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R Muhammad ects Dauda ales E of and of of Ste t Ste St Sewuese owth Garpiya. ff Akintunde Danladi Ngomba , Saleh Ahmadi c , E Y ancy Challenges a Conflicts essor Major Gr ernment ernment e-Colonial or imper Mambilla Ali Assessment p aba ombo ombo ael/P Historical . ando Critical Pr

t esolution olitical olitics ar m The Gov Prof Origins Ak Impacts the Abah, Isr The R Umar LARR The the The Omar Ak Milit Contributions The Odeigah, T A Joking Neighbour Dr Phases Haruna Impact Awudu, An A Nigeria Danjuma P Nwagu A Vict P Anuye, A Iorkile I Julius Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

ISSN: 2682-6194

JOURNAL OF MULTI-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES A Publication of Institute of Peace Studies and

Conflict Management (IPSACM), University, , Nigeria

Volume 1, Number 1, 2018 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

A Publication of Institute of Peace Studies and Conflict Management (IPSACM), Taraba State University, Jalingo,

Volume 1, Number 1, 2018 ISSN: 2682-6194

Editorial Board Editor-In-Chief Akombo I. Elijah, PhD

Secretary Abdulsalami M. Deji, PhD

Editorial Members Aboki M. Sani, PhD Atando Dauda Agbu, PhD Haruna M. Suleimuri, PhD Ajala Bamidele Luqman, PhD

Article should be submitted online to the Secretary, Institute of Peace Studies and Conflict Management (IPSCAM), Taraba State University PMB 1167 Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria. Email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

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Editorial Consultants

Professor Talla Ngarka S., Director, Institute of Peace Studies and Conflict Management (IPSCAM) Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria. Professor Abolade Adeniji, Department of History and International Studies, University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria Professor Oguntola-Laguda, Danoye Department of African Traditional Religions, , Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria Professor Mike O. Odey, Department of History, University, , Nigeria. Professor E. C. Emordi, Department of History and International Studies, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, , Nigeria Professor Adagba Okpaga, Department of Political Science, Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria Prof. Umar Habila Dadem Danfulani, Department of Religious Studies, University of , , Nigeria. Prof. Olubunmi Akinsanya Alo, Department of Sociology, Federal University, , Taraba State, Nigeria Professor Saawua Gabriel Nyityo, Department of History, Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria. Dr. Gbemisola Abdul-Jelil Animasawun, Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of , Nigeria

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Mission Statement

The world system is increasingly passing through very disturbing phases. Almost every sphere of life is being subjected to unprecedented crises. Both the human and the physical environments have come to crossroads of crises. There are, for instance, unprecedented episodes of global warming; depreciating conditions of soil fertility caused by, mostly, unregulated human activities; overflowing of banks of oceans and rivers on one hand, and alarming rain failures in different parts of the world resulting in protracted droughts and famine; on the other hand unprecedented frictions in human relationships across the globe resulting in unprecedented inter-personal, inter-group, inter-regional and inter-continental confrontations, among others. The Nigerian society is caught up at a similar crossroad. This presupposes that what has become, or is becoming, of the Nigerian society is directly a reflection of the predicament of the international community. Indeed, the entire Nigerian system is increasingly becoming alarmingly chaotic, resulting in unprecedented episodes of conflicts and violent behaviours. For instance, relationship within, and between, families is increasingly becoming very confrontational; the echoes of intra and inter-communal or group conflicts and violence are assuming new disturbing dimensions; the educational system is fast proving highly incapable of producing variables for positive national growth and development; the two dominant religions, Christianity and Islam, are disturbingly proving to be avenues for the promotion of intra and inter-religious rivalries other than peace and unity which are supposedly their main tenets; the

iii Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies political system is fast becoming terrains of unprecedented violence, conflict, misrule on one hand, as the security agencies are increasingly proving to be suspiciously incapable of performing their constitutional roles on the other hand, among many other vices. Needless to assert at this juncture that conflict, violence and confrontation have become the dominant features of the Nigerian society. This development results from a network of causes. Apparently, therefore, for us to be able to adequately comprehend the adjoining variables responsible for this down trend in our society, much mental, physical and financial energies have to be exerted. This, of course, is the hallmark of Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies, A Publication of Institute of Peace Studies and Conflict Management (IPSCAM) Taraba State University, Jalingo. The Centre appreciates our renown academies who have identified with this mission, particularly, the maiden edition of its Journal through their very valuable articles. Our most reputable senior colleagues who have graciously accepted to be part of this mission as editorial consultants cannot be appreciated enough. The Centre has, indeed, put its hands on the plough and pledges to stick to the philosophy of “Forward Ever, Backward Never”. We remain resolute.

Akombo Elijah Ityavkase, PhD

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Notes on Contributors

1. Professor Talla S. Ngarka, Abdulsalam M. Deji, PhD & Abdullahi Danburam, Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria. 2. Akombo I. Elijah, PhD & Sunday Theophilus Abom, Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria 3. Abah, Danladi, Department of History & International Studies, University Anyigba & Tanko A. Adihikon, Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria. 4. Umar, Garpiya, Department of Political science, Federal College of Education, , State, Nigeria. 5. LARRY, Steve Ibuomo, Department of History and Diplomacy, , Amassoma, , Nigeria. 6. Omar Saleh, PhD Department of Sociology, University, Gombe, Nigeria 7. Akombo I. Elijah,PhD Atando Dauda Agbu Ph.D & Rebinah Rinret Amos Nyonkyes, Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria. 8. Odeigah, Theresa Nfam, PhD, Department of History and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, , , Nigeria. 9. Atando Dauda Agbu, PhD & Yahya Adamu, Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria. 10. Dr. Ali Ahmadi Alkali, Department of Languages and Linguistics, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria & Hosea Nakina Martins, Department of Christian Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria.

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11. Haruna Muhammad Suleimuri, PhD & Asherum Garba, Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria. 12. Awudu, Angyu Daniel, Department of Political Science, Federal College of Education, Zaria, , Nigeria & Raymond Ferdinand, Relationship Manager, Cement and Logistics Team CIBD, Access Bank Plc. Plot 999c, Danmole Street V/Island Lagos, Lagos State, Nigeria. 13. Danjuma Jibaniya, Library Department, Federal College of Education, Zaria, Kaduna State, Nigeria. 14. Nwagu Evelyn Eziamaka, Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria. 15. Victor Akintunde Ajayi, Department of History and International Studies, Federal University Oye-Ekiti. . 16. Anuye, Steve Paul, Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo. Joseph, Bonglo Kinglsey, Department of History, College of Education, Zing, Taraba State & Ishaku Taraba Dahbo, Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo. 17. Iorkile Sewuese Rachael Department of History Faculty of Arts, Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria & Nwagu Evelyn Eziamaka Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria. 18. Julius Ngomba Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Social Science Taraba State University, Jalingo. Nigeria & Angela Ajodo- Adebanjoko, PhD Department of Political Science, Federal University , , Nigeria.

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Contents

1. The Effects of the Plebiscites on the Peoples of 1-19 , Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, 1959-2002 2. Origins and Migrations of the Yandang and the 20-42 Mumuye in the 19th Century 3. Impacts of Farmer-Herders Conflict in Benue 43-62 State, Nigeria: Focus on 2016 Agatu Episode and the imperatives of a new Management approach 4. Israel/Palestine Conflict: The Futility of Israel 63-78 Concept of Conflict Management and Peace Resolution 5. The Major Dynamics of Communal Conflicts in 79-92 Otuasega and their impact since 1960 6. The Conflicts between Fulani Pastoralists and 93-117 Cultivators in Taraba State, Nigeria: The Case of the Mambilla Plateau 7. The Growth of the Jukun-Kona Political and 118-132 Economic System, 1900 – 2017 8. Militancy and Conflicts in the Niger Delta 133-149 Region of Nigeria: A Historical Account of the Contributions of the Multi-National Oil Corporations, 9. The Challenges of Teaching and Learning 150-179 History in Some Selected Secondary Schools of Taraba State, 1991 – 2011

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10. Joking Relationship (Samba/Nyaa Sang/ Nuu 180-196 –Mel) Among the Mumuye and their Neighbours: A Panacea for Conflict Diffusion in Nigeria 11. Phases of Development of the Kuteb Economy 197-211 from 1960-2018 12. Impact of Terrorism on Socio-Economic 212-228 Development of Nigeria 13. An Assessment of The Impact of Library and 229-238 Information Services in National Development in Nigeria 14. A Critical Examination of the Role of Ethnic 239-259 Associations in the Emergence of the Three Major Political Parties in Nigerian's First Republic, 1960-1966, 15. A Pre-Colonial Economic History of Ekitiland 260-282 16. Politics of Violence in Nigeria: A study of Taraba 283-297 State, 1991 - 2019 17. A Historical Analysis of the Causes and Effects 298-312 of Herders-Farmers Conflicts in Taraba State 18. Impact Assessment of the United States War on 313-330 Terror in Afghanistan

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The Effects of the Plebiscites on the Peoples of Mambilla Plateau, Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, 1959-2002

Professor Talla S. Ngarka, Abdulsalam M. Deji PhD & Abdullahi Danburam Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria

Abstract This study is an interrogation to the effects of the Plebiscites on the peoples of Mambilla Plateau, Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria, from 1959-2002. The Mambilla Plateau is a home to the conglomeration of ethnic groups, which include the Mambilla, Fulbe, Kaka, Kambu and Panso, who make claims to the area based on the Plebiscites conducted in 1959 and 1961 respectively. The plebiscites were conducted as a result of the uncertainty of identity and claims of belonging to either Nigeria or Cameroun after the two countries attained independence. This resulted to two different problems of nativity and nationality in post-, which the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria support as the basis for clamant to belonging to Nigeria. The study, relying on the historical approach and the use of primary and secondary sources, argues that the problems associated with nativity and nationality claims created a marginality of inter-group relations, which make the dominant ethnic group to label “others” as foreigners, hence posing challenges for them to assert their right and benefit from state based distributive resources. The study concludes that the effects of the Plebiscites have been negatively exploited to the detriment of the collective development of the Mambilla Plateau and suggests the need to assert collectively claims to demand for Government attention on the area.

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Introduction The 1959 and 1961 Plebiscites as an important factor in the history of the peoples of Mambilla Plateau have had far reaching effects on the inter-ethnic relations among different groups in the area. The effects are not just far-reaching but also strong and important in negotiating the obvious character in the dynamics of such group relations in contemporary Nigeria1. The post Plebiscites experience on the peoples of Mambilla Plateau, particularly the 1982 ethno-political violence and the subsequent conflict that bedeviled the area in 2002 were the consequences of the contested plebiscites that came about as a result of the misgivings of group identities concerning who belongs and who does not belong to the Mambilla Plateau2. Ethnic groups on the Mambilla Plateau are collections of ethnic migrants who migrated onto the area at different times on or before the period of independence in Nigeria3. However, they were not part of the Nigerian traditional boundaries as a protectorate or colony, because they were under the status of Trusteeship until the Plebiscite of 1961. It is important to note that the post-Plebiscites challenges originated from the period before the first Plebiscite, when the Mambilla ethnic group agitated with the effort to exclude the Kambu, Panso, Kaka and the Fulbe ethnic nationalities from participating in the Plebiscites exercise, claiming and labeling them as foreigners, and as such have no right to participation4. This paper examines the effects of the Plebiscites on the peoples of Mambilla Plateau. The study revisits the historical and political antecedents of the peoples, though briefly, to provide basis for proper historical analysis on the contemporary dynamics and manifestation of the challenges facing the peoples about the claims of nativity and nationality rights in Nigeria.

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Geographical Location of the Mambilla Plateau The Mambilla Plateau also known as Sardauna Local Government Area is one of the sixteen Local Government Areas in Taraba State. The Local Government Area is located on the South-East of the State, and is bounded by Republic of on the Southern, Eastern and almost half of its Western part and and Kurmi Local Government Areas on the North and South-West respectively5 The Mambilla Plateau has a total landmass of about 3, 765.2 km, and lies on the latitude 5o311 and 7°18¹ north and on the longitude 10o 181 and 11° 37¹ east with an altitude of about 1,850 m above the sea level. This part of the country, owing to its altitude, is relatively cool; most days in the dry season, the temperature will reach 20 to 23°C and drop to 16 to 18°C at night, whilst in the wet season these averages fall a couple of degrees to about 14 to13°C. Mambilla Plateau is highly saturated by green-lush vegetation6. It is Tsetse flies free and harbors over one million herds of . The route to the Plateau and the terrain is widely fascinating given its scenic beauty, vegetation and landscape which charm various ethnic groups and tourists to the area7.

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Figure 1: Taraba State map showing Mambilla Plateau (Sardauna Local government Area) bordered by Republic of Cameroon on the South-East of the state.

Source: Taraba State Ministry of Environment, Jalingo

Conceptual Clarification Plebiscite The word Plebiscite is derived from the Latin words meaning Plebis, “the people” and scitum, “decree”. Under a Plebiscite, the people are allowed to decide on an issue of importance, and the outcome of the vote is like a decree from the citizens. Both democracies and dictatorships use Plebiscite, but for different purposes. In both instances, it cannot truly be called a Plebiscite unless eligible voters are

4 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies able to participate8. A Plebiscite is popular vote on a proposal which include the entire populace. Voters are asked to either reject or accept the proposal7. With the outcome of the Plebiscite determining the fate of the proposed measure, action, constitution or other political proposal, the political atmosphere determines whether a country conducts a plebiscite or not9. Plebiscite was first administered in there about 18th century in France before it became phenomenal in many nations. In where there were Plebiscites, most of the territories voted to achieve independence as independent countries, and not by joining independent federation. For instance, ; and Togo land Somalia and Somali land, and , among others; in a Plebiscite agreed to merge and achieve independence as one entity respectively10. Encyclopedia Britannica defines Plebiscites as a vote by the people of an entire or district to decide on some issues, such as a choice of a ruler or government, option for independence or annexation by another power, or a question of national policy11. However, in a plebiscite, voters are asked not to choose between alternative regimes or proposals but to confirm or reject the legitimacy of a certain form of government or course of action. Plebiscites are seen as a way for government to go directly to the people, bypassing intermediaries such as political parties12. The Plebiscites of 1959 and 1961on the Mambilla Plateau The first attempt to determine the political faith of the peoples of Mambilla Plateau and the entire Northern Cameroun was the 1959 Plebiscite. The questions presented to the peoples by the United Nations Plebiscites Council were: · Do you wish the Northern Cameroon to be part of the Northern Nigeria when Federation of Nigeria becomes independent on

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October 1st 1960? · Are you in favor of deciding the future of Northern Cameroon in a later date? The table below depicts the results of the 1959 Plebiscite in Northern Cameroon. Table 1 Plebiscite area Votes for Vote s against Total vote s Nigeria N igeria Dikwa North 7,575 7197 14,772

Dikwa Central 8,891 11,988 20879 Gwaz a 3,356 6 ,773 10,102 9 Madagali/Chubunawa 4,24 7 9 ,818 14,065 Mubi 6,1201 13,578 19,698 Cha mba 4,539 11 ,651 16,190 Tungo G ashaka 2,252 2 ,099 4,351 Mambilla 2,743 7,352 10,098

United Hills 3,063 89 3,152 Total 42,788 7 0546 113,33 4 Source: Trus teeship committee rep ort on the plebisc ite of 1959 Given the chance for democratic expression of opinion at the polls, 70,

546, which constitute 62.25%, voted for future date while, 42, 799, which constitute 37.75%, voted to join Northern Nigeria. It was unfortunate for the Northern Political class, particularly to the Northern People's Congress (NPC), because the result did not favour them. The peoples decided to vote in favour of the second option, indicating the continuity of the Trusteeship Council until a later date13. However, since the result of the 1959 Plebiscite did not favour either side, another date was slated for the second Plebiscite which was on the 11th and 12th February, 1961, in the Northern Cameroon. During this period, Nigeria had already secure

6 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies independence on the 1st October 1960, with the future of Mambilla Plateau not decided. Sir Ahmadu Bello the Premier of Northern Nigeria, his political party with his lieutenants involved in the campaign to secure votes of the peoples of the Mambilla Plateau and the other parts of Northern Cameroun14. Upon advice of the British representative to the United Nations Plebiscite Council, Andrew Cohen, that the Queen of England should not accept the inclusion of a third alternative on the questionnaire because it will lead to the fragmentations of the African Continent into small Countries, the third question removed. However, the third question would have enabled the peoples of Mambilla Plateau and Northern Cameroun at large to gain their independence. Unfortunately, by its removal they were provided with only two options of choosing to be integrated with Nigeria or Cameroon15. The two options presented to the peoples of Northern Cameroun by the UN were: i. Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria? or ii. Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroun? The table below depi cts the result of the 1961 P lebiscite. Constituency Votes for Votes for Total number

Table2 Nigeria Cameroon of votes Dikwa Nort h 22,705 10,502 33,327 Dikwa Central 28,097 24,203 52,900

Gwoza 18,115 2,554 20672

Madagali/Chubunawa 10,904 13,299 30,203 Mubi 23,798 11,1 32 34,930 Chamba 9 ,704 25,1 97 34,881 Tungo/Gashaka 4,999 3,108 8,107

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Mambilla 13,523 7,497 20900 United Hills 7,791 157 7,748 Total 146,299 97,659 243,958 Sources; Trusteeship Committee Report on the Plebiscite of 1961,

United Nations Document T/1556 of April, 1961 The table above depicts the nine Plebiscite Constituencies in Northern Cameroon during the 1961 Plebiscite and the number of votes for Nigeria and Cameroon. Nigeria got a total of 146,299 votes, which constitutes 59.299%, while 97, 659 voted for Cameroon, which constitutes 40.031%. With the outcome of the result, Mambilla plateau and Northern Cameroun at large became part of the independent Federation of Nigeria with effect from 1st June, 1961. Figure 2: Map showing Northern and Southern Cameroun

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The Effects of the Plebiscites on the Peoples of Mambilla Plateau The various ethnic nationalities on the Mambila Plateau are facing the challenges of nativity and nationality rights as a result of the 1959 and 1961 Plebiscites that brought these ethnic groups into the independent Federation of Nigeria. The effects have Economic, Political, Socio- Cultural and Psychological dimensions. These dimensions are necessary to consider because, generally, ethnic nationalities are organized around sets of common activities, which are Political, Economic, Social and Psychological16. The dynamics associated with these activities produced challenges which are mutual but also exclusive in nature. They are reinforcing factors necessitating conflicting relations because of competition for economic, political, social and psychological space on the Mambila plateau. The outcome of the negative relationship among the peoples of Mambila Plateau was based on the claim of belonging by the “majority” (Mambilla) and labeling other ethnic groups as aliens (Fulbe, Kaka, Kambu and Panso) despite having the same historical antecedent17. The following are the effects of the Plebiscites on the peoples of Mambila Plateau. Economic Effects In any society, modern or primitive, economy occupies the centre of its structure. As a result of its centrality, there is always the struggle among the ethnic entrepreneurs to have access to the nerves of the economy18. Ethnicity taken the form of tribalism finds expression and usefulness especially in the economic sense, which is dangerous for evolving inclusive nationality. The primary condition necessitating the unhealthy competition for economic opportunities among the ethnic groups is the localization of nationality in the form of nativity. Nativity includes and excludes based on ethnicity and especially

9 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies territorial belonging19. Those considered not to be within the native circle of certain ethnic groups suffer exclusion from time to time. They are deprived rights and privileges of benefiting from the Local Government resource accruing to their territory. This results to segmentation and ethnic rivalry among the various ethnic groups on the Mambila Plateau and former Northern Cameroon at large; this was to reduce their share proximate to them, and to dominate social relations of production which are economically deriven20. The Plebiscites on the Plateau necessitated the unhealthy competition for economic space among ethnic groups as well as the localization of nationality in the form of nativity. This resulted in the exclusionary context that impacted on the ethnic exclusion and the violence that followed in 1982 between the Mambilla and the Panso/Kambu peoples. It was also a factor that gave birth to the 2002 ethnic violence between the Mambilla and Fulani on the Mambilla Plateau. Since then, the feeling has been that ethnic groups who have no claim to indigenousness (the Fulani, Kaka, Kambu and Panso) of the area have been excluded from the so called real “owners”, (the Mambilla ethnic group) of the area21 As Horowitz noted, groups tend to agitate and seek to exclude other ethnic groups in order to extend their competitive efficiency. On the Mambilla Plateau, the exclusionary nature of ethnic identity is geared towards reducing other ethnic groups share of economic resources and to dominate the social relations of production22. The consequences driven from the Plebiscites in the post-colonial era on the Mambilla Plateau are the volatile nature of ethnic relations, particularly the partial distribution of ethnic groups and the infertility of the soil which has created the tendency of having ethnic groups

10 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies engaging in conflict. Even when the conflicts tend to be suppressed, they tend to still manifest with ethnic suspicion dominating the relationship among ethnic individuals and groups on the Mambilla Plateau.23 Political Effects The political effects associated with the challenges of nativity and nationality rights have generated identity questions on the Mambilla plateau. The political dynamics of nationality questions play out importantly and apparently against the various ethnic group that locate themselves territorially on the plateau24. This situation manifests between those who considered themselves more Nigerians (Mambilla) and those consider as nominal Nigerians (Fulani, Kaka, Kambu and Panso). Yet, they share the same historical, social, economic and political fate in Nigeria25. The Plebiscites separated the people who have shared historical, cultural and traditional heritage into two different countries, the Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroun. This separation accounts for the nativity and nationality question that echo on the Mambilla Plateau26. The Plebiscites also liquidated the internal harmony, cohesion and solidarity enjoyed by the peoples of Mambilla Plateau and beyond in the pre-colonial times. It is important to note that despite the artificial colonial boundaries that led to modern states creation, dividing the people, it has not prevented them from traversing between Nigeria and Cameroon, even in contemporary times.27 Social Effects The social effect manifests in various dynamics and in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria supports it. On the Mambilla Plateau there is ethnic segmentation which manifests in

11 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies form of the when Kaka, Kambu, Panso and the Fulbe ethnic groups being singled out and labeled as foreigners by the Mambilla, within the same territorial enclave28. Furthermore, in the first half of 1990, the Nigerian Immigration Service resorted to using the plebiscites card as a means of identification of the nationality of the peoples of Mambilla Plateau. There is no such provision that compels people in the former Northern Cameroun territory in Nigeria to use it as a National Identity Card29. This unholy act could have nearly caused the deportation of Kambu and Panso ethnic groups on the Plateau to Republic of Cameroon by the Nigerian Immigration Service. This was allegedly hatched by the officials of the Sardauna Local Government Area, majority of who are from the Mambilla extraction. The situation was halted as a result of a timely intervention of the Comptroller General of the Nigerian Immigration Service30. Psychological Effects The psychological effects of the plebiscites on the peoples of the Mambilla Plateau ranges from stereotype and insecurity, particularly with ethnic members with whom they share the same historical antecedent within the territorial boundaries, that is, the geographical boundaries before the Mambilla Plateau joined Nigeria31. The psychological trauma manifest on the myths of first in time is first in right. This led to ethnic segmentation on the ground that they do not belong here in Nigeria43. It also led to exclusionary notion of nativity and nationality which generates tension and mutual apprehension among groups that perceive one another as rivals32. Another effect of the Plebiscites is the emotional exclusion that they have no place in a country which they collectively have spoken to claim by virtue of the 1961 Plebiscite33.

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Another form of harassment which is being manufactured in recent times by Nigerian Immigration Service against the nationalities on the Mambilla Plateau is checking the arms of passengers travelling from Mambilla Plateau to other parts of Nigeria34. According to them, any mark of vaccination seen around the four arms labeled the passengers as foreigners (Cameroonians)35. This informs some of the factors responsible for group hostility on the Plateau because such harassment has created feelings of ethnic animosity leading to perennial conflicting relations since they cannot engage the government directly36. The psychological effect of the Plebiscites on the peoples of the Plateau is also linked to the with nationality question associated with unfinished work started by the UN in the area. The United Nations is accused of causing this problem because it engaged in unfinished business which has remained in conclusive to this day37. Furthermore, the Nigerian government failed to actualize proper integration of the peoples of Mambilla Plateau in Nigeria, as required by the international law. This rendered the Plebiscites a deception and their stay in Nigeria precarious38. Despite the Plebiscite which terminated the trusteeship, there is still much to be done by the UN about the nationality status of the peoples of the Mambilla Plateau. The failure of the UN and Britain during the Plebiscites to give the people of Mambilla Plateau the third option of becoming an independent federation was a deception39. More so, the UN was expected to conduct another plebiscite twenty years after the 1961 plebiscite to ascertain the status of the peoples of Mambilla Plateau and Northern Cameroun as a whole and to validate or invalidate the union with Nigeria40. The failure of Nigerian government to develop social, economic

13 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies modalities and political modalities through constitutional reform to effectively integrate the peoples of the Mambilla Plateau into Nigeria is a major source of concern to the peoples of the area. Talla points out that, the inability of the Nigerian government to file in a document formalizing the cooperation of the people of Mambilla Plateau and the Northern Cameroon at large into Nigeria to the UN Secretariat which will be published renders the union between the Northern Cameroon and Nigeria uncertain in modern times41. In addition it can be stated without any fear of contradiction the Plebiscite conducted under the supervision of the UN in 1961 denied the peoples an alternative requiring them to achieve independent as a Sovereign Nation.

Conclusion The investigation into the effects of the 1959 and 1961 Plebiscites on the peoples of Mambilla Plateau reveals that the peoples are facing the challenges of nativity and nationality rights as a result of the failure constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to recognize and give adequate attention to the peoples of the study area. The Constitutional provisions treated the entire country as a monolithic entity. It is quite unfortunate to state that such misconception amount to denying the peoples the sense of identity, history, and recognition in Nigeria as a peculiar people who join Nigeria in the middle of 1961. There is a need for constitutional reforms to address this constitutional impasse and the challenges coming there from. In this context, the responsibility is on the United Nations to conduct a Plebiscite that would validate or invalidate their status of the peoples of the Mambilla Plateau in Nigeria.

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References

1. Lenshie N. E. Johnson. A. Ethnicity and Citizenship Crises in Nigeria: Interrogating Inter-Ethnic Relations in Sardauna Local Government Area, Taraba State, in African Journal of Political Science and International Relation. Vo l . 6 ( 3 ) , 2 0 1 3 . A v a i l a b l e @ http;//www.academicjournals.org./AJPSIR 2. Talla N. S. The Third Alternative Element in the 1961 Southern Plebiscite: Issues and Perspectives. Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University Lapai, , Nigeria. Available @ http:/www.juldelsen.com/the%91third Alternative%92.html,retrieved 27th August, 2011 3. Talla N.S. and Lenshie, N.E, “Linking the past with the present: Understanding the Dynamics of Ethnicity in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, North- East, Nigeria”. A paper presented at the Historical Society of Nigeria, Zone on the theme: North- East in the 20th Century, Challenges and Prospects, organized by Department of History, Taraba State University, Jalingo from 2nd to 5th September, 2012 4. Abubakar A. Bonglo J.K. The United Nations and Decolonization in Trusteeship. A case study of the former Northern Cameroon (1884-1961). A paper presented at the 1st North East Historical Society Conference held at Taraba State University, Jalingo, 2002. 5. Ahmad Adi Abubakar, M. A. Thesis: “Ethnic identity and self Determination on the Mambila Plateau, 1979 and 2002”. Submitted to the Department of History, University of

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Maiduguri. 2015 6. Ahmad Adi Abubakar, M. A. Thesis: “Ethnic identity and self Determination on the Mambila Plateau, 1979 and 2002….. 7. Ngah, L. The 1959 and 1961 plebiscites and their implications for self determinations in the Nigeria- Cameroon border area in the former Sardauna Province, submitted to the Department of History Benue State University Makurdi. 2014 8. Ngah, L. The 1959 and 1961 plebiscites and their implications for self determinations in the Nigeria- Cameroun border area in the former Sardauna Province…… 9. Dunmoye, A. R. The citizenship-Indigeneship Contestations in Nigeria: Towards the Evolution of an Organic Citizen, in J. H. P. Golwa & O. C. Ojiji, (eds.), Dialogue on Citizenship in Nigeria. Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflicts Resolution.2008 10. The New Encyclopedia Britannica Vol.25, Chicago-USA, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. U.S.A. 1998 11. The New Encyclopedia Britannica Vol.25, Chicago-USA, Encyclopedia Britannica…. 12. Lenchie, N. E. & Gambo, J. Y. United Nations Plebiscite in the Northern Cameroun: Post-Colonial Issues and Challenges in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 2014. Vol. 6, No. 3 13. Lenshie, N. E. & Gambo, J. Y. United Nations Plebiscite in the Northern Cameroun: Post-Colonial Issues and Challenges in Sardauna…. 14. Talla N.S. and Lenshie, N.E, “Linking the past with the

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present: Understanding the Dynamics of Ethnicity in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, North- East, Nigeria… 15. Talla N.S. and Lenshie, N.E, “Linking the past with the present: Understanding the Dynamics of Ethnicity in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, North- East, Nigeria… 16. Talla N.S. and Lenshie, N.E, “Linking the past with the present: Understanding the Dynamics of Ethnicity in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, North- East, Nigeria… 17. Akombo E. et al, “The role of ethnicity in violence in Nigeria”, in the Jalingo Journal of arts and social science vol.1 of 2.2009 18. Akombo E. et al, “The role of ethnicity in violence in Nigeria”, in the Jalingo… 19. Talla N.S. and Lenshie, N.E, “Linking the past with the present: Understanding the Dynamics of Ethnicity in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, North- East, Nigeria… 20. Talla N.S. and Lenshie, N.E, “Linking the past with the present: Understanding the Dynamics of Ethnicity in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, North- East, Nigeria… 21. Horowitz, D.L. Ethnic Group in conflicts. London: Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985 22. Horowitz, D.L. Ethnic Group in conflicts. London: Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of…. 23. Blench R., “Natural Resources Conflicts in North-Central

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Nigeria”: A Handbook and Case Studies, London: Mandaras Publishing. 2004 24. Blench R., “Natural Resources Conflicts in North-Central Nigeria…Taraba State, Nigeria. M.Sc. Project… 25. Goodridge, R.A. Minorities, Plebiscite and in British Northern Cameroun 1959-1961, in M. Fois & A. Pes (eds.), Politics and Minorities in Africa. Roma: Nova Collectanea. 2013 26. Ngah, L. The 1959 and 1961 plebiscites and their implications for self determinations in the Nigeria-Cameroon border area in the former Sardauna Province…… 27. Human Rights Watch. They do not own this place: Government Discrimination against Non-indigenes in Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch. 2006 28. Talla N. S. The 'Third Alternative' Element in the 1961 Southern Cameroons Plebiscite: Issues and Perspectives… 29. Talla N. S. The 'Third Alternative' Element in the 1961 Southern Cameroons Plebiscite: Issues and Perspectives… 30. Talla N.S. and Lenshie, N.E, “Linking the past with the present: Understanding the Dynamics of Ethnicity in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, North- East, Nigeria… 31. Ngah, L. The 1959 and 1961 plebiscites and their implications for self determinations in the Nigeria- Cameroon border area in the former Sardauna Province…… 32. Ngah, L. The 1959 and 1961 plebiscites and their implications for self determinations in the Nigeria-Cameroon border area in the former Sardauna Province…… 33. Lenshie, N. E. Indigeneity and Citizenship Question in

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Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria. M.Sc. Project… 34. Lenchie, N. E. Indigeneity and Citizenship Question in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria. M.Sc. Project… 35. Ndangam A. F. The Northern Cameroun Questions: A tactical diversion, retrieved August 27th, 2011, available at http://www.thefrontiertelegraph.com/context1012 908/cameroon- question.html.2010 36. United Nations, The 994th Plenary meeting, 21 April 1961, Resolutions adopted on the reports of the forth committee, Geneva: United Nations. 1961 37. United Nations, The 994th Plenary meeting, 21 April 1961, Resolutions adopted on..... 38. Federal Republic of Nigeria “Official Gazette, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2011”, in Ahmad Adi Abubakar…. 39. Blagojevic B., “Causes of Conflict: A Conceptual Framework”, Journal of Global C h a n g e a n d G o v e r n a n c e , V o l . i i i , N o 1 , w i n t e r , http://globalaffairsjournal.org. 2009 40. Blench R., “Natural Resources Conflicts in North-Central Nigeria”: A Handbook and Case Studies, London: Mandaras Publishing. 2004 41. Nnoli O. Ethnicity and Democracy: Intervening Variables. Lagos: Malthouse Press. 1994

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Origins and Migrations of the Yandang and the Mumuye in the 19th Century

Akombo I. Elijah PhD Sunday Theophilus Abom Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria

Abstract The Yandang and Mumuye ethnic groups inhabit the Yoro-Gorobi highlands or mountains and its vast surroundings, located in the North Eastern part of Nigeria today. Their history of origin and migration is not clear enough due to the dearth of pragmatic evidence to authenticate or address the different accounts of their origin and migration in the pre-colonial period. This paper, therefore, attempts to bring to limelight the history of origin and migration of the Yandang and Mumuye. Data collection approach is based on historical research method and multidisciplinary sources such as oral traditions, available written documents, ethnography and archaeological evidences. The paper also serves as a significant milestone on the quest for delineating the origin and migrations of the Yandang and Mumuye in the study area. Key Terms: Archaeology, Ethnography, Origin and Migration.

Introduction The history of origins and migrations of peoples is essentially about how the groups emerged and their shift from their original places of origin to where they are presently found. According to Massey, Arango, Hugo, Konaouci, Pellegrino and Taylor, migration is as old as man himself.1 This is because there is no group that did not come from another place. This is to say that, no individual, ethnic group or groups germinated from the ground and remained immovable like natural features such as mountains or lakes (which have been where they were since creation). In other words, man in

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Africa, most especially in the area of study, has the physical, intelligent and social mechanism to move and settle in other areas of his choice. Migration is the movement of individuals, groups or peoples from a primary or original place of settlement to another place with the aim of settling down in a new or particular place either temporarily or permanently. Migrations are cyclical, spasmodic, piecemeal, seasonal, periodic or linear. Some migrations can take two or more of these variables, for example, the Fulanis or Bororos migrate in search of pasture or grazing land for their cattle which combines seasonal, periodic, cyclical and piecemeal processes. This is why migration is believed to be the movement of people from one place to another in the search of more rewarding or friendly environment. Migrations take different forms of long and short distance movements of peoples, in search of arable land, economic opportunities, features such as foot mountains or foot hills, favourable climatic conditions, among others, outside or within a given region or geographical area. In addition to this, in pre-colonial times, migration was part and parcel of normal life in many parts of Africa. This could be permanent movements to open up new lands or to escape wars or crises. More so, it could be seasonal or circular for the purposes of hunting, trade, agriculture or religion as in the case of the Islamic that also affected Gorobi, the area of study. Migrations take the form of trans-local, trans-regional, trans- national, trans-continental and trans-international boundaries. The Yandang and , among many Africa ethnic groups, kept on migrating within the African continent in the pre-colonial period until each group finally and permanently occupied its present place of abode. Until when man discovered the value of arable land, rich climatic conditions, economic privileges, among others, humanity in pre-colonial Africa never bothered about the need to 21 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies explore far away locations for the purpose of discovering more conducive territories. Also, until when the acquisition of land took the centre stage in Africa, Europe, the Americas, and so on, that empires, kingdoms, states and societies started to emerge. This paper focuses on the origins and migrations of the Yandang and the Mumuye, the geographical location, the peopling of the area, and other general perspectives on origins and migrations which contribute, in part, to our profound understanding of pre- colonial Nigeria. The Location of the Area of Study Gorobi, meaning a “hilly country,” was one of the wards created in former Mayo-Belwa District, in the then Yola Province,2 during the colonial administration in the 20th century. The present Mayo-Belwa Local Government Area has twelve (12) Wards: Mayo- Belwa, Ribado, Genle, Yoovo, Dikong, Faran, Tola, Gangfada, Binyeri, Jareng, Gorobi and Bajama. The entire area has been occupied by the Yandang and Mumuye and few other people groups since from 14th Century A.D.3 The last two wards are predominantly occupied by the Yandang group, while the other ten are primarily inhabited by the Mumuye counterpart. Gorobi is located on Latitude 9o 36' N and Longitude 12o 28' E of the equator, in Mayo-Belwa Local Government Area of .4 It is an agrarian society endowed with fertile land for agriculture. Other economic activities include fishing and animal husbandry such as mares, donkeys, , , etc. The predominant agricultural produce in the area are yam, sweet potatoes, groundnut, indigo, rice, beans, millet, maize, corn (sorghum), beans, etc. The area also engages in industrial crafts such as dyeing, smithing, weaving, pottery, etc.5 The Peopling of the Gorobi Area The Mumuye and Yandang are the predominant groups in the Gorobi area. The Yandang people were originally called or known as 22 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies the “Nwin-Khuk”, meaning, “fellow tribe person”, dates as far back to 1300 A.D. The Nwin-Khuk were described by Vereker as occupying the hill country between Jalingo and the Districts of Mayo-Belwa and Mayo-Faran.6 The Yandang, Mumuye, Chamba, among other groups, linked their origin to the Mandara Highlands. However, in order to understand the peopling of the Gorobi area (ward), it is paramount to analyse the population distribution of Mayo-Belwa Local Government Area as the macrocosm of the study area. According to Dong, et.al (2008), the twelve wards of Mayo-Belwa Local Government Area are occupied by the Mumuye, Yandang, Genle, and Yoovo. While the Mumuye constitute the dominant group in nine (9) wards, the Genle, Yoovo and Yandang are predominant in Genle, Yoovo and Gorobi wards respectively. Other minority groups found in the area are the Dangsaa and Fulani. The Yandang constitute the dominant group in the Gorobi area followed by the Mumuye. The two groups have co-existed in clusters or in separate settlements in the area. Both groups built and sustained very symbiotic or harmonious relationship with one another before, during and even after the colonial rule, as it is evident even to date. Perspectives on Origins and Migrations Many ethnic groups in Nigeria by trying to magnify the Hamitic hypothesis claimed to have originally migrated from far away distant areas, while some other ethnic groups believe to have migrated to their present place from within the same region. These externally based theories have damaging effects on the true histories of origin and migration of groups, particularly African societies. Based on this mindset, therefore, many African societies attribute their existence, establishments and achievements to some superior elements in far away societies. Ernest Ravenstein (1885) propounded the origins of 23 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies migration theory, as he drew his data, first from the British Isles and then from other European countries, in order to identify empirical regularities that became plausible laws of migration. He hypothesized the following seven laws: 1. Most migrants only proceed a short distance, 2. Migrant absorption grows less with the distance proportionately to the native population which furnishes them, and population gaps resulting from migration from surrounding areas are filled up by migrants from more remote districts, 3. The process of dispersion is the inverse of that of absorption, and exhibits similar features, 4. Each main current of migration produces a compensating counter-current, 5. Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centres of commerce or industry, 6. The natives of towns are less migratory than those of the rural parts of the country, and 7. Females are more migratory than males.6

Point one focuses on migration within the same geographical area or region, which the traditions of origins of many Africa peoples disassociate from as theory of migration. Thus, from the Mandara Highlands to the Gorobi hills in the area of study lies within similar geographical jurisdiction. Points two, three and four tilt more towards the colonial epoch, where, for instance, the mass exodus of Europeans into the Americas took the fore immediately the new world was opened in the 15th century. This theory was also prominent during the colonisation of Africa after the Berlin Conference which officially mandated the European powers, without the consent of the African peoples, to colonise the entire continent and beyond. 24 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Points five and six centre on the human ingenuity of/in choice and immediate conduciveness of settlements in the course of migration. For example, during the pre-colonial migrations, many African or Nigerian societies focused their preference and index of migration on hilly topography, including the study area. Whereas during the colonial period in Nigeria, areas where the colonialists concentrated their administrative and economic activities were places where natural resources could be easily exploited and shipped to Europe. The last point here deals with gender migration which goes against the period and area of study where the male counterpart in the course of migration discovers a suitable area, now takes the news back and then a large number of the people move from their initial settlement location to a new destination within the same region. For instance, many of the settlements or peopling of pre-colonial communities in Africa were discovered and spearheaded by male hunters, and not by the female counterpart. Perhaps, women may be more in number compared to men in the course of early migrations, but not that they are more migratory than men. Thus, the laws of migration aforementioned are applicable and pragmatic to the migratory situation of the Yandang and Mumuye people into and around the area of study in particular, and Africa as a whole. Authors such as Portes7, Boyd8, and Faist9 agreed on the migration system theory which has assumed that there are factors that instigate the movement of people, like the case of the super-powers migrating into the African continent after the parceling of Africa to physically colonise its people and land. They claimed that: …migration systems create the context in which movement occurs and that these systems influence people's actions on whether to stay or to move. Basically, a migration system includes two or more places - most often nation-states - 25 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

connected to each other by flows and counter- flows of people. Lately, migration system theory has stressed the existence of linkages between countries other than people, such as trade and security alliances, colonial ties, and flows of goods, services, information, and ideas. These linkages have usually existed before migration flows occurred.10

Adepoju in his work states that, Migration by its very nature, involves at least three major actors: the migrant, the area or country of origin and the area or country of destination. While internal migration, in principle, implies movement of people within a geographically defined territory unrestricted by legal constraints, an international migrant is invariably confronted with a series of sometimes complex regulations relating, at first, to exit from the country of origin, and later, entry into, residence within, and exit from the receiving country.11

He went further to add that migration was a catalyst for the emergence of many African societies from the pre-colonial to the decolonisation process, following Africa's political independence in the second half of the twentieth century and onwards. He asserts that: The migration phenomenon in Africa can be better understood within the context of political and historical evolution of African societies. The effects of colonisation and decolonisation on the economy and indirectly on migration are most visible when examined in the context of the pre- 26 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

colonial, the colonial and post-colonial era. In the pro-colonial era, population movements in Africa were associated largely with the prevailing socio-political and ecological conditions, especially internecine warfare, natural disasters and the search for farm land or colonisation. The movements were, as a result, unstructured, occurred in groups, and the m i g r a n t s w e r e d e m o g r a p h i c a l l y undifferentiated.12 In another trend, the origins or traditions of origin of numerous Nigerian societies take different forms or degrees.13 The origin of a people refer to the initial point or place where they came or started from or where they originated. Therefore, the Yandang and the Mumuye believe to have originated from the East, moved to the Cameroon/Mandara Highlands and then the Mumuye permanently settled in Yoro Mountains and the Yandang in Gorobi Mountains,14 respectively. It is quite glaring that early Africa historiography or writings gave dimensions of origins and massive movements of peoples in Africa, most especially in , including the area of study, starting from fifteenth century, the slave trade epoch. Therefore, during this four hundred years or much more of compelled migrations and the disruption and dislocation of societies and groups who had little or no defense against the hyper-demand for slaves in West Africa, were evacuated to plantations and mines in the New World at the other side of the Atlantic Ocean; while other groups who were less affected or managed to escape the “imperial atrocities” migrated to hilly areas and virtually remained there after the official Abolition of the slave trade in 1807. This agrees with the enormous contributions of Walter Rodney15, Lovejoy16 and Inikori17 on the subject of slave trade. However, the obnoxious trade before its 27 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies replacement brought about the emergence of city-states along the coast of, most importantly, West Africa, and it is in this perspective that Tamuno, in his work, stated that: From the 16th century, Ijoland communities also took part in the Trans- and so attracted the attention of Western European commercial interests in their territories. Violence against human- beings (called slaves) became prominent then. In that illegal traffic, slaves who struck for freedom lost the war for the dignity of man. Moreover, in that transit trade, from source to the users, there were more sinners than saints. What eventually came to be known as the Niger Delta was initially part of the notorious “Slave Coast” of West Africa. It witnessed considerable Terror associated with the inhuman traffic in slaves: involuntary victims of voluntary victimisers (European, American and African)…18

Tamuno further stated that, “in that violent commerce, the Niger Delta acted as a conveyor-belt of slaves from the hinterland. Slaves who resisted their change of status lost their lives on land and at sea. In that process, the Niger Delta city-states also suffered considerable social and political dislocation. With the Abolition of the trade in 1807 and Emancipation in 1833, Western Europeans became more interested in so-called legitimate commerce in the domains of the Ijo and their coastal and hinterland neighbours.”19 Ade Ajayi, in his work, “Africa at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century: Issues and Prospects” argued that: 28 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Movements of this sort should, however, be regarded as regular flows of population that usually did not involve permanent abandonment of locations or displacement of people and the movement of significant numbers over long distances or long periods of time. However, population pressure relative to the pattern of land use, perhaps arising from normal increase over a period of relative prosperity, or immigration due to war and the collapse of existing state systems, or to prolonged drought, pestilence or other ecological disaster in a neighbouring area could set off a process of expansion by drift. The nineteenth century was to witness several such movements.20 Here, the general surveillance is that migration in Africa before the parcelling of Africa among the European super-powers had a number of indexes such as the upshot of wars, famine, in search of a better settlement site for agrarian purpose, among others. Ajayi went further to maintain that: by 1800, the main linguistic and cultural divisions of the African population had long been established in their various locations, claiming rights over their own portions of the land mass. Indeed, for most parts of Africa, the process was complete by the sixteenth century and, by the nineteenth century, varying degrees of consolidation had taken place and stability had been established. Only in the Horn of Africa, East Africa (outside the central highlands of the Great Lakes region) and in Madagascar were major migrations into relatively underpopulated 29 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies areas still continued into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and even in those places stability, in the sense of mastery over the land space, had been achieved by the beginning of the nineteenth century. This is to use the term migration in the sense of extraordinary movements of significant numbers of people over wide areas of time and space. However, in another sense, mobility of people in the process of earning their livelihood continued, either as pastoralists involved in transhumance; or crop farmers alternating between land under cultivation and land left fallow; or hunters and gatherers roaming over defined areas for animals or honey or even palm fruits; or fishermen following the movement of fish according to different seasons; or specialist craftsmen such as blacksmiths or traders pursuing their occupation in enclave colonies in distant places.21 From earlier studies, it is evidently clear that before the Islamic or Jihadic revolution and subsequently the colonisation of Africa, and the area of study in particular, all the ethnic groups in Nigeria, including the Yandang and the Mumuye, had consolidated and defined their political, economic, socio-cultural and geographical domain (i.e. Gorobi). Practically speaking, there were no land left-overs when the European conquistadors came after the Berlin Conference between 1884-5 to colonise Africa, including the study area. That was why the British, for instance, having their spheres of influence in the area called Nigeria today had to colonise the people before they took-over and exploited the land together with the people who had already occupied the land. According to Samir Amin's work, “Social Relations and Migration: A Study of Postwar Migration”, Postwar migration needs to be understood in relation to labour movement from one area to another. The trend of this movement is characterised in the postwar period 30 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

a s l a b o u r e m i g r a t e s f r o m industrially and economically less developed countries to arrive at industrially and economically more developed countries… Relations between the formations of the "developed" or advanced world (the c e n t r e ) a n d t h o s e o f t h e "underdeveloped" world (the periphery) are affected by transfers of value, and these constitute the essence of the problem of accumulation on a world scale.22

This aftermath war theory of migration is triggered as a result of war where movement of people established a centre-periphery relationship in terms of industrial and economic developments. People migrated to developed countries as against underdeveloped or developing countries. The theory was operational during and after the world war, where people moved to countries that experienced fewer losses as a result of the war. Origins and Migrations of the Yandang and Mumuye People Traditions of origin refer to the first point and place where a people or group started from or where something originates. According to tradition, the Yandang and Mumuye had a common tradition of origin and migration traceable to or from the East, through Cameroon/Mandara Highlands to Yoro Mountains,23 before the former left and permanently settled in Gorobi and spread to other areas, while the latter spread in clans and became neighbours with the Yandang people. The ancestral and cultural headquarters of the Mumuye people is Yoro, whereas the cultural centre and present home of the 31 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Yandang people is Gorobi. There are no evidences whether the Yandang and Mumuye migrated or took off at the same time from the East to Cameroom/Mandara Highlands and finally to Yoro. Traditions of Origin and Migration of the Yandang The sources of information on the origin and migration history of the Gorobi or Yandang people are basically oral tradition, ethnography and archaeology. According to Jan Vansina in his work, Oral Tradition as History, Every community in the world has a representation of the origin of the world, the creation of mankind, and the appearance of their own particular society and community…. They are accounts that originate out of speculation by local sages about these questions, out of preexisting material of the same nature or borrowed from other communities, and out of heavily fossilized group accounts (that is, accounts reduced to clichés). Traditions of origin are new accounts and they may or may not remain stable over long periods of time.24

From historical perspective, there is leakage in preservation and transmission of the history of the people in the area of study. Therefore, the effort to bring to limelight the accurate origin and the migration of the Yandang and Mumuye is not free from sprinkles of speculation, here and there. According to tradition, the Yandang people, originally or formally known as “Nwin-Khuk”, migrated from the East (which they generally referred to as ) to Cameroon- the Mandara 32 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Highlands, from there they migrated and settled at “Wayorro” Hills located in the present Local Government Area of Taraba State, and then migrated to Yakoko-Yonko where they moved to hilly areas of the Adamawa Highlands along with their Mumuye counterpart. The Nwin-Khuk decided to settle at the other side of the hills, demarcated from other ethnic groups (most especially the Mumuye) by a river. The name Yadang was given to them by their neighbours, and it connoted the people at the other side of the river. It was from there that they finally migrated to Gorobi Hill. Tradition has it that the Yandang people inhabited Gorobi as far back as 13th century A.D. On arrival at Gorobi, the Yandang people metamorphosed into seventeen (17) large clans known as Nyakara. The clans were: Wagadele, Wadaku, Wakutibi, Wakare, Wagole, Wakak, Watashi, Wahara, Watsah, Wakule, Wakumbe, Wagele, Wakpore, Wateme, Wamale, Wagure and Wadindele.25 However, there was the gradual disintegration of these clans partly as a result of colonial influence or activities, among other things, leaving only seven in existence as listed below: i. Wagadele clan lives at Wagereng ii. Wagole clan resides at Dapanti iii. Wawak clan occupies Wakka iv. Wakutibi clan inhabits Wakutibi (Kufuru) v. Wakare clan occupies Wakare vi. Wadaku clan is found at Wadaku (Kudaku) vii. Wagure clan domiciles at Wagure26 These settlements remain in the hilly area known as Gorobi, the study area, in Mayo-Belwa Local Government Area of Adamawa State of Nigeria. According to the unpublished thesis by R. R. Bala, which is in agreement with other Yandang informants or sources; the names of Yandang (Nwin-Khuk) settlements are derived from these clan names. It is from Gorobi that the Yandang people spread to Yelwa, 33 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Yubolung, and Sabongida, extant settlement. This spread took place in the 18th and 19th centuries and went as far as Demsa, Fufore, Jada and Numan in Adamawa State. In Taraba State, the Yandang people are also found in the fertile grassland of Lau Local Government Area known in Yandang as “Sanwi”, meaning grassland. They are also found in Yorro, Zing, Bali, Karim Lamido, and Local Government Areas…the Yandang society did not evolve with a centralised political entity. It was rather the council of elders that oversaw the affairs of the people. Even after the coming of the Europeans in 18th and 19th centuries in Gorobi, when village heads and ward heads were created to oversee the affairs of the people, the position of the council of elders was not compromised.27 The contending issue concerning the origin and migration of the Yandang people is one, that they migrated from Egypt which is a betrayal orchestrated by the imperial apologists whose claim was that, what existed in Africa before the coming of the Europeans was darkness, and that there was no historic movement or development to exhibit. Therefore, every society in Africa, including the area of study, from the 19th and 20th centuries A.D (which was the colonial period) intended to create a possible impression of associating their origin with Egypt, the cradle of ancient civilisation. Thus, according to E. I. Akombo, this pattern of historical extension has its foundation on speculations due to the forgetfulness of tangible past events, among several other factors.28 The foregoing argument suggests that the history of origin and migration in the Africa milieu should be looked at from within rather than from without, which makes it more credible when we say the Yandang people migrated from the Mandara Highlands in Cameroon (a neighbouring country with Nigeria) within the West African region, than to say that the Yandang people migrated from far away Egypt in . According to the archaeological evidence, the original or old Gorobi is an abandoned settlement site 34 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies located in the present modern Gorobi (Ward) in Mayo-Belwa Local Government Area of Adamawa State. It is located 2 kilometres north of the modern Gorobi and 32 kilometres east of Mayo-Belwa.29 Traditions of Origin and Migration of the Mumuye The Mumuye people were originally referred to as “mountain people.” However, others referred to them variously as, “Mumuni”, a Hausa word meaning good behaviour; “Mome” a Bachama word for mountain, etc. Thus, the Mumuye people prefer to be identified by their local titles such as Yotti, Saggbee, Gboore, Manang, Bansi, among others; and generally claim and see Yoro (and Kang) as their origin and point of reference. It is very glaring that C. K. Meek in his study of ethnic groups in northern Nigeria generically classified the Mumuye and Yandang peoples among other groups as, various groups of peoples in the Adamawa Province occupying the hill country between Jalingo and the Districts of Mayo-Belwa and Mayo Faran.30 This is obviously an overgeneralisation by not presenting them as independent ethnic groups but rather subsuming them to be of the same element. According to Dong et.al,31 on the origin of the Mumuye people, they declared in explicit terms that, the Mumuye claimed Kang or Kam as their origin. The place is located between Garba Chede and Bali towns in Taraba State. Kam Hills have later been occupied by Kamawa and Dirim people after the Mumuye migration from there to Yoro Mountains. The exact period of existence of the Mumuye in Kang and Yoro is not traceable because it has not been written down and the oral tradition cannot explain it either. The existence of the Mumuye in Kang may be during the Stone Age, and that of Yoro was probably during the Iron Age. There have been no remains of their crude tools which they used when they were in Kang. But there are traces of iron ore smelting found in Yoro Mountains where they lived for many years after they migrated from Kang. There are also traces of iron ore smelting found around 35 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Monkin, Kassa, Sagbee; Mampaa' Sensi Dong and Yotti areas where they settled when they dispersed Yoro mountains around 1300 A.D to different directions looking for new farmlands.32 From this contrasting direction on the origin and migration of the Mumuye people, the striking point remains that of their migration to the Yoro Mountains which is associated with the Iron Age; with the evidence of iron slag indicating iron technology, which is tantamount to that of Gorobi Mountains. Kirk-Greene's contention in his work, Adamawa Past and Present, believes that the Mumuye people migrated from the Cross Rivers region and probably became one of the original ethnic groups of Adamawa Province. He argued further that,

If the Mumuye were one time in the Cross Rivers region, they probably migrated from Western Sudan region long time ago in the prehistory period passing through to Eastern and Western Cameroon to Nigeria.33 The Mumuye people are not Semitic or Berber extractions from Egypt, neither do they believe that they came from the Cross Rivers region. Rather, they claim to have migrated to Yoro from Kang and Mandara highlands, respectively. The Mumuye and Yandang peoples are of Black African or Negroid race. Anderson and Watts described the characteristics of the Black race as, Nearly all the people of Sub-Saharan Africa are black, or contain characteristics of the Negroid race. Yet, as there are in all races, there are many variations among them. West African Negroes have broad flat noses, thick 36 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

turned-out lips and dark kinky hair.34

Meek classified the Mumuye into seven (7) groups as follows: Pugu, Yoro, Rang, Zina, Ya (Yakoko), and Gola (Gongla) or Jeren;35 as against the successive fifteen (15) clans that encompass the Mumuye people namely: Yoro, Gangoro, Pugong, Sagbee, Zing, Dong, Manang, Yotti, Kugong, Monkin, Gomlaa (Gongla), Mang or Koodii, Ya'a, Kwajji and Kung (Shong Kpare). Yoro and Gorobi are unifying factors for the widely scattered Mumuye and Yandang, respectively. The Mumuye also spread and live in ten (10) Local Government Areas in Nigeria: Zing, Mayo-Belwa, Yoro, Jalingo, Bali, Ganye, Karim-Lamido, Fufore, Yola and Numan.36

Conclusion Having examined the traditions of origin and migrations of the Yandang and Mumuye using various available sources, it seems evidently clear that the claim of Yandang and Mumuye migratory story from the East is no longer tenable, especially as it relates to the concept of objectivity. This is because many African pre-colonial societies who have no clear preservation of their origin and their migratory histories tend to tilt towards the East, which has been the product of Eurocentricism. Based on available sources, it does appear that the Yandang and Mumuye origin and migrations started from the Mandara Highlands and then to Yoro and Gorobi, respectively; even though the Mumuye attach a second history of origin, migration and dispersal from Kang (a place between Garba Chede and Bali). The appropriate time the migrations took place is not clear, but archaeological evidence on the hilltops of Yoro-Gorobi mountains reveals that they must have been in these areas during the Iron Age period. In fact, the above standpoint has implications for historical and archaeological researches; with the collaboration of other sources such as oral 37 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies tradition, linguistics, ethnography, and archaeology. Subsequent researchers will no doubt help in shedding more light on the possible cradle of the Yandang and Mumuye peoples.

