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Source: NARA, Series T-312, Reel 1650, Folder AOK 20 36560/16, first frame 000061 Oberkommando der 20. (Gebirgs) Armee Ic/AO Tgb. Nr. 1055/43 geh. UNCLASSIFIED Activity Report Section 1c / AO (Abwehr Officer) Headquarters, 20th Mountain Army for the time period 1.1.1943 through 30.6.1943 Table of Contents I. Defense against espionage, sabotage, subversion, et cetera, in the Wehrmacht 1) Espionage and sabotage. 2) Unauthorized absence and desertion. 3) Defection. 4) Various incidents (capital crimes, murder, theft, suicide, et cetera). 5) Violations of security regulations. 6) Subversion. 7) Field postal inspections. a) Statistics b) Analysis and evaluation c) Special inspection of field postal [activity] of personnel replacement battalions I and II of 2d and 6th Mtn. Divisions. 8) Enemy propaganda. a) General situation b) Statistics c) Analysis d) Enemy propaganda from the Reich e) Special cases 9) Examination of soldiers, civil servants, employees, and laborers of the Wehrmacht. 10) Various special cases. II. Defense in prisoner-of-war activities. III. Defense in passenger transport, border screening, passports. IV. Defense in the arms industry. V. Defense against enemy intelligence organizations and partisan bands. [frame 000062] 1) General situation. 2) Soviet‒Russian military and civilian intelligence structures. a) Presumed organization on the Karelian Front. b) Activity during the reporting period. 3) Soviet‒Russian partisan bands. a) Presumed organization on the Karelian Front. b) Activity during the reporting period. VI. Organization. * * * [beginning translation at frame 000076] V. Defense against enemy intelligence organizations and partisan bands. 1) General situation. In this reporting period, Soviet‒Russian – and that includes both military and civilian intelligence activities – have almost been rendered ineffective. Apart from isolated individuals who may have come under suspicion, other enemy intelligence activities are not traceable. Nevertheless, it is presumed that Swedish and British‒American intelligence services are active in the Army area in support of their alliance. The activities of Soviet‒Russian partisan bands are closely linked with the activities of Soviet‒Russian intelligence organizations. [frame 000077] In cooperation with Finnish military Abwehr Offices–Lapland and Rovaniemi, and in particular the Finnish State Police–Rovaniemi, we are closely monitoring the fight against Soviet‒Russian intelligence services. This cooperation has typically been outstanding. The comparative quiet in the early years was at the same time exceptional. The struggle with Soviet‒Russian intelligence services and partisan bands at the front line became the responsibility of an officer, namely the Ic [intelligence officer], of the corps and divisions. [This officer] paid particular attention to examination of the territory within which the Soviet‒ Russian intelligence services and partisan bands conducted their required training and equipping, and imparted their knowledge of the operational area. For these purposes, numerous standing orders are listed below: a) (Geb.) AOK 20 Ic/AO 17/43 g.K., of 5.2.43. Through this standing order, the struggle against partisan bands has been organized and the differences in partisan band membership have been clarified. The Führer order regarding handling the remaining prisoners of war has been implemented. b) (Geb.) AOK 20 1c/AO 114/43 g., of 5.2.43, subject: Examination of relationships of Soviet‒Russian intelligence organizations. This report provides the most recent results regarding organization of Soviet‒Russian ND [nachrichtendienst – intelligence services]. It provides instructions for examination and further disposition of relationships in the ND. (see Annex 8) c) (Geb.) AOK 20 1c/AO 24/43 g.K., of 21.2.43, subject: Soviet‒Russian Intelligence Services. The text, coming from OKW, Foreign Intelligence Bureau, provides the latest revelations regarding Soviet‒Russian ND. d) (Geb.) AOK 20 1c/AO 210/43 g., of 11.3.43, subject: Analysis of information gained from Soviet‒Russian agents and prisoners of war. (See Annex 9) e) (Geb.) AOK 20 1c/AO 306/43 g., of 28.3.43, subject: Analysis of information gained from Soviet‒Russian agents. In addition, “Intelligence in regard to partisan warfare” from the OKH has been distributed regularly to the divisions. A conference was also convened of the Ic [intelligence] staffs of the corps and divisions by the 20 (Mtn.) Army command at the end of May 1943. The Ic/AO conducted discussions in regard to probable organization of the partisan bands in the Karelian Front.1 [frame 000078] Simultaneously, the apparatus of the Secret Field Police-provided training. 