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THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN INTERNAL

CONFLICT: THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN SECURITY IN NIGERIA

Jennifer Douglas Abubakar

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy

International Relations

Chair:

Randolph Persaud, Ph.D

Peter Lewis, Ph.D

atriek Jackson, Ph.D AJ,'A (a J Dean of the School of International Service T f f ) ^ '2tr?7 Date / 2007 American University Washington, D.C. 20016 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY n in

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Jennifer Douglas Abubakar

2007

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN CIVIL

CONFLICT: THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN SECURITY IN NIGERIA

Jennifer Douglas Abubakar

ABSTRACT

At the end of the Cold War, a surplus of small arms and light weapons

exacerbated civil unrest throughout the Third World. West Africa has been particularly

susceptible to this unfortunate situation. This research applied a human-interest approach

in analyzing small-arms proliferation by examining perceived threats to human security

rather than focusing on state security. The study was conducted within the most populous

West African country of Nigeria with concentration on the religious, subcultural, and

modernization issues facing the country. The uneven distribution of power and

disenfranchisement of specific ethnic groups that fuel the sense of insecurity and civil

strife are a collective focus of the investigation.

This study examines the effects of demand-side dynamics upon militarization in

civil conflict. The relatively new nature of the approach and dearth of related literature

are also discussed. Data for the case studies were collected using the following three

techniques: (1) initial field interviews with key informants, (2) detailed interviews

conducted in both a structured and unstructured manner through focus-group discussions,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and (3) field visits to conflict zones. Data analysis involved the classification of data into

thematic domains that included the identification of sentinel encounters, episodes or

practices precipitating violent conflict that led to small-arms proliferation, and the

subsequent militarization of conflict.

This study discusses organizations, groups, and subcultures, as well as the

relationships among them that influence conflict. Information relevant to policy making

is presented by providing a groundbreaking, in-depth analysis of internecine conflict

within Nigeria. The findings of this research will provide policy makers with strategic

options for containing the problem of arms proliferation effectively, and

recommendations are made toward concrete measures for reducing its spread within

Nigeria and the balance of West Africa.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research could not have been possible without the help and encouragement

of many people and the invaluable input from friends and scholars. I will also be forever

grateful to my husband and children for their enduring patience and understanding. My

interest in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons stems from the class work

and passionate discussion within the doctoral human-security course taught by Dr.

Randolph Persaud. This study would never have been completed without the urging of

this caring and skilled professor. I owe him a debt of thanks for guiding my initial writing

and the framework for this research. His continued guidance through to completion of the

dissertation was invaluable to me. My focus on the subject was also sharpened by Dr.

Habu Galadimah of the University of Jos, to whom I also owe special thanks. Profound

thanks are extended to my other committee members. Dr. Peter Lewis was instrumental

in the initial formulation of my ideas and in structuring the outcome of the case studies

and overall research. Dr. Patrick Jackson provided valuable guidance on the

methodology. The assistance of these valued academic professionals was crucial to the

completion of this work.

To my friends and colleagues, Dr. Yoku Shaw-Taylor and Dr. Cynthia Ticao,

thank you for the time spent working with me and discussing my ideas, as well as for

your honest and constructive criticism. Dr. Ogoh Alubo and his researchers at the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Jos; Dr. Sunday Ochoche of the

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja; and Dr. Leo Fwa provided

tremendous assistance in obtaining interviews and material. Special thanks are extended

to Nura Rimi and Dr. Adeola Akande who helped me to compile source material.

Appreciation is also expressed to all those who made the fieldwork possible—His

Excellency, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the Former Governor of Baylesa State; His

Excellency, Governor Goodluck Jonathan, and Her Excellency, Mrs. Patience Jonathan;

His Excellency, Governor Joshua Dariye, and her Excellency, Mrs. Valentine Dariye;

Oronto Douglas; and Dimeari Von Kemedi. To his Excellency, the Vice-President of

Nigeria, Atiku Abubakar, a world of gratitude and heartfelt thanks is extended for your

support of this research.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Since the 1990s, increasing attention has been drawn to the proliferation of armed

violence in the internal conflicts of Nigeria. Within the North, Middle Belt, and Niger

Delta regions of the country, the proliferation of small arms among ethnic populations is

serving to increase violent conflict. These groups are not only fighting the central

government, but each other, for control of land and social structures, as well as for

control of resources such as oil. Recent violent activities have become deadly as a result

of the dramatic influx of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The marked

proliferation of such weaponry among the civilian population is causally linked to the

social tension that has transformed into violent armed confrontation.

The acute demand for firearms for use in civil conflict has become common

throughout Nigeria and West Africa in general, where the search for greater security has

intensified. A growing body of evidence indicates that arms demand and a subsequent

diffusion in civil conflict has presented a significant security dilemma. The problem is

heightened by the fact that, during the 1990s, West Africa suffered bloody civil wars,

particularly within countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, which experienced a

major influx of arms into conflict zones. Small arms are now the primary weapons used

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in ethnic, religious, and political feuds; insurgency; and local wars. The civil war that

destabilized Liberia for a decade was fueled by illicit arms proliferation.

Boutwell and Klare (2000) illustrated the impact of small-arms proliferation

within Liberia by documenting observation of the invasion of insurgent leader Charles

Taylor into his country with one hundred civilians solely armed with AK-47s. The aim

was to take control of the mineral and timber resources to gamer enough profit to

purchase additional light weapons. Similar to Liberia, SALW are visible within most

conflict areas of Nigeria. There is troubling evidence that the diffusion of small arms has

become an even greater security issue after contributing to a decade of unrest throughout

the country (“Guns Out of Control” 2007). An unexpected consequence of this

proliferation of arms is found within the Niger Delta region where the taking of hostages,

attacks on oil installations, and fighting among rival militias have become commonplace.

The militia group known as the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta [MEND]

claim that their agitation for a greater share of the oil profits is in the interest of other

impoverished groups within the region. The current trend in the use of arms in such

civilian conflicts highlights the distressing effects of their availability. As Gebre-Wold

and Masson (2002) reported, “Increasingly, individuals and communities and even states

believe and act on the notion that well-being and security needs can only be satisfied

through the acquisition of small arms and light weapons.”

Clearly, the concern over the proliferation of small arms in regional conflict is not

new. Such activity has been linked to violent confrontation among civilian populations

throughout the post-Cold War period. Of greater concern is the marked increase in small-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. arms trade and SALW diffusion into all strata of society, which from a supply-side

perspective, have been primarily attributed to a multitude of interconnected factors

including

1. A general increase in the small arms market—both covert and overt—which is

aided by globalizing processes.

2. The loss of democratic societies as SALW customers with the end of the Cold

War, which created arms surpluses (Latham 1996; Lumpe 2000).

3. The increased supply of SALW to conflict groups (e.g., insurgents and militia

groups) who use arms to negotiate social contracts with the state.

Rather than presenting the traditional supply-side explanations for arms

proliferation, this current research was designed to discover whether the human-security

challenges forming the core of internal or demand-side factors are responsible for the

militarization of Nigerian conflict. The study initially examines the global role of the

arms trade and arms proliferation while outlining the supply dynamics that form the

normative basis for armed violence. Arms supply, in and of itself, provides a powerful

explanation for the global, national, and regional dynamics of violent conflict.

This research subsequently assesses the internal dynamics, or demand-side factors (e.g.,

the actual effects of human insecurity on arms proliferation), that tend to fuel the small-

arms problem. A key issue is the nature of the colonial foundation upon which the

modem Nigerian state is built, as well as effects on the socioeconomic, political, and

religious factors that shape the dynamics of many Nigerian conflicts. Additionally,

demand-side dynamics, which are often neglected within the literature, are used to

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highlight the complexities of SALW proliferation and its relationship to arms-related

conflict.

Importance o f the Demand-Side Perspective

The demand-side perspective is grounded in the knowledge that the illicit SALW

trade that “feeds” armed violence in the post-Cold War period is characterized by

dynamics created by the escalation of “nontraditional” threats to security (Terriff, Croft,

and James 1999). Such threats include aspects of relative deprivation and

marginalization; that is, socioeconomic inequality, the increasing inability of citizens to

meet their basic needs, lack of access to jobs and other income-generating activities,

insufficient political access and repression and competition for limited resources,

environmental threats, and other aspects of nonmilitarized security issues.

Analysts investigating factors driving arms proliferation have suggested that

socioeconomic and political inequalities, as well as the social injustices perceived by

various ethnic groups, emerge as likely motivators. Lewis and Alemika (2004) found

“widespread deprivation and increased pessimism about personal conditions among

Nigerian public” in a 2003 Nigeria survey on public attitudes and attempted reforms”

(viii). Runcinman (1966) conducted a landmark study on social inequality in twentieth-

century England and examined how the constellation of relative deprivation and

inequality and injustice related to societal grievance. Relative deprivation forms a

fundamental aspect of the demand-side dynamics of arms proliferation. In general, “the

demand-side dimension of the small arms problem is concerned with the factors that

prompt people to acquire or possess small arms, either illegally or illicitly” (Muggah and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Batchelor 2002, 35). The demand-side explanation becomes important because

conventional approaches to explaining diffusion do not adequately address new forms of

threat that are nonmilitary in nature.

While the significant role of SALW in social conflict has been acknowledged

within the growing base of literature addressing the demand-side dynamics of availability

of such arms, major weapons systems continue to be dominant on the security-

configuration agenda of most nation states. The U. S. Bureau of Intelligence and

Research (1999) has emphasized that “the growth of arms trafficking has coincided with

a change in the nature of warfare [and civil conflict] in Sub-Saharan Africa” (4). This

point is echoed by Karp (1995) who observed the critical role of weapons in twentieth-

century conflict and discussed the sectarian violence and high number of civil conflicts

attributed to light weapons. Karp called attention to the fact that it is the “trade in small

arms and light weapons that is dramatically shaping the emergence of new states” (17).

Smith (2003) drew a distinction between conventional warfare and the “new wars”

shaped by small-arms proliferation in the following excerpt:

Whereas weapons systems are the technological embodiment of conventional warfare, SALW have now come to be seen as a category of their own. The so- called “new wars” that have shaped the security landscape of the Post-Cold War era relied almost entirely upon controlled and generally illegal or poorly controlled SALW. (20)

Klare (1999b) echoed this view, highlighting the fact that major weapons systems, such

as tanks, heavy artillery, aircraft, and warships, have dominated the study o f international

relations since the 1970s (3). Clearly, the emphasis on major weapons systems is logical,

given that heavy weapons provided strategic deterrence during the hostile Cold War

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. environment that surrounded the ideological power relations and domestic politics of the

great powers. However, with the exception of the 1991 Gulf War and the August 2006

Israel-Lebanon conflict, which included heavy weapons and small arms, armed conflicts

during the post-Cold War period have been fought primarily with SALW rather than

heavy weapons such as tanks, aircraft, missiles, and major artillery ordnance (Boutwell

and Klare 1998).

The demand-side “triggers” have far-reaching implications for an emerging body

of literature focusing on this perspective of arms proliferation. While demand-side

literature has begun to examine the elements of demand that sustain and nourish conflict,

those with this perspective have long recognized the devastating impact of light weapons

and attributed the large number of civilian casualties in armed conflict to the significant

flow of small arms (Burrows 2002; Graduate Institute of International Studies [GIIS]

2001; Klare 1999a). Burrows (2002) reported that “an overwhelming preponderance of

lives lost in conflicts have been those of non-combatants” (35). The GIIS found that the

use of small arms causes 500,000 deaths each year. Of these, 300,000 fatalities are the

result of armed conflict. Klare underscored the significant civilian casualties caused by

armed conflict and noted that “civilians constituted only five percent of the casualties in

World War I, but they constitute about 90 percent of all those killed or wounded in more

recent wars” (18).

Loss of life is not the sole damage caused by armed conflict. Cohen and Deng

(1998) reported that millions of people have been forced from their homes and are

internally displaced as a result of such violence. According to these researchers, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. estimated number of internally displaced people (IDP) within Africa alone is as high as

ten million. Internal displacement leads to humanitarian emergencies and further armed

conflict. Muggah (2006) examined arms proliferation among IDP and found an alarming

increase in arms among refugees, as well as a militarization of conflict within the local

and host communities of those internally displaced.

Views on Proliferation: The Cold War and Post-Cold War

There is a conceptual distinction between supply-side and demand-side

explanations for SALW proliferation during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

During the former, proliferation was rooted in Cold War approaches and hence primarily

focused on supply-side explanations. Factors aiding proliferation include the collapse of

Cold War rivalry, which spurred a surplus of weapons throughout the supply network.

Boutwell, Klare, and Reed (1995) noted that the collapse of the Soviet Union not only

gave rise to ethnic and religious conflicts, but also served as a major contributory factor

in this surplus (11). Laurance (1992) examined the transfer of international arms and

surmised that proliferation occurred insidiously because actors in the international system

paid little attention to systemic changes. This includes the growing importance of

nonstate actors within the weapons trade, notably insurgent groups, separatist

movements, tribal and religious communities, and criminal organizations (Boutwell,

Klare, and Reed 1995, 11). From the perspective of supply-side dynamics, it is the

politics of the international system, which is dependent upon weapons in defending

against externally directed threats, that drives arms proliferation. However, the failure of

the supply side lies in its inability to operate outside the realm of state-to-state transfers

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and distinguish between the availability of, and demand for, weapons. This failure is

primarily due to the limiting role of the state-centric perspective on proliferation that

manifests from the demand factors.

