Beatrix Himmelmann, Robert B. Louden (Eds.) Why Be Moral?
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Beatrix Himmelmann, Robert B. Louden (Eds.) Why Be Moral? Why Be Moral? Edited by Beatrix Himmelmann and Robert B. Louden An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libra- ries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access. More information about the initiative can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. ISBN 978-3-11-037045-4 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-036639-6 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-038633-2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. © 2015 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Druck und Bindung: CPI books GmbH, Leck ∞ Gedruckt auf säurefreiem Papier Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com Acknowledgements The editors would like to thank all those individuals and institutions thathave supported us in one wayoranother. Several of the contributions to this volume have been presented at the con- ference “WhyBeMoral?”,which was organized by the Tromsø Ethics Research Group in the fall of 2013.The group is based at the PhilosophyDepartment of UiT,The Arctic UniversityofNorway.Other chapters have been written for the present collection independently. We thank all the authors for their commitment to the project and the institutions mentioned for their organisational and finan- cial assistance. The authorsand the editors of the book owe special thanks to Peter Dennis, Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, Logic, and Scientific Method at the Lon- don School of Economics,who was acopy editor as competent and reliable as one can wish for. Beatrix Himmelmann &Robert B. Louden, May2015 TableofContents Beatrix Himmelmann Introduction 1 Part I: Investigating the Question Dieter Birnbacher Why Be Moral – APseudo-Problem? 13 Peter Schaber Why Be Moral: AMeaningful Question? 31 Part II: Exploring ViableAnswers Robert B. Louden Why Be Moral? ANew Answer to an Old Question 45 Hallvard J. Fossheim Aristotle on Virtuous Questioning of Morality 65 Ivar Russøy Labukt The Egoistic Answer 81 Beatrix Himmelmann Why Be Moral? An Argument from the Human Condition in Response to Hobbes and Nietzsche 103 David Sussman Morality,Self-Constitution, and the Limits of Integrity 123 Christoph Horn What is Kant’sPreciseAnswer to the Question ‘Why Be Moral’? 141 Iddo Landau The “Why Be Moral?” Question and the Meaning of Life 159 VIII TableofContents Roe Fremstedal Why Be Moral? AKierkegaardian Approach 173 RichardEldridge Acknowledging the Moral Law 199 Erik Lundestad “Why Be Moral?” Pragmatism’sAttempt to Dismiss the Issue 217 Héctor Wittwer Is the Overridingness of Moral Reasons aSemantic Fact? 235 Alan Thomas Williams on Integrity,Ground Projects and Reasons to Be Moral 249 Contributors 273 Index 275 Beatrix Himmelmann Introduction “Whybemoral?” is an age-old question, which has been discussed ever since the Sophists contested the validity of moral claims. No longer,itseems, could they be considered amatter of course. Whereas the Seven Sages of Greecehad stated what they deemed obvious in laconic brevity: “Nothing in excess”; “Honour the Gods”; “Be yourself”; “Yield to justice”,¹ later generations felt the need of ex- plaining and exploring what they sawasanything but self-evident.Socrates and Plato, most prominently, not onlyaccepted the challengebut turned the ta- bles by asserting thatexamination and self-examination are part and parcel of a trulyhuman life. Accordingly, assumptions thatunderlie human thinking and conduct should not be taken for granted but have to be accounted for. Logon di- donai, giving arguments in order to justify your beliefs, is considered arequire- ment henceforth. These endeavours to investigatealleged givens included, con- traNietzsche, right from the beginning the issue of what he called our “faith in morality”.² Asomewhat related question, “Whyshould Ibemoral?” was also highonthe agenda from very earlyon. Plato’swell-known discussion³ still fig- ures into today’seffortstocome to terms with this delicate as well as central question. Several contributions to this collection also bear witness to the lasting influenceofPlato’sthought-provoking case studies and ambitious arguments.