38 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

References

1. D. S. Massey, J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Konaouci, A. Pellegrino, and J.E. Taylor. Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 2. W. C. Moore. Yola Province, Mayo-Belwa District. Re- assessment Report. NO.253/17. 4:12:17. 3. P. M. Dong, A. K. Dime, M. Yazela, and K. Mavula. The Mumuye Contemporary History and . Jalingo: MAKAD Association, 2001. pp16&18. 4. P. M. Filibus, et.al. Yandang People and Culture: An Introduction. Yandang Community Development Association, Yola: Paraclette Publishers, 2001. 5. W. C. Moore. Yola Province, Mayo-Belwa District. Re- assessment Report. NO.253/17. 4:12:17. 6. P. H. S. Vereker. Zinna District Old Reports. Zinna Yakoko Reassessment, 1918. 7. E. Ravenstein. (1885) “The Laws of Migration,” in Abreu Alexandre José Germano de Migration and Development in Contemporary Guinea Bissau: A Politica Economy Approach. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London, 2012. p. 29 & 30. 8. A. Portes and J. Walton. Labor, Class, and the International System. New York: Academic Press, 1981. 9. M. Boyd. Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Development and New Agendas. International Migration Review, 23: 638670, 1989. 10. T. Faist. The Crucial Meso-Level. International Migration, Immobility andDevelopment.Oxford, Berg Publishers,1997. 11. M. Ambrosini and T. Nazio. Building a Comprehensive Framework a of African Migration Patterns: The Case of 39 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Migration Between and Europe. Universita Degli Studi Milano, Facolta Di Scienze Politiche, Graduate School in Social, Economic and Political Sciences Dipartimento Di Studi Socialie Politici, 2010. pp. 9& 10. 12. A. Adepoju. Linkages Between Internal and International Migration: The African Situation. International Social Science Journal, Vol. 50 Issue 157, 1998. 13. A. Adepoju. Migration and Development in Tropical Africa: Some Research Priorities. African Affairs, Vol. 76, 1977. 14. T. Falola. et.al. : Nigeria Before 1800 AD. Lagos: Longman Nigeria Plc, 1999. p.29. 15. L. K. Fuller. The CROSS and the gods: A Look at Adamawa and Taraba States, Nigeria. Jos: Capro Research Office, 1992. p.303. 16. W. Rodney. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Dares Salam, Tanzanian: Publishing House, 1972. 17. P. E. Lovejoy. and Bowser, Benjamin P. The Transatlantic Slave Trade and Slavery. Africa World Press Inc., 2012. 18. J. E. Inikori. Forced Migration: The Impact of the Export Slave Trade on Africa Societies London: Hutchinson Publishing Group Ltd., 1982. 19. T. N. Tamuno. Oil Wars in the Niger Delta 1849-2009. : Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd., 2011.p.18 20. T. N. Tamuno. Oil Wars in the Niger Delta 1849- 2009……p.19 21. J. F. A. Ajayi. “Africa at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century: Issues and Prospects,” in General VI: Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s. J. F. A. Ajayi (ed.), Heinemann, California UNESCO, 1989. p.3&4. 22. J. F. A. Ajayi. “Africa at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century….” p.4. 23. F. Alam. “Social Relations and Migration: A Study of 40 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Postwar Migration,” quoted in Amin, Samir (1974), Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, Vol 1, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. 24. L. K. Fuller. The CROSS and the gods: A Look at Adamawa and Taraba States. Nigeria. Jos: Capro Research Office, 1992. p. 303. 25. J. Vasina. Oral Tradition As History. United States of America: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.p.21&22. 26. P. M. Filibus, et.al. Yandang People and Culture: An Introduction…... p.11&12. 27. P. M. Filibus, et.al. Yandang People and Culture: An Introduction…….p.13. 28. R. B. Rose. An Archaeological Survey of Gorobi Abandoned Settlement, Mayo-Belwa Local Government Area, Adamawa State, Nigeria. An M.A Thesis Submitted to t h e P G School, Department of Archaeology, ABU-Zaria, 2012. pp. 18 & 19. 29. E. I. Akombo. Jukun-Tiv Relations Since 1850: A Case Study of Inter-Group Relations…. p.13 30. R. B. Rose. An Archaeological Survey of Gorobi Abandoned Settlement…..p.20 31. C. K. Meek. “Tribal Studies of Northern Nigeria” in Dong, P. M., Dime, A. K., Yazela, M., and Mavula K. The Mumuye Contemporary History and Culture. Jalingo: MAKAD Association, 2001. p.3. 32. P. M. Dong, A. K. Dime, M. Yazela, and K. Mavula. The Mumuye Contemporary History….p1. 33. P. M. Dong, A. K. Dime, M. Yazela, and K. Mavula. The Mumuye Contemporary History….p2. 34. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene. “Adamawa Past and Present” in Dong, P. M., Dime, A. K., Yazela, M., and Mavula K. The 41 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Mumuye Contemporary History and Culture. Jalingo: MAKAD Association, 2001. p.3. 35. L. Anderson and F. Watts. “Nigeria, Cameroon and the Central African Province” in Dong, P. M., Dime, A. K., Yazela, M., and Mavula K. The Mumuye Contemporary History and Culture. Jalingo: MAKAD Association, 2001. p. 3 & 4. 36. C. K. Meek. “Tribal Studies of Northern Nigeria” in Dong, P. M., Dime, A. K., Yazela, M., and Mavula K. The Mumuye Contemporary History and Culture. Jalingo: MAKAD Association, 2001. p. 37. L. K Fuller. The CROSS and the gods: A Look at Adamawa ….p304

42 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies Impacts of Farmer-Herders Conflict in Benue State, Nigeria: Focus on 2016 Agatu Episode and the imperatives of a new Management approach

Abah, Danladi Department of History & International Studies, Anyigba, Email: [email protected] & Tanko A. Adihikon Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State Email: [email protected]

Abstract This paper is a critical analysis of the recent upsurge of violent conflicts between Fulani pastoralists and farmers in Agatu Local Government Area of Benue State, North Central Nigeria. Across different parts of contemporary Nigeria, there have been incessant violent conflicts between native farmers and the herders over grazing land. The Agatu episode of February to March, 2016, was one of the most devastating conflicts which led to the deaths of about 500 people and displacement of over 7000. This paper argues that the February, 2016, episode was a reprisal attack by the Fulani against the native farmers. The Fulani pastoralists claimed that between 2013 and 2014, some herders and their cattle were attacked and killed in Agatu without any pragmatic effort by government security agencies to investigate or punish the perpetrators. This study links the causes of the conflict to the absence of early warning signals and failure of government institutions especially law enforcement agencies, sabotage, poverty of leadership, climate change, failure of civil society organizations, among others. Through a qualitative and exploratory approach, this paper recommends the establishment of ranches and effective legislations to curtail future violent occurrences in the entire central Nigeria. The paper adopts primary and secondary sources of data and the functionalist theory of conflict. Keywords: farmers, herdsmen, conflicts, conflicts, Agatu, Nigeria

43 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Introduction The rate of violent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in contemporary Nigeria has become alarming. This is more worrisome even as Nigeria grapples unsatisfactorily with the challenges orchestrated by Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, Oil Militants in the Niger Delta, separatist (IPOB) in the South East and militia cum secret cult related violence in the South West. These coteries of violent group confrontations, if not properly managed, are capable of damaging the fundamental basis of Nigeria's existence and retard national development. Agatu, an Idoma occupied Local Government Area of Benue State of Nigeria, which is reputed for its enormous agricultural potentials made headline news in major local and international media in February, 2016, for wrong reasons. Within few days, Agatu became a showdown of itself. Armed herdsmen had besieged the town, murdered many people, including children, women and the elderly, and created one of the worst humanitarian crises ever noticeable in the area. The herdsmen, through their representatives, blamed the natives (Agatu) for killing their members and rustling their cattle. One report credited to Jamiattu Allah Cattle Breeders Association claims that about 10,000 cattle belonging to the were rustled between 20013 and 2015. On the other hand, the native farmers argued that Fulani pastoralists destroyed their farmland, damaged their crops and contaminated their source of drinking water and raped women. Ultimately, the natives had severally asked the Fulani to “leave their land”. In the midst of this gory situation, the government suspiciously or genuinely remained incapacitated to arbitrate as an unbiased for the purpose of averting the seemingly irreconcilable hostilities between the farmers and herdsmen. The February, 2016, Agatu- Fulani herdsmen conflicts wrecked immense havoc to the people. Apart from the security implications, many families lost their loved ones and bread winners, property 44 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies worth millions of naira were destroyed, schools were shut down and socio-economic activities paralyzed. What is more, the humanitarian crisis arising from internal displacement of large number of people or communities heightened the incidence of hunger, malnutrition, disease and trauma, especially for women, children and the elderly. The central focus of this paper is to critically illuminate and interrogate the remote and immediate causes of the 2016 Fulani- Agatu conflict, examine its impact on the socio-economic and political development of Agatu and recommend feasible strategies for engendering sustainable mutual inter group relations germane for Nigeria's national peace and security. Schematically, this paper is divided into four parts, namely; the introduction which is ongoing, part two examines the socio-economic and geographical milieu of Agatu, section three provides theoretical framework and conceptual clarifications, section four examines the causes and impact of the conflicts and recommends way forward. Conflict The word conflict has multifaceted meanings. In a broader perspective, it means a clash or disagreement over certain goals or interest leading to violent reaction(s) between two or more opposing parties. Oyeshola posits that conflict emanates: When there is a sharp disagreement or clash, for instance, between divergent ideas, interest or people and nations. Conflict is universal yet distinct in every culture. It is common to all persons yet experienced uniquely by every individual. It is a visible sign of human energy and often the result of competitive striving for the same goals, rights, and resources (Oyeshola, 2007:15). The above statement shows that conflict is the product of struggle towards protecting or maintaining common goal or interest which –usually– lead to open confrontation with the aim of destructing, injuring or killing person or group of persons. 45 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Another outstanding scholar of conflict, Coser A. Lewis, defines conflict poignantly as: …a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. Such conflict may take place between individuals, between collectivities, or between individuals and collectivities…conflicts are perennial features of social life (Coser, 1956:6). Similarly, conflict, to Stagner, is a “situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which are perceived as being obtainable by one or another, but not both. Each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation and each perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal” (Stagner cited in A.M Adejoh, 2004). According to A.M Adejo (2004:4), conflict is an inevitable part of human existence and has been: A way of settling disputes, even if the means employed is destructive and injurious to either or both of the parties in conflict and by extension their neighbours alike. Consequently, conflict by nature is dynamic and so tends to be chaotic and incontrollable and often manifest in violence. Violence in this case is the application of injurious physical force to persons or property. Conflict is therefore a violent pursuit of incompatible goals by individuals, states, or ethnic groups capable of inflicting injuries, harm or death and, or destruction of live and property. Conflict in this paper is seen within the Coser Lewis perspective. It is the violent pursuit of goals between pastoralist Fulani and the natives of over arable grazing land. While the Fulani need the land for grazing, the farmer's sustenance depends on farm produce which 46 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies remains their major source of food and income. Functionalist Theory The functionalist doctrine holds that societies or social systems have needs that we can use to explain institutions and practices in terms of the functions they perform for the survival of the whole. Functionalist explanation is prevalent in all traditions in social science. The functionalist theory, according to Gboode Eric, was proposed by Auguste Comte and later developed by Talcott Parsons and Emile Durkheirn. The major assumption of the functionalist theory holds that the society is made up different interacting independent parts. Each of these parts or sub-units has a function in maintaining peace and progress and security of the society as a whole. The theory also states that the human society as a social system has a need for stability and a need to keep all its constituents parts working together. To Ian Mclean, functionalism theory views societies as been made up of component parts whose interactions contribute to the maintenance of whole, and focus on the problems of order specifying forces that bring cohesion, integration and equilibrium to society. The origins of modern functionalism can be traced to Comte. Comte maintains that all of the institutions beliefs, and morals of a society are interrelate as a whole and so the method of explaining the existence of any one item is to discover the laws which govern the coexistence of all phenomena. Functionalists, particularly Talcott Parson (1902- 1979), holds the view that there is a central value system in every society and stresses the importance of political socialization which teaches appropriate normative expeditions and regulates the potential conflicts which is inherent in situations of scarce resources. Functionalists view human societies as stratified. The assumption of the theory is that function is a consequence, which adds to the stability of the system. A dysfunction is a consequence, which takes away stability from the system of social stratification, thus, there are 47 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies certain institutions, among them include the family, the political system, economy, military which hold the peaceful functioning of the society In terms of weaknesses, a number of objections have been raised to functionalist explanation in social science. Most decisively, it has been argued that all functionalist accounts rely on teleological explanations. To explain an event teleological is to account for its occurrence on the grounds that it contributes to a goal or end-state and that the goal is sought or maintained by the system in which the event takes place. Explaining an event by showing that it has beneficial consequences for another is to treat an effect as a cause. To argue that the state exists to meet certain functions necessary for the maintenance of capitalism is to use a consequence to explain a cause. These both defile orthodox logic and is clearly a historical. In addition, functionalist accounts have been criticized for lacking adequate accounts of human actions. In spite of these shortcomings, the functionalist theory is still very useful in explaining conflicts and other social changes in the human society. These institutions, making in order, with harmony, will not only increase social cohesion but contain conflicts and wars. To the functionalists, the armed forces have critical roles to play in promoting security and peace by safeguarding the territorial integrity of nation-states from both internal and external strife. This theory can be linked to what Okoli describes as Eco- violence theory of conflict. Situating his analysis within the theoretical paradigm of Homa-Dixon, he avers that the theory holds that: Decreased in quality and quantity of resources, population growth, and resource access act singly or in various combinations to increase the scarcity, for certain population groups, of cropland, water, forests, and fish. This can reduce economic productivity, both for the local groups experiencing the scarcity and for the larger 48 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

regional and national economies. The affected people may migrate or be expelled to new lands. Migrating groups often trigger ethnic conflicts when they move to new areas, while decreases in wealth can cause deprivation conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1999:30 cited in Okolie A.C & Atelhe GA. 2014:83).

Implicit in the eco-violence theory is the assumption that struggles over scarce ecological space and resources engender livelihood crisis, which, in turn, drives violent conflicts (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014:79). This situation derives impetus from the dynamics of climate change which have accentuated ecological scarcities and struggles across the world. According to Okoli, The conflicts between the herders and crop growers on the transhumance corridors and routes of North-Central Nigeria typify ecological resource-conflict aggravated by the impacts of global climate change. What is at issue in the conflicts is livelihood struggles in a context of stiff ecological scarcity and competition. The desperation exhibited by the principal actors in the conflicts can only be properly conjectured by understanding the conflict situation as a struggle for collective subsistence in an ecological domain fraught with resource- scarcity and do-or-die contestation. In this context, it becomes expedient for the parties to apply counter-group tactics in an attempt to live through the ecological struggle. This apparently explains the level of violence that has characterized such conflicts situation in contemporary times.(Okolie A.C & Atehel G, 2014. Another theoretical paradigm that is relevant in explaining the dynamic of Fulani/farmers conflicts in the Middle Belt of Nigeria is the theory of “ecological existentialism. This theory looks at the 49 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies behavior of humans in a queer, hostile and indifferent environment, where he must devise means of taking charge of his destiny. The theory holds that the imperative of survival in an unfriendly ecology necessitates violent living (Okoli, 2014). This is more-so the case when there is a persistent threat to one's means of survival and subsistence. The import of this theory is that environmental cum ecological resources provides the life-wire of human existence and any threat to such means or source of livelihood instigates violent resistance. This survivalist worldview of the nomadic-Fulani is explicit in the following citations captured by Okolie (2014) Our herd is our life, because, to every , life is worthless without his cattle. What do you expect from us when our source of existence is threatened? The encroachment of grazing field and routes by farmers is a call to war…This is a hostile environment in which the Fulani man lives. You have to be hostile as your environment to survive. There must be a balance of terror for you to survive in the jungle. The Fulani herdsman is a man that believes the entire world is after him and what he has. He believes he has to arm himself to the teeth…“He (the Fulani man) has found himself in a situation whereby if he does not pay somebody to take care of his enemies, the enemy will kill him and take over his property The afore-stated citations are instructive of the militant worldview and posture of the Fulani in respect of their response to the ecological conflict with settled farmers in the study area. On the side of the farmers, the same level of militancy is being cultivated. As a Key Informant interviewed in the course of the research opined: “It's survival of the fittest for us”. This militant posture has been culminated in the emergence of the local militias such as Sojan Patari ( a Tiv militia) and the Ombatse (an Eggon militia) in Nasarawa State, 50 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies whose principal aim to protect the farmers against the onslaught of the Fulani militants (Okoli and Uhembe, 2014). Muffled Voices: Issues and Perspectives in the 2016 Herders Invasion of Agatu Agatu came under violent attacks of the armed herdsmen from the 20th 0f February, 2016. The mayhem lasted for about two weeks. The immediate cause of the conflict is difficult to precisely ascertain. However, what is clear is that it was the Fulani herdsmen who carried out a reprisal attack on the hapless villagers. The reason for their action is primarily linked to the 2013 killing of a prominent Fulani man, Ardo Madaki, in Agatu. It was claimed that the Agatu, in 2013, killed one Mallam Shehu Abdullahi and eight other Fulani pastoralists. Apart from this, the Fulani also claimed that the Agatu youths rustled their cattle, numbering over 200 and also sized some of their property. In April 20, 2013, Ardo Madaki was claimed to have been murdered by suspected Agatu and Tiv Militias. According to Saleh Bayeri, the Interim National Secretary of Gan Allah Fulani Associatio(GAFA), an umbrella body of Fulani Association in Nigeria,: the Killing of Ardo Madaki reverberated amongst every Fulani in West Africa, He was invited to the place of the district head of the area on the ground that a solution was being sought to the problem, however, the Agatu militia beheaded Ardo right in front of the district head...this action reverberated across all the people of West Africa and the clamour for revenge began to grow strong. He comes from a much respected clan and the Agatu sent the Fulani a chilling message with his murder...till date, no action was taken, even by the village police station on the murder (Emmanuel 2016b:1)

He further argues that: 51 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

the Agatu killed over 300 of their people...but because we do not have people in government or the media, no one said anything when genocide was been carried out against our people...we have no confidence in the National Assembly because of the overriding influence of the former Senate President, David Mark, who knew how the Fulani were being massacred and did nothing...the Sultan of was in Benue three times trying to find solutions to the problem, but David Mark n e v e r c a m e o n c e o r e v e n s e n t a representative(Emmanuel 2016b:3)

Boko Haram has also been implicated as having a strong influence in the violent conflict that claimed several lives and property in Agatu in 2016. Members of the Nigerian National Legislators held this view few days after the Agatu pogrom. In fact, the Senators specifically denied that it was Fulani herdsmen that perpetrated the dastardly acts. It notes that “Mass murder across Nigerian communities were committed by “overpowered” Boko Haram insurgents not Fulani herdsmen”. Senator (PDP-Taraba State) who spoke on behalf of the other senators argues that “there is presently a change of tactics by insurgents who parade themselves as herdsmen to make it difficult for the public to identify them”(Hassan 2016:7).

Another popular view expressed by the Agatu on the recent Fulani invasion holds that it was a calculated attempt by militias to eliminate the pasture rich Agatu. Many residents of Agatu hold that on that fateful day, the Fulani invaders came with a chartered helicopter jet to the village. The villagers, especially women and children, upon citing the Jet rushed to catch a glimpse of the helicopter. Unfortunately for them, they were welcome with sporadic bullets gushing from nuzzles of sophisticated guns and instant beheading and burning down of 52 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies houses and property.

Many people believed that the Fulani are on an expansionist mission to re-colonize the Benue Valley Region for religious, political and economic gains (Emmanuel 2016b:3). As a result of orchestrated by climate change and overgrazing, the Northern vegetation can no longer support the growth of disease free pasture. Thus, the North Central Region, and Agatu in particular, has become a prominent safe haven for the nomads. Impacts of the Herdsmen-Farmers Conflicts in Agatu Violent conflict anywhere it occurs usually leaves behind tales of sorrow, anger and anguish for the communities and residents. The 2016 Fulani invasion of Agatu left behind staggering proportions of negative impacts in the community. The conflict had negative impact on the social, economic, political and security structures of the people.

Destruction of lives and property Justina observes that, during violent conflicts, assets get lost or destroyed through heavy fighting and looting (Justina 2011:19). The very poor usually suffer the most. Destruction of lives and property remains one of the outstanding impacts of the Agatu conflict. Within few days, several individuals were killed by the Fulani militias. Charred bodies of the locals who were shot littered the streets of Aila and Ataganyi communities. It was reported that over 500 were killed by the herdsmen. Some of those killed were mostly the elderly, women and children (Emmanuel 2016a:6, Emmanuel 2016b:2, Hassan 2016:8,)). The psychological effect of these to the families that lost loved ones and family breadwinners can better be imagined that examined A recent media report indicates that over 3200 houses were razed down by the herdsmen and 15,000 people displaced in the Agatu 53 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies conflict (Uja, 2016:2). Households properties like chairs, television, cooking utensils (pots, plates, spoons, mortars and pestles) which are critical for household survival were lost by most families in the conflict. Many displaced persons claim that they may never be able to re-acquire the properties that were lost during the conflict. The destruction of assets in Agatu by the herdsmen in addition to creating vacuum in families has engineered instability in the economic, social and political mien of the people. This will impact significantly on the ability of the affected households to recover their economic and social positions in post conflict settings. Forced displacement Armed conflicts in recent Nigeria communities are typically accompanied by large population movements. Civilians are often targets of attacks. This unsavory scenario always leads to population flights from areas of intense fighting to a more peaceful zone. The same consequence applied to the Agatu community following herdsmen attack on the community. The Agatu conflict of 2016 led to a major humanitarian crisis in Benue State. The violent attack led to the displacement of over 15,000 people with untold consequences for the elderly, women and children (Uja 2016). Some believe that due to the unstructured nature of displacement, many people who were displaced were not registered or domiciled at the Internally Displaced Persons Camps (IDPs) as many who had family relations in neighboring towns were accommodated (Emmanuel 2016a:4). At the various IDP camps, displaced persons faced further daunting challenges which worsened their situation. These ranged from hunger arising from shortage of food aid from both federal and state emergency management agencies (Uja 2016). There were also cases of water scarcity, human rights abuse, and poor sanitary and medical facilities. The poor conditions of the camps and inadequate facilities made life difficult for nursing mothers, pregnant women and 54 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies children. The conflict led to forceful displacement of Igbo migrant traders and farmers in Agatu. It should be noted that Agatu being an agrarian community had a large concentration of migrant Igbo farmers and traders who made immense contribution to the economy of Agatu. For instance, the migrant traders used to pay tax to state and local government. However, this has changed as majority of these migrant traders and farmers have migrated out of Agatu to other peaceful areas. Some have even relocated out of the state. This has negative implications on food security and development of Agatu.(Omada 2016). Security Consequences The security impacts of herder-farmers conflicts in Nigeria have been stressed by both security agencies and policy makers in Nigeria. The Agatu episode showed clearly how this strand of conflict threatens internal security. The fear and trauma of attacks created a high sense of insecurity in Agatu. People could not move freely and socio- economic sources of livelihood were destroyed (Emmanuel 2016b:6). Economic Consequences Economic impacts of the conflict were enormous. Agatu is an agrarian community with over 90 per cent of the people been farmers. However, the violent attacks led to the suspension of farming activities. The attack occurred at a time the farmers were making post-harvest arrangements and pre-planting preparations such as clearing of land. Farmlands were destroyed while yam seedlings stored in barns were burned. It is difficult to quantity in financial and statistical terms the agro-allied effects of the attack but analysts believe that crops worth over 3 billion naira were lost. Adejoh Omada claims that he stored yam worth three hundred thousand which were destroyed, besides losing raw cash (Omada: 2016). Many traders had their stores/shops burnt. The number of houses 55 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies vandalized and burned were too numerous to document. Reports show that over 3,000 houses were razed down (Maya, 2016a, 2016b, Abonu 2016). These houses ranged from detachable bungalows to mud and thatch houses containing furniture and basic household facilities such as television sets, radio, among other electrical and electronic gadgets. Enormous loss was also incurred in the livestock industry in Agatu. Animals such as goats were killed by the herdsmen. It should be noted that investing in livestock was a lucrative investment in Agatu(Maya 2016b). Instead of saving money in banks or investing stock, rural Agatu dwellers, due to ignorance, would simply buy goats to rear. Many domestic animals were slaughtered by the marauding herdsmen(Abonu 2016). Education impact: The conflict affected education negatively within and outside Agatu. In Agatu, educational activities in primary and secondary schools were suspended abruptly (Maya 2016a, Maya 2016b). Pupils and students who were preparing for the common entrance and senior schools examinations had to forfeit their classes due to the menacing and rampaging activities of the armed herdsmen. Besides, schools in neighbouring Ugbokolo were turned into IDP camps. There were reports of damages of school chairs by the IDPs in these areas(Maya 2016a). Curbing Farmers-Herdsmen Conflicts in Agatu and Nigeria: Some Recommendations Push and pull factors have been used by scholars to describe the basis of herdsmen migration in contemporary Nigeria. The push factors primarily refer to those issues that prompt or trigger the upsurge in migration of the Fulani from the North (source) to the Central Nigeria (destination). These include climate change, desertification and insecurity. Therefore, a sustainable panacea to minimizing the massive forceful migration of herdsmen into Agatu and other Benue communities will be for the Federal Government of Nigeria to tackle 56 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies drastically the problems of desertification and insecurity in Northern Nigeria. Achieving this will involve providing legislative and institutional mechanisms that will engage in forestation and regeneration of the North. It is reported that the desert is fast spreading towards the region. States and Local Government Councils in traditional herdsmen dominated states must pursue and promote land regeneration programmes that will make pastures readily available for the herdsmen all year round. It is not arguable that activities of Boko Haram insurgents coupled with cattle rustlers are major driving factors pushing the herdsmen out of the North into Agatu. The Federal government of Nigeria must intensify efforts in the ongoing counter insurgency programmes. Security agencies must engage and partner with Local Civil Society Organizations and traditional institutions, especially in information gathering and sharing to identify those engaged in cattle rustling. The establishment of ranches is another strategic panacea to incessant violent herdsmen-farmers conflicts in Agatu and Nigeria in general. This paper is against the move by government to establishing grazing reserves. In fact, setting up cattle ranches is the most sustainable solution to the incessant migrations of herdsmen for several reasons. First, Ranches will help ensure that the frequent energy and resource-sapping movements of herdsmen and their cattle is curtailed. This will promote the health of both the Fulani herders and their cattle and will lead to better production of dairy products. Second, establishment of ranches will reduce the often violent confrontations between the herders and farming communities as they will be confined to the ranches. On the other hand, grazing reserves will lead to land crisis, especially in agrarian communities where greater emphasis is placed on land. Another feasible strategy to overcome the proliferation of violent conflicts between the farmers and Fulani herders in the Middle Belt Region is through effective legislation. The current situation in which 57 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies the Fulani herder's movements are unregulated by law or monitored by security operatives is disastrous. The question of policing the herdsmen has remained a neglected issue in Nigeria Police architecture. Whereas security personnel are provided for banks, oil workers, schools and in markets and forest Police (guards) to guard against illegal lumbering, none is made available for millions of herdsmen in the remote areas even when they contribute greatly to Nigeria food security and economic development in general. Perhaps, this scenario explains why they (herders) have resorted to self-help. Thus, if the bearing of deadly arms and ammunitions such as cutlasses and guns by Fulani is to be curtailed, the government must rethink its security architecture in order to integrate the herders. Furthermore, creation of new police stations in many rural areas is equally important to ensure that rural farmers are protected. In other words, government must intensify efforts to balance the interest of both the farmers and the herders through fair and equitable protection from attacks. Efforts should be made by the Federal, State and Local governments towards documenting the identity and data of herdsmen and their owners in various parts of Benue state and Nigeria in general. This will help security agencies to determine the location and movement and identity of herdsmen in every location. Also, having the data about the herders will help in the collection of internally generated revenue which boast the revenue base of states and Local government councils, especially now that the price of crude oil has fallen. Also, the state and Local governments must intensify its revenue drive by reintroducing cattle tax which was in existence during the colonial epoch. The essence of this tax is to ensure that the identity and location of the herders are properly monitored in cases of violence. Civil Society Organizations have enormous roles to play in mitigating the occurrence of herdsmen-farmers conflicts in Benue state and Nigeria in general. Through pro-active peace building 58 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies initiatives, peace education and dialogue, conflict mapping and mitigations through early warning signals, Civil Society Organizations need to rejig their approach and strategies in Benue state. From the Agatu episode, it is crystal clear that very little and insignificant efforts were made by CSOs prior to the outbreak of the conflict

Conclusion The rising cases of herdsmen-farmers conflicts in contemporary Benue state and Nigeria in general portends enormous dangers for the entire socio-economic and political development of Nigeria. From the Agatu violent episode which claimed several lives and properties, this paper avers that there is the urgent need for government to set up a high powered judicial panel of inquiry to investigate the remote and immediate causes of the attacks and recommend sustainable peace building measures.

There is the need for early warning signals and conflict threats assessments in other agrarian communities in other parts of Nigeria. This is necessary to avert a repeat of the Agatu episode. Law enforcement agencies, National Human Rights Commission and other human rights and civil society organizations must intensify efforts to bring perpetrators of conflict to book. It is unfortunate that since the Agatu episode, no body or group of individuals or organization have been prosecuted or indicted for this dastardly act. There is also the need for the decentralization of the Police Force. The creation of State Police Force is necessary to help stem the tide of conflicts, especially farmer-herders conflict in contemporary Nigeria. In addition, relevant government agencies and institutions in partnership with international donors should carry out post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation analysis in Agatu and other communities that were attacked. The essence of this is to help 59 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies empower those whose means of livelihood were destroyed and cultivate a culture of peaceful coexistence.

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References

Abbas, I. M. (2000). “No Retreat, No surrender: Conflict for survival between Fulani pastoralists and farmers in Northern Nigeria”. European Scientific Journal 8(1), pp. 331-346. Adekunle, A.O. and Adisa, S.R (2010). An empirical phenomenological psychological study of famer-herdsman conflicts in Northern Nigeria. Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 2 (1), pp. 1-27. Adejoh A.M(2004). “History, Conflict Resolution and National Unity in Nigeria” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Special Edition, vol.No.1, Adam Abonu (2016), Agatu Massacre, Thisday Newspaper, Feb, 27 Coser, L.A. The Functions of Social Conflicts, Glencoe:The Free Press Emmanuel Maya, (2016a), Agatu Killings: Och'Idoma expels suffering refugees from domain, Premium Times, March 9. Emmanuel Maya (2016b), Inside Agatu Killing Field: blood on the streets, Charred bodies everywhere, Premium Times Special Report, March 18 Emmanuel Maya, Sani Tukur & Hassan Adebaya (2016) Why we Struck Agatu-Fulani herdsmen, Premium Times, March 19 Folami, M.O, Climate Change and Inter-Ethnic Conflcit between Fulani Herdsmen and Host Communities in Nigeria, Being a Paper Presented at Conference on Climate Change and Security Organized by the Norwegian Academic of Sciences and Letters on the Occasion of 250 years Anniversary in Trondiem, Norway 2010 Gyuse, T.T. and Ajene, O. (2006),Conflicts in the Benue Valley. Makurdi: Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Benue State University, Makurdi. Gbehe NT (2007). Geo-political perspectives on resource control in the middle belt regions of Nigeria: Periscoping agriculture in 61 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Benue economy. In Okpeh OO (Jr.), Okau A and Fwatshak SU (Eds)The Middle – Belt in the Shadow of Nigeria.. Makurdi, Oracle Bus. Ltd, pp. 132 – 157. Hassan Adebayo (2016) Agatu Killins: Senate blames Boko Haram, Not Fulani herdsmen, Premium Times Newspapers, March 9 Mordakai, S.D. (2015) Desertification and Conflict in Central Nigeria Area, POLAC Historical Review,Vol.No.1. pp35-46 Okeke, O.E. (2014). Conflicts between Fulani herders and farmers in Central and Southern Nigeria: Discourse on proposed establishment of grazing reserves. An International Journal of Arts and Humanities, 3(1), pp. 66 – 84. Okolie A.C. & Atelhe G.A, “Nomads against Natives: A Political Ecology of Herder/Farmer Conflicts in Nasarawa State, Nigeria” American Journal of Contemporary Research, Vol.4No.2, 2014, PP62-82 Okpeh O.O. Jr.,(2006) Inter-group Migrations, Conflicts and Displacement in Nigeria: A Historical Appraisal of the Central Nigerian Experience, Paper presented at the Africa international conference on the theme “ Movements, Migrations and Displacement in Africa” organized by the Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, USA, March 24th -26th Reference Uja Emmanuelson,(2016) Agatu Killings: Food Crisis Imminent, Nations Newspaper, March 14,

62 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies Israel/Palestine Conflict: The Futility of Israel Concept of Conflict Management and Peace Resolution Management and Peace Resolution

Umar, Garpiya Department of Political science Federal College of Education, Zaria, Kaduna State, Nigeria [email protected] 07036287777

Abstract This study is centered on Israeli concept of peace and it usability in managing Israel/Palestine conflict. In the conflict, Israel has been fighting for security and to maintain her statehood in the Middle East while Palestinians are fighting for rights and statehood. Both are laying claim to the land and Jerusalem as headquarters. Different peace models on how to achieve peace in the region were advanced prominent among which include a two state solution where an Israeli sovereign state and a Palestinian sovereign state exist side by side, or the suggestion of a one state secular solution where power is shared by Israelis and Palestinians. Using secondary sources of data, the findings show that the Israeli concept of peace is hinged on the following parameters: holding unto their statehood with Jerusalem as capital, demilitarization of a future Palestinian state, along with additional security guarantees, including defensible borders for Israel and securing all Israeli lands and possible expansion. They believe that the use of military force is also essential in protecting the state and citizens from any threat. With this position, it is obvious that managing the conflict with this model which is not favourable to the Palestinians will be a difficult task. The paper thus recommends that the Israeli expansionist theory using military force should be condemned and ordered to be stoped and negotiation be embraced no matter how long it takes to achieve peace. Keywords: Israel/Palestine, Peace, Conflict, Management

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Introduction The conflict between Palestinian and Zionist (now Israeli) Jews is a modern phenomenon, dating to the end of the nineteenth century. Although the two groups have different religions (Palestinians include , Christians and Druze), religious differences are not the major cause of the strife. The conflict began as a struggle over land. Talking about Israeli concept of peace, there are a multitude of opinions and views of the concept that elicited at various points during Israel's history and by a variety of people. A popular understanding of the origins of the conflict from the Israeli point of view is that it began following the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel's occupation of the territories and consequently the process of peace negotiations after the war (Pappe, 2004). However, there are other understandings of the conflict and therefore the solution for peace, as even opined by some Israeli academics' and peace activists, requires the understanding that a much longer history of the region has to be brought into consideration thereby involved, differing from the popular narrative often recited (Slater, 2001,). Suggestions for how to achieve peace in the region include a two state solution where an Israeli sovereign state and a Palestinian sovereign state exist side by side, or the suggestion of a one state secular solution where power is shared by Israelis and Palestinians. However, while hardliners believe that Israel should maintain sovereignty over the land it currently occupies and give no concessions to Palestinians, others believe keeping up the military campaign, occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and separation from Palestinians is the only current way forward. There is also a note of despair and uncertainty expressed by others as to how to proceed particularly following the failure of peace summits in the 1990s and early 21st century and the second Intifada, as Kaufman et al. (2006) have stated; "there is a growing consensus that 64 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies the current political leadership are not able to build a stable peace and resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people". As Cowen (2004) says, "almost everyone wants peace (but) on his or her terms" and this is the crux of the problem. This article therefore examines Israeli concept of the peace and how it could be used in managing the Israel/Palestine conflict.

Israeli Concept of Peace Peace is a concept that is central to Judaism. Along with truth and justice, it is one of the three key Jewish values. Peace, according to the Jewish sages, is the ultimate purpose of the whole Torah: "All that is written in the Torah was written for the sake of peace” and so, one most hold unto it no matter the sacrifices and consequences. To them, peace means holding unto their inheritance that is under constant threats. Inheritance in this case refers to the right of ownership over the holy land of Israel (Jerusalem) and all the surrounding lands of the Jewish people. Taking this from them is a call to war that they are ever ready to fight. Claiming ownership to the same land are the Palestinians who also have argument to justify their ownership. The competing claims to the territory are not reconcilable if one group exercises exclusive political control over all of it. Jewish claims to this land are based on the biblical promise to Abraham and his descendants, on the fact that the land was the historical site of the ancient Jewish kingdoms of Israel and Judea, and on Jews' need for a haven from European anti-Semitism. Palestinian Arab claims to the land are based on their continuous residence in the country for hundreds of years and the fact that they represented the demographic majority until 1948. They reject the notion that a biblical-era kingdom constitutes the basis for a valid modern claim. If Arabs engage the biblical argument at all, they maintain that since Abraham's son Ishmael is the forefather of the Arabs, then God's promise of the land to the children of Abraham includes Arabs as 65 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies well. They do not believe that they should forfeit their land to compensate the Jews for Europe's crimes against Jews. The inability to resolve the above competing claims has led to several crises and the household term we now have as Israel/Palestine conflicts. At different levels, world leaders and the parties involved initiate peace processes to find a lasting solution to the conflicts. The peace process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict refers to intermittent discussions held during the ongoing violence which has prevailed since the beginning of the conflict (Eran, 2002). Since the 1970s, there has been a parallel effort made to find terms upon which peace can be agreed to in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Israel is characterized by a multitude of opinions and views of the peace that vary across time as well as across society. There are right- wing opinions (both secular and religious) which believe Israel should not concede to Palestinian demands and instead should maintain the original Zionist vision of Israel (Jones, 1997). There are those that hold left-wing viewpoints that believe Palestinians should have a sovereign state and Israel needs to go further in compromising to create peace; and there is a spread of people in between with varied views (Ben-Ami, 2005). For example, Israeli elites wanted peace in the 1990s so as to build Israel's economy and integrate into the global economy that was opening up in the post–Cold War period (Ben- Ami, 2005). The slowing down and deterioration of peace relations with Palestinians under Netanyahu's leadership frustrated many Israelis who view peace as a path to stability (Yakan, 1997). Public opinions change, as Slater says, the notion of a withdrawal from the territories and Palestinians gaining their own state was unthinkable in most circles prior to the 1990s. However, a decade later, it was an accepted central theme of the peace process for many (Slater, 2001).The violence of the second intifada however has altered this opinion to a popular belief that this may no longer be a viable solution as military 66 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies responses rather than negotiation have taken precedence (Pappe, 2004). The official position of the State of Israel is that peace ought to be negotiated on the basis of giving up some control of the occupied territories in return for a stop to the conflict and violence (Facts about Israel, 2012). Israel's position is that Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, be the negotiating partner in the peace talks, and not Hamas, which has, at times, engaged with Israel in escalations of the conflict and attacks Israel's civilian population. The Oslo Accords and the Camp David 2000 Summit negotiations revealed the possibility of a two state system being accepted by Israeli leadership as a possible peace solution. The "two-state solution" would create an independent Israel and Palestine, and is the mainstream approach to resolving the conflict. The idea is that Israelis and Palestinians want to run their countries differently; Israelis want a Jewish state, and Palestinians want a Palestinian one. Because neither side can get what it wants in a joined state, the only possible solution that satisfies everyone involves separating Palestinians and Israelis (Retrieved from www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine on 18th May, 2017). The "one-state solution", on the other hand, would merge Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip into one big country. It comes in two versions. One, favored by some leftists and Palestinians, would create a single democratic country. Arab Muslims would outnumber Jews, thus ending Israel as a Jewish state. The other version, favored by some rightists and Israelis, would involve Israel annexing the West Bank and either forcing out Palestinians or denying them the right to vote. Virtually the entire world, including most Zionists, reject this option as an unacceptable human rights violation (Retrieved from www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine on 18th May, 2017). However, the violence of the second intifada and the political success of Hamas (a group dedicated to Israel's destruction) have convinced 67 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies many Israelis that peace and negotiation are not possible and a two state system is not the answer (Slater, 2001). Hardliners believe that Israel should annex all Palestinian territory, or at least all minus the Gaza Strip. Israelis view the peace process as hindered and near impossible due to terrorism on the part of Palestinians and do not trust Palestinian leadership to maintain control. In fact, Pedahzur (2005) goes as far as to say that suicide terrorism succeeded where peace negotiations failed in encouraging withdrawal by Israelis from cities in the West Bank. A common theme throughout the peace process has been a feeling that the Palestinians give too little in their peace offers. Nevertheless, there is a range of ulterior motives for Israel's denial of Palestinian statehood. If Palestine were declared a state, then immediately, Israel, by its present occupation of the West Bank, will be in breach of the United Nations Charter. Palestine, as a state, could legitimately call upon the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter to remove Israel from the occupied territories. Palestine, as a state, would be able to accede to international conventions and bring legal action against Israel on various matters. Palestine could accede to various international human rights instruments, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It could even join the International Criminal Court and file cases against Israel for war crimes. It would be a tinderbox of a situation that is highly likely to precipitate conflict in the Middle East. Summarily, the Israeli concept of peace is that of the possibility of two state solution and military force. Management of the Israel/Palestine Conflict using Israel Model The Israeli Model of two states solution and the future peace agreement will entail Israel giving up sacred or vital national assets such as water resources, farmland, East Jerusalem and other parts of the Jewish homeland. Large segments of Israeli society believe that occupying all parts of the Holy Land is a value that justifies any cost and sacrifice. The settlers demonstrate 68 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies ideals of determination, dedication and commitment that constitute a Zionist fulfillment model for many others. In June 2009, reacting to President Obama Barack's Cairo Address, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, declared for the first time conditional support for a future Palestinian state but insisted that the Palestinians would need to make reciprocal gestures and accept the following principles (Dan and Dawoud, 2015): i. Recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people; ii. Demilitarization of a future Palestinian state, along with additional security guarantees, including defensible borders for Israel; iii. Palestinian would also have to accept that Jerusalem would remain the united capital of Israel, and renounce their claim to a right of return. iv. That Israeli settlement will retain a right to growth and expansion in the West Bank. The above principles as part of the Israeli peace model in managing the Israeli/Palestine conflicts is said to be one-sided and cannot be used to manage the conflict effectively and guarantee lasting peace; hence its rejection by the Palestinians. The model is deficient because the Israelis are not willing to let go of what they are holding unto and claim of Jerusalem as their headquarters and so also the Palestinians are not ready to let go. Most polling suggests that both Israelis and Palestinians prefer a two- state solution. However, the inability of Israelis and Palestinians to come to two-state terms has led to a recent surge in interest in a one- state solution, partly out of a sense of hopelessness and partly out of fear that if the sides cannot negotiate a two-state solution, a de facto one-state outcome will be inevitable. However the dimension, if the Israeli peace model can be relevant in managing the conflicts, they must redesign the perspectives on several issues including: The question of the permanent borders for the State of Israel 69 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

(including the issue of the settlements): The first issue on which the struggle centered was the territorial division of the land between the two nations. Groups opposed to the process on both sides (Palestinian resistance movements on the one hand and Jewish objectors to the Oslo process on the other) reacted angrily because of the same principle: relinquishing control over part of the land means relinquishing the historical-religious right of the national movement to control over its historic homeland (be it Israel or Palestine) (Meital, 2004: 64-74; Naor, 1999: 11-17). So long as Israelis are holding unto this position, peace in the region is still far from reality. The status of Jerusalem: “there are no differences of opinion in this home regarding Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel. A whole and united Jerusalem is not a matter for negotiation; it was and will always be the capital of the nation of Israel under Israeli sovereignty” (Knesset Record, 21-23 September 1993). With both parties holding unto Jerusalem as capital and none is willing to shift ground or compromise, despite the effort of the world powers, the idea of peace is really a hard nut. The issue of the Palestinian refugees from 1948: The problem of the Palestinian refugees from 1948 presents at least as significant a barrier to the resolution of the conflict, and many see it as the core of the conflict. This issue, perhaps more than any other, symbolizes the claims of two peoples to national self-determination and to recognition of their legitimate right to sovereign existence on their land. Alongside this symmetric significance, the refugee problem carries with it distinct historical and political meanings for each party to the conflict (Shiri, 2010).In the Palestinian view, the traumatic events after which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians lost their homes, their property, and their traditional social framework are seen as a historical injustice, which has driven their collective struggle for the past 60 years. The phrase “right of return” embodies, first and foremost, the demand for justice at the personal level – the right of 70 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies every refugee to return to his original home. Only after that does the phrase refer to the demand for historical justice at the collective level by remedying the injustice that led to the uprooting of Palestinian society as a collective. For the Palestinians, any compromise on the right of return means rendering decades of struggle meaningless (Friedman, 2004; Peled&Rouhana, 2004). In contrast, if Israel is required to acknowledge its responsibility in creating the Palestinian refugee problem and their right of return, not only would this threaten the historical narrative on which the collective Israeli identity is based, but it would also subject it to a real existential threat: the fear of Israel being flooded by millions of Palestinians who would undermine its character as a Jewish state and threaten its very existence (Friedman, 2004; Zakay, Klar&Sharvit, 2002: 62). It follows that the three core issues of the conflict are perceived as protected values by the two opposing sides. Both parties express fierce opposition to any compromise and even to placing the issues on the negotiating table. Implications of Israel-Palestinian Conflict to International Security The ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has killed and wounded many people. It has done even graver damage to the humane principles at the heart of both Judaism and Islam. Among Jews and Muslims in Israel and Palestine, the golden rule has been largely forgotten (be your brother's keeper). The frustration and injustice of the treatment of Palestinians has angered many citizens in the Arab world against US/Israeli policies. Palestinian frustration has spilled into extremism in some cases as well. Many militant groups from Palestine and other areas of the Middle East have therefore sprung up in recent years as well as past decades, performing acts of what the West and Israel describe as terrorism and what the groups themselves justify as freedom fighting (though achieving freedom through terrorist actions could arguably still be called terrorist 71 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies organizations, despite claimed motives). Suicide bombings, and past acts of terrorism have terrorized Israeli civilians, making peace harder and harder to imagine, yet it has been easy to influence and recruit the young, impressionable and angry into extremist causes. As violence continues, it seems that it will remain easy to find recruits to violent causes (Anuh 2006). In fact, Deborah (2012) asserts that the emergent forms of such conflicts between Israel and Palestinian have involved intensive violent activities that include terrorist acts such as suicide bombers, assassinations, and whole scale attacks.

The following are the summary of the implications of Israel- Palestinian conflict to international security. 1. Proliferation of Armaments – The involvement of the USA in the Middle East Conflict is becoming deeper every day. In 1947, President Harry Truman extended unqualified political support at the UN, but no military assistance for the creation of Israel. President Eisenhower (34th President 1953-1961) was a notable exception to the policy of neutrality and vigorously insisted on Israel withdrawal from the territories she wrongly seized in 1956 during the Suez aggression. In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson gave Israel considerable economic help and a limited amount of arms, and again during the war of 6th October 1973, President Richard Nixon supplied massive armaments to Israel on an unprecedented scale. The arming of Israel proceeded under the regime of his successor and some talks and actions of presidents after him. The parties to the conflict enjoy the support of powerful friends and can as a result count on the supply of modern and destructive weapons of warfare. While the Arab States have been able, though sometimes with difficulty, to obtain arms mostly of a defensive nature from the Soviet Union, Israel, through the influence of her powerful hobby in the USA has received massive supply of arms even at the 72 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies risk of depleting inventories of the USA, army as it happened in the 6th October 1973 war. Consequently, Israel has today become a vast arsenal and has developed a war machine which threatens not only neighboring Arab States but the peace of the world. In 1974 also, Israel pronounced that she had the potential to produce Atomic weapons. This pronunciation is grave as the message is not to the Palestinians alone but the all notions a manifestation of threat to international security (Mallison Jrn 1984). 2. Spread of terrorism – The Israel-Palestinian conflict with the tension and rivalry it has created between the two parties involved has given rise to Terrorism mostly on the side of the Palestinians who believe that the aim of any grouping is solely to destroy the Jewish Israelis. As such, the evolution of Hamas and its chains of attacks encourage the growth and rise of other terrorist groups as they perceived that their collective victory could strengthen their political dynamics and their domestic position, ease their international isolation and increase the regional influence of their backers in Damascus and Tehran. This is very detrimental to international peace and security, as these terrorist groups tend to emulate or adapt the strategies of each other, for instance, the Hamas attack in Gaza which inflicted many casualties and the tactics to withstand the authority's onslaught was an emulation of Hizballah's 2006 tactics (Micheal 2009). 3. Cooperations, Agreements and Globalization – Agreements and the existence of cooperation and the current globalization has made a situation where trouble in one region or state turns out to be trouble extended to other regions or states and peace to another turns out to be peace or peace process to others. Israeli- Palestinian conflict has not just affected security in the Middle East alone but internationally (Mallison 1984). As a result of conflict between Israel and Palestine, the rate of cooperation and agreement within the international system is weakened. This is because some 73 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies states are sympathetic to Israel like USA, Britain and EU, while Palestine receives support from other Arab countries alongside Russia, especially through military and technical aids. These happenings have divided the world into two; one side supporting Israel and the other Palestine. 4. International Law and Order –There has been a constant violation of UN resolutions and agreements by both parties which has affected the peace process and international security, and has therefore invoked a sanction at every point from the UN. The aim is to bring about conformity to the principle of justice to avoid reoccurrence or same actions by other entities based on the principle of equal rights, self-determination, to encourage friendly relations among states and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion: all aimed at attaining and maintaining international security (Policy watch, 1448, 2009). These violations by both Israel and Palestine without necessary sanctions or the enforcement of the sanctions has rendered the potency of the United Nations non effective. This, through the contagious theory, may encourage other states and non-state actors within the system to take cue and go scot- free. 5. Involvement and support of other actors – The Arab-Israel Conflict has far reaching ramifications that extend beyond the parties directly involved. The relative strength of the parties should not be measured by their number/population, reason being that both parties are backed by other states and by extraneous forces. The Palestinian (Arab State) whose territory was seized by Israel in 1967 are backed by the Arab world whose ownership of 2/3 of the world's oil reserve gives it a tremendous economic and strategic power, especially with the rise in crude oil price from 1973 to date. On the other hand, Israel is backed by the USA on whose political, financial and military support she can count upon and by a large segment of world Jewry 74 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies which, despite its small number, controls most of the finance and news media in several western countries. As a result, the two (2) superpowers (USA-Russia) have either directly or indirectly been involved in this conflict. Their involvement could either strengthen or weaken the relation among states allies or promote rivalry among states as such international insecurity (Massad2000). 6. Isreal-Palestinian Conflict as a mechanism to show power and economic capabilities As mentioned above, the two (2) superpowers (USA and Russia) are either directly or indirectly involved for various individual reasons or interest. Since the 1947 and 1953 incidents when both powers maintained the same side of the fence as cited above, the USA and Russia have not been in agreement in their aims and policies in respect to the conflict and in the manner of the resolutions, which is a threat to international security. Since 1956, one can even notice that a certain polarization had taken place between the parties to the conflict. These parties include USA extending its support to Israel on one hand and Russian and the entire Arab World extending their support to the Palestine on another hand (Massad 2000). Each side tries to show its support to its dependent ally and to prove a point or send a signal/message to the other superpower and its dependant which is no good to international security (USA political, financial and military capabilities as oppose to Russia's economic strength of 2.3 crude oil reserves under its soil).

Conclusion The aim of this paper is to underscore the Israeli concept of peace and how it can be used to manage the long lasting Israel/Palestine conflict. The major determining factor of the conflict has been centered on land ownership and who has absolute control of it. Both Israel and Palestine have substantial argument to ascertain and establish their claims. Their seemingly irreconcilable disagreement has generated into conflicts which has been a re-occurring decimal. 75 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

The two states solution has been one of the greatest Israelis road map to peace even though some portion still shares the model of one state solution. The use of military force has also come to stay as a means to attain peace. But with the Israel's expansionist agenda to claim more Palestinian lands and extend their borders, stand on Jerusalem as their capital and denial of the Palestinian refugee the right to return, the management of this conflict will be less effective; no matter the constant threat in the region and its implications to global peace.

Recommendations i. The Israeli expansionist theory using military force should be condemned and ordered to be stoped and negotiation be embraced no matter how long it takes. ii. Two states solution is the most viable peace model to end the conflicts and the two parties should be willing and be made to compromise their stands and positions on some core values. iii. The international system or United Nations should let go of division and speak with one voice to enforce peace considering the huge implication of this conflict to international security. iv. If security is freedom from threats, then both sides to regulate their instruments of threat and to guarantee security. All radical groups that emerged as a result of the conflict should be de-radicalized and disbanded as their existence and constant threat negate the survival of peace.

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References

Anuh S. “Palestine and Israel Introduction, Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Issues (2006). Ben-Ami, S., Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: the Israeli–Arab Tragedy, London, Weidenfeld& Nicolson (2005) Cowen, T., A road map to Middle Eastern peace – a Public Choice perspective, Public Choice, volume 118, pp 1–10, page 2 (2004). Dan C. S. &Dawoud E. The Palestine–Israeli Conflict: A Beginner's Guide, Oneworld Publications (2015) David P. "The threat of a one-state solution," Al Jazeera (26 January 2011). Retrieved 17-12-2013. Deborah S. K. Decision making under threat: Israeli and Palestinian public opinion. Political Science Dissertations. Paper.http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20002703 Northeastern University (2012). Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking."The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East.Ed. AvrahamSela. New York: Continuum, 2002, p. 121. Facts About Israel. Jerusalem: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010. p. 52. Friedman, A. “Unraveling the Right of Return”. Refuge, 21(2), 62- 69. (2004) Jones, C., "Ideo-Theology: Discourse and Dissonance in the State if Israel", in Karsh, E. (ed), From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel's Troubled Agenda, London, Frank Cass and Co Ltd (1997). Kaufman, E., Salem, W. &Verhoeven, J., (2006). Introduction, in Kaufman, E., Salem, W. &Verhoeven, J. (eds), Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, page 3 Massad, J. The “post-colonial” colony: time, space and bodies in Palestine/Israel', in FawziaAfzal-Khan and KalpanaSeshadri- 77 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Crooks, eds. The Preoccupation of P o s t c o l o n i a l S t u d i e s . Durham, NC: Duke University Press (2000). Naor, A. “Greater Israel: Belief and Policy”. Haifa and Lod: Haifa University Publishing and ZmoraBitan Publishing (Hebrew) (2001). Pappe, I., A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2004). Pedahzur, A., Suicide Terrorism, Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 65. 2005. Peled Y. & Rouhana, N. “Transitional Justice and the Right of Return of the Palestinian Refugees.” Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 5(2) 317- 332. (2004) Rachel S. "The death of the Israel-Palestine two-state solution brings fresh hope," The Guardian (23 October 2012). Retrieved 17-12-2013. Shiri L. “Barriers to peace: protected Values in the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict in; Barriers to Peace in Israeli- Palestinian Conflict” ed. Yaacov B. T. The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. Founded by the Charles H. Revson Foundation (2010). Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli- Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, pp. 171-199. Yakan, M.Z., "From War to Peace: Obstacles, Prospects, and Implications of the Middle East Peace Process", in Karsh, E. (ed), From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel's Troubled A g e n d a , London, Frank Cass and Co Ltd (1997). Zakay, D., Klar, Y. &Sharvit, K. “Jewish Israelis on the 'Right of Return”. Palestine-Israel Journal, 9, 58-66. (2002)

78 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies The Major Dynamics of Communal Conflicts in Otuasega and their impact since 1960

LARRY, Steve Ibuomo Department of History and Diplomacy, Niger Delta University, Amassoma, Bayelsa State. E.mail: [email protected] Phone: 08030745300

Abstract Otuasega is a town in Ogbia Local Government Area ofBayelsa State. Its indigenes are farmers and fishermen. They also engage in small scale businesses and evolved means to administer their affairs politically and socially. Over the years, the people of Otuasega have also practiced a certain level of land ownership, chief among which is by inheritance. The total way of life of the people, from land ownership to politics, social and economic activities, have made the people vulnerable to conflicts of different kinds. Hence, the people have had their fair share of conflicts and means of conflict resolution. Conflicts in this community are basically of two types, namely, inter and intra communal conflicts. These conflicts had in most cases led to confrontations necessitating the destruction of lives and properties, arrests, detention and imprisonment. This paper, therefore examines two major areas where these conflicts have been pronounced since 1960. These areas are political conflicts over the leadership and governance of the community and land ownership conflicts upon which the economic life of the people depend. Primary and secondary sources of data are used to source for the needed information.