During the post-Cold War era an increase in demand-side explanations emerged

within the scholarly literature, which introduced a multidisciplinary approach to the

debate surrounding the role of demand in armed violence. Klare (1999b) suggested that

the application of demand-side explanations occurred because, during the decade

following the end of the Cold War, sectarian conflicts were “fought largely by insurgents,

militias and paramilitary groups that place heavy emphasis on the use of small arms and

light weapons” (3). Klare observed that there are no formal armies involved in the

majority of these types of social conflict; however, heavy reliance on SALW is frequently

evident. More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, an influx of weapons, such as

Russian AK-471 automatic rifles, into the conflict-prone regions of West Africa has

occurred. This scenario has become a prime contributor to the weaponization of ethnic,

religious, and socioeconomic conflict throughout this region of the Africa, as well as to

the low-level warfare prevalent among civilian populations.

From the perspective of the demand-side, this growing base of literature

recognized the dislocation between supply-side factors and preventive supply-side

measures. It also pointed to the increasing determination of nonstate actors to redress

perceived imbalances appearing to affect human security. Therefore, most existing

studies focused on the demand side draw heavily from the social sciences—

1 This Avtomat Kalashnikov weapon served as the standard Russian assault rifle since the early 1950s and is the most widely distributed weapon of its kind (Hogg and Weeks 2000).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. “psychological, sociological (Runcinman 1966), anthropological, political, [and] public

health material” (Muggah and Brauer 2004,1). Furthermore, this “school of thought”

moved beyond supply-side answers—not to examine the system of production, supply,

and control efforts, but to conduct deeper investigation into the characteristics of the local

communities that caused their people to feel vulnerable enough to obtain arms.

Glatz and Muggah (2006) emphasized the importance of the human-development

literature addressing demand. These researchers noted that development agencies and

nongovernmental organizations were the first to articulate the intrinsic link between

security and development and assert that the combination of security guarantees and

developmental incentives reduce the demand for arms. Additionally, the current study

was based upon assumptions culled from a demand-side perspective applicable to the

Nigerian experience (e.g., democratic transition literature, theories of the state, and

specific views on colonialism and globalization for a broader explanation of arms

diffusion within civilian conflicts).

Definition of Terms

In general, the proliferation or diffusion of arms involves their transfer,

circulation, and trade. Behera (2001) defined proliferation as a “great and rapid increase

in the number of particular weapons in a given area or an increase in the number of

weapons possessed by certain governments or in the number of states possessing a

particular kind of weapons system” (559). Therefore, the term suggests widespread

availability of SALW. Diffusion, according to Behera, refers to “the spread of light

weapons throughout the world and at all levels of society through multiple channels”

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(559). From the perspective of increasing demand, the Behera definition of diffusion

more closely describes the global spread of light weapons through all levels of society.

Diffusion implies the dispersion and recirculation of light weapons to both state and

nonstate actors such as insurgents and militant groups, private armies, criminal

organizations, and common citizens. For purposes of the present study, proliferation is

defined as the movement—both legal and illegal—of SALW within either external or

internal sources. Diffusion is defined in this research as the spread of military weaponry

by individuals and groups who employ such instruments in the performance of their

political agendas and related acts of violence. Therefore, proliferation will be used in

reference to the supply-side dynamics and diffusion to the demand-side dynamics.

No consensus exists surrounding a definition for small arms, and explanations

vary from major weapons to light arms. Although SALW are generally classified as

assault rifles, machines guns, grenade launchers, land mines, and antiaircraft weapons, to

name a few, they represent the most common, and arguably, the most deadly armaments

currently in use. Behera (2001) suggested that small arms are “weapons that can be

carried by an individual or a few individuals and are capable of inflicting severe

casualties and destruction” (558). A variant definition applied by the United Nations

includes knives, clubs, and machetes, while the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS)2 excludes such instruments (Ochoche 2002). The broader definition of

the United Nations (2003) views small arms as “weapons manufactured to military

specifications for use as lethal instruments of war. They are used by all armed forces,

2 This organization is now known as the Africa Union.

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including internal security forces, for inter alia, protection, or self defense, close or short-

range combat, direct or indirect fire and against tanks or aircraft at relatively short

distances” (14). The U. S. Bureau of Political and Military Affairs (2001) defined small

arms as a “variety of lethal instruments, from handguns to man-portable air defense

systems” (1). While the Bureau maintained that no uniform definition of small arms

exists, it emphasized that the term commonly includes “man-portable firearms and

ammunition primarily designed for individual use by military forces” (1).

Stohl and Smith (1999) adhered to the view of the United Nations (1997),

categorizing small weapons into the following three major subdivisions: (1) small arms,

(2) light weapons, and (3) ammunition and explosives. They defined small arms as

“weapons such as revolvers, self-loading pistols, sub-rifles, carbines, assault rifles, and

submachine guns” (3). Light weapons were defined as “heavy machine guns, hand-held

under barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles,

recoilless rifles, portable launchers, and mortars of less than 100 mm caliber” (3). The

category of ammunition and explosives included land mines and cartridges and

antipersonnel and antitank hand grenades (3). Based upon this same categorization, Klare

(1994) posited that SALW present the following four properties rendering them desirable

for use in contemporary armed conflict: (1) inexpensive, (2) portable, (3) a minimum

infrastructure requirement, and (4) easy concealment. National security forces rely

heavily upon light weapons, particularly within areas o f difficult terrain where ground

operations remain necessary. Small arms are also the popular weapons of choice for

nonmilitary conflict actors. For example, had

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. rebel leader Charles Taylor needed to equip his forces with heavier weapons such as artillery, armored cars, and tanks—the weapons conventionally associated with a conquering army—[or he] would have faced crippling logistical obstacles. In comparison, a few boatloads of assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns were simple to transport and provided enough firepower. (Boutwell and Klare 2000,48)

Although the traditional supply-side approach has ignored characteristics

rendering small arms appealing to civilian combatants, it has focused on the sheer volume

and quantities of weapons currently in circulation, as well as the politics and dynamics of

superpower hegemony over conventional weapons transfer. Recent tracking of weapons

transfer has illuminated the SALW trade as a multibillion-dollar industry (GIIS 2001) and

West Africa as a primary market. The rise in global trade and privatization at the end of

the Cold War created a vibrant international market for SALW with an estimated 500 to

550 million arms in circulation worldwide. During 2002, the Small Arms Survey

conducted by GIIS (2002) indicated an increase in global SALW stockpiles of 639,000

million weapons. However, significant debate continues as to whether the total trade in

SALW is increasing (Boutwell and Klare 1998), decreasing (GIIS 2001), or remaining

relatively constant (Forecast International 2000). Regardless of whether cross-border

SALW volumes are decreasing or increasing, “the re-circulation of existing small arms

and light weapons and their longevity suggests that global stockpiles continue to grow”

(GIIS 2001,3).

During 2001, the GIIS reported that the legal trade in SALW was between US$4

billion and US$6 billion.3 One-fifth of that amount (i.e., US $1 billion) is traded on the

3By2002, the GIIS (2002) reported a total value of global arms production, including ammunition, of $7.4 billion.

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“black market” through clandestine exchanges between private dealers who operate

secretly and in violation of the export laws and regulations of their home nation. The U.S.

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1999) reported that close to eight million arms are

in circulation within West Africa and “more than half [are] in the hands of insurgents and

criminals” (11). Weapons in circulation within Nigeria alone were reported by Stohl

(2004) during a U.S congressional human-rights hearing to reach one million. According

to Obasi (2002), this number is more accurately within the three-million range and

approximately 80 percent of these weapons are in the hands of the civilian population. It

is difficult to determine the validity of these figures, not only due to inaccurate reporting,

but also due to the sensitivity surrounding SALW proliferation within this region—both

legal and illegal. Additionally, governmental agencies do not release such information to

the public.

Discrepancies in their number notwithstanding, SALW have become a prime

contributor to persistent violent conflict, and they render such conflict more lethal than

that excluding the use of small arms. Specifically, SALW have been consistently

involved in the high number of civilian deaths and the “humanitarian and refugee crisis

that spill[s] over borders from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea” (U. S. Bureau of

Intelligence and Research 1999, 5). Since the 1980s, the use of SALW within Nigeria has

become more deadly and civilian casualties and displacements more pronounced because

increasing numbers of nonstate groups use military-style weapons to defend their

communities or challenge the state authority.

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Overview of the Study

From 1999 to 2002, Nigeria has experienced more than thirty violent civil clashes

(Ugwodu 2003), and many of these conflicts involved the use of small arms. Although

the argument has been made that the presence of small arms alone does not directly cause

conflict, the ready availability of the weapons encourages warfare as a way to achieve

socioeconomic or political goals (Eavis 1999; Sislin and Pearson 2001). As Sislin and

Pearson clarified, small arms alone are insufficient to “start, escalate, de-escalate or

resolve a conflict”; however, are they now considered socially acceptable tools for

reaching desired goals (4).

The Nigerian small-arms problem presents an interesting paradox. Although

Nigeria has many elements of a failed state with its weak control over peripheral states

within the federation, the country houses a strong central government. However, the

government must contend with violent sectarian conflicts caused by perceptions of

human-security deficits, threats or perceived threat, perceived marginalization, and an

abundant supply of SALW outside the control of state authorities. The present study was

based upon the assumption that weaponization is likely to occur when these factors

intersect. The research employs a case study and historical narrative technique to

examine SALW proliferation within Nigeria.

Chapter 2 of this dissertation presents a discussion of existing literature relevant

to SALW. The historical dimensions and mechanics of the small-arms trade are explored,

and the precolonial and postcolonial weapons trade is discussed via a traditional security

approach involving the supply-side dynamics. The current demand-side motive for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SALW proliferation is subsequently explored along with discussion surrounding current

debates within literature focused on demand-side dynamics. While the success or failure

of governments to control SALW proliferation during civil conflict hinges upon their

ability to control demand-side factors, many governments have failed to grasp the

importance of these factors and continue to use the “guns-and-thugs” model to determine

threats to national security (Bendana 2001). A human-security framework for SALW

proliferation is proposed in chapter 3 of this dissertation. The ability of the human-

security paradigm to explain SALW proliferation is examined to determine how

structures of human insecurity have developed and consolidated, as well as how arms

proliferation supports socioeconomic and political demands.

Significance of the Study and the Research Questions

The importance of small arms in civil conflict justifies the focus on SALW in the

present study. This research illuminates the circular nature of SALW proliferation. That

is, SALW proliferation not only reflects underlying threats to human security, but also

causes and prolongs these threats, which in turn, increases the demand for arms.

Consequently, this study focuses on SALW proliferation rooted in protective efforts

against perceived threats to human security rather than arms acquisition to commit

banditry. Therefore, the research was designed to discover why some conflicts have

failed to militarize. The study is guided by the following research questions:

1. Is the supply of SALW an important predictor of civil conflict?

2. Does marginalization of specific population groups increase both the demand

for arms and militarization of conflicts?

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3. Do perceptions of threats increase the demand for arms?

As noted earlier, demand factors include the availability of, and access to,

weapons; marginalization; and perceptions of related threats. The assumption is that

where a combination of these three factors exists, demand is influenced. The nature of

relative deprivation involves downward pressures on upward social mobility. At the

upper end of society, there exist segments of the population who are improving their

quality of life via higher income, accumulation of private property, and increased

disposable income, which translates to observable shifts in patterns and/or levels of

consumption. The improved quality of life generates a display effect and contributes to

relative deprivation (Runcinman 1966). The concept of deprivation, as explained by

Runcinman, has proved useful in the determination of a causal link between deprivation

and armed conflict.

Providing insight into relative-deprivation theory, Walker and Smith (2002) noted

that “people’s reactions to objective circumstances depend on their subjective

experiences” (1). Taylor (2002) noted that this becomes an important factor in an

examination of inequality translating into grievance (13). In general, relative deprivation

assumes that economic success translates into social and cultural power. A static nature is

present at the lower end of the societal spectrum with regard to upward social mobility.

That is, increases in income are slow and the divide between the rise in nominal income

and real income is great. At the upper end o f the societal spectrum, a resistance to an

upward mobility of those at the lower end is evident. This phenomenon is often referred

to as the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. The perception of this scenario is

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widely believed to have significant consequences leading to civil violence, which in turn,

leads to the pivotal question of threat perception.

Whenever a threat is present, an individual, group, or core value is at risk. The

risk translates to an individual or group feeling threatened by another individual, group,

or process. Consequently, the question of threat perception is directly linked to that of

marginalization and, in particular, relative deprivation, because particular segments of the

society feels marginalized by the economic gains of another segment. Marginalization

can be viewed in terms of perceived absence/obstruction of upward mobility (i.e., relative

deprivation) among competing communities. This could be rooted in exclusionary

politics as in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, or economics, as in the conflicts of the

Niger Delta. Such marginalization could also have social or religious underpinnings, as

observed in the Kano and Kaduna conflicts of the Nigeria North region.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this dissertation present empirical studies focused on

demand-side explanations and the extent to which demand-side factors linked to human

security frame the related conflicts. The empirical evidence indeed reveals a link between

the economic, social, and political dynamics, as well as a link between weapons demand

and availability. The case studies describe conflicts from selected Nigeria zones—the

North, Middle Belt, and South-South regions—and reveal who uses weapons and where,

when, and under what circumstances. The consequences of their use are also described.

Chapter 4 contains case studies from within two Middle Belt conflicts—the

Tiv/Jukun conflict in Taraba State and the Jos conflict in Plateau State. These studies

reveal that Middle Belt conflicts are centered on claims of marginalization based in land

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disputes and political appointments, as well as threats to identity involving civil argument

as to who is indigenous to the land and who is a settler. The individual perceptions of

threat by each group are exemplified in the case study drawn from the Tiv/Jukun conflict.

This is also an aspect of the two case studies drawn lfom conflict within the North region,

which illustrate that differences in religious ideology or perception of threat from the

imposition of Sharia and ethnic differences spurred many of the conflicts within this area.

