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The Evolving Us Intelligence Regime and the Chinese

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The Evolving Us Intelligence Regime and the Chinese IMPROVISING TRADECRAFT: THE EVOLVING U.S. INTELLIGENCE REGIME AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE 1940S Sara Bush Castro A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History. Chapel Hill 2016 Approved by: Michael Tsin Joseph Caddell Michael Hunt Michelle King Wayne E. Lee © 2016 Sara Bush Castro ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Sara Bush Castro: Improvising Tradecraft: The Evolving U.S. Intelligence Regime and the Chinese Communist Party in the 1940s (Under the direction of Michael Tsin) The activities of U.S. intelligence officials in China’s Communist base areas in the 1940s reveal that the underdevelopment of the U.S. national security bureaucracy before World War II impeded the ability of accurate and timely intelligence about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to reach U.S. policymakers. Structural deficiencies in U.S. intelligence practices affected U.S. foreign relations, including U.S.-China relations, in ways historians have failed to appreciate. Because widespread anti-Communist sentiment had significant consequences for postwar U.S. strategic behavior, historians of twentieth-century U.S.-China relations have generally assumed anti-Communism was the most important factor shaping U.S. intelligence about the CCP in the 1940s. Actually, inefficiency in the U.S. intelligence process as a result of inexperienced personnel, interagency friction, and abrupt expansion under the Truman administration were equally, if not more, influential on the content of U.S. intelligence on the CCP. American intelligence collection about the CCP in the 1940s, particularly at Yan’an, where the United States maintained a delegation of intelligence personnel known as the “Dixie Mission,” showcases inherent vulnerabilities in U.S. bureaucratic processes. Interagency rivalry, politicization, and logistical challenges regularly influenced the information that U.S. intelligence officers in Yan’an disseminated to policymakers. The activities of the Dixie Mission, iii from the collection of information in the field to dissemination of reports in Washington D.C., illustrate the extreme malleability of procedural norms for intelligence operations during World War II in the absence of a cohesive U.S. intelligence regime. Based on intelligence successes in the European theater, the National Security Act of 1947 inadvertently preserved problems that U.S. intelligence officials encountered in China in the design of the postwar U.S. national security regime. By illustrating the development of flawed bureaucratic procedures that were built into the postwar U.S. intelligence community, this study has implications for understanding the structural causes of so-called “intelligence failures” that have plagued the U.S. intelligence community since the late 1940s. It also helps correct a Eurocentric bias in the historiography of twentieth- century U.S. national security, which currently lacks empirical studies of intelligence collection in non-Western countries prior to the Cold War. iv To Kenneth Morrison v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS While writing the first draft of The Caine Mutiny, a novel for which he received the Pulitzer Prize in 1951, acclaimed World War II fiction writer Herman Wouk described his daily writing experience as “trying to play a symphony on a solo piccolo.”1 Wouk’s quote resonated with me as this project took form, while I attempted to draw order from an overwhelming pile of potentially relevant and frequently contradictory sources about the 1940s and do justice to protagonists that, in many cases, seemed long overdue. At these times in particular, I felt deep gratitude for the gift of an extensive support network that Wouk lacked. I owe thanks first to the History Department at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, which has supported me through a long degree program, giving me resources and opportunities to develop skills in both professional historical research and teaching. Within the History Department, my advisor, Michael Tsin, has accompanied me every step of the way, including when I made a sharp change in direction and chose to focus my efforts on U.S. national security history. I also could not have asked for a more skillful and inspiring dissertation committee to review my work, including (in alphabetical order) Joseph Caddell, Michael Hunt, Michelle King, and Wayne Lee. I am also grateful to Benjamin Waterhouse for his insightful commentary on my dissertation prospectus. Beyond the advice I have received from faculty, I have also regularly benefitted from conversations with and critiques by my peers. Conversations and correspondence with my fellow 1 Herman Wouk, preface to the 2003 edition, The Caine Mutiny (New York: Little Brown & Company, 2003). vi aspiring China historians Zachary Smith and Dáša Pejchar Mortenson on everything from coursework to fellowships was invaluable. As I was conducting research, my ad hoc writing group of Mary Beth Chopas, Rachel Levandowski, and Margaret Martin helped me conceptualize the form that this project needed to take. During the later stages of writing, Elizabeth Lundeen always came through with the right comments at the right time, holding me accountable to my own deadlines and potential. Financial support from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Graduate School enabled me to conduct research for this project around the United States. I am grateful for the help of many archivists I encountered in my trips to the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, MD; the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park, NY; the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, MO; the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University; and the Bancroft Library Archives at the University of California, Berkeley. I am also indebted to Sidney Rittenberg, one of the last living Americans who spent time at Yan’an in the 1940s and who made himself available to answer my questions about his impressions of the Chinese Communist Party leaders, the American Dixie Mission personnel, and the conditions at Yan’an. I am also indebted to Lawrence Kessler, UNC History professor emeritus, who introduced me to Sidney. I am grateful to my mentors, trainers, and peers at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who helped me hone my skills in professional research and analysis during the years that I worked there. The CIA’s pre-publication review board has reviewed this manuscript to prevent the disclosure of classified information. They asked me to specify that all statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the CIA or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be vii construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or Agency endorsement of the author's views. I did not begin my degree program focused on U.S. intelligence history, and I credit two parties with convincing me I had an important contribution to make in this field. First, the Summer Institute of Conducting Archival Research at George Washington University opened my eyes to the fascinating materials available within U.S.-based and foreign archives on important topics in global security and Cold War studies. My conversations with instructors, guest speakers, and peers during the weeklong conference provided the motivation I needed to make the initial turn toward research on U.S. intelligence activity in China in the 1940s. Second, I credit the outstanding undergraduate students I have had the privilege of teaching in Chapel Hill, particularly those studying in the Curriculum on Peace, War, and Defense. Their insatiable curiosity about global security studies and persistent interest in my experiences working in international affairs and intelligence are completely infectious. Their perceptive comments and questions consistently motivate me to elevate my own scholarship. Finally, I could not have completed this project without the full and unconditional support of my family. To my parents, Michael and Michele, thank you for fostering my love of learning. To my sister, Amy, thank you for serving as a sounding board when balancing everything was a challenge. To my husband and best friend Fernando, thank you for joining me in this adventure as I walked away from one lucrative career to go in a completely different direction. Finally, thank you to my daughter Leila for making life infinitely more fun and priorities infinitely more clear. I hope my example reminds you that it is never to late to take a new path. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... xii INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 The U.S. intelligence regime experienced growing pains in the 1940s ...................................... 4 The politicized historiography of wartime U.S. intelligence activity in China ........................... 7 Moving beyond the “Lost Chance in China”: Dixie Mission as U.S. intelligence history ....... 12 U.S. intelligence activities in north China in the 1940s as institutional failure ........................ 17 Theory and Method ..................................................................................................................
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