Introduction Otuasega is a community in Ogbia Local Government Area of Bayelsa State. It occupies a landmass of 18km square. The people speak Ogbia as their indigenous language. The community shares boundaries with several communities. It has a common boundary on the north with Agudama at Payan, Egboin, Edepie and Kpansia. It is bounded by Imiringi on the east, as well as shares boundary with Oruma, Ibelebiri and Okarki at Okubokolo, Osisi and Edawei south

79 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies and west respectively (Milton,2004:18). Otuasega enjoys two climatic conditions of dry and rainy seasons. The dry season usually starts from November and ends in March, while the rainy season starts in April and ends in October. The dry season is marked by high temperature, while the rainy season, on the other hand, is characterized by heavy rainfall which, in turn, provides economic opportunities (Milton, 2004:25). The Otuasega community consists predominantly of farmers and fishermen. They grow crops such as plantain, banana, cassava, potato, fruits, and vegetables and also involve in lumbering, trading, craftsmanship, palm oil production, palm wine tapping and civil service works. Presently, it is an evolving cosmopolitan town with schools, hospitals, police station, electricity and fairly good roads. According to Milton (2004), the origin of Otuasega is traceable to Asega and Ebar. Ebar was a warlord who migrated from kingdom and founded Ebarama settlement in the western part of Otuasega. The tradition maintains that in the course of time, Asega migrated from Emeyal and joined Ebar in his settlement. After a while, for the purpose of farming, Ebar decided to relocate with Asega and his family to the eastern part where the present Otuasega community is located. However, an epidemic broke out in Ebarama's settlement which killed some of his family members and some of them became sickly. This prompted Ebar to relocate with his family to join Asega in the eastern part to found the community that is presently known as Otuasega. Ebar was said to be a man of the forest; he always farmed and fished in the creeks, lakes and streams. Ebar is presently the name of two compounds known as Ebarama East and Ebarama West and they are the compounds that have the largest portion of land in the community. Traditions has it that, when Ebar joined Asega, he was not social and receptive, but Asega was. He usually received and entertained strangers and traders who travelled along the Kolo Creek 80 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies and within the Otuasega axis. It was most of these strangers who came in contact with him that went out with the name “Otuasega” (House of Asega) (Okilo, 1993:34). It was through this process that the name Otuasega evolved. Asega is believed by tradition to have given birth to three children namely, Adodi, Amuso, and Adinika. He played host to many immigrants such as Aghologholi from Ologbomima, Erosi from Imiringi, Egieribo from Igbogene, among others. Otuasega had four original compounds, namely, Amuso, Adinika, Adodi and Ebarama compounds. In 1999, six more compounds were carved out of the four, thereby bringing the number to ten. The ten compounds are Efigumigah, Igbuasi, Adinika Egieribo, Aghologholi, Adodi, Otuamuso, Ebarama East, Ebarama West and Efiebiri (Azibaluwa, 2001:9). The people of Otuasega practiced the Africa Traditional Religion. Shrines, houses, pounds, bushes and particular spots of the community were dedicated to deities and sacrifices were offered to them through spiritual enchantments. The chief priests of the deities were regarded as the religious heads, while the family heads that made the compounds were representatives. However, the advent of Christianity made the people to believe in the Almighty God whom they called “Aziba”. This has affected their belief in these deities as Christianity has overtaken the Africa Traditional Religion. Conflicts over Leadership and Governance in Otuasega Otuasega is a traditional community in which its leaders, especially the Obenamas (paramount ruler) before now, were selected based on the traditional means of consulting the oracle of the local deity called Adema. After performing rituals, the deity through its chief priest, would reveal the name of the Obenama to the elders of the community. This was to happen when ever a sitting Obenama died, resigned, was rejected by the gods or was deposed. But in 1957, after the death of the last Obenama (AkoIgboroki, 1939- 1957), the 81 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies deity – Adema, through its chief priest, selected Mr. Maclean Bail as the next Obenema. Bail refused to accept the privileged offer. All entreaties to make him change his mind failed. In the circumstance, the community elders, chiefs and family members resolved to choose another person from amongst his kindred since it was their turn to produce the Obenama. This effort led to the selection of Mr. Dokubo Akile Aseimo who was generally accepted by the community (Onapu, 2017). Consequently, he was corronated as Chief Dokubo Akile Aseimo, Obenama of Otuasega , Asega xii, in 1957. Chief Dokubo Akile Aseimo reigned as the Obenama of Otuasega from 1957 to 1976. During his reign, the community was very peaceful and prosperous. He defended his subjects with everything he had. His patriotism came to the fullest when the Nigerian civil war broke out. While many of his subjects took refuge in the forest, he stood his ground to defend the position of his community to both the Nigerian and Biafran soldiers. At the end of the war, the bravery of Chief Dokubo Akile was celebrated and admired by all and sundry. However, in 1976, a group of influential elites residing in Port Harcourt, popularly known as “Port Harcourt Branch”, conspired and dethroned him and installed Chief Taylor Okilo after leveling some allegations on him such as collecting of bribe, associating with commoners, illiteracy, etc. (Moses, 2017). Chief Taylor Okoli was the choice of the powerful and influential elites who masterminded the dethronement of Chief Aseimo Dokubo. Reports have it that he was forced on the community. Because of this, he faced stiff opposition in the course of his administration. The conflicts under Chief Taylor heightened when the opposition group under Chief Okpoto Donald formed a parallel government in 1985 and refused to recognize Chief Taylor as the Obenama. This made his government to have divided loyalty. This, coupled with the fact that he was not accepted and some wrong decisions made by Chief Taylor such as his arrest and detention of Mr. 82 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Sunday Ofor and Sunday Bail for opposing his idea of general contribution, made his government further unpopular and conflicts continued in Otuasega until his resignation in 1986 to allow for peace (Ezuzu, 2017). Put differently, this conflict was resolved when Chief Taylor was persuaded to resign in 1986 for the sake of peace. When Chief Taylor Okilo resigned, the throne of the Obenama became vacant for seven years. The community was ruled with different community councils until Chief Ramani Abah was appointed as the Obenama in 1992. When Chief Ramani Abah became the Obenama, he had a Advisory Council whose duty was to advise him. This body was made up of eight elders with Chief Ogbuasi Thompson as chairman and Chief EbhesiIbegba as vice chairman, among others. Chief Ramani Abah also constituted a body known as the Otuasega Ruling Council to oversee the affairs of the community as he was residing in Port Harcourt. The first ruling council he constituted was led by Chief Philip Omere as Chairman, Hon. Michael Amiditor – Vice Chairman, Hon. Dorgu Azibanabhel – Secretary, among others. This ruling council was short lived as an opposition group fought against it, based on the fact that, Chief Ramani Abah single handedly selected the people and that the membership did not cut across all the compounds in the community. Consequently, he dissolved it and constituted another one with members selected from all the compounds without the consultation of the people. The constitution of this body for the second time without the consent of the community set the stage for a violent communal conflict. In Otuasega, leaders are selected from the various compounds with the consent of the people. That is to say, the people partake in deciding who leads them, but contrary to this tradition, Chief Ramani Abah sat with some few persons, selected those to serve in the ruling council and inaugurated them to serve for two 83 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies years. This action was not accepted by the community. To most persons, the body was responsible to Chief Ramani Abah alone. The community waited for two years for the tenure of the council to come to an end. At the end, the community invited Chief Ramani Abah to come home so that they could collectively form a new government. When he came, he was invited to the town hall with the intention of selecting new people but when the issue was presented, Chief Ramani Abah disagreed with the idea of selecting new people and insisted in retaining the old members. This caused disagreement and open quarrel in the town hall leading to the emergence of factions. One faction supporting Chief Ramani Abah and the continuation of the ruling council and the other faction, opposing the idea of continuation of the ruling council. Therefore, the meeting was brought to an abrupt end without any resolution (Micheal, 2017). Unfortunately, the disagreement up to 1994 when Chief Ramani Aba was dethroned.

Land Ownership and Conflicts in Otuasega Land in Otuasega community is owned and controlled under different conditions. The major portions of land in Otuasega is owned and controlled by individual families due to inheritance (Christopher, 2017). These lands are handed down through ancestral descendants of the families. The Otuasega community also owns land through acquisition from individual families for different developmental purposes without compensation to the families. These lands are the cemetery, land used for developmental projects such as schools (primary and secondary), hospital, market, toilet houses, community secretariat, town hall, town square, guest house and a football pitch. The Onuoto land in Otuasega is presently a community controlled land which the community assumed control and management after it sponsored a litigation between Otuasega and Imiringi community and won the case. This is the land that all shell facilities and 84 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies operations are situated. Shell came to Kolo creek in the 1970s and acquired its present location. On its arrival, the Company acquired the Otuasega cemetery, which is the boundary between Otuasega and Imiringi and paid compensation first to Otuasega and later to Imiringi, whereas Otuasega is the rightful owner of the cemetery. Otuasega protested and this brought disagreement between the two communities which resulted to fighting, destruction of farmlands, food crops and loss of human lives. After the conflict, Otuasega summoned Imiringi before the Port Harcourt High Court in order to disassociate Imiringi from the joint ownership of the cemetery. This incidence occurred during the reign of Chief Dokubo Akile Aseimo. The Otuasega community was represented by Chief Dokubo Akile Aseimo, Chief Simon Telu and Chief Ibulu Endwell, while Imiringi was represented by Chief Anthony Amos, Chief Innocent Oquo and Mr. Apigi Ezeke. However, the case was struck out by the court. Otuasega was not satisfied with this judgment, hence they appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Nigeria sitting in in 1973 where the case was finally ruled in favour of the community in 1975 ( Silas, 1975). Even before the arrival of Shell, Otuasega had earlier contested this same piece of land with Imiringi at the Native Court of Emeyal 1 in Ogbia in 1942 and the case was ruled in favour of Otuasega. By the Supreme Court judgment, the conflict between Otusega and Imiringi communities was settled. Land dispute also broke out between Otuasega community and Onuoto families in 1999 over farmland. This was twenty five years after their case with Imiringi over Onuoto bush. The Onuoto is a group of thirteen families who argued that they are the owners of Onuoto land by inheritance and that they should be considered and given some percentage of whatever that comes into the community from Shell. But in the real sense, Otuasega community has being in control of this land since 1975 and have been managing the benefits 85 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies that accrued to the community. It was the same land the Otuasega community took the Imiringi community to the Supreme Court and won the case. However, in 1999, the Onuoto farmland families seek a legal interpretation of the Supreme Court judgment between Otuasega and Imiringi and concluded that the dispute between Otuasega and Imiringi was the cemetery that is clearly demarcated by the road leading to Imiringi and other Ogbia communities and not the other area occupied by Shell. As a result, they wrote a letter to Shell claiming the sum of one hundred million. They copied the community and other authorities. When the community received her copy of the letter, they invited them and asked why they wrote a letter to Shell without first discussing the matter with the community. The community tried to apply force to compel these families to accept that the land belongs to the entire community and this resulted in quarrels and fights. Members of these families were banned from enjoying benefits accruing to the community from Shell, NGOs and Government. These include social amenities such as electricity, empowerment, and scholarships. They were also banned from the administrative functions in the community. And from the continual fighting, the matter was eventually taken to court (Igani, 2017). Another conflict broke out in Otuasega in 2012 between the Adodi compound and Otuasega community. The conflict stem from two points: first, is the claim over ownership of land and second, suspension of Adodi and Ebarama compounds from the administrative structure of the community. The land in dispute is situated at the Ekuraba Bridge to the boundary between Otuasega and Edepie. Otuasega community had been in possession and control of this land from origin. The community had been leasing this land to timber lumbers, palm wine tappers, and other traders and had been collecting rent from them. However, in 2012, the Adodi compound issued receipt to these economic groups and further instructed them 86 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies not to pay any rent to the Otuasega community. The Otuasega community invited the Adodi community leaders to the town square to explain the rationale for their action. In their defence, they claimed ownership of the land and argued that the portion of land was given to them by Ebar, one of the early settlers of the community. Meanwhile, members of the Ebarama compound supported the claim of Adodi compound and promised to stand as witness to Adodi compound should the matter go to court. This caused disagreement between the Otuasega community and these two compounds. As a result, these compounds were removed from the administrative body of the Otuasega community. They were not allowed to participate in governance nor benefit from employment, training and other such benefits that accrued from Government, Shell, and NGOs. As a result of this exclusion, in 2013 the two compounds came together and declared themselves as an independent community known as Otuasega1. This declaration resulted to fights and arrests. Consequently, the leaders of the Otuasega community arrested and took leaders of the Adodi and Ebarama compounds to Abuja Subsequently, the matter was settled by the Inspector General of Police was made the leaders of the compounds and the Otuasega community to sign an undertaken to maintain peace and order in the community. However, the land ownership case is still in court. The above are therefore the major conflicts in Otuasega community emanating from leadership and land ownership within our period of study. Effects of the conflicts on Otuasega Communal conflicts have made the administration of the Otuasega community very difficult. The lobbying and campaign to be elected into the Community Development Committee (CDC), Council of Chiefs or Youth Executive can be compared to the campaign for political office in the state. Very worrisomely, personal and group interest have always superseded the interest of the 87 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies community. Groups have always risen to oppose or dethrone a sitting government. The cases in the community have given rise to factions including those regarded as the elites. These elites are involved in the conflicts and have transferred the sentiment created by these conflicts into the political system to the extent that they see themselves as people who cannot work together to achieve a political aim. Even when an Otuasega indigene is contesting for a political office, they prefer supporting an outsider (Eribo, 2017). The youths are divided among the politicians and contractors who have different interests and ideology about the well-being and development of the community. These politicians and company directors have a way of influencing the running of the community to their advantage (Onapu, 2017). More so, the politicians who are appointed into government do not use their position to attract the needed development to the community because of the sentiment from these communal conflicts. Otuasega is accorded the position of a 3rd class chief in the Bayelsa State Traditional Rulers Council, a position that comes with monthly stipends, but since there is no paramount ruler due to persistent conflicts in the community, the position is vacant and the stipend is not paid. Furthermore, the communal conflicts have led to the breakdown of law and order and this has given birth to disrespect for constituted authority. Because the authorities are not respected, it has resulted to cultist activities in the community which sometimes lead to the death of young people. Unfortunately, nothing is being done to correct this by the leadership of the Otuasega community. Due to the fear of cultists and hatred, those in authority are unable to enforce those laws put in place to checkmate the actions of the people. Communal conflicts have also resulted to fights, arrests and detentions, destruction of lives and properties. Young men that would have contributed to the growth of the community have lost their lives in the process of the conflicts. 88 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

These conflicts have equally affected the relationship between Otuasega and her neighbours. The immediate neighbours are Oruma, Ibelebiri, Imiringi, Edepie, and others. The conflicts between Otuasega, Imiringi, Oruma, and some Epie communities are usually caused by land disputes, and because they are immediate neighbours, when these conflicts occur, it usually lead to unwarranted attacks on each other. At such times, they do not visit each other's community. Even farmers do not go to the forest because of the fear of been attacked. For instance, when the mother of Chief Taylor Okilo was beheaded during the land dispute between Otuasega and Imiringi, the two communities developed strong hatred for each other and never had anything in common to do for a longtime (Onikakpari, 2017). This is equally applicable to Oruma and other communities whenever a conflict occurs. These sentiments have always been used to define their relations politically, hence, they hardly agree when it comes to political matters in the larger society. The endemic state of conflicts in Otuasega have eluded the community of any meaningful economic progress. This is because peace is inevitable for economic development. As a result of the conflicts, many businessmen and women, including investors, have relocated from the community to safer places. More so, these conflicts have led to wasteful spending of Otuasega's finances as Otuasega has spent millions of naira in the name of prosecuting community cases. Monies that could have been used for the development of the community are spent on the police, lawyers, and to induce youths to attack and beat up opponents (Endurance, 2017).

Conclusion Otuasega in the period under review has experienced series of devastating conflicts which resulted, first, from leadership tussle over the administration of the community particularly the throne of the Obenama, and by the desire of a few to control the resources of the 89 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies community. Secondly, disputes over ownership and control of land. Land disputes have been between the community and neighboring communities, between compounds and the community and between the Otuasega community and group of families. These conflicts have led to backwardness, disunity, and disrespect for constituted authority and the breakdown of law and order. Conflicts in the Otuasega community have also resulted to the arrest, detention, imprisonment and death of vibrant indigenes that could have contributed to the development of the community. The resources of the community have been spent on police, litigations and settlement of disputes. This has created an avenue for regular embezzlement of the community funds that could have been channeled to meaningful development. By way of mitigating the unfortunate development in the Otuasega community, it is recommended as follows: i. The various compounds within the Otuasega community should learn to tolerate one another. ii. The compounds, and the Otuasega community at large should embibe the culture pf joint ownership of resources that cannot be divided like rivers, forests, community lands, among others. iii. Members of the compounds and community at large should establish harmonious working relationship with their neighbours for the purpose of attracting investors to their community for development purposes. iv. Members of the compounds and community at large should discourage gangsterism and cultist activities. v. Members of the community should learn to resolve issues among themselves without necessary taking to court actions or to the police against one another. vi. Traditional leaders, opinion leaders, political actors and the elite in Otuasega community should establish a harmonious 90 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies synergy for the purposes of development and conflict resolution.

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References

Milton, O. (2004). The Originofthe OgbiaMan (Port Harcourt: Triumphant Press). Azibaluwa, O. (2001). EmergingChangesin OgbiaKingdom. (Yenagoa: Mojek Press Ltd) Okilo, M. (1993).Ogbia OgbiaandIssuesof Integration. (New York: Putanna). Christopher Omonibo (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Pigando, Reginald (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Ezuzu, Pigando (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Onikakpari, Ada (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Moses, Owapu (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Igari, Jarious (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Opiapu, Egbo (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Michael, Amiditor, (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Erebo, Galaxy, (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Endurance, Justice (2017) Oral Interview, Otuasega. Silas, O. (1975) “Otuasega- Imiringi Land Case: High Court Verdict Quashed” in TheNigerianTide, March 15th Supreme Court Judgment on the Land Dispute between Otuasega and Imiringi, 1975. Otuasega Town Agreement on Onuoto Bush After the Supreme Court Judgment of 30th March, 1975,

92 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies The Conflicts between Fulani Pastoralists and Cultivators in Taraba State, Nigeria: The Case of the Mambilla Plateau

Omar, Saleh PhD Department of Sociology, , Gombe, Nigeria GSM: 08036321034; 07037494295. Email:[email protected]

Abstract Communal conflicts are very widespread in Nigeria, and have reached epidemic proportions in recent years. Taraba State has not been an exception. One of the most enduring communal conflicts in Taraba State is the one between nomadic Fulani pastoralists and sedentary cultivators. There is a general misconception of the actual nature of this problem, with many suggesting that it is based on the competition over land and water resources. This research work reexamined this problem. Various techniques of data collection and analysis were used, the main one being content analysis of publications both official and by private individuals. Legal and technical information was also obtained through the sampling of opinions of legal practitioners and experts on livestock matters. Findings strongly suggest that other forms of conflict-ethnic, religious, e.t.c. may, as a matter of fact, be more important motivations in these crises. It is also intended to use this particular case study to challenge some of the core assumptions of those who see this conflict as essentially between pastoralists and cultivators over the use of land and water resources, and have tried, when they get the opportunity, to formulate and implement policies in favour of the 'farmers'. Finally, suggestions are made as to how the Nigerian state may intervene meaningfully to address the massive aggravation in the conflicts between Fulani pastoralists and cultivators in various parts of the country. Key words: Fulani pastoralists; Cultivators; Conflicts; Political Economy; Mambilla Plateau;

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Background As an ethnic group the Fulani number 20-25 million and inhabit many countries in the Central and Western sub-regions of the African continent.1The main countries with significant Fulani populations are-Nigeria, (7,611,000), Guinea (: 4,099,645), , (2,567,664), , (1,639,052), Niger, (1,211,509), , (800,000), Cameroon, (700,000), Guinea-Bissau, (501,360), ,(128,000), and Sudan (90,000).2 About 7 to 8 million of them are nomadic pastoralists who seasonally move between the various countries they inhabit. The transhumance routes they traverse are well known, fairly well documented, although not always gazzeted.3 The majority of Fulani people, however, are sedentary or semi- nomadic and pursue farming and other occupations in their localities. The Fulani are truly a multi-national ethnic group. The stereotypical image of the Fulani as a stick-wielding herdsman, generally unruly and troublesome overlooks the fact the Fulani, through their migratory movements and wars of conquest over the centuries, have intermingled with many other ethnic groups, such that new ethnic categories are beginning to emerge.4Moreover, it must be noted that those that lead sedentary and semi-sedentary lives have also inter-married with other groups. Their way of life also brings the nomadic-pastoralist Fulani into contact and conflict with sedentary farmers over matters relating to land use and utilization of agricultural space. While the pastoralists temporarily require land to graze their livestock, the sedentary farmers need this same land for the cultivation of their crops. The potential for conflict over this competition has always been there. However, in earlier periods, such conflicts, whenever and wherever they arose, were seen, and, in most cases treated, as inter-personal, rather than inter- communal. The intensification of this conflict in recent years has been attributed to a variety of factors such as urbanization, climate change, advances in livestock and human disease control which have led to increases in 94 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies both human and livestock populations, and political considerations. According to Blench, (2003): Conflict between pastoralists and farmers has existed since the beginnings of agriculture, but the prevalence of tsetse and low settlement densities kept the incidence of clashes at a low frequency until the twentieth century. In West Africa, the introduction of cheap trypanocides and other veterinary drugs increased herd sizes to levels that compelled herders to seek pastures outside their traditional ecological range. At the same improved human health has increased overall population and thus pressure on arable land.5 Blench further noted that-: Nonetheless, the persistence of slash and burn agriculture typical of much of semi-arid and subhumid West Africa allowed the two groups to co- exist, especially through the exchange of crop residues for manure. However, the marked expansion of riverine and valley-bottom (fadama) cultivation since the 1980s has meant that herders and farmers are now competing very directly for access to river banks with a consequent increase in conflict. Increasing political control of LGs by representatives of farming populations has meant pressure both to invade land reserved for grazing and to exclude pastoralists from high-productivity areas. In Nigeria, in particular, this conflict has now been subsumed into a broader dichotomy of religion and disputes over access to resources are now framed in religious terms. Increasing availability of modern weapons has increased the intensity and violence of these disputes. 95 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

It is often said that Pastoral Organisations, such as Miyetti Allah, can play a role in conflict mediation. However, their record in this area is very poor because they are in reality highly dispersed and their ability to lobby correspondingly limited.6 Statement of the Research Problem Competition and conflict have characterised the relations between Fulani pastoralists and cultivators in the Taraba Area for over a century.7The enactment of a law8 by the Taraba State House of Assembly in 2017, purporting to make illegal the pastoralist practice of open- grazing is perhaps the clearest example yet of this conflict. Whereas in the past, this manifested itself in the form of violent and bloody clashes between the two contenders, the law merely amounts to a political/legal statement of the position of the cultivators, their allies, and their political representatives. Objectives of the Study The main objective of this study is to uncover the underlying causes of the perennial conflicts between Fulani pastoralists and their sedentary kinsmen on the one hand, and cultivators, (both Fulani and non-Fulani), on the other. More specifically, the concerns of the paper include the following: 1. The relationship between pressure on land and the incidence of clashes between Fulani pastoralists and cultivators; 2. The relationship between political issues and the incidence of clashes between Fulani pastoralists and cultivators, and, 3. The relationship between ethnic tensions and the incidence of clashes between Fulani pastoralists and cultivators. To facilitate a thorough investigation of these issues, the following research questions were posed- Research Questions a. Is there a significant correlation between pressure on land and water resources and the incidence of clashes between Fulani 96 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

pastoralists and cultivators in Taraba State? b. Is there a significant correlation between politics and the clashes between the Fulani pastoralists and cultivators in Taraba State? c. Is there a significant correlation between ethnic tensions and the clashes between Fulani pastoralists and cultivators in Taraba State? There are many other cogent questions to ask regarding the conflict between the Fulani pastoralists and cultivators in Taraba State, but these appear to be central ones at the present time. Techniques of Data Collection Several techniques were used in the process of collection of data for this study. A major technique used was content analysis of publications relating to the issues of concern for the study including those relating to land use patterns, general social relations between nomadic pastoralists and the sedentary cultivators. Available records of previous conflicts were also gleaned. Government publications such as decrees, laws, gazettes, bye-laws, and reports of commissions of inquiry were also consulted. Oral interviews were also conducted with community leaders, traditional rulers, leaders of farmers' and pastoralists' associations, politicians and political office-holders, as well as ordinary pastoralists and cultivators. Relevant foreign studies on the subject in hard and soft forms were also used. Finally, it was also necessary for us to augment these useful sources of information with our own participant/non-participant observations on some of the issues of interest for the study.

Clarification of Concepts Some of the key concepts used in the debates on the conflicts and competition between pastoralists and cultivators are somewhat slippery, and may, therefore, need clarification at the very outset. A pastoralist is someone who leads a way of life that “depends on 97 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies raising livestock and living on its milk and meat”9. Nomads, on the other hand, are “people who move seasonally from place to place to search for food and water or pasture for their livestock.”10 The Fulani as an ethnic group can be nomadic, semi-nomadic, or sedentary. There are also semi-nomadic Fulani who are both pastoralists and cultivators. As has been noted earlier, about one-third of all Fulani people, (numbering 7-8 million) are nomadic pastoralists. The other two-thirds are made up of semi-nomadic and sedentary communities. This latter category contains both pastoralists and cultivators, although the proportions have not been determined for this study. It is, however, important to note that all categories of Fulani have been involved in these conflicts although to varying degrees. There are also nomadic farmers who create the problem of land encroachment. These concepts are important in any study of the conflict between pastoralists and cultivators in general. Their specific forms in the situation in Taraba State were also taken into account in this study. Cultivators are those who plant, grow, and harvest crops or plants, and are as a rule, sedentary. However, certain systems of cultivation, e.g. shifting cultivation, may render some of them nomadic or semi- nomadic over relatively long periods of time. Theoretical Framework: The Political Economy Approach The political economy approach to the study of society emphasizes a comprehensive, wholistic, historical, and integrated way of understanding society and its diverse components. For the Marxist variant of this approach which has been adopted for this study, primary importance is accorded the economy, which is the process through which society reproduces and sustains itself. At the same time, it also takes into account the various superstructural factors- politics, law, religion, ethnicity, regionalism, e.t.c.,-which influence and sometimes over determine economic processes and their outcomes.11 98 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

In discussing the complex and intricate relations between nomadic pastoralists and cultivators, some important factors are sometimes ignored in favour of the more volatile and inflammatory political slogans and cultural stereotypes and ethnocentric attitudes. A political economy approach to the study of the conflicts between pastoralists and cultivators must take into account the following factors-: a. The dominant socio-economic system or sub-system; b. Patterns and intensity of land and water use; c. Inter-ethnic relations; d. Population dynamics; and, e. Political interventions. All these factors have been taken into account in this study. However, it must be borne in mind that these variables are closely interlinked and that they are separated here for the purposes of analysis only. That is why the research questions below have been framed in such a way as to integrate all these elements under three research questions. A General Overview of the Situation in Taraba State Taraba State is one of the thirty-six states that make up the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is located in the north-eastern part of the country. It lies within the Tropical zone and has vegetation that ranges from the short forests in the southern part to grassland in the north. According to one source: Taraba State lies largely within the middle of Nigeria and consists of undulating landscape dotted with a few mountainous features. These include the scenic and prominent Mambilla Plateau. The state lies largely within the tropical zone and has a vegetation of low forest in the southern part and grassland in the northern part. The Mambilla Plateau with an altitude of 1,800 meters (6000 ft) above sea level has a temperate climate all year round. The Benue, Donga, Taraba and Ibi are the main rivers in the state. 99 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

They rise from the Cameroonian mountains, straining almost the entire length of the state in the North and South direction to link up with the River Niger.12 Occasional conflicts between Fulani pastoralists and cultivators have been a common feature in some parts of Taraba State, notably the Mambilla Plateau, for at least a century, 13 and may have their roots in a history of almost 200 years.14 However, in the last 20 years, there has been an intensification of this conflict, particularly on the Mambilla Plateau, culminating in what one security official has called a 'carnage'15 in 2017. In trying to understand the dynamics of the relations between Fulani pastoralists and cultivators, and the factors that may lead to conflict, certain commonsensical misconceptions have to be dispensed with. These include the notions that the Fulani pastoralists are 'naturally' troublesome, or that those engaged in the fighting are foreign mercenary Fulani forces from neighbouring countries. By the very nature of their spatial distribution across much of West and , Fulani nomadic pastoralists are multi-national: a pastoralist may be based in Nigeria but have relations in Cameroon, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic. And this is not peculiar to the Fulani; the Yoruba also have kith and kin in Benin Republic, while across the Nigeria-Niger border, many Hausa communities such as those in Jibia, ( State) and Illelah, () have relations in the Republic of Niger. Even on the Mambilla Plateau, both Fulani and Mambilla have relations across the border in the Republic of Cameroon. And when and where they abide by the laws of their host countries, particularly the payment of taxes, they have every right to consider themselves, and be considered by others, as citizens with dual or multiple citizenship. Ethno-Geo-Political Description of the Mambilla Plateau The following description of the Mambilla Plateau has been provided by Wikipedia and has been reproduced here with slight 100 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies modifications. The Mambilla Plateau is a plateau in the Taraba State of Nigeria. The plateau is Nigeria's northern continuation of the Bamenda Highlands of Cameroon. The name "Mambilla" is a derivative of the ancient name "Mamberre" which has been used for the Mambilla Plateau from ancient times and which concomitantly denotes its inhabitants. The Mambilla Plateau has an average elevation of about 1,600 metres (5,249 ft) above sea level, making it the highest plateau in Nigeria. The Mambilla Plateau measures about 96 km (60 mi) along its curved length; it is 40 km (25 mi) wide and is bounded by an escarpment that is about 900 m (2,953 ft) high in some places.[4] The plateau covers an area of over 9,389 square kilometres (3,625 sq mi) Gang ('Chappal Waddi') Mountain is found at the northeastern flank of the Plateau. Some mountains on the plateau and around it are over 2,000 metres (6,562 ft) high, like the Chappal Waddi (more appropriate name: Gang) mountain which has an average height of about 2,419 metres (7,936 ft) above sea level. It is the highest mountain in Nigeria and the highest mountain in West Africa if Cameroon's mountains, such as Mount Cameroon, are excluded. The Mambilla Plateau, is found in the southeastern part of Taraba State of Nigeria under Sardauna local government area (the former Mambilla District set up in January 1940, which became known as 'Mambilla Local Authority' of Mambilla Division in 1970, and then as 'Mambilla Local Government Area' in 1981) The current 'Sardauna' title is believed to be an inappropriate cognomen for this historically famous spot in Africa, given that the combination of three 101 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies local government areas in one, which was the tenuous basis for the new appellation, has since ceased to exist. The plateau has its south and eastern escarpments standing along the Cameroonian border, while the remainder of its giant northern escarpment and its western slope are in Nigeria. Climate The climate of the plateau is comparatively cold. Daytime temperatures hardly ever exceeds 25 °C (77.0 °F) making it the coolest region in Nigeria Strong winds prevail during the daytime, and the rainy season lasts from mid-March until the end of November. As a result of its high elevation, the plateau experiences temperate weather conditions but on a smaller scale due to its location in a tropical environment. The rainy season on the Mambilla Plateau is associated with frequent and heavy rainfall due to orographic activities on the plateau involving moist winds from the south Atlantic Ocean in southern Nigeria and the steep edges and escarpments of the plateau. The Mambilla Plateau receives over 1850 millimetres of rainfall annually. It is also Mosquito and Tse- Tse fly free. The plateau is dissected by many streams and rivers; notably among them are the Donga River and Taraba River, with both having their sources on/from the Mambilla Plateau. Vegetation on the plateau comprises low grasses with trees being noticeably absent except for man-made forest planted by German colonialist during the period of German administration of the cameroons (c. 1906-1915)and other Nigerian government tree planting programs. The plateau is the only region of Nigeria that grows the tea plant on a large scale, and there are several tea farms, although the sector remains mostly underdeveloped. It is also home to the 102 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Gashaka Gumti National Park, which is the largest national park and protected area in all of Nigeria, as well as the Ngel Nyaki Forest Reserve, both of which harbor rare and endangered West/Central African plant and animal species endemic to the area. The abundance of low lush green grasses on the plateau has attracted a large number of cattle, whose advent beginning during British rule affected the plateau's vegetation. This has resulted in overgrazing of the plateau and has created problems between the cattle herders, referred to as the Fulanis, and the indigenous people, the Mambila. There are numerous towns on the plateau with populations ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 people except for Bommi (Gembu), Nigeria (Gembu), which is a sprawling ancient Mambilla city with a much higher population. The latter contains the headquarters of new-christened "Sardauna" Local Government Area which is synonymous with the Mambilla Plateau. Other important towns on the plateau are Liimil (Mbamga), Mvurr (Warwar), Bang, Mbuk (Tapnyia), Ndik (Kabri), Gam (Vakude), Mbar, Kara, Mang, Dembe, Nge (Leme), Mbun (Kakara) (Which is home to Mambilla Beverages Company Ltd, the only Tea Production Company in West Africa), Furu (Yerrmaru), Yirrum, Ngumbun, Kuma, Kerke (Titong), Mbungnu (Nguroje), New Ndaga (Mayo Ndaga), Benene (Maisamari), and Mamal (Hainare). According to Percival (1938), the Germans met some 200 villages on the Mambilla Plateau,all being of Mambilla origin then. The major ethnic groups on the plateau, include, the Mambila (the ancient population of these mountains), Kaka, Fulani, trading communities of Igbo, Wimbum (Kambu), Hausa and Banso, with the Mambilla being the majority and original inhabitants. The major Languages spoken on the Mambilla 103 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Plateau are Mambilla (the language of the predominant population, Fufulde (used for commercial transactions by various groups), Kaka, Banso, Igbo, etc. English is used as official language. Note, however, that only the Mambilla and Kaka have existing villages while the Fulanis established cattle-farm settlements nestling between the villages in British times. Christianity and Islam are the main religions today, having gradually displaced the Mambilla Traditional Religion based on Suu, which predominated before the coming of White missionaries and Hausa-Fulanis.16 Let us now answer the research questions posed at the beginning of this paper against the background of the evidence that has been gathered in the course of the research work to enable us answer this question. The significant correlation between pressure on land and water resources and the incidence of clashes between Fulani pastoralists and cultivators in Taraba State In economic and demographic terms, “pressure on land” usually refers to population density which is also an indicator of the intensity of land use. Available statistics suggest that pressure on land is one of the factors responsible for the conflict between pastoralists and cultivators. At 42 persons/km2, Taraba State has one of the lowest, if not the lowest, population densities in Nigeria. This, however, is not to suggest that pressure on land does not exist. In the first place, the reference to land is not to land in general, but to grazing land and arable land used for and cultivation, respectively. In these important respects, pressure on land is much heavier than the figures of population density may suggest. Although actual statistics are difficult to obtain, it is well known that in the two Local Government Areas most prone to conflicts between pastoralists and cultivators, namely Sardauna and Lau, population 104 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies growth rates between 1991 and 2006 were quite significant. In Sardauna Local Government Area, the population increased from 224,357 to 290, 800, an increase of 29.6%.17In Lau Local Government Area, the corresponding increase was 26%.18. That the population of Taraba State has grown from 1,512,163 1991, to 2,294,800 in 2006, and was projected to reach 2,974,300 by 2015.19 In Lau this rapid increase has combined with expansion of cattle population and the depletion of grazing lands and water resources due to climate change, to lead to increased competition and conflict between pastoralists and cultivators, and also between fishing communities over fishing ponds. But the main focus area for the present study is Sardauna Local government Area. In Sardauna Local Government Area-the epicentre of the current violent confrontations between pastoralists and cultivators-empirical evidence tends to support the widely-held notion that the conflict is as result of pressure on land. The massive increase in the human population, which has, in turn, led to urbanization and the expansion of human settlements, decline in water resources and vegetation, decline in soil fertility on both farmlands and ranches have all increased the already heavy pressure on land on the Plateau. However, this does not appear to have had a direct impact on the land and water relations between Fulani pastoralists and Mambilla cultivators. In the first place, ranching, rather than open grazing, is the dominant form of herding system on the Mambilla Plateau.20 Even where open grazing is involved, this is usually short-range, and herders rarely graze beyond the boundaries of the neighbouring Gashaka Local Government Area.21 In a widely cited 2002 article in the Journal of Biogeography, the French geographer Jean Hurault had this to say: The uncontrolled growth of livestock has been followed by high competition for land between the graziers and those Mambila farmers who survived the 105 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Fulani occupation. The graziers holding most of the political power have progressively deprived the farmers of their lands: the latter are now confined within isolated small enclaves. They have lost their economic independence and are reduced to work for the graziers or to emigrate to Cameroon. Furthermore, in a large part of the Mambila plateau, the pastoral range has been divided between the graziers, excluding the Mambila farmers, as well as the poorest Fulani, from land ownership and enhancing their dependency on the graziers. Such an explosive situation is illustrated by two surveys of the Kuma and Leme regions. Over the 78 km2 studied in Kuma, the Mambila possess only 22% of the area; the survey found 132 herds (at an estimated total of 9475 cattle) with a population density of 1.5 cattle per ha, almost totally owned by Muslim graziers. The area studied in Leme covers 113.5 km2 of uneven land. Although confined to nine enclaves, the Mambila owned 32% of the land, while the Muslim graziers possess 67%. 145 herds have been counted (at an estimate total of 10,215 cattle): 63% are owned by the Mbororo, 20% by Fulani and the Haoussa from Gembu, 10% by the Mambila, and 7% by the recent Yamba migrants.22 Notwithstanding the author's obvious ethnic and religious biases, he reveals the rather complex nature of the relationship between the Mambilla cultivators and the Fulani pastoralists. When it was convenient he used the ethnic criterion; when it became less convenient he used the religious criterion, all aimed at portraying the Mambilla as an economically exploited, and religiously oppressed. The significant correlation between politics and the clashes between the Fulani pastoralists and cultivators in Taraba State 106 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

By “politics” we refer to all acts of commission and omission through which various classes and other groups within society struggle to realize their interests even at the expense of others. Political actions may be peaceful or violent, open or hidden, and may be designed to achieve broad general goals of a society or the narrow goals of a section of society. Can the conflict between the Mambilla and the Fulani pastoralists be considered to be 'political' in the sense suggested above? To answer this question it is necessary to go through the history of the relations between the two groups with respect to at least four important issues, namely, the indigene/settler dichotomy, the right of accession to the throne of the chief of Mambilla, traditional land rights, and patterns and leanings in party politics in Sardauna Local Government in particular, and Taraba State in general, since the creation of the state in 1991. The relations between the Fulani and the Mambilla on the Mambilla Plateau have a long history characterised by invasion, domination, contention, and assimilation. Beginning with the Fulani of the 19th century, various clans of the Fulbe, notably the Wolarbe and Kiri'en, had established sub-emirates on the , namely, Ngaundere, Tibati, and Banyo, (all presently in the Republic of Cameroon), affiliated to Modibbo Adama.23 Some accounts, such as those of Hurault cited above, suggest that it was from these bases in Cameroon that the Fulani began to launch slave raids on the Mambila on the Mambila Plateau, enslaving the 'indigenous' people and confiscating their lands. More charitable accounts24 associate the Fulani influx to the search for grazing lands and water sources and the Fulani Jihadist Movements of the 19th Century. Although the Jihad on the Mambilla Plateau never achieved complete hegemony over non-Fulbe groups, it nevertheless largely succeeded in converting many elements of these groups into Islam and the establishment of the Fulfulde as the not only 107 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies between the Fulbe and non-Fulbe, but also between and even within the non-Fulbe groups.25 The issue of chieftaincy is another important political factor in the relations between the various ethnic groups on the Mambilla Plateau, particularly the relations between the Fulani and Mambilla. Although the source of conflict appears to have been settled by the adoption of a rotational kingship between the Fulani and the Mambilla, problems persist due to past experiences and demands by other groups. The acrimony which surrounded the burial of the last Lamdo Mambilla, Muhammadu Mansur, is still fresh in the memory of those who witnessed it and is a continuing source of political tension. Another source of political conflict between the Fulani and the Mambilla relates to party politics. Since the referenda of 1959/1961, patterns of political affiliation have emerged that tend to encourage the conflict between the Fulani and Mambilla. Traditionally, the Mambilla have allied with either the nomadic pastoralist mbororo'en, or the sedentary cultivator Fulani (known locally as huya'en) as well as other ethnic minorities notably the Kaka. In terms of policies, the Mambilla have had an upper hand on the Fulani since the Plebiscites of 1959/1961. Policies pursued by government, (federal, state, and local) have generally favoured the Mambilla cultivators against the Fulani pastoralists. Such policies include the Land Use Act, (1978;1990),which, as amended, vested power over land use on Governors and Local Government Councils, thereby removing Fulani traditional leaders, (the ardo'en,) from adjudicating on/in land disputes. The Nigerian government has also toyed with the idea of 6,000km stock routes26 designed to avert conflicts between nomadic pastoralists and cultivators, particularly during the rainy, farming season when the competition conflict between herders and cultivators tends to peak. This has also not been implemented. Indeed, according to Abdullahi, Daneyel, and Aliyara, of the

108 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies proposed 299 grazing reserves in the former northern states and Abuja, only 23 have been implemented, representing 0.08 % of the total, and about 0.22% of the total hectarage proposed.27 Well-defined, and geo-politically grounded, international stock routes have been documented and gazetted, but not implemented in Nigeria. Occasional political references to them merely heighten the tensions between the nomadic pastoralists and cultivators. The following Transhumance International Routes are recognised and respected,-: 1a. transhumance international stock route Ilela (sokoto state)- (falali gr)-bobi gr (Niger) enters kwara at jebba bridge and terminates at gidan majiya gr in baruteen LGA, Kwara State 1,400 km B. north central transhumance international route 1. Katsina enters kukar jangari gr –birnin gwari(kaduna state) bobi gr (niger state) –jebba bridge -580km Baure(near )- state--(wudil)-sumaila enters state at burra in ningi lga-torro lga(panshanu) – plateau(jos east lga)- leaves plateau(bokkos lga)-wamba gr (nassarawa)-keana gr in keana lga and terminates at benue state border with -1,700km C. north east transhumance international route 1. enters Nigeria at damask (mobbarlga)-jauro yaya gr (magumeri lga)-kimba ritawa gr(biu lga)-hawul lga-shani lga enters adamawa state(shelleng lga)-guyuk lga-lamurde lga enters taraba state(karim lamido lga)-leaves taraba at dogongawa takum lga to benue state(katsina la) and terminates at obudu -1,500km yusufari()-jakusko nasari gr-enters at wurbo- odubo gr- jarmari gr-yautare gr-kafin madaki-dass lga-leaves Bauchi state(tafawa balewa lga) enters plateau state (mangu lga) to bokkos - 820km. kafin madaki Bauchi state-alkaleri LGA enters plateau state kanam lga- wase gr-250 km, Banki (Cameroon) to gwoza –borno- madagali lga (adamawa)-shaushau gr(Hong lga)-dauchi gr(song 109 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies lga)-ngongoshi gr(mayo belwa lga) –jada lga-leaves adamawa state at toungo lga and terminates at mayo kam gr bali lga taraba state- 780km 28 These routes are continually being blocked by the construction of residential and industrial structures. The one major policy initiative carried out by the Taraba State House of Assembly in 2017, (with planned, but stalled implementation on January 1st 2018) is the Anti-Open-Grazing Law that sought to make nomadic pastoralist practices illegal throughout the state.29 The significant correlation between ethnicity/sense of ethnic Belonging and the Conflict between the Fulani pastoralists and Mambilla Cultivators in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State There are no easy answers to this assumption. However, the history of the area suggests that feelings of ethnic animosity arising from the Fulani conquest, domination, and subjugation of the pre-jihad ethnic groups, including the Mambilla, by the Fulani jihadists, may, as a matter of fact, be the most important factor in the conflict between the Fulani and Mambilla. The presentation of the problem as that between pastoralists and cultivators over land and water resources misses the point that both Mambilla and Fulani are cultivators and herders at the same time, although to varying extents. Summary Fairly strong evidence from our research work suggests that economic, political and ethnic factors have played the most important part in the conflict between Fulani pastoralists and the Mambilla on the Mambilla Plateau in Taraba State. Evidence further suggests that religious considerations came into play only much later in the history of the area due to the activities of the Cameroon Baptist Mission and colonial anthropologists associated with them, notably David Zeitlyn and Jean Hurault. The creation of a Mambilla Script of the Bible, the establishment of the Cameroon Baptist Mission Schools in the 110 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Christian majority areas of the Plateau, and the recent ethnic cleansing, all indicate a desperate effort on the part of certain elements of the Mambilla elite, notably, misguided politician, to help control over the area. Since the 1970s, concerted efforts have been made, mainly by Christian Mambilla elites, to create the now familiar indigene/settler dichotomy they anchored on the misguided notion of the Mambilla being the original settlers of the Plateau. Suggested Solutions. The conflict between nomadic pastoralist Fulani and cultivators is not about land use and access to water resources.It.is driven by ethnic hatred and economic envy. It is also aggravated by the party political manipulation of primordial sentiments of ethnicity. The laws enacted by the governments of Benue and Taraba States complicated the problem. Governor Samuel Ortom of Benue State has been very vocal in defence of the aggression against Fulani herdsmen in Benue State for ethnic and political reasons rather than the alleged conflict between farmers and herdsmen. Recent facts emerging over his misunderstanding with the former governor of the state, Gabriel Suswan, and links to a notorious mercenary are further indications of the political nature of this security crisis. We recommend the following-: 1. Since the crisis on the Mambilla Plateau is mainly ethno- political, a different approach to its resolution may be necessary. As an interim measure, security must be beefed up around the “cattle farm settlements” or ranches. The Mambilla militias must be disarmed and prosecuted, together with their sponsors, for the genocide they perpetrated against the Fulani on the Plateau. 2. Legitimate grievances of both parties must be addressed through the due process of the Law. In the long-term, a power- sharing formula must be evolved to protect the rights of vulnerable numerical minorities such as the Fulani. 111 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

3. All blocked cattle routes (both local and international) should be unblocked in the same way as illegal structures have and are being destroyed in various parts of the country. The blocking of the burti is as serious, if not more serious, than the dumping of waste in our drainage systems. 4. No one in their proper senses would recommend violence as a way out of social problems. However, government must investigate the alleged involvement of herdsmen and some ethnic militias, particularly in Benue, Taraba, and Adamawa States, and punish all guilty parties. Particular attention must be paid in this regard to those who supply the arms no matter how highly placed they may be. 5. The recently proposed establishment of ranching colonies in ten (10) states is a welcome and commendable development. However, its implementation must involve all relevant stakeholders, not chauvinistic politicians. In implementing this policy, however, adequate attention must be paid to the failures of the past30 with a view to ensuring that they are not repeated. 6. This problem has an international dimension which should be taken into account in resolving the crisis. Togo has, for example, recently enacted a law on the transhumance movements. Nigeria must take a lead in this direction. Many people have complained that the Fulani herdsmen who are engaged in the current conflict are 'foreigners' because they have found to be unable to speak 'Fulfulde'. Fulfulde has many dialects, some of which may be mutually unintelligible. Moreover, some nomadic pastoralist Fulani groups may also lose their language to other languages. Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement and residence, and the right to work must be protected for all Nigerian citizens, including the nomadic pastoralists. 112 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

References

1. “” in Wikipedia, retrieved on December 26, 2017. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Blench, Roger. "Summary”, in “The Transformation of Conflict between Pastoralists and Cultivators in Nigeria”, in, Moritz, M. (Ed.) Journal of Africa. Cambridge, 13 September 2003. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Taraba State of Nigeria. The Taraba State Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Bill, 2017. 8. Ibid. 9. Microsoft Corporation, (2008).Microsoft Encarta Dictionaries. Redmond, W.A. 10. Ibid. 11. Engels, F. “Letter to W. Borgius” in Marx-Engels. Pre- capitalist Socio-Economic formations: A Collection. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979. 12. Wikipedia, “Taraba State”, 2018. 13. See Blench, Roger, “The Mambilla Plateau: a century of conflict.” in Blench, R.Op.cit.P.7.In more recent times, “there were several ethnic crises dating back to the 1970s.There were attacks in 1979, 1980, 1982, 2001, and 2002.”See the Premium Times, October 14, 2017. P. 2. 14. Abubakar. Saad, The Lamibe of Fombina: A Political History of Adamawa 1809-1901.Zaria: ABU Press.1977.Pp 66-71.Sa'ad Abubakar places the establishment of the fulbe chiefdoms of Ngaundere, Tibati, and Banyo at around 1825 to 1835.Since the establishment of these emirates was achieved mainly through war, and since these emirates, particularly 113 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Banyo under Hamman Sambo, constituted the bases from which the Fulbe invaded the Mambilla Plateau, it seems reasonable to backdate the history of the Fulani/Mambilla conflict to that period. 15. “During a visit to the area, the acting General Officer Commanding, GOC, Third Armoured Division of the Nigerian Army, Jos, Benjamin Ahanotu said he had never seen carnage like he saw on the Mambilla Plateau.” Cited in Premium Times, October 14, 2017. 16. Wikipedia. “The Mambilla Plateau”. Retrieved on 20th June, 2018. 17. “NIGERIA: Administrative Division”, retrieved from www.CITYPOPULATION.DE on 21st July, 2018. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Wikipedia, ibid. speaks of “cattle farm settlements” rather than ranches. 21. Information obtained from Alhaji Dahiru Goro Gashaka in Jalingo on15th May, 2018.Until a ban was placed on the practice by the Sardauna Local Government about 5 years ago, herders on the Mambilla plateau camped at various locations for the short dry season between November and March, on the Plateau, rather than elsewhere. 22. Hurault. Jean. “Land crisis on the Mambilla Plateau, Nigeria, West Africa” in Journal of Biogeography, retrieved at www.researchgate.net/publication/230148544 on 20st June,2018. 23. Saad, Abubakar, op.cit. Pp. 66-71 24. Ibid. 25. The major ethnic groups on the Mambilla Plateau are the Mambilla, the Fulani, kaka, panso, and kambu. These groups migrated onto the Plateau in at various times. The process of 114 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

peopling of the Mambilla Plateau has resulted in the emergence of Fulfulde, the language of the Fulani as the lingua franca on the Plateau. See for example, Lenshie, Nsemba, E., Johnson, A.. “Ethnicity and Citizenship Crisis in Nigeria: Interrogating inter ethnic relations in Sardauna Local Government Area, Taraba State”, in African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, Vol.6 (3), pp 4 8 - 6 1 , M a r c h 2 0 1 2 , r e t r i e v e d a t www.academinjournals.org/AJPSIR,on 5th July,2018., where it is stated,inter alia that 'All ethnic groups on the Mambilla Plateau speak Fulani language,Fulfulde,as their lingua- franca,..” It is necessary to reassert this obvious fact in view of the recent efforts being made to downgrade Fulfulde to the status of “language of commerce”. Cf: Wikipedia. 'the Mambilla Plateau”. Op.cit. 26. Abdullahi, Daneyel, and Aliyara, (2015). “GRAZING RESERVES AND PASTORALISM IN NIGERIA: A REVIEW”, in Vom Journal of Veterinary Science, Vol. 10, 2015:137-142. 27. W. Hamman/. NLPD, Federal Ministry of Agriculture. “Transhumance International Routes”. 2004. 28. One of the Bills is Bill No. HB 16.02.388.C371, entitled “A Bill for an Act to Establish the National Grazing and Reserve Commission To Establish, Manage, and Control Grazing Routes and Reserves in all parts of Nigeria and other Incidental Matters thereto”., of 2015.Although merely legal, implementation of the bill could have mitigated the crisis. Non-implementatation of several Federal Government Policies aimed at alleviating the perennial conflict between sedentary cultivators and nomadic cattle rearers could have reduced tensions if they had been implemented. A similar bill- The National Grazing Reserve,(Establishment) Bill,2016 was 115 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

also proposed in 2016,with the same results. 29. The resistance to the spread of Western Education in the 'Muslim' areas of northern Nigeria, by the Caliphate authorities is well documented. See, for example, Fafunwa, B. (1972) The History of Education in Nigeria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The opposition to Western Education in the northern parts of this country under Colonial Rule is not as irrational as some commentators have suggested. The Muslim parts of the North already had a well- established Koranic Educational System based on Islamic Principles. Western Education also came with its own religious attachments, and those Caliphs of the , notably Attahiru 1, (Attahirun Ahmadu), definitely knew what they were doing. 'Pagan' resistance to both Islam and Christianity in Africa and other parts of the Third World is also well known.

116 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies The Growth of the Jukun-Kona Political and Economic System, 1900 – 2017

Akombo I. Elijah, PhD Atando Dauda Agbu, Ph.D & Rebinah Rinret Amos Nyonkyes Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria [email protected]

Abstract Prior to the intrusion of colonialism into Kona land, the people had their traditional socio-economic and political systems. The entire Kona system was founded on the existing platform. Just like in any other former colonial territory, the incursion of colonialism in Kona land impacted much on their pre-existing system. This chapter is an attempt to examine the impact the colonial system had on the economic and political systems of the Kona people. To properly do this, the paper looks at the entire Kona political and economic systems before the advent of colonialism in the area. Findings in this paper reveal that colonialism distorted what was formally obtainable in the Kona political and economic spheres of life before its incursion. In addition, colonialism brought many changes into the Kona system of organization such as introduction of new ways methods of administration or structure of government, neglect of local industries while maintaining colonial interests. The multi-disciplinary research approach was adopted in this paper using oral tradition, written sources, archival sources, journal articles and other relevant materials to this paper.