The case study of the Niger Delta region clearly establishes this casual linkage in a

systematic manner. The South-South case studies describe the Ogoni conflict in Cross

Rivers State and that of Ijaw in Warri, Delta State. They focus on marginalization rooted

in exclusion from the oil economy and environmental insecurities.

The empirical cases studies described in this research portray the various political,

social, regional, and ethnic insecurities that create the demand for SALW and the impact

of human insecurity on conflict. Added to this mix is the availability of weapons financed

by a thriving indigenous arms industry, a black market, and the theft of oil (i.e., “oil

bunkering”). Chapter 8 of this dissertation presents the findings from the six case studies

and a comparative evaluation of conflict patterns. The results are described and reviewed

in light of current knowledge surrounding SALW proliferation. The general findings are

summarized and the implications for relevant policy are discussed.

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

SALW proliferation in general, and within West Africa and Nigeria in particular,

have been the subject of many scholarly publications (Harkavy 1975; Laurance 1992).

Early studies were grounded in perceived notions of the role arms played in the

consolidation of the empire through the two world wars and politics of the Cold War

(Laurance 1992). This fundamental research was crucial to a subsequent understanding of

proliferation within the politics of the international system. It was necessarily biased

toward traditional approaches; in general, the production, increase, and control of

armaments, as well as the political and military dimensions of weapons transfer. Early

literature related to SALW proliferation and the various dimensions of arms proliferation

were dominated by supply-side factors. However, as the noticeable increase in the

proliferation of SALW since 1980 became a fundamental issue for state consolidation

within conflict-prone regions of Africa, the international community and developmental

agencies began to examine the links between the presence of weapons and the lethality of

the conflicts. Aspects of the demand-side dynamics affecting human security also became

a focus of investigation. Muggah and Batchelor (2002) reported,

The development community has started to recognize the effects of small arm violence on human development and a discourse linking armed conflict and development has been developed in key UN reports. UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report adopted a seminal interpretation of security that stretched the military domain. It acknowledged the imperative multi-faceted and human-

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centered security in the daily life of people and the conviction that the search for stability lay in development rather than arms. (13)

The narrow focus of supply-side approaches that generally assume a state-centric

position became too restrictive to explain SALW proliferation and its connection to

human security. Demand-side analysis began to focus on SALW proliferation, with

researchers seeking to attribute weapons proliferation to explanations oriented in human

security. Two common approaches to arms research are exemplified in this review of

related literature. The first approach thematically examines proliferation from the

traditional supply-side perspective usually framed by traditional concepts of supply.

Many of the variables sustaining this supply-side argument can be categorized under the

rubric of traditional security. Supply-side explanations include the history and theory of

light-arms proliferation and the influence of the Cold War, globalization, arms dealers,

and civil war. This type of research generally tends to focus on systemic explanations for

global arms transfers that reflect the history of the arms trade and details surrounding

arms production, suppliers, and sources of supply (Laurance 1992). The supply-side

explanation of arms proliferation within Africa is addressed in the colonial literature in

the context of the process of state formation. This process involved the movement of

arms from the “First World” to Africa in a rigidly controlled manner. Another subset of

supply-side literature frames arms proliferation within the dynamics of the Cold War.

Most related research focuses on supply-side triggers because these factors are easier to

deal with than those of the demand side (Lumpe 2000). However, there is

interdependence between the factors of supply and demand, with subnational, national,

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and international actors working together at all levels to move arms from suppliers to

recipients.

The second approach to arms research examines the shift from the state-centric

views prevalent in the supply-side explanation of proliferation and places individual and

group demands at the center of the factors driving proliferation. This type of research

tends to be demand driven and calls for “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” approaches

to solving arms diffusion. Such study suggests that internal factors are the proximate and

fundamental forces behind SALW demand. Demand-side research tends to be

multidisciplinary and grounded in theory surrounding the state and its relationship to civil

society; democratic transition; colonialism; and aspects of criminology, sociology,

economics and development.

The present study contributes to existing literature because it examines the

demand-side dynamics involved in SALW proliferation and establishes connections

between the demand triggers toward proliferation and human security. Insight into the

patterns of SALW proliferation and the subnational dynamics that account for the spread

of weapons in conflict is also provided. Additionally, this research offers new

information to policy makers and government leaders that could facilitate a reduction in

the number of violent conflicts throughout Nigeria. Most importantly, this work

illustrates that the overemphasis on controlling the arms trade and the related

criminalization, which is a result of emphasizing supply-side factors, will not eliminate

SALW proliferation unless demand-side factors are concurrently addressed.

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This review of scholarly literature has been divided into two thematic domains—

the state-centric traditional approach and the alternative perspective. The supply-side is

influenced by the tenets of realism and steeped in the dynamics of the Cold War in which

the state influences the parameters of weapons transfer. The inclusion of the elements of

sustainable livelihood into security studies necessitated the alternative approach, which is

advocated by international organizations such as the United Nations Development

Program (UNDP) and other developmental organizations that recognize the importance

of human security in arms proliferation. This approach recognizes the importance of the

demand side, which is primarily grounded in state capacity, sustainable livelihoods, and

other internal threats. Those promoting the use of the demand-side approach have

generally moved away from the dominant hegemonic realist paradigm that places

emphasis on the state to concentrate on, a more people-centered approaches.

The Supply-Side Perspective

External Influences

The supply-side approach applied in literature focused on SALW proliferation

basically assumes the existence of a global arms market composed of two separate

factions. First, a formal arms market exists wherein producers sell arms directly to

particular states or to other arms-procurement organizations that sell to particular states or

other arms-procurement organizations that also sell to particular states. The second is an

artificial and often informal market within which SALW are illegally moved via covert

means. With the supply explanations, the market is impacted by the spread of new

technology, supplier driven, and influenced by politics at the global level. Therefore, a

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“common thread” throughout existing literature related to supply-side arms proliferation

is the traditional concept of security revolving around national security.

National security is the absence of threat to the core values of any nation (1952).

Supply-side literature during the Cold War dealt with proliferation from the perspective

of the basic survival, welfare, and protection of the state and discussed nuclear

proliferation and conventional threats to state sovereignty (Boutwell, Klare and Reed

1995; Pierre 1997). Such research tended to discuss national-security agendas in

primarily military terms and described them as strengthening the military capability of

the state in order to counteract threats from external military aggression. Arms transfer

was viewed as the principal instrument used by superpowers to maintain geopolitical

balance.

Arms proliferation within Nigeria came in the form of gifts and direct sales by

superpowers to client states, as well as from allies in the ideological fight for political

control over regions in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa. As a result, key studies

focused on external systemic factors because security was viewed as externally oriented

(Azar and Moon 1984). Blanton (1996) noted that external or exogenous explanations

often view the production or purchase of arms as reaction to external stimuli (e.g., the

Cold War). Cold War arms literature embraced grand strategy and rarely examined

nontraditional issues (i.e., marginalization) that became the subsequent catalyst for the

diffusion in civil conflicts in the post-Cold War period.

The political realists who formed the core of researchers in the area of state-

centric analysis assumed that the key actor involved in the global transfer of arms is the

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state. It is from within this assumption that the supply aspect of small-arms proliferation

can be understood. It was assumed by the realists that states operate in an anarchic

environment and are compelled to purchase arms to defend the interests of the nation

(1952). Many scholars (Blanton 1996; Laurance 1992; Wolfers 1952) assumed that the

security of the state is paramount and its sovereignty sacrosanct. Therefore, global arms

and acquisitions and transfer serve as strategic defense tools to deter what is generally

assumed to be external threats. However, the form and scope of arms transfer changed

over time and, during each governmental phase (i.e., precolonial, colonial, and

postcolonial to post-Cold War), it was shaped by what Held and colleagues (1999)

referred to as “military globalization” (88).

A supply-side examination of the sources involved in SALW proliferation

indicates that many of the arms in circulation are from old stockpiles and involve almost

all types of weapons from the global arms race of the Cold War and post-Cold War

periods. Post-Cold War proliferation was a turning point for the influx of unregulated

arms within West Africa. In the wake of the Cold War, SALW became an embedded

component of the new world order, influencing the nature and outcome of conflicts.

Although there is historical evidence of arms proliferation during the precolonial,

colonial, and postcolonial periods, West Africa, and specifically Nigeria, has a current

problem with SALW proliferation that is more serious than ever experienced within this

region.

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Historical Patterns o f Proliferation within Africa

The supply-side perspective of arms proliferation provides historical evidence of

its existence during the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods. An analysis of

early proliferation during these eras is useful because it appears that arms played a key

role in territorial expansion and commerce, as well as in attempts toward state formation.

European states brought weapons to Africa during the “scramble” for territorial

consolidation. Historically, military power has been crucial to the territorial expansion of

states and civilization in general (Held et al. 1999, 87). The global arms trade and its

impact on national and global military capacities are related to the broader processes of

global conflict and security that define the geopolitical world order. According to Held

and colleagues, it could therefore be conjectured that arms proliferation stimulated the

following three facets of military globalization: “The global reach of the war system

(great power rivalry and conflict), the global arms dynamic (the military production

system and trade in arms), and the expansion of geogovemance of security and military

affairs, such as arms control agreements (89).

Precolonial period. Colonialism was a catalyst for early weapons transfer into the

continent of Africa. As is evident, SALW proliferation during the precolonial period

occurred during the rush by European powers to annex territory within Africa and

consolidate small African city-states. Historical evidence suggests that from 1500 to

1800, the Lower Guinea coast, which is a region within modern-day West Africa,

contained “small communities and city-states or chiefdoms bound together, not by

allegiance to a common sovereign, but by kinship, agnatic and clan ties and linked by

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trade routes” (Boahen 1992,412). During the homogenization of colonial boundaries,

these city-states gradually moved toward consolidation and state formation. Along the

Upper Guinea coast, from Senegal to the lower basins of Guinea, and within the Niger

Delta (i.e., Nigeria and Cameroon), the same patterns of state consolidation were evident.

The concurrent presence of Dutch, Portuguese, Danish, English, and French traders along

the coasts transformed trade relations and expanded interaction among diverse

populations.

State hegemonies were evident during the 1800s. The Karou kingdom emerged

along the Upper Guinea coast, the Asante kingdom appeared along the Lower Guinea

coast, and the Fon Kingdom of Dahomey and the Oyo Kingdom of Yoruba emerged

within the Niger Delta region. During this period of state consolidation and

centralization, trade in slaves replaced trade in commodities such as ivory, gold, maize,

and cassava. This shift to the slave trade had a serious impact on social development

within West Africa. As Alagoa (1992) described,

the communities gained from the [slave] trade at the expense of the normal development of their social, political and moral systems, which were disrupted by the violence involved in procuring slaves.... Mostly raids, kidnapping, wars and general cheapening of human life probably disrupted the economic and social systems of communities .... Villages were destroyed or dispersed, farms were abandoned and people lived in terror. (452)

Radical social change occurred during this period, which included the introduction of

Western education and Christianity, the promotion of literacy, and the spread of Islam. It

was during this period that the use and trade of firearms increased and was directly

related to an increase in internal war and growth in the slave trade.

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Smith (1989) noted that, although small quantities of firearms did reach the West

African interior during the late seventeenth century, arms transfer dramatically increased

to approximately 283,000 guns during the second half of the eighteenth century. He

underscored that “the purchase of firearms by the Africans was largely financed by the

export of slaves” (80). Conversely, Boahen (1992) suggested that the growth in slave

trade along the Guinea coast was a result of the increased use of firearms from the 1650s

onward. Within the Niger Delta, trade between West Africa and Europe increasingly

involved muskets and gunpowder (Barkindo 1992). Firearms became so popular that,

during 1658, the Dutch reported that “only musquets sell well,” and “the natives take the

field with thousands of them [and in] 1660, the Dutch lifted their firearms export ban and

started exporting in quantity” (Boahen 1992,409). Between 1673 and 1704, the Royal

African Company shipped almost 66,000 firearms and more than 9,000 barrels of

gunpowder to West Africa. These transfers, most of which were small arms, were

conducted between agents of European kingdoms, such as the Royal African Company,

and representatives of local kingdoms and states such as the Asante, Fon, and Yoruba.

According to Held and colleagues (1999), attention was drawn to the importance

of arms transfer during this period, suggesting that European rulers realized that such

transfer was a “potentially significant instrument in continental power politics” (107).

Arms transfer within and outside Europe were used to facilitate alliances and the outcome

of battles. Smith (1989) emphasized the importance of weapons to the external policies of

West Africa and noted that “firearms were important too for the internal as well as the

external policies of West African states in the nineteenth century” (83). Compared to the

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work of Smith, as well as that of Boahen (1992), Ekeh (1994) examined the tactical use

of weapons during this period and observed that precolonial-period communities within

the coastal states of southeast Nigeria were able to impose their will over communities

within the Nigerian hinterlands through their control of trade and access to European

firearms. British colonizers supplied firearms to district heads and representatives of the

colonial governments to ensure their policies were implemented within the hinterland.

An important use of weapons in inter-African wars during the precolonial period

was exemplified at “Buguma in the Niger Delta where the Gatling was used in the

Kalabari civil war of 1879-83 and the Ijesa where a Gatling was also used against Ibadan

at Kiriji during the early 1880s” (Smith 1989, 83). During the mid-seventeenth century,

the Dutch exchanged twelve guns for every African slave (Held et al. 1999). By the

eighteenth century, Europe had shipped large quantities of firearms to West Africa and

other parts of the world including India and the Americas. According to Ajayi (1998),

“The importation of guns by African rulers spread widely in the nineteenth century.. . .

As the importation of such guns became more important in war, they also became an

essential feature of commerce, diplomacy and statecraft” (319). Ajayi also noted that

African rulers obtained the “bulk of the supply of their guns initially from North Africa

and later also from the coastal trade of West and East Africa” (319).

