Source: NARA, Series T-312, Reel 1650, Folder AOK 20 36560/16, first frame 000061

Oberkommando der 20. (Gebirgs) Armee Ic/AO Tgb. Nr. 1055/43 geh. UNCLASSIFIED

Activity Report Section 1c / AO (Abwehr Officer) Headquarters, 20th Mountain Army for the time period 1.1.1943 through 30.6.1943

Table of Contents

I. Defense against espionage, sabotage, subversion, et cetera, in the Wehrmacht 1) Espionage and sabotage. 2) Unauthorized absence and desertion. 3) Defection. 4) Various incidents (capital crimes, murder, theft, suicide, et cetera). 5) Violations of security regulations. 6) Subversion. 7) Field postal inspections. a) Statistics b) Analysis and evaluation c) Special inspection of field postal [activity] of personnel replacement battalions I and II of 2d and 6th Mtn. Divisions. 8) Enemy propaganda. a) General situation b) Statistics c) Analysis d) Enemy propaganda from the Reich e) Special cases 9) Examination of soldiers, civil servants, employees, and laborers of the Wehrmacht. 10) Various special cases. II. Defense in prisoner-of-war activities. III. Defense in passenger transport, border screening, passports. IV. Defense in the arms industry. V. Defense against enemy intelligence organizations and partisan bands. [frame 000062] 1) General situation. 2) Soviet‒Russian military and civilian intelligence structures. a) Presumed organization on the Karelian Front. b) Activity during the reporting period. 3) Soviet‒Russian partisan bands. a) Presumed organization on the Karelian Front. b) Activity during the reporting period. VI. Organization. * * * [beginning translation at frame 000076] V. Defense against enemy intelligence organizations and partisan bands. 1) General situation. In this reporting period, Soviet‒Russian – and that includes both military and civilian intelligence activities – have almost been rendered ineffective. Apart from isolated individuals who may have come under suspicion, other enemy intelligence activities are not traceable. Nevertheless, it is presumed that Swedish and British‒American intelligence services are active in the Army area in support of their alliance. The activities of Soviet‒Russian partisan bands are closely linked with the activities of Soviet‒Russian intelligence organizations. [frame 000077] In cooperation with Finnish military Abwehr Offices–Lapland and Rovaniemi, and in particular the Finnish State Police–Rovaniemi, we are closely monitoring the fight against Soviet‒Russian intelligence services. This cooperation has typically been outstanding. The comparative quiet in the early years was at the same time exceptional. The struggle with Soviet‒Russian intelligence services and partisan bands at the front line became the responsibility of an officer, namely the Ic [intelligence officer], of the corps and divisions. [This officer] paid particular attention to examination of the territory within which the Soviet‒ Russian intelligence services and partisan bands conducted their required training and equipping, and imparted their knowledge of the operational area. For these purposes, numerous standing orders are listed below: a) (Geb.) AOK 20 Ic/AO 17/43 g.K., of 5.2.43. Through this standing order, the struggle against partisan bands has been organized and the differences in partisan band membership have been clarified. The Führer order regarding handling the remaining prisoners of war has been implemented. b) (Geb.) AOK 20 1c/AO 114/43 g., of 5.2.43, subject: Examination of relationships of Soviet‒Russian intelligence organizations. This report provides the most recent results regarding organization of Soviet‒Russian ND [nachrichtendienst – intelligence services]. It provides instructions for examination and further disposition of relationships in the ND. (see Annex 8) c) (Geb.) AOK 20 1c/AO 24/43 g.K., of 21.2.43, subject: Soviet‒Russian Intelligence Services. The text, coming from OKW, Foreign Intelligence Bureau, provides the latest revelations regarding Soviet‒Russian ND. d) (Geb.) AOK 20 1c/AO 210/43 g., of 11.3.43, subject: Analysis of information gained from Soviet‒Russian agents and prisoners of war. (See Annex 9) e) (Geb.) AOK 20 1c/AO 306/43 g., of 28.3.43, subject: Analysis of information gained from Soviet‒Russian agents. In addition, “Intelligence in regard to partisan warfare” from the OKH has been distributed regularly to the divisions. A conference was also convened of the Ic [intelligence] staffs of the corps and divisions by the 20 (Mtn.) Army command at the end of May 1943. The Ic/AO conducted discussions in regard to probable organization of the partisan bands in the Karelian Front.1 [frame 000078] Simultaneously, the apparatus of the Secret Field Police-provided training. 2) The Soviet‒Russian military and civilian intelligence services. a) The believed organization of the Soviet‒Russian intelligence services on the Karelian Front, derived from agent information and analysis by the Finnish reports, paints the following picture. The structure of this intelligence activity is built upon two over-arching systems: 1. Military intelligence 2. The NKVD. The military intelligence organs fall under the supervision of the Red Army and Red Navy central authorities, with intelligence departments (RO – razvedyvatelnyy otdel) in the headquarters of Karelian Front and in the Northern Fleet; in the general staff of the 19th, 14th, and 26th Armies; and in the staffs of subordinate divisions and subordinate border guard regiments. This organization is likewise massively manned, with an authorized strength of 60 persons in the front intelligence department, 20 persons in each army department, and 5‒10 men in each division. The intelligence department of the commanding headquarters controls intelligence and reconnaissance sections. The extremely active Reconnaissance Detachment 1146 [“1146” was likely its postal number. The unit’s actual title was ultimately 181st Special Reconnaissance Detachment – trans.] in Polyarnoye, which conducts broad agent and diversionary actions in the Petsamo area and in the northern Norwegian coastal regions, and well organized commando raids against German strongpoints, is subordinated to the RO of Northern Fleet and led by Kapitan Wisgin [Captain Third Rank Pavel Aleksandrovich Vizgin, chief of the intelligence section of the Northern Fleet staff, a direct report to the chief of staff and fleet commander, Admiral Golovko]. The RO of the general staff of the Karelian Front has responsibility for the following:

