820,000 m3 RWE 2000 3% 3 7.4 U Myat Thinn 2003 1 2003 130 m3 RWE 98% 4 Global Witness A Conflict of Interest 2000 840,000 m3 (AQSIQ) RWE MCSO AQSIQ 2003 130 m3 RWE 60% 60% AQSIQ 2004 23 7 2004 1 13 21 1992 4 1 19 89 Gangfang 2004 AQSIQ 89 / 62 2 2,400 82 5 2,400 2004 7 1 50 59,500 3 3 10 5 5 2001 1 1 84 Global Witness 86 84 / 86 24 7 7.4.1 CITES CITES 90 2003 1981 1997 40 91 CITES CITES CITES 3,000 0.225 (Taxus wallichiana) II 1994 CITES II 151 163, 2004 10 CITES 13 92 CITES 93 (SFA) CITES CITES 25 7 2001 8 SPDC 2008 2003 3 22 2008 4 12 KIO 2003 5112 2000 Jadeland 95 94 29 Global Witness 2004 6 26 7 7.5 / 2005 2001 2004 / 98 Global Witness " 96 KIO 2004 90 2001-02 2002-03 RWE 10-15% 98 / Global Witness 2003 96% 5 q Global Witness / 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 / 88 98 Global Witness Muse 19 20 15 9 37-49 5 97 1.0 其它 广州 上海 0.8 昆明 原木 锯切木 0.6 0.4 等量圆木体积 (百万立方米) 0.2 0.0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 年份 q F.
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  • On 9Th March 2002, Major General Kyaw Win, Vice-Chief of Defence

    On 9Th March 2002, Major General Kyaw Win, Vice-Chief of Defence

    3/2002 WILL THE FAILED COUP ATTEMPT DERAIL THE ONGOING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL TRANSITION IN MYANMAR? Maung Aung Myoe1 March 2002 On 7 March 2002, news came out from Myanmar that the government had arrested the son-in-law, U Aye Zaw Win, and three grandsons, Aye Ne Win, Kyaw Ne Win, and Zwe Ne Win, of U Ne Win, who ruled the country between 1962 and 1988. Many people believed that U Ne Win (or General Ne Win) continued to yield and exercise influence among top military commanders who formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), later transformed into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997, after the military takeover in September 1988. Some analysts interpreted the event of 7 March as an indication of 'the end of the Ne Win era'. Two days later, on 9 March, at a special conference, Major General Kyaw Win, Vice-Chief of Defence Services Intelligence, explained that the four were arrested in connection with a coup attempt. Additional information on the event was given at special press conferences on 12 and 18 March. According to the information provided by Major General Kyaw Win, the coup plotters had planned to win over some military commanders and to use their troops to overpower and disarm security forces at the residences of the top three regime leaders – Senior General Than Shwe (Chairman of the SPDC and Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Armed Forces), General Maung Aye (Vice Chairman of the SPDC and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Armed Forces cum Commander-in-Chief of Army) and Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt (Secretary-1 of the SPDC and Chief of Defence Services Intelligence Bureau).