Colonial period. The colonization of Africa during the colonial period between

1890 and 1935 was the result of bilateral and international treaties (e.g., the Berlin Act in

1884 and the Anglo-German Treaty of 1885), which divided the African continent among

European countries. European powers colonized the entire continent, with the exception

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of Ethiopia and Liberia. As colonialism became entrenched, weapons also became a

dominant feature of colonial governance. The “process of European conquest and

occupation was clearly irreversible” (Ranger 1985,45) because the Europeans had

superior technology, weapons, and communication systems. The Europeans also

possessed superior knowledge with regard to Africa in general, its interior, and the

capabilities of African kingdoms and societies. The Europeans also possessed

prophylactics in the form of quinine, which rendered malaria less of a threat.

It is generally accepted that the Industrial Revolution supplied Europeans with the

material and financial resources needed to colonize Africa. Additionally, African

kingdoms were not united and were materially and militarily weakened by wars. On the

other hand, the vast size of Africa made it difficult for Europeans to easily colonize the

entire continent. Some kingdoms resisted colonization; for example, the Asante won

many battles against the British before being conquered. World War I also affected

European colonization and consolidation. Africans were recruited to fight in the African

campaigns. According to Crowder (1985), approximately 2.5 million Africans fought in

World War I. By the end of the war, the colonial “landscape” had changed: Germany was

no longer a colonial power, and African efforts to regain independence were effectively

halted. After World War I, colonial consolidation regained momentum and the European

colonizers instituted new social structures based upon western civilization and religion.

Postcolonial/Cold War period. Postcolonial literature focused on arms proliferation

within Africa’s postcolonial structures with the start of the Cold War. Existing studies are

primarily framed from within the dynamics of the Cold War and politics at the

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international level. As the economic and global dynamics changed with decolonization,

newly independent states attempted to forge coherent systems of government, national

identities, and state security. Cold War allegiances were concurrently forming, and

govemment-to-govemment arms transfer increased to Cold War allies or from

governments to guerilla movements seeking to undermine opposing ideological regimes

(e.g., the war in Angola). During this period, more countries entered the global arms trade

(e.g., Israel, Brazil, and China). As trade increased, the largest number of arms was

purchased by developing countries (Held et al. 1999). According to Musah (2001), the

superpowers dumped weapons to support proxy wars within Africa; however, arms

remained tightly regulated.

From the 1970s forward, studies examining arms transfer were greatly influenced

by political tradition (Laurance 1992; Stanley and Pearton 1972). Related literature began

to analyze the diffusion of military capability to the less-developed world (Ra’anan,

Pfaltzgraff, and Kemp 1978), as well as the implications of the structural changes

occurring within the arms trade (Brozska and Ohlson 1987; Ohlson 1988). The work of

Neuman and Harkavy (1979) expounded upon the various aspects of proliferation

dynamics through the examination of bureaucratic politics and economic and other

factors reflecting the nature of politics at the time. Neuman and Harkavy offered

important insight into the bureaucratic politics affecting the arms trade. Harkavy (1975)

argued that arms-transfer behavior is shaped by political variables such as bipolarity,

block structures, and ideology. Other researchers studied external dynamics such as arms

production, the global marketplace, brokers and agents, and arms acquisitions (Blanton

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1996; Boutwell and Klare 2000; Klare 2001; O’Callaghan and Wood 1999; Wood and

Peleman 1999).

Laurance (1992) and Smith (1994) examined the nature of global arms transfer

and control at the systemic and national level. These researchers highlighted the

economic and political aspects of the arms trade. Buzan and Herring (1998) emphasized

the problem within the arms dynamics of the Cold War period, noting that an attempt to

arm by a hostile state will lead to the arming of yet another state. This process was

responsible for the growth of weapons during the Cold War years. The literature implies

that states have the right to acquire arms for strategic defense, and the security of the state

ranks higher in importance than the security of the individual. As Laurance explained,

early related research sought to “connect international relations theory to a concrete

phenomenon that is at the heart of the contemporary state system: the transfer of military

capability for the purpose of securing and developing the national security of sovereign

states” (xiv). Therefore, supply-side literature focused on the problem of nuclear

proliferation and the larger weapons system that dominated the Cold War agenda. The

national security of states was primarily defined by military might in the form of weapons

capability. At the systemic level, arms transfer is generally considered a facet of the

foreign-policy agenda of states and is used to defend a nation from external threats.

Post Cold War. The supply-side literature focused on the post-Cold War era

described arms supply in terms of processes in place during the aftermath of the Cold

War. Some studies detail the decision-making processes of the foreign powers that

controlled arms supplies to the Third World. For example, Hutchful (2000) reported that,

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at the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-led and Soviet-led power blocks withdrew their

support from weak authoritarian regimes across Africa. Researchers examining

democratic transition detailed the impact of this decision. Young (2002) described the

onset of the 1980s when the legitimacy of African governments began to unravel and

civil societies began to demand change. These demands were translated into action by

militant opposition movements (Mbaku and Ihonvbere 2003). In some cases, military

governments were compelled to relinquish control to civilian officials. However, the new

democrats of Africa inherited states with structures that were incapable of

accommodating the demands for participation in national decision making. Faced with

this challenge, “the new democrats tried to use the same undemocratic, exploitative,

violent, corrupt, and insensitive political structures and methods of the past to govern the

new dispensation” (10). In other words, they relied upon shifting patron-client alliances

rather than building broadly based and inclusive politics.

Relying upon indirect rule through patronage systems favoring regional/ethnic

strongmen, the states began to lose their monopoly over public coercion. Given these

circumstances, some states failed and competing factions “stepped into the vacuum”

(Hutchful 2000). As the hegemony of the African state crumbled, rivalry among

warlords, visionaries, adventurers, ethno nationalists, and power interests desiring to

manipulate the vacuum ensued. This served to appropriate and shape new forces, as well

as the nature of the developing geopolitical space. Combined with weapons proliferation

from dissipating wars, the decomposition of the state created new and vicious forms of

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conflict that were depicted by the media and scholars as a descent into barbarism,

anarchy, “orgies of primordial savagery,” and a “retreat from modernity” (217).

The supply-side literature noted that the conclusion of the East-West power

struggle created conditions within which manufacturers of SALW were compelled to

seek new outlets for their accumulated inventories and ongoing production. With

shrinking armies and newer technology producing improved weapons, older arms were

sold or given to proxy clients. According to Hutchful (2000), “The winding down of the

Cold War... empowered internal constituencies within individual African states to

challenge former client regimes in ways unimaginable in the past” (210). Lacking the

backing from Washington and/or Moscow, the already weakened African governments

found their power undercut still further, which in turn, led to the emergence of new

centers of power within their nominal jurisdictions, and backed by firearms.

Illicit Diffusion and Licit Trade

Existing supply-side research provides information related to production and

suppliers, noting the inherent connection between new production and existing stockpiles

of SALW (Boutwell and Klare 2000; Lumpe 2000). However, a United Nations (1999)

report concluded that most SALW used in recent or ongoing conflict are not new. While

some investigators have examined arms production, other research is concerned with

demand-side proliferation that is usually illegally acquired (Gamba 1998; GIIS 2001;

Musah 2001). Throughout the developing world, and most certainly within sub-Saharan

Africa, “a major source of illicitly trafficked arms today is the large stock of light

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weapons that the United States and the Soviet Union supplied to Cold War proxy forces

in the 1980s” (Lumpe 2001,16).

The overwhelming bulk of SALW circulating across West Africa were

manufactured within the West and imported through legitimate channels. However, the

private arms market that has developed during the post-Cold War period has an

“underbelly”; that is, the illegal arms trade that enables dissidents and criminals to

acquire SALW on “gray” or black markets. The mechanics of the cross-border, black-

market SALW trade are labyrinthine and intentionally obscure. Burrows (2002) described

a complex network of interconnection between shipping agents, transporters, corrupt

officials, and secret contacts. He observed that brokers source the small arms, usually

from the accumulated stock in the central and Eastern European states, and supply them

to clients in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Burrows further reported that brokers

“might never see the arms themselves and often work in such a way that a route from the

arms can never be traced to them. Profits are posted in offshore accounts; front

companies are set up and aliases assumed” (93).

Studies examining the role of “gunrunners” found that most such

enterprises are comparatively small operations, composed of a few traffickers dealing in

relatively small amounts of guns and ammunition. However, according to Klare (1997),

“collectively, [they] constitute a global network of suppliers capable of providing

belligerents with vast quantities of basic combat hardware” (43). Placing black-market

arms sales within the broader economics of the arms trade, researchers at the GIIS (2001)

suggested that approximately US$1 billion in SALW are traded on the “black-market,

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that is, through clandestine exchanges by private dealers who operate secretly and in

violation of their home nation’s export laws and regulations” (3). These researchers

further noted that black-market brokers are inordinately nimble with multiple sources of

supply, and they often work in concert with each other or other criminal groups,

particularly those engaged in illegal drug traffic (Klare 1997). The black market is one of

the major sources of SALW within Nigeria, and smuggling remains the main source of

arms diffusion (Agboton-Johnson, Ebo, and Mazal 2004; Birai 1999, 2002; Yakubu

2002). The GIIS (2001) also described an ill-defined gray market involved in

covert arms transfer by government-sponsored entities to insurgent groups and pariah

governments. This gray market is believed to be significantly larger than the wholly

illegal black market.

Research has indicated that recipients of cross-border arms have authorized agents

of sovereign powers, insurgents, militias, and other irregular forces arrayed against the

state or each other, and have organized crime factions extorting protection payments

(Berdal and Malone 2000). Stockpiles of Western-made SALW, including automatic

weapons produced within the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany,

have been reported in the arsenals of state and nonstate forces within West Africa.

However, the black-market transfer of new and surplus SALW to nonstate actors are

primarily from Eastern Europe (e.g., the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia,

and Bulgaria) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, from the Peoples’ Republic of China.

According to Burrows (2002), “There is no doubt that it is the illegal arms market that is

the driving force behind [the] civil conflicts, corruption, crime, and random violence”

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that plagued developing countries during the 1990s (37). Nevertheless, most of the

weapons involved in these armed conflicts were originally manufactured under the

auspices of developed-country governments for legal sale to other governments, or

transfer to nonstate actors through the gray market. It is reasonable to assume that many

of these arms will eventually cascade into black-market conduits (Boutwell and Klare

1998). Additionally, “given the low levels of economic and industrial development on

this part of the continent [i.e., West Africa], most countries . . . do not possess their own

domestic small arms industries” (GIIS 2001,40).

Broad Dimensions and Mechanics o f Supply. During the 1980s, SALW were

produced in five sub-Saharan nations by ten firms. By the end of the 1990s, production

had spread to seven nations and a total of twenty-two firms (Abel 2000). The one major

exception to this pattern is South Africa, which has a well-developed small-arms

industry. More importantly, South Africa is an epicenter of the illicit-weapons trade

throughout the continent. Nigeria, the dominant regional power in West Africa, has a

very small, and now moribund, capacity for manufacturing SALW. Its sole defense-

sector firm was established in 1964 and is owned by the state. Until the mid-2000s, the

firm produced firearms such as rifles, pistols, and ammunition chiefly for the domestic

market (see table 1). However, some of the products manufactured by the firm (see

appendix) reached Liberia and Sierra Leone during closely related civil conflicts during

the mid- and late-1990s (Forecast International 2000). With the restoration of civilian

rule within Nigeria, the firm suffered a sharp reduction in firearms orders from the

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military, security agencies, and police forces. During June 2000, operations halted and all

staff were dismissed (GIIS 2001).

The major producers of all SALW are the same nations responsible for the

production of conventional weapons systems (i.e., Austria, Belgium, China, France,

Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Italy, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, and the United

States). These leading producer nations have ensured that “the small arms industry is the

most widely distributed sector of the global defense industry” (GIIS 2001, 7). The study

conducted by Abel (2000) supported this statement and emphasized the growing number

of arms traders, noting that at least 385 companies in sixty-four countries were producing

small arms during the 1990s, an increase from 196 companies in fifty-two countries

during the 1980s. The greatest increases occurred within Eastern Europe, Africa, and the

Middle East. The United Nations (1999) claimed that, while most SALW are produced in

developed countries, at least seventy nations participate in this sector of the defense

industry. Most recently, the GIIS (2001) published statistics that SALW were being

produced in at least ninety-five countries by no fewer than 600 firms.

According to the trend data presented by Abel (2000), many smaller nations,

particularly within developing areas of the world, have turned to SALW production.

Taken collectively, “the large number of production sites contributes not only to the

expansion of national arsenals, but to the spread of arms within societies via theft,

bribery, and corruption” (Boutwell and Klare 1998, 7). With cutbacks in defense

expenditures, longstanding SALW manufacturers have engaged in outsourcing

production to established subsidiaries and joint ventures in foreign economies that offer

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reduced labor costs (Anthony 1997; Burrows 2002). According to Anthony, “Whereas

arms production used to be a predominantly national activity, the recent trend has been

toward transnational industrial organization” (33), mirroring ongoing globalization trends

at large. Many of the smaller developing nations “have come to view investment in arms

production as the best means available to them under today’s trade and investment rules

for industrial/technology development” (Lumpe 2001,17).

Inadequacy o f Supply Side Explanation. The end of the Cold War brought

dramatic changes to the world security environment. For example, there was a

“disintegration in the supply-side control” by the superpowers, and there was a “subtle

but dangerous shift in the demand of weapons—the commercialization of the demand

side and the ability of non-state actors to not only get these weapons but.. . pay for

them” (Naylor 1997,47, 57). After the Cold War, the concept of security as defense

against military threats from other states no longer explained the conflicts that developed

in regions of Africa and elsewhere. This was because these conflicts were caused by

internally generated threats. According to Ayoob (1984), threats to the national security

of many African states “emanated to a substantial extent from within [their] boundaries,

rather than externally [and] external threats quite often augment the problems of

insecurity that exists within” (43).