2) The Soviet‒Russian military and civilian intelligence services. a) The believed organization of the Soviet‒Russian intelligence services on the Karelian Front, derived from agent information and analysis by the Finnish reports, paints the following picture. The structure of this intelligence activity is built upon two over-arching systems: 1. Military intelligence 2. The NKVD. The military intelligence organs fall under the supervision of the Red Army and Red Navy central authorities, with intelligence departments (RO – razvedyvatelnyy otdel) in the headquarters of Karelian Front and in the Northern Fleet; in the general staff of the 19th, 14th, and 26th Armies; and in the staffs of subordinate divisions and subordinate border guard regiments. This organization is likewise massively manned, with an authorized strength of 60 persons in the front intelligence department, 20 persons in each army department, and 5‒10 men in each division. The intelligence department of the commanding headquarters controls intelligence and reconnaissance sections. The extremely active Reconnaissance Detachment 1146 [“1146” was likely its postal number. The unit’s actual title was ultimately 181st Special Reconnaissance Detachment – trans.] in Polyarnoye, which conducts broad agent and diversionary actions in the Petsamo area and in the northern Norwegian coastal regions, and well organized commando raids against German strongpoints, is subordinated to the RO of Northern Fleet and led by Kapitan Wisgin [Captain Third Rank Pavel Aleksandrovich Vizgin, chief of the intelligence section of the Northern Fleet staff, a direct report to the chief of staff and fleet commander, Admiral Golovko]. The RO of the general staff of the Karelian Front has responsibility for the following: 1 Used in this context, this Russian word describes a formation equivalent in size and command structure to a British or American army group. The Soviet Army front operating in the Murmansk area was the Karelian Front. [translator] Intelligence Department of Karelian Front 1114, under Major Svyadkin in Belomorsk; Intelligence Section 1475 under Major Kotlov in Belomorsk; [frame 000079] Intelligence Section 1922 under Major Radionov in Sumskaya. The RO of the general staff of 14th Army directs the Intelligence Section of the 14th Army under Major Rakhmanov; The RO of the general staff of 19th Army directs Intelligence Section 1720 of the 19th Army in Niva III under Lieutenant Colonel Takhestnakov; The RO of the general staff of 26th Army directs Intelligence Section 4082 in Kem under Major Kovalsko. The NKVD has responsibility for the conduct of espionage through its Department IV and for carrying out counter-espionage activities through its Department III. These departments can be found in higher commands, thus in the NKVD of the Karelo‒Finnish Republic in Belomorsk and in the NKVD in Murmansk. On the whole, the Department IV has been eliminated from special units and schools, so a Department IV and a Special Espionage School have been established in Special Section 45 in Belomorsk, and a Department IV in the Special Section in Murmansk. The NKVD conducts political monitoring, espionage, and counter-espionage by means of organic “special sections” (OO – osobyy otdel) in troop units through the staffs of the front, armies, divisions, and border troops,. The presumed structure of the military ND and NKVD ND in the Karelian Front can be found in two closely transparent channels (see Annexes 10 and 11). The separation of the areas of responsibility cannot be clearly defined. The military is occupied mainly with military intelligence, while the NKVD is primarily involved in the revealing of economic and political status and counter-espionage. Recently, both the military as well as the NKVD ND have given special attention to the security protocols and productivity of the Kolosjoki Nickel Works, German and Finnish identification document requirements, the disposition of Russian prisoners of war in our camps, and the organization of German and Finnish defenses (counter-intelligence). [frame 000080] The Soviet‒Russian ND has acted with extraordinary precision and great rapidity in organization of the partisan movement. Their motto is commitment of forces with deliberate low risk, with the understanding that the majority of their force will fail. Their agents are delivered into their operating areas by various means. The intelligence sections provide delivery by parachute, by passage through the front line, and on occasion by amphibious aircraft landings. The reconnaissance detachment of Northern Fleet inserts its diversionaries on the north Norwegian coast with submarines, and supports their presence for months at a time through parachute drops or submarine deliveries. All of the reconnaissance units have recently added an expert in handling defectors.