Introduction The Kona people are presently found in an exclusive village popularly known as Kona Garu. The village lies between latitude 100 500 and 800 900 north and longitude 110 and 120 east. Kona village is bounded on the north, east and west by huge protective mountain

117 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies chains, and on the south by a valley of fertile land and some perennial streams (Talla, 2016). According to Habu, the word Kona is derived from the which refers to the entire Jukun people as Kona. This may be connected to the Jukun Gwana or Kwana of Pindiga area in the present day Gombe State. To others, Kona is a derivation from the Jibu word “Kauna”, meaning “excuse”. Other versions have it that the word “Kona” originated from the Fulbe word “Konobe” which means warriors. By the 11th century, the Jukun had settled on the Gongola and Benue valleys. According to Halima it was from there that a larger group, made up of the Wase clan travelled farther west and established the famous kingdom west of the River Taraba Bali. The Jukun Kona clan remained on the and established their first settlement at Kuro or Kindom near Lau and subsequently founded Kona under their Kuru (Chief). Politically, the Kuru had the power of life and death over his people. Through religio-political control, the Kona were able to influence all their neighbouring groups such as the Mumuye, the Bandawa, Kunini, Shomo, Jiru and so on, who, in turn, owed allegiance to them over a period time (Sabine&Ann, 2000). The Kona people practiced numerous traditional beliefs founded on rites, cults and practices which had definite functions among the people. The principal economic activity of the Kona people was farming. Over70% of the total population of the people actively engaged in the growing of different types of food crops used both for subsistence and for commercial purposes (Kaigama, 2017). Origin and Migration of the Kona People The origin and migration of the Kona people is shrouded in myth, just like several other peoples of African origin, including Nigeria. The origin of the Jukun-Kona is linked to the origin of the Jukun of Kwararafa and all other Jukunoid-speaking ethnic groups. 118 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

The tradition about the ancestral home of the entire Jukun speaking group of people is very complex and obscure, with about three or four ancestral homes mentioned as Egypt, Yemen, Baghdad, and (Talla, 2016). In their oral history, the Jibu claim that Kona existed even before the founding of the Kwararafa Empire, which is most likely not verifiable as the present site of Kona was founded in the mid-18th century during the jihad movement of the Fulbe. According to oral sources, the Jibe migrated from Yemen to Borno around the 9th century, continued their migration through Pindiga and finally reached a place at the banks of the River Benue, referred to as Kuro or Kindo some two hundred years later, where they settled for some years, until they lost a magic golden stone, that was given to them by their ancestors. The group then split in two, the larger group wandering on towards the old capital of Kwararafa, Byepi, while the other group remained at the river where they waited for the waters to subside in order to get their stone back. During the dry season they finally retrieved the stone and settled at this place until the beginning of the 17th century (Dame, 2016). Habu and Nokani (2105), maintain that the Kona state is situated along the migratory routes of the entire Jukun people. As a result, the origin and migration story of the Kona people cannot be unconnected with that of the entire Jukunoid-speaking people. The Pre-colonial Political Organization of the Kona Politically, the Kona people, evolved a centralized system of government headed by the Kuru which had Seventeen council members representing the Seventeen clans of the Kona people. These council members assisted the Kuru to govern the people. The evolution of the centralized system of governance saw the emergence of Seven king makers who were the Wunkir, Kashar, Khrwhar, Khngbana, Sinigha, Sikani, Wuru and Sinkani Janabanibu (Garba, 2017). 119 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

The clans that evolved the kingship system of the Kona were the Bahjiburo, Bahmurtai, Bah-Doni, Bah-Wururo, Bah-Mirisi, and the Janabanibu. There were also few vassal states that were incorporated into the administration of Kona Chiefdom as a result of the religio-political doctrine adopted by the Kona people. The religio-political doctrine adopted by the Kona over the years aided the growth of Kona hegemony with mutual relationship.4 The Kona people so much believed in the divine power of their chief who could not be seen easily by the people, except through a mediator. The Kuru and his council members who assisted him were responsible for the general administration and justice inherited from the sacred ancestors (Talla, 2016). The status and functions of the offices of the Kona political system are discussed below: Kuru – The Kuru was believed to embody the creator-god referred to as Kurumam by the people. He was regarded as a sacred ruler of divine descent who possessed absolute political and religious authority over all. He lived a life of seclusion which was characterized by the observance of a multiplicity of taboos. He was responsible for the administration and justice, which were inherited from the sacred ancestors. In the case of his death or dethronement, the appointment of a new Kuru could only be carried out by the seven- member king-making officials, drawn from the three ruling houses of Jiburo, Doni and Marisyi. The Wururo and Janabanibu clans also had a stake in the appointment of a new Kuru because of the indispensable duties carried out by the leaders of the two clans for the Jibu society (Dame, 2017). Kajan – The Kajan was the head of all civil officials in the government. He was the administrative assistant and the premier advisor to the Kuru. His primary function was to receive report of daily events and happenings in the society, investigate them thoroughly and give account of same to the Kuru. Kajan was the channel of communication between the people and the Kuru. He 120 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies mediated between the title-holders, the community and the Kuru and could represent the Kuru in both religious and political matters. In the case of death or dethronement of a king, the Kajan presided over the affairs of the state pending the appointment of a new Kuru. He oversaw the election of a new Kuru but was never allowed to participate in the election and could never be made a king because he was not an heir apparent to the throne by virtue of his position as a maternal relation of the royal lineage (Dame, 2017). Kawu – The holder of this title must be a member of the Kushaba clan. He was the head of the priestly class and was in charge of the security and defense of the people. He did not mingle with the public but lived a life of seclusion in adom shrine where he spent time communing with the ancestors and maintaining regular contact with the spirits through the performance of rituals, libations and sacrificial offerings, in a liturgical manner. The Kawu acted as mediator between offenders and justice and could reverse the Kuru's verdict over certain matters. The Kawu did not meet face to face with king in the presence of other people. The Kuru could only visit him secretly in his shrine to discuss matters of urgent public importance. Furthermore, every newly appointed Kuru must be taken to Kawu's shrine to observe a six-day period of seclusion and spiritual rebirth from his former self to a state of sacredness before being crowned as the king. The Kawu observed a one-month period of fasting before the ceremony of Shi~sanu, during which time he was forbidden to talk with anyone until the fast was over (Kaigama, 2017). Wunkhri – The Wunhri must be a member of the ruling aristocracy of Bajiburo. He was one of the king-makers and could take charge of all religious affairs in the absence of the king. He provided accommodation to the visiting male members of the royal family who came to Kona Garu from the outlying villages for religious feasts. 121 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

The Wunkhri's compound was used as the burial ground for the deceased male members of the clan. He was also in charge of collection of data and keeping of accurate record of all the dead male members of his clan. He was also responsible for giving in marriage, the women from the royal family and delegating the person (apyenu) to whom their bride would be paid (Joseph, 2017). Siniga – The Siniga must be a member of the Badoni clan. He was the caretaker of the shrine nowasabayi, and the leader of his clan. He was the premier adviser to the traditional council on matters that affected the society. He was highly respected by everyone in the society and was regarded as the “father” of the Kuru and, by extension, a Kuru of some sort. He did not observe taboos in the palace and cannot be queried by the king. The Siniga was one of the most important king-makers whose duty, it was, to inspect all the candidates aspiring to the office of the Kuru with a view to ascertaining the soundness of their health and to also ensure that they had appealing physique (handsomeness) required of a Kuru. He was assisted in the discharge of duties by sundod who could perform his functions. However, whether he was absent, Sundod could never act for him in his function as the king- maker (Joseph, 2017). Kangbana – The Kangbana was one of the king-makers and was a member of Baiburo clan. He, in collaboration with the Wunkhri, was responsible for maintaining cohesion within the royal family. He provided accommodation for the female members of the royal family who visited Kona Garu for religious ceremonies. He directed the distribution of food and drinks during the clan's religious feasts and could act on behalf of the Kuru and Wunkhri at Brikuru shrine whenever the two were unavoidably absent. Also, he was charged with the responsibility of overseeing the way princes interacted with people outside of the ruling class. Lastly, in collaboration with the Simani, could stand in for Wunkhri in giving out the brides, married 122 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies from the royal family (Nojiri, 2016). Sunu – The holder of this title must be a member of Bajiburo clan. He was charged with the responsibility of conducting all the burials and funerals of the members of the royal family. He was responsible for preparing the corpses of the male members of the clan before they were buried. He could delegate his assistants, Keiyai and Wunsuni, to carry out this task. In addition to this function, he presided over all religious activities at Kuro during Shi~aku festival (Sabine & Ann, 2000). Kinihow – The Kinihow title was given to the clan members of Bamuribayi. The holder of the title was the leader of all the servants in the palace and was charged with the responsibility of looking after the Kuru on a daily basis to check his health status, the account of which he gave to the Kunuhwoy. He was also responsible for the treatment of snake bites since he was the custodian of the herbs and medicine that cured snake bites. These herbs were kept in his shrine, now daw (Habu, 2016). All these officials assisted the Kuru in the Kona political system and contributed to the political stability and development of the people in the pre-colonial times. The Jukun Kona exercised political influence and control over the communities among whom they settled, for instance, the Mumuye, the Bandawa, Kunini, Shomo, Jini, among others. Sources have it that these groups, especially the Minda, Jessi, Waitai, Gongon and Kassa were said to have come under the influence of the Kona to the extent of paying tribute to them. Furthermore, Habu (2015), provided some of the glimpse of Kona influence among the Jenjo and Bachama. He maintained that because of the control of Kona over the salt production centre (Bomanda), the Jenjo called salt cikwei, meaning salt or ashes of Kona, while the Bachama referred to salt as fite-Kona, meaning salt of Kona. The Kona were said to have established their influence on the Mumuye through conquest, and their military superiority over all the 123 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies surrounding communities in terms of organization and the use of cavalry was cited as a definite advantage which made the conquest feasible. This may have been true in respect to the Mumuye communities on the plains who were accessible to horse-using invaders. The Mumuye group that seemed to have been subjected to Kona raids were the Zavon, excluding the Zompa and Ranti clans, who were later immigrants into the area and who cooperated with the Kona people (Vakkai, 2006). From the above-mentioned, it can be clearly observed that the Kona chiefdom welded great influence far and near their territory in the pre-colonial times before the colonial incursion into the area. Pre-colonial Economic Organization of the Kona People The principal economic activity of the Kona people in the pre- colonial period was farming, just like a number of other people of African origin and Nigeria in particular. Over 70% of the total population was actively engaged in the growing of different types of food crops which were used both for subsistence and commercial purposes. In the earliest times, food crops such as millet were cultivated primarily for subsistence purposes whereas crops such as groundnuts, cassava, bambara nuts were grown as cash crops (Nojiri, 2016). i. Farming In the Jukun-Kona society, the true worth of a man's social standing was measured on the basis of his husbandry and industry as proven by his farm harvests rather than by his boasts or display of physical strength. And as a result, to attain such a prestigious status, every Kona man in the society learnt the art and practice of different types of agricultural activities. They discovered which types of soil types and conditions were suitable for the cultivation of a particular crop and also understood the various systems of preserving the fertility of the soil; such as crop rotation, shifting cultivation, mixed farming/cropping and bush fallowing (Nojiri, 2017). 124 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

In the earliest times, the vast unoccupied land was free for anybody to farm without encumbrances by another. Members of the same household, kindred or clans occupied virgin lands in the same location which would be cultivated by all families within the clan. Although the entire kindred owned the lands, farmlands were usually inherited from fathers to sons and they were cultivated through the cooperative work of the kindred members. The rule of inheritance from fathers to sons is still maintained but the lands are now distributed to individuals in each family. Disputes, when they occurred, were usually settled by the elders of the clan, but where parties involved were unable to agree by the verdict, the case could be referred to Sonji (the settler of land disputes in the shrine by oath) for oath-taking and establishment of truth by the gods (Dame, 2017). Different types of food crops were cultivated by the Kona people, but guinea-corn was given premium in view of the fact that it was used for brewing of beer required for various rites, daily consumption and the periodic co-operative farm work purposes. Maize used to be only cultivated in order to bridge the gap before the harvest of guinea-corn. The women assisted the men in the less strenuous farm work during its season. They took part in planting, weeding, harvesting, winnowing and transporting of the harvested crops home (Dame, 2017). ii. Smithing The Kona were also engaged in iron smelting. This was a gender endeavour in the Kona society. It was an occupation reserved exclusively for the men folk. The Kona men and their Mumuye neighbours were famous for their skill in the extraction of iron which found diverse uses as means of income generation. It was equally used in the production of tools, weapons and jewelry. They made tools like hoes, cutlasses, bores and arrows, knives, traps, money currency (Taje) (Sani, 2017).

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iii. Carving Wood carving was another important craft reserved for particular clans who were considered to be very creative. Wood carving and blacksmithing crafts were regarded as noble because of the role they played in the production of weapons, tools, jewelry, and other aesthetics. In the former times, wood carvers and blacksmiths were feared and avoided by many because they were believed to be in contact with evil spirits who gave them the ingenuity required for their professions. Members of other clans avoided giving out their daughters to wood carvers, because they were required to sacrifice or perform rites to the spirit of a tree which would be used for the making of important objects. This they feared because a wood carver would not mind sacrificing his children in other to appease the evil spirits controlling the forest (Dame, 2017). iv. Pottery Pottery making was a lucrative economic venture reserved exclusively for the women folk. Pottery is a surviving trade that has remained very relevant, owing to the fact that its economic contribution to the society is still very much appreciated. Although some pots might be molded for personal use, majority of pots built were usually taken to the market for the purposes of income generation. However, the ritual pots which were used in the shrines for offerings to the ancestors were either built by men or old women who had attained menopause. In the earliest times, young unmarried women were forbidden from engaging in pottery making because it was believed to hinder them from bearing children. Pots molded included pari piru (reservoir water tank), pari zah- kunu-gurel, pari fonu (bathing water container), pari sobah (cooking pot), swai (pot for beer), and ag'ru (special jar for husbands) (Sani, 2017). The Kona potters also decorated the inside and outside of their houses which added beauty in the society.

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v. Brewery Beer which is called shii in Kona local language occupied an important position in the religion, economic and social life of the people. The religious significance of beer lied in its use by the priests for sacrificial offering to the spirits and ancestors. Its economic contribution lied in the fact that it served as a lucrative source of income for the women, whereas its social importance lied in the fact that it was an indispensable beverage required for entertainment at social gatherings such as marriages, naming ceremonies and burials. To the Kona, beer is a favourite drink, the preparation of which is a task reserved exclusively for the women folk and its daily consumption by almost everybody in the community (Sani, 2017). They used sorghum or bulrush-millet in its production which takes about six days before it is ready for consumption. This trend has been so from the pre-colonial up to the colonial era in the economic activities of women in the Kona society. The British colonialists in Kona employed some strategies to encourage the smooth running of Kona society. The British also encouraged the production and subsequent exploitation of raw materials and taxation. The British colonial administration adopted the pre-capitalist method of labour extraction, which is the peasant cash crop production method. This method focused on the process of production of the needed cash crops, such as cotton, groundnut, beniseed and so on in the hands of Africans, using essentially family and community labour (Okpani, 2013). Economic Effect of Colonialism in Kona Economically, attention shifted from the production of food crops to cash crops following the establishment of colonial rule in Kona. This was geared towards the satisfaction of the colonial economic interest to the neglect of the Kona people. The use of forced and paid labour was introduced for massive production of cash crops as against food crops and local products. Consequently, the people's 127 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies local industries such as iron extraction and blacksmithing, wood carving and pottery was relegated to the background while promoting the production of cash crops to meet up the demand of the Europeans (Price, 3187). This development resulted in famine since there was drastic reduction in the quantity of food crops produced. On what could be said to be positive development, colonialism introduced a standard means of business transaction in Kona otherwise referred to as money. By this development, the traditional barter system, and later the use of salt, livestock, crops, beads, labour and iron bars ceased to exist as means of business transaction. This was facilitated by the introduction of the British currency, pounds and shillings. The incidence of colonialism also saw the introduction of taxation among the Kona just like in any other administrative area in what became Nigeria. Taxation served a number of functions, but the most outstanding was to raise money for administrative purposes as well as to use it for the development of Britain. Similarly, taxation was introduced to maintain the flow of money or cash from the people to the Europeans (Michael, 1986). With this exchange pattern, the Europeans gained full control of quantity of goods/cash crops demanded and supplied and the price of each commodity. Finally, the introduction of money during the colonial period in Kona have a great effect on the people's attitude towards money. The love of money took over the spirit of good neighbourhood among the people. Money became the major yardstick that determined relationship between people. A man without enough money to give people is termed poor and, as such, considered less important in determining his relationship with others. The love for money made people to pay more attention to the production of cash crops, as was the focus of the colonial masters, which resulted in shortage of foodstuff with its attendant effects, the most outstanding which was famine (Paul, 2016). 128 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Conclusion In conclusion, this paper has examined the Jukun-Kona political and economic organization from 1900-2017. In addition, the paper also examined the effect of colonialism on Jukun-Kona political and economic systems. By engaging the multi-disciplinary approach in this paper, the study observes that the Kona people suffered foreign incursions which, to a large extent distorted their way of life. The study also observed that the numerous practices introduced by colonialism stunted the growth of the traditional Kona system even though it did not completely destroy same. Even in the post-colonial period, the effect of colonialism has continued to weigh higher influence in the lives of the Kona society to the extent that economic system of the people has moved away from its original state. The study suggests that both the former and the later systems should be harmonized by the people in order to improve their political and economic systems. This can be done by reviving the most beneficial aspects of the former political and economic spheres of the Kona people to enhance the growth and development of the Kona people.

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References

Talla, S. N. ed; Topical Issues in the Study of Early History of Some Ethnic Groups and the Mambilla Plateau in Taraba State of Nigeria, Tedia Ventures, 2016, p. 24. Sabine, D. & Ann, S. Magic and Gender....2000, pp. 59-60. Mr. Kaigama, R. 62yrs. Oral Interview on Kona History, 5th June 2017. Talla N. S., ed; Topical Issues in the Study of Early History of Some Ethnic Groups and the Mambilla Plateau in Taraba State of Nigeria, Tedia Ventures, 2016, p. 25. Mr. Dame Jauro, Oral account on the history of Kona, Yawhai Village on 06-2016. Talla, S. N. ed; Topical Issues in the Study of Early History of Some Ethnic Groups and tte Mambilla Plateau in Taraba State of Nigeria, 2016, p. 28. Mr. Garba 60yrs. Oral Interview on Kona History, 5th June 2017. Talla, S. N. ed; Topical Issues in the Study of Early History of Some Ethnic, pp. 29-30. Dame, B. The Jukun Kona: Historical and Anthropological Perspective, Real Design and Multimedia. 2017, pp. 104-105. Dame, B. The Jukun Kona: pp. 105-106. Mr. Kaigama, R. 62yrs. Oral Interview on Kona History, 5th June 2017. Mr. Nemzu Joseph, 78yrs interview in Kona 13th June, 2017. Mr. Nemzu Joseph, 78yrs interview in Kona 13th June, 2017. Mr. Simon Nojiri 68yrs, Mrs. Elizabeth Yashin 65yrs., Mr. Nokya Francis 60yrs, Group Interview on Traditional Worship of Kona, 2016. Sabine, D. & Storch, A. Magic and Gender....2000, pp.60-61. Mr. Habu Sani, e'tal, interview on the Migration and Settlement of Kona, 2016. Mr. Vakkai, M. 60yrs, Kona Oral Account on the Worship System of 130 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Kona Community, 2016. Mr. Vakkai, M. 60yrs, Kona Oral Account on the Worship System of Kona…, 2016. Mr. Simon Nojiri Kona, 68yrs interview in Kona, 11th June, 2017. Mr. Simon Nojiri Kona, 68yrs interview in Kona, 11th June, 2017. B. Dame, The Jukun Kona: pp. 36-38, 40. Dame, B. The Jukun Kona: pp. 33-35. Mr. Habu Sani, Oral Interview in Kona, 15th June, 2017. Baya Dame, The Jukun Kona: pp. 36-38, 40. Mr. Habu Sani, Oral Interview in Kona, 15th June, 2017. Mr. Habu Sani, Oral Interview in Kona, 15th June, 2017. Okpani, U. P. “Kona Excursion Report” of Student Historical Society of Nigeria Taraba State University Chapter (SHSN), 2013. Price, S. L. “Kona Tribe” Adamawa Province Anthropological Notes.NAK.3187, p. 61. Michael, O. Certificate History of Nigeria, Longman Ltd., 1986, p. 193. Paul, A. S. Opposition Politics in Taraba State, 1991-2011, Unpublished Master Dissertation Benue State University Markudi Department of History, 2016, p. 39.

131 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies Militancy and Conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Historical Account of the Contributions of the Multi-National Oil Corporations

Odeigah, Theresa Nfam, PhD Department of History and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ilorin, P.M.B 1515, Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria. [email protected], 08038042036, 08054292977

Abstract The Niger Delta region of Nigeria is endowed with abundant natural oil and gas resources and therefore has enormous potentials for the economic development of the country. Even before Nigeria gained political independence, oil and gas exploration activities had started in the region as early as 1955. The foreign exchange earnings that have accrued to the nation from oil exploration in the region have been largely responsible for the economic development, albeit limited, that Nigeria has witnessed. When oil drilling activities started in the region, the host communities had no premonition of the hazards they will be exposed to in the subsequent years. But sooner or later the operational activities of the Multinational Oil Corporations resulted in massive environmental degradation in the region. Several years of unchecked oil spillage have resulted in extensive degradation in the communities. The pollution has not only affected the soil surface, but also underground waterways. The sea, rivulets and fresh water have all been polluted and as a result, fishing and farming, the major occupations of the people in the region, have been negatively affected resulting in low yields. The inadequate or absent remediation process has not only affected the social relationship between the host communities with government, but also with the Multinational Oil Corporations. The situation further deteriorated following the inability of the Multinational Oil Corporations to provide jobs for the teeming unemployed youths in the region. As a consequence, the region has witnessed an upsurge in militancy, violence, pipeline vandalism, youth restiveness and criminality. This paper examines critically, the negative consequences of the Multinational Oil Corporations explorations' and exploitation activities in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, using a historic-structural and multidisciplinary approaches. The study concludes that violence and militancy in the Niger Delta region are traceable to the poor management of the negative consequences of oil exploration activities in the region. Keywords: violence, militancy, exploration, exploitation, Multi-nationals

132 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies Introduction The Niger Delta region is located in the Southern part of Nigeria on the Gulf of Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean. The region comprises of six states from the South-South geo-political zone, namely, Cross River, Akwa-Ibom, Rivers, Delta, Bayelsa and Edo, including Imo, Abia and Ondo States. The Niger Delta Region is the host of all the oil producing companies in Nigeria. However, the region has been known as a major producer of agricultural produce right from inception, even before the discovery of oil in 1956. Niger Delta was one of the major producers of palm oil, timber and rubber in Nigeria. It was mainly because of these agricultural produce and other important raw materials that the British firmly took control of the region which they named the Niger Coast protectorate (Mitee, 2012). The Niger Delta people had very high economic prospects, which buoyed by the discovery of oil. The discovery of oil made the region to become the hub of oil business over the whole of West Africa. The Niger Delta people should therefore not be seen as indolent people mainly because of the several conflicts and violence in the area. Before the advent of crude oil business in the region, agricultural produce were widely and intensively propagated and there were no conflicts, violence or unnecessary agitation among the people (Coker Benku and Ekundayo, 1995). Conflicts most times are products of artificial and ill-conceived problems. In the case of the Niger Delta Region, the recklessness of the Multinational Oil Companies' exploration and exploitation activities, lack of adequate compensation and several other factors have turned the oil rich region into a conflict and violent area. Excessive gas flaring by Multinational Oil Companies has caused global warming challenges which have affected agricultural yield and caused untold hardship to the people (www.nairaland.com, 2016). Consequent upon the foregoing, the Niger Delta Region that was

133 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies once known as a peace loving region suddenly became a place of conflict and violence. The incident of conflicts and violence can be traceable right from the inception of Ken Saro Wiwa's struggle for the Niger Delta people. Ken Saro Wiwa was a renounced play writer and also environmentalist. In 1956 when Shell British Petroleum Company, which was transformed from Royal Niger Company, discovered oil in a town called Oboibiri in the present day Bayelsa state, it held a lot of promises for the development of the region and, indeed, Nigeria as a whole. In 1958, the same Company discovered oil in Ogoni land in a large and commercial quantity (Etim, 2003). Consequently, Shell British Petroleum and the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Nigerian National petroleum Corporation (NNPC) started entered into partnership for the exploitation of oil in the area with strong promise to develop the region. On the long, however, the activities of the Company left much to be desired in terms of improving the people's standard of living. Generally, the exploration of oil in the Niger Delta Region has caused a lot of environmental degradation and hazard which has virtually destroyed the ecology of the region. The region that was once known for massive agricultural produce during the colonial period suddenly became limited to a few produce as a result of the crude oil exploration activities in the region (Ajodo-Adebanjoko, 2017). The exploration of crude oil in the region has provided more than 90 percent of the revenue of the Federal government of Nigeria. Despite the enormous contribution from the region to the entire economy of Nigeria, the region has remained grossly neglected and undeveloped resulting in conflicts and violence and the emergence of several militant groups. No planned remediation programme has been carried out in the region to mitigate oil exploration activities, despite even promptings from the United Nations (Punch Newspapers 2012). 134 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

The Genesis of Conflicts, Violence and Militancy in the Niger Delta Region The genesis of conflicts, violence and the emergence of militia groups in the Niger Delta Region was born out at of the frustration of the people and their desire to call the attention of the Oil Companies and the Federal Government of Nigeria to the massive environmental pollution resulting from the activities of the Oil Companies in the region (Kimiebi, 2010). The conflicts began in 1992 in Ogoni land and it escalated to other groups in the Niger Delta region, supporting that compensation should be paid to the people (Bagaji, Achegbulu, Maji, Yakubu, 2011). In 1979, the Federal Government of Nigeria got the right of ownership of all oil wells and the right to all Nigerian land which eventually gave the Federal Government of Nigeria the opportunity to properly engage the Oil Companies. In all these there was no active investment of the natives in the oil business, neither was compensation paid to the people for several oil spillages that damaged their arable agriculture and fishing activities. The empty promises from the Federal Government of Nigeria were however the main factor that gave room for the formation of the Movement for the Survival of the in 1992. Among other grievances, the people of the region were not satisfied with the environmental and economic impact of oil exploration by the Oil Companies. The elites in the region such as late Ken Saro-Wiwa became the main agitators campaigning for the survival of the people and the protection of their environmental rights (https://m.dw.com...nigeria..ken-saro, 2015). In 1990, Ken-Wiwa launched a non violent movement for Social and ecological justice. In respect to this, there were attacks to the Oil Companies, and in 1993, some Companies in the area pulled out. Because of the conflicts between the people and the Oil Companies and the Federal government, the production of oil slowed down causing reduction in the exchange flow as well as the reduction in 135 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies foreign exchange accruing to the country. Several agitations by the Niger Delta people led to the death of several people in the region through assassinations, death by hanging through the court and summary trails. Consequently, the cohesion in the struggle to clean up the Niger Delta region was lost due to several actions of the Federal Government and oil producing companies as well as corrupt practices by highly placed people from the region (Oral Interview with Johnson, 2018). This development resulted in the emergence of many militant groups in the region for the protecting and promoting the interests of the Niger Delta communities. Emergence of Militant Groups in the Niger Delta Region The Niger Delta region of Nigeria with great economic potentials has ironically become a conflict and violence zone. The vast abundance of natural resources being controlled by the multinationals, contrasts with the abject poverty of the people of the Niger Delta. The region where most of the country's wealth is been generated has remained in abject poverty. The region is characterised by lack of infrastructure, access roads, basic medical facilities, power supply and high fuel cost. The foregoing factors are some of the factors responsible for the conflicts and violence in the Niger Delta region. The conflicts and violence in the area are triggered by a number of factors such as revenue allocation and the formulae being used in revenue sharing and youth restiveness in the region. Some people have supported that allocation to oil producing Niger Delta areas should be increased to take care of the problems associated with crude oil production. The derivation percentage to the region should be increased to take care of unforeseen circumstances and environmental degradation associated with oil exploration activities (Nasiru, 2012). Other causes of conflicts and violence in the Niger Delta are the refusal of the Multinational Oil Companies, to pay adequate compensation to the Niger Delta people and also put in place latest oil production technologies to limit oil spillage in the 136 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies region. Unemployment among the youth is another major factor fuelling the conflicts (Okah, 2010)...... In recent times, because of lack of compensation by the Oil Companies on one hand and government's silence on the other hand, a lot of militant groups have emerged in the Niger Delta. Their objectives include, struggle for survival of their people, payment of compensation, development, social justice and promotion of youth employment, among others. Prominent among the militant groups in the Niger Delta are, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and the Niger Delta Liberation Front among others, are the groups vandalising oil pipe lines and kidnapping people in the Niger Delta area (Nathaniel, 2018). Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta group began in January 2006 with the kidnapping of four foreign oil workers as well as claiming responsibility for attacking oil pipe lines in the Niger Delta. It has also disrupted the global oil supply as a result of attacks on pipe lines and this group is largely made up of Igaw youths (Hanso, 2007) Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) is a prominent militant group that was launched by late civil rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in1990. The group was against the Royal Dutch Shell and the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the neglect of the Niger Delta. The agitation of the group was mainly for upholding the right and the benefits of the people. They were several protests especially on environmental degradation and economic neglect. The agitations eventually led to the death by hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine others. Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) was founded in 2004 by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari with the interest of gaining control over their oil and it is also one of the largest militant groups in the region. This militant group had always demanded for 137 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies large shares of oil wealth from the government, and failure on the part of government to meet their needs had resulted to oil bunkering and pipeline vandalisation (Nyiayaana, 2015, 132-138). The Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) is another militant group in the region led by Ateke Tom since 2003. The group is made up of Ijaw youths around Port Harcourt, and their main arm is to take control of the oil in the region, because of the marginalisation by the government and the multinationals operating in the region (Wikipedia.org). Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) this is one of the most recent and destructive groups in the Niger Delta region. This group is mostly composed of young adults. The activities of the Niger Delta Avengers from 2016 become a major concern to the polity because of the serious security implications of its activities. In 2016, the group attacked oil facilities causing the shutting down of oil production and the slowing down of Nigeria's economy. This singular incident grossly slowed down the Nigerian economy and was one of the major factors responsible for the Nigerian economy going into recession in 2016. This led to the shutting down of other oil terminals causing a short fall in oil production. The group's spokes man General Murdoch Agbinibo most times issued statements of threats against the Multinationals. The group struck oil installations in the Niger Delta leading to massive revenue shortage by the federal government Nigeria. (Sharea Reporters, 2018) The Niger Delta Liberation Front was established in 2005 by John Togo whose main aim was to liberate the Niger Delta region by gaining its independence. The leader of this group was killed in July 2011. The militant group is closely associated or linked with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta because their ideologies appear the same and their operations around Port Harcourt and its environs. The militant groups have made several attempts to control the 138 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies exploration of oil in their land, even through bunkering and several other criminal methods. The conflicts between successive governments and the people of the Niger Delta, particularly the militant groups have remained, causing violence and unrest for the people and massive economic losses to the nation. Suffice it to say that these groups are concerned about the economic development of the people, protection of the ecosystem, mitigation of the adverse health consequences of oil exploration, the inability of Federal Government and the Oil Companies to respond positively to the yearnings and aspirations of the Niger Delta communities (Odeigah, 2015, 80-85).. Generally, the inability of the Multinational Oil Corporations to provide jobs for the teeming unemployed youths in the Niger Delta region has become worrisome, and is one of the reasons for the conflicts in the region. As a consequence, the region has witnessed an upsurge in militancy, violence, pipeline vandalism, youth restiveness and increased criminality in the nation. Criminality in the region has reduced the activities of the Oil Companies, especially in situations where oil wells are shut down for security reasons. A lot of major foreign investors have also had to go elsewhere for the fear of being involved in unprofitable ventures. The Effects of Exploratory Activities of Multinational Oil Companies in the Niger Delta Region The Niger Delta region of Nigeria has been embroiled in violence and conflicts between the government, Multinational Oil Companies and the Niger Delta people. These conflicts and violence have affected a lot of families and their livelihood. In recent years, the Itsekiri and Ijaw militias in Delta and Ondo states fought and killed several people and destroyed property worth several million of naira respectively. Similarly, in 1997, the Warri youths had a clash with the Ijaw youths over the establishment of a new Local Government headquarters. This clash resulted in six Shell Petroleum fuel stations 139 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies taken over by the youths. Furthermore, communal clashes or ethnic squabbles have been known to result in seizure of oil pipe lines by the youths leading to stoppage of oil production. Other negative consequences include environmental hazards caused by oil production activities in the area (Oral interview with Eweseudo Sunday, 2018). The pollution of the land has also resulted in low yields of the agricultural produce. The following are some of the consequences and problems associated with the extraction of crude oil in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Environmental pollution: The extraction of crude oil in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has polluted the air, the land and the water thereby imposing numerous dangers to aquatic life and the people. Most areas in the Niger Delta region lack access to good water as a result of pollution of the environment (Ugboma, 2015). The global memorandum of understanding signed by Chevron Nigeria Limited, a major Oil Company in Nigeria, in 2005 was denounced by most of the host communities because of the Company's inability to meet the needs or the demands of the people. No serious attention has been paid to the issues of protection of the environment by either the Oil Companies or the Federal Government of Nigeria (Owabukeruyele, 2000). Lack of adequate compensation from the companies: Another problem with crude oil extraction in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is the lack of adequate compensation by the Multinational Oil Companies and the Federal government of Nigeria to host communities. Among the compelling factors for the justification of payment of compensation include the event of oil spillage or other environmental hazards as a result of oil exploration activities. This has inadvertently encouraged youth restiveness, violence, oil theft, bunkering and other criminal activities prevalent in the Niger Delta region. Some of the these criminal activities by the young people in the communities have led to pipe line explosion, massive fire out 140 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies break and several deaths of the people of the Niger Delta Region (Oluwaniyi, 2010). Hazards of gas flaring: Gas flaring in the Niger Delta region has several consequences on the ecosystem and the inhabitants of the communities. Some of the consequences result from fact that this technology of gas flaring is out dated, wasteful to the natural gas reserves and dangerous to the human lives. Unfortunately, the Federal Government of Nigeria has not been very proactive in addressing this urgent problem by continually changing the date for the stoppage of gas flaring in the region (Soeze, 2007). Oil Spillage: Since the inception of oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, oil spillage has been common as a result of wrong operations or the old technology used by the companies. Oil spillage in the region has destroyed and polluted a lot of farm lands, roads, water and crops. The region has also experienced a number of manmade disasters because of oil pipe line leakages. Most of the leakages come from equipment failure, vandalisation of pipe lines either by criminal elements or from the disgruntled youths in the region. It should be noted that, during oil spillage, most times the oil floats on the water surface invariably killing the fish, impoverishes the soil and also destroys the components of the ecosystem, leading to the degradation of the mangrove forests thereby negatively affecting the livelihood of the people (https://www.wilderness.org). It is necessary to recall that in 1971, massive oil spillage occurred in Ebubu-Ochani around Ogoni community of Gokana Local Government Area of , leading to the death of several indigenous people. This and a combination of several factors led to the formation of militant groups in Ogoni land. It is common practice that whenever environment and economic conditions of the people deteriorate to unbearable level, the communities naturally become unhappy. 141 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

The militant groups in the Niger Delta region are therefore basically formed to checkmate the excesses of the Oil Companies. The devastation is really awful. Unfortunately, successive governments have refused to be sensitive to the plight of the Niger delta people. It has been indicated that oil-spill has adversely affected the nutrient level and fertility status of Eleme soil (Nwosu, 2009). One of the major negative consequences of oil exploration is oil spillage which damages the ecosystem. It is pertinent to note that the vegetation of the Niger Delta Region consists of extensive mangrove forests, swamps and rain forest. The recurrent spillages of oil in the region have been a major issue that has become worrisome to the people. Estimates of 5 to 10 percent of the mangrove forest have been wiped out leaving the land unproductive and with some of the rainforests fast disappearing. Furthermore, the oil spills do spread out to farm lands and water ways destroying aquatic life and other crops, including the mangrove forests which have really been a veritable source of timber to the people of the Niger Delta region. The oil spills into water ways have specifically negatively affected the fishing industry. The Niger Delta which was formerly well known for fishing as its main occupation has lost this important economic status due to poor environment management by the oil companies. Similarly, The rivers and the waterways that provide drinking water and water for various other domestic uses have become contaminated by the oil spillage (Odimegw, 2018). Health hazards: There are many health hazards associated with the exploration of crude oil. Oil exploration has exposed many people to sicknesses such as respiratory tract infections, allergic skin diseases and even chromosomal disorders. Other health hazards include deaths on injuries caused by natural disasters such as earthquakes (Nwosu, 2009). Some of these earthquake result from the damaging effects on the ecosystem as a result of activities of heavy duties 142 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies equipment. Drug or substance by the youths, in particular, resulting from loss of sources of livelihood and frustration has resulted in accidents claiming lives as well as causing injuries and with many youth having mental disorders. There oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta Region are not without their complications on the health of the local inhabitants. Among the dominant health hazards include recurrent chest and skin infection. (Oral interview with Ezenwo Matthew, 2018). Unfortunately, little is done in terms of improving health facilities in the area or even subsidizing medical services.

Recommendations The Niger Delta that was once known for peace has recently become a region of violence, because of marginalisation, subjugation, oppression and consequent poverty caused by the Multinational companies in the area. One of the recommendations to foster peace in the region is for the Multinational companies to pay compensation to their host communities to help mitigate the negative consequences of oil exploration activities. The federal government of Nigeria and the Multinationals Oil Companies in the region should put in place infrastructure such as good roads, electricity supply, hospitals, creation of jobs and skill acquisition especially by the teeming unemployed youths. However, the Federal government should be committed to its amnesty programme and its rehabilitation of the ex- militants. The federal government should also reduce the impunity of the Multinational Oil Companies in the region. It is pertinent to note that in 2012 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ordered the Federal government of Nigeria to hold the Multinational Oil Companies accountable for environmental degradation of the region, and that fines should be imposed on Oil Companies for the environmental pollution. The Multinational Oil Companies it further added should be made to clean up the land because of the oil spillage which has destroyed the 143 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies eco-system and aquatic lives in the region (Opejobi Seun, 2016). Conclusion The oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria has enormous economic potentials but it has become a region of conflicts and violence as a result of the poor management of the consequences of oil exploration by the Multinational Oil Companies operating in the area. The Oil Companies, as agents of neo- colonialism, have destroyed the ecosystem of the region causing low agricultural yield and lack of adequate compensation to the people of the Niger Delta. The devastating effects of oil production has also resulted in massive environmental degradation, increased agitation, violence, conflicts, youth restiveness, criminality, insecurity and poverty. Unfortunately, government presence has been less inclined towards dialogue and less sincere in its approach, responding to the agitation of the Niger Delta communities for the purpose of mitigating the growing incidence of militancy in the area. Instead, the Niger Delta people are being intentionally schemed out of important decisions regarding the survival of the Region.

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References

?7 Ways Oil and Gas Drilling bad for the Environment, https://www.wilderness.org/articles/ article/7-ways -oil-and- gas-drilling-bad-environment ?Abii, T. A.& Nwosu, P.C., (2009): The Effect of Oil-Spillage on the Soil of Eleme in Rivers State of the Niger-Delta Area of Nigeria https://scialert.net/fulltextmobile/?doi=rjes.2009.316.320 ? Ajodo-Adebanjoko, (2017): Towards ending conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta region ?Akpan, N. S. (2010): Kidnapping in Nigeria's Niger Delta: An Exploratory Study, Journal of Social Science, 24(1): 33 – 42. Retrieved on 4/5/2018 from ?Bagaji, A.S.Y. Achegbulu, J. O. Abu Maji, Aatala Yakubu, (2011): Explaining the Violent Conflicts in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Is the Renter State Theory and the Resource-Curse Thesis Relevant?, Canadian Social Science, Vol. 7, No 4, pp34-42 ?Benkuf Coker M. O. A Spill Site in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria” Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 36 (2) 94- 104, Editorial Comment, Retrieved on 21/4/2018 ?Etim, W. (2003): ICE Case Study: Ogonis and conflict, factsheet on the Ogoni struggle. Retrieved on 1/7/2018 ?Hanso Stephanie (2017): NEND: The Niger Delta Umbrella Militant ?http://www.insular.com/~tmc/politics/africa/ogoni.fact.html. ?http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JSS/JSS-24-0-000- 10-Web/JSS-24-1- 000-10- ?http://www.punchng.com/editorial/stemming-resurgence-of- militancy-in-nigerdelta/ ?https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/towards-ending-conflict-and- insecurity-niger-delta-region 145 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

?https://www.ajol.info/index.php/stech/article/view/119190 ?Kasomo, D. (2012): An assessment of ethnic conflict and its challenges today. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 6 (1), pp. 1–5. ?Kimiebi, I. E. (2010): Oil, Militancy and Political Opportunities in N i g e r D e l t a . R e t r i e v e d o n 2 / 6 / 2 0 1 8 f r o m http://kimiebi.blogspot.com ?Ledum Mitee, (2012): Oil exploitation, the environment and crimes against naturehttps://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/03/oil- exploitation-the-environment-and-crimes-against-nature/ ?Nasiru Idris Medugu's (2012): Blog, Issues and Challenges “Crude Oil Exploration, Exploitation and production in Nigeria”, https://environmentalsynergy.wordpress ?Nathaniel Soonest, Top 5 Deadly Militant Groups from the Niger Delta 2019: https://www.legit.ng. ?Odimegwu Onwumere (2018): Beyond Oil Spillage in Niger Delta, http://wwwm.thenigeriavoice.com. ?Nyiayaana Kialee (2015): Arming Community Vililantes in the Niger Delta, Implication for Peacebuilding ?Okah, E. (2010): Why Niger Delta may remain poor. Retrieved on 1 / 1 2 / 2 0 1 8 f r o m , http://www.nigerianbestforum.com/blog/?p=48565. ?Oluwatoyin Oluwaniyi, (2010): Oil and Youth Militancy in N i g e r i a ' s N i g e r D e l t a R e g i o n , https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0021909610367767 ?Opejobi Seun, (2016), How to end NIGER Delta Crises-SERAP advises, F.G, https://www.dailypost.ng. ?Oral Interview with Eweseudo Sunday, (2018): 83+ years, Status Male, Occupation Trader, Place of interview Warri, , Date of interview 10/7/2018 ?Oral Interview with Ezenwo Matthew, (2018): 50+ years, Status Male, Occupation civil savant, Place of interview Port Harcourt, 146 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Rivers State, Date of interview 5/5/2018 ?Oral Interview with Johnson John, (2018): 68+ years, Status Male, Occupation farmer, Place of interview Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Date of interview 12th May, 2018 ?Oral Interview with Okleke Ukpei, (2018): 83+ years, Status Male, Occupation Farmer, Place of interview Onicha-Ugbo, Agba Royal Family, Delta State, Date of interview 4/5/2018 ?Owabukeruyele, S. W. (2000): “Hydrocarbon Exploitation, Environmental Degradation and Poverty in the Niger Delta of Nigeria” a paper presented the Lund University LUMES ?Owabukeruyele, S. W. (2000): “Hydrocarbon Exploitation, Environmental Degradation and Poverty in the Niger Delta of Nigeria” a paper presented the Lund University LUMES ?Punch Newspapers (2012): Stemming resurgence of militancy in Niger Delta, ?Sahara Reporters (2018): Niger Delta Avengers to Resume Massive Attacks on Oil Facilities, https://www.saharareporters.com. ?Soeze, C, 2007: Companies and Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta Vanguard, http://wwwvnguardng.com/articles/2002/business/b121102003. ?Odeigah, T. N. (2015): “The Implications of Globalisation on Security and Development: a Study of Boko Haram Insurgency and Niger Delta Militancy in Nigeria”. Alore; Ilorin Journal of Humanities, 24. 79-93. Published by Faculty of Arts, University of Ilorin. ?Ugboma, PP (2015): Environmental Degradation in Oil Producing Areas of Niger Delta Region, Nigeria: the Need for Sustainable Development ?Ugochukwu C., & Ertel Jurgen, (2012): Negative impacts of oil exploration on biodiversity management in the Niger De area of Nigeria, 147 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

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148 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies The Challenges of Teaching and Learning History in Some Selected Secondary Schools of Taraba State, 1991 – 2011

Atando Dauda Agbu, PhD & Yahya Adamu Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria

Abstract It is obvious that, the challenges of teaching and learning History kept growing since 1980s following the introduction of Social Studies/Governments in our schools. This study examines the challenges of teaching and learning history in some selected secondary schools in Taraba State, 1991 – 2011. This is in view of the crisis of relevance of the subject matter as reflected in the glaring shortage of teaching materials, inaccessibility to historical site/excursion, poor timing of history lessons, lack of encouragement, volume of history work, among others, are the core challenges of teaching and learning history in some selected secondary schools in Taraba State. Through historical multidisciplinary approach and random-sampling of views/opinions, the study concludes that, concerted effort and genuine approach by government, Historical Society of Nigeria, Parents Teachers Association, would no doubt ameliorate the above mentioned problems. Moreso, it is hoped that, the chapter will contribute to the body of knowledge/emerging issues regarding historical scholarship.

Introduction Modern Academic historical studies in Nigeria started since the colonial period. However, the teaching and writing of history then was Eurocentric in nature and biased against local History. The study of history and, indeed, Nigerian history as a discipline began to take shape between the end of the 1940s and in the 1950s. The most remarkable epoch in the study of Nigerian history was the emergence of the

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University College Ibadan in 1948. This served as the pivot of Nigerian historical studies. During the 1950s, a revolution occurred in historical studies in Nigeria following the completion of Doctor of Philosophy in history by Kenneth Onwuka Dike, who elevated African and Nigerian history in particular through the use of oral sources.1 The year 1955 signaled the establishment of the Professional Association of the Practitioners of History in Nigeria. With the attainment of independence, the study of history continued to gather momentum as the practitioners of the discipline began to Nigerianize Nigerian history which had been subjected to colonial distortions, domination and manipulations for years. In 1962, more History Departments were established at the new Universities of Ife, , Zaria, and University of Nigeria, Nsukka, as offshoots of .2 Through these Departments of History, many historians were trained and historical studies continued to expand in the country up to 1970. The discipline of History was then regarded to be the flag-ship of humanities.3 However, from the beginning of the 1980s, historical studies began to derail when the corrosion of the Curriculum Conference of 1969 began to unfold on History. In essence, by 1983, History was removed from the curriculum of Nigerian Junior Secondary Schools and replaced with Social Studies. This development laid the foundation for the crisis that eroded the reputation of the discipline, which is still threatening advancement of historical scholarship in Nigeria. Additionally, the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of 1985 to 1993 under General Ibrahim Babangida's administration made matters worse. According to Samaila Suleiman: By the late 1980s, the Nigerian state had lost its initial productivity for social engineering with the result that, culture of institutions and discipline within humanities, hitherto seen as purveyors of national values were 150 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

neglected while the applied sciences became synonymous with national development. Meanwhile, drastic cuts in government expenditure on education affected scholarly activities such as conferences, researches and publications. History was severely affected by the fiscal crises and the identity politics associated with it.4

While historical scholarship was in the midst of crises, the creation of Taraba State from Gongola State in 1991 became a reality. The newly created State grappled with the teething problems as a result of inherited educational problems affecting historical studies. From the beginning, there was presence of History in most schools in Taraba State, inspite of the waning status of the subject in the school curricular. Two decades after the creation of Taraba State, studies have shown that, very insignificant number of schools maintained History as a subject of study. Up to 2011, History was taught in Government Day Secondary School, Gassol, Government Day Secondary School, Bali and Government Day Secondary School, Gembu in Central Zone. Government Day Secondary School, Bantaje, Government Day Secondary School, Wukari and Government Day Secondary School, Ibi in the Southern Zone. Government Day Secondary School, Salihu Dogo, Government Day Secondary School, Zing and Government Day Secondary School, Lau in the Northern Zone. Even though History was taught in these schools, the operation was nothing to write home about.5 Teachers of History in the aforementioned schools lost the needed enthusiasm to handle the subject because of fewer students. And more often than not, the students complained of mockery from their colleagues, that, the subject lost its ranking in terms of priority and it did not offer a better prospect for its graduates.6 In GDSS, Gassol, for example, the available History teachers were asked to teach Government, and Social Studies in the Junior and Senior Secondary levels. This was because of fewer number of History 151 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies students in the classes. Other History teachers were delegated responsibilities like Form Masters of larger classes, Food Masters, Game Masters, while teachers of subjects like Basic Science, Basic Technology, Mathematics and Economics were allowed to handle their classes only, for the fact that, students were congested in their subjects/classes.7 Status of History in Taraba State The study of History in what became Taraba State is traced to the colonial period. During this period, History was taught right from the primary school level, though Eurocentric in nature. The curriculum was basically Eurocentric in nature covering mainly European History devoid of African/Nigerian History. The creation of Taraba State on 27th August, 1991, out of the defunct Gongola State of the North-eastern Nigeria had an impressive picture about History. Almost all its secondary schools offered History at the early age of the State. While some schools had greater number of students, others had relatively fewer numbers. The History students' enrollment in the schools identified with the study of history thus is reflected in the tables below:

Student Enrollment into schools identified for study 1991 – 2011 Table 1: Student enrolment in Central Zone

GDSS Gassol GDSS Bali GDSS Gembu Year of No. of Year of No. of Year of No. of S/N S/N S/N Enrollment Students Enrollment Students Enrollment Students 1. 1991 - 1996 35 1. 1991 - 1996 45 1. 1991 - 1996 100 2. 1996-2001 21 2. 1996-2001 30 2. 1996- 2001 85 3. 2001-2006 18 3. 2001-2006 16 3. 2001-2006 72 4. 2006-2011 09 4. 2006-2011 07 4. 2006 -2011 65

8 9 10 Sourc e: GDSS Gassol Sourc e: GDSS Bali Source: GD SS Gembu

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Table 2: Student enrolment in Southern Zone GDSS Wukari GDSS Takum MGDSS Wukari Year of No. of Year of No. of Year of No. of S/No. S/No. S/No. Enrollment Students Enrollment Students Enrollment Students 1. 1991 - 1996 50 1. 1991 - 199 6 60 1. 199 1 - 1996 40 2. 1996-2001 38 2. 1996-2001 53 2. 1996-2001 32 3. 2001-2006 24 3. 2001-200 6 47 3. 2001-2006 24 4. 2006-2011 1 1 4. 2006-201 1 28 4. 2006-2011 13 Source: GDSS Wukari11 Source: GDSS Takum 12 Source: MGDSS Wukari 13 T able 3: Student enrolment in Northern Zone GDSS Karim-Lamido GDSS Zing MGDSS Jalingo S/No Year of No. of Year of No. of Year of No. of S/No S/No . Enrollment Stude nts En rollment Students E nrollment Stud ents 1. 1991 - 60 1. 1991 - 38 1. 1991 - 30 2 . 1996 52 2. 1996 23 2. 1996 18 3. 1996-2001 45 3. 1996-2001 19 3. 1996-2001 10 4 . 2001-2006 20 4. 2001-200 6 05 4. 2001-2006 06 2006-2011 2006-2011 2006-2011 S ource: GDSS Karim Sourc e: GDSS Z ing15 Source: MGDSS Jal ingo16 L amido14 The statistics of the History students' enrolment as obtained from the Admissions and Statistic Office of the schools across the zones, and tabulated above, serve as backup on the chanted outcry about the continuous declining enrolment of students History in Taraba State. In the Central Zone, GDSS, Gembu was holding sway, followed by GDSS, Bali and Gassol but all indicating the extinction of History in the schools. Also, the scenario in the Southern Zone reflected a depletable phenomenon with GDSS, Takum, holding sway followed by GDSS, Wukari and MGDSS, Wukari, at the bottom indicating red card for History. The two zones above went with the Northern Zone hand-in-hand in the travail to abort the glory of History, with GDSS, Karim Lamido, holding/losing grip of History students followed by GDSS, Zing, and MGDSS, Jalingo, indicating the marginal falling in the teaching of History. 153 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies Similarly, a comparative study of the students' enrolment in History and Government in the West African Examination Council (WAEC) within the period under review further exposed the drastic decline in the study of History at the Senior Secondary School level. The study shows the edge Government continued to have over History within the period of study as reflected in the table below; Table 4: West African Examination Council, Senior Secondary Schools Students enrolment in the Subject of History and Government 1991 2003 2011 Centr No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of School S / N e No. History Gov’t. History Gov’t. History Gov’t. Students Students Students Stud ents Students Students 1. GDSS Gassol 33112 09 45 56 04 19 105

2. GDS Bali 33122 27 67 02 112 02 191

3. GDSS Gembu 33103 53 100 34 5 4 23 49 4 . GSS Zing 33110 71 120 4 1 01 0 132 5. GDSS Karim 33115 12 50 0 1 64 0 72 Lamido 6 . GSS Jalingo 33102 34 45 4 8 8 0 200 7 . MGDSS Wukari 33 105 8 65 0 5 6 0 58 8. GDSS Takum 33104 88 122 1 89 0 95

9. GSS Wukari 33101 1 7 9 98 0 148 Total number of students per 251 469 63 526 21 653 subject Source: WAEC Office, Yola Branch17 The above table reflects students' enrolment in History and Government in the nine schools covered by the study across the three geopolitical zones of the state. The findings from the study point to the drastic declining interest of students in the study of History. The beginning of the declining interest in History and the humanities generally could be linked to the 1969 Curriculum Conference. The consequence of the conference was the deemphasization on the 154 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies humanities and History as the mother subject. The introduction of the 6-3-3-4 resulted in the introduction of Government as a subject which was erroneously considered as equivalent to History. This development provided a soft landing for students who considered History to be difficult and uninteresting, the consequence which was mass migration from the study of History to Government as reflected in the table above. Drawing analogy from the table above, it could be said that the future of History as a subject was at stake, endangered, tottering and ready to collapse. The danger became so enormous since secondary schools served as the first gateway for students to come in contact with History. Considering this bizarre situation of History and impugnation on the future of the subject, Alabi lamented that: The ground for sowing seeds of interest is arid as students in secondary schools have to make choice between History and such subjects as Governments and Economic. In private schools it is almost nonexistence in the syllabus.18 In 1993, a panoramic view of the table above indicates that while the total number of students offering Government kept increasing, the total number of students' enrolment in History in the schools sampled kept declining in an alarming rate. This ebbing away of the reputation of History was not without connection to the comparison between History and Government, and other subjects, which made Adeyinka to observe that: “the increase competition among other secondary grammar school subjects is the cause of the initial unpopularity of History”19. Many factors accounted for this unfortunate development about the status of History as discussed in next part of this chapter/study. The Challenges of Teaching and Learning of History in some selected Secondary Schools in Taraba State Government Policy on Education; The status of history in Nigerian 155 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies educational system became threatened following the introduction of the 6-3-3-4 System which was the outcome of the Curriculum Conference of 1969. The policy or the system corroded the reputation History enjoyed before and after independence. Among other negative policies, it phased out History in Primary and Junior Secondary Schools and miniaturized the study of History with Social Studies. Clearly, government adopted negative attitude towards History. By the early 1980s, it had become obvious that things were beginning to fall apart for the discipline of History following the introduction of Social Studies. This development at the lower level of education affected historical scholarship in two ways; first, the absence of History in Junior Secondary Schools for more than three decades led to low turnout of History students in Senior Secondary Schools. Since then, very few students offer History at Senior Secondary School level. The policy of the tertiary institutions that erroneously accepted Government as alternative of History for the purpose of admission into History Department added salt to the challenges. This has contributed in worsening the state of historical studies in Taraba State20. Similarly, in attempts to attract students to History, and to justify the admission of students without background in History, many universities or tertiary institutions have changed the nomenclature of History Departments by attaching to the Department other disciplines. For instance, in Taraba State, Federal University, Wukari, and Taraba State University, Jalingo, have introduced the Department of History and Diplomatic Studies. The attachment of diplomatic studies has created a window to accommodate students without History at the O-Level to properly fit in for admission. This development made students having Government, Civic Education and the likes to be admitted for the study of History. This, no doubt, contributed to the damage to the study of History at the secondary 156 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies school level21. Inadequate Trained History Teachers: This also contributed to the growing challenges and status of History in the selected schools in Taraba State. This constrained Bozimo to advise that, “effort be made to re-appraise the level of preparation of teachers of History, as it is observed that most of them did not possess much needed understanding of the epistemology and ontological demands of both the content and method of teaching History”22. From the foregoing, it is imperative for History teachers and learners, alike, to acquire pedagogical skills necessary for effectively handling of the teaching of the subject. This is to encourage the students develop interest in the learning of the subject. Similarly, teachers of History should be made available in our schools as against the acute shortage that exist today23. Worthy of note about the gross shortage of trained history teachers in the selected schools is the fact that inspite of the strength and status of these schools in terms of years of establishment, location and population, the schools today have nothing to write home about regarding the study of History as a subject. Below are tables reflecting the distribution of teachers in the schools identified for study within the period under review.

Table 5: Distribution of History teachers in the schools identified for study in Central Zone

GDSS Gassol GDSS Bali MGDSS Gembu No. of No. of No. of s/No s/No Year Teache s/No Year Teache Year Teache . rs rs rs 1. 1991-1996 06 1. 1991 - 04 1. 1991 - 10 2 . 1996-2001 03 2. 1996 04 2. 1996 08 3. 2001-2006 02 3. 1996-2001 02 3. 1996-2001 06 4 . 2006-2011 00 4. 2001-2006 01 4. 2001-2006 03 2006-2011 200 6-2011 Source: PPSMB24

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Table 6: Distribution of History teachers in the schools identified for study in Northern Zone GDSS Zing GDSS Karim Lamido MGDSS Jalin go No. of No. of No. of S/N S/N S/N Year Teache Year Teache Year Teache o o o. rs rs rs

1. 1991-1996 03 1. 1991 - 06 1. 1991 - 05 2. 1996-2001 01 2. 1996 03 2. 1996 05 3 . 2001-2006 00 3. 1996-200 1 04 3. 1996-2001 03 4 . 2006-2011 0 0 4. 2001-200 6 00 4. 2001-2006 00 2006-201 1 20 06-2011 Source: PPSMB25 Table 7: Distribution of History teachers in the schools identified for study in Southern Zone GDSS Takum GDSS Wukari MGDSS Wuk ari No. of No. of No. of S /N S/N S/N Year Teache Year Teache Year Teache o o o r s rs rs 1 . 1991-1996 0 8 1. 1991 - 07 1. 1991 - 06 2. 1996-2001 05 2. 1996 04 2. 1996 03 3 . 2001-2006 0 3 3. 1996-200 1 04 3. 19 96-2001 03 4. 2006-2011 01 4. 2001-2006 02 4. 20 01-2006 01 2006-2011 2006-2011 Source: PPSMB26 The tables above bluntly picture gross inadequacy of History teachers covering the period of study 1991 – 2011. More worrisome at present is the glaring appearance of History teachers in the schools covered by this study. For instance, in the Central Zone, GDSS, Gassol, has no single History teacher today. Similarly, GDSS, Gembu, which used to have greater number of History teachers had only three History teachers left with GDSS, Bali, having only one 158 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

History teacher by the time of this study. In the Northern Zone, the three schools identified for study, today, have no single History teacher. The scenario underscores the urgent need for intervention otherwise the celebrated return of History in our schools may end up only in the pages of newspapers and websites. In the Southern Zone, the distribution of History teachers in the schools identified for study from 1991 – 2011 left some glimpses of the subject, but reflects geometrical retrogression which wore same garment with the two sister schools in the Northern and Central Zones. While GDSS, Wukari, was left with two, GDSS, Takum and MGDSS, Wukari has one each respectively. Non-availability of Teaching Aids/Materials: Most of the textbooks available were not up to date, and more often than not owned only by individual class teachers. In events of transfer, such teachers went with their textbooks. Unfortunately, the school authorities, on their part, did not make effort to procure History textbooks. In GDSS, Gassol, for example, following the creation of Taraba State, and between in 1991 – 2011, when History teachers were redeployed to Adamawa State, the only History teacher left for SSS I to III had to borrow past notes prepared by the deployed teachers with relevant textbooks to teach the upcoming classes27. This was a sorry state of the subject in GDSS, Gassol. In GDSS, Bali, as at the period of the interview, the principal, who was himself a History teacher, complained of acute inadequacy of instructional materials from 1991 – 2011. He lamented that, all his textbooks borrowed to NYSC members and teaching practice students who came to teach History were not returned, which placed the teaching of History in the school on the cross-road28. In MGDSS, Jalingo, History was downplayed due to the fact that, priority was turned to science even before 1991. From 1991 – 2011, the only 18 students in the hay days of History in the school 1991 – 1996 were taught by a teacher who only had background of Political 159 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Science. The teacher confessed that, he managed to assist the students to realize their dreams but could not follow the syllabus strictly because of inadequacies29. The story duplicated itself in GDSS, Wukari30, and all the other schools identified for study in the period 1991 – 2011. This scenario clearly showed total neglect by the government in the provision of the basics facilities for the teaching of History as opposed to other subjects. This development posed great challenge in the teaching and learning of History in Taraba State. The Tradition of forcing Teachers who are not History biased to teach History. Teaching is a deliberate attempt to impart knowledge by a professional of a field. Unfortunately, the teaching of History was misconceived to be mere storytelling and as such sociologists and political scientists were found teaching History. This was the sorry state of history in some of the schools in Taraba State within the period under review. Tanko Hikon, when interviewed, stated that: I took over GDSS, Wukari, with a single History teacher and myself. When he retired, I engaged NYSC members who read Arts oriented courses to manage the subject.31 The above testimony reveals the reason why students were not interested in History, and History cannot be interesting if the few who chose to study it could not properly understand it at the Secondary School level. In a similar vein, tertiary institutions more often than not gave admission to applicants who did not have credit in History or even did not attend History lessons at their ordinary level. These, and other factors, made History lessons uninteresting to some students even at the tertiary level. A survey conducted into the phenomenon of forcing those who did not read History to teach the subject within the period under review, 1991 – 2011, further exposed the doom History experienced within the period in Taraba State. Unfortunately, History rejects any society that rejects it, and historians provide the searchlight for any society to 160 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies address both present and future challenges as Tunji Olaopa quoted Frierich Von Schlegel, a German philosopher, thus; Historians are prophets in reverse! They are the custodians of the narratives of the past, and that fact alone explains why they are to be feared by today's custodians of power.32 The foregoing remark entails that, it is needless to force a teacher who is not a Historian to teach the subject, for the required narratives/knowledge is not there and above all, he/she may only succeed in cheating instead of teaching. Historians/History teachers should be allowed to teach History, and where there is none, concerted effort must be put in place by PTA and relevant community agencies to get one for the sake of the children imparting adequate and relevant historical knowledge. Less Emphasis and Poor Timing of History Lessons in the School Timetable. Akombo Elijah holds that; throughout his secondary school years, History lessons were taught only in the afternoon33. This, according to him, was in contrast with other subjects like Mathematics, English language, Physics and Chemistry which received greater priority of morning hours. Unfortunately, to most secondary school students and teachers, afternoon lessons are considered harsh because attention is either tilted to going home, hunger, thirst, headache, drowsiness, among other factors, which, no doubt, affect optimal performance of students. Side by side with the above is the frequency of History in the school timetable. History lessons were deemphasized. For instance, while History appeared twice in the whole week, subjects like Mathematics, English language and their likes appeared daily on the timetable. This tradition sent signals to students that History was not a priority subject and hence lessening the enthusiasm to offer it. A survey was made to authenticate the forgoing phenomenon, especially in respect to the appearance of History in the school time 161 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies table in the three zones covered by the study between 1991 – 2011. The findings presented in the tables below clearly shows virtual disappearance of History in the school time table; Table 8: Analysis of appearance of History in the Lesson Timetables of the schools identified in the Central Zone as case studies. S/No. S chool Frequency of History Time 1. GDSS Gassol 2 x in a week 11:30am and above 2. GDSS Bali 3 x in a week 12pm and above 3. GDSS Gembu 3 x in a week 1pm and above

Source: Schools34 Table 9: Analysis of appearance of History in the Lesson Timetables of the schools identified in the Northern Zone as case studies. S/N School Frequency of Time

History 1. MGDSS Jalingo 2 x in a week 12pm and above 2. GDSS Zing 2 x in a week 12pm and above 3. GDSS Karim Lamido 2 x in a week 12pm and above Sour ce: Schools35 Table 10: Analysis of appearance of History in the Lesson Timetables of the schools identified in the Southern Zone as case studies. S/No . School F requency of History Time 1. GDSS Wukari 2 x i n a week 11:30am and above 2. MGDSS Wukari 2 x in a week 12pm and above

3. GDSS Takum 3 x in a week 12pm and above Source: Schools36 The tables above do not only reflect inadequate lessons allocated for History, but also the very odd hours allocated for History on the schools time tables. These odd phenomena contributed in no small measure in eroding the credibility History used to attract during the 162 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies colonial period and in the early years after independence, especially before the 1969 Curriculum Conference which ushered in the 6-3-3-4 system of education in Nigeria. Student's attitude to History: There is no doubt that students exhibit the attitude of fear towards the subjects they consider difficult. This habit is common to subjects like Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry in the sciences. In the same vein, students in the humanities tend to display similar fear towards History. The fear is informed by some of the complaints often made by students such as History notes are voluminous; history is full of dates and difficult names to pronounce; History emphasizes the past; use of high sounding words and vocabulary, and so on. This is not unconnected to what Ajayi succinctly put as “… we could have an enduring sense of History without overloading syllabus with facts and dates”. The foregoing factors accounted for the drop in the number and quality of students enrolling for History for school certificates and with predictably low performance37. In another development, some History students in the tertiary institutions feel inferior to students studying disciplines like Law, Accounting, Mass Communication and the host of others. The two factors put together resulted in the mass exodus of students from History to other disciplines, and hence a major challenge in the prosperity of the subject in Taraba State38. A sample of opinions about students' responses in the schools identified as case studies for why students ran away from History indicated a strong phobia students developed towards History. The fundamental questions asked included; (i) Do you offer History in your school? (ii) Do you consider offering History necessary? (iii) If you are to offer History, do you expect support from your parents? (iv). Do you prefer Government to History? (v) Do you consider words used in History subject sounding and notes bulky? Generally, the responses to all the questions show very negative attitude toward the study of History. This was particularly about 163 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies students' attitude toward History as reflected in the tables below in case of each of the zones.