The realist approach to SALW proliferation during the post-Cold War period has

paid minimal attention to the role played by nonstate actors (Keohane and Nye 1989). For

example, the national-security approach does not include the brokers and middlemen who

move much of the illicit arms. Consequently, many researchers have begun to address the

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nonstate dimension of proliferation. For example, Sislin and Pearson (2001) examined

the “patterns of armament in ethnic disputes” and the role of nonstate actors and arms in

sectarian conflicts (21). It became apparent that literature focused on SALW proliferation

was biased toward the traditional supply-side approach. However, the concept of security

as defense is no longer adequate to explain threats that are not military in nature.

Proliferation of arms is now viewed more as a commercial activity than as a threat to

national security, and the emphasis of research has shifted from arms for defense to arms

for economic gain. In their study of arms and ethnic conflicts, Sislen and Pearson

concluded that arms “represent in themselves a prevalent and persistent form of currency

and barter in the international economy—that interact with other factors to push a conflict

one direction or the other” (21).

Researchers have found that the arms trade is no longer dominated by arms

companies serving national interests, but rather, by nonstate elements. Anthony (1997)

suggested that “whereas arms production used to be a predominately national activity, the

recent trend has been toward transnational industrial organization” (33). For example,

within the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, where national

militaries were decimated following the end of the Cold War, newly privatized firms

have increased output and shifted from internal to export markets. An unknown, but

presumably significant, proportion of their sales are to private arms brokers working the

global SALW black market. As reported by Klare (1997), “Desperate for hard currency,

many of these East European manufacturers are selling surplus equipment to shady

dealers without their government’s approval or perhaps, with their tacit consent” (52).

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Research that examined substate groups concentrated on arms as weapons of

conflict rather than weapons of defense. The state-centric perspective, which places arms

transfer within the international market wherein states are both the sellers and buyers,

was no longer appropriate for studying subnational arms transfer to nonstate actors.

Therefore, scholars such as Karp (1993) criticized the means by which the traditional

supply-side literature explained arms transfer during the post-Cold War period. Such

studies treated arms transfer as just “another miniature version of the traditional state-to-

state transfers of major weaponry focusing on arming police and gendarmeries,” which

does not adequately explain the post-Cold War scenario (8). Henk (2001) supported Karp

and further argued that the preoccupation with state-to-state arms transfer obscures a

more profound security breech and precludes consideration of important demand-side

triggers in policy formulation. According to Birai (2002), “Supply and proliferation of

small arms is a function of a number of interconnected questions regarding the structure

of the supplier markets and the differences in behavior of various factors in those

markets” (10).

During the 1990s, research began to reflect the changing nature of threats to the

state and the influence of nonstate actors with their increasingly visible role in

intensifying conflict. More and more studies began to look beyond the political and

military assumptions surrounding conventional arms transfer. This was reflected in the

research of Dhanapala and colleagues (1999), Dikshit (1994), Goose and Smyth (1994),

and Lumpe (2000). These studies all examined the destabilizing effect and overall role of

small arms in the intensification of conflict. In other words, they examined proliferation

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from the perspective of its impact on human security. Dikshit noted the dramatic increase

in conflict causalities since 1945, while Goose and Smyth investigated the genocide of

civilians with small arms in Rwanda, noting that this is “what can happen when small

arms and light weapons are sold to a country plagued by ethnic, religious, or nationalist

strife” (86). The collection of essays published by Lumpe illuminated black-market trade

and changing supply- and demand-side patterns.

Conceptualizing the global spread of SALW, Klare (1994) suggested that “global

patterns are largely shaped by the ever-changing exigencies of the world security

environment” (24). Locke (1999) noted that, following the Cold War, there was “a

profound paradigmatic change” (11) in thinking surrounding the nature of war and arms

proliferation. He further reported that “after the Cold War, armed conflicts are more

directly constrained by the economic resources the fighting parties can mobilize locally”

(11). The supply-side approach to SALW proliferation was adequate for explaining arms

transfer during the Cold War; however, it severely limits clarification of the post-Cold

War proliferation. Research using the demand-side approach has suggested other

plausible explanations for the phenomena of proliferation. Musah (2001) reported that,

after the Cold War, the bulk of the weapons was moved by private arms brokers, local

smugglers, and others in accordance with the slack regulation. Bad economics, rather

than political ideology, became the driving force behind proliferation during the post-

Cold War era.

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The Wilderness Phase

The wilderness phase of Nigerian conflict is characterized by increased use of

military to quell conflict and subdue militias. The events of this period demonstrated that

the state no longer held a monopoly in coercive force. It is difficult, however, to

determine whether the use of military force has been effective in stemming the “rising

tide” of Nigerian conflict and attending proliferation. In fact, it appears that the

possession of arms by so many nonmilitary agents has consolidated the process of SALW

diffusion within the country. Globally various accounts of armed conflict during the first

half of 2007 reported that the militias had become proficient in the use of SALW (Klare

1997; Musah 2001). In Nigeria, milita activities have now turned to full-scale insurgency

with militants acquiring new lethal weapons, such as surface to air missile and air

grenades, backed by cohesive high-level military training (Sunny Ofili, personal

interview, 18 January 2007). In addition to exhibiting greater efficiency in the use of

SALW, militias and insurgent groups use the threat of armed conflict as a bargaining chip

to negotiate with the government (Alobi 2002). This scenario has been attributed to

antigovemment sentiments so strong in some communities that a covert attempt to

stockpile SALW is evident in order to use them against the government.

A large proportion of all SALW are held by government agents, the military,

security agencies, and police forces, and virtually all of these arms were obtained through

legitimate channels. Nevertheless, very few governments have published statistics

reporting the number of SALW in their possession, and an even smaller number of

regimes have released estimates on the number of legal weapons in the hands of private

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citizens (GIIS 2001). At the other end of the spectrum, “there are no statistics or

reference works on the scope and magnitude of black-market arms trafficking” (Klare

1997,48). It must be assumed that the major portion of the weapons possessed by

organized groups of nonstate actors (e.g., insurgent groups and warlord factions) were

obtained from black- or grey-market sources (57). Without consistent, verifiable data on

SALW interception and seizure, it is very difficult to determine whether Nigerian

security forces are reducing SALW proliferation.

Records of arms seizure from Nigerian agencies, such as customs and the police,

were inconsistent with facts discovered in the field. During 2002, for example, these

records indicated that the Nigerian Customs Service seized two guns and 5,944 rounds of

ammunition. In contrast, the Human Rights Watch (2003c) reported for the same year

that SALW seized by Nigerian customs during the first six months amounted to N4.3

billion (i.e., US$30 million).

Table 1. Nigerian Police Seizures of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2001-2004

Year Number of Weapons Seized

2001 1,941

2002 3,150

2003 3,541

2004 (January through March) 422

Total 9,054

Source: Salisu Dambatta. 2004. Mopping Up Illegal Weapons. Vanguard 7 (July): 11. http://www.nisat.org/default.asp?page=/search.asp (accessed 19 July 2006).

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There are other cases that illustrate a discrepancy in the data. For example,

Dambatta (2004) documented that the police seized a total of 9,054 weapons during 2001

through the end of March 2004 (see table 1). This huge cache of weapons does not tally

with official customs records, which indicate a seizure of thirty-two weapons and

407,865 rounds of ammunition seized between 1999 to 2005 (see table 2). Williams

(2006) cited official records reporting that a special task force was established by the

Nigerian police that recovered 3,662 arms and 194,259 rounds of ammunition nationwide

between March 2004 and August 2006. He also noted that the number of confiscated

ammunition rounds was relatively larger in 2004 (i.e., 124,582) than the 42,766 in 2005.

Table 3 provides a breakdown of current arms and ammunition seizures by state.

Table 2. Seizures of Arms and Ammunition by the Nigerian Customs Service, 1999-2005

Number of Guns Rounds of Year Seized Ammunition Number of Suspects

1999 2 4,100 9

2000 1,075 -

2001 2 3,002 1

2002 2 5,944 2

2003 14 352,381 13

2004 11 500 2

2005 1 39,966 5

Total 32 407,865 30

Source: Nigerian Customs Service. 2006. Seizures o f Arms and Ammunitions 1999-2005. Abuja, Nigeria: Nigeria Customs Service.

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Table 3. Current Seizures by Zone

Rounds of Zone State SALW Seizures Ammunition

Zone 2 Lagos, Ogun 616 6,161

Zone 3 Gombe, Adamawa, 7 591 Taraba

Zone 5 Edo, Delta, Bayelsa 48 1,052

Zone 6 Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Ebonyi 69 8,430

Zone 7 Niger, Kaduna and Federal Capital 76 9,545

Zone 9 Anambra, Imo, Abia Enugu 52 3,275

Zone 10 Kebbi, Zamfara, Sokoto 3 1,024

Zone 11 Oyo Osun, Ondo 86 -

Note: SALW = Small arms and lights weapons. Source: Rotimi Williams. 2006. Police Recover 3,266 arms. The Punch 10 (September): 1-7.

The secrecy surrounding arms data renders it very difficult to collect accurate

figures related to circulation, weapons seizure, or weapons held by the militia. The

salient characteristic of empirical data on SALW is the paucity of reliable data.

According to the GIIS (2001), “Although it may seem bizarre, more is known about

nuclear warheads, stocks of chemical weapons, and transfers of major conventional

weapons than about small arms” (59). In addition to the reluctance of authorities to

release data on SALW, Nigeria is plagued by a dramatic increase in the number of

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unauthorized firearms manufactured by local blacksmiths. Despite the inconsistencies,

it is possible to estimate through ancedotal evidence that diffusion is occurring in

Nigerian conflicts, and SALW diffusion is a marker for a generalized sense of

marginalization and perceptions of threat. The “new wave” of insurgency and diffusion

has moved Nigeran conflict into the wilderness phase, which portends a level of SALW

proliferation and militancy that does not readily yield to traditional solutions.

Consolidation and Diffusion o f Arms

Legal sources. The legitimate transfer of SALW remains a major avenue of arms

entry into Nigeria. As noted earlier, at one time, Nigeria operated a SALW firm that only

supplied arms to Nigerian armed forces and some neighboring African states. The arms it

produced are an insignificant source of SALW held by the civil population; however, it is

common knowledge that thefts from government armories are a significant source. An

inventory of SALW used by Nigerian armed forces is listed in table 4, and many of these

arms have found their way into the hands of civilians involved in Nigerian violent

conflicts.

Local production. Although various sources of SALW exist, field evidence

indicates significant increase in the use of locally manufactured weapons. Local

blacksmiths became skilled arms producers during the Biafra war and, following this war,

many weapons produced for the conflict were not properly dismantled. They were

considered outdated and were ultimately used as hunting rifles and the firearms used in

traditional ceremonies.

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Table 4. Inventory of Small Arms and Light Weapons Used by the Nigerian Armed Forces

Submachine Antitank Pistols Guns Rifles Machine Guns Mortars Weapons

9 mm 9 mm sterling 5.56 mm 5.56 mm 60 mm 3.5 in RL FN 35 M16A1 AUG/HBAR M20 M20

9 mm SIG 9 mm Beretta 5.56 mm 7.62 mm 81 mm RPG 7

P220 M12 AR70/223 HK21 L16

9 mm 9 mm 5.56 mm FN 7.62 mm 81 mm 84 mm Beretta Franchi LF-57 FNC FN MAG M43 Carl M951 Gustaf 9 mm 5.56 mm 7.62 mm RP-46 89 mm Vz/23, 25 SIG 540 LRAC 9 mm H&K 7.62 mm FN 7.62 mm RPD, MP 5 FAL RPK 9 mm Uzi 7.62 mm G3 12.7 mm DShK 7.62 mm 0.50 calibre steyr Browning SSG69 M2 HB 7.62 mm Beretta BM59

Source: Inventory of Small Arms Used by Nigeria’s Armed Forces. 2005. http://www.dlw.com (accessed 6 June 2005).

In the South East, SALW are produced by blacksmiths within the following areas

(Durueke 2003):

1. Abala in Obioma and Ngwa within Abia State.

2. Akwa, Akwuzu, and Igbo Ukwu within Anambra State.

3. Ezeagu local-govemment area within Enugu State.

4. Umuopara Nguru within the Aboh Mbaise local-govemment area.

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5. Ogbe within the Ahiara Mbaise local-govemment area.

6. Ngor Okpala local-govemment area within Imo State.

According to Bisina (2003), SALW are produced in Bakassi Peninsula, the

Middle Belt region, Lagos, and eastern states such as Anambra. There are also local

blacksmiths that produce SALW within and near Warri. While the locally manufactured

short guns and pistols can be obtained in different regions of the country, there is a

concentration of SALW in areas known for black-market activity4 such as (Durueke

2003).

1. Alaoji (Abia State).

2. Onitsha and Nnewi (Anambra State).

3. Enugu, especially Obiagu and coal camp areas (Enugu State).

4. Etche, Obigbo, Omoku, and Okirika (Rivers State).

The demand for guns has made it profitable to produce local arms. According to Yakubu

(2002), a “double barrel gun is between N50,000 to N65,000 and singles are sold for

between N25,000 and N30,000, with pistols going from between N3,000 to N7,000” (7).

Smuggling. Significant numbers of weapons are smuggled into Nigeria and sold

illegally. Bisina (2003) observed that the bulk of the arms within the Niger Delta are

smuggled from the neighboring West African countries of Sierra Leone, Liberia,

Cameroon, Guinea Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana. These countries have stockpiles of

SALW obtained from the former Soviet Union, the United States, and their allies during

the 1970s and 1980s and used in proxy interstate wars (Musah 2001). Agboton-Johnson,

4 These sites are black market areas for locally made weapons.

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Ebo, and Mazal (2004) suggested, “Trafficking is facilitated by the country’s long and

porous border.... Nigeria shares a 1,500 kilometers land border with the republic of

Chad in the North, about 1,000 with Benin republic in the West, 1,700 with Cameroon in

the East and has about 700 kilometers Atlantic coastline” (21). The key entry points for

illegal SALW are the Idi-roko border in the South West, the Seme border in Ogun, the

port city of Warri in Delta State, and the northeastern border with Niger and Cameroon

(i.e., the states of Adamawa, Bomo, and Yobe).