1 Used in this context, this Russian word describes a formation equivalent in size and command structure to a British or American army group. The Soviet Army front operating in the Murmansk area was the Karelian Front. [translator] Intelligence Department of Karelian Front 1114, under Major Svyadkin in Belomorsk; Intelligence Section 1475 under Major Kotlov in Belomorsk; [frame 000079] Intelligence Section 1922 under Major Radionov in Sumskaya. The RO of the general staff of 14th Army directs the Intelligence Section of the 14th Army under Major Rakhmanov; The RO of the general staff of 19th Army directs Intelligence Section 1720 of the 19th Army in Niva III under Lieutenant Colonel Takhestnakov; The RO of the general staff of 26th Army directs Intelligence Section 4082 in Kem under Major Kovalsko.

The NKVD has responsibility for the conduct of espionage through its Department IV and for carrying out counter-espionage activities through its Department III. These departments can be found in higher commands, thus in the NKVD of the Karelo‒Finnish Republic in Belomorsk and in the NKVD in Murmansk. On the whole, the Department IV has been eliminated from special units and schools, so a Department IV and a Special Espionage School have been established in Special Section 45 in Belomorsk, and a Department IV in the Special Section in Murmansk. The NKVD conducts political monitoring, espionage, and counter-espionage by means of organic “special sections” (OO – osobyy otdel) in troop units through the staffs of the front, armies, divisions, and border troops,. The presumed structure of the military ND and NKVD ND in the Karelian Front can be found in two closely transparent channels (see Annexes 10 and 11). The separation of the areas of responsibility cannot be clearly defined. The military is occupied mainly with military intelligence, while the NKVD is primarily involved in the revealing of economic and political status and counter-espionage. Recently, both the military as well as the NKVD ND have given special attention to the security protocols and productivity of the Kolosjoki Nickel Works, German and Finnish identification document requirements, the disposition of Russian prisoners of war in our camps, and the organization of German and Finnish defenses (counter-intelligence). [frame 000080] The Soviet‒Russian ND has acted with extraordinary precision and great rapidity in organization of the partisan movement. Their motto is commitment of forces with deliberate low risk, with the understanding that the majority of their force will fail. Their agents are delivered into their operating areas by various means. The intelligence sections provide delivery by parachute, by passage through the front line, and on occasion by amphibious aircraft landings. The reconnaissance detachment of Northern Fleet inserts its diversionaries on the north Norwegian coast with submarines, and supports their presence for months at a time through parachute drops or submarine deliveries. All of the reconnaissance units have recently added an expert in handling defectors. This expert prepares the agent for employment, in the framework of the defector’s attempts to get through the front line. They proceed with such ingenuity that not once has a scout patrol from our side discerned the true mission from a defector/agent. This method has had primary application when our reconnaissance has brought a defector to a prisoner-of-war camp. The defector has been trained so cunningly that, immediately after capture, and he has been brought in to German or Finnish Abwehr authorities and has been identified, he has been turned around and allowed to go back over to the Russian side. b) Activity in the reporting period. This year, as far as we have been able to determine, the agent activity began with the agent Drushchinin, who on 22.1 was wounded at Tenniojarvi and fell into German hands. The nature of the instructions with which Drushchinin was trained and sent out from Department IV of the Murmansk NKVD was remarkable. According to his legend, he was supposed to attempt to spark the interest of the Abwehr, penetrate into the Finnish ND, and send his intelligence back through an agent. He died after interrogation and as a consequence of his wounds, and his case was closed. [frame 000081] The interrogation of agent Sirotin, who came in from a Finnish prisoner-of- war camp near Huttuvaara on 28.2.43, was revealing. Sirotin belonged to the Special Department of the 14th Army. In this unit, he had already participated in several commando actions against German strongpoints at [Cape] Pikshuev, and at the [time of his interrogation] was attempting to weave himself into the Finnish ND or, failing that, pass himself off in a prisoner-of-war camp as a “V-man” [confidential informant]. His conspicuously mysterious legend aroused the interest of the Finnish ND. He had been guided through the front line with greatest luck to our side camouflaged as a defector. Through a prolonged and difficult interrogation, his legend was exposed and he was handled in accordance with the Fuhrer order on 11.5.43. On 5.3.43, a Finnish national named Ranta, who in 1917 had wandered into Russia, was registered