Table 11: Table indicating the attitude of Students toward History, Central Zone S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Gassol No

2. GDSS Bali Yes 3. GDSS Gembu Yes Source: Schools39

Table 12: Table indicating the attitude of Students toward History, Northern Zone

S/No. Schools Responses 1. MGDSS Jalingo Y es 2. GDSS Karim Lamido Yes 3. GDSS Zing Yes

Source: Schools40

Table 13: Table indicating the attitude of Students toward History, Southern Zone S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Wukari Yes

2. MGDSS Wukari Yes 3. GDSS Takum Yes Source: Schools41 Versatility of History: It is true that History is versatile and contains technical details and most importantly venerated the culture of reading. Habila Balasa maintains that: 164 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies At my early age, the study of History prepared me to read anything that I came across but I jittered today if I recall the volume of books I read in the past.42 Students in our secondary schools have mindset that, History is voluminous and contains high sounding words. Apart from the opinion held by Mr. Balasa, many academics in other disciplines also perceived that, History is versatile; they saw History from the perspective of story-telling and totally ignorant of fact that, History instigates national consciousness and rejuvenate the consciousness of the past and the future. No wonder, students in secondary schools today, took leave from the general perspective of people that, History is irrelevant and consider subject versatile in scope. Sample opinions/responses of students in the schools under study about their perception of the versatility of History reveal that majority of the respondents echoed about the versatility of the subject as reflected in the tables below in the case of each of the zones: Table 14: Table indicating Students' response on the versatility of History, Central Zone S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Gembu 1 (No), Others (Yes)

2. GDSS Bali 1 – 5 (Yes) 3. GDSS Gassol 1 – 5 (Yes) Source: Schools43 Table 15: Table indicating Students' response on the versatility of History, Southern Zone S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Takum 1 (No), Others (Yes)

2. GDSS Wukari 1 (No), Others (Yes) 3. MGDSS Wukari 1 – 5 (Yes)

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Source: Schools44 Table 16: Table indicating Students' response on the versatility of History, Northern Zone S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Karim Lamido 1 – 5 (Yes)

2. GDSS Zing 1 – 5 (Yes) 3. MGDSS Jalingo 1 – 5 (Yes) Source: Schools45 In the tables above, making a comparative analysis, only GDSS Gembu and Takum exhibited determined zeal to pursue Historical studies. The “No” answers to the versatility of History and “Yes” answers to (ii) and (v) above indicate favourable disposition to the study of History. For the remaining schools, whose answers were “Yes” to the versatility of History and “No” to (ii) and (v) above, indicate students' negative attitude toward History due to its versatility. Students of History must be voracious readers and ever determined to get to the facts and figures of issues and narratives that concern the past, present and future. Non-accessibility to Historical Sites: History cannot be taught properly in abstract and created imagination. History cannot be reduced to mere fiction and hearsay if it is to serve the purpose of reconstruction and reorientation of our society. History teachers and school authorities failed to appreciate the place of excursion in teaching History. For instance, a teacher teaching Kwararafa Kingdom ought to visit Wukari, the capital of the Kingdom, which is the seat of Aku Uka, the spiritual leader of the Kingdom. In teaching the Jihad, the palace of the Emir of Muri ought to be visited to receive talks on the available gazette, since Muri received one of the twelve flags issued by Usman Dan Fodio himself. Unfortunately, all the schools identified for study, none had idea about excursion nor did they know even the meaning and purpose of 166 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies excursion in teaching History. This was the situation within the period under review, 1991 – 2011. Most of the teachers interviewed covering the period did not even know about excursion, not to talk of appreciating the importance of excursion. Valentine Tyor remarked, for instance, that: I taught history in the whole of my 35 years in service preaching to schools authorities to provide room for excursion even by way of taxing students but to no avail. I ended teaching imagining history.46

The foregoing phenomenon, according to findings, was compounded by the cost involved in organizing excursions, which parents and school authorities found it difficult to shoulder. The unfortunate consequence was that the few students who studied History could not appreciate the importance of excursion and its associate benefits like practical evidences and leisure. Even the students interviewed indicated that the phenomenon is still obtainable. The findings were obtained from the following cardinal questions put across to the students; (i) Do you know what excursion is?, (ii) Have you ever visited a museum or a zoo?, (iii) Have you ever visited any of the Kings palaces to receive oral traditions?, (iv) Do you know artifacts? and (v) Have you ever visited Rivers Taraba, Benue or Donga? The findings or responses obtained from the questions are presented in the tables below: Table 17: Students non-participation in excursion in the Central Zone S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Gembu Yes 2. GDSS Bali No 3. GDSS Gassol No 47 Source: Schools 167 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Table 18: Students non-participation in excursion in the Southern Zone S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Takum Yes

2. GDSS Wukari No 3. MGDSS Wukari No Sour ce: Schools48

Table 19: Students non-participation in excursion in the Northern Zone S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Karim Lamido No 2. GDSS Zing No 3. MGDSS Jalingo No

49 Source: Schools The above exposed vividly poor excursion culture. Only GDSS, Gembu, and GDSS, Gassol, met the minimum standard of outdoor experience of Historical studies and Historical dispositions. The scenario of non-compliance to excursion culture was reported to cover the period 1991 – 2011 in the schools identified for study as shown above. Societal Attitude towards the Subject: In an interview, Akombo Elijah opined that, both parents and their children in the Senior Secondary Schools have developed negative perception about History50. The poor perception translated into the children's lukewarm attitude to take their History class/lesson serious. History class to the few, who opted to offer it, gave it lip service, pursuing it as just a means to an end. In Taraba State, in the selected schools, the interviews conducted revealed that, many parents wanted their children to read courses 168 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies considered lucrative or marketable, namely, Medicine, Engineering, Architecture and other pure science inclined subjects. Further revelations showed that there were instances when a child would choose History, but the parent will prevent him or her from taking it51. The society is more concerned with material possession to the detriment of intellectual advancement. Professor Ajayi narrated his experience in 1952, when he was about leaving for studies in the United Kingdom thus: I recalled that it was my mother who queried me as to what I was going to study in England when I said, “Itan” in Yoruba by which she understood “story telling” and asked what I would do with it. She was herself a good raconteur and probably wonder why anybody would need to go all the way to the UK to learn story telling.52

The above is a clear testimony that the subject, History, had for long, been stigmatized and down played. No wonder Saliba James concluded that; Until that moment, that hour, our past venerated, present built on the past foundation and future linked to the present, development will remain a mirage.53

Mr. Kamai, when lamenting about the societal attitude towards History attributed the phobia against History mainly to the body language of parents today, and the general attitude toward quick acquisition of wealth and the desire for things that glitter40. Even the children themselves having understood the body language of their parents toward History, and the general negative attitude the society developed toward the subject, decided to shy away from the study of a subject that does not attract quick financial gains. The story is the same today as revealed by responses from the questions below: 169 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

(I) Do you see Accounting and Medicine preferable courses than History, (ii) Do you subscribe to the idea that, History provides little prospect in life?, (iii) Do you agree that History concerns only about past and nothing else?, (iv) Do you support the study of commercial and science subjects than humanities?, (v) Do majority members of your community regard those who read History as role models? Responses to these questions reflect the general societal attitude toward History reflected in the three zones of Taraba State.

Table 20: Societal attitudes towards History, Northern Zone S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Karim Lamido Positive

2. GDSS Zing Positive 3. MGDSS Jalingo Positive

54 Source: Schools Community

Table 21: Societal attitudes towards History, Southern Zone

S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Wukari Nega tive 2. GDSS Takum Nega tive 3. MGDSS Wukari Negative

Source: Schools community55 Table 22: Societal attitudes towards History, Central Zone

S/No. Schools Responses 1. GDSS Gassol Pos itive 2. GDSS Bali Positive 3. GDSS Gembu Negative Source: Schools Community56

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The findings or results from the tables above representing the three zones of the State clearly show negative societal attitude toward the study of History. This accounted, in part, to the eventual withdrawal from the study of History, not only in the three zones, but in the entire nation. Little wonder, therefore, that the subject was eventually removed from the Junior Secondary School Curriculum.

Conclusion From the foregoing, it seems obvious that the study of History faced major challenges that in turn affected not only its study, but the cardinal functions History serves in any society. This is because no country can do without recourse to its origin, cultural heritage and its value system in which case primary schools and secondary schools should be moulding grounds and history as a subject represents a platform where the said origin, cultural heritage and the value system can be transmitted from one generation to the other. Unfortunately the study of History was neglected and relegated to the background within the period under review. The records of 1991 to 2011 covering the schools under study leave little or nothing to be desired. The story was not only in Taraba State, but across the nation essentially due to nonchalant government attitude toward promoting the study of History, and compounded by general negative societal attitude toward the subject. But the study of History is very crucial to every nation essentially for producing patriotic citizens. This is why the Historical Society of Nigeria has worked tirelessly to secure the reintroduction of the subject at all levels of learning in the country. The following recommendations will make the reintroduction more effective.

Recommendations First, a review of government policies on education is imperative for the purpose of strengthening the teaching and learning of any subject, 171 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies including History, in any educational system. Unfortunately, government policies on education over the years downplayed the status of History by not prioritizing the teaching of the subject in the Primary and Junior Secondary Schools. If United States of America, being the largest economy in the world has made the study of History mandatory at all levels and its army made to pass through a special course about the History of the United States of America, one then questions the rationale behind the relegation of History in the third world countries in Africa. The effort by the Historical Society of Nigeria which has achieved much in securing the reintroduction of History at all levels of learning must be well appreciated. However, to make the reintroduction meaningful, proactive measures have to be taken immediately to put every machinery in place to properly kick start the new project in the 2018/2019 as projected. Secondly, on the challenges regarding the inadequate trained History teachers and the non-availability of teaching aids/instructional materials, there is urgent need for continuous employment of History teachers, training and retraining programmes for them in the areas of workshops, seminars, incentives and special packages in order to keep them up and doing in the field. On the issue of teaching aids/instructional materials, the Federal and State Governments should ensure steady supply of History textbooks, maps and others, to make the teaching of History practical and livelier. The Parents Teachers Association, philanthropists and other community interest groups should volunteer in providing support to the schools whenever the need arises in order to cushion the long biting challenge of absence of History in our schools. There is need to take a leaf from the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) which ensured genuine provision of instructional materials to schools at all levels as well as proper supervision and utilization and maintenance of the materials. Thirdly, the tradition of forcing teachers who are not History biased to teach the subject, poor timing of History lessons and lassies-faire 172 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies attitude of students to History are products of poor school management.. Principals are supposed to be the academic champions of their schools, they are spiritual heads, and should have sound and well articulated decisions balancing priority and numerous school needs. School authorities should device a follow-up mechanism to compel government to employ trained History teachers to avoid employing the services of quack teachers to teach History. Furthermore, suitable time for History lessons should be allocated on the school time table, at least between 10 and 11 in the morning mainly because of the compelling requirement of History being logical, narrative, and cohesive and facts producing. It is even not arguable that, teaching History at odd times makes students to stay away from the subject. Fourthly, the challenge of versatility of History, non-accessibility to historical sites and societal attitudes towards the subject is also surmountable if History teachers should make their lessons captivating with some kind of summary, highlighting on the main points for slow learners to catch up. The idea of “versatility” of the subject should be made mild in the mind of the students and be replaced by that of “necessary coverage”. This may give a better and brilliant picture about History. Finally, non-accessibility to historical sites and societal attitudes towards History has to do with societal reorientation and attitudinal change. The society is dynamic and so the men and women that live in it. People must consciously understand that, until yesterday and today is properly diagnosed; tomorrow cannot give a good reflection be it in science, arts or even speculations. Our almighty palaces and historical sites need to be made available for our students for excursion. The areas be made attractive, government and parents to support excursion exercise to expose students to understanding of artifacts, knowing museums and historical sites thereby making History more practical and sticking to the minds of younger ones. 173 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Those who read History should be celebrated, but not rebuked and should be made to have a pride of place in the civil service and managerial affairs of the state. They should also be engaged as managers, analysts and problem solvers. In an attempt to validate the aforementioned recommendations randomly by way of sampling views and opinions of respondents across the area identified for study, pertinent questions were put forward as follows; (i) Do you consider government attention in teaching History necessary?, (ii) Do you recommend for the recruitment and training of History teachers in your school?, (iii) Are you against the tradition of forcing teachers of other discipline to teach History?, (iv) Do you support summarizing History notes to avoid unnecessary details?, (v) Do you support frequent excursion by History students to historical sites?, (vi) Are you an advocate of societal reorientation and attitudinal change about the teaching and learning of History? The responses of the respondents on the above six questions were in affirmative which lends credence to the fact that, those recommendations, if followed, may provide necessary panacea to the quagmire of Historical scholarship in Taraba State, and in the schools identified for study in particular.

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References

1. B.J. Kinsley, et al, The Decline of the Teaching and Learning of History in Nigeria (A Case Study of North-East Geo- Political Zone 1979 – 2009), Education Trust Fund (ETF) Sponsored Research, 2013, P. 14 2. Z.O. Apata, “The Teaching of History in the Post Primary and Tertiary Institutions: Problems and Remedies”, A paper presented at the 38th Annual Historical Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1994, 3. C.B.N. Ogbogbo, “Historical Society of Nigeria, The Study of History and Nigerian Nation”, Presidential Lecture delivered at the 60th Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, , 2015, P. 8. 4. S. Suleiman, “The Nigerian History Machine and the Production of Middle Belt Historiography”, Thesis of the Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, 2015. P. (no page number). 5. Interview: M. Kamai, civil servant, Jalingo, 05/10/2017 6. Interview: M. Kamai, civil servant.... 7. Interview: Musa Bello, civil servant, Gassol, 11/09/2017 8. Admission and Statistic Office, GDSS Gassol, 11/09/2017 9. Admission and Statistic Office, GDSS Bali, 15/10/2017 10. Admission and Statistic Office, GDSS Gembu, 25/09/2017 11. Admission and Statistic Office, GDSS Wukari, 28/09/2017 12. Admission and Statistic Office, GDSS Takum, 29/09/2017 13. Admission and Statistic Office, MGDSS Wukari, 28/09/2017 14. Admission and Statistic Office, GDSS Karin Lamido, 03/10/2017 15. Admission and Statistic Office, GDSS Zing, 26/09/2017 175 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

16. Admission and Statistic Office, MGDSS Jalingo, 26/09/2017 17. West African Examination Council, Zonal Office Yola, 16/08/2016 18. A.S. Alabi, “Declining of Interest in the Study of History among University Students in Nigeria with reference to Bayero University, Kano: An Assessment of the Study of History in Nigeria”, in Sokoto Journal of History, Vol. 1, Sept. 2012, P. 1 19. A.A. Adeyinka, History in Danger?: The Place of History in Nigerian Secondary School Curriculum, in Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria, University of Ilorin,1983, P. 4 20. B.J. Kingsley, et al, The Decline of the Teaching/Learning of History in Nigeria (A Case Study of the North-Eat Geopolitical Zone (1979 – 2009)), P. 59 21. B.J. Kingsley, et al, The Decline of the Teaching/Learning of History…. 22. O.G. Bozimo, The Idea of History in the Classroom, Genteel Warri, 1992, 23. Interview: Habila Bala Balasa,…. 24. Statistic Unit, Post Primary Schools Management Board, Jalingo, 15/07/2018 25. Statistic Unit, Post Primary Management …. 15/07/2018 26. Statistic Unit, Post Primary Management …. 15/07/2018 27. Interview: Musa Bello, Principal, GDSS Gassol,…. 28. Interview: Habila Bala Balasa… 29. Interview: Sufyan Abubakar… 30. Interview: Esther Ali… 31. Interview: Tanko Hikon, Vice Principal, GDSS Wukari, 12/03/2015 32. O. Tunji, “Teaching History in Nigeria Today: Challenges 176 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

and Prospects”, a column in Premium Times, 14/12/2016, 12:54pm 33. Interview: Akombo Elijah I., Lecturer, Taraba State University, Jalingo, 28/10/2017 34. Admission and Statistic Offices, GDSS, Gassol, Bali and Gembu 35. Admission and Statistic Offices, MGDSS Jalingo, GDSS Zing and Karim Lamido 36. Admission and Statistic Offices, MGDSS Wukari, GDSS Wukari and Takum 37. J.F. Ade Ajayi, “Towards a More Enduring Sense of History: A Tribute to K.O. Dike”, Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria Vol. XII No 3&4, 1985. P. 3 38. B.J. Kingsley, et al, The Decline of the Teaching/Learning of History…. 39. Cross Interview: GDSS Gembu, Gassol and Bali 40. Cross Interview: MGSS Jalingo, GDSS Karim Lamido and Zing 41. Cross Interview: MGDSS Wukari, GDSS Wukari and Takum 42. Interview: Habila Bala Balasa, …. 43. Cross Interview: GDSS Gembu, Gassol and Bali 44. Cross Interview: MGDSS Jalingo, GDSS Zing and Karim Lamido 45. Cross Interview: MGDSS Wukari, GDSS Wukari and Takum 46. Interview: Valentive Tyor, …. 47. Cross Interview: GDSS Bali, Gassol and Gembu 48. Cross Interview: MGDSS Wukari, GDSS Wukari and Takum 49. Cross Interview: MGDSS Jalingo, GDSS Karim Lamido and Zing 50. Interview: Akombo Elijah I., …….. 177 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

51. Interview: Akombo Elijah I., …….. 52. J.F. Ade Ajayi, “Towards a More Enduring Sense of History: A Tribute to … 53. S. James, An Inaugural Lecture delivered on the occasion of Ushering New Students of the Department of History, organized by History Society of Nigeria – University Chapter, 2013, P. 4 54. Community Interview: Jalingo, Zing and Karim Lamido 55. Community Interview: Wukari and Takum 56. Community Interview: Gassol, Bali and Gembu

178 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies Joking Relationship (Samba/Nyaa Sang/ Nuu –Mel) Among the Mumuye and their Neighbours: A Panacea for Conflict Diffusion in Nigeria

Ali Ahmadi Alkali, PhD Department of Languages and Linguistics, Faculty of Arts Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria Email:[email protected] Phone: 08036213145 & Hosea Nakina Martins Department of Christian Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria Email: [email protected] GSM: 08066669017, 07015390007

Abstract This paper, “Joking Relationship (Samba/nyaa sang/nuu-mel) Among the Mumuye and Their Neighbours: A Panacea for Conflict Diffusion in Nigeria”, attempts to examine the place of jokes as an oral tapestry in mitigating conflicts among the Mumuye and their neighbours (Bachama and Jenjo). Conflict is multi-dimensional in nature, and is one of the major problems the world has been battling with up to date. The paper seeks to examine the benefits of joking relationship as one of the panaceas for conflict diffusion among the Mumuye and their neighbours. The study equally discovers some of the challenges facing the practice of the use of joking relationship in conflict resolution such as inadequate documentation of the jokes and drastic reduction in their use, among other factors. Recommendations have been made on how joking relationship can be maintained in order to forge ahead in achieving its aims and objectives in conflict resolution in the society. Keywords: Joking relationship, Mumuye, Bachama, Jenjo, Panacea.

Introduction The social life of Africans is ultimately an embracing part and parcel for the basis of all human expressions of their ways of life. Similarly,

179 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies it ultimately embraces all historical, cultural and social experiences or other wise and form the driving force behind the emergence and practice of Joking Relationship as panacea for conflict diffusion in Nigeria. Samba/nyaa (joking relationship) sang/nuu mel is highly fluidic and runs through the veins of participants whose existence could be traced back to the days of the first custodians, families, neighbours, clans and even some tribes who ensured its usage and continuity through mutual relationship among them and their neighbours. Insults, mocking, laughter, teasing are symbols employed by members of joking relationship to foster and mitigate conflicts. Joking relational ties penetrate all dimensions of the African life- joy, sorrow, praise are experienced and shared among the Mumuye and their neighbours with the aim of unraveling or discovering the inter connectedness involving them and their neighbours in mitigating conflict on the slightest provocation. Thus, social relationship aids in rediscovering the inter- value of peaceful resolution of any conflict that will arise. The strength and benefit of peace sharing deal lies in its social interactions between friends, families, tribes and even among communities in ensuring tolerance, mutual respect and jokes to easing tension. Tolerance is a virtue and means for ensuring peaceful coexistence among diverse nationality. It is certainly expressed in verbal oral repository method by its adherents, who ensure the fluid of joking relationship is passed from one generation to the other so as to be taped from the abundance of cherished mouthful concept of relating with members. Community, family, clannish and tribal links are well built on this foot note by cherishing and practicing ways of mitigating conflict using jokes to ease tensions. Similarly, interaction fosters love as expressed in mutual living relationship, which are spring boards of conflict resolution. Peace is a necessity which needs to be sought at all times. However, 180 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies conflict is a catalyst for most of the social unrest in which two or more persons, families, tribes, communities, states or nations are faced or involved in it today, and which has retarded mutual trust and peace. Conflict arises from different contests and it is named, accordingly, based on its hydra nature. Rediscovering the significant place of joking relationship among the Mumuye and their neighbours is a duty in resolving or diffusing conflicts, which are destructive elements of disunity, mutual hatred or suspicion, and even threats to national security and development in Nigeria as a whole.

Clarification of Terms Joking Relationship This represents the kind of friendly jokes normally done between families, clans and even neighbouring tribes .Dong and Rudanyuba termed it “as a kind of friendly fun making of one's friend to make caricature of a friend. This is normally done with neighbouring tribes, clans and friends”. According to Magesa (1997:108), Joking relationship is a kind of relationship that has practical purpose of bond of friendship which ensures safe bond between blood brothers, family or voluntary association of group in ensuring intimacy between members. Similarly, Berthuel (2018) states that Joking Relationship is a kind of friendly exchange of jokes made palatable with the flavour of humour, menial services and expression of general bond of friendly intimacy which ensures tolerance as a result of insulted jokes uttered by a friend to a friend. In similar vein, Vori (2018) asserts that joking relationship is a kind of codified mutual respectful forms of humorous jokes either insultive or menial that are performed by people who are socio- culturally bond to express their willingness in connectivity with the act of fostering coexistence and mutual respect of one another.

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Conflict: Fairchild (1966:59) describes conflict as a situation in which two or more human beings or groups seek actively to war with each other's purpose, to prevent satisfaction of each other's interests, to prevent satisfaction to the extent of injuring or destroying the other. Hornby (2002: 239) also defines conflict as a situation in which people, groups, countries are involved in a serious disagreement or argument. Conflict is a social problem in which two or more persons, families, districts, communities, states, or nations are at war with each other. Other words, according to Dzurgba (2010: vii), used for conflict are disagreement, character raised by quarrel, fighting, severe anger, aggression, violence and bloodshed. On the other hand, Conflict can consist of the denigration of one person in the conversation of another person, or it can take the form of outright quarreling and even violence (Ukagba, 2014:58). Origin and Nature of Samba/ Nyaa Sang/Nuu Mel (Joking Relationship) among the Mumuye Origin and Nature of Joking Relationship The Mumuye are predominantly found in Taraba State in places like Zing, Yorro, Ardokola, Gassol, Lau, Jalingo and in Jada, Mayo Belwa, Toungo, Fufore, Jimeta -Yola and Ganye all in Adamawa State, North Eastern Nigeria. History has it that they originated from Egypt, migrated and settled at Kang in Bali Local Government Area, Taraba State, and finally migrated and settled at Yorro hills, their ancestral home (Nyabun, 2014:1). However, the exact period the Mumuye stayed at Kang cannot be traceable with certainty but probably during the Stone Age era while that of Yorro perhaps may be during the Iron Age (Nyameh Qtd. Marubitoba et al, 2006:1). Joking relationship is as old as the Mumuye who practice it. History reveals that joking relationship existed from time immemorial and it is as old as ancient Mumuye parents. It has remained a fluid that runs through their veins for fostering happy mood and better conditions 182 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies for militating against tensions or conflicts. Joking relationship also came as a result of interactions with others. Generally, joking relationship constitutes an important aspect of Mumuye heritage and social relation. Some aspects of joking relationship among the Mumuye resulted from their contacts with other neighbouring tribes, families, clans and so on. Hence, certain patterns of jokes were adopted and fostered as a result of such a mutual sharing relationship. Because of its historical offshoot, those who are the custodians of joking relationship are otherwise known as cultural specialists (Magesa, 1997:108). Joking relationship is a social activity has been in existence long ago, and still lingers on among young and the aged. It is a heritage that is being passed on to subsequent generations of Mumuye and even non Mumuye alike for its continuity among them for mutual relational respect for conflict to be curtailed. According to Fairchild (1966:202), joking relationship denotes a nature that has been endowed in man by nature, and much of man belongs to nature. It is evidently affirmative that the nature of joking relationship lies in the very natural endowed concepts like jokes, peace, conflict, relationship, joy etc. Joking relationship is a value to be cherished in its natural expression. Joking relationship is normally done by people of cordial or respectful affiliation: among friends, tribes, clans, families and even neighbours. The nature of such a practice is defined in the philosophy of the act, by those who are concerned. Similarly, it is customary to stress the emphasis of intelligence and common sense, and sociological utility (Faircild, 1966:202). The nature of joking relationship is normally conceived by the way people share feelings and how they also react with the aim of purging wrong feelings, encouraging mutual care or cordial relationship and fostering peaceful coexistence in the control of conflicts uprising from people 183 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies bonded in the practice within and outside their scopes. Types of Joking Relationship Joking relationship among the Mumuye and their neighbors are of various kinds, but for the sake of this work only the followings shall be considered: Jokes(s) is something that young say or do to make people laugh, for example, a funny story (Hornby, 2002:644). A Mumuye person can Joke with a Jenjo or Bachama person because they share joking relational ties. A Mumuye will, for instance, call a Bachama man slave or subject without a Bachama man being so furious about it. Similarly, a Mumuye will tell a Bachama man, “I am your king”, and they will all laugh. Insults: Some jokes are expressed through “insults”. For instance, a Mumuye person can say something insulting to a Bachama or a Jenjo without the person taking it too personal, and same applies to a Jenjo to a Mumuye. These insults range from various forms like in the spirit of respect for individual's personality, for instance, “Who is that lazy farmer or fisherman (Mumuye and Bachama) fooling around there?” Mockery: This is another type of joking relationship which a joking friend mocks his/her friend. For instance, in 2015 when the Chief of Zing and many other Muslim pilgrims died in Saudi Arabian stampede, a Jenjo mocks a Mumuye that, “you Mumuye aren't strong and cannot fight the devil, but the devil fought you to defeat”. Another one is, “You Mumuye are ugly, that is why you hate your brothers”. In the case of the Bachama, there is a mockery that, “Bachama cannot find bleaching creams in the market, so they bought engine oil from the mechanic to be used as body cream” Symbols of Joking Relationship Joking Relationship is comprised of symbols which are been used by members of a group, family, tribe, clan and neighboring tribes as well. It cannot be said to exist without employing the use of symbols to portray or convey its deeper target to its members. Joking 184 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies relationship is symbolic in nature because ideas are represented in more quality situation for better meanings. It is highly believed that symbols in joking relationship serve as a uniting factor among members of the group. These signs are used to direct people' reaction towards the real meaning of the whole structure of the system (Anyacho, 2005:22). However, we know that African ways of communicating are primarily symbolic as opposed to mere signs. Thus, they appear in forms of oral gesture, body gesture, and socializations (Ejim, 1995:77). The following constitute some of the symbols of joking relationship. Laughter: Members of any joking ties share at most importantly in laughter pertaining one another. One person can joke and laugh with those he /she recognizes as a play friend, tribe, neighbours, etc. Teasing: A member of a joking group, for instance, a Jenjo man can tease a Mumuye because they have joking relationship bond that have existed for a very long historical time. Among such jokes from the Jenjo to Mumuye are “Which type of Mumuye are you? Your yam is your height?” And from “Mumuye to a Jenjo” such jokes include, “you think because of your height, you can reach heaven?” Singing/clapping/eye blinking/crying: These are symbols shared among members. In song, clapping, eye blinking, crying, members of joking relationship share this symbols to effect feelings in the other person(s). Insults: People who are not codified as joking relational mates cannot engage in insult making with other persons who are not part of jokes sharing deal. They must be people who share in the ideology of joking relationship and symbols if not, it will not be tolerated by others. Joking Relationship (Samba/Nyaa Sang/ Nuu-Mel) Among The Mumuye And Their Neighbours: A Panacea For Conflict Diffusion In Nigeria Joking Relationship, as the name implies, plays significant roles in 185 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies the lives of the Mumuye and their neighbours in mitigating conflict within and between. The same can be applied at the national level for conflict mitigation. Joking relationship plays the following vital roles in conflict resolution. i. Joking relationship helps in ensuring a very strong bond and avoidance of vices that could split into social disunity among families, ethnic groups, and even among brothers or kinsmen. ii. Marriage bond is easily cemented by joking relationship. iii. Joking relationship helped to create friendly tie between Pwamadi, a Bachama, and Zanko, a Mumuye. This friendly tie has encouraged peaceful coexistence, benevolence and mutual respect for people's cultural personality, and as a gateway for mutual trust and pride in mitigating conflicts in society. iv. Joking relationship helps to ensure safe passage through each other's territory, provides assistance for such activities at burial, receiving privileged consideration in the bride wealth where marriages are permitted (Magesa, 1997:108). People are assisted financially, materially and otherwise because of the ties of joking relationship. v. Joking relationship helps in offering emotional stability and the opportunity to relax and be entertained by humours so as to sustain the tempo of jubilant mood and those involved in it, each time it is shared. vi. Joking relationship helps in mitigating emotional uprising of the human state of mind (Magesa, 1997:107). vii. Joking relationship has been beneficial in the area of conflict diffusion, beginning through the institution whose purpose is precisely not intended to offend but to mitigate misunderstanding that are likely to arise. viii. Joking relationship also helps to make use of falsehood in order to render the truth more evident in the eyes of the group members, tribes, clans, families or among neighbours. It is on 186 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

this note that, falsehood is commonly shared among those concerned, which renders its use as an added recipe for such a practice. ix. Another significant role of a joking relationship is in the control of sexual aberrations between one family, clan or tribe. In joking relationship, unwanted behaviours are addressed jokingly so as to have a balanced and moral community of people, bounded and expressed by love and security of mind. The Mumuye respect in high degree the place of joking relationship with their neighbours. This connectivity is imbedded in the early mutual coexistence between parents and their wards or neighbours, who passed it to subsequent generations of clans, families, groups, tribes to ensure its continuity. In this exposition, only few selected joking relationships which exist between Mumuye and their neighbours shall be examined here: Samples of Joking Relationships between Mumuye and their Neighbours The Mumuye share joking relationships with many groups. However, this paper with consider such relationship between the Mumuye- Bachama and Mumuye-Jenjo. Mumuye and Bachama The Mumuye crack the following jokes with the Bachama. i. A Mumuye can call a Bachama person foo (servant or slave) According to Magwa (2018): There was a time in history when the Bachama people went for war, under the able leadership of Makwada. The war was hot and the Bachama people had to smoke, so a Mumuye woman took saa/sis (local wine) to Makwada, when he drank it, he went to sleep, and forgot about his mission. So the Mumuye woman packed his tools and other items, and went with them. When Makwada woke up, there was nothing for him. Hence, the Bachama man became a slave under kpanti (chief). So, the 187 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Mumuye called any Bachama man “slave, or I am your king”, which continues till date. ii. The Bachama respects a Mumuye as a king. According to an oral account narrated by Bitenja (2019): During the time of wrestling (Fari in Bachama), there was a stone which was heavy, and the Mumuye person was tested whether he can lift it up, if not, wrestling will not take place. The Mumuye person lifted the stone up, and the wrestling continued. Hence, the Mumuye man is recognized as symbol of power (king) and war like in nature. That is why a Bachama man respects him as his /her king (Mumuye). iii. The Mumuye refer to the Bachama complexion to that of a “black and salty fish”. According to Yopoh (2019) “Bachama descended from the sea, and that is why their skin complexion could be compared to that of black and salty fish”. The Bachama do not regard this as an insult, if it is a remark from a Mumuye, they only laugh over it. iv. Similarly, the Mumuye usually say that the “Bachama black” skin is as a result of rubbing coaltar as pomade” (Isa, 2019). v. In similar vein, the Mumuye maintain that the Bachama like water that is why they dance like aquatic animals and reside with fish, which is why their livelihood is dependent on water. For instance, according to Nabang (2019), his father used to joke with his Bachama neighbour thus: “Bachama shared basic features with the fish in the river, and their language is like the aquatic sound made in water”. Bachama and Mumuye The Bachama also share many jokes with the Mumuye among which include the followings: i. The Mumuye are very stiff when it comes to showcasing any dexterity.They are like the yam they eat, and that is why they are not flexible but crude (Pwamadi, 2019). 188 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies ii. According to Nuhu (2018), a Myth on a Joking Relationship has it that: When God created the world, all people gathered to receive their dance styles. So God gave all tribes on earth their pattern of dance styles, except one tribe. When the angel of God realized that, he approached and reminded God that there is one ethnic group, that is Mumuye, who haven't received their dance . Then God said: “I forgot about the Mumuye, they can adopt any dance style”. This is why today the Mumuye have no recognized dance style unlike their brother, Bachama. iii. “The life of a Mumuye is tied to the local wine (Burkutu) and that is why the Mumuye are fairly funny when drunk”. iv. “A Mumuye eats a lot of yam, that is why he is stiff and not flexible to do any dance styles” (Makanto, 2017). v. “The Mumuye are ugly that is why they are called Mumuye”. vi. “The Mumuye are unwise, they farm yam, sell it, and later go to buy fried ones” (Abrahamp, 2018). vii. “Mumuye are very hard working, but they are like beast when infuriated or pushed to the wall” (Mami, 2018). Mumuye and Jenjo The Mumuye share the following jokes with the Jenjo: i. “One with right senses during the day…but at night...hmm (A Jenjo appears to be normal in the day, but at night, he becomes violent due to drunkenness or spiritual possession)”. ii. “Jenjo consume more wine than those who brewed it”. iii. “Who are those palm trees?” Referring to Jenjo, who are mostly tall as palm trees. iv. “A Mumuye fears giving a Jenjo maize farm to look after it, because Jenjo might consume both fresh and dry maize at once”. v. “Jenjo eat a lot of palm fruits as their food and that is why they grow tall”. 189 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies vi. “A Mumuye describes a Jenjo man as one who is in the depth of the river, but his/her head is above the water” (Kpanti, 2019). Jenjo and Mumuye Joking Relationship On their part, the Jenjo share the following jokes with the Mumuye: i. “A Mumuye is a slave to a Jenjo man, while a Jenjo is a chief to a Mumuye who must respect his chief anywhere he sees him”. ii. “A Mumuye is not strong enough to defeat the devil, the devil stoned him to death during a pilgrimage” (Jibril, 2019). iii. “A Jenjo is the security of a Mumuye, while a Mumuye is a slave to a Jenjo because, he farms yam for a Jenjo's consumption”. iv. “Mumuye are as short as the yam they farm”. v. “Mumuye do not like eating food only leaves [sonko/ koro] and local wine [saa/sis]”. vi. “A Mumuye is self-centered and lacks the enthusiasm to support his kinsmen” (Kankani, 2018). It is imperative to state that the jokes shared by these groups help to sustain cordial relationship between them. Even in times of conflicts the jokes could be used in the process of peace building. Recommendations i. Joking relationship, if sincerely inculcated and fostered among members, will go a long way in rediscovering true bond of confidence that will aid in revering the glory of tackling conflicts. Jokes are tools for divisiveness among families, clans, tribes and society at large. The treasure of peaceful sustenance can be achieved when joking relationship is accorded its respected place among all concerned members. ii. Parents/custodians should as a matter of fact help to inculcate sound moral values on the need to foster joking relationship among members so as to help in fostering ways of addressing social uprising. Narrative techniques of oral stories, tales, legends and proverbs should be taught to children at home and in the 190 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

schools. This will serve as spring boards for resolving conflicts, and ensuring peace and happiness in social interactions among members. iii. Film industries can as well serve as a means of promoting the cause for the revival and survival of the institution of joking relationship. Hence, there is need for effort to be made by indegeneous producers actors/ actresses and marketers so that the messages depicting the value of such an institution would be maintained (Dagin, 2005:198). iv. People should try and see the need to imbibe in ideal joking relationship as a means to cementing or solidifying mutual relationships among related members or neighbours , who are tied with the flow of fluid running through their veins in addressing off shoot of clashes or conflicts in Nigeria. v. Indigenous writers should, as a matter of fact, consult oral historians or verbal watch dogs so as to gain or reap from the vast richness of oral tapestry for documentation, which can be useful to people who lay their hands on it. It would also help in managing conflicts or social uprising. Similarly, books are treasures that one needs to possess and read. People can discover about the values of joking relationship when they lay their hands on these books written on such social connective measures of resolving conflicts. Various aspects of joking relationship can help people know about them when put down on books. vi. All those concerned in joking relationship should be selective in their diction when issuing out jokes to a fellow mate, friend, or any member(s) so as not to provoke the other person (s). They should try as much and know when such jokes would be entertained by members. Similarly, such jokes should carefully be selected and addressed to those whose temperaments can accommodate their impacts. All those concerned should try and know their members, whom they engage in such joking relationships with them in order 191 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

to avoid any conflict from being ignited. vii. Tolerance and accommodation of members should be highly encouraged so as to cement the tie of mutual tolerance among practicing members. Also, love, peace and unity can prevail as measures of impeding any uprising that is heading to tear apart the treasure of joking relationship. viii. The use of bad or vulgar words should be discouraged among members so that the younger ones do not copy and exhibit such unwanted behaviors that impede the smooth process of ensuring peaceful coexistence among people of diverse ethnicities. ix. There is need to return to our roots. There is need to retrace our steps to our traditional social ideals which have been the core fabrics for conflict diffusion and for ensuring peaceful coexistence among us and our neighbours. There is need for adequate knowledge about the roots of each family, clan, tribe and friendly relationship and the place of social relationship as a means for attaining peaceful co-existence. x. Our wholesome life as a people must be in peace with ourselves in order to be fully integrated into the community [family, tribe and clans] (Ikenga, et al 2005:53). Revitalization of our cultural values needs to be pursued with every vigour in order to instigate in the minds of the youths the need to imbibe the value and continuity of joking relationship in our culture for peaceful coexistence and harmony. Conclusion Joking relationship is an integral part and parcel of the Mumuye society which has been in existence since the creation of humanity. It ultimately embraces all the experiences that formed the driving force behind the thinking and relationship of the Mumuye and their neighbours as means of resolving conflicts and ensuring peaceful co- existence, solidarity and mutual trust. Rediscovering the paramount place of joking relationship among 192 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Mumuye and their neighbours is a panacea for mitigating conflicts. Joking relationship is one of the ingredients of promoting interconnectedness and peaceful relationships within and between groups. Peace is a priceless commodity which, when upheld, could lead to mutual co-existence and rapid development. Generally, social interconnections, solidarity and expression of mutual co-existence between families, clans, friends, tribes and neighbours are prerequisites for the development of any nation. Peace, progress and unity can only be achieved in Nigeria if we tolerate one another and share in our social and mutual interactions with our neighbours, families and other tribes. People should take advantage of the relevance of joking relationship in ensuring peaceful coexistence wherever they are found. It is by cherishing and promoting the values of joking relationship among groups that unique affiliations within our families, neighbours and among other neighbours could be established or re-established.

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References

Arinze, Cardinal Francis. Progress in Christian- Muslim Relations Worldwide Jos:Augustinian Publications, Nigeria,1988. Anyacho, Ernest O. Essential Themes in the Study of Religion. Obudu: Niger Link Printing and Publishing, 2005. Dzurgba, Akpenpuun. Prevention of Conflict Local and International Perspectives. Ibadan: John Archers Publishers Ltd., 2010. Dagin, Sylvester. Bring Back The Lost Daughters A Fight Against Trafficking of Nigerian Women and Girls For The International Sex Market. Jos:Fab Educational Books,2005. Dong, Peter Marubitoba and Rudanyuba, Isa Alphonsus (eds). Excavating the Mumuye Heritage on Family Building and Ethics. Jos: Nigeria Bible Translation Trust, 2004. Ejim,Jerome. “The Formation of Youths In A Traditional African Society” In NACATHS Journal of African Theology, Vo l.6, March, 1995. Fairchild, Henry Pratt (ed). Dictionary Sociology. Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams &co, 1966. Hornby, AS. Oxford Advanced Learner' Dictionary of Current English, Six Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Ikenga, Emmanuel. “A Theological Evaluation of Transsexualism: Relevance in the African context” In NACATHS Journal of African Theology, Vol, 15, April, 2005. Magesa, Laurenti. African Religion The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life. Nairobi, Pauline's Publications Africa, 1997. Nwanze, J E. “Emphasis On Communications Overtones of Culture” In Shalom Proclaim Peace, Vol. vii, No.1 Nyabun, Mathias. Hidden Treasures of The Mumuye People (Mika Clan Perspective). Jalingo: Matty Printing Press, 2014. Nyameh, J. Kotasori. A. Qtd. Marubitaba et al. A Look At The 194 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Mumuye Communities in Lau Local Government Area. Jos: Padane Ventures,2006. Ukagba, George U. “Human Nature, Dirty Hands And Social Disorder: A Socio-Political Understanding Of The Nigerian Society” In SWEM Journal Of Religion And Philosophy, Vol. 4. No. 1 July, 2014. Published by Department Of Religion and Philosophy, Benue State University, Makurdi.

LIST OF INFORMANT S S/N NAMES AGE S EX ADDRES S OCCUP ATION DATE 1 Bitenja, Francis 47 Male Lamma Farmer 19/2/19

2 Bethuel, Wupuru 35 Female Mayo- Lope Business man 1/04/18 3 Jibril, Sarah 46 F emale Jalingo Civil ser vant 14/2/19 4 Kankani, Festus 29 F emale Nukkai Farmer 19/9/18 5 Kieran, Faith 40 Female Kofai Farmer/ 10/8/18

politician 6 Nuhu, Esther 36 Male Magami Student 3/7/18 7 Nabang,John 58 F emale Shavon Fisherman 19/3/19 8 Magwa, Asicus 46 Male Dong ‘C’ Driver 16/6/18

9 Mabelang, Yohanna 45 Male Kassa Student 3/11/17 10 Makanto, Joel 42 M ale Appawa Fisherman 1/12/17 11 Pwamadi, Eli 40 M ale Demsa Driver 20/1/19 12 Vori, Ladi 57 Female Iware Farmer 12/5/18

13 Mami, Winis 68 Male Lau Fisherman 30/12/18 14 Yopo, Cletus 62 M ale Sunkani Farmer 25/1/19 15 Mabelang, Y ohanna 42 M ale ATC,Jalingo Civil 22/3/19 16 Abraham,Shonru 32 Male Shavon Student 1/4/19

195 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Phases of Development of the Kuteb Economy from 1960-2018

Haruna Muhammad Suleimuri, PhD & Asherum Garba Department of History & Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria

Abstract Agriculture has been the mainstay of Nigerian economy in the pre-colonial and colonial times. Kutebland was not an exception due to its rich vegetation by the virtue of being located in the guinea savannah area, which has contributed to the economic development of Nigeria since 1960. This paper explores and examines the development of the Kuteb economy in southern Taraba since the era of self- determinism. Thus, the paper argues that agriculture has remained the backbone of the Kuteb economy. For adequate analysis, the paper briefly discusses the pre- colonial agricultural economy among the Kuteb. Thereafter, the paper identifies the successive phases of the development of the Kuteb economy in the post-colonial period bringing out the salient features of each of the phases. Finally, the paper examines recent developments, challenges and prospects, and with some recommendations for way forward. Keywords: pre-colonial, Kuteb economy and agricultural development.

Introduction The Kuteb are found predominantly in Takum and Ussa Local Government Areas and Yangtu Special Development Area located in the Middle Benue region. These administrative areas were carved out of former Takum Local Government Area which was created in 1976 by the then General Murtala Mohammed. Former Takum Local Government Area or territory lies between latitude 60 30 and 70 36'N and Longitude 90 40' and 100 18'E. It shared boundaries with Benue State to the west, Donga LGA to the North-East. While to the South- East lies Kurmi Local Government Area and the Republic of 196 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Cameroon to the south. The area covers an estimated land mass of 2400sqkm1. Development implies sustained improvement, advancement, growth in the various facets of the economy or society. The word development is used as a universal phenomenon with a multi-focal dimension. In economic sense, it means a developing society which utilizes its members to jointly increase their capacity for dealing with the environment7. The overlapping nature of development in human relation shows on all round social process which relies on the outpouring of man's potentials to overcome the challenges of his natural environment. Therefore, development involves the process and policies by which a nation improves the economic, political and social well-being of its people2. The development of Kuteb economy has been anchored on agricultural development. This involves the process of continual improvement in agricultural production which simultaneously enhances the standard of living of vast majority of people, especially farmers. Invariably, this development facilitates the provision of certain social, health and educational facilities and services such as rural infrastructural like good road network, potable water, electricity, health, recreational and educational facilities for farmers which reduce the urban-rural drift3. The term economy consists of production, distribution or trade and consumption of limited goods and services by different agents in a given geographical location. There exists a relationship between production, trade and the supply of money in a particular country or region. These incorporate the variety of activities spread across agricultural, industrial and commercial sectors4. This noticeable trend in Kutebland in the pre-colonial period accommodated many commodities like the industrial and agricultural products for commercialization. The people engaged in both domestic and external trade with products such as millet, guinea corn, plantain, beniseed, pepper, palm oil, timber (madrit) among other. The emergence of Nigeria as an independent nation in 1960 was a significant event which has helped to consolidate the nation as one of

197 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies the leading Africa economies5. For the Kuteb people of Southern Taraba, the period between 1960 and 2018 witnessed one of the tremendous socio-economic changes and development in their ancestral homeland. Basically, however, the agrarian nature of the Kuteb people predated the pre-colonial times. The discovery of crude oil in Nigeria in the early 1950s has gradually played a significant role in the growth and development of the Nigerian economy. On the contrary, the prevailing trend in the agricultural sector, especially among the Kuteb people has contributed enormously in transforming the Kuteb economy. This resulted from appreciable level of detachment from the primitive agricultural practices to the mechanized or modernized techniques being practiced in other parts of the world. This occurred, notwithstanding the fact that the British colonial agricultural policies in the region were targeted towards economic exploitation6. It is imperative to note that the advancement of agricultural practices has continued to increase food production, provision of essential raw materials for industry growth and rural development, improved standard of living, income-earning and source of foreign exchange among others. The development of new varieties of crops and the exotic breed of animals has resulted in a very substantial increase in world food production7. This period could be described as the green revolutionary age with the invention of sophisticated equipment of mechanization unlike in the Neolithic times when conventional practices of agriculture were prevalent8. Kutebland is blessed with a vast fertile farmland surrounded by mountains and hilly. The geographical environment gives considerable opportunities for agricultural activities and other economic ventures9. This has remained the major contributory factor to the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) among the Kuteb and reduction in the rate of unemployment in the area whose sole means of livelihood is dependent on agriculture. Hence, the development of Kuteb communities during the post-independence till date is premised on agricultural development. Among other effects, the foregoing developments has not only

198 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies resulted in the improvement in sub-sectorial economy, but also in employment generation, improved standard of living through manpower development, improved land resources utilization, government interventionist policies and programmes, technological invention among others10. This is not only among the Kuteb, but also in other nations that witness or have witnessed improvement or development in agriculture. Generally, the development has witnessed the advancement of an agrarian economy among the Kuteb from 1960-2018.

Pre-Colonial Agricultural Economy in Kuteb-land Before the coming of colonialists, the Kuteb people practiced agriculture as their major source of livelihood. The vast majority of the people were engaged in agricultural pursuits11. Generally speaking, two major factors influenced the economy of the area. Firstly, the needs analysis of the producers which are food, shelter and clothing and, secondly, the environmental factors that determined potentialities of the soil, climate and vegetation area. No matter the crucial roles the two factors played in favour or against the production of particular crops, agricultural practices were still mainly determined or influenced by the twin factors12. The feature of this area shows a mountainous and lowland level. The mountain ranges are collectively called “Takum Hills” They are foot- hills of Bemenda highlands. The mountains ranges are dominant in the South, thus naturally bisects the study area into northern zone without mountain ranges and southern zone with mountain ranges. The land is drained by rivers Gamana and Katsina Ala in the South. In the East, it is drained by tributaries of river Donga, north by Chanchanji and Kukunu. While in the West, it is drained by River Loko13 The land is typically savannah with a cover deciduous woodland. The underlying soil of the adjacent valley of the hills is underlain by basement complex rocks. Generally, the soil possesses natural agricultural potentials which favour relatively intensive use for the cultivation of agro-based raw material such as sugar cane, groundnut, rice, beans, palm-kernel,

199 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies millet, maize, guinea corn, cowpea, cocoyam, sweet potatoes, banana, timber, yams, coconut, bambara nut, assorted fruits.14 It is important to note that soil formation is related to climate, geological formations, topography and living organisms and to the time factor. Climate is certainly the most important of the above factors because it influences the rate of weathering, leaching and also the rate at which the living organisms operate in the breaking of soil. The soil is very fertile and has a satisfactory water holding capacity and therefore it is reasonably good for farming and grazing.15

Post-Colonial Kuteb Economy: Developmental, Challenges and Prospects The colonial epoch in Nigeria ushered in a period of imposition of colonial agricultural policies with the sole aim of exploitation of the natural and human resources of the area. This altered the African modes of production, thought, patterns of cultural development and ways of life which, by implication, changed the political structures and the economy at large.16 Basically, the colonial agricultural policies which were accompanied with the introduction of cash crops at the expense of food crops, promoted land dispossession, persistent taxation, among others which were tailored to achieve certain imperial objectives. The nature and impact of these colonial agricultural policies alongside with their objectives had adverse repercussions on the Kuteb economy, especially in the areas of land ownership and utilisation, the social organisation of production, rural well being, food security and local industrialization.17 The post colonial era, therefore, structurally weakened the Kuteb economy. The period witnessed disturbing stagnation in the development of the agricultural sector and heavy reliance on cash crops and mineral exports. The multiplier effect of this development was food insecurity as earlier stated. The attainment of independence in 1960 did not usher in any appreciable change in the Nigeria's economy, particularly the agriculture sector. Agriculture has continued to play a dominant role

200 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies in the national economy with 59.8% recorded in the Gross Domestic Product, especially in the early 1960s. However, the growth began to witness decline in the early 1970s (1971-1975- 38.1%, 1981-1985- 22.7% 1991-1995- 38.0% 2000-2002- 40%)18 To alleviate the negative trend, successive governments since independence, particularly as from the periods of Obansanjo-led military regime in the early 1970s, various interventionist policies to improve the agricultural sector such as Operation Feed the Nation(1970) Land Use Act (1978) the Green Revolution Programme(1980), among others, were adopted. Notwithstanding, these interventionist programmes or initiatives, the agricultural sector never witnessed any appreciable improvement due to numerous constraints among which include poor physical infrastructure, land tenure system, massive rural-urban drift of youth, poor incentives,19 etc. Right from the pre-independence period, the economy of the Kuteb society has continued to be anchored on Agriculture as the major means of livelihood of the people. Since independence, the economy has gradually gone through transitional phases of development. The peculiarity of these phases had been the deployment by most farmers of various cultural and modern techniques in processing and preserving most farm produce. Similarly, some modern techniques and inputs were also introduced or adopted by farmers to increase output20. Attempt has been made in this paper to identify the various phases of development and their respective features from 1960-2018.

A. The first phase (1960-1980) Throughout this period, the Kuteb economy was significantly agrarian and largely at subsistence level. This era was characterized by small-holding system of farming, the use of family labour to work in the farms ('Rukun ijawb'), the use of short-term capital, application of simple tools and farm implements such as hoe, machetes, cutlasses among others. Generally, Kuteb economy or agriculture did not witness appreciable development due to the long established traditional methods of production without any significant changes

201 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies and the retrogressive agricultural policies inherited from the colonialists.21 The booming period of oil trade in the nation in the 1970s and 1980s was a major factor which resulted in the less attention accorded to the agricultural sector. Within the period, the enormous revenue accruing from exportation of crude oil diverted attention from the cultivation of food and cash crops which would have earned self-sufficient food and foreign exchange by individuals and the government. This was equally the predicament of the Kuteb society. The creation of Takum Local Government Area in 1976 to bring development to the grassroot did not bring any remarkable change. The introduction of Land Use Act commenced on 29 March, 1978, which confers land ownership and control to the State Government, was not as pronounced as ownership of land by settlement, conquest, sale, gift or larches and acquiescence that have been in practice22. The impact of this policy was not pronounced since the government presence was just been established in the region and the implementation process was gradually adopted. Land Use Act was therefore merely a white paper in existence without actionable plan for implementation in the Kuteb society. Hence, Land matters were still treated based on the conventional or traditional practices among the Kuteb people. It is therefore worth noting that communal egalitarianism, co-operation, family labour, communal grouping and land ownership were still the hallmark of the societal pattern and values that characterized the Kuteb people within the period23. On the other hand, the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) which was launched on 20 May, 1976, with the cardinal objectives of addressing fundamental economic problems such as youth joblessness, inflation, rural-urban migration due to neglect of the agricultural sector, was short-lived as a result of government policy summersault, poor implementation and non-continuity24. Since OFN sought to promote farming, increase food production and balance nutritional quality of Nigerians, the focal areas of the scheme were tailored on fertilizer procurement and distribution, pest control, use of improved seed grains, tubers and vegetables, livestock feed, poultry and fisheries25.

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Regretably, in Kutebland, the impact of this scheme witnessed an abysmal failure as a result of poor implementation process, lack of incentives to encourage increased agricultural productivity on a more sustainable basis, non-supply of fertilizer at the right time and absence of storage facilities. Notwithstanding the abysmal failure of the OFN, the provision of credit facilities which the scheme pursued led to the establishment of agro-industry based bank like the Nigerian Agricultural and Co- operative Bank (NACB) and the Nigeria Bank for Commerce and Industry to assist in giving loan to farmers to boost agricultural production24 Consequent upon this, the bank came to being in the former which was made up of Wukari, Donga and Takum Districts. It is relevant to note that the People's Bank of Nigeria (PBN), the Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank (NACB) and Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP) were merged in 2000 to form the Nigeria Agricultural, Co-operative and Rural Development Bank (NACRDB).26 The Bank was basically aimed at providing micro-credit to farmers and rural dwellers which has help in boosting the socio-economic development of Nigerians including the Kuteb people.