On the North East axis, surplus weapons from the Chadian war are often

smuggled into Nigeria and used in some of Nigeria’s communal conflicts (Adejo 2002).

According to Adejo,

Chadian rebels of the Toube ethnic group maintain a depot of arms and ammunition in caves around the Tibesti Border region between Niger and Chad. These arms and ammunition are often transported on camels to border towns and villages in Niger republic and Nigeria where they are sold to Nigerians and other prospective buyers. (11)

Okonta and Douglas (2001) alleged that some of the SALW used in Nigerian conflicts

are imported by multinational oil companies and used to equip militia groups and state

police to protect oil rigs. Other channels of arms diffusion are soldiers returning from

peacekeeping duties in neighboring West African countries.

Arms-Control Measures

Nigerian weapons-control measures can be divided into two broad categories—

administrative/structure and legal. The National Committee on SALW, which was

established during 2001, is the organization responsible for the Nigerian

administrative/structure measures (Ochoche 2002). The committee is tasked with

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providing policy guidance; conducting research; and monitoring all aspects of SALW

proliferation, control, circulation, trafficking, and reduction. It has facilitated the

destruction of 1,257 SALW valued at N50 million, and the committee has stopped

issuing SALW licenses to state commissioners of police in an effort to reduce the number

of SALW circulating within Nigeria. Nigeria has strict requirements in place for granting

licences allowing individuals to possess SALW for personal protection. These

requirements include age and economic and employment status. Holders are required to

renew their licences at regular intervals to monitor their use of the SALW. The licences

are issued and regulated by the Nigerian police.

Nigeria has also been active in multilateral and bilateral initiatives to address the

SALW problem. It is a signatory of the ECOWAS Moratorium, which lists a number of

measures to control the influx of arms to member countries (Obasi 2002). This

moratorium stipulates that member states will seek and secure the approval of ECOWAS

before importing SALW. Approval is only given if a member country can prove the

SALW imports are necessary for internal security. Another provision makes it mandatory

for all imported SALW to be marked and registered in a national database. This ensures

that every weapon can be identified and tracked. The moratorium also outlaws the

transfer of SALW to rebel groups.

The National Committee on SALW was established as a result of the ECOWAS

Moratorium, which recommends a national committee as an interim measure to control,

reduce, and manage the trafficking and circulation of SALW. Specifically, Article 5 of

the Code of Conduct of the moratorium calls for a national committee on small arms to

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control the import, manufacture, movement, and use of legitimate SALW (Ochoche

2002). The moratorium establishes guidelines for the registration, detection, and

destruction of all illicit and surplus weapons. It has not produced many positive results

within Nigeria because leaders are unwilling to adhere to its guidelines and regulations.

The major legal instrument enacted by Nigeria for the control and regulation of

production, use, import, and export of SALW is the Firearms Act of 1959, which was

amended in 1966 (Agboton-Johnson, Ebo, and Mazal 2004). This law renders

unauthorized possession and use of firearms an offense. Further legislation subsequently

increased the fine for unlawful possession of firearms from N400 or twelve months

imprisonment to both imprisonment and the fine. The penalty for robbery is also

specified as death, and the penalty for attempted robbery is life imprisonment. Arms-for-

money initiatives have been attempted at the national level and by state governments

within Nigeria. For example, the Plateau State government initiated a buy-back program

following the Jos conflict to encourage conflict actors to turn in weapons. The federal

government also attempted to buy weapons from the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer

Force. While these initiatives were meant to reduce the number of weapons in circulation

and disarm conflict actors, demand-side researchers have argued that it actually

encourages the increase of small arms into the system because conflict actors use the buy

back money to purchase more technologically advanced weapons. This was the case in

theRivers State buy-back initiative.

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The Demand-Side Perspective

The dominance of realist approaches to intemational-relations theory and its

emphasis on the state has been challenged by the new concept of security that has shifted

focus to individual and community threats influenced by human-security deficits. An

increasing amount of research has examined nonstate actors and their influence on the

movement of arms in conflict. Findings indicate that supply-side theories can no longer

explain increased armed conflict. Additionally, the increase in militancy witnessed in

sectarian conflict challenges the supply-side explanations for SALW proliferation. The

end of the Cold War also brought an end to the ideological hold on client states by the

superpowers and the supply of weapons that generally supported the foreign policy

behavior of the great powers.

Two things occurred after the Cold War to dramatically impact SALW

proliferation. First, on a global scale, sectarian conflict and the demand for arms both

increased. The inherent attributes of SALW and their demonstrated effectiveness in the

actual or threatened execution of intrastate force contributed to their increased demand

among nonstate actors of the developing world. When compared to heavy arms (e.g.,

tanks, aircraft, and major ordnance), SALW Eire widely available and comparatively

inexpensive. They are simple (e.g., the AK-47 has only twenty moving parts), durable,

and easily maintained. They are also highly portable and easily concealed. As Hutchful

(2000) described, “Unlike heavy weapons, which require an organized military

formation, light weapons [are] cheap to buy, easy to use and maintain, facilitate a

privatization—indeed individuation of violence, and are thus emblematic of the state of

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social relations par excellence” (224). The second occurrence after the Cold War that

significantly impacted SALW proliferation was the number of government agents who

joined the global illegal-arms market. Supply-side logic argues that supply basically finds

a market and sometimes creates a market for weapons. States sell arms to anyone who

can buy them, including insurgents and militia groups, and the arms tend to flow to

conflict zones because conflict creates and propels the supply market.

In contrast, there was an increase in demand-side explanations that focused on

internally oriented factors because of the growing recognition that supply-side control

measures, such as arms control and disarmament, as well as top-down approaches, had

not halted SALW proliferation. The demand-side perspective tends to focus on the

endogenous factors that influence this demand. Within Nigeria, these factors include

structural problems caused by the postcolonial state and governance processes (Ayoob

1995, Musah 2001), poverty and marginalization (Burrows 2002), and democratic

transition issues (Mustapha 2002). Demand-side analysts recognize that a combination of

threats tends to increase demand for SALW. The growing body of demand-side research

attempts to integrate the different dimensions of demand factors. This is evident in the

definition of demand proposed by Glatz and Muggah (2006), which is an “interplay

between motivations (deep and derived preferences) and means (prices and resources)”

(142).

According to Glatz and Muggah (2006), motivations are “structured according to

deep preferences such as personal security, social and economic security, individual

status; and political identity, representation, and group status” (149). Atwood, Glatz, and

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Muggah (2006) noted that “these deep preferences are unchangeable and also includes

[.sic] elements of personal security and socio-economic security” (10). For example, it is

clear from related literature that post-Cold War proliferation is fueled by economic gains.

This is a core facet of the means side of demand. Glatz and Muggah found that “an

important determinant of small arms demand on the means side is the relative monetary

value of firearms” (152). According to these researchers, the term means “includes both

the monetary and non-monetary resources required to obtain the real and the relative

prices that must be paid for them” (10). This fits the post-Cold War arms focus, which

moved lfom ideological politics to a financial motivation for arms proliferation. This

commercial view of arms proliferation is evident in some African conflicts within which

insurgents fight to obtain resources to procure weapons.

The demand-side explanation focuses less on the system of supply, and more on

the factors that cause the sense of being threatened and the belief that weapons are

necessary for defense. Arms demands, for example, results from a combination of a

number of factors, one of which is security (Glatz and Muggah 2006, 148). Personal

security is the responsibility of the state; however, when states are unable to provide

citizens with security, nonstate actors fill the void. Additionally, the state itself is an

agent of violence, and its militarized prescription for handling conflict has led to

preferences for self-protection against state-sponsored violence. Militia groups involved

in the Tiv/Jukun and Nigeria Delta conflicts have been motivated to arm against what

they viewed as a “predatory” nature of the state (148). In other words, the use of weapons

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from the demand-side perspective is a result of the failure of formal politics and the

weakness of formal bureaucracy with regard to the provision of effective governance.

Some of the described local dynamics, apart from the arms demand derived from

the need for personal security, also include social and economic factors such as resource

disputes that have led to perceptions of relative deprivation by certain segments of the

population. Other motivations that are casual to conflict include, indigene/settler

dynamics, ethnic bias, and identity politics. Identity in Nigeria is key to the acquisition of

wealth, resource mobilization, and political appointment.

Identity Dynamics

As noted earlier, research focused on the demand side of SALW proliferation

“borrows” from the fields of criminology, economics, and even development.

Criminologists, for example, have concluded that “guns intensify violence [and] that a

reduction in demand for firearms can lead to a significant decrease in the intensity of

violence” (Glatz and Muggah 2006, 148). From an economic perspective, Glatz and

Muggah pointed out that “polarization and rent-seeking lead to a particular set of political

and economic motivations, which in turn results in small arms demand” (143). Useful

demand-side explanations have also been supported by McIntyre and Weiss (2003) who

investigated the relationship among small-arms proliferation, youth, and security within

Africa. These researchers concluded “that the inclusion of demand-side measures . . . are

crucial to effective policy-making” (3). They further contended that “current policy

emphasis is narrowly supply oriented, focusing on manufacturers and suppliers at one

end and crisis conflict response on the other. By isolating the debate on both poles, there

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is a failure to see all possible interventions in between” (3). McIntyre and Weiss pointed

out that motivations for arms demand are influenced by “(a) socio-economic exclusion,

(b) livelihood or coping strategy, and (c) exploitation” (3).

The following two observations are noteworthy:

1. There is an interaction between supply- and demand-side explanations.

2. Clearly, the supply-side dynamics constitute a “pull factor” on demand-side

explanations for arms proliferation within Nigeria.

This is reflected in Musah (2001), assertion that demand-side factors can be placed

between intemal-govemance processes and the external influences that shaped the

processes. Lacina (2004) echoed this view by stating, “The local dynamics and interests

are nearly always the key factors in understanding the causes and outcomes of civil

violence; major states generally interpret such conflicts (and decide if, when, and how to

become involved with them) in simple terms of their global security agendas” (191).

Sociocultural Basis

Colonialism is central to the demand-side analysis of SALW proliferation. As

noted earlier, the use of arms was instrumental in the formation of colonial empires, and

demand was geared toward meeting the motivations of building and solidifying empires.

World War I changed the dynamics of demand with weapons used to conduct proxy wars

and preserve state integrity. Concurrently, supply-and-demand dynamics intensified as a

result of the ideological struggle between the West and the Soviet Union. Within Nigeria,

the motivation for, and use of, SALW ultimately depended upon conditions rooted in the

internal development of Nigeria. These factors include the motivations and means that

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serve as “indicators” for demand (Glatz and Muggah 2006,19). This was evident in the

relative threat to political identity, representation, and group status that accompanied

colonial rule. For example, in West Africa, the British brought indirect rule and imposed

bureaucratic/administrative structures based upon preexisting African political systems.

In general, the French had no use for preexisting systems of government and used a direct

system of assimilation. The British system of indirect rule and French system of

assimilation were to later become the basis for confrontation and conflict throughout the

region.

Mbaku and Ihonvbere (2003) noted that colonialism formed the basis of ethnic

contestation as the European colonialists forced “Africans from different ethnic groups,

each with its own culture, language, religions, traditions, customs, and political and

economic systems to come together and form a single political and administrative unit

[i.e., the protectorate of Nigeria]” (1). Nationalist historians of Nigeria emphasized the

centripetal potential embedded by the British by virtue of compelling variant ethnic

groups to live within a single administrative unit (Chazan et al. 1999; Mustapha 2002).

These historians also suggested that the historical legacy of Nigeria (i.e., colonialism)

established several structural divisions that provided the “fault line” for the subsequent

problem of SALW proliferation. Furthermore, Chazan and colleagues (1999) contended

that colonialism imposed new administrative structures that restricted the growth of the

traditional social and political structures necessary to instill conflict-resolution

mechanisms. Additionally, they argued that the governance of many states was too

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immature to deal with civil disobedience and insurrection arising from such structural

division.

Writing from within a colonial perspective, Mustapha (2002) observed that, while

the British amalgamated ethnically distinct territories to create Nigeria, they also divided

the West African colony into the Sudan Province (i.e., northern Nigeria) and the

Maritime Province (i.e., southern Nigeria), and “this duality. . . persists as an enduring

fault-line in Nigerian politics” (157). The martial northern Nigerians (i.e., the

Fulani/Hausa bloc) dominated the military and the commercially oriented southern

Nigerians (i.e., the Yoruba bloc) who, in turn, dominated civilian affairs. The British

deliberately attempted to insulate the predominantly Muslim section of their colony from

external influences, limiting the activities of missionaries and curtailing the provision of

education. As a result, there was “a profound process of uneven development which

tended to generate conflicting interests, conflicts over resources, and even separatist

tendencies” (158).

Mustapha (2002) posited that polarization resulted from the amalgamation of the

western and eastern provinces by the British during 1939. In general, the British retained

direct control over southern Nigeria while governing through the local emirate within

northern Nigeria. By 1946, the British restructured Nigeria into three distinct sections,

each with a dominant ethnic group within its perimeters—(1) the Muslim Hausa-Fulani in

the north, (2) the Christian Igbo in the east, and (3) the religiously mixed Yoruba in the

west. These three divisions remain and, at the time of national independence, the

following three political parties vied for power based upon ethnic identity (Okom 1997):

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(1) the Northern People’s Congress (i.e., the Hausa/Fulani); (2) the National Council of

Nigeria and Cameroon (i.e., the Igbo); and (3) the Action Group (i.e., the Yoruba).