⁴ First and foremost,this collection of new essays is intended to shedlight on the “Whybemoral?” question from avariety of perspectives. Different ap- proaches originatingfrom different philosophical traditions represent the possi- bilities of discussing this still haunting question today. The anthologyincludes authorsfrom Europe, North-America,and Israel. It starts out by putting the meaningfulness of the question, “Whybemoral?” itself to the test.Inview of the fact that countless attempts to provide for acon- vincing answer have turned out to be futile, Dieter Birnbacherwonders whether the “Whybemoral?” problem is areal problem or what Carnap and others called a “pseudo-problem”.Apseudo-problem is aproblem which,for some reason or another,proves to be undeserving of philosophical effort.The “Whybemoral?” question, Birnbacher argues, is not apseudo-problem in that it is trivial. Itssol- ution cannot be considered obvious. Neither does the concept of moralitycover Cf. Wachsmuth/Hense ,p.f. Cf. Nietzsche ,Vorrede . Cf. Plato, Rep. II, aff. Cf. the contributions of Dieter Birnbacher,Robert B. Louden, and Peter Schaber. 2 BeatrixHimmelmann anyvalues anyindividual might prioritize, nor does it implythat moral norms necessarilyoverride all other kinds of norms. Birnbacher suggests, however, that the “Whybemoral?” problem is unsolvable for reasons of principle. Either it can be answered by giving moral reasons or by giving non-moral reasons to follow morality in cases of conflict. The first option seems to be unattractive be- cause it is question-begging.The second option is fated, Birnbacher contends, in that it also leadstoakind of circularity.Onlywhoever is alreadyconvinced that moralityisprecious and preferable willbeopen to non-moral justifications of the priority of the moral. In spiteofthisrathersoberingresult, Birnbacher does notdeprive thosewho continueworking on answeringthe “Whybemoral?” question of anyhope: “The irresolvabilityofthe problem”,heassuresus, “is by no meansobvious”.Mostof theother contributors to this anthology, indeed,dosuggest solutionstothe prob- lem. PeterSchaber also aims at investigatingthe question, “Whybemoral?” by in- specting thepossibletypes of answersitinvites.Isthe “Whybemoral?” question meaningless? Suspicions to that effect have been voiced,notably by H. A. Pri- chard.⁵ Schaberarguesthatthe question is meaninglessindeedifitisunderstood as thequestion of whetherwehavereasons to do what is morally required.Itis meaningful,though, if it is understoodasthe question of what reasons canjustify theclaim that we ought, morally,toact in certainways. Schaber’spoint is that the reasons forobeying moral principles areequivalenttothe reasonsthatgivethese principles theirjustification.Accordingly, he rejectsthe widely sharedviewthat moral theories,whentryingtorespond to theworries of themoral sceptic, have to proceedintwo steps: First, they determinewhatthe rightmoral principles are; second,theyanswer thesceptic’squestion “Whyshould I follow theseprinci- ples?” Instead,Schaber suggests,ittakes only one step to satisfybothrequire- ments: Thejustification of moral principles provides us,atthe same time,with thereasons forfollowing theseprinciples. Though we mightverywellask whether acertain moral principleisjustified,wecannotsensiblyask whetherwehaverea- sons to follow amoral principlethatwetaketobejustified. What are the moral principles that can be justified?Inwhat way, if any, does the kind of moral principle suggested shape the answer that is giventothe “Why be moral?” question?Thisanthologypresents arangeofdifferent responses to these queries, beginning with Robert Louden’spaper. In order to convince moral sceptics thatthey have sufficient reason to give up their scepticism about moralityand instead try to be moral, Robert Louden Cf. Prichard . Introduction 3 considers it necessary to locate non-moral reasons that are powerful enough to do the job. He is very clear,though, about the failureoftwo standard candidates. Neither appeals to self-interest, nor related appeals to happiness, provide any credible reasons for being moral. The pull of self-interest itself mayoften be the biggest barrier to acting morally, so it would be wrong-headed from the start if we relied on one of the sources of immoralityinorder to solicit morality. Prospects of happiness,onthe other hand,donot necessarilyarise as aresult of moral conduct and, therefore, cannot always motivateit. Louden’sown strategy involves drawing attention to the moralnorms and values thatlie behind or are presupposed by ordinary cognitiveactivity and rationalcommunication. There are norms, he demonstrates,regardinghow we ought to think and reason, and some of these norms, he claims, are moral norms. If we can show,sothe argument goes, thatanyone who wishes to engageinsuch activities successfully must first adhere to certain underlying norms and values, then we have also shown,