in Sedankula. Ranta was recruited as an agent by the NKVD Monchegorsk, and was sent to Sedankula, and either on his own volition or through a confidential informant was prepared to report on the political and economic situation and in regard to preparations for chemical warfare. He was provided with neither a passport nor a legend. His only support was a sum of 5,000 Finnmarks found on his person. The Finnish Abwehr undertook the broad handling of Ranta. On 3.4.43, a Russian named Heikkinen was brought in near Luostari. After his initial interrogation legend account, he confessed to belonging to the Special Department IV of the Murmansk NKVD. He had substantial reconnaissance taskings, particularly the operating efficiency of the Kolosjoki Nickel Works, shipping traffic at Liinahamari, the military facilities in the Petsamo district, German‒Finnish relations, and the situation at the food storage facilities at Salmiyarvi. His presence augured the possibility of continued reconnaissance, insertion of a saboteur into the Nickel Works and, through the creation of conspicuous inquiries around [frame 000082] Nordkin Spit and Evanger, rumors of a British landing attempt. The Finns convicted Heikkinen and shot him. On 14.4.43, agent Tikka was apprehended near Ylaluostari. After prolonged denials, he confessed that he was from the Special Department of 14th Army, sent into the area to link up with a Finn named Leppinen in Trifona. This person, “Leppinen,” had come in around 1941, and had been placed in protective custody. The ongoing handling of Tikka was turned over to the Finns. Communication with the Finnish Abwehr Office in Rovaniemi indicates that a courts martial was convened and he was sentenced to death. On 31.5.43, the Intelligence Department of Northern Fleet, Murmansk, inserted two German Wehrmacht members as parachute‒radio agents into the Army area. Luftwaffe Technical Sergeant Kaiser, Fighter Wing V, was shot down on 24.12.42 while escorting a Stuka unit sortie to Murmansk. [Sergeant of the] guard Joseph Klement, Army Coastal Battery 562, had been captured by a Russian tactical landing party near Fisherhals [Rybachiy Peninsula] in August 1942. The foundation for the dispatch of these two German prisoners of war to the Soviet‒Russian ND was their country of origin–Austria. In addition, Sergeant Kaiser also was under the pressure of a political situation within his own family. His brother was currently sitting in Dachau concentration camp for communist activity, according to a letter confiscated by Soviet‒Russian ND during Kaiser’s capture, to which he confessed. In light of the recruitment pitch they received, Kaiser and Klement went back over to the German side. After a lengthy period of time, in particular for their political training under the motto, “The Struggle for a Free Austria,” their insertion was carried out. Their mission included observation of traffic on Eismeerstrasse [the main supply route south from this area to Rovaniemi–trans.] and the Nautsi and Salmiyarvi airfields (occupation, takeoff and landing times, direction of flight). [frame 000083] They were to report the results of their observations by radio transmitter to Murmansk. Klement had a hard landing in his parachute insertion. Klement was successful in falling through a primeval forest and directly into a German unit position. Klement was retrieved by an amphibious aircraft sortie. The Abwehr Office Kirkenes, using Klement’s drop-damaged radio, made one attempt to enter a radio game with the RO Murmansk, but was unsuccessful because too much time had elapsed. The information gained from Kaiser and Klement regarding the RO of Northern Fleet was valuable in the education and confirmation for German soldiers that it was advisable in Russian captivity to overcome Russian defection. [Document continues on this page at subparagraph 3) with discussion of Soviet‒Russian partisan bands, followed by 4) [frame 000086] “Miscellaneous”; and VI. Organization [frame 000087], a discussion of Abwehr organization of various police and military agencies to combat espionage and partisan band activities in north Norway]. The document contains no formal signature block [frame 000088], rather a last-name signature above the signatory’s rank (lieutenant colonel, and below that a three-word hand-written comment and the last-name-only signature of General Ferdinand Jodl, at that time the commanding general of XIX Mountain Corps, and the date 9.10.43.] [Translator’s note: The information regarding actions of the Northern Fleet Reconnaissance Detachment in paragraph V.2) and the name of the chief of intelligence, Northern Fleet (Captain Vizgin) quite possibly came from the interrogation of Seaman Georgiy Vertyanskiy, Northern Fleet Reconnaissance Detachment, captured on 19 September 1942 and formally interrogated by Abwehr in late April 1943. Curiously, no mention is made in this document of Vertyanskiy’s name. The other anomaly found in this document is the information found at the top of this page regarding the insertion by parachute of two German POWs after indoctrination by the Northern Fleet Intelligence Department. I have found no mention of this activity in any Soviet Navy document.]