Although these groups operated from within very different agendas, they agreed that

Nigeria must assume a federal form of government. As Mustapha explained,

Nigeria moved toward federalism, not so that erstwhile autonomous units could come together, but because the ethno-regional blocs wanted sufficient “elbow room” for their divergent aspirations and interests. The politics of ethnic differences was central to the party formation process, the nature of party programmes, and the style of political leadership. (160-161)

Unlike nationalist movements within other African nations, “the three ‘different colonies’

produced three ‘different nationalist movements’ with no unifying icon.. . . [As a result]

an unsteady system lurched from one crisis to another between independence in 1960 and

1966 when the military intervened in the political process” (161).

Within the army, a critically important social divide occurred. As described by

Fayemi (2003), “A division of labor emerged in the colonial army in which the bulk of

the rank and file soldiers came from the so-called ‘martial races,’ mostly from northern

minority ethnic groups, while southern ethnic groups dominated the officer corps” (64).

During January 1966, Yoruba and Igbo officers overthrew the civilian administration and

six months later, the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group engineered a countercoup. From that

point forward, members of northern ethnic groups have tended to dominate the military

and, with the establishment of military rule, the Nigerian state. This regional/ethnic

rivalry persists today as a strong factor in intrasocietal conflict.

The 1960s military coups toppled the first wave of postcolonial rulers and were

widely welcomed by beleaguered publics and the international community at large

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(Agbese 2003). However, as Africa’s military rulers confronted security dilemmas, they

built competing state mechanisms—most notably, security forces—that enabled them to

use coercive power to control the state. Additionally, the military often fragmented,

creating factions that fought for the control of resources rather than for control of the

state. Therefore, Ake (1995) attributed the rampant violence across the continent to the

past and present military rulers of Africa, stating,

The military is one of the great tragedies of Africa, for the military is nothing more than a highly specialized apparatus of violence whose salience begins when sociability has become impossible and civilized values no longer apply, when we take to the killing fields. That is why military rule is inherently and inevitably decivilizing. (244)

Democratic Transition

Literature that focused on democratic transition emphasized that military

intervention within the state of Nigeria resulted in the eventual arming of the populace.

As Musah (2001) observed, “The advent of coups d’etat gradually emphasized the

decisive role of weapons as the surest route to power and personal enrichment, and their

proliferation increased with the entry of junior military officers into the political arena”

(4). Musah also reported that, within West Africa alone, six junior-officer coups were

instigated between 1980 and 1986—Ghana in 1979 and 1981, Liberia in 1980, Burkina

Faso in 1983 and 1986, and Gambia in 1984. He noted that the advent of such coups

further exacerbated the diffusion of SALW and introduced arms possession to civilian

youth, radical students, worker leaders, and marginalized groups within the urban

population. They also contributed to increased gun-related civilian casualty rates (Musah

1999,115-119; Musah 2000, 4). In light of this evidence, Musah suggested that “from

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the advent of junior military coups and the diffusion of arms into civil society, the stage

was set for the entry of the civilian warlords and their ill-trained combatants into the

conflict vortex” (4).

During the 1980s, a third wave of democratization unfolded within Africa and

created a new species of militarism, violent conflict, and insecurity. Throughout Africa

and elsewhere, “militarism, coups and military governance—which were the traditional

preoccupation of civil-military relations [were replaced] by new forms of military

politics, privatized violence and armed conflict” (Luckham 2003, 3). Research that

examined arms diffusion found it difficult to account for this new species of militarism,

violent conflict, and insecurity. Agboton-Johnson, Ebo, and Mazal (2004) suggested that

protracted military rule “led to the entrenchment of a militarized national psyche and a

culture of violence” and attributed SALW diffusion to this scenario (3).

As arms moved from state forces during the Cold War period into the possession of

nongovernmental groups at the end of the Cold War (Mandel 1998, 5), analysts began to

examine the subnational, nongovernmental recipients of SALW who constituted a higher

threat to state security than external forces. Among both scholars and policy makers,

general consensus existed with regard to the dangers of small-arms proliferation and with

the perception of the larger problem as defining the parameters of the arms trade

(Hartung 2001), particularly at the subnational level of diffusion.

Globalization

Several factors are responsible for SALW demand at the subnational level. While

supply-side theories suggest that accessibility is a key factor in weapons transfer, some

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researchers highlight factors such as state weakness, globalization, and bureaucracy as

interactive processes creating such demand (Strange 1996; Klare 1997; Muggah 2001).

Global economic structures intensify local or domestic poverty and social malaise. The

availability of arms reinforces and transforms ethnic, political, and socioeconomic

problems into community violence. As a result of the “pressures of sub

nationalism and globalization” (Musah and Fayemi 2000, 16), the demand for, and use

of, SALW has reached epidemic proportions within many, if not most, West African

nations. Klare (1997) delineated the broad contours of the role of globalization in

weapons diffusion by stating,

While it is evident that the bipolar system of the Cold War era has broken down, it is not yet apparent what sort of system will replace it. Nevertheless, some features of the new era are becoming evident. These include: an increased role in world affairs for non-state actors, including separatist groups, multinational corporations, international financial institutions, and non-governmental organizations; the increasing integration of states and societies into the global market economy; the growing diffusion of Western consumer culture; the increased assertion of ethnic, religious, national, and tribal identities; the international spread of advanced technologies; and as a result of these other trends, a relative decline in the power and authority of nation-states. Together, these add up to a world in which power is diffuse and boundaries are porous, and in which non-state actors will increasingly compete with nation-states for control over vital prerogatives and resources. (57)

Researchers such as Hutchful (2000), Muggah (2001), and Strange (1996)

concluded that globalization is intimately associated with the erosion of state control over

patronage, resources, and ideas. Muggah suggested that globalization has promoted and

sustained armed conflicts because

reduction in trade barriers and the massive increase in “freely” traded goods have facilitated smuggling and illicit arms trafficking and overwhelmed state capacities to police their physical and electronic frontiers.. . . Weak states are increasingly

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incapable of restraining sales and leakages of arms surplus and receiving states are less capable of controlling their effects. (71)

In other words, the state lacks the capacity to police all sectors of the population. As

Strange, as well as Muggah, concluded, globalization has aided the diffusion of state

power and encouraged the diffusion of small arms into other societal strata. Globalization

has contributed to armed conflict within West Africa partially because “the global

expansion of markets and trade has taken place in parallel with reduction in state

capacities to maintain regulatory and oversight functions over their borders” (Muggah

2001, 71). Muggah further explained,

Globalization has unleashed intra-state conflict in Africa and West Africa by undermining the capacity of governments to constrain dissident elements within their respective civil societies. As Glatz and Muggah (2006) writes [sfc] “the factors that condition the preferences of non-state actors include relative levels of state legitimacy and the credibility of public security sectors entities. The relative stability of state institutions can also influence the real and relative prices of weaponry, while access of non-state groups to international and domestic revenue (whether legal or illicit) determines the resources available for weapons acquisition.” (147)

Globalization is “part and parcel” of the privatization of state-owned enterprise

and the reduction in heavy regulation; however, “in a world where the state is in retreat,

and public goods are being converted to private gain, it is no surprise that the means of

public coercion are being privatized too” (Luckham 2003, 24). As Musah (2001)

suggested, “The weakening effect of globalization should be seen as exerting only an

exacerbating but subordinate impact on the collapse of internal governance” (4). Musah

also stated that “the internal conflicts that have reared their heads in a big way in Africa

since the 1990s were already fermented in African countries during the Cold War” (4).

However, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist during the 1990s, cross-government

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arms transfer from that region of the world declined, and surplus weapons from Soviet

Union stockpiles increased intemational-arms sales. African leaders battling internal

challenges needed these weapons to quell internal dissent. Reno (1998) noted that the

end of the Cold War shifted the distribution of opportunities to African rulers, whose strengths and vulnerabilities were altered as they responded to these changing external conditions. Cheap weapons gave [African] strongmen new opportunities to arm themselves and to directly challenge vulnerable rulers. (45)

The Rentier State

Given the centripetal tendencies inherent to the Nigerian multiethnic society at the

time of national independence during 1960, the national government was construed as a

unifying force and Nigeria adopted a statist model with a one-party structure (Mbaku and

Ihonvbere 2003). The single-party political system was considered the only structure of

governance capable of promoting the peaceful coexistence of variant population groups

and sustaining economic growth and development. National leaders considered

competitive politics a vehicle for the politicization of ethnic, religious, and other social

cleavages. Consequently, they rejected the ideal of a multiparty system, which appears to

have been a correct decision. Mbaku and Ihonvbere suggested that the growth of

multiparty political competition played a role in exacerbating ethnic conflicts within

Nigeria.

In essence, political pluralism was rejected by Nigerian leaders “in favor of state

expansion and nation building” (Young 2002, 39). However, communal politics persisted

as an alternative and rival to state power, undercutting the government capacity to

provide security. Nigerian leaders leveraged patronage to counteract communal politics.

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The patronage system allowed them to support their constituencies and allies, who were

largely the elites, and also allowed these leaders to maintain control over various ethnic

groups. Instead of benefiting all citizens, governments within Nigeria and other African

states have only benefited a small number of elites who have used the government as a

way to accumulate wealth (Chabal and Daloz 1999). In so doing, leaders succeeded in

alienating a greater proportion of the population and engendered the “prebendal state”—

an arena within which various factions engage in an ongoing struggle to acquire the

“spoils” of office such as revenues from the sale of energy exports (Joseph 1990, 1). In

characterizing post-1983 Nigeria as a prebendal state, Joseph wrote,

Politics ... is fundamentally about the struggle over resources. In some countries the struggle is not focused in a continuous and insistent way on the state itself. Power, status and the major economic goods can often be procured through a variety of paths and from a multiplicity of sources. In Nigeria, however, the state has increasingly become a magnet for all facets of political and economic life, consuming the attention of traders, contractors, builders, farmers, traditional rulers, teachers, as much as that of politicians or politically motivated individuals in the usual senses of these terms. (1)

Ayoob (1995) observed that the patronage system has made it difficult for the

leaders of developing countries to achieve broad popular legitimacy, and many

developing world leaders often curb bureaucratic development in favor of purely

patrimonial systems for the distribution of goods. In other to maintain control, these

leaders rely upon local strongmen and obtain their loyalty via patronage. Van De Walle

(1995) contended that, through this system, a typical African leader “harbors a powerful

domestic constituency for a strong central administration” (2). Unfortunately, the

patronage system typically rewards few people; and many are excluded from the

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economic benefits of government. This situation spurs the accumulation of weapons as

necessary tools for obtaining a share of resources or retaining state power.

Patronage has caused “the progressive embedding of patrimonial practice into the

conduct of public affairs [and] honeycombed the political realm with clientistic networks,

within which ethnicity usually supplied the cementing basis of affinity” (Young 2002,

44). In the case of Nigeria, especially under the rule of the military regime from 1993 to

1998, the political leadership actually inflamed ethnic rivalries (Reno 1998). Soyinka

(1996) recounted numerous instances in which the ruling military government instigated

interethnic rivalry. Supporting the Soyinka observation, Reno also noted that the military

administration deliberately sought to create insecurity as a means of asserting its

superordinate political authority. This approach “effectively destroys civil society,

replacing it with sets of rival ethnic organizations geared toward currying favor with the

regime” (207).

To retain power, the regime unleashed conflict and, in the process, created

increased demand for SALW. Simultaneously, enterprising elements within the Nigerian

military offered assistance to the strongmen of warring ethnic factions, thereby

completing a system of “warlord politics” (Reno 1998, 207). The resultant inequality

(i.e., massive riches on the one hand and millions of poor on the other) and structural

distortion served as a “recipe” for discontent and potential mutiny including arms

diffusion. The climate further weakened the Nigerian state, which in turn, became more

coercive or forceful in its attempts to combat violence. This situation creates an endless

cycle of escalating violence and SALW diffusion (Chazan et al. 1999; Mbaku and

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Ihonvbere 2003; Migdal 1994, 1998; Young 2002). The Odi conflict within Niger Delta

is a classic example. As the state arms to defend itself, average citizens are compelled to

acquire arms to protect themselves. If the argument outlined by Glatz and Muggah

(2006), with regard to polarization and rent seeking leading to a particular set of political

and economic motivations, is indeed the case, the Nigerian problem with regard to

SALW demand is founded on the insecurities engendered by the Rentier state. It is

evident, therefore, that the process of state formation is closely related to motives for the

acquisition of arms.

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CHAPTER 3

HUMAN SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Much is unknown surrounding SALW within Nigeria and elsewhere. What is

known does not fit neatly into a single, cohesive theoretical or conceptual field. Lumpe

(1999) recognized this problem and stated that “there is no big conceptual framework to

tie it all together” (153). The search for a unified conceptual framework within which

analysis of SALW can be considered within the context of insecurities is hindered by the

multiplicity of factors that have influenced the current SALW problem within Nigeria.

This substantive problem is lodged within a constellation of overlapping theoretical

constructs that encompass theories related to the democratic transition of the state,

globalization, and ethnic rivalries, among other factors. The United Nations (1999)

reported, “There is no single cause for these accumulations [of SALW] and their

subsequent transformation into instability and conflict” (16). The variety of causes

identified by Musah (2001) and international technocrats is usefully categorized by the

United Nations under demand and supply factors, although the distinction between these

two major divisions “is not always clear-cut and there are grey areas in between” (6).

