Janet L. Dolgin – CV
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Who Is the Attorney General's Client?
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 1 20-APR-12 11:03 WHO IS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CLIENT? William R. Dailey, CSC* Two consecutive presidential administrations have been beset with controversies surrounding decision making in the Department of Justice, frequently arising from issues relating to the war on terrorism, but generally giving rise to accusations that the work of the Department is being unduly politicized. Much recent academic commentary has been devoted to analyzing and, typically, defending various more or less robust versions of “independence” in the Department generally and in the Attorney General in particular. This Article builds from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, in which the Court set forth key principles relating to the role of the President in seeing to it that the laws are faithfully executed. This Article draws upon these principles to construct a model for understanding the Attorney General’s role. Focusing on the question, “Who is the Attorney General’s client?”, the Article presumes that in the most important sense the American people are the Attorney General’s client. The Article argues, however, that that client relationship is necessarily a mediated one, with the most important mediat- ing force being the elected head of the executive branch, the President. The argument invokes historical considerations, epistemic concerns, and constitutional structure. Against a trend in recent commentary defending a robustly independent model of execu- tive branch lawyering rooted in the putative ability and obligation of executive branch lawyers to alight upon a “best view” of the law thought to have binding force even over plausible alternatives, the Article defends as legitimate and necessary a greater degree of presidential direction in the setting of legal policy. -
Is Free Speech Too High a Price to Pay for Crime - Overcoming the Constitutional Inconsistencies in Son of Sam Laws
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Volume 24 Number 2 Article 4 3-1-2004 Is Free Speech Too High a Price to Pay for Crime - Overcoming the Constitutional Inconsistencies in Son of Sam Laws Kathleen Howe Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kathleen Howe, Is Free Speech Too High a Price to Pay for Crime - Overcoming the Constitutional Inconsistencies in Son of Sam Laws, 24 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 341 (2004). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol24/iss2/4 This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. IS FREE SPEECH TOO HIGH A PRICE TO PAY FOR CRIME? OVERCOMING THE CONSTITUTIONAL INCONSISTENCIES IN SON OF SAM LAWS I. INTRODUCTION Many people want to hear stories about famous crimes, criminals, and trials, such as that of O.J. Simpson;' the Gambino Crime family Underboss, Salvatore "Sammy the Bull" Gravano; 2 the kidnappings of Polly Klaas3 and Elizabeth Smart;4 and the recent death of Laci Peterson and her unborn son, Connor.5 While some of these famous stories will be told through the vivid 1. Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson was criminally charged in 1994 with the murders of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her friend, Ronald Goldman. -
The Virginia "Son of Sam" Law: an Unconsitutional Approach to Victim Compensation
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 2 (1993) Issue 2 Article 8 November 1993 The Virginia "Son of Sam" Law: An Unconsitutional Approach to Victim Compensation Kerry Casey Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons Repository Citation Kerry Casey, The Virginia "Son of Sam" Law: An Unconsitutional Approach to Victim Compensation, 2 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 495 (1993), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/ vol2/iss2/8 Copyright c 1993 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj THE VIRGINIA "SON OF SAM" LAW: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO VICTIM COMPENSATION Kerry Casey* Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... ' I. INTRODUCTION The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the press, and prohibits Congress from acting to restrict these rights.2 The Supreme Court has held that the states too are bound by the restrictive language of the First Amendment by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Nevertheless, the Court has allowed certain restrictions on freedom of speech when the restrictions are narrowly tailored to further compelling government interests.4 This Note examines whether state legislatures may limit a criminal's right to tell the story of his crime. If a state legislature may restrict a criminal's right to profit from the exercise of his5 freedom of speech, the issue becomes the extent to which a legislature may do so.6 Criminal antiprofit laws have been enacted only recently. -
Calendar No. 16
Calendar No. 16 104TH CONGRESS REPORT 1st Session SENATE 104±5 " ! BALANCED-BUDGET CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT JANUARY 24 (legislative day, JANUARY 10), 1995.ÐOrdered to be printed Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following R E P O R T together with ADDITIONAL, MINORITY, AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS [To accompany S.J. Res. 1] The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill (S.J. Res. 1) to propose an amendment to the Constitution relating to a Federal balanced budget, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon, and recommends that the bill do pass. CONTENTS Page I. Purpose ........................................................................................................... 2 II. Legislative history ......................................................................................... 3 III. Discussion ....................................................................................................... 6 IV. Votes of the committee .................................................................................. 12 V. Text of S.J. Res. 1 .......................................................................................... 14 VI. Section-by-section analysis ............................................................................ 15 VII. Cost estimate .................................................................................................. 20 VIII. Regulatory impact statement ........................................................................ 23 IX. Additional -
