7 the Rhine-Main-Danube Waterway 161
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Governance of large infrastructures The cases of the canals of King Willem I, the Suez Canal and the Rhine-Main-Danube waterway An application of new institutional economics Tom Weijnen GOVERNANCE OF LARGE INFRASTRUCTURES. THE CASES OF THE CANALS OF KING WILLEM I, THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE RHINE-MAIN-DANUBE WATERWAY. AN APPLICATION OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Twente, op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. H. Brinksma, volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen op vrijdag 17 september 2010 om 16.45 uur door Thomas Jozeph Gerardus Weijnen geboren op 7 maart 1952 te Vlodrop Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door: Prof. dr. P.B. Boorsma (promotor) Prof. dr. J.L. van Zanden (referent) Promotiecommissie: Prof. dr. P.J.J.M. van Loon, UT, voorzitter/secretaris Prof. dr. P.B. Boorsma, UT, promotor Prof. dr. J.L. van Zanden, UU, referent Prof. dr. N.S. Groenendijk, UT Prof. dr. J. P.M. Groenewegen, TU Delft Prof. dr. H. de Groot, UT Prof. dr. N.P. Mol, UT Prof. dr. A. van der Veen, UT Governance of large infrastructures The cases of the canals of King Willem I, the Suez Canal and the Rhine-Main- Danube waterway An application of new institutional economics Tom Weijnen Ter herinnering aan: M. Weijnen (1921-1999) A.M.C. Weijnen- van Cann (1925-2006) Printed by Ridderprint Offsetdrukkerij BV, Ridderkerk ISBN: 978-90-365-3072-9 DOI: 10.3990/1.9789036530729 © 2010 Th.J.G. Weijnen. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a database or retrieval system, or published in any form or any way, electronically, mechanically, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without written permission from the author. Preface The realization of this thesis could not have been succeeded without the invaluable support of a number of people. This is in the first place of course my supervisor prof. dr. P.B. Boorsma who gave me the opportunity to write this thesis. I value very much his support and the way he guided me through the process of bringing the undertaking to a good end. Also I would like to mention with a special attention Ben Tommee, who especially in starting up the work for the thesis was very important for me, with his very stimulating encouragements. Prof. dr. C.J. Rijnvos gave me the idea in the early nineties of the last century to study the history of the Rhine-Main-Danube waterway in relation to the recent German economic history. With this he laid down the fundaments for this thesis. I have appreciated this idea very much because it gave me the opportunity to come in contact with the fascinating subject of the German history. I am very happy to know that I will have my son Gijs and my dear friend Peter Verschuren at my site when defending this thesis. Throughout the past four years, in working at the thesis, the most important support for me I received from Maria, my dear and life long companion. Love, we did it! I dedicate this thesis to the remembrance of my parents who unfortunately cannot experience anymore the completion of it. Dordrecht, August 2010, Tom Weijnen "History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society's institutions." (Douglass North. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 1990, p. vii) "The future is not out there waiting to be learned: we create it ourselves." (Robert Skidelsky. Keynes. The return of the master. 2009, p. 88) Table of contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Central premise: the significance of governance structures 1 1.2 Central research question 2 1.3 Institutions and governance structures 3 1.4 Large infrastructures as collective or market goods 5 1.5 Three projects 7 1.6 Specific research questions 10 1.7 Limitations of the research 12 1.8 Outline of the thesis 14 2 New institutional economics 17 2.1 Introduction 17 2.2 Old and new in institutional economics 19 2.3 The nature of the firm: transaction costs 22 2.4 Institutions and organisations 24 2.5 Incomplete contracting and transaction cost economics 26 2.6 Uncertainty and new institutional economics 28 2.7 An overview 32 3 Transaction cost economics and property rights theory 35 3.1 Introduction 35 3.2 Transaction cost economics 37 3.2.1 Behavioural assumptions 37 3.2.2 Attributes of transactions 39 3.3 Governance structures 40 3.3.1 Scores on the dimension 42 3.3.2 Mechanisms of adaptation 44 3.3.3 Transaction cost economising 47 3.4 Transaction cost economics and the public sector 48 3.4.1 Economising on transaction costs 48 3.4.2 Probity and the alignment hypothesis 49 3.4.3 Theory of collective goods 50 3.5 Hybrids 51 3.5.1 The problem 52 3.5.2 Two case studies 53 3.5.3 Exploratory control 55 3.6 Some notions on property rights 56 3.6.1 Characteristics of property rights 57 3.6.2 Alternative property rights systems and their implications 59 3.6.3 Property rights as shift parameters in transaction costs economics 60 3.7 Summary and conclusion 62 4 Analytical scheme derived from new institutional economics 67 4.1 Introduction 67 4.2 Methodological considerations 67 4.3 A starting point for studying the canal projects 70 4.4 Property rights 70 4.4.1 The concept of property rights 71 4.4.2 Alternative systems of property rights 71 4.4.3 Analytical scheme for applying property rights theory 72 4.5 Transaction cost economics 73 4.6 Phases of a project 77 4.7 Analytical scheme for applying transaction cost economics 79 4.8 Summary 80 5. The canals of King Willem I 83 5.1 The Netherlands in the early 19 th century 83 5.2 King Willem I 84 5.3 The Constitution 87 5.4 Canal building by the King 89 5.5 Fiscal policy and the Amortisatiesyndicaat 95 5.6 The Noordhollandsch Kanaal 98 5.6.1 Planning the Noordhollandsch Kanaal 99 5.6.2 Designing and Financing 100 5.6.3 Building 102 5.6.4 Own operate maintain 103 5.7 The Zuid-Willemsvaart 105 5.7.1 Planning 105 5.7.2 Designing 107 5.7.3 Financing 108 5.7.4 Building 110 5.7.5 Own operate maintain and transfer 110 5.8 Application of the analytical scheme 111 5.8.1 Property rights and the canal building by Willem I 111 5.8.2 Governance structures. 115 5.9 Conclusions: answering the research questions 120 6 The Suez Canal 125 6.1 Introduction 125 6.1.1 Basic facts 125 6.1.2 Early history 126 6.2 Planning: the idea of the modern canal 127 6.2.1 Napoleon Bonaparte 127 6.2.2 The Saint-Simonians and Enfantin 127 6.2.3 Ferdinand Marie Vicomte de Lesseps and Said Pasha 128 6.3 Designing and financing: concessions and the Suez Canal Company 130 6.3.1 First concession 130 6.3.2 The second concession 131 6.3.3 Financing the Suez Canal Company 133 6.3.4 Distribution of profits 135 6.4 Building the canal 136 6.4.1 Solving concession problems 136 6.4.2 The canal is finished 139 6.4.3 Panama 140 6.5 Control, ownership and operations 141 6.5.1 Status of the canal 141 6.5.2 Operations by the Suez Canal Company 142 6.6 Transfer: Crises over Suez and the Company 143 6.6.1 Egyptianisation 143 6.6.2 The Suez Crisis and the aftermath 145 6.7 Application of the analytical scheme 146 6.7.1 Concessions as property rights 146 6.7.2 Property rights and the Suez Canal 147 6.7.3 Governance structure for the Suez Canal 151 6.8 Conclusions: answering the research questions 156 Annex 1 A time line 160 7 The Rhine-Main-Danube waterway 161 7.1 Introduction 161 7.2 Some German economic history 163 7.2.1 The 'Kaiserreich' 163 7.2.2 The Weimar republic 164 7.2.3 The Third Reich 166 7.2.4 After the Second World War 166 7.3 Rhine-Main-Danube waterway 169 7.3.1 Location 169 7.3.2 Rhein-Main-Donau AG 169 7.3.3 Construction 171 7.3.4 Shipping 173 7.4 Planning: From Fossa Carolina to a high capacity waterway 174 7.4.1 Fossa Carolina and Ludwig-Main-Danube Canal 174 7.4.2 The Canal and Shipping Society 175 7.4.3 Motives for building the waterway 175 7.5 Designing and Financing: the treaties 177 7.5.1 The constituting treaties of 1921 178 7.5.2 The construction treaty of 1922 179 7.5.3 The Third Reich and Allied occupation 180 7.5.4 The financing and extension treaties of 1966 181 7.5.5 The canalisation treaty and the settlement treaty from 1976 183 7.6 Building and operating 184 7.6.1 Estimating the total costs of the waterway 184 7.6.2 Goods traffic on the canal 186 7.7 Application of the analytical scheme 188 7.7.1 Institutional environment: property rights 190 7.7.2 Governance structures 192 7.8 Conclusion: answering the research questions 198 8.