A framework of human security, which is sufficiently broad to accommodate

overlapping multidisciplinary theoretical constructs, was adopted in the current research

to explain the process of diffusion among the Nigerian civilian population. Drawing upon

the human-security concept, this discussion is presented on current thinking related to the

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militarization of civil conflict from the demand-side perspective. This chapter links the

demand-side explanations for the human-security factors that form the basis for armed

conflict. The literature review conducted for this research demonstrated that the SALW

problem within Nigeria is informed by internal factors of insecurity inherent to state

formation. Consequently, the legacy of the colonial state, as explored within the review,

becomes a basis for the contestation that has led to the demand for SALW. The human-

security approach enables investigation into questions surrounding armed conflict that are

not as easily problematized within the national-security framework. Therefore, the

application of human security as an analytical approach to examine SALW proliferation

is useful because it encompasses a theoretical framework that is not restrictive. The

approach is also all-encompassing because it can accommodate the widely diverse

elements involved in demand-side dynamics.

While the human-security approach is arguably beset by a lack of focus, the

traditional security concept, which focuses on interstate war, is limited in its ability to

explain the complex interrelationship between proliferation and insecurity. It has failed to

capture the phenomenon of proliferation in its current manifestation (i.e., proliferation as

a result of nonmilitary threat). According to Azar and Moon (1984), this is due to the

“rigid” and “uni-dimensionality” of the sources of threat and the “types of national

security” espoused by the traditional security approach (107). Pettiford and Curley (1999)

supported this general line o f reasoning and claimed that “the conceptual parameters o f

security were limited for a long time by the constricted parameters of the realist tradition”

(5).

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The National Security Paradigm

The inadequacy of the national-security paradigm lies in its inability to capture a

range of nonmilitary threats. As Baldwin (1997) suggested, the

realists have tended to emphasize the anarchic international system rather than domestic affairs in their treatment of security issues [therefore] the close relationship between the traditional security studies and the realist paradigm makes the possibility of incorporating domestic affairs especially difficult. (13)

The realist approach has paid minimal attention to the role played by nonstate actors and

major international processes (Keohane and Nye 1989) such as SALW proliferation

during the post-Cold War period. Buzan (1991) recognized that this narrow view of

security has “become increasingly inappropriate and even counterproductive in light of

the rising density of international systems characterized by the dynamic of

interdependence” (133). Birai (2002) noted that security “has several interlocking

dimensions and levels in relation to an individual or in relation to a nation state” (4). The

political, economic, social, and cultural context and realities of a state affect the

conception and execution of efforts required to guarantee state security. Therefore, “in

today’s world, national security is not just about a threat to attack or invasion by an

enemy state as important as it is, but rather greater concern about internal generation of

sources of threats” (6).

Human security and national security are complementary concepts, and the

traditional security paradigm is explored within the current research alongside the

dimensions of human insecurity within Nigeria (i.e., economic, personal, and political

security). Both of these dimensions, as well as the role of the state in assessing human-

security needs, are evaluated from the perspective of the Rentier state. Additionally, the

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critical link between diffusion and human security within Nigeria is investigated,

outlining human-security deficits that trigger the demand for SALW and their diffusion.

Human security involves protecting individuals from critical and pervasive threats and

situations, developing their strengths, and meeting their needs. It equates to creating

systems that supply people with the building blocks for survival, dignity, and livelihood.

According to the UNDP (1994), it is necessary to meet basic economic, environmental,

political, and physical needs in order to ensure human security. When human security

exists, individuals and societies benefit both socially and economically from constructive

interaction. When human security does not exist, societies are vulnerable to threats, and

these threats, in turn, engender a subsequent demand for arms to redress the insecurity.

Defining Human Security

It is difficult to define human security because of its broad-based outlook. The

theoretical and political perspectives of research typically influence how the term is

defined. Emergence of the concept of human security during the 1990s was inspired by

post-Cold War, nonmilitary threats that increased in the aftermath of the war. States

bought and sold arms to further their political and national interests. The traditional

approach used to explain arms transfer appeared logical in light of Cold War geopolitics;

however, it is now criticized because of its exclusion of nonstate actors and processes.

With emerging nonmilitary threats affecting a larger portion of the globe, scholars and

nongovernmental organizations called for a widening of the term human security to

include these new threats. Scholars known as “wideners” (Buzan 1997; Buzan, Weaver,

and de Wilde 1997; Katzenstein 1996) called for broader research into human security;

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whereas “tighteners” proposed a narrower focus to the study of security. Further, Hyden

(1997) contended that

a growing realization that individual livelihoods and the fate of local communities can no longer be viewed in isolation from national or international structures and processes has given rise to new forms of scholarships in which micro and macro considerations are being combined to provide fresh perspectives and insights on issues previously studied in isolation from each other. (1)

As calls for broader human-security research were extended, McSweeney (1999)

espoused the concept of identity and interests, suggesting that “the emphasis on identity

in postmodern cultural theory reinforced its significance for international scholars” (3).

The McSweeney emphasis on identity is useful to the human-security approach because

the application of this approach goes beyond solely material sources of conflict. As

McSweeney argued,

the central position of the state in literature on security studies, and the dominance of the idealist that “national security” represents an attainable and indispensable goal for the achievement of security [cannot] be sustained in the face of global interdependence on the one hand and the fragmentation of the state into competing ethnic and other institutional allegiances on the other. (4)

Moreover, McSweeny argued that “the narrow, militaristic definition of security is hardly

an adequate basis for understanding the dynamics of this process” (4). Therefore, the

emergence of the concept of human security suggests the growing acceptance of a

broader definition of security than the traditional state-centric focus.

Since 1952, Wolfers has stressed the ambiguous nature of human security, and

indeed, his contention has proven useful (Azar and Moon 1984). In the aftermath of the

Cold War, the concept of security was subject to intense review in light of emerging

threats (Galtung 1982). In some ways, the narrow nature of the national-security

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framework had been recognized since the 1980s. For example, in 1984, Azar and Moon

wrote, “There is still no precise definition [and] there are competing paradigms within the

approach and divergent conclusions on the levels of analysis, sources of threats and

policy prescriptions” (105). This has made security a contested concept (Baldwin 1997;

Black 1962; Buzan 1991) that has generated considerable debate surrounding the form

and scope of the basic concept of security (Baldwin 1997; Booth 1991; Dabelko and

Simmons 1997; Galtung 1982; Job 1992; Kolodziej 1992; Terriff, Croft, and James 1999;

Wolfers 1952). Buzan (1991) argued that “the nature of security defies pursuit of an

agreed definition” (16). Similarly, Morgan (1992) noted that “security is a condition, like

health or status, which defies easy definition and analysis” (466). According to Luckham

(1983) security is a nebulous term. Ochoche and Bashir (1989) noted that the term “has

not been sufficiently operationalized” (201).

Definitions of national security are influenced by the area of expertise of the

respective researchers, the needs and problems of the corresponding country, and the

state of related international relationships. Human security has wide, diverse

connotations. Traditionally, the concept of security is viewed from within the context of

the state and the aspects of external aggression that would affect national interests or

sovereignty. This traditional security orientation placed the state at the center of the

security debate. However, this emphasis does not explain the threats to human security

that appear to promote SALW proliferation within Nigeria. Human security is a notion

that implies the now-famous expression “freedom from want and freedom from fear.”

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The UNDP (1994) listed seven components of human security: (1) economic, (2)

food, (3) health, (4) environmental, (5) personal, (6) community, and (7) political.

According to the UNDP, security has inherent nonmilitary elements that can affect the

security of individuals and substate groups. Basic to this notion is the view that human

security has two parallel elements—(1) security from chronic threat such as diseases,

famine, or physical repression; and (2) security from sudden painful changes in family

life, work, or community. Persaud (2003) suggested that national security has the

following three central features: (1) state-to-state security relations, (2) external threats,

and (3) a stress on military security. He argued that a more comprehensive approach is

needed with equal focus on nonstate actors and processes, domestic threats to the security

of citizens and communities, and nonmilitary sources of threats to individual livelihoods.

Securitization

The debate surrounding security has centered on a determination of its parameters

and the proper objects of security analysis. Booth (1991) argued that people, rather than

states, should be at the center of security concerns, and “individuals are the ultimate

referent” (315). Human security focuses on two key elements of securitization—the who

or what that is secured. According to Dabelko and Simmons (1997), the question of

security centers on two issues:

1. Who or what should be the focus of security? Should it be states, groups based

upon nationality or gender, or individuals? Should one level of analysis be prioritized

over another?

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2. Who or what threatens security? Is it the state and the policies of decision

makers, or are there functional threats created by the sociopolitical environment? What

about nonstate actors such as drug traffickers and transnational criminal organizations?

Dabelko and Simmons also questioned the method through which security should be

provided.

A structural understanding of wealth and marginalization, which is at the center of

the development debate on security, is embedded within related literature (Collier 2000;

Homer-Dixon 1999; Hyden 1997; UNDP 1994). Critics who support this poverty-driven

perspective of human security have established the conditions that give rise to a divided

society. The empirical work of the UNDP is testimony to the manner in which human-

security researchers have outlined the issue. However, a gap is evident within this work,

which is a thorough appreciation of the manner in which poverty/marginalization and

other structural contradictions, such as relative deprivation, actually lead to armed

conflict. Analyzing small-arms proliferation within Nigeria, using the human-security

approach, does raise interesting questions. For example, how does human security

explain the relationship between the three core claims within this dissertation study (i.e.,

access/flow, perceptions of marginalization, and relative threats), and how do the

elements of human security explain the various events that combine to generate demand?

There is a casual relationship between human insecurity and the diffusion of arms in

conflict, and the triggers to such diffusion are inherent to the process of human insecurity.

Marginalization can be viewed in terms of perceived absence/obstruction of

access or relative deprivation among competing communities within a given locality.

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According to Runcinman (1966), relative threats are derived from “peoples attitudes,

aspirations and grievances [that] largely depend on the frame of reference within which

they are conceived” (9). Further he contended that relative threat is derived from a

comparison with the imagined situation of another person or group (11). This could be

political, as in the Middle Belt conflicts; economic, as in the conflict within Niger Delta;

or even social or religious, as in the Kano and Kaduna conflicts within the North.

Therefore, the first step is to answer questions surrounding the nature of a threat, its

sources, and agents, as well as the evidence for these claims. The questions of what and

who is at risk and how they respond to such threats must also be addressed.

It is hypothesized that the link between marginalization and threat perception,

when combined with access to, or flow of, arms, leads to the weaponization of conflict.

The causal relationship between marginalization/threat perception and armed conflict has

been established in a number of scholarly works. Regan (2003) emphasized the

established causal connections between “the pursuits of economic interest [and] the

origins of wars and their persistence” (133). He also observed that the human-security

explanation of the casual relationships among marginalization, threat perception, and

weaponization was supported in research conducted by Ross (2003). According to Regan,

“Ross suggests that separating the casual role of political and economic factors is very

difficult as the two are often empirically inter-related” (133). Regan also noted that “a

range of possible initial causes of conflict arise from natural resources-with grievances

commonly related to the inequitable distribution of resource revenues” (134).

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The nature of threats articulated by the dispossessed might be addressed in

various ways, as noted by the UNDP (1994, 2004) in reports framed in the context of

human security. For most people, a sense of insecurity does not typically manifest from

the traditional security concerns of the state, but from concerns over basic survival and

well-being. Most individuals view security as a means of protection from disease, hunger,

unemployment, crime, social conflict, political regression, and environmental

degradation. Therefore, the motivation for applying the human-security approach is

twofold: (1) the theory of change embedded within the approach, and (2) the inherent

theory explaining the change in how security is perceived is now institutionalized in

theory and in practice for the protection of the vulnerable. For example, the national-

security approach recognizes that state security involves protecting state citizens;

however, it does not recognize the security concerns of individuals or communities

within the state. As an analytical framework, the human-security approach uses

individuals and communities as referent objects (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde 1997).

The displacement of the state as the focus of both explanation and change,

combined with the focus of individuals and communities, produces a bottom-up, broad-

based, inherently democratizing set of tendencies that relate to the demand-side triggers

for violence. Colonialism, as another explanation, correctly maps the structural and

institutional consequences of colonial rule, but more often than not, such explanations do

not contain a theory of change. One common feature within such analyses and criticisms

is an appeal for change at the level of world order and a greater understanding of

metropolitan countries and multinational institutions.

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historicity of the problems of development and the basis of insecurity; however, it falls

short of any type of comprehensive political, economic, and cultural framework beyond

reaching the modernization process and the focus on world order. The recurrent pitfall is

that this body of work is restricted by an analytic hegemony of the state; that is, the state

is the referent object. Despite protests concerning the focus on top-down strategies for

change within related literature, the focus on the state generates a vicious cycle of starting

at the top and ending in the same position. Conversely, the human-security point of

departure presents “simultaneous and complementary vertical dimensions” in the ongoing

redefinition of security (Hyden 1997,2). Therefore, human security is highly influenced

by critical theories of international relations, and at least some aspects rely heavily upon a

critical political economy. One of the hallmarks of a critical political economy is that

theory and practice are mutually reinforcing elements of a more comprehensive totality.

This is important for the questions posed in the present study and the manner in which

they are addressed.

The Basis o f Human Insecurity

It is important to outline the basis of the insecurity that leads to various forms of

armed conflict. Human-security analysis presents specific internal conditions that spur a

demand for weapons. The nature of the Third World state is problematic. For example,

elite power, much of which is congealed within state power, renders it difficult for

reforms that address grievances, threats, or access to take root. Reference was made

within the literature review of this current study to the nature of postcolonial state

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formation in Africa. As demonstrated, political authoritarianism combined with the

power of economic elites have produced a ranking system that places the material and

social security of marginalized individuals at the bottom of the socioeconomic “ladder.”

Therefore, state formation is related to the entire issue of weapons diffusion in conflict

because the process of state formation has produced two security problems—forces from

an interstate system and forces from a world economy.

Research that examined security within the Third World suggested that

differences between state formation