B. The second phase (1980-2000) The creation of Takum and Ussa Local Government Areas in 1976 and 1996 respectively were milestones in the gradual development of the Kuteb economy. The two political antecedents opened the Kuteb society to wider commercial environment. The efforts by the two local councils coupled with inter-play of economic, political and geographical factors made the Kuteb society to become a hub of socio-commercial activities27. Consequent upon the foregoing, Kuteb society witnessed a shift from small scale farming to a large scale farming as a result of pressing socio-economic demands from within and without the various families in the area. These needs cut across education, improved health care services and better standard of living. For instance, an educational opportunity afforded the youth and parents the privilege

203 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies to modify the quality and use of their labour. Among the effects was the introduction of monetised labour otherwise referred to by the people as 'wander'sur,' that is, paid labour. In addition to the above, the enforcement of the Land Use Act and Green Revolution (April 1980) had multiplier effects on the Kuteb economy between 1980-2000. Among the effects was the leasing out of some family lands by enterprising farmers to raise resources either through farm produce or monetary terms in order to acquire large cultivable areas. Some indigenous farmers worth of mention were Dr Nuhu Andeyaba, Christopher Iratse Iranyang, Rebecca Hamza, Gen. T. Y. Danjuma (T.Y. Accres) These eminent personalities began to employ modern agricultural implements such as tractors, plough, harrow, among others. The introduction of fertilizers within the period gradually increased agricultural productivity.28 Notwithstanding, the emerging positive trend in the development of Kuteb economy within the period, there were impediments associated with this modern trend such as poor technical know-how, inadequate financial loans, poor incentives, paucity of extension service workers etc29. Perhaps, the era of ethnic conflicts and warfare in the Kuteb society during the early 1990s drastically slowed down the pace of development of the Kuteb economy generally. Nonetheless, the unfortunate development still left the Kuteb economy at a better level or stage than in the pre-colonial and colonial periods.

C. The third phase (2000-2018) This phase witnessed some remarkable development in the Kuteb economy. Firstly, it witnessed the emergence of large scale farming using either mechanised implements or communal group labour. This could be adduced, partly, to increase in population and growing economic and socio-political development in Kutebland. The eventual emergence of small-scale, large-scale farming and business outfits has greatly improved the Kuteb economy30 The increase in the rate of mechanized farming has equally contributed to the growth of the Kuteb economy in diverse ways, among which

204 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies include the adoption of improved variety of seedlings; hire tractor services, use of herbicides and subsidized fertilizers to increase farm yields, processing machines, especially milling devices in terms of palm oil production, technological devices and expansion of road networks like Takum to Marraraba route, Takum to Kashimbilla, Takum-Chanchanji-Rafin kada to Wukari Route and Rufu to Ikpakya route in the Ussa area. These road networks were however pre- existing footpaths which were later reconstructed to serve as motorable roads in the area31. The creation of Yangtu Special Development Area in 2008 added impetus to the growth of Kuteb economy. Being a predominantly Kuteb area, the growth in all sectors of the Local Government directly translated into the growth of the Kuteb economy and society generally. More Kuteb people became empowered to advance economic activities. Indeed, the growing Kuteb population has continued to exploit the economic potentials of the Kuteb society, especially in agriculture. The export of timber (Madrit) and other agricultural produce such as Guinea corn, Yam, Millet, Palm Oil, Beniseed and Cassava, among others has been more pronounced in recent times. A cursory look at the table below reveals the availability of diverse agricultural produce in the three administrative areas(Takum and Ussa Local Government Areas, including the Yangtu Special Development Area).

Table 1. The Agricultural produce potentials of Kuteb society S/N CROPS/ANIMALS USES 1. CEREAL A. G u i nea corn Food, local beer (ijwab) B. M i l let “ C . M a i ze “ animal feeds D. Rice “ E. Bean “

F. Soya bean “

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G. Bennisee d “ H. Groundn ut Oil, food 2 . ROOT CROP A. Yam Food, flour B. Cassava Starch, Garri, C. Sweet P otatoes Foo d A. Cocoa Foo d 3. TREE PLANTATION A . M ango Fruit B. Cashew “ C. Orange “ D. Palm Kernel P a l m Oil, soap making E. Timber ( Madrid) Wood, construction, furniture F. Banana Food, plantain chips 4. ANIMAL A. Cow Food, hides and skin B. Food C . Fowl Food D. Duck Food E. Dog Food, S ecurity F. Pig Food 5 . VEGETABLE A. Water leaf Medicinal, food B. Pumpkin Food C. Moringa Medicinal D. Sorrel Herbal medicine, Native drinks Source: Oral interviews with members of the Kuteb Society32 The basis of Kuteb economy is tied to human and environmental factors such as natural resource endowment, human resources, advent of technology and social relations. These parameters were in consonance with the view held by Walter Rodney (1972) in the political development of Merina Kingdom (Madagascar)33 which was corroborated by Adihikon that development entails a growth with structural and technological change.34

Conclusion Farming is the nucleus of agriculture. Both in the pre-colonial,

206 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies colonial and post-colonial times agriculture has remained more prevalent than animal husbandary and hunting which were subsidiary ventures among the Kuteb people. The end of the Second Republic served as a landmark in the beginning of large-scale farming among the Kuteb people. The expansion and development in the agricultural sector between 1960 and 2018 among the Kuteb shows a tremendous modification from communal grouping to individualistic enterprising farmers using monetized labour as against family labour and traditional tools. The era witnessed the use of technological equipment, agro-chemical substances, application of hybrid varieties of seedlings, etc. This development marked a shift from subsistence economy to commercial agriculture or economy. Nonetheless, some subsistence economy or agriculture is still being practiced by some Kuteb people up to date.

Recommendations There are many key strategies to enhance agricultural production in Nigeria. Firstly, there is a need to formulate sustainable and viable economic policies that are agriculturally driven in terms of diversification of the sector. Secondly, land conservation, land use and land tenure system should be fine-tuned through a review of the existing legal frame work to accommodate recent developments and peculiarities of the Nigeria state in order to boost food self- sufficiency. Thirdly, subsidization rates of agricultural inputs, implements, improved seedlings, fertilizers, agro-chemical substances and provision of farmers' incentives would unarguably improve agricultural productivity and guarantee food security. Finally, Government should ensure that agricultural banks serve the farmers in most rural areas by provision of micro-credit loans to promote agricultural activities while road networks and storage facilities are accorded prime of place in the development agenda of the nation.

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References

1. Araen Shinge A. (2017) An Appraisal of Cultural and Economic Setting of Kuteb People of Takum and Ussa Local Government of Taraba State before British Colonial Conquest. 2. Walter Rodney (1972) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London; Bogle L' Overture Publisher) p.121 3. Ibid p.10 4. Araren Shinge A. (2017) An Appraisal of Cultural and Economic Setting of Kuteb People of Takum and Ussa Local Government of Taraba State before British Colonial Conquest. 5. A. I Ologhobo (2004) (ed) Agriculture Renewable Resources, Animal Husbandary and Health, General Studies Programme; University of Ibadan, p.1 6. U. Saddi (1973) The History of Kuteb and its neighbour of Southern Gongola State. 7. G. O. Folade (2008) Introduction of General agriculture COP 111 National Open University of Nigeria, p.2 8. Ibid 9. M. Saddi Umaru (1973) Know the story of Kuteb chatper on calendar of Kuteb Migration Translated, Zaria; Gaskiya Coporation 10. G. O. Folade (2008) Introduction of General agriculture COP 111 National Open University of Nigeria, p.6 11. William A. & Ahmed – Gamgum Kuchicheb Festival: The challenges of cultural Genocide in Nigeria 's Takum Chiefdom, research Academy of Social Science. Vol. 2 No 4, 2015 12. Araren Shinge A. (2017) An Appraisal of Cultural and Economic Setting of Kuteb People of Takum and Ussa Local Government of Taraba State before British Colonial Conquest. 13. U. Saddi (1973) The History of Kuteb and its neighbour of

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Southern Gongola State. 14. Taraba State Government of Nigeria Dairy 2012 15. Mordakai S. D. (2016) Inter-group in Wukari and Donga 1900-1992, A case study of Jukun and ; Unpublished Dissertation, ABU, Zaria 16. Asherum Garba (2018) The impact of British Agricultural Policy in Kuteb Area of Taraba State 1900-1960, M.A History, Dept. of History and Diplomatic Studies, Taraba State University, Jalingo. Unpublished Dissertation. 17. Ibid 18. A. I Ologhobo (2004) (ed) Agriculture Renewable Resources, Animal Husbandary and Health, General Studies Programme; University of Ibadan. p.3 19. Ibid 20. Asherum Garba (2018) The impact of British Agricultural Policy in Kuteb Area of Taraba State 1900-1960, M.A History, Dept. of History and Diplomatic Studies, Taraba State University, Jalingo. Unpublished Dissertation. 21. Ibid 22. Otubu Akitunde, The Land Use Act and Land Ownership Debate in Nigeria: Resolving the impasse, SSRN Electronic Journal 2015, P.1,2 23. William A. & Ahmed – Gamgum Kuchicheb Festival: The challenges of cultural Genocide in Nigeria 's Takum Chiefdom, research Academy of Social Science. Vol. 2 No 4, 2015 24. Omob.blogspot.com (c) omo 2013 25. Jide Ibietan, Public Policy Making Process Agricultural & Rural Development Policies in Nigeria (1960 – Date) international Journal of Studies in the Humanities (IJOSH) Vol.8 No9 2011 pg 102 26. A. I Ologhobo (2004) (ed) Agriculture Renewable Resources, Animal Husbandary and Health, General Studies Programme; University of Ibadan. Pg 13 27. Asherum Garba (2018) The impact of British Agricultural

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Policy in Kuteb Area of Taraba State 1900-1960, M.A History, Dept. of History and Diplomatic Studies, Taraba State University, Jalingo. Unpublished Dissertation. 28. Ibid 29. Araen Shinge A. (2017) An Appraisal of Cultural and Economic Setting of Kuteb People of Takum and Ussa Local Government of Taraba State before British Colonial Conquest. 30. Oral Interview S/N Name of Age Sex occupation Place Date of informat interviewed interview 1. R. Maliki 56 M C/ servant, farmer Takum 7 July 2018 2. Kande Angyu 64 F Fa rmer?Bu siness Uss a April David 2018 3. U.S Mgbe 72 M Rt d. Jalingo June 2017 4. A.B Andetur 61 M Rtd. H/Teacher Ussa 10 March 2017 5. S. Mongaru 53 M Farmer Bika- June 2017 Lupwe, Yangtu 31. Ibid 32. Ibid 33. Walter Rodney (1972) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London; Bogle L' Overture Publisher) p.160 34. Adihikon Tanko A. (2015) Jalingo Historical Review, A Journal of the Department of History and Archaeology, Taraba State Vol.5 No1&2 p. 42

210 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies Impact of Terrorism on Socio-Economic Development of Nigeria

Awudu, Angyu Daniel Department of Political Science, Federal College of Education, Zaria, Kaduna State, Nigeria 08032462365, 08022993218, [email protected] & Raymond Ferdinand Relationship Manager, Cement and Logistics Team CIBD Access Bank Plc. Plot 999c, Danmole Street V/Island Lagos, Lagos State, Nigeria 08032032902, [email protected]

Abstract Nigeria has been experiencing series of agitations, reactions and counter reactions from various regions in the country. These agitations have taken a terrorist dimension which constitutes a great challenge to national security; as well as hampering socio-economic development. Terrorism is seen as the execution of radical attacks in a state by forces which originate and operate within a particular state. The study therefore aims at examining the impact of terrorism on socio- economic development of Nigeria. Using secondary source of gathering data, the study argues that frustration, poverty, unemployment, quest for resource control, ethno-religious intolerance, among other factors, are the causes of terrorism in Nigeria. The inability of state to resolve those imbalances and provide adequate security to her citizens has caused more havoc than good. This subscribes to the tenets of Human security theory which seeks to maximize the capabilities of the modern sovereign state to provide effective security to her citizens. The findings show that Nigeria is experiencing reduction in foreign exchange earnings, low foreign investment, low school enrollment, reduction in small scale businesses, etc. as a result of constant unrest. The work brings to limelight the implications of terrorism on socio-economic development of the country and the necessary measures in addressing the contending national issues. The study, thus, recommends that national security should be treated with all sense of commitment by all and sundry. Politics, bias mindset, religious and ethnic sentiment by Nigerian elites and politicians should be discouraged through massive campaign and dialogue so as to encourage all hands to support the fight against terrorism. Keywords: Terrorism, UNDP, Socio-Economic, Development, Nigeria

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Introduction Ethno-religious crises, militancy, terrorism and other forms of intra- national political violence are in many ways more threatening today than ever before as the rate of havoc done through these means are unimaginable and highly destructive. The most deadly challenge to global security in the 21st century is the havoc posed by terrorists in different parts of the world with Nigeria inclusive. The fact that terrorism is now a household phenomenon in Nigeria is no longer a point of debate. This confirms the position of Patrick and Omemu (2013) that Nigeria has experienced deadly untold confrontation and massive assault from terrorist groups. This unfortunate development has brought to fore wanton destruction of government properties, bombing of worship centers, and other public places, assassination of prominent individuals, kidnapping or hostage-taking of citizens, vandalization of oil installations, burning of homes and schools occasioned by sporadic shooting of innocent citizens mist with sporadic developmental features. The above analysis put terrorism as actions focusing on harming people either specifically or generally so as to create fear in them by targeting civilians and facilities or system on which they rely (Kydd & Walter 2006). It is viewed as violence carried out by individuals within or outside the government circle that is specifically directed against civilian or government institutions as a way of calling attention to perceived real or imaginary injustices in a clandestine manner (Alao, Atere & Alao 2012). Inadequate human security measures characterized by disease, hunger, unemployment, political oppression, environmental degradation, economic deprivation, poverty, suppression of human rights and marginalization are basically some of the reasons that triggered the rise of terrorist activities in different locations within the country. Regrettably, the use of terror strategies by the agitated groups to end the real and perceived injustices and attain economic emancipation has caused more harm than good. From the Niger Delta militancy, activities of MASSOB in the east, ethno religious uprising, and sectarian crisis all over the federation, as well as the activities of Boko Haram in the North, Nigeria has suffered loss of millions of

212 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies dollars from Foreign Direct Investment, low agricultural productivity, unemployment on the increase, thousands of lives have been lost and more displaced. The broad analysis of these activities affecting the rate of development in the country which has received minimal attention among scholars is the main trust of this paper. The paper is limited to recent security challenges in the Nigerian body polity. Theoretical Framework As a concept of global concern, terrorism has generated serious and wide theoretical thinking across both social and non-social science disciplines. The interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches to the study of terrorism have produced a wide variety of explanations and theoretical statements. Within the context of domestic terrorism certain theories are germane, but this work is based on the main argument of Human Security Theory. Recent global security is so dynamic that states are no longer actors in conflicts alone. The fragility of the world security with high rate of arm proliferations and arm race has brought in non-state actors threatening national and international security thereby constituting to incessant outbreak of crises that place humans in jeopardy. The need to place security of human lives at the center-piece of national and international security policy therefore becomes germane. As a post-cold war paradigm, human security covers personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security (UNDP, 1994). Contrary to the traditional state-centric approach to security, human security promotes individual's rights and interests, which are usually given less attention by global security approaches. An ideal security entails the protection of individuals from such threats as disease, hunger, unemployment, political oppression, environmental degradation and economic deprivation (Tsai and Tan, 2007). The theory views security as people-centric with the dimension of guaranteeing the well-being of individuals and responding to human needs. This is because, a people-centered security framework is necessary for national, regional and global stability and development. Human security enhances our common understanding of how to link

213 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies the citizen to the state by emphasizing on people based security structure where the security of citizens determines the socio- economic and political development of the state. Under this, the state looks inward to the people from where it draws its legitimacy. This substantiates the fact that the inherent contradictions in a society cannot be addressed by the state alone. Human security framework upholds the creation of political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that promote the building blocks of human survival, livelihood and dignity (CHS: 2003). When threats are addressed, the interface between security, development and human rights is expanded; and a new integrated, coordinated and people-centered approach to advancing peace, security and development within and across nations is promoted (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2009). A broader range of actors such as the local communities, international organizations, civil society as well as the state are involved in human security. Human security, however, is not intended to displace state security. Instead, their relationship is complementary: “human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other. Without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa” (CHS: 2003). Human security acknowledges that as a result of downturns such as conflicts, economic and financial crises, ill-treatment and natural disasters, people are faced with sudden insecurities and deprivations. These not only undo years of development but also generate conditions within which grievances can lead to growing tensions. Therefore, in addition to its emphasis on human well-being, human security is driven by values relating to security, stability and sustainability of development gains (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2009). In environment that human security is not given necessary priority, social unrest, kidnapping, assassination and all forms of terrorist activities will manifest. The crises in the Niger Delta area before the amnesty programme launched by President Yar'adua was a reaction to what the people of the region considered as threat to food, environmental, health and economic security and a fair share of the

214 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies oil wealth that is exploited from their land. The frustration made the aggrieved youth take vandalization of oil pipelines, kidnapping of oil workers, etc. Struggle for the control of resources and the quest for ethnic and religious supremacy precipitates most crises in Nigeria today. This paper therefore argues that domestic terrorism in Nigeria is a conflict arising from inadequate human security policy framework and implementation. Conceptual Clarification As a multidisciplinary concept, terrorism has multiple approaches from different scholars which make a universally acceptable definition difficult. According to Claver (2002), terrorism is the illegal use of force to instill fear with the aim of establishing political, economic or social change. Ajayi (2012) extends that position by asserting that terrorism is from the word 'terror' which conjures the image of fear and trepidation. It is an act intended to instill fear and submission in the targeted victim(s). He further opines that it could also take the form of hijacking of commercial aircraft, kidnapping, assassination, gun attack, arson and frontal assaults on important state institutions. The essential purpose is the desire to draw attention to, and/or gain sympathy for a cause. The perpetrators are usually religious fundamentalists, extremists of the right and left, governments and underground organizations (Ajayi 2012). It can also be seen as politically motivated acts of violation perpetrated against civilian targets and even security agencies with the aim of inflicting mass causalities, instilling fear and a sense of insecurity and affecting a change in the policies and action of the victims (Nolan, 1998). The African Union also in its Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism Article 1 (3) defines terrorism as any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: i. Intimidate, put in fear, coerce or induce any government,

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body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles; or ii. Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or create general insurrection in a State. This generally proves that terrorism is adopted to mean a wide range of deployment of force largely targeted at civilian population and government of a state by disgruntled elements within the society to direct the attention of government to their plight or to force a change of government (Alao, Atere & Alao 2012). Apparently, therefore, terrorism is usually characterized by bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hostage situations and hijackings and can be practiced and sponsored by individuals, groups, institutions and even governments and states. From the above understanding of terrorism, domestic terrorism can therefore be seen as the commission of terrorist attacks in a state by forces inside or originating from the state, as opposed to terrorist attacks by forces external to the state. In other words, domestic terrorism is a terrorist act practiced in one's own country against her own people (online dictionary in Ezema 2013). It is terrorist activities that focus on facilities or populations that usually manifest in molestation, intimidation, domination or manipulation of the victim (Donald 2013) without foreign direction. The United States Department of Justice (2005) further coined domestic terrorism to connote the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within a country without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives. Terrorists and their Methods of Operation in Nigeria Abiye (2011) notes that terrorism arose in Nigeria over the past one hundred years because waring, conflicting and agitating groups took advantage of government's inefficient action and inactions in dealing with the fundamental elements of nationhood such as internal

216 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies security, resource control, injustice, corruption, ethnicism, sycophancy, favouritism, and marginalization. These factors have made terrorism to be ethicized in Nigeria. Currently the nation is witnessing high spate of insecurity all over with higher concentration in the northern region (Patrick & Omemu 2013). Several terrorists from individual to group levels are existing in Nigeria. The Niger Delta region has different socio-economic and cultural agitators whose operations have taken the form of terrorism. Examples of these groups are Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta, People Volunteer Force, the Egbesu Boys, and Niger Delta Vigilante with a long history dating to the Adaka Boro Movement in the 1960's (Ayangese, 2010) and through to Ken Saro Wiwa's struggles. These militant groups starting from individuals like Ken Saro Wiwa launched agitation against environmental degradation, unemployment, poverty, deprivation and marginalization in the Niger Delta areas of Nigeria and demanding for resource control. Summary of their recent activities include: October 3, 2006, seven expatriate oil workers held hostage from their residence at Essan Akpan estate in ; October 10, 2006, sixty oil worker taken hostage by militant youth in Balyesa; January 2007, 24 Filipino held hostage and not released until after a month in February. Also 9 Chinese were kidnapped in Sagbama, Bayelsa state; January 10, 2007, ten oil workers comprising 9 Koreans and one Nigerian working for Daewoo were kidnapped; May 8th, 2007 attack on oil facilities at Brass and Asaka; May 16, 2007, attack and destruction of the country house of Goodluck Jonathan, Governor of Bayelsa State and Vice President-elect of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Friday July, 24 Bayelsa State Speaker's mother abducted etc. In the East, apart from the high rate of kidnapping and armed robbery, Movement for the Actualizations of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) are also terrorizing and fighting for equal rights and security of N'digbo, true federalism, autonomy and political relevance of the in Nigeria having been ravaged by the civil war and abandoned thereafter. In the western region, cases of domestic conflict, ritual killings characterized by dropping of dead

217 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies bodies in public places, especially in Lagos, are all pointers of domestic terrorist act. Others include Ogoni Youth, Ijaw Youth, Bakassi Boys involving inhuman treatment, extrajudicial killings and human rights violations perpetrated in , Ombatse group in Nasarrawa state. Several pockets of minor ethno-religious aggrieved groups which tend to use small arms, local weapons and petrol bombs have dominant interest in violent activities such as burning of places of worship, business enclaves and residential areas as well as destruction of lives also arose in places like the Plateau State, Taraba State, Kogi, Benue State, Nasarrawa State, etc. Their interest was mainly on land acquisition, religious and ethnic disagreement, marginalization, boundary adjustment and grazing rights (Patrick & Omemu, 2013). Boko Haram is also one of the terrorist groups in Nigeria whose activities is affecting the corporate existence of the country as well as hampering socio-economic development of the country, especially within the Northern region. The Global Terrorism Index ranking shows that Nigeria is the seventh terrorist country with 7.347 score in the world after Somalia with 7.844 as a result of the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist activities (Global Terrorism Index from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia retrieved on the 28th July, 2014). Their attacks are staged on regular basis against the churches, mosques, security establishments, government institutions, civilian settlements, business centers, media organizations, etc with huge human casualty that present the government as helpless and incapable of handling the insurgence (Alao, Atere & Alao 2012). It started as domestic terrorist group but has taken international dimension of recent. The anatomy of the activities of the terrorist groups in Nigeria which is basically aimed at unleashing fear and terror in the mind of Nigerians cannot be overemphasized. The methods used by these terrorists generally include: bombing, arson, assassination, shooting, robberies, assault, kidnapping, hostile takeover of territories, malicious destruction, hate speeches, media campaign, etc. Today, thousands of lives are gone; properties worth billions of naira destroyed, investment and business opportunities lost and lot more.

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Drawing from the above conceptual analysis and explanations, it is glaring that terrorism can lead to socio-economic underdevelopment of a country, since the practice of domestic terrorist groups makes the society difficult to return to normal politics. Development at the level of the individual implies increase skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity and material well-being (Rodney, 1969, in Abdulhamed, 2008). As a concept that goes beyond economic indicators, development can also be seen as a “multidimensional process involving the reorganization and reorientation of the entire economic and social system. This involves, in addition to improvement of income and output, radical changes in institutional, social and administrative structures as well as in popular attitudes, customs and beliefs” (Tadaro, 1985, in Abduhamed, 2008). It is germane to assert that social and economic development characterized by national integration, tolerance, life sustenance, self-esteem or respect, material well-being, institutional changes, peace and stability, growth in income and investment, high rate of employment opportunities, growth in Gross Domestic product, high standard of living, etc, cannot strive in an environment of social unrest, gross political instability and insecurity. Terrorism and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria The activities of terrorists have destabilized socio-economic development in Nigeria. It is obvious that the lack of peace and stability in any society is often counter-productive, hence a debilitating effect upon socio-economic prospects (PIDAN Publication, 2013). This shows that the economic base of any state cannot strive effectively amidst crisis. This explains why socio- economic activities are on the lowest ebb in Nigeria, especially at the Northern region. Below are some of the impacts of terrorism on socio-economic development in the country. Reduction in Foreign Exchange Earnings, Foreign Investment and increase in unemployment: Nigeria is a country endowed with natural and material resources, which has been securing a big chunk of foreign exchange earnings for the country especially in the oil sector. But because of constant instability, there has been bullet of reduction. Some recent statistics show that confessed; “… the

219 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies temporary closure of wells in the Niger Delta as a result of the attacks by militants led to a sharp reduction in government foreign exchange earnings”, (Guardian newspapers of January 2, 1999), resulting in the non-realization of “the budgeted 1998 revenue of N216.336 billion from oil. The situation has gone worse since then. In a period of seven months in 2006 (between February and September), the Business Day of September 4, 2006, reported that the country lost about 12 billion US dollars to the Niger Delta militants. By May 2007, it was estimated that militant activities and protest reduced oil production from a total capacity of 3million barrels per day to about 2million barrels. At an average of 65 dollars a barrel, this loss translates to $65 million per day. Expectedly, this is damaging to the economy of the nation- an economy that is significantly driven by oil. All these took place before the amnesty programme launched by President Yar'adua (Ogundiya 2009). In another development, there has been weak approach in the inflow of foreign investments into the country. This is because; many investors no longer view the Nigerian economy as the safe haven for their investment (Ezema 2013). In fact, most nations, including United States, Britain, Australia, among others, instruct their citizens against doing business in Nigeria (British High Commission, Nigeria, 2005; Australian High Commission, 2005). These activities are cumulatively increasing the rate of unemployment in the country. Decline of Small Scale Businesses: Most small scale businesses in the conflict environment have today been in a state of comatose as a result of business men relocating to safe areas or places. According to Ezema (2013), about 75 percent of the over three million Igbo businessmen and traders in the Kano city who engage in both small and medium scale businesses have fled to other business areas due to the growing insecurity posed by the activities of Boko Haram insurgence. Equally worrisome is the fact that indigenous business communities in the city, especially the textile merchants, are not faring better as they count their losses as customers who used to patronize them no longer go to Kano for the fear of the unknown. In , the seat of the insurgence, due to constant social unrest, commercial and business activities have very alarmingly dwindled.

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For example, the Maiduguri Monday Market which is the biggest market in the city is seriously affected as hundreds of shop owners; especially southerners, have closed their businesses and left the troubled city (Ezema, 2013). In Jos, the capital city of Plateau state, with the burning of its ultra-modern market (arguably one of the largest in West Africa) in 2001 (PIDAN publication, 2013) and the twin bomb blast in 2014, small scale businesses are also declining. The same situation is obtainable in Damaturu, Postiskum, Southern Kaduna villages, Wukari in Taraba State, etc. Decline of the Tourism Industry: The impact of terrorism can also be felt in the area of tourism as most tourist centers in the heart of crisis areas are now left as shadows of their former selves. In places like Jos, Kano, Maiduguri, etc, tourism used to be a great revenue- earner, but this has changed to a point where the states can no longer pride themselves as the indisputable “Homes of Tourism in the country”. According to PIDAN publication (2013), the once busy Jos Museum; the Jos Zoo and the Jos Wildlife Park are no longer thronged by tourists from other parts of the country and the world at large. The Assop Falls, Kurra Falls and the Pandam Wildlife Park are no longer patronized. In Kano, the Durbar festivals which used to attract local and international tourists have been canceled due to the challenge of insecurity (Sun, August 30, 2012). Consequently, tourism industry has stopped contributing substantially to the treasury of the country as it used to do. The Decline in Agricultural Productivity: Most farmers in the Middle Belt (Central Nigeria) and the core north have lost access to their farm lands due to incessant threats and conflicts. Notable among them are most of the rural and agrarian communities in Plateau, Taraba, Nasarrawa, Zamfara, Kaduna Benue, Adamawa and host of other states within the country. In most of these places, villages are abandoned and farm products destroyed. Now farmers and herdsmen can hardly settle down to cultivate the needed food and livestock for production. This is causing food insecurity and inflation in the prices of food items in the country. Diversion of Government's Attention and Resources: “Conflicts have the capacity to severely constrain development endeavors by

221 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies destroying physical infrastructure, interrupting production processes and diverting resources away from productive uses” (PIDAN publication, 2013). Generally, conflict stunts development because it creates humanitarian problems, and resources are diverted to security, relief materials and reconstruction. Because of terrorism, huge amount of resources that can be used in providing infrastructures in the country, like good roads, electricity and other vital amenities that will enhance the economic development of Nigeria are diverted to address security challenges. For example, 18 Northern States spent N3tr on security from 2009 to date (Usman Farouk retrieved from www.dailytimes.com on July 22, 2014). Between 2010 and 2014, a total of US$14 billion (totaling N3.38trn) was allocated for defence, security and the Police. This year alone, the total sum is US$4 billion. And this has not clipped the wings of Boko Haram and other security challenges in the country. Another worrisome development is the plan on ground to borrow US$1 billion. The question now is, if US$14 has not done much in upgrading military and security facilities in five years, what impact can US$1 billion do? (Retrieved from www.thecable.ng on July, 22nd 2014). Segregated Settlement Patterns: As a result of incessant crises in Nigeria, the nature of free interaction and cordial relationship among citizens has since given way to segregated settlements with constant mutual fear and suspicion. Most urban settlements are now divided along religious and ethnic lines. In fact, in some places like Jos, Kaduna, Zaria, Kano, Maiduguri and many others, some locations are tagged “No-Go Areas”. This pattern of settlement is affecting the nature of economic transactions and hampering social development in those places. National Disintegration: As a constitutional quest, national integration is seen as a purposeful strategy which is directed with the aim of incorporating various groups irrespective of ethno-religious affiliations in the country in order to guarantee peaceful co-existence, harmony and cooperation at various levels of national endeavors. This is a good developmental strategy for a heterogeneous society like Nigeria. But through the multidimensional phases of unrest and

222 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies conflict, Nigeria is today disintegrating and dividing into different blocs with secessional tendencies. We are daily witnessing the emergence of different informal groups calling for the division of the country typical of the IPOB and others. Low Enrollment of Students and Distorted Academic Calendar: School attendance and academic calendar are affected in areas prone to Boko Haram attacks, ethno-religious conflicts, high cases of kidnapping, etc. Several schools, especially in the Northern region, are suffering low enrolment rate especially at the primary and secondary schools. Schools that manage to operate usually live in perpetual fear of attacks. Effort of Government in Addressing Terrorism in Nigeria Considering the negative impact of terrorist activities on the socio- economic development of the country, several efforts and strategies have been made and adopted by both formal and non-formal institutions as means of combating terrorism and resolving internal threat and insecurity. These institutions include the government and Non-Governmentals. Among the measures adopted by the government are the followings: i. Part of the government effort in combating the unrest, particularly in the Niger Delta Region include the 15 percent derivation formular, establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Ministry of Niger Delta, Amnesty Program and other direct Federal Government projects, among others, which are of economic value to the populace. ii. Another effort by government is the immediate response in sending military presence to areas of conflict so as to maintain law and order. This has been demonstrated all over the country as the present of security operatives is very obvious. However, the military sometimes adopt the coercion method or armed confrontation strategy which usually results to mass killings and in some places escalation of the mayhem. Oromareghake and Akpator (2005) argue in favour of this when they assert that “the problem with the deployment of security forces that are not backed by intensive Mediation

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effort is that it unnecessarily prolongs the stay of such security forces deployed in different parts of Nigeria”. iii. In the case of Boko Haram, several methods including armed confrontation, call for dialogue and negotiations and other methods have rather fueled the terrorist act instead of resolving it. iv. Of recent, several efforts, including some international cooperation, owing to the abduction of the Chibok girls have been going on to fight Boko Haram. The Federal Government also strived in relocating serving chiefs and the Tactical Command Center of the Nigerian Military to Borno. Unfortunately, these efforts have not translated to concrete actions that could have effectively reduced the onslaught of the sect. This caused some commentators and security analysis to say that the Boko Haram insurgency is a political metrics.

Conclusion The foregoing discussion has clearly revealed that terrorism has a great negative impact on the socio-economic development of the Nigeria. The country is at present bedeviled with incessant national unrest virtually in all parts of the country as a result of terrorist activities. Constant fear, human and economic threats, bombing, kidnapping, ethno-religious conflicts, militancy and rise of ethnic militias loom the country. The study also finds out that most of these crises are rising as a result of the inability of the government to provide adequate human security. Where human security is neglected, poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, marginalization, abuse of human rights, and constant social unrest, among others, will become the order of the day. Contingent on this happening, the country's socio-economic landscape is experiencing great setbacks such as reduction in foreign exchange earnings, foreign investment and employment opportunities; national disintegration, decline in agricultural productivity, etc.

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Recommendations I. The issue of security is everybody's responsibility, hence every patriotic Nigerian should co-operate with the Nigerian State in finding lasting solution to this ugly situation. The emergence of Civilian JTF in is a welcome development that should be encouraged and controlled by the government. ii. Government should give maximum attention in developing human security which covers personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security. iii. Professional associations and Non- Governmental Organization (NGO) should also support the government in the fight against terrorism using their technical expertise. This can be done through the support of government policies, serving as agents of orientation to the masses, sponsoring research that can bring out necessary strategies of fighting terrorism. iv. Programmes centered on the need to fight against poverty through promoting conducive environments to growth and effective delivery of services, addressing problem of weak governance should be given high concentration. Employment opportunities should be generated to provide jobs for the growing population of job seekers. v. Establishment of programmes that focus on building counter- terrorism capacity such as border control and regional co- operation, especially among neighbouring countries. A collective anti-terrorism operation between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Benin and Cameroon should be given maximum attention. vi. National security should be treated with all sense of commitment by all and sundry. Politics, bias mind set, religious and ethnic sentiment by Nigerian elites and politicians should be discouraged through massive campaign and dialogue so as to encourage all hands to support the fight against terrorism.

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References

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?Ilufoye Sarafa Ogundiya I. S. (2009). Domestic Terrorism and Security Threats in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria; Journal of Social Science, 20(1): 31-42 ?Kydd, A. H. & Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism, Journal of International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp 49-79 ?Nolan, J. (1998). The Greanwood Encyclopedia International Relations. London: Greenwood Publishing ?Ogundiya I.S (2005). The Threats of Terrorism in Nigeria: Myths or Reality. Paper Presented at the Workshop on Disaster and Emergency Management, Organized by the Office of the Secretary to the Kebbi State Government, Kebbi, Nigeria, 20-22 Sept 2005 and author's compilation from Financial Standard February 13, 2006; Financial Standard February 6, 2006, Vanguard January 23, 2006; The Pointer January 20, 2006, ?The Punch January 20, 2006, Tell magazine, June 4, 2007 ?Ojukwu, C.C, 2011. Terrorism, Foreign and Human Rights Concern in Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 13, No.4.Clarion, Pennsylvania : Clarion University of Pennsylvania, ?Patrick O. & Omemu F. (2013). Effect of Boko Haram on School attendance in Northern Nigeria; British Journal of Education Vol. 1, No 2. Pp1-9 ?PIDAN (2013). Effects of the Jos/Plateaunconflicts and crises, and their implications on Nigeria's National Security: Vol. 2. No. 1, Jos, La'asuk Production ?United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (2009). Human security in theory and practice; Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security retrieved from www.tr.undp.org/content February, 2015. ?U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism from 2002-2005 retrieved from www.fbi.gov/states- services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005 on June, 26 2014.

227 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies An Assessment of the Impact of Library and Information Services in National Development in Nigeria

Danjuma Jibaniya Library Department Federal College of Education, Zaria, Kaduna State 08064324189; 0808333411 wawatayimi50@ gmail.com

Abstract There is no doubt that library plays a significant role in Education and nation building. The realization of the enormous power of information in our contemporary society has made library and information services platforms in championing the course of national development in every sector. Using secondary sources, this paper aims at assessing the impacts of library and information services in promoting national development in Nigeria. The findings show that library and information services promote national literacy by making reading materials available thereby optimizing development through education. But the challenge of poor reading culture in Nigeria has lowered the maximum impact of library and information services in the country. The paper recommends that government should use National Orientation Agency to provide orientation and awareness on the importance of reading so as to stimulate reading culture among Nigerians. Keywords: Library, Information and National Development

Introduction Information is a crucial factor in national development and the ability to use information tools is considered a source of power. According to Achitabwino (2007), information is a link pin of national development. He states further that for a nation to develop, it requires relevant and up to dale information on education, economic, social, and political revolution. The dogma that libraries exist for proper records management, provision and dissemination of such information becomes a reality in achieving national development. It, therefore, becomes apparent that the impact of library and information services in national development is unquestionable.

Libraries play a vital role in the world systems of education and

228 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies information storage and retrieval. They make available through books, journals, films, recordings, and other media knowledge that have been accumulated through the ages. A large number of people in all life endeavours (scholars, scientists, teachers, business executives, government officials, etc) use library resources in their activities. Many people also turn to libraries to satisfy a desire for knowledge, perform research, or to obtain materials for leisure.

In addition, a large number of people enjoy film shows, lectures, book discussions, etc, that are provided by libraries. Furthermore, libraries play vital role in preserving societal cultural heritage. In other words, library is the citadel of learning or nerve centre of any academic institution. It is an important aspect in educational development of man at all stages of life. In modern times, the overall aim of libraries has changed, becoming more multi-faceted. Libraries are now agents of educational, social, economic and political revolution and are accessible to all that require their services. This means that a library is a place equipped for the acquisition, organisation, preservation, storage, retrieval and dissemination of information. It is against the foregoing background that this research tends to examine the impact of library and information services on national development.

Library and Information Services To Kumar (2009), library service is that phase of work that helps users in securing information and assisting users to get what they want with a view to meeting their needs. Thompson (2010) sees library services as help rendered by a librarian to assist users in securing information. Williams (2009) opines that the introduction of internet into library services has greatly enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of library services. Users can get satisfactory answers to their queries within the shortest time; a librarian can perform those

229 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies services more efficiently. Among the greatest benefits of internet to library services is the expensive way to communicate with oilier internet users worldwide. It is used to obtain important instructional resources for effective teaching and learning in schools.

The contribution of library services to education would be better appreciated when one recognizes the fact that it is an important source of updating knowledge. Kumar (2009) reiterates that libraries are one of the most important educational tools that proprietors or administrators of schools should provide in all their educational institutions in accordance with established standards. They should also provide for training of librarians and library assistants for good service delivery. It is the responsibility of any library in institutions of higher learning to assist in the dissemination of information required for proper teaching, learning, research and public services in those institutions, which will enable them to turn up high caliber of graduates into the labour market to enhance national development. Johnson (2011) notes that the importance of library and information services to education can also not be over emphasized especially when one recognizes the fact that not all works are needed for private and group studies. Libraries make provision for the acquisition of rare books, printed and non-printed materials including costly and many useful works that an individual cannot afford, but make them available for free use by those in need of them. It is also a function of the library to help readers to obtain loaned materials from other libraries that are not available in its library where such materials are highly needed.

Challenges of Library Information and Services in Nigeria i. Generally, it is a known fact that the prevailing attitude of staff to work is one of the major factors confronting library services delivery.

230 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies ii. Maduabuchi (2011) identifies one of these problem of library services to high rates of absenteeism of staff. iii. The problem of network fluctuation and slowness contribute to poor achievement of desired result iv. Poor management of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). v. Epileptic power supply is another challenge affecting effective and efficient library services delivery. vi. In-adequate funding has constituted another major constraint which results in inadequate information resources, inadequate facilities and equipment for library staff to carry out their job (Idovvu. 2011). vii. The greater problem of information provision by libraries to promote human resources and socio-economic issues are high illiteracy rate and lack of reading culture, viii. There is no area of library operation to which the computer has not been applied with tremendous gains. At this junction, one can ask how much of these technological devices are in use in Nigerian libraries. In the past decades, whatever has been done in terms of modern technological application or automation has not gone deeply enough to make an appreciable impact.

National Development National development is one of the concepts in the social sciences for which no single definition is given. Each writer defines it according to his/her own perception of the twin word. However, the general consensus is that development is all about change. Davidson (1981) explains that development is all about qualitative change of existing structure into a different, better and more advanced structure. He explains further that it involves radical transformation in institution, social and administrative structures. Similarly, Oladoyin (2010) explains that development is tantamount 231 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies to progress. According to him, progress entails a comprehensive enhancement, building on itself and involving both the individuals and social change. If this definition is acceptable, it means development is a continuous process. He, however, explains that development implies deliberate efforts made towards achieving higher standard in terms of set of objectives.

National development is equated with economic development by other writers. Gerald (1984) describes it as economic development which is upward movement of the entire social system. To him, it is the attainment of a number of ideals of modernization like productivity. Social and economic equalization improves knowledge and attributes. This is in agreement with T'odaro (1982), who states that it is a multi-dimensional process which involves major changes in social structure, popular attitude, national institutions and acceleration of economic growth and it reduces inequality and eradicates poverty. Mobogunje (1995) views development as a means of wealth creation. He states that a nation can achieve these goals if only it transforms her institutional libraries and improves the general altitude of her people. Abe (2010) sees development as a complex and multi-dimensional social process that should be viewed from the individual. It connotes increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self- discipline, responsibility and material well-being. While at societal level, it is an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relations. In the final analysis, therefore, development is the quality of life enjoyed by either the society or the individual. Human beings are in the centre of every process of development. Development therefore deals with three core values which Yusiif (2005) has identified as follows: i. Life sustenance which includes provision of basic things such

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as housing, clothing, food and education. ii. Self esteem which is self respect and independence, and iii. Freedom from want, ignorance and squalor. These three values determine to a large extent the degree to which a nation can be said to have developed. Thus, the level of poverty, illiteracy, ignorance and dependency reveals the state of development of a nation. For development to be sustainable, therefore, individuals and groups must have full opportunity to realize their potentials in a conducive environment.

Role of Library and Information Services in the Promotion of National Development For any nation to develop, the individual citizens of such nation must be well informed. Many people have carried out studies on the role of libraries to individuals and national development. Pollard (2008) opines that libraries are able to bridge educational, economic and social divides that challenge communities. While Krolak (2005) asserts that libraries play a major role in the promotion of literacy by making reading materials available to all thereby optimizing human development through education.

According to Chigbu (2004), modern libraries have been founded to make them instruments of education to all members of the society where they are situated, and for this reason, libraries and all knowledge providers are significant in human capital development in order to continue to improve standards. Chigbu and Uzoagba (201!) assert that librarians and libraries play very significant roles in knowledge which is relevant to both education and nation building and that librarians are active partners in drawing of national development plans in all nations. Librarians play active role in information management through selection, procurement, packaging and dissemination of information

233 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies resources for utilization by manpower trainers and trainers. The use of ICT infrastructure provides the library with limitless access to information which provides vast range of knowledge to support education and national development. Mamvoto and Mutasa (2004) have observed that adequate and relevant information in all spheres of existence is needed for a nation to develop as its availability can dictate the wealth or poverty of a nation. Library assists in the provision of relevant information to the different strata of the society thus helps in achieving development goals.

The basic functions of the library are to select, acquire, store, package and disseminate information to users for the development of individuals and for nation building. Hawkin (2002), while supporting thus, opines that knowledge and information have become the most important currency for productivity, competiveness, increased wealth and prosperity. The extent to which a Librarian, can perform these functions depends on the quality and ability of the librarian to interpret user's queries and be able to employ the necessary search engine in order to satisfy the user's information needs.

Conclusion The importance of libraries in the developmental process of any nation cannot be overemphasized. The development of any nation in this information age is dependent on the ability of its citizens to access relevant information that could be used to harness such development. Reading provides the vital skills for both work and life and it is a principal building block in education, without which no true educational revolution can take place. Unfortunately, at present age, the greatest problem militating against information provision by libraries and information services to promote national development is illiteracy. Above all, library and information services can provide information on all walks of life and

234 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies to all the three tiers of Nigeria government knowing fully that no nation can prosper without reliable information and no information can be properly managed without the library, and qualified librarians and information scientists.

Recommendations In view of the important roles library have to play in building reading culture and increasing literacy level in the country, the following measures are to be considered: 1. Better attention should be paid by government to library and information services. 2. Emphasize on the use of ICT should be included in school curriculum. Government at all levels must partner with libraries in their quest for building high reading culture in the citizens. 3. It is therefore pertinent that libraries should be well staffed and equipped by employing well trained people who will contribute enormously in providing high quality library and information services for national development in spheres of life. 4. Government should use the National Orientation Agency (NOA) to provide orientation and awareness o n t h e importance of reading so as to stimulate reading culture among Nigerians.

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References

?Abe. T. (2010).Governance and accountability tor development. In omotosho. F.Agagu. A.A. and Abegunde. (). (ed) Governance polities and policies in Nigeria. Poto Noro; Editions SONNU'd Afrique. Pg 85-103. ?Chigbu, L.D. (2004). The role of librarianship and nation building. Health and Movement educational (81) 100-105 ?C'higbu, B.I), and Uzoagba Ngozi (2011). Knowledge asserts management and the Librarian's role in education and nation building in Nigeria. Nigeria association 49n National conference Awka ?Devidson, S. (1981).Africa in modern history. The search for a new society; Comparatives Education Revise 25(2) 145- 167 ?Idowu. A. O. (201 1). Effective library services in the college. A paper presented at The Ist library workshop at Adejemi College of education, Ondo. ?Johnson. C. (2011). ICT and library services in development countries: An appraised. New York: presentiee Hall. ?Gerald. D. (1984). Reform and innovation in national development university Quarterly 20(1) 70-89 ?Kumar, M. (2008).Library services and information management; Delhi: vikas Press Ltd. ?Mamvoto. P. & Motosa, M. (2004). The library as a tool for development, the case of Zimbabwe http:/wwvv.infla.org ?Maduabuchi. O. (2005). Library and information services in development in developed countries.Vikas press Ltd. ?Mabogunje. (1995). A concept of development/Ibadan: development policy centre ?Polland, B. (2008). Libraries: partners in sustaining communities http?www.santaclanitalibrary.com ?Oladoyin. A. M. (2010) doner agencies governance and development in Nigeria; In Omotosho. Agagu and Abegunde (ed) in governance politics and policies in Nigeria porto Novo. Education Sonovd Afrique. P65-84

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?Todaro. M.P. (1982). Economics for developing word: London; Longman ?Williams, P. (2009). An introduction to the use of Internet in academic libraries; London: Oxford University Press. ?Yusuf, A. (2005). The influence of social studies education; student opinion on political participation and democratic reforms in Nigeria; A paper present of annual conference of social studies association of Nigeria (SOSAN) September 14- 17: Ondo

237 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

A Critical Examination of the Role of Ethnic Associations in the Emergence of the Three Major Political Parties in Nigerian's First Republic, 1960-1966

Nwagu Evelyn Eziamaka Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts Taraba State University, Jalingo Phone No: 08036009650 E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract Multi-ethnicity is the dominant feature of most African countries. This is no doubt the dominant nature, also, of Nigeria. Naturally, the presence of diverse ethnic nationalities in a country does not automatically translate to rivalry, confrontation, aggression, suspicion, violence, conflicts, crises, etc. Where the diversity is positively harnessed, unity of purpose could example with her philosophy of “A melting Pot”. Unfortunately, most African nations have refused to take a leaf from, particularly, America. This was manifested even before and during the era of nationalist struggle. Rivalry and suspicion among ethnic nationalities thwarted the pace for nationalist struggles, and very worrisomely weakened nationalist struggles in many African countries. Nigeria suffered from this as well. Right from the era of nationalist struggle, ethnicity remained a cog in the wheel of socio- economic and political development in the country. The main focus of this paper is, therefore, to examine the way and manner ethnicity played a dominant role in the emergence of the first political parties in Nigeria in the First Republic. Among the areas of focus are political developments in Nigeria in the nationalist period up to the demise of the First Republic and the effects of ethnic politics on Nigeria. A historical methodology has been adopted for data collection using multi- disciplinary approach.

Introduction Nigerian's Party Politics has been dented by ethnic chauvinism. The problem has been one of the major obstacles confronting the progress of liberal democracy in the country since 1960. This development has introduced ethnic and other primordial sentiments into every facet of

238 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies politics in Nigeria. Consequently, politics, which ideally ought to be driven by ideologies and developmental strategies, has become significantly driven by ethnic bigotry, blind followership, clannishness, nepotism and sense of “it must be one of us”, thus resulting in a situation where political power is seen as a tool for ethnic empowerment and self-preservation. It is to this end that the Nigerian political class usually stirs up ethnic sentiments in their quest to perpetuate themselves in power. The problem of ethnic politics in Nigeria is not new, it has been a key feature of Nigerian politics since the colonial era. The British, in their wisdom or lack of it, divided Nigeria into three regions which were clearly dominated by the three major ethnic groups in the country, that is, the Hausa/Fulani in the Northern Region, Igbo in the Eastern Region, and the Yoruba in the Western Region. The implication of this kind of arrangement was the fact that these three regions greatly competed among themselves in their quest to grab political power and opportunities at the centre to the benefit of their ethnic groups and, by extension, their regions, not minding what happened to the other groups in the country. Simply put, ethno-regional interests were far placed above national interest, invariably making it very difficult to achieve national unity and cohesion. The foregoing factors have continued to pose serious challenge to the continued existence of Nigeria as one indivisible political and economic entity. The disunity of the diverse ethnic groups and elements that make up the country has become a clog in the country's wheel of progress. Nigeria's heterogenous nature which, on its own, is supposed to be a blessing, has turned out to be a curse. Unlike America, where the diversity of her people has been exploited to become her greatest asset, making her the most powerful country in the world, Africa's most populous black country has continued to crawl largely due to instability and mediocrity, occasioned by ethno- regional cum religious politics. The first three major political parties, namely, the Northern Peoples

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Congress (NPC), the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG), were all ethno-regionally based parties whose emergence was bolstered by ethno-socio- cultural associations of the three major ethnic groups in the country. This formed the tripartite power base, ultimately representing the Hausa/Fulani (NPC), Igbo (NCNC), and Yoruba (AG) interests, leaving the other ethnic groups with no option but to enter into alliances with these dominant parties. The dominance of the three major ethno-regionally based parties could not give the minority groups confidence to found their political associations like the United Middle Belt Congress which founded by a Tiv man, Joseph Tarkaa, with the sole aim of challenging the dominance of the NPC in the Northern Region, particularly in the North-Central Nigeria area2. The emergence of ethno-regional political parties adversely affected national unity and cohesion. Based on the foregoing, this paper specifically aims to examine the extent to which ethnicity has influenced the political process, as well as the formation of political parties, and how this has affected the fortunes of democracy in Nigeria. It also seeks to identify lessons that can be drawn from the collapse of the First Republic (1960-1966) so as to strengthen the political culture and deepen democracy in the country.

Development of Political Parties in Nigeria It is not arguable that Nigeria is a product of British imperialism and colonialism. Nigeria only came into being in its present form in 1914 when Fredrick Lugard, then Royal Governor of the two Protectorates, amalgamated the Northern and Southern Protectorates. In 1861, the British began the conquest and subsequent colonization of Nigeria with the annexation of Lagos as a British Crown Colony. The annexation of Lagos, a coastal town, soon led to the eventual capture, conquest and the colonization of the interior, ultimately resulting in the establishment of the Southern

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Protectorate. By 1906, both Lagos and the Southern Protectorate were united and designated a British colony.4 In the case of Northern Nigeria, the Royal Niger Comapany was saddled with the responsibility of administering the vast territories through a charter granted the Company by the British government in 1886.5 However, in 1899, the Charter was revoked by the British government, largely due to the fact that the vast territories in the north were becoming too large for the RNC to effectively administer. This was in addition to the threats posed by the Germans and French, who also wanted to occupy territories in the area.6 With the revocation of the Charter, the British directly fully engaged in the progressive conquest of the Northern territories which became the Northern Protectorate. In 1914, the Southern and Northern Protectorates were amalgamated with Sir Fredrick Lugard becoming the first Governor-General of colonial Nigeria. This development set the stage for the evolution of what became a sovereign and Independent Nigeria on the 1st of October, 1960. The amalgamation of the two Protectorates further brought about the development of constitutions in colonial Nigeria. As a result, the Clifford Constitution of 1922 came into effect to replace the Nigerian Council introduced by Lugard in 1914.7 The major highlight of the Clifford Constitution was the introduction of elective principle, which was limited to male adults who had resided in Nigeria for over a period of twelve months, and had gross annual income of £100.8 It was this development that paved way for the founding of the first political party in Nigeria. Herbert Macaulay founded the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) in 1923. This gave room for more participation and representation of the natives in the affairs of the land9. The NNDP went ahead to successfully organize various interest groups to turn the party into a very formidable force. The party contested and won seats to dominate politics in Lagos until 1938 when the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) overtook it in elections.

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The NYM was founded in 1934 by a group of professionals and intellectuals led by Prof. Eyo Ita. Other notable members of the party included Samuel Akinsanya, Ernest Ikoli, Nnamdi Azikiwe and H.O. Davies who joined the party later, upon return from overseas. Although the party was largely based in Lagos, it made great efforts to promote politics outside Lagos, just as it was the first party to emphasize national unity over ethnic discrimination and rivalry, particularly between the Igbo and the Yoruba. One interesting thing about the NYM was that it made it a cardinal objective to see the evolution of a united nation out of the conglomeration of diverse ethnic groups and peoples who inhabited Nigeria, as well as the promotion of a complete understanding of one another, alongside developing a common sense of nationalism among the different ethnic groups and elements that make up the country. This aside, the NYM also sought to increase the level of participation of Nigerians in the Civil Service and government. In the process, it exhibited a very strong desire for the struggle for self- government. In 1944, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons was formed, again by Herbert Macaulay. He was President of the NCNC, while Nnamdi Azikiwe was the General Secretary. The party embraced diverse groups of people, irrespective of ethnicity and religion.14 In 1951, it won elections, even emerging the major political party in the Eastern Region's House of Assembly, although it was an opposition party in the Western Region. During the 1954 national conference, the NCNC opposed a call to include the right of secession in the constitution of the soon to be independent Nigeria. It argued that the country was not a league of forced nations, and as such, it would be ruinous to include such rights.15 When Nigeria was to become independent in 1960, a plebiscite was conducted to determine whether Southern (British) Cameroon would join Nigeria or French Cameroon in 1959. Southern Cameroon voted for the decision to be postponed to a later date.

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Consequently, another plebiscite was conducted in 1961 in which they voted to join French Cameroon instead of Nigeria.16 It was as a result of this that the name of the party changed to National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). The Ethnic Factor and Political Development in the First Republic Nigeria became an independent nation state in October, 1960. This marked the beginning of the First Republic, which, unfortunately, was tragically and abruptly ended on the 15th of January, 1966, when a group of young military officers, led by Major Kaduna Chukwuma Nzeogwu who described themselves as “revolutionaries”, staged the first military coup d'etat in the history of Nigeria.17 At independence, Nigerian had all the trappings of a democratic state, and was indeed seen as a hope for democracy in Africa. The departing colonial authority hopped that the development of national politics would forestall any sectional or ethnic appropriation of power, but this was not to be, as it underestimated the effects of the ethno-regional based political parties who saw politics as a means to protect and defend ethnic interests and identity, as well as a tool for accessing national resources for self presenvation.18 The major political parties in the First Republic emerged between the late 1944s and early 1950s, basically as ethno-regional parties whose main aim was to control as much power as possible in their respective regions, as well as to defend and promote their regional interests at the Centre. The Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and the Action Group (AG) largely emerged from purely ethnic associations. The National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), which initially began as a nationalist party, was compelled by the prevailing circumstance of ethno-regional politics and chauvinism to become an ethno-regional party.19 While the NPC controlled the Northern Region, led by Ahmadu Bello, a Fulani man from Sokoto, the AG, under the leadership of Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba man from Ikenne, controlled the

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Western Region, and NCNC, under the leadership of Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo man from Onitsha, controlled the Eastern, as well as the Mid-Western Region which was created in 1963. The implication of this kind of tripodal arrangement was that, these ethno- regional parties derived their main support from their ethnic enclaves alone.20 Not to be outdone, the minorities (smaller ethnic groups), such as the Tiv, formed their own political party too. In 1957, Joseph Tarkaa, a Tiv man, founded the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), whose sole aim was to challenge the dominance of the Northern Region, particularly the North-Central, otherwise called the Middle-Belt, by the NPC.21 In the midst of these ethno-regional parties, one party was notable for being more ideologically inclined, and that party was 's Northern Elements Progressive Union. This notwithstanding, the party did not achieve any significant power in the First Republic. The ethno-regional configuration of the three major parties, the NPC, NCNC and AG, set the stage for the series of crises that engulfed the First Republic, which significantly threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria as a sovereign nation-state. Some of these crises, such as the Census Crisis of 1962/63, Tiv Riots of 1960 and 964, among others, played very crucial role in the collapse of the First Republic in 1966.22 a. Emergence of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) The Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) can be aptly termed a Hausa/Fulani political party which held sway in the Northern Region during the First Republic. The party was founded in 1949, emerging from the Hausa/Fulani Northern based socio-cultural association popularly known as “Jamiyar Mutanen Arewa”, loosely translated as Association of Northern People. By 1951, it had become a formidable force in the Northern Region, further going on to becoming a dominant political party in the First Republic. Out of the three major parties, it was the most entrenched in its ethno-regional identity. Observers are of the view that nothing illustrates this more than its

244 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies name, and the fact that in the 1959 General Elections, it did not field a single candidate in the other regions.23 The NPC's principal aim was to protect the conservative social hierarch of the North from what was seen as the “winds of radical change sweeping up from the South”.24 It won majority of the seats in the House of Representatives, bus was unable to meet the required number to form the national government when Nigeria eventually became independent in 1960. The party required about 157 seats, whereas it was only able to garner 134, hence a coalition was entered into with the NCNC, which was able to win about 89 seats.25 The table below shows the distribution of seats won by the major parties in the 1959 General Elections.