Checkbook Journalism
Checkbook Journalism: It May Involve Free Speech Interests but It Is Not Free; Can Witnesses Be Prohibited from Selling Their Stories to the Media Under the First Amendment? CHRYSANTHE E. VASSILS* I. INTRODUCTION A woman witnesses a white Ford Bronco resembling the vehicle of a defendant in a high-profile double-murder case driving recklessly near the scene of the crime on the night of the murders. The woman is paid $5000 to tell her story on Hard Copy, a television tabloid show, and $2600 to recount her story for the Star, a supermarket tabloid newspaper. Afterwards, the prosecution declines to call the woman to testify at the grand jury proceeding because she now lacks credibility due to the profitable deal she made with the media.' In response to situations such as these, the California State Legislature enacted legislation that prohibits a witness to a criminal event or occurrence from accepting or receiving any compensation in exchange for providing information obtained as a result of witnessing that event or occurrence.2 * The author wishes to thank the members of her family and her close friends for their continued support and encouragement. I This incident occurred in the much publicized 0.1. Simpson double-murder case, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Oct. 3, 1995). See Robin Clark, Tabloids Are Paying, but at a Cost: Journalism by Oeckbook Is a Big Problem in High-Profile Cases, PHRADELPHIA INQUIWR, July 3, 1994, at C1, C8; Henry Weinstein, Free-SpendingTabloid Media CauingJudidalConcemr, L.A. TIMEs, July 2,1994, at Al, A2. 2 CAL. -
Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW VOLUME 79 NOVEMBER 2004 NUMBER 5 SPEECH "WISE PARENTS DO NOT HESITATE TO LEARN FROM THEIR CHILDREN": INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL JURISPRUDENCE THE HONORABLE MARGARET H. MARSHALL* In this speech delivered for the annual William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice, Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, reflects upon the present need for comparative analysis in state and federal courts. The influence of the United States Constitution can now be seen globally in the widespread practice of guaranteeing individual rights by means of a written constitution enumerating individual rights, the interpre- tation of which is charged to an independent judiciary. But the influence runs in more than one direction. Chief Justice Marshall explores the global cross-pollina- tion of constitutionaljurisprudence. Noting that state constitutions often provide protection of individualfreedoms beyond those guaranteedby the federal Constitu- tion, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall sug- gests that state courts are optimally positioned to incorporatecomparative analysis into their jurisprudence. She explores three particularsubstantive areas-personal autonomy, hate speech, and physical detention-as particularly appropriatefor the exercise of comparative analysis involving the decisions of foreign and interna- tional constitutional courts. Copyright © 2004 by Margaret H. Marshall. * Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. B.A., 1966, Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg; M.Ed., 1968, Harvard University; J.D., 1976, Yale University. This speech was delivered on February 9, 2004, at New York University School of Law for the annual Justice William J. -
THE LAW PRESIDENTS MAKE Daphna Renan*
COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION THE LAW PRESIDENTS MAKE Daphna Renan* The standard conception of executive branch legal review in the scholarship is a quasi-judicial Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) dispensing formal, written opinions binding on the executive branch. That structure of executive branch legalism did have a brief heyday. But it obscures core characteristics of contemporary practice. A different structure of executive branch legalism—informal, diffuse, and intermingled in its approach to lawyers, policymakers, and political leadership—has gained new prominence. This Article documents, analyzes, and assesses that transformation. Scholars have suggested that the failure of OLC to constrain presidential power in recent publicized episodes means that executive branch legalism should become more court-like. They have mourned what they perceive to be a disappearing external constraint on the presidency. Executive branch legalism has never been an exogenous or external check on presidential power, however. It is a tool of presidential administration itself. Exploring changes in the structure of executive branch legal review sheds light on the shifting needs of the * Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. From 2009–2012, I served in the Justice Department as Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General and then as an Attorney Advisor in the Office of Legal Counsel. The views expressed are my own and the discussion is based only on publicly available materials. For generous engagement with this project at various stages, -
Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation
California Law Review VOL. 82 MARCH 1994 No. 2 Copyright © 1994 by California Law Review, Inc. Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation Neal Devinst With a few exceptions, the Solicitor General controls all aspects of independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court. Solicitor General control of Supreme Court litigation creates a tension between independent agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority. On the one hand, Solicitor General control provides the United States with a unitary voice before the Supreme Court, andprovides the Court with a trustworthy litiga- tor to explicate the government'sposition. On the other hand, such control may undermine the autonomy of independent agency decisionmaking. In this Article, the author argues for a hybrid model of independent agency litigation in the Supreme Court: so long as there are independent agencies, Congress should allow independent agency self-representation whenever the Solicitor General is unwilling to advocate the agency's interests. Thus, when disagreements between the Solicitor General and an independent agency are irreconcilable,the independent agency should be allowed to go its own way. The author concludes by connecting the issue of Solicitor General-independentagency relations to the largerdebate over the unitary executive, arguing that the unitary executive is the only theory which sup- ports Solicitor General control of independent agency litigation. In other Copyright 0 1994 California Law Review, Inc. t Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. B.A. 1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Dawn Darkes, Brook Edinger, and Wendy Watson for research assistance; to those current and former government officials who shared their time and insights with me; and to participants at an Emory Law School faculty workshop, participants at the Executive Branch Interpretation Symposium at the Benjamin N. -
The Constitutionality of "Son of Sam" Laws After Simon & Schuster V
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law Volume 3 Issue 2 Spring 1993 Article 2 The Constitutionality of "Son of Sam" Laws after Simon & Schuster v. New State Crime Victims Board Jane Langdon Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip Recommended Citation Jane Langdon, The Constitutionality of "Son of Sam" Laws after Simon & Schuster v. New State Crime Victims Board, 3 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 58 (1993) Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol3/iss2/2 This Lead Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Langdon: The Constitutionality of "Son of Sam" Laws after Simon & Schuster THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "SON OF SAM" LAWS AFTER SIMON & SCHUSTER v. NEW STATE CRIME VICTIMS BOARD I. INTRODUCTION Compensation Board ("Board") of any profits gained A "Son of Sam" law is an antiprofit statute requir- from a criminal act by way of a movie, book, or mag- 7 ing criminals to surrender all proceeds received from azine article. The law also required a publisher to the sale and publication of their memoirs.' New surrender to the Board any contract made with a York's "Son of Sam" statute was the first of its kind criminal for the publication of a book." However, and acted as a model for many other states and the Executive Law 632-a was not limited to criminals in federal government. -
Simon & Schuster, Inc. V. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law
Notre Dame Law Review Volume 66 | Issue 4 Article 10 6-1-1999 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment Challenge Karen M. Ecker Margot J. O'Brien Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O'Brien, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment Challenge, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1075 (1991). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol66/iss4/10 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTES Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti:1 Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment Challenge? The enormous box office success of recent films such as The Godfather Part III,2 GoodFellas,' and The Silence of the Lambs,4 il- lustrates the public's fascination with criminals and their atrocities. Criminals willing to tell the stories of their exploits satisfy the public's curiosity and reap great financial reward in the process.5 Outraged that criminals profit while their victims are left uncom- pensated, approximately forty state legislatures6 and the federal 1 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 59 U.S.L.W. -
Statement of Charles Fried
Statement of Charles Fried Beneficial Professor of Law, Harvard law School July 5, 2021 To the President’s Commission on the Supreme Court: The reason the judiciary is respected, indeed almost revered, is not its reflection of democratic values or of any particular variety of political value. It is revered, rather, because it is viewed as the guarantor of the rule of law, and it embodies the notion that we are subject to law and not to any passing political regime. The judges should be men and women who care above all about faithfulness to the law. That is why we dress them in black robes and ask them to do their work in solemn and imposing surroundings. Judges have been revered in many different societies and political circumstances.1 Judges serve justice the way scientists and thinkers serve truth. In American politics the Supreme Court has represented the very apex of the ideal of fidelity to law. This makes understandable the frequent lament that this or that political party or regime is threatening to “politicize” the judiciary. In a variety of deplorable regimes, the politicization of the judiciary has been taken as one of the hallmarks of a corrupt polity. One need only think of the practice of what came to be known as telephone justice in the Soviet Union to have a sense of what is at the very bottom of this slippery slope. The process leading up to the final seating of a new justice has been widely deplored as increasingly politicized in a way that has undermined the public regard for the judiciary as guardians of the rule of law—although it must be said that even now the judiciary enjoys the highest public regard of all the organs of government. -
Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J
Designed by Ciano Design Photography by Harvard News Office, Carol Maglitta, Stu Rosner and Martha Stewart Printed by Kirkwood Printing Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Designed by Ciano Design Photography by Harvard News Office, Carol Maglitta, Stu Rosner and Martha Stewart Printed by Kirkwood Printing Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Dennis F. Thompson University Faculty Committee Christine M. Korsgaard Director Arthur I. Applbaum Philosophy Arthur I. Applbaum Government-KSG Lisa Lehmann Director of Graduate Fellowships Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr. Medicine Jane Mansbridge Staff Business Martha Minow Government-KSG Jean McVeigh Law Frank Michelman Administrative Director Michael J. Sandel Law Shelly Coulter Government Mark H. Moore Financial Consultant Thomas M. Scanlon Government-KSG Stephanie Dant Philosophy Lynn Sharp Paine Assistant to the Director Dennis F. Thompson Business Erica Jaffe Government Thomas R. Piper Assistant to Professor Applbaum Robert D. Truog Business Melissa Towne Medicine Mathias Risse Staff and Research Assistant Government-KSG Kimberly Tseko Faculty Associates Marc J. Roberts Publications and Derek Bok Special Events Coordinator Public Health Interim President Nancy Rosenblum Allan M. Brandt Government Deborah E. Blagg History of Science James Sabin Dan W. Brock Writer, Ethics at Harvard 1987-2007 Medicine Medicine Elaine Scarry Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. English Business Frederick Schauer Norman Daniels Government-KSG Public Health Amartya Sen Leon Eisenberg Economics and Philosophy Medicine Tommie Shelby Catherine Z. Elgin Philosophy and African Education American Studies Einer R. Elhauge Carol Steiker Law Law Richard H.