Table 1: Distribution of Seats won by major parties in 1959 General Elections Party Northern Region Western Eastern (Capital) Region Region Lagos

1. NPC 134 0 0 0 2. NCNC 8 21 58 2 3. AG 2 5 33 14 1 4. Others 7 8 1 0 Source: E.E Oaghae; crippled Grant: Nigeria Since Independence, Hurst $ co, London, 1998. Pp. 32-33.

The above table shows how clearly the ethno-regional politics that characterized the First Republic became systematically entrenched. The NPC won 134 seats (43%), the NCNC won 89 seat (29%), the AGwon 73 (23%), with other (such as UMBC, NEPU) wining 16 seats (5%).26 a. Emergence of the Action Group (AG) The Action group was founded in 1951 by Chief Obafeme Awolowo.

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The party drew membership largely from the Yoruba Socio-Cultural Organization, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa”, meaning the descendants of Oduduwa.27 The Party was founded to serve as a platform for mobilizing the Yoruba in the Western Region to forestall the NCNC's control of the Region as well as to co-operate with other parties in the nationalist struggle for Nigeria's independence from British. Ethnicity greatly played a role in the formation of the AG due to the massive inroad the NCNC, largely perceived as a Igbo party, was making in the Western Region.28 Action Group (AG) dominated politics in the Western Region during the First Republic. However, the party experienced serious squabbles between 1962 and 1963, which resulted in its factionalization into two and subsequent breaking away of the Akintola's faction. The anti- climax of the political crisis in the party was the trial and imprisonment of its leader, Obafemi Awolowo, by the Central Government. The Party advertised its political ideology termed “democratic socialism”, with which it hopped to gain national support. However, the reality of the Nigerian political terrain at that particular time forced the leaders of AG to conclude that “the only certain avenue to power was a regional political party”.30 Consequently, the AG put on the ethno-regional robe, that had become the political reality of the country, thereby seeing itself from the lenses of the Yoruba ethnicity and the watchdog of the Western Region. Despite its ethno-regional colouration, the AG, unlike the NPC, fielded candidates for seats in other regions during the 1959 General Elections, even wining about 25 seats in the Northern Region and 14 seats in the Eastern Region. It also succeeded in 33 seats in its own ethnic enclave, the Western Region, making a total of 73 seats, representing about 23%. However, the party was only able to win about 53% of the seats in the Western Region. Due to the coalition government formed by the NPC and NCNC, the AG therefore became the major opposition party in Nigeria's First Republic.31

246 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies b. Emergence of the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) The National Convention of Nigerian Citizens was formed in 1944, with Herbert Macaulay as President, and Nnamdi Azikiwe as General Secretary. The party was initially known as National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons, but due to the plebiscites of 1959/1961 in which the Southern (British) Cameroon opted to be unified with the French Cameroon, the party's name subsequently changed to National Convention of Nigerian Citizens. The NCNC, as the name implies, originally set out to be a pan- Nigerian and nationalist party, unfortunately, it soon became caught in the web of ethno-regional political climate that pervaded the country. As a result, the party gradually began to tilt towards the promotion of the interest of the Igbo, and by extension, the Eastern Region. It became a very strong “Voice of Igbo Nationalism”32, and in the process became closely associated with the Igbo socio-cultural association, the Igbo Union. The party then became the dominantly political force in the Eastern Region, winning about 79% of the total seats in the Region, that is, about 58 seats, and about 31 seats in other regions and the capital, Lagos, bringing to a total of 89 seats in the Federal House of Representatives.33 Furthermore, the NCNC entered into a coalition with the NPC to form the National Government in 1960, after it failed to secure the required majority, which was 157 out of the 324 seats available in the House of Representative, having won just about 134 seats. The party, by virtue of the coalition with NPC, was rewarded with the post of President, which went to Nnamdi Azikiwe. It is important to note that the role of the president, as in every parliamentary system, was largely a ceremonial one. The juicy post of the Minister of Finance also went to the NCNC's Festus Okotie Eboh, this was in addition to a number of ambassadorial posts.34 Effect of Ethno-Regional Politics on Nigeria's First Republic The deeply entrenched ethno-regional politics in the First Republic

247 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies had far-reaching implications on democracy, negatively affecting the political culture and the stability of Nigeria. The way and manner the major ethno-regional parties strove to defend and preserve their ethnic enclaves from the grasp of others, as well as access to as much resources from the Federal coffers, greatly intensified the wave of crises that engulfed the First Republic. One of the major effects of ethno-regional politics was the deepening of the sense of mutual “fear of domination” that existed, and still exists, among the ethnic groups in Nigeria. The division of the country into three unequal regions, with the Northern Region alone bigger than the other two (Eastern and Western) Regions combined, became a source of concern for the Southern regions, which feared that the north would utilize its huge size and population to perpetuate northern hegemony. On the part of the north (Hausa/Fulani), both the east (Igbo) and West (Yoruba) were seen as a threat to their largely conservative cultural and religious values, especially when they control power at the centre.35 The foregoing political development aggravated the already existing sense of mutual suspicion and mistrust. Thus, the focus was on parochial ethnic and regional interests, while national interest was grossly neglected, thereby making it very difficult for national unity, harmony and cohesion, which are all required for the country to thrive and make meaningful progress. Ironically, even between the Igbo and the Yoruba, that fear of domination was exhibited by both groups, despite the fact that they saw the north as a so-called “common enemy”. This was clearly manifested when the Yoruba elites of the AG saw the massive presence and support for NCNC in the Western Region as a threat and an attempt by the Igbo to dominate politics in the West. In the same vein, in as much as there was a coalition between the NPC and the NCNC, that sense of fear did not diminish, as both sides viewed each other with suspicion, contempt and disdain. No wonder the alliance broke down by 1964, when another election held. The Hausa/Fulani

248 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies saw the Igbo as being more educated, and as such that they would use that advantage to dominate the political and economic structure of the government.36 All these largely contributed to the tense, fractured and fractious atmosphere that beclouded the socio-political landscape of Nigeria in the First Republic. This ethnically and regionally charged political competition hindered the attainment of national unity and progress, prompting Falola and Oyebaade to conclude that: Party politics in (the First Republic), thus, necessarily focused on achieving narrow regional and ethnic political security, and not national interest. In the prevailing atmosphere of mutual suspicion and antagonism, regional politics inevitably led to destructive power struggles among the dominant ethnic parties to gain control of federal power for their respective regions. Given this political dynamic, Nigeria drifted from one crisis to another, compromising national stability, unity and development.37 Another effect of ethno-regional politics in the First Republic was the crisis that greeted the censuses of 196/63. The 1962 census was the first in post-colonial Nigeria. It is, however, important to note that in 1952/53, the colonial authorities conducted a census. The result of that census formed the basis for the distribution of parliamentary seats during the 1959 General Election.38 This gave the Northern Region greater representation because, as per the census, the population of the region was much more than that of the other regions, so also its landmass. Based on this, both the Eastern and Western Regions perceived that the Hausa/Fulani of the Northern Region would utilize the advantage of their huge population to dominate the political and economic structure of the country.39 Consequently, when a new census was to be organized in 1962, the desire for ethno-regional balance of power became rife, inevitably

249 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies shaping the course of events that took place before, during and after the census. The Igbo and Yoruba elites, in particular, saw the census as an avenue to unchange the seeming dominance of the Hausa/Fulani in the political landscape of Nigeria. They reasoned that the census would reduce the demographic gap between the north and the south. This position was based on the assumption that, if the population could be turned in favour of the Eastern and Western Regions, power relations among the three regions would equalize, and as such, northern domination would be permanently removed.40 Given such world view, the census generated an atmosphere of intense competition, as ethno-regional champions mobilized their constituencies for the census exercise. There was a growing sense of dissatisfaction on the part of the Eastern and Western Regions, who felt that the result of the 1952/53 census was grossly inaccurate and deliberately falsified by the British to ensure northern dominance. This notion was fueled by the belief that the British colonial officials were favourably disposed to the Hausa/Fulani of the Northern Region. The foregoing considerations, therefore, set the stage for the kind of reaction that greeted the announcement of the result of the 1962 census. The census result put the population of Nigeria at 45.26 million. A breakdown of which showed that, the Eastern and Western Regions combined had a population of 23.25 million, slightly higher than the Northern Region which had about 22.01 million.42 This result was greatly celebrated by the Eastern and Western Regions. However, their jubilation was shortlived, as the Prime Minister, Sir , questioned the integrity of the 1962 census, and therefore rejected it out rightly, ordering a verification of the result. The action of the Prime Minister, from the Hausa/Fulani extraction of the Northern Region, was seen as an attempt by the northerners to continue to perpetrate their dominance of Nigeria's political and economic structure. This triggered a series of protests, and subsequently, the result of the 1962 was cancelled that the region

250 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies was undercounted in the 1962 census.43 The 1963 census was conducted, despite the series of protest against its conduct by, especially the Eastern Region. The result of this census showed an increase in the population of the Northern region by 8.5 million, bringing the total to 31 million, a figure higher than the population of every other region in the country, and Africa at large. The total population of Nigeria was put at 56 million.44 That was outrightly rejected by the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions (the Mid-Western Region in 1963). Michael Okpara, Premier of the Eastern Region, described the result as “worse than useless”, and on his part, the Premier of the Mid-Western regions, Dennis Osadebay, described the result as “the most stupendous joke of our age”.45 What this meant of the north was that their power balance and advantage had been maintained, much to the chagrin of the Eastern and Mid- Western regions, which tried everything to see that the result of the 1963 census was cancelled, and that of the 1962 upheld.45 Furthermore, the Tiv riots of 1960/1964 were also effects of the ethno-regional politics that characterized the First Republic over the arrest and detention of the leader of the United Middle Belt Party, Joseph Tarkaa.47 The UMBC was largely perceived as Tiv Political Party, thus the riot broke out over the detention of Tarkaa, on charges of treason. The riot was brutally repressed by the NPC-led government. The Tiv had always felt unfairly treated by the NPC, which dominated politics in both the Northern region and Nigeria at large. The Tiv also had always opposed being part of the north, despite the “One North Policy” of Ahmadu Bello given that they were pre-dominantly Christians without any form of ethno-linguistic affinity to the predominantly Muslim Hausa/Fulani.48 The opposition of the so-called “One North Policy” by some northern minority ethnic groups, particularly the Christian dominated North- Central (Middle Belt), which was led by Joseph Tarkaa, inevitably brought him in conflict with the deeply entrenched political establishment in the Northern Region, controlled by the

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Hausa/Fulani NPC.49 The UMBC under Tarkaa's leadership gradually began to form alliance with the Western Region dominated AG, which advocated for the creation of a Middle Belt region out of the Northern Region. This was seen as a threat by the feudal and aristocratic leadership of the NPC, 50 which greatly accounted for the speed and manner in which a whole battalion (3NA) of the Nigerian Army was deployed to quell the 1964 Tiv Riots51. These ethno-regionally induced crises, along with other crises, such as the General Election Crisis of 1964, AG crisis of 1962/63, General Strike of 1964, etc, ultimately resulted in the fall of the First Republic in 1966. As a matter of fact, some observers have argued that ethnicity played a very key role in the outbreak of the civil war, which occurred between 1967 and 1970.

Conclusion It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that the myriad of crises that engulfed Nigeria's First Republic were caused by the ethno-regional politics of the era. The big masquerades, that is, the three major political parties, namely, the NPC, NCNC and AG, most of which emerged from the socio-cultural associations of the three major ethnic groups, the Hausa/Fulani, the Igbo and Yoruba, desperately competed with one another in their bid to secure their ethnic enclaves and to also promote their various ethnic interests at the Federal level. The severity of this competition, its attended crises, greatly threatened the unity and sovereignty of Nigeria. It is on the basis of this that this paper seeks to identity some lessons to be learnt from the First Republic, if democracy and Nigeria herself must continue to exist as presently constituted. One of such lessons is that ethno-regional politics impedes national economic growth and development. This is because a lot of time, energy and resources are dissipated unnecessarily in championing ethnic and regional agenda, which, in most cases, do not promote economic growth and development, but rather preserve primordial

252 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies ethnic and regional sentiments. This largely accounts for the little political, social and economic development recorded in the First Republic. While the key political figures were busy engrossed in promoting and defending the interests of their various ethnic groups and regions, little attention was given to developing and implementing policies that would result to the overall socio-political cum economic transformation of Nigeria. Another lesson to be learnt is that, ethno-regional politics promotes mediocrity and bad leadership. Since all it takes to occupy a very sensitive and powerful political office is affiliation to one powerful ethnic group or region, this means that no matter how competent, visionary and capable an individual is, by virtue of the fact that he/she does not belong to a particular ethnic group, he/she would not be qualified to occupy such office. The implication of this is that square pegs find themselves in round holes, and as a result mediocrity, incompetence, cluelessness and visionlessness become the characteristic features of governance. The examples of this are all over the place in today's Nigeria. Similarly, ethno-regional politics entrenches a “win at all cost mentality”. Nothing exemplified this in the First Republic like the census crisis of 1962/63. The major ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba extractions were all out to prove a point. Each group saw the census as an opportunity to defend and promote its interest. The Igbo and Yoruba, for instance, saw it as an opportunity to correct the “mistake” of 1952/53, while the Hausa/Fulani saw it as an opportunity to consolidate their hold on political power in the country. In addition, one may not be wrong to conclude that the post election violence that broke out in some northern states during the 2011 General Elections was as a result of this “win at all cost mentality”, which, when not achieved, resulted in the embrace of desperate and brutal measures to express grievances. Ethno-regional politics also encourages disunity and disharmony. This is true because wherever ethno-regional politics prevails, the

253 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies principles of fairness and equity take a back stage. People are then treated on the basis of their ethnicity, region or religion rather than their abilities, character and humanity. This makes it very difficult to achieve national unity and cohesion, which are necessary ingredients for the evolution of a vibrant and stable nation-state. The evil of the Siamese twins of ethnic and regional politics makes it extremely difficult for the emergence of a prosperous, stable and united country because they perpetually keep citizens divided, and as the saying goes, “a house divided against itself cannot stand”. In the same vein, ethno-regional politics brings about conflicts and crises, which in mot cases, are absolutely unnecessary. Some of the crises that engulfed the First Republic, such as the census crisis and the Tiv riots, would have been avoided if the evil seeds of ethnic rivalry and the fear of domination largely shown by ethno-regional politics had not been allowed to fester and deepen. Ethno-regional politics usually sets up one group or region against the other, the result of which is usually crises of diverse nature thereby making peaceful coexistence difficult to achieve. Finally, ethno-regional politics also hinders the development and entrenchment of sound political culture and democratic tenets. The ideals of democracy such as free and fair election, equitable distribution of resources, freedom of speech, respect for human rights and dignity become grossly violated and neglected. What, therefore, prevail are, imposition, injustice, violence, inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities. This, therefore, means that politics becomes devoid of ideologies, philosophies and manifestoes, rather, ethnic, regional and religious sentiment and primordial beliefs become deeply entrenched in the political landscape. From the above, it becomes very clear that if the 21st Century Nigeria would truly live up to her title, as the self-acclaimed “Giant of Africa”, deliberate and conscious efforts must be made towards weaning her of the menace of ethnic and regional politics. This can be achieved through positive attitudinal charge, political awareness,

254 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies enthronement of meritocracy, showing genuine respect and tolerance for one another, and embracing the principles of fairness and equity. The media, political parties and leaders would have to take the lead in this regard.

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References

1. H.I. Ekamam; Political Process and Contemporary Political Analysis: Selected Themes and Concept, Great Stars Publisher, Owerri, 2012. 2. Nnoli, Okwudibe, Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa: Intervening Variables, Malthone Press Ld, Lagos, 1994. 3. J.J. Abraham, Federalism and Politic of State Creation in North-Central Nigeria: The Case of Benue-Plateau State, 19 0-1980”, B.A Project, Department of History, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, 2017. P. 25. 4. Abraham; Federalism and Politics…P. 25. 5. Abraham; Federalism and Politics… P. 25. 6. Itse Sagay; Federalism, the Constitution and Resource Control, A Lecture Delivered Under the Auspices of the Ibori Vanguard, March, 2001. 7. O.I. Odumosu; The Nigerian Constitution: History and Development, Sweet and Maxwell, Londo, 1963. 8. Odumosu; The Nigerian Constitution… 9. Odumosu, The Nigerian Constitution … 10. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian-National- Democratic-Party, accessed 6th/11/2018. 11. Richard L. Sklar; Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African National, African World Press, Trenton, 2004. 12. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties… 13. Sklar; Nigerian Political Parties… 14. O.E. Udofia; “Nigerian Political Parties: Their Role in Modernizing the Political System, 1920-1966”. Journal of Black Studies, vol. II, No. 4, June 1981. P. 435. 15. Udofia; “Nigerian Political Parties: Their Role in …”. 16. Sklar; Nigerian Political Parties… 17. A.A. Madiebo; Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War,

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Fourth dimension Publishers, Enugu, 1980. 18. Udofia; Nigerian Political Parties: Their Role in … 19. Nnoli; Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa… 20. www.countrystudies.us/nigeria/68.html,accessed 6th/11/2018. 21. Patrick I. Ukase; J.S. Tarkaa and Ethnic Minority Agitations and Struggles in Nigeria, 1960-1980: An Eulogy Revisited, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 22, 2013. P. 82. 22. L.R. Jackson; Nigeria: The Politics of the First Republic, Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 2. No. 3, 1972. P. 227. 23. Larry Diamond; Crisis, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, 1955-1966, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1988, P. 72. 24. O.O. Out, and O.F. Anas; Oil Politics and Violence in Post- Colonial Niger-Delta, Africa Research Review, Vol. II, No. 1, 2017. 25. Diamond; Crisis, ethnicity and Democracy… 26. E.E. Osaghae; Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence, Hurst & Co, London, 1998, P. 23. 27. www.passnow.com/development-political-parties-nigeria- colonial-era-first-republic, access 7th/11/2018. 28. www.passnow.com/development-political-parties-nigeria- colonial-era-first-republic, access 7th/11/2018 29. J.A.A. Ayoade; Party and Ideology in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Action Group, Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 16. No. 2, December, 1985. P. 169. 30. J.S. Coleman; Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, London, 1958. P. 350. 31. Jackson; Nigeria: The Politics of the First Republic … P. 282. 32. James Minahan; Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups; Around the World, Vol. II, Greenwood Press, COnnectical. 2002. P. 764. 33. Jackson; Nigeria: The Politics of the First Republic … P. 282.

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34. www.passnow.com/development-political-parties-nigeria- colonial-era-first-republic, access 7th/11/2018 35. Diamond; Crisis, Ethnicity and Democracy… 36. Diamond; Crisis, Ethnicity and Democracy … 37. T. Fadol and A.O. Oyebade, Hot Spot: Sub-Saharan Africa, ABC-CWO, California, 2010. 38. Abraham Okolo; The Nigerian Census: Problems and Prospects, The American Statictian, Vol. 53, No. 4, November, 1999. P. 322. 39. Okolo; The Nigerian Census: Problems and Prospects … 40. Osaghae; Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence… P. 4. 41. K. Kwarteng; Nigeria; Current Troubles and its British Colonial Roots, The Globalist Magazine, 2012. 42. https//nigeriaworld.com/articles/2006/march/211/html, accessed 8th/11/2018 43. https//nigeriaworld.com/articles/2006/march/211/html, accessed 8th/11/2018 44. https//gz.com/Africa/1221472/the-story-of-how-census- figures-became-weaponised; accessed 10th/11/2018. 45. Diamond; Crisis, Ethnicity and Democracy … PP. 138-139. 46. https//gz.com/Africa/1221472/the-story-of-how-census- figures-became-weaponised; accessed 10th/11/2018. 47. Dele Ogun; A. Fatherless People: The Secrets how Nigerians Missed the Road to th Promised Land, Lemon Tress Book Company, Australia, 2018. 48. Ogun; A. Fatherless people: The Secrets of … 49. http://www.thenationonline.ng/i-remember-j-s-tarka, accessed 10th/11/2018. 50. http://www.thenationonline.ng/i-remember-j-s-tarka, accessed 10th/11/2018. 51. http://www.thenationonline.ng/i-remember-j-s-tarka, accessed 10th/11/2018.

258 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies A Pre-Colonial Economic History of Ekitiland

Victor Akintunde Ajayi Department of History and International Studies, Federal University Oye-Ekiti. Ekiti State +2348032086733 [email protected]

Abstract This paper examines the pre-colonial economic activities of Ekiti people. Attempts have been made to look into the historical origin of Ekiti people, their political organization, settlement pattern as well as their religion. This research also discusses in detail, the economic potential of Ekiti, focusing on the major aspect of the economy that were indispensable to the growth of Ekiti during the pre-colonial period such as agriculture, art and craft as well as domestic and external trades and their market systems. In carrying out the research, both primary and secondary sources were used. This does not in any way claim to be exhaustive. It is however, hoped that this work would stimulate further research in this area of study and also be of great benefit to the people of Ekiti. Key words: Ekiti, Pre-colonial, Agriculture, Indigenous Technology, Market System

Introduction The name Ekiti was a topographical description. According to Samuel Johnson, Ekiti means “hilly country.1 It is important to note that ruggged hills of relative heights dominate Ekiti and many other Yoruba communities in the hinterland. Hence, the name Ekiti was used to cover the whole northern areas of Eastern Yoruba before the arrival of the Europeans. Historically, Ekiti once occupied a very large area, covering parts of the present Kogi State as well as the present Ilesha and Akure.2 Many traditions have been ascribed to the origin of the Ekiti people. Some scholars believe that Ekiti ancestors migrated from the Middle East to Ile-Ife, the cradle of the Yoruba race, from where they spread all over the place to form one of the largest ethnic groups in 259 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

Yorubaland.3 While some sources believe that some of the present sub-groups of Ekiti were the aborigines of Ekiti, various traditions of origin also claim that many sub-groups or towns migrated to the present location from other Yoruba areas and at different times. This seems to receive popular acceptance among some scholars; more so since the Ekiti dialects strongly differ in intonation from one town (kingdom) to the other. The intonations of the towns on the main trade routes were reasonably very similar, while those of many towns outside the main trade routes were not only very different but also complex or very twisted in tonal variations. For example, the dialects of , Iyin, Ado, Ikere and Akure, Ise, and Emure on the trade routes were close in intonation. Aramoko, on the main trade route, was, however, a rare exception. But the intonations of the towns in Ekiti interior were not only markedly too different from one another but were also very twisted and complex to understand by those on the main trade routes. Some of these towns were Ilawe, Igogo, Igbara- Odo, Awo, Ijero, , Ifaki, Igbemo, Osi and Otun. In addition, is the fact that Ekiti before colonization, had 16 kingdoms, with diverse cultural traditions. The 16 kingdoms, which later increased to 17, in the pre-colonial period, were Otun, Ikole, Ado, Oye, Ijero, Ikere, Ido, Akure (which later became independent of Ekiti in 1940), Ise, Emure and Efon. Others were Okemesi, Ara, Isan Itaji, Obo and Ogotun.4 The traditional economic system of Ekiti was based on both subsistence and large scale farming. Like other African societies, the whole economic structure was based on the family mode of production. Economic activities were divided on the basis of sex. Men tilled the soil and cultivated local food crops. Men were either full-time or part-time hunters, the latter involved in setting traps and snares all the year round or taking part in communal hunting, especially during the dry season. Men also kept goats, dogs and sheep

260 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies principally for sacrifice, gift and sale. Women took conspicuous part in planting and harvesting of food crops and cotton, etc. Processing of food crops and textile were preserves of the women in Ekiti. Women extracted oil palm fruits and kernel oil from kernel residue; carded cotton, span thread, wove the broadloom and dyed before or after weaving. Women also dominated pottery and mat weaving industries and marketing activities.5 The pre-colonial Ekiti people who also constantly intermingled economically with other ethnic groups were usually referred to as the people in the hinterland by the Ibadan or the Oyo elite. They traded far and wide within the Yoruba territory, especially the women who always displayed great resourcefulness and acumen in long distance trade.6 For example, the Ekiti traded with the Benin and the Nupe before the colonial rule. The people also took their economic interests to as far as Oshogbo, Ibadan and Lagos. In fact, large quantity of food consumed in the Yoruba cities came from Ekiti. But the Ekiti Parapo wars of 1879 to 1886 temporarily affected the pre-colonial Ekiti economy, because it gave the Europeans the opportunity to come into the hinterland of Ekiti, with the aim of bringing peace, suppressing slave trade and introducing legitimate trade, as well as new social and economic relations among the people. It is important to note that the Ekiti people already had a well structured agricultural activities and well organised trade or commercial associations before the advent of the Europeans whose main contribution was to encourage production for export. Thus, the pre-colonial Ekiti already had highly productive agricultural traditions that prepared them for their active colonial economic role.7 Social and Political Organisation of Ekiti in the Pre-Colonial Period Ekitiland is a homogenous society made up of different family units within households that were also within districts. All the

261 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies districts within each town were headed by an Oba or king. The chiefs were special advisers to the king who also had minor chiefs in charge of, for example, wars, purification of the society or religious rites, community work and judicial problems. The pre-colonial Ekiti people were simple in their ways of life as well as their settlement pattern. They lived in scattered settlements surrounded by their farms and hunting grounds. The buildings they erected were all bungalows and were built in compounds known as Agbo Ile (a group of houses).8 The compound was usually circular in shape enclosing a large area. Each compound was divided into several compartments serving the need of all the families and their dependants. In the open space in the centre of the compound, Aede were used to keep goats and sheep at night to prevent leopard from destroying them.9 There was no difference between the building of the rich and the poor except that one was more spacious than the other. Every compound had an entrance near a urinary called Ojuto or a gutter. There, the god of iron, Ogun was worshipped. At the other end of the entrance outside was the Esu represented with mud sculpture and there he was daily propitiated. In course of time, the compounds were expanded with several new compounds being added. The first open space embraced the compartment of old women and strangers. This place was usually lower than the others and was called Odo Aede. The upper part was called Oke Aede or Akodi. Akodi was reserved for the highest authority in the family. Within each compound were also different areas for cooking, bathing and other activities like night story telling. It was not in the people's tradition to pass stools within a compound. Instead, each household, made up of several compounds, had a separate area, distant from the compounds, for this. To avoid any plague, this area was always burnt to ashes, usually once a year. Sanitation was an important aspect of

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Ekiti's communal settlement. For example, it was very mandatory for all the young boys and girls in each compound to sweep the grounds within and outside the compound every morning.10 Periodically, all male adults in every district used to clear and burn the areas where refuse was dumped. At first, there were few families in Ekiti. They lived in scattered settlements surrounded by their farms and hunting grounds. The family head called Baale (Baba ile), meaning father of the household, was virtually everything to his people. He led his house in religion and settled their differences. As the family grew larger, the leadership of the family became a bone of contention. Then the next higher grade of leadership emerged. The head of this new hierarchy was called Oba (Father of the land or King). He was the court of appeal. The Baale settled his children's quarrels with people and if not satisfactory, an appeal could be made to the Oba who, as the head of several families, would see that justice was done. The Oba's or king's words were final; to disobey him was risky to one's course.11 Thus, prior to the colonial period, every town in Ekiti had the same system of government based on Kingship. All administrative, judicial, military and cultural powers were vested in the kings who had many slaves, messengers and numerous court attendants who all affirmed the next-to-god image of these rulers. The kings, who were also graded or classed according to some cultural, military, medicinal and population criteria, dominated all the social, economic, political, religious and cultural lives of their people. They even had the power of death over their subjects. The use of leopard's hide was exclusive privilege of Obas. If a hunter killed a leopard, he must bring the hide to the Oba. He could not turn it to his own use. The King had around him civil officers who served as public criers to make known laws or publish temporary enactments; he appointed over every department of labour or business, principal men who acted in their respective

263 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies spheres; and also had regular officers of a police character who were so detected --- that it was difficult for anyone to thwart them in their vigilance. Hence, there was law and order in Ekitiland during the pre- colonial era.12 The administration of each town was made possible through a well organized system that took its root from the heads of family units through the heads of households to the heads of the districts who, automatically, were the senior chiefs to the kings. Each chief had his special role as demanded by tradition and the king. Every town had one palace where all the kings lived in succession. And kings were selected from ruling houses according to age-old tradition. Kingship stool could not be bought in any way in Ekiti land. Every ruling house produced the person next in line for the kingship stool, no matter how financially poor he was,13 which is why, till today, many Ekiti kings are not very rich financially, though their subjects always elevate them materially, placing them very comfortably among the notable elite in the society. For good governance, various cultural experiences were also practiced. For example, there were many festivals in each town in which young men and women, as well as old people, participated. These festivals could be for the peace and development of the town; they could be for land fertility, protection from witches and wizards, procreation and for preventing premature deaths.14 The aboriginal inhabitants of Ekiti were farmers. They lived close to nature and they believed in the existence of supreme God who did not need anything except acknowledgment of his supremacy. The first object of worship among Ekiti people was the god of fate, Ipin. Once a farmer discovered that the farm of his neighbor whom they cultivated in the same locality was better than his own, he felt that he should propitiate his own head. According to a popular saying, 'Ori eni ni ngbe ni (the head is the support of one's life). Such a person

264 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies would offer cold water and kolanut to his own head for good fortune. The father and mother of the family offered kolanut and cold water on their heads, the god of fate. In some places, children were given a fowl each every year at the Ogun festival to propitiate the god of fate, the cock was killed. Some of the feathers were plastered on the fore- head with the blood of the fowl. The child been the owner of the cock must eat the head.15 Ogun (the god of iron) held a pride of place among the farmers and hunters in Ekiti. The feast of Ogun is universal in Ekiti. As the saying goes “T eru t omo ni nsogun (Both the slave and the free celebrate the festival of Ogun). However, when the new batches of Obas and their followers arrived, various objects of worship were introduced. The Ewi was believed to have been accompanied with Egungun, and the Elekole with different kinds of deities. From that time on, various objects of worship were introduced to Ekitiland and were headed particularly by those who had a version for cutlasses and hoes. There was human sacrifice since the period of the Obas. The victims were mainly slaves, male and female. The victim must not have a blemish and most not be pregnant. Ifa oracle was introduced to Ekiti people during the Ibadan war. Those parts of Ekiti that were closer to Ife had some cults that were strictly secret, for instance, the worship of Omolourogbo at Igede and Ara. The worship of hills, for example, Olosunta and rivers e.g. Ogbese came into being later on.16 Early Indigenous Agricultural Activities Agriculture was the most important productive activity in Ekitiland. The allocation of land for farming was usually in the hands of elders. The chief of each community or family head acted as trustee in the disposal of land. Land could be allocated only with his approval and could not allocate it without at least the tacit consent of majority of the community. In Ekitiland, each family was entitled to a certain

265 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies portion of the land owned by the lineage.17 Cultivation was usually carried out using implements like cutlass and hoe both of which were produced locally by blacksmith with wrought iron and shaped wood. Most farmers operated two classes of farm type called 'Idabo or Oko Etile' (farms near home). It was cultivated purposely for easy reach and snap finger requirement. The other type was the long distance farm which was usually much bigger and which bore the farmers' chief crops. It was organized around a farmstead complete with hut(s) where they slept at night and other conveniences required for personal comfort and upkeep during their stay away on the farm. The huts also served as facility for storage of seedlings and farm produce.18 The Ekiti people cultvate cereal and root crops such as guinea corn, yam of various species, cassava, maize, pepper and beans. Sylvan products produced by the farmers in Ekiti were kolanut, commonly called 'Obi Abata', palm oil, cocoa, tobacco, sheanut and locust bean. Melon, okro and a variety of vegetables, which, at times, grew up unplanted among planted crops. The common vegetables were ewe dudu, tete, rorowo, edu and egure (water leaf). A variety of pepper was also cultivated in addition to plantain, potatoes, cotton and pawpaw. These subsistence cereals, roots and trees were produced for local consumption and export even prior to the colonial era. Yam was predominantly cultivated by Ekiti farmers and each district appeared to specialize in production of definite variety but most farmers grew more than one variety. Some matured earlier than others. According to oral tradition, the locust beans tree belonged to the land owners but the sheanuts belong to no man as anybody could pick the fruit. In Ekiti, the locust bean seed and sheanut exclusively belong to the land owners and farmers when matured. But the moment they fell down from the tree, they did not only belong to them, but to all members of the community. The picking of these

266 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies seeds in the bush were generally performed by the women and the children.19 Crop rotation and bush fallowing used to be the predominant farming methods. Until recent, manuring was unknown since the land was remarkably fertile. The fertile nature of the Ekiti soil made agriculture a prosperous enterprise. The systematic nature of the practice of rotational cropping and bush fallowing is instructive. According to Temple: “Crops are generally raised for four years in succession after which the land is left fallow for three years to ten years according to the crops it has borne and locality.20

In order to make a farm, clearing of weeds was the initial task of the farmer. This was carried out with cutlasses, knives, hoes and axes. This was followed by making heaps which were arranged in ridges with hoe. Planting was determined by the farmer's knowledge of seasons of the year. The two dominant seasons were Igba Erun (dry season) Igba Ojo (raining season). After planting, this was followed by weeding at interval to ensure proper growth of crops. Harvesting was the last stage of the farming calendar.21 The Ekiti farmers also reared animals like goats, dogs and pigs. The animals were allowed to roam about freely after being fed in the morning. Apart from pigs which were not allowed to enter a house, dogs and goats were free to mix with people. In fact, a dog was treated like a human being and was allowed to even sleep within a house and close to people. Dogs were used for hunting and for other domestic purposes. Fowls were raised both at home and in the farm. While the men were responsible for rearing fowls in the farm, women were mostly in charge of rearing them at home. Another important aspect of the agricultural life in the pre-colonial Ekiti was hunting. During this period, and the situation still remains 267 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies the same till today, nearly all the farmers were also hunters, using locally made guns, different types of traps, wires and catapults. Apart from individual hunting, there were also periodic communal hunting expeditions made up, at a time, of about 20 to 30 or more, hunters hunting various animals and birds. Such game resulting from hunting were usually shared according to age and contribution either for food or for sale.22 One practice which was very common among Ekiti farmers before 1900, though this was carried over to the colonial period, was the practice of selling some crops in the farm without the sellers or the owners of such farm products being around. Anderson (a British man) also commented in 1899: “The amazing thing about the Ekiti farmers, both men and women, is their strange method of selling farm products without the presence of the sellers. This is a lesson for we British because I cannot but wonder how this method can work among us in Britain. At the entrance or gateway to a farm is usually found items like ripe plantain, tomatoes, yams, roasted rats and snakes and other things that were displayed on skeletal wooden beds resting rectangular on four wooden sticks that were firmly driven into the ground. What the buyers do is to pick any of the items displayed and put the cowrie money there. Nothing is ever stolen.23

Ekiti people called this practice kosoloja or remote selling. Kosoloja or ko si oloja means the seller is not around or very distant from his market. It was a custom that, among other things, helped teach and promote moral decency among the Ekiti people. People believed that it was a curse for anybody to steal or take any of the displayed items

268 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies without dropping the price money near the product. However, for a prospective buyer to know the price of each product displayed for sale, a price was put very close to each item for sale. What the buyer needed to do was to first count the amount of money, usually in cowries, beside the item he or she wanted to buy and then drop the exact amount in front of the product. For example, it is still the practice that when somebody buys any food item in the market or in a yard, it is customary for the seller to generously add to or top what has been bought with small and free extra. This small extra or gift was known in Ekiti as eni". However, not all the remote sellers practiced this; many farmers usually put extra foodstuffs on the right side of other foodstuffs for sale. No money or amount was placed near this, meaning that it was “eni or free gift.24 What happened was that if, for example, a bunch of banana was placed on the extra portion of the stall, one was free to take one or two from the bunch after buying an item. Nobody had the right to touch the extra gift if the person had not bought anything from the stall. The method of putting eni or extra on many stalls was a way of attracting patronage. This made it necessary to discuss the amount for and the currency used in remote selling. It is necessary here to understand that the main and most popular currency were cowries followed by precious beads called ayun. About the remote selling, the quality and quantity of the foodstuffs usually determined the number of cowries placed near each item by the seller. However, it is important to note that the pre-colonial Ekiti people, like other Yoruba sub-groups, equally engaged in trade by barter system. People occasionally exchanged food item for another food item.25

Sources Labour for Agriculture Labour was very important in all sectors of economy of Ekiti during the pre-colonial era. In agriculture, labour for farming was

269 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies supplied considerably by the family.26 Men as the household leaders performed the hectic part of food production. They were saddled with clearing, heap making, weeding and sometimes assisted by the children. Generally every son of Ekiti was encouraged to engage in farm work so that he could acquire experience which he needed to manage greater responsibility later in life. Indeed, on getting married, a young man was always given a large portion of family land by his father so that he could take care of his new family. The allotment of a portion of land was symbolic because it signified the granting of some form of independence by the father to the son.27 Another form of labour recruitment, apart the family labour, was Aro (co-operative labour group). A member of the group was entitled to call on members whenever he had a major assignment like clearing, weeding and planting of new seeds in his farm. The service was reciprocated when any member of the group needed it. Also, Owe (labour by relations, friends and in-laws) was mostly used as source of labour for agriculture in Ekiti during the pre- colonial era. It involved a large workforce for not more than two days. The Owe was used for the same purpose as Aaro. It was done with fun because the Olowe (organizer of the workforce) provided the food and drinks for entertainment during the duration of the work.28 Furthermore, Iwofa (pawnship) was another form of labour provided to work on the Ekiti farms. Under this system, the debtor provided labour to a creditor as interest on the money loaned in lieu of payment. If he could not render the service actively himself, he looked for substitute who may be his son or daughter, nephew or niece. The creditors used the labour of 'Iwofa as additional workforce in his farm. The money lending contract was always sealed in the presence of Oluwa (money lender), the Onigbowo

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(sponsor) and the Iwofa. As part of the contract, the Iwofa was expected to clear a piece of land equal to one hundred yam heaps or an equivalent in his master's farm once in five days. This, the Iwofa had to do until the money owed was repaid.29 Similarly, Eru (slaves) also constituted part of the labour force in agricultural production in Ekiti during the pre-colonial era. These slaves were either bought or captured during the wars. As a result of the Yoruba civil wars in the 19th century, slave labour became the most prominent sources of labour especially in the household of political elites and wealthy farmers. Slaves, once acquired, became the property of their masters. They worked from dusk till dawn in the farm of their masters. Their labour in the farm enabled the political elites of Ekiti to meet their ever increasing food requirement of their large household.30

Indigenous Industries and Enterprises in Ekitiland Prior to the British occupation, Ekiti people engaged in different kinds of arts and craft industries, chief among them was wood carving. Wood carving formed a prominent profession among the Ekiti people. There was availability of woods such as mahogany, iroko tree, sheabutter tree and several other trees suitable for carving in Ekitiland. Nearly every district in a town had wood carvers who were revered not only for their ability to create images of the gods but also more importantly for their closeness to the powerful chiefs and kings who were their major patrons. Culture was the life of the people, and religion was the soul of this life. All the daily activities of the people were tied to religious practices which were totally controlled by the worship of their gods. Hundreds of religions activities were sustained and associated with very many shrines that also had to be constantly equipped with art images or carved figures and other objects.31 Pottery was also a widespread craft in Ekitiland. Unlike other 271 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies industries which were commonly found around every town, pottery industries were found only in towns where clay was available. These towns were Ara, Isan, Afao, Obo, Igbara-Odo and Okemesi, among others.33 Pottery was regarded as a female activity because only the women did this type of occupation. They collected clay, the principal and locally available material, from Iwo-Amo (Clay hole) to the preparing site where the dirt and unwanted materials were removed. The clay was then mixed with water to standard and pounded well enough to achieve a desired texture. This type of clay was cemented to the back of the unused chosen pot whose shape was required. Through the process of delicate molding, two types of coloured pots were produced; black and light brown. The black colouration was produced by smoking the pottery ware in wet leaves of local species, that is, roro ogede and orogba. Thereafter, the pots would be sealed in and made lustrous with liquor made from the pods of the locust bean trees. Despite the fact that only few Ekiti towns produced pottery, the few pottery industries were able to even produce surplus pottery wares with locally made instruments and traditional techniques. 32 Another home industry, monopolized by women was mat weaving. Like pottery, it was an industry that strongly affected the lives of the Ekiti people generally. Ekiti people were well known for their dynamic tradition of mat making and the towns engaged in this craft were well known. Mat is produced by the simply intertwining of the mat leaves (Ewe iran). The leaves are grown and harvested in due time, dried and processed for production process. Mats are highly esteemed among the especially by traditional rulers because of the diverse purposes it serves.33 In the pre-colonial period, when there were no modern beds, mats were the major materials for sleeping; followed by animal skins. Even when raised mud beds were in use by some wealthy Ekiti, mats

272 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies were still needed to spread on them before sleeping. Mats were also used during ceremonies like marriage, masquerade rituals, child naming, death rites and special thanksgiving to the gods for success. In some endeavours, mats were usually spread on the ground for children, boys and girls to sit on. Grown up people or adults were given wooden or palm frond stools to sit on. On occasions, when stools or benches were not enough, mats were also used by the adults for sitting.34 Mats were also used for scatting, making ceilings and fencing and for preserving various types of vegetables. They varied a great deal in colour, size and texture depending on the type of raw material used and the purpose for which they were intended. Like pottery, mat weaving was practiced in only a few Ekiti towns where the raw materials for it (Ewe Iran) were available. The most famous producers were Ogotun, Ipoti, Okemesi, Efon-Alaye, Erin Oke,Erinmo, Ipetu, and Ikogosi.34 Cloth weaving, dyeing and blacksmithing were other forms of arts and crafts industries widely practiced in Ekitiland during the pre-colonial period. Cloth weaving was another industry of Ekiti before colonization. With the use of vertical and horizontal looms, Ekiti women were able to produce enough cloths for people to wear. The process of weaving began by obtaining thread for weaving from cotton wool front which cotton seeds had already been removed. The seeds were removed by a thin iron rod called obibo that served as a roller. After all the cotton seeds had been removed, the cotton was beaten into a light and thin form, before being spun into threads with a spindle that had a round, heavy object at its bottom end. The heavy object could be circular in shape. The threads could be dyed in different colours, while others were used in their white colour. There were women whose occupation was to produce threads for weaving. Weaving with vertical looms was the exclusive occupation of the Ekiti women.

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Blacksmithing was another essential aspect of economic activity in Ekitiland before the colonial era. The Ekiti people were adept blacksmiths who, before colonization, produced a variety of cultic, hunting and domestic objects for the community. Like in other Yoruba ethnic groups, iron ore was available and obtained from the mountains that abound in Ekiti. This was smelted in furnaces before being sold to blacksmiths who used them to produce a variety of implements and instruments such as cutlasses, hoes, spears, axes, etc.35 Blacksmithing was an important and indispensable industry before colonization, because without their products, there would be no implements for agriculture and no instruments to fight in wars, among other experiences. Guilds of wood carvers, blacksmiths, potters, mat weavers and cloth weavers were formed. It is important to note that none of these crafts was practiced alone. They were done conjunctly with farming. A wood carver was as much a farmer as any other.

Markets and Trade In pre-colonial Ekiti, markets were the engine of commerce and the soul of people's economic activities and growth. There have always been two traditional markets in Ekitiland from time immemorial, the king's Market and other markets. The king's market (Oja Oba) was the main market and was usually located in front of the Oba's palace, while the second market was usually located at the nerve center of the town. What could be called the third one was operated only when an Oba joined his ancestors. Thus, it was a taboo for any market activities to take place at King's Market in Ekitiland when the king joined his ancestors. As soon as a new Oba was installed, marketing stoped and normal operations resumed at the two main markets aforementioned. In other Ekiti towns where there was no third market arrangement, marketing

274 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies operations took place by the road sides pending the time that a new Oba would be installed.36 Every town and village in Ekiti had a market which belongs to it exclusively. Some large towns have more than two or three markets. Ado-Ekiti in the pre-colonial period had close to ten markets. One of them, Oja Ojido, was of special socio-economic and religious significance. Every main market was located in the front of the palace of the Oba or village head. Apart from being place of transacting business and exchanging of goods, the main market was the centre of all town activities. Friends and distant relatives met to exchange news, discuss current affairs and held ad- hoc meetings on important issues in town. It was the forum of all unusual meetings. There, public offenders were punished or executed. It was believed that a mad man could be cured if he had not wandered through the market. In some places like Ikole, there was a special chief in charge of the main market and once in a year, he had to appear there to do some imaginary buying and selling all by himself alone.37 Marketing was rotational. If people attended Oja Oba (king's Market) today, they would attend the second Market on the fifth day. Each market was operational every five days. People from neighbouring towns and even faraway places would come to buy and sell at the markets. The Hausas and the Ijebus bought Kolanut while others concentrated on food crops. Because of the keen competition among buyers, sellers got better prices for their product. It must be pointed out that just as some came to buy local products, so also did they bring their own articles of trade to the markets for local inhabitants to buy. In addition to buying and selling, markets in pre-colonial Ekiti served a lot of other functions. For example, markets were information centres where people, particularly from

275 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies neighbouring towns, gathered information, consciously or unconsciously, about various social, religious and political events in Ekiti generally. A market could also be an entertainment arena where local musicians, singers and jesters performed for gifts. And, of course, it was generally believed that a market could be a therapeutic place for those who needed healing or spiritual ablution. For example, women looking for the fruits of the womb could be directed by traditional doctors to sweep any area of the market as part of spiritual cleasing. The leaves that dropped from any market tree as well as market pebbles or sand were of medicinal significance to the traditional doctors. This is why Hodder and Ukwu believe that most Yoruba markets were associated with some fetish practices, since spirits were believed to meet and even to live in trees in or around the market places. Sacrifices were also made to these market spirits for the peace and tranquility of the town. A market, in Ekiti, was also used for unusual town meetings that required large or community attendance; particularly meetings on child kidnapping, controversial death or incursion of another town on the community's land. In addition, offenders were punished or executed in the market. It was believed that a madman could be cured if he had not wandered through the market. 38 The market, like any orderly organization, had its pattern of control in its activities. However, since markets were predominantly populated by women, the leadership of every market was under a woman Chief known as Iyaloja or Iya Oloja (the Mother of the Market). In some towns, she was called Iya Alaje. She supervised over the affairs of the market which included price control, settling of dispute, security and sanitation. Under the Iyaloja, there were supposed to be peace, material prosperity, order and market security through the services of night watchmen known

276 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies as olode. She must also see to the keeping of market's sanitary law which made it mandatory for all sellers to clean up their sheds or stalls before vacating the market. Her position was so powerful that all trade associations that generally made up each market respected and obeyed her instructions which were also supported by the king who conferred on her the chieftaincy title of Iyaloja.39 After the tribal wars, some Ekiti towns in imitation of Ibadan and Ilorin began to keep market in the evenings. Examples were Ikere, Aramoko and Efon Alaaye. New yams were forbidden in the main market until certain feasts were celebrated. During such festivals, the Oba or Baale would eat new yams for the first time.40

Conclusion This study focuses on the pre-colonial economy of Ekitiland. The study portrayes Ekiti people as a homogeneous sub-group of the Yoruba whose origin is traced to the migration of some people from “the Middle East to Ile-Ife, the cradle of the Yoruba race, from where they spread all over Ekiti to form one of the largest ethnic groups in . Some sources believe that some of the present sub-groups of Ekiti were the aborigines of Ekiti who played host to this immigrants. The pre colonial economic activities in Ekiti evolved within the people and became part and parcel of their culture. Agricultural and indigenous technological activities in Ekiti during the pre-colonial era gradually developed from a subsistence economy. This development is indicated among other things by a heightened spirit of enterprises, capital formation, and improved techniques and in the productive capacity of labour. The surpluses formed the basis of trade and development of markets. Trade stimulated contact between the Ekiti and outside and consequently led to increase in the volume of trade. This, in turn, resulted into

277 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies changes in the pattern of trade and productive processes. The vast range of contact between Ekiti people and other peoples like Ilorin, Ibadan, Nupe, Benin, Yagba, and Igbomina led to different threads of culture permeating into the fabric of Ekiti culture. Ekiti culture itself spread outwardly beyond its boundaries. It should be noted that apart from the extensive economic activities of Ekiti during the pre-colonial era, Ekiti passed through different phases of foreign rule, beginning with the subordination under Oyo, Benin and Ibadan marauding incursions. The reasons for these conquests and domination of Ekiti by these foreign invaders could be attributed to a number of reasons, but economic reason seems to be outstanding.

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References

1. Johnson S, The History of the Yorubas from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate, Lagos: C.S.S. Bookshops, 1921, 664 2. Olomola I .O, Ekitiparapo Aspirations since the 1890s, Ile- Ife: Andkolad publisher, 2005, 2. 3. Oloidi J.F, Economic History of Ekiti people 1900-1960, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Nigeria, Nsuka, 2011, 5 4. Ibid. 5. Olomola I .O, Ekitiparapo Aspirations since the 1890s… 31- 32. 6. Oguntuyi A.O, A Short History of Ekiti: from the beginning to 1939, Ibadan: Bisi Books, 1979, 10. 7. Oloidi J.F, “Economic History of Ekiti people 1900-1960… 8 8. Adebisi J., Ekiti Local Architecture. Ado-Ekiti: Karimu Printing Press, 1962, 19 9. Ibid. 10. Oguntuyi A.O, A Short History of Ekiti: from the beginning to 1939... 16 11. High Chief Abiola, the Ekerin of Aisegba-Ekiti, 48 years, Interview conducted in Aisegba-Ekiti on March 8, 2018 12. Ibid. 13. Oyebode A, et al. (eds.), Ekiti State: The Story of a Determined People, Ado-Ekiti: Fountain Newspapers Publishing Company Ltd., 2001, 9 14. Olomola I .O, Ekitiparapo Aspirations since the 1890s. 15. Oguntuyi A.O, A Short History of Ekiti: from the beginning to 1939… 36 16. Ibid.

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17. Hassan K.R, “Aspects of Economic History of Igbomina 1800-1960, Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Ilorin, 2004, 36 18. Chief Akosile, 79 years, a farmer in the early 1960s in Ado- Ekiti, Interview conducted at Ajilosun Street in ado- Ekiti on January12, 2018. 19. Hassan K.R, “Aspects of Economic History of Igbomina 1800-1960… 36 20. Temple C.L, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirate and States of Northern Province of Nigeria, London: Longman 1969, 25 21. Chief Akosile, 2018, interview already cited. 22. Ibid. 23. Oloidi J.F, “Economic History of Ekiti people 1900-1960, 39-40 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Emmanuel Ajayi, 60 years, a retired civil servant, Interview conducted in Usi- Ekiti on May12, 2018. 27. Ibid. 28. Rodney, W. How Europe underdeveloped Africa, Dares Salam: Boggle L'overtune publication, 1972, 47 29. Hassan K.R, “Aspects of Economic History of Igbomina 1800-1960, 40 30. Ibid. 31. Oloidi J.F, “Economic History of Ekiti people 1900-1960, 8 32. Ibid. 33. Nwaoko. S, “In Ogotun-Ekiti, Mat Weaving is Road to Wealth.” Nigerian Tribune, Ibadan, June 15, 2018. https://www.tribuneonlineng.com/67535/ 34. Ibid. 35. Emmanuel Ajayi, 2018, interview already cited

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36. Adetunberu J.O, et al (eds), Igede-Ekiti in Perspective, Ibadan:John Archer publisher, 2001, 69-70 37. Oguntuyi A.O, A Short History of Ekiti: from the beginning to 1939, 10 38. Ibid. 39. Adetunberu J.O, et al (eds), Igede-Ekiti in Perspective, 69-70 40. Oguntuyi A.O, A Short History of Ekiti: from the beginning to 1939, 11

281 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies Politics of Violence in Nigeria: A Study of Taraba State, 1991-2019

Anuye, Steve Paul Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University. Jalingo, Nigeria

Joseph, Bonglo Kingsley Department of History, College of Education, Zing, Taraba State & Ishaku Taraba Dahbo Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts, Taraba State University. Jalingo, Nigeria

Abstract This study examines Political Violence in Taraba State since 1991, when the State was created, to 2019 in which we witnessed the recent conduct of the general election in the country. The research focuses on the origin and historical roots of political violence as well as the nature, causes, dynamics, and the impacts of political violence on Taraba State. Both primary and secondary sources of data were used for the research. The research reveals key facts about political violence in Taraba State. Firstly, there have been cases of political violence in Taraba State. Secondly, there is a pressing need on the sides of government, political parties, and other institutions to act and curb political violence in Taraba State. In conclusion, the study recommends that the redress of issues causing and promoting the phenomenon of political violence is a necessary solution for politicking and good governance in Taraba State.

Introduction Political violence is a common means used by politicians and governments around the world to achieve political goals. Many groups and individuals believe that their political systems will never respond to their political demands. As a result they believe that violence is the only necessary strategy they can use to achieve their political objectives. By the same token, many governments around the world believe they need to use violence in order to intimidate their populace into acquiescence.

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Anifowose (2015) Defined political violence as the use of threat of physical act carried out by individual or individuals within a political system against another individual or groups and property, with the intent to cause injury or death to persons, damage or destruction to property, and whose objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstance, implementation, and effects have political significances, that tends to modify or change the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement for the political system.1 Political violence could take two dimensions, namely pre-electoral violence and post-electoral violence. The pre-electoral violence may occur where electoral laws or provisions are seen to favour a particular candidate at the expense of the other. It could also occur when a particular candidate is over-ambitious and perhaps sees the signals that he may likely lose the election to the opponent. Post- electoral violence, on the other hand, may be spontaneous. It may be engineered by individuals who feel cheated, alienated or deprived by the unfairness of the electoral process. This deprivation may be real or perceived.2 In Nigeria, the purpose of such violence, apart from seeking redress through illegal means, is also to destroy it, if we cannot have it.3 According to Adekanye (1989) an objective review of the Nigerian political journey would reveal that political violence has been part and parcel of the country's history.4 unfortunately, no country can develop in an atmosphere of rancour and acrimony. Nigeria would have been among the leading economies of the world but this has been hampered due to the fact that monumental resources are channelled into security votes, conflict resolution and reconstruction as a result of occurring and reoccurring political violence. Since political power is assumed to be the major source of wealth in Nigeria, the contest for political office is always presented to be a 'do or die' affair.5 Series of political violence have ensued in Taraba State, the results of which have been destruction of lives and properties, injuries

283 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies to victims, enmity; an environment indisposed of peace, and at worst, loss of livelihood. It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to examine political violence in Taraba State from 1991-2019. The Concept of Political Violence: Gurr, Aver Norom and Targba A. (2016) defines political violence as all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies.6 According to Della Porta (1995) “Political violence is an ambiguous concept and its definition involves some controversy for it implies defining not only what is “political,” but also what is “violence.” In general, w e c a n understand political violence as “repertoires of collective action that involve great physical force and cause damage to an adversary in order to impose political aims”.7 Political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies. Furthermore, Della Porta (1995) asserted that “Political violence has become something that is used by groups seeking power, by groups holding power and by groups in the process of losing power”. Therefore, this study views Political violence as all forms of organised acts or threats, be it physical, psychological, and structural, aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder with a view to determining, delaying, or otherwise influencing a political process. In Nigeria, political violence involves both threat and the actual inflictions of physical injury on individual opponent or perceived groups that may likely hinder the goals attainment of either the party or candidate. What is known today as Taraba State was created on 27 August 1991, with Jalingo as its capital. At inception, the State was headed by a military adminitrator.8 However, 1992 ushered in the first civilian rule in the State. This was a significant development and also a test for the State's transition to civil rule. The politics and election which took place

284 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies from January 1992 to November in the State was overseen by the military, since the military were in control of power in the nation. The people voted peacefully, with no reported cases of ringing. Taraba State's return to democratic rule on 29th May, 1999, recorded no serious cases of political violence as most politically related frictions that arose at that time were intra-party conflicts. The rise of political thuggery and consequently political violence in Taraba State could be traced to 's third administration. This is because Jolly Nyame's third term as the governor of Taraba State from 2003-2007 brought in some elements in the system who believed political thuggery could help them achieve their political goals and personal interests. It was the first time that cases of political thuggery, violence and political killings surfaced and became so pronounced in the State. The activities of groups like 'Bani Isra'ila', 'Ba kuskure', 'Black scorpions' and other political thuggery groups thrived, as their sponsors were key players in the administration. The result was the destruction of properties, political killings, and lawlessness Unfortunately, this unhealthy situation persisted even to the end of Jolly Nyame's third administration in 2007. According to Mafindi, the two major sponsors of political thugs then were Ahmed Yusuf and Danladi Baido, who at the unfolding of incidences became rivals. The conflict between Ahmed Yusuf and Danladi Baido who were the key sponsors of political thugs in Taraba State during Jolly Nyame's regime started when Governor Jolly Nyame decided to work closely with Danladi Baido, and started giving Ahmed Yusuf less attention; making the two individuals rivals.9 Musa John (2018) identified two major rival political blocs in Taraba State that gave rise to political thuggery in the State. According to him, the two were led by Ahmed Yusuf and Danladi Baido popularly referred to as 'Bani Israila' and 'Ba Kuskure' respectively. These two groups were involved in several political clashes. Notable among the clashes was the August, 2005, physical confrontation between Ahmed Yusuf and Danladi Baido at Nukkai Area of Jalingo LGA, when the then

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Vice President of Nigeria, , visited Taraba state to commiserate with the people over the disastrous flood which caused loss of lives and property within Jalingo. The confrontation escalated further between the rival groups who used knifes, axes, cutlasses, bows and arrows and other dangerous weapons against each other at the entrance of the Jalingo Presidential Lodge. Although no life was lost, people were badly injured, and one Murtala Bare lost one of his eyes in the clash. The violence continued even after the Vice President left the State (Musa John 2018). Jolly Nyame's third regime (2003-2007) recorded series of political violence in the State, and killings that were politically engineered. Some among the cases include: 1. The violent clash between Bani Israila and Ba Kuskure which caused the destruction of properties, injuring of persons (especially those involved in the clash), the damaging of an eye of one Murtala Bare (who was also a political thug). 2. The assassination of Idris Waziri Serti. 3. The Kidnap and assassination of Joshua Kala. 4. Several confrontations among the politicians and between their supporters (who were mainly thugs). An example of this was the attack on Ahmed Yusuf and the destruction of his house, cars and other properties. 5. Other several cases of harassment, use of threats, extortion and harm on both lives and properties of opposing politicians as well public office holders.10 Another main instance of political violence in Taraba State was recorded towards the election of 2007. This was between the two factions of Action Congress (AC) led by Ahmed Yusuf and Joel Ikenya. Hopson Bitrus (2018) stated that the clash erupted from among the supporters (mainly thugs) of Ahmed Yusuf and Joel Ikenya who were all contestants under the banner of the Action Congress (the then opposition in Taraba State). The violence started during the primary election in the Action Congress and continued after Joel Ikenya was

286 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies declared the winner of the governorship election primaries.11 Even though political violence ensured on assumption of office by Pharmacist Danbaba Danfulani Suntai as the Governor of the State in 2007, he did much to reduce the trend since he gave no room for political thugs and their activities. Silas Jephthath (2018) agrees that most of the violence that erupted came in form of demonstration from the supporters of Danladi Baido who felt that (Danladi Baido) was supposed to be the PDP's flag bearer in the State in the 2007 election was denied the opportunity by President Olusegun Obasabjo who was the leader of the party at that time (being the President elect under PDP platform). The violence initially started right from Bauchi State, where flags were being presented by the then President to the winners of the PDP Gubernatorial primary election. The rivalry however, subsided when Baido later agreed to work with Suntai and as such mobilised his supporters to vote for Suntaiin the 2007 Gubernatorial election. The major terms of the agreement was Baido's presentation of one of his loyalist, Sani Abubakar Danladi to serve as Deputy Governor to Danbaba Suntai, while Baido was appointed the Chief of Staff to the Governor, although he later resigned due to obvious personal reasons. 2011 Gubernatorial Election in Taraba State keenly contested by Pharmacist Danbaba Danfulani Suntai of the PDP and Joel Ikenya of Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) came with its own face of political violence. This was basically a post-election violence (after the 2011 election). The political violence this time around erupted from a protest against the re-election of Danbaba Suntai by people (especially the youths) in Anguwan Gadi, and areas of Anguwan Sarki within Jalingo L.G.A. Notwithstanding, in 2012 events changed the pattern of how politics (and political violence) played out in Taraba State. The change in pattern had its origin from the swearing in of Alh. Garba Umar as the Acting Governor of Taraba State after Governor Danbaba Suntai had a plane Crash and was undergoing treatment. This caused division among

287 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies the stakeholders due to the reshufflement of the State cabinet by the Acting Governor, Garba Umar. There was already a religious divide among the people of the State. According to Mafindi (2018), the Acting Governor started employing the services of political thugs as he thought they would help him achieve his political aims. This led to the rise in the activities of a group particularly referred to as “cabals” who disagreed with the leadership style of Garba Umar and the manner in which he was running the State.12There were series of political battles between the “cabals” and the Acting Governor (and his supporters), the climax which was the eventual removal of Alh. Garba Umar as the Acting Governor and the reinstatement of Abubakar Sani in 2014 (who was impeached as Deputy Governor of the State). The foregoing development and its attendents effects heated up the polity in the State. Mutual suspicion began to grow among the political gladiators in the State, while they make plans for 2015 election.13 There were a lot of tension and pockets of violence in most parts of the state in places like Wukari, Ibbi, Takum, Ussa, Donga, Karim/Lamido, Sardauna, etc. The politic of the 2015 Gubernatorial election mainly between Aisha Jummai Alhasan of All Progressive Congress (APC) and Arch. Ishaku Darius Dickson of People's Democratic Party( PDP) created much tension and rivalry, especially in Jalingo the State Capital, where Senator Aisha had overwhelming followership. The act of violence increased more in places where election was declared inconclusive (e.g Donga, Karim/Lamido, Sardauna and Wukari). Various groups of political thugs were used during the election to harass voters and electoral staff thereby causing many cases of violence in those areas. Looking at the 2019 general election which has just been conducted, cases of political violence were experience in some parts of the State before, during and after elections. The areas mostly affected included Jalingo, Wukari, Gassol, Sunkani and Ussa Local Government Areas. It was mostly inter-party conflicts with only one case of intra-party conflict. However, the All Progressive Congress

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(APC) witnessed political violence during the gubernatorial primaries. It was marked by ballot snatching, gun shot and chaos.14 The stakeholders reported the issue to the party national headquarters calling for the cancellation of the primaries. Unfortunately, the appeal feel on deaf ears as Abubakar Sani was still adopted as the flag bearer for APC in the State. Furthermore, it was well observed that during the campaigns, they were activities that fuelled political violence. For instance, the political thugs of Abubakar Sani repeatedly destroyed the bill boards of Governor Ishaku Dickson and other PDP aspirants. This was done more in Angwan Gadi and Angwan Sarki. Acts of alarming political violence were exhibited during the Presidential campaign when President Mohammadu Buhari visited Jalingo. Political thugs, allegedly mostly APC supporters openly carried weapons like cutlesses, knives, and other harmful instruments around the streets during which the bill boards and posters of Governor Ishaku Dickson and other (PDP) aspirants were either removed or torn in broad daylight. Notwithstanding, the calm exercised by the PDP supporters, the incident resulted in the lost of lives of some APC supporters.15 Another instance of political violence in the 2019 election occurred in Wukari where Abubakar Sani and his thugs came under attack and had some of their vehicles burnt.16 It was the timely intervention of the men of the Department of Security Services (DSS) that brought the situation under control. Meanwhile, the most devastating political violence was the one witnessed in Jalingo the State Capital after the declaration of the gubernatorial results on 13th March, 2019, by the Returning Officer of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Generally the atmosphere after the announcement of Governor Darius Dickson Ishaku'was filled with alarming violence which resulted in the imposition of 12 hours curfew, and later 24 hours curfew on Jalingo the State Capital, until the atmosphere became calm on the 18th March, 2019.17 This was, indeed, a very major political violence registered in Jalingo in recent times.

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Besides those who lost their lives and property, this ugly situation brought not only untold hardship but high number of casualties were admitted in both Specialist Hospital and Federal Medical Centre, Jalingo, for medical attention.18 Dynamics of Political Violence in Taraba State Political violence in Taraba State had, most at times, arisen from intra-party conflicts rather than inter-party. This should however not be construed as saying all cases of political violence recorded in the State have originated from intra-party conflicts. It is however, important to acknowledged the fact that political violence in Taraba State has always mostly being engineered by the political elites (from one party or the other) and executed by political thugs who are most at times poor, illiterates and lack political orientation and awareness. These elements have always been at the centre of every political violence that played out in Taraba State. The political composition of Taraba State has always been a thing of one dominant party against the others. It is, however worthy of note that opposition politics has most at times been so weak in the State. Since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, the gap between the main ever ruling party the PDP and the opposition parties has always been very wide except in 2015 when the margin between the ruling People's Democratic Party and All Progressive Congress became so thin. This pattern of political composition has made the ruling party, PDP, so congested, causing high friction among members of the party (especially during contest under the party's platform). This, according to Silas Jephthah (2018), has reasoned why intra-party conflicts in PDP have always been high. At many times, these conflicts which ensued within individuals or groups within the party (and their factional supporters) evolved and exploded beyond the party, thereby making the larger community to be at the receiving end. Very worrisomely, Political elites in Taraba State, particularly within the ruling party, have allegedly reared thugs for the prosecution of political violence. The recent event in the 2019 election however,

290 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies showed that the opposition party, APC, seemingly surpassed any other party in the recruitment and use of political thugs to prosecute political violence (Silas 2018).this was the case with PDP during Nyame's regime from 1999-2007, when political thuggery and violence was at their best with many attacks on innocent citizens. The gruesome assassination of Joshua Kala was one of the major consequences of political thuggery and violence ( Mafindi, 2018). Implications of Political Violence on Taraba State Political Violence may have a lot of implications on both the people and the socio-economic development of the areas in which they occur. Some of the implications of political violence in Taraba State include: A. Socio-economic implications: Political violence affects socio- economic development wherever it occurs. Political violence in Taraba State, has devastating effect on life, property, businesses and infrastructure. Since the beginning of political violence in the State, many lives have been lost, alongside with the destruction of property and infrastructure, in addition to general insecurity. This has greatly affected economic activities thereby thwarting economic development ( Philemon Azara, 2018). B. Political implications: Political Violence negatively affects political institutions and distracts political processes in the areas they occur. This has been the case with Taraba State. Political Violence destabilises political structure, breeds fear, enmity and distrust, and also creates an atmosphere of insecurity, all which affects the stability of the state. For instance, the Igbo people are always compelled to send their families members home ( to Eastern Nigeria) and only their men stay and vote during election. The result is that those of them that are of voting age are always disfranchised. Indeed, low voter turnout during election often characterised some of our pulling units in the State for fear of lack of safety of the electorates. However, such situations do not only make INEC to

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suffer political apathy but also waste of electoral materials. C. Violation of Human Rights: Many innocent and law abiding citizens have also suffered the violation of their human rights due to political violence in Taraba State. It is however, important to note that the violation of human rights is mostly promoted by political thuggery and political violence. For instance, the killing of late Joshua Kala by political thugs was a violation of his human right to security and also enfranchisement. But unfortunately, the perpetuators of the hideous act could not be apprehended and brought to book. Similarly, the right to freedom of association and also security of APC members in the State was violated during their Gubernatorial election primaries which was hide jacked by political thugs. Baido Danladi also suffered the violation of his human right for unlawful arrest during the 2019. Even the INEC Returning Offices from some Local Government Areas could not declare the election results due to the threat from political thugs. It is this situation that resulted in the assassination of the INEC Returning Officer of Bali LGA in the just concluded election. The result is that it could breed more fear and apathy for electorates and electoral officials. D. Educational implications: Political violence often disrupts all activities including our educational systems. Students are easily distracted from their academic activities because of fear which is induced by the activities of various political thugs. For instance, the election often comes along with election break which affect the academic calendar and activities in schools. Although, the curfew imposed by Governor Darius Dickson help to calm the post-election tension in Jalingo, yet schools could not resumed immediately thereby further causing delay in the commencement of academic activities. However, all this disruption end up making students to have difficulties in comprehending the academic work for the term or semester due

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to the frequency of interference in the academic calendar. Conclusion Conclusively, it is clear from the foregoing that political violence has infiltrated the body politics of Taraba State over the years. The practice of political violence by politicians is seemingly very alarming and also to have formed the DNA of the politics of the State. This is because the only period political violence was at its bearest minimum was in 2007 when Governor Danbaba Suntai took over and decided to address the menace because of its consequences for our politics. Indeed, the devastating effect cause by this phenomenon is enormous and also very unhealthy for the politics of the State. In view of the above some of the recommendations made in order to cope political violence include:- First, the development of political culture should be a priority of the government of Taraba State, other key institutions and individuals in the State in order to promote the political development of Taraba State, and the Country at large. Secondly, Political leaders should carry the responsibility of ensuring that their supporters reject violence as an instrument of politics. This will go a long way in promoting order and sanity in the electoral process. They should conduct their campaigns on the basis of pressing issues that affect the populace in the State, rather than malicious attacks on political opponents or mobilization of religious, ethnic and regional sentiments. Thirdly, parties, NGOs, educational institutions etc. have a role to play in educating the people on best political practices and the need for peace. This will go a long way in creating political awareness among the people and also peace building. Fourthly, poverty and unemployment are strong tools in the hands of those who perpetrate political violence. Also, and the politicians are good in taking advantage of the poor condition of the youths and also their unemployed status to buy them and use them for political thuggery and violence. It is recommended that the government create jobs for the youths and improve their conditions, as when

293 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies someone is engaged doing something productive, he/she would most likely have no time for violence or other counter-productive activities. Our Justice system and its processes should be enhanced. If the justice system functions well, perpetrators of political violence would easily be brought to order through prosecution. Security agencies must also carry on their duties effectively to checkmate the activities of thugs at all times (before, during and after elections), and they should be politically neutral. The government and other private institutions like NGOs should hold town hall meetings, workshops, seminars, and other awareness campaigns from time to time to promote the building of a political culture and sensitize the people especially the youths in the State on the need to shun political violence all towards preventing political violence and institutionalising best political practices.

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References

1. Anifowose, A. Violence and politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yourba Experience. In Ikyase, Tersoo Johnkennedy & Egberi, Anthony Ejue. Political violence and democratic stability in nigeria: reflecting on the past and chatting the way rorward. Department of Public Administration Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria and Zainab Arabian Research Society for Multidisciplinary Issues Dubai, 2015 Gurr, T. Why men Rebel,. In Aver, Nnorom & Targba Aondowase, Political Violence and its Effects on Social Development in Nigeria 2013. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 17 p. 263. 2. . UAE. P. 33. 3. Tamuno, T. N. Peace and Violence in Nigeria. In 2. I n Aver, Nnorom & Targba Aondowase, Political Violence and its Effects on Social Development in Nigeria, 2013. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 17 p. 263. 4. Afolabi, O. Electoral Violence and the consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria, In Ikyase, Tersoo Johnkennedy &, Anthony Ejue. Political violence a Reported by African Independence Television (AIT) News on 13th November, 2018. 5. nd democratic stability in nigeria:reflecting on the past Egberi and chatting the way forward, 2007. Department of Public Administration Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria and Zainab Arabian Research Society for Multidisciplinary Issues Dubai, UAE. p. 34. 6. Adekanye, J. B. Politics in a Military Context. In Ekeh, P. P. et al (eds.), Nigeria since Independence; The first 25 years, 1989. Vol. V,. Heinemann. Pp 7. 186-205.

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8. Alfa, P. I. and Otaida, E. Political Violence and Negation of Democratic Stability in Nigeria; the Implication for Nigerian Fourth Republic, Journal of Physical Science and Innovation, Vol. 4, 2012. Available in www.cenresinpub.org. Pp.43-51. 9. Nkwede J. O. and Nwobashi, H. N. “Political Violence in Nigeria: Implications for a Developing Democracy, 2010. Nigerian Journal of Business 5(1). 10. Interview with Habu Sani in Jalingo on the 16th June, 2018. 11. Interview with Ambassador Musa John in Jalingo on the 16th June, 2018. 12. Joseph D. “Tree and treeless business centres in Jalingo metropolis.” A project submitted to the Department of Forestry, College of Agriculture, Jalingo. 2017. 13. Interview with Ambassador Musa John in Jalingo on the 16th Ju Interview with Habu Sani in Jalingo on the 11th July, 2018. 14. Reported by African Independence Television (AIT) News on 13th November, 2018. 15. Reported by African Independence Television (AIT) News on 13th November, 2018. 16. Reported by African Independence Television (AIT) News on 13th November, 2018. 17. An eye witness account by Kingsley B. Joseph at the Civil Service Commission, Jalingo on 13th March, 2019. 18. An eye witness account by Linda A. Sah at Specialist Hospital, Jalingo on 13th March, 2019

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A Historical Analysis of the Causes and Effects of Herders-Farmers Conflicts in Taraba State

Iorkile Sewuese Rachael Department of History Faculty of Arts, Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria

& Nwagu Evelyn Eziamaka Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Arts Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria. Phone No: 08036009650 E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract Since the Fourth Nigerian Republic in 1999, farmers-herders violence has killed thousands of people and displaced tens of thousands more. The trend enveloped almost throughout much of the western Sahel due to an expansion of the population of the agricultural communities associated with the encroachment on cattle routes on one hand and the deteriorating environment conditions, desertification and soil degradation; breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanism, struggle over land and water resources, proliferation of small arms and crime in rural areas, on the other hand. This paper, therefore, attempts to examine or assess how these factors contribute in one way or the other in the ongoing farmers-herders conflict in Taraba state. Both primary and secondary sources contributed enormously in the supply of information used in this study. The paper has also proffered some of the recommendation as the panacea for taming the tides farmers-herders conflicts in the state. Key Words: farmers, herders, conflicts

Introduction Over the last decade, clashes between indigenous farming communities and nomadic herdsmen have increased in several parts of Central Nigeria, including the country's eastern flank (IDMC 2008). For instance, on 4/3/2003, herdsmen from neighbouring Chad attacked the rural town of Dumne in Borno state killing 40 people. [1] In the same year, Udawa cattle herders attacked and burned 34 farming villages in Adamawa and Gombe states in Feb and March, 297 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

2003, resulting in 63 deaths, 563 injured and 23,700 displaced [2] (International Federation of the Red Cross-IFRC 2003, cited in IDMC 2008). Such conflicts have spread to other parts of west Africa including Nigeria (Igna 2011)[3] Tonah in his studies as cited in Ufuoku and Isife (2006) confirmed that conflicts between farmers and nomadic cattle herders have become a common feature of economic livelihood in West Africa [4] Back home in Taraba State in 2002, similar conflicts occurred on the Mambila plateau, which, resulted in dozens of deaths and forced more than 25,000 Fulani herdsmen to flee across the border to Cameron [5] in recent time, farmers-herders conflicts have escalated in Taraba State. The attacks, particularly on the farming communities, have resulted in loss of lives and properties as well as displacement of native farmers cutting across all the 16 Local Government Areas of the state. The magnitude of the disaster is, indeed, very horrific in nature. This development is clear departure from the relatively peaceful or harmonious relationship that existed between the farmers and herders in time past. This calls for serious concern as the negative effects of this crisis-ridden relationship on the socio-political and economy of the indigenes of Taraba and their neighbors cannot be overemphasized. In the light of the foregoing, this paper has tried to examine the historical perspectives of the relationship between the farmers and herders in Taraba state prior to the emergence of the negative trend. The paper has tried to identify the immediate and remote causes of the farmers-herders conflicts in Taraba state. Efforts have also been made to examine the role played by government and other groups over the herders-farmers conflicts in the state

Historical Perspectives of the Relationship Between Herdsmens and Farmers in Taraba State Just as how the of Benue state use to live a peacefully among there settlers the herdsmen before crisis set in, so it is with the Mambila ethnic group, the Kona, the Kunini, Mumuye and tribes in Taraba state. There has been series of conflicts between the Mambilla and herdsmen. It is imperative to note that the phenomenology of herders- 298 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies farmers conflicts was never the feature of the early contacts between the two groups in what became Taraba state. Initially, the two groups enjoyed harmonious relationship with one another. In all what became the three geo-political zones of Taraba state, the two groups established a symbiotic form of relationship characterized by mutual trust and cooperation. Generally, no group in what became Taraba State was involved in any form of hostility with the herders and vice versa. [6] Unfortunately, in the 1980s, the tide changed. This development was the first noticed on the Mambilla plateau, particularly from January to March, 1980. this series of crisis worst a f f e c t e d t h e F u l a n i c o m m u n i t i e s i n W a r w a r ,Mbamnga,Tamnya,Titong, Kakara, Kumu, etc [7] Apart from many cows killed and many badly matcheted, the magnitude of the crises attracted the attention of both the state and the Federal Governments. In other part of Taraba State, there existed minor skirmishes between herders and farmers particularly over cases of trespass. However, such skirmishes were usually between individuals' farmers and herders, which were usually amicably resolved [8] Unfortunately, the phenomenon of violent herders-farmers conflicts has become unprecedented in recent time. Two major factors account for this negative trend. First and foremost, the free -range cattle rearing practice among the herders usually result in trespass thereby causing conflicts, at times. Secondary, climate change resulting in desertification has pushed herders not only from the northern part of Nigeria, but from other countries into the Central Nigerian area. The emergency of these foreign herders, and their use, allegedly by mostly wealthy cattle owners have contributed in no small measure in escalating herders-farmers conflicts, particularly in the Benue Valley, which is their major target. The violent or aggressive armed nature of these category of herders equally has remained the major causes of the growing hostility between herders and farmers.[9] The growing awareness and organized nature of the herders equally served as one the major factors for the growing hostility between them and farmers. In some places, particularly on the Mambilla Plateau, for instance, some herders bought land from the indigenes. By this singular action, the herdsmen claim grazing rights 299 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies and consider any one who attempts to prevent them grazing right on the area as infringing on their rights, which they are prepared to do anything to protect their called grazing rights.[10] Moreover, the herders are aware that the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Sections 41 and 42, has conferred the right to freedom to movement and right to freedom from discrimination respectively. Their effort to exercise these rights, even where it infringes on the rights of others, has remained one of the sources of herders-farmers hostility in some places.[11] To worsen the situations, some traditional rulers either sell some parcels of land to the herders or allow them to graze on community land without duly informing members of the immediate communities or the joint owners. More worrisomely, some traditional rulers even allegedly collect stipends from the herders secretly to allow them to graze on people's farm lands or community land. Similarly, some dubious members of some communities use to secretly sell parcels of land belonging to others to herders. All these factors, combined, have caused herders-farmers conflicts in some places. Some crises have even erupted, like on the Mambilla plateau, where members of the community wanted to seize from the herders parcels of land they had sold to them. This was one of the major causes of thee 2002 herder-farmers violent crises on the Mambilla. The herders resisted the attempt, in some cases, to seize from them the parcels of land they officially purchased and received certificates of ownership. The herders resisted the attempts because they considered themselves being exploited, having paid for grazing rights only to be harassed by the ''so called land owners.'' [12] Immediate and remote causes of herder-farmers conflicts in Nigeria. Expansion of agricultural activities vis-à-vis increase in herd sizes and climate change. Conflicts between herdsmen and farmers have intensified since the beginning of increase agricultural and pastoral activities viz-a-vis environmental factor like soil degradation and increase desertification occasioned by climate change. For example, increase in the herd sizes, due to improved conditions of the cattle, compelled the herdsmen to seek for more pasture beyond their limited range. Climate change has also constituted a great threat by 300 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies putting great pressures on the land and thus provoking conflicts between the two occupational groups. General geometric increase in population vis-à-vis static landmass, Improvement in human health and population have enhanced greater pressure on land. Since the 1980s, there has been a geometric increase in human population which has resulted in increase pressure on land for agricultural and pastoral activities. This development has made farmers and herdsmen to begin to engage in fierce struggles for access to land, land which, more often than not, result in increased conflicts and violence. These conflicts have constituted serious threats to the means of survival for both the farmers and herdsmen. The consequence has remained provocative claims over grazing and farmlands as well as encroachment on cattle routes. Unfortunately, this has become ubiquitous and seems to have defied solutions [13] (Abbas, 2012; Abubakar, 2012 and Bello 2013) Another major contributory factors for the ongoing violent conflicts between herders and farmers are trespass and recent cases of forceful invasion and occupation of farm lands by armed herders, mostly suspected to be hired militants from neighboring countries like Niger and Chad. [14] In Nigeria, the most frequent causes of conflicts between herdsmen and sedentary farmers are trespass on farms and destruction of crops by cattle. Of recent, the phenomenon has assumed very alarming dimension in our society today.[15] This has assumed an unprecedented dimension since herders now intentionally graze on farmers farms destroying crops at will. Most of such herders carry dangerous weapons, mostly AK47, rifles, to intimidate farmers as they graze on their crops at will. Increasing incident of cattle rustling in the society of recent. This is the opinion of Abass (2009) 28 who associates increase in herders-farmers conflicts with increase in the rate of cattle theft. Among the factors associated with this development are climate change and general crime rate which have dislocated many people from their legitimate sources of livelihood. Some among such people have resorted to cattle theft as a means of survival. [16] From the foregoing highlights, the key underlying causes of farmers-herdsmen conflicts could be summed up as follows:

301 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies i. Changing resource access rights, whereby traditional access rights to communal grazing and water resources are being obstructed by the individual tenureship of arable farmers. This is particularly severe on the traditional trek routes, which become favorite cropping sites because of their better soil fertility resulting from the concentration of animal manure from the trekking herds in these areas. Tonah is of the opinion that the causes of farmers' herders' conflicts include the southward movement of pastoral herds into the humid and sub humid zone, promoted by the successful control of the menace posed by disease, the widespread and availability of veterinary medicine and the expansion of farming activities into areas that hitherto served as pasture land. As a result, the herdsmen destroy crops of the farmers on their farmland [17]. Within the fadama areas, this is exacerbated by the fragmented nature of the crop plots, which makes prevention of animals straying in the crop plots difficult. ii. Inadequacy of grazing resources, as increasing crop cultivation (and increasing commercialization of the crop-residues) and poor management of the existing grazing reserves have resulted in a significant reduction in available livestock feed resource, in particular in the northern states. Moreover, the high yielding and valuable value crops introduced by National Fadama Development Program NFDP (Tomatoes and Onions) produce almost no-crop-residues for livestock feeding. iii. Availability of grazing resources, including pasture and water, in different places at different time of the year, hence the need for constant mobility among herdsmen for opportunistic resources use. This brings them into contact with the farmers, thereby causing competition and conflicts.[18] iv. Land tenure system or ownership of land equally accounted for the conflicts in most societies in Nigeria. Farmers are regarded as those that own the land, and therefore determine how landless groups, like herders, could use and settle on land [19] The seeming rejection of the posture has therefore being bringing the two groups into conflicts, since the latter also believe they have the

302 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies constitutional right over land especially to graze and settle in areas of their choice. Hoffmann et al., (2008) have argues that, relationship between farmers and herdsmen started degenerating in the north when the Hausa farmers began to raise animals, including cattle. Consequently the farmers who used to allow the herders to feed their cattle on crop residues began to take crop residues to their animals, and as a consequence forage became scarce for herders in dry season. Invariably, the growing diversification of the farmers' agricultural practices soon began to throw the in conflict with the herders over pasture aggravated by eventual squeeze of crop residues by farmers [20]. Blench (2010) summarizes some of the general issues regarding the causes of herders-farmers conflicts. As follows; i. Widespread availability of modern automatic weapons into illegal hands and improved communication devices being used by armed bandit in their nefarious activities.[21] ii. Alarming rate of widespread religio-political bigotry. This conflicts are being increasingly interpreted as religious and political even though the main or underlying driver may be conflicts over access to resources. iii. Unprecedented spirit of ethnicity across the country. iv. Failure of Government to effectively implement reports or recommendations of judicial or other commissions of inquiry on past and prevailing conflicts in the society. v. Failure of dispute resolution mechanisms to proffer workable framework for resolving conflicts. vi. Introduction of democratic apparatuses for resolving conflicts vis-à-vis the seeming partnership of both security agencies and successive Governments. Abbas (2009), however, has concluded in his paper on conflicts between the Fulani cattle herders and farmers in Northern Nigeria, which Taraba is inclusive that, “Recurring scramble for scarce ecosystem resources has degenerated into violent conflicts in Northern

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Nigeria between Fulbe cattle herders and farmers. These conflicts have become more intense, widespread and destructive. Since most of the Fulbe cattle herders do not own or possess the right to land, they, therefore, depend absolutely on open land to feed their cattle, culminating in intense pressure on land and frequency of conflicts. Ecological climate change and, of course, government policies on agriculture especially all year fadama farming, are [22]. threats to pastoralist access to pasture'' Causes of herders-farmers conflicts on Taraba State In many places, in Taraba State, herders have clashed with farmers and their host communities over cases of trespass, cattle destruction of crops, farmers' encroachment on grazing reserves and in discriminate bush burning by nomads, which normally leads to loss of crops. The seeming boldness of the perpetrators and mystery surrounding the unprecented nature of the conflicts have continued to attract mixed perceptions. While many perceive this development disputes over grazing lands trespass as mere farming, grazing land and water resources,, others see the conflicts as reprisals in defense of livestock from banditry in farming communities. In recent time, there have been prevalent cases of herders- farmers' clashes in Taraba state. Note that in Lau, Mambilla, Wukari, Bali, Takum, Ussa, Donga,, Gashaka, etc. many people have being killed and thousands displaced and rendered homeless in clashes between herders and farmers.[23] Based on the oral information gotten from a farmer Simon Ijir (2018), one of the causes of herders-farmers conflict in Taraba state is Trespass on farmlands. It is alleged that nomadic herdsmen have of recent adopted the habit of allowing their animals to graze freely on farm lands. There are also widespread cases of nomadic herdsmen deliberately allowing their animals to feed on farm produce kept on the farm. In some glaring cases, they even open yam barns, remove yams and roast for their feeding and allow their animals to feed on the rest. Allegations are also widespread about some of the alleged hired militants removing food items and other

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valuables away for their use [24]. Moreover, in another interview conducted with Julapai Yohanna (farmer), (2018) deliberate contamination of drinking water sources by the cattle is also one of the cause of herder-farmers conflicts. There are widespread allegations by farmers of nomadic herdsmen deliberately allowing animals to drink, walk and excrete inside water ponds which are the only sources of drinking water for the communities. They do the same even on earths dams which are constructed through communal efforts. Conflicts have also occurred between herders and farmers over these unwarranted conduct. In some cases, members of the affected communities either catch some cows or out of annoyance kill some thereby resulting into open hostility between the two groups [25]. Synoptically, John Yani (a farmer), (2018) opined that the provocative claims of right over grazing land has been another cause of herders-farmers conflicts. In some cases their claim of right to land has blindfolded them to the extent that they behave as if their right to land has dispossessed other people of both the land and their crops. This behavior has resulted in violent conflicts between the two groups in some places. In some places, the development has led to a situation of cat and dog relationship, which is akin to the proverbial saying of sitting on gun powder which could explode at any time at the slightest provocation.[26] According to Samson Yavini (a farmer), (2018), Sexual assault and other criminal acts by herdsmen have equally resulted in conflicts. Cases of sexual assault, in particular, have been reported in some communities prominent among this was the case in Kurumi Local Government Area where a married woman was raped and eventually murdered by suspected herdsmen. This heinous incident instigated reaction from members of the community which resulted in to loss of lives and destruction of properties worth millions of naira. Similar cases have been reported in other parts the state like Wukari, Takum, Ussa, and Ibi Local Government Areas. It is argued that these criminal conduct by the heavily armed herdsmen is also not only to intimidate the communities in order to create fear unto the communities but also to arrogate to themselves the freedom to

305 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies graze on farm land and, even, crops unmolested. Unfortunately, their agenda has succeeded in some part of Taraba State [27]. Socio-economic effects of herders-farmers conflicts in Taraba State Clashes between herdsmen and farmers have been a major cause of increasing violence and general insecurity in Taraba State in particular and Nigeria at large. There has been increasing adverse economic effects and social or relational implications such as; 1.First and foremost, the conflicts have resulted in the loss of lives and properties. In most encounters, lives and properties are mostly lost. According to a report by Tonah, for instance, on the 10th and 11th of April, 2016, clashes between herders and farmers in Taraba State claimed seven lives, while 73 lives were reportedly lost on the 5th July,2017. The account further stated that 43 people were killed in Lau following herders' onslaught on communities on the 12th July, 2018. The Vanguard Newspaper reported the killing of 3 police men and many members of the community in an onslaught on the Busum settlement in Lau Local Government1 Area on the 6th September, 2018. It generally argued that Taraba State has recorded more than 2000 deaths, and over 350 communities have been displaced and are now living in IDP camps.[28] 2. Displacement of communities and destruction of crops and properties worth millions of naira. This has not only created an impediment to the survival of the host communities but has forced many farmers to abandon farming for lesser occupations like (commercial cycling) and other artisan works. Very worrisomely, many of the displaced young people who have been dislocated from their legitimate sources of livelihood have taken to criminal activities and prostitution, as source of livelihood. Generally, this has, no doubt, endangered the victims of the conflicts.[29] 3. Rampant cases of reprisal attacks in some parts of the state and the country in general. This is largely the

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consequence of the inability of the security agencies to control the excesses of the rampaging herdsmen as well as the most aggrieved members of the farming communities. Generally, the phenomenon has thrown the society into the atmosphere of unprecedented insecurity, hatred, distrust and lack of confidence between the herders and the farming communities. 4. Emergence of a vicious cycle of poverty. The unprecedented conflicts have not only ushered in a prolonged phenomenon of poverty among the farming communities, but also among the indigenous herders, many of whom have been displaced or compelled to relocate to new unfriendly areas. While great chunks of the farming communities are dislocated from their sources of livelihood, many herders have had their cows either killed or subjected to activities of cattle rustlers. Generally, members of both groups can no longer be fully engaged in their economic activities as hitherto thereby reducing their income and savings and general out put both in terms of crops and livestock. 5. It has been observed that the violent disposition of the Fulani herdsmen has given rise to anti-Fulani sentiment in some parts of the country, and has also continued to instill hatred against them. Some persons have cited a Fulani expansionist agenda as being behind these attacks. There are allegations by MAFO Movement against Fulani Occupation of possible collusion between wealthy indigenous cattle owners and the armed herders, many of whom are believed to be hired terrorists from neighboring countries like Niger, Chad and Libya. 6. Stagnation of academic activities in the affected areas. While many schools, in the worst affected areas have been closed down, even in those areas not close down, parents fear to send their children and wards to schools for the fear of sudden attacks. Similarly, some schools are being used as internally displaced people's camp (IDPs) thereby halting educational activities in such schools. This has 307 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies

both short and long term effects on the children and the society in general 7. Discouragement of investors from coming into Taraba state and to other affected areas for investment. It is obvious that no investor will want to invest where his or her investment will be at risk. 8. Forceful occupation of ancestral lands belonging to the farming communities by the herders. This has created psychological torture to the communities. However, even invading herders are scared to graze freely due to fear of being attacked. Similarly, they no longer come in company of their wives and children thereby resulting in the partial dislocation of their family life.[30] This has denied them of the free services the used to enjoy from their wives, children, wards and other individuals. Recommendations 1. Government should establish grazing fields and outlaw- open grazing of cattle. This should be done through due consultation, dialogue or appeals to some aggrieved regions of the country which may oppose or resist the move. 2. Nomadic education should be intensified to properly position nomadic cattle herders to see the need for peaceful co-existence with their host communities. 3. Herdsmen should be properly educated or re-oriented on the sanctity of human lives, and taught how to use better channels of communication and negotiation to convey their grievances than resorting to conflicts or violence. 4. Proactive measures should be taken not only to settle the Fulani nomads and also have the programs sustained, it is also necessary to provide farmers with other farming tools and incentives to uplift them from the traditional subsistence farming to modern mechanized farming practice in order to reduce environmental degradation. This is necessary, in the case of the farmers, due to the degraded nature of the soil and the low yielding crops being used. This will enhance high output even in 308 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies relatively smaller pieces of land. 5. There is also the need to develop and strengthen institutions engaged in preventing and resolving conflicts and assisting those displaced by conflicts to avoid the fire brigade approach to conflict prevention and resolution as it has been the case in Taraba State and Nigeria at large. Conclusion The recurrent clashes between herdsmen and sedentary farmers in Nigeria has portrayed a conflict of interest over resource acquisition or control. This is exacerbated by the climatic change that has continued to force the herdsmen out of their northern abode to the southern region in search of pasture and fresh water. Reactions and counter –reactions arising from this phenomenon have been responsible for the prevalent and persistent conflicts between farmers and herders. Needless to even say that the crises have claimed thousands of lives with properties worth billions of naira either destroyed or looted, in addition to the displacement of thousands of farming communities from their ancestral farm lands. Some herders have also been killed and with many losing their cattle as well as displaced. Considering the impact of the incessant crises between farmers and herdsmen on the lives of the two groups, and the inability of the current measures to check the crises, there is need to enact a law prohibiting pastoral nomadism and providing for privately owned cattle ranches, where basic facilities for raising cattle will be provided. Under this arrangement, herdsmen will negotiate for and acquire land privately just as it is the case with any other occupational group, instead of using government machineries to acquire grazing reserves where by Fulani herdsmen will be seemingly given undue advantage over other occupational groups. This, it is hoped, will permanently put an end of the incessant crises arising from conflicting demands for croplands by farmers and traditional pasture for livestock grazing by herdsmen.

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References

1. M o n i t o r i n g c e n t e r, N o r w e g i a n r e f u g e e . www.internaldisplacement.org. retrieved on 03/09/2018 2. M o n i t o r i n g c e n t e r, N o r w e g i a n r e f u g e e . www.internaldisplacement.org. retrieved on 03/09/2018 3. Igna, I. G (2011) Liability for Damages caused by Domestic Animals in Rural Areas of Nigeria. http//dspace.unijosedu.ng/bitstream/10485/632/1.Retri ved on 3/9/2018. 4. Internal Displacement monitoring centre (2008) unresolved conflicts cause ongoing Displacement situations, 12 Dec 2008 internal Displacement. 5. Ofuoku, A.U. and Isife, B.I 2010: causes, effects and Resolution of farmer—Nomadic cattle Herders conflict in Delta state, Nigeria. Agricultural Tropica E.T Subtropica Vol 43(1)2010 6. Patrick Iukase, Sylvester I. Ugbegili, Tyoshin in historical perspective Volume 1 7. Tropical is issues in the study of early history of some Ethnic group and the Mambilla Plateau in Taraba state. 8. Patrick Iukase, Sylvester I. Ugbegili, Tyoshin in historical perspective Volume 1 9. Patrick .I. Ukase, Syvester.I. Ugbegili Tyoshin in historical perspective Volume 1 10. Ardo Husaine Oral interview 24/09/2018 11. constitution of federal Republic of Nigeria section 41 and 42 12. The guardian Nigerian newspaper Saturday Magazine by Chares Akpesi Jalingo. 16/4/2016 5:56am. Retrieved on the 26/9/2018. 13. Abbass, I.M (2012) No retreat No surrender: conflict for survival between Fulani pastoralist and farmers in Northern Nigeria. European scientific Journal Vol.8 No. 1, pp 331-346. 14. Leadership newspaper May 17 2011 retrieved 29/9/2018 15. Blench, R. (2004) Natural Resource conflicts North-central

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Nigeria: A hand book and case studies CLE St. Lves pp 1: 164. 16. Abass, I.M. (2009) No Retreat No surrender conflict for survival between Fulani cattle herders and farmers in Northern Nigeria, in European scientific Journal, 8(1), 17. Tonah, S. (2006) Managing farmer-Herder conflicts in Ghana and Volta Basin, Ibadan Journal of social sciences 4 (1) 33-45. 18. Abubakar, M.B (2012) sociological Assesment of Nomadic pastoralist and sedentary farmers conflicts in Katsina state. An unpublished M.SC thesis submitted to sociology Department Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria 19. Abass, I.M. (2009) No Retreat No surrender conflict for survival between Fulani cattle herders and farmers in Northern Nigeria, in European scientific Journal, 8(1), 20. Hoffman, I., Umar, B.F and Turkur, H.M (2008) crisis and cooperation over control and management of Zamfara Reserve, Nigeria. In Gefu, J.O. Clement, B.I.A and Maidamari, B. (Eds) the Future of transhumance pastoralism in West and Central Africa. Strategies, dynamics, conflicts and interventions. Shika-Zaira. http:/w.w.w.katsinastate.gov.org. 21. Centre for peace, Diplomatic and Development studies (CPDDS), unimaid (2012) Nigeria stability and Reconciliation programme “watching us Die on CNN”. Report on the study of community level conflict management mechanisms in the Niger Delta, middle Belt and North East Zones of Nigeria: Analytical report Abuja Vol.1 pp 69-84 http//w.w.w.nsrp- nigeria.org/wpcontend/upload2013/11/ccmm-Vol-1 Reports 6.12.12 pdf. 22. Ijir S. (2018) interviewed November, 2018. A Farmer Aged (58) from Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State (unpublished). 23. Yohanna J. (2018). Interviewed October, 2018. A Farmer Aged (75) from Lau Local Government Area of Taraba State (unpublished). 24. Yani J., (2018) interviewed December, 2018. A Farmer Aged

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(60) from Ardo-Kola Local Government Area of Taraba State (unpublished). 25. Yavini S. (2018) interviewed October, 2018. A Farmer Aged (55) from Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State (unpublished). 26. Ofuoku, A.U. and Isife, B.I. (2009) causes, Effects and Resolution of farmers-Nomadic cattle Herders conflicts in Delta state, Nigeria: in international Journal of sociology and Anthropoly 1 (2): 49 27. Patrick .I. Ukase, Sylvester.I. Ugbegili: Tyoshin in historical perspective volume 1 pg 78 28. Tonah, S. (2006) managing farmer-Herder conflict in Ghana and Volta Basin. Ibadan Journal of social sciences 4 (1). http:w.w.w.pdf 29. Allyui AS (2015) causes and resolution of conflict between cattle herders and crop farmers in Kastina school. A published M.SC Dissertation by the school of post graduate studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaira pp 24 30. Patrick I. Ukase, Sylvester.I. Ugbegili: Tysohin in historical perspective Vol (1)

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Impact Assessment of the United States War on Terror in Afghanistan

Julius Ngomba Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Social Science Taraba State University, Jalingo. Nigeria E-mail address: [email protected] & Angela Ajodo-Adebanjoko, PhD Department of Political Science, Federal University Lafia, Nasarawa State E-mail address: [email protected]

Abstract The United States efforts in the war against terrorism have been substantial and sustained, with more than four trillion dollars spent, two and a half million military personnel sent into harm's way, and nearly 7,000 service members losing their lives over the past fifteen years. Despite this, few studies have sought to measure the effectiveness of those efforts. This paper attempts to measure the US government's effectiveness in achieving its stated objectives. It focuses on US efforts outside the homeland, rather than on domestic efforts in her fight against terrorism in Afghanistan to protect against terrorist attacks. United States efforts in the war on terror have been associated with a worsening of the situation, a fact which may be a function of US policies unwittingly making terrorism than insurgency more fea- sible by creating power vacuums after invading and failing to assure a monopoly on the use of force. Additionally, US policies likely increased grievances that fueled terror recruiting by deploying hundreds of thousands of military personnel into Muslim-majority states and upending political power relationships. This paper concludes that US efforts in the war on terrorism have been largely ineffective .It therefore recommends that US Defense policy should focus on capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to support homeland security efforts. Keywords: Afghanistan, Insurgency, Terrorism, War, Counter-terrorism Introduction The U.S.-led war on terrorism was the defining feature of George W. Bush's presidency and is likely to remain, directly or indirectly, one of the central issues facing American grand strategy in Asia and beyond

313 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies for, at least, this decade, if not longer. The United States did not seek this war. Rather, it was thrust upon an administration that, like its predecessors, came into office planning to manage more conventional problems of international politics. When George W. Bush became the 43rd president after a tightly contested election, he presided over a country that, having emerged triumphant from almost 50 years of the Cold War, hoped to enjoy a long period of tranquil security. Its principal adversary, the Soviet Union, had disappeared, and the Warsaw Pact, which had posed such a formidable military threat to the United States and its allies were also no more. By and large, this state of affairs was judged to be both propitious and desirable. Although some analysts expressed skepticism about the stability of this new post-Cold War order, most viewed this “unipolar moment” as offering the United States an unprecedented opportunity to create a durable peace that would provide order and stability globally, while permitting its citizens to enjoy the “peace dividend” that could only be dreamt about during their struggle with the Soviet Union (Charles, K, 1990). Afghanistan is one of the countries where the US war on terrorism has been prolonged. Beginning from the attack on the World Trade Centre since 9/11, more forces have been deployed against terrorism. However, more Americans have been killed by terrorist acts since September (2011) than before while still a very small number, the number of Islamist-inspired terror attacks in the homeland has also increased. Additionally, al-Qaeda and terror groups of global reach such as Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) have not been defeated and destroyed. It is for this reason that this study

314 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies assesses the US war on terrorism with a focus on Afghanistan.

US Objectives for the War on Terrorism America's stated objectives have remained consistent over time. As outlined in various strategy documents published by the White House, they include protecting Americans, preventing terror attacks, defeating specific terror groups, and diminishing the conditions that fuel terrorism through promoting democracy. Less than two weeks after the attacks of September (2011), President Bush articulated the defeat of al-Qaeda and all terrorist groups with global reach as a US goal. President Obama echoed that objective and added the Islamic State to the list. Both administrations pursued a broad objective of preventing terror attacks worldwide and a narrower one of protecting Americans and the homeland. Both administrations also sought the additional goals of diminishing the underlying conditions that facilitate terrorism by promoting democracy (The White House, 2011).

Causes of and factors associated with terrorism Terrorism is a political violence that targets civilians deliberately and indiscriminately and a shadowy world of faceless enemies with irregular tactics marked by extreme brutality and bestiality (Goldstein and Pevehouse , 2012; Magstadt , 2011). A United Nations Security Council report (2004) defines terrorism as any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non- combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.'

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The causes of terrorism and the factors associated with it are complex, varied, and often contested. Scholars a are unanimous in their views that terrorism is a the result of an overlap of concurring and mutually reinforcing factors which manifest in different forms depending on the individual and context (Roy 2003; Bakker 2006 ; Saggar 2006 ; Silke, 2008). There is a consensus that grievance, ideology, mobilisation and tipping points are ingredients in the radicalisation process. Whereas grievance is understood to be the sense of alienation or disenchantment that provides a cognitive opening, ideology entails the extreme set of ideas that provides the individual with a new outlook and explanation for the world an individual finds him or herself while mobilisation captures the process by which the individual is slowly integrated into a community of individuals who are like-minded and create a self- reinforcing community, and finally tipping points are the specific events that push an individual or group from rhetoric to action (Ajodo-Adebanjoko , Ojua, . and Okorie, 2017). Typically, terrorists seek to change the status quo or preserve something they value highly, and they are willing to employ violence to achieve those aims. Walter (1998) describes terrorists as rational actors making rational choices. Crenshaw (2011) further refines the terrorist-as-rational-actor literature by asserting that a collective rationality exists at the group level, which addresses the free rider problem otherwise present when the unit of measure is the individu- al. Bruce Hoffman makes similar points with a splash of provocative language (e.g., terrorist as “altruist” and “intellectual”) to highlight that terrorists typically have an underlying logic and they are not

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necessarily self-serving. Crenshaw concludes that the most common characteristic among terrorists is their normality. The scholarly research does not support the popular claim that terrorists suffer from a mental illness or other pathology (Walter, 1998; Crenshaw, 2011). The causes of terrorism are unresolved, and the factors associated with it are often contested. For causes, the desire to correct a perceived grievance is commonly cited. Grievances have frequently resulted from ethnic fractionalization, colonialism, and religious , among others. In addition to perceived grievances, an inability to participate in the political process also plays an important role in motivating people to terrorism. In terms of environmental considerations, Crenshaw suggests a precondition for terrorism is a government that is either unwilling or unable to prevent it. Piazza found that states experiencing failure are likely to experience more terror attacks and to have their citizens conduct more transnational strikes. This feasibility argument—that where the opportunity exists, it will more be likely to occur—has also been used to explain civil war onset (Piazza, 2008; Paul, 2009). The Global War on Terrorism in a Geopolitical Context The new era of peace and prosperity that America sought as a result of the Cold War's denouncement appeared to have materialized, at least on the surface, during the 1990s. Although it became clear, in retrospect, that the most dangerous transnational terrorist group ever to threaten the United States—Al Qaeda—set about organizing itself and developing roots in over 60 countries during this period, neither its activities nor the extent of the threat it posed to American

317 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies security was clearly perceived by the body politic at large. Despite the violent previews of Al Qaeda capabilities provided through the bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, U.S. foreign policy for much of the last decade of the twentieth century focused primarily on managing the humdrum problems of international security such as humanitarian crises, ethnic conflict, minor interstate rivalries, and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict—which, although occasionally onerous, did not threaten American survival. Even the most challenging problems of this epoch seem to comport with this rule. The Desert Storm conflict of 1990– 91, the management of NATO enlargement, and the peacemaking operations in the Balkans, although closely aligned with U.S. grand strategy, did not tax American well-being and security in any fundamental way (Benjamin, 2001). For the most part, the challenges facing U.S. foreign policy at this time seem to revolve around mastering a novel reality: a global order that has survived the most remarkable power transition in modern history—the collapse of a principal pole in the international system without major war. In such circumstances, many policymakers and analysts hoped that the competitive world of realist international politics might somehow have been left behind. Numerous scholarly and popular articles proclaim the obsolescence of major conflict, the transformative potential of international institutions, the promise of cooperative security and global engagement, and the diminishing relevance of alliances for advancing peace and prosperity in this new world order. In such a universe, having a good foreign and strategic policy almost bordered

318 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies on the optional, as even the major challenges of the time—the rise of ethnic conflicts, state failure in peripheral countries, the prospect of major pandemics, the corrosiveness of environmental problems, and minor interstate conflicts—were viewed in the main as not radically undermining what was at last a basically peaceful international system (Philip and Condoleezza, 1995). Although it harbored many, sometimes deep, internal differences, the Bush administration came into office fundamentally suspicious of this liberal vision of global order. Although welcoming the unipolar moment as deeply desirable, it recognized that U.S. preeminence did not entail either an obliteration of competitive international politics or a suspension of “the general law of the dynamics of international relations,” namely, “the uneven growth of power among states”( Robert, 1988). Consequently, Washington could not indulge in excessive self-congratulation for having won the Cold War. Rather, it had to confront the prospect that the unipolar moment represented just another phase in the relentless cycle of rising and falling hegemonies, and that even while American primacy was already becoming a magnet attracting dissatisfied state and non-state actors, the larger processes of economic growth, the diffusion of scientific knowledge, and the spread of dual-use and dedicated military technologies in Asia were creating new power centers like China that could over time challenge the preeminence of the United States. These realities implied that American hegemony, far from being permanent, could turn out to be merely a transient period in the march of history if it were not carefully tended and buttressed as part

319 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies of a conscious grand strategy.

Have US efforts any significant impact on terrorism over the past 15 years? Empirical evidence strongly suggests US efforts have had a significant and negative impact on terrorism over the past 15 years. Increased US efforts are correlated with a worsening of the overall terror situation. Statistical modeling indicates for every additional billion dollars spent and 1,000 American troops sent to fight the war on terror, the number of terror attacks worldwide increased by 19. Furthermore, the model finds up to 80 percent of the variation in the number of worldwide terror attacks since September (9/11) can be explained by just those two variables—US money spent and military Personnel sent to fight the war on terror (Belasco, n.d; the Global Terrorism Database). A broader analysis which examines both the impact of US efforts and other factors thought to affect terrorism, such as gross domestic product, per capita and education levels, also strongly suggests US efforts have had a significant and negative relationship with terrorism. The data show that countries the US invaded had 143 more terror attacks per year than countries the US did not invade. Similarly, countries in which the US conducted drone strikes were home to 395 more terror attacks per year than those where the US did not. Of note, the model's explanatory power was greatest when drone strikes conducted in year one were compared with terror attacks in year three. Other variations were also investigated, such as comparing drone

320 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies strikes and terror attacks in the same year and leading drone strikes by a year, but none yielded results as significant. This may mean US drone strikes are having the unintended effect of inciting more terror attacks. The results were derived from a multiple regression statistical model. The intent was to design a fully specified model that included independent variables frequently used to explain the causes for terrorism, variables designed to capture US efforts in the war on terror (e.g., drone strikes, nations invaded), and variables that proxy for the destabilizing effects frequently observed in heavily traumatized societies. Twenty countries were randomly selected from the universe of countries: 10 from the 51 Muslim-majority states and 10 from non-Muslim-majority states. Certain countries were automatically included because of their relevance to the study. Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen were included because the United States either invaded or conducted drone strikes in each of them. The model includes data from 1994 through 2013. The results from both models strongly suggest US efforts in the war on terrorism have had a significant impact on terrorism worldwide. Potentially, up to 80 percent of the variation in terror attack numbers from 2001 to 2013 can be attributed to how much money the United States spent fighting terrorism and how many military personnel were deployed to fight the war. Unfortunately, the results indicate US efforts have been correlated with a worsening of the terror situation.

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Level of Achievement of the United States' War on Terrorism America's critical and enduring objectives have been the protection of Americans and the homeland, defeating al-Qaeda and other terror groups of global reach, and promoting democracy to diminish the underlying conditions favoring terrorism. A review of the seven national strategy documents related to the war on terrorism strongly suggests protecting Americans and the homeland has been the number one priority. Bush and Obama administrations' strategy documents further indicate that defeating al-Qaeda and other terror groups of global reach has been the second most important objective. Five of the strategies either list it second after protecting the homeland and US citizens or place it first (as a means to protect Americans and the homeland). It is unclear whether promoting democracy was the third most important objective for the US government in the war on terrorism. In the first strategy to combat terrorism promulgated by the Bush administration, diminishing the underlying conditions, which included democracy promotion, was referred to as the “third component” of the strategy. Elsewhere, the promotion of democracy was identified as “the long term solution” in the fight against terrorism and the “best way” to achieve enduring security for America (The White House, 2003). In terms of protecting Americans and the homeland, data from the Global Terrorism Database indicate an average of 65 Americans were killed each year by terrorists for the 12-year period following September (9/11). as compared to 57 annually in the 12 years before September (9/11). In the past 30 years, 2001 notwithstanding, more

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Americans were killed in 2012 than in any other year. Moreover, while the overall number of terror attacks in the United States decreased during the post September (9/11). period, the subset of Islamist-inspired attacks increased. From 1987 to 2000, five Islamist-inspired attacks took place within the homeland, but in an equal period of time since 2001, the number of Islamist-inspired attacks rose to seven. Looking at the war on terrorism more broadly, the indicators worsen. In 2001, some 1,880 terror attacks occurred. By 2014, the number had risen to 16,818. Over the past four decades, the fewest number of terror attacks worldwide occurred in 1998 and that trend continued into the early years of the war on terror. However, 2005 signaled a break out, as terror attacks nearly doubled from the previous year and then continued climbing rapidly. Globally, fatalities caused by terror attacks have increased to unprecedented levels. The average number of deaths rose 72 percent for the 13 year period after September (9/11). as compared to the 13 years prior. In 2014, 43,512 people were reportedly killed by terrorism, a staggering 297 percent increase from the worst year in the pre September (9/11). period which was 1997. Effectiveness in defeating al-Qaeda and other terror groups of global reach has been similarly bleak. In terms of recruitment, terrorist organizations appear to have taken advantage of America's response to September (9/11).. Annual reports from the Department of State and data from the Mapping Militant Organizations at Stanford University indicate there were an estimated 32,200 fighters in Islamist-inspired foreign terrorist organizations in 2000. By 2013,

323 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies that number had more than tripled to more than 110,000. Additionally, the number of Islamist-inspired groups listed by the Department of State as foreign terrorist organizations has likewise increased dramatically. In 2001, there were 13 such groups and by 2013 that number had swelled to 37. The war on terrorism has been associated with a dramatic increase in both the amount of Islamist- inspired terror groups and the number of fighters comprising them. The final area regarding effectiveness has to do with the promo- tion of democracy. Democracy indicators across the 51 Muslim- majority countries have marginally improved since 2001. Data from Freedom House indicate the average political rights and civil liberties scores for Muslim-majority states have improved by 5.7 percent during the war on terror. In the dozen years prior to September (9/11). the average score was 5.25, which improved to 4.96 for the 12 years following the attacks (lower scores are better, with 1 representing “most free” and 7 reflecting “least free”). For Afghanistan and Iraq, the Polity IV Project offers another governance measure. Researchers have assessed Afghanistan as “moderately fragmented” ever since 2001, which is defined as 10 to 25 percent of the country being ruled by authorities unconnected to the central government. However, their assessment of Iraq has changed rather dramatically. In the decade prior to the US invasion, Iraq was assessed as extremely autocratic. Beginning in 2003 and holding for the next six years, the assessment was “seriously fragmented,” defined as between 25 and 50 percent of the country being ruled by authorities that were not connected to the central government. From 2010 to 2013, however, Iraq was listed as slightly

324 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies democratic. The data indicate Muslim-majority countries are modestly freer now than they were prior to the war on terrorism and a degree of democracy has taken hold in Iraq. A reduction, even possibly a cessation, of American military operations in Muslim-majority countries could help stabilize and, over time, diminish the terror situation by eroding the narrative that Islam is under attack from the West. If the United States reduces or ceases military operations in countries such as Syria and Iraq, stabilization might result as terror recruiting efforts become strained. Both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri have highlighted the narrative power of US military presence. For example, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, Bin Laden criticized Saudi requests for American protection as a humiliation to the Muslim community. In 2005, Zawahiri reminded Abu Musab al Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, that public support would only continue if he fought an “outside occupying enemy, especially if the enemy is firstly Jewish, and secondly American”

(Ayman, 2005).The message has been consistent and effective: Islam is under attack from the infidel Americans and the West. The US invasion of two Muslim-majority nations and execution of military operations in another five feeds that narrative, particularly as the mili- tary forces of neighboring Muslim countries remain on the sidelines. Additionally, the United States should reduce military operations because, as presidents Bush, Obama and Trump have noted, the problems ultimately require political solutions which must be led by those directly involved, not outsiders. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans provided herculean levels of assistance for more than a

325 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies decade, but as the current situation suggests, the will of host governments continues to falter. Moreover, neighboring states in the region continue to be only fractionally involved despite being better positioned to provide assistance (Jim, Kevin and Josh, 2014).

Conclusion The paper suggests US efforts in the war on terrorism have been largely ineffective in achieving the stated objectives. More Americans have been killed by terrorist acts since September (9/11). than before. While still a very small number, the number of Islamist- inspired terrorist attacks in the homeland has also increased. Additionally, al-Qaeda and terror groups of global reach have not been defeated and destroyed. Rather, the number of such organizations and fighters supporting them has risen substantially since 2001. However, efforts to democratize Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader region have achieved a modest degree of success. Freedom, as measured by civil liberties and political rights, has improved marginally, and Iraq is more democratic today than it was before the US invaded her.

Recommendations i. Policy-makers should substantially curtail America's offen- sive military operations. Instead, US Defense policy should focus on capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to support homeland security efforts. ii. Additional research is needed regarding the effectiveness of US efforts in the war on terrorism to augment the few quantitative studies that have been done. Other areas for

326 Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Studies future research include measuring the efficiency of American efforts and incorporating American values as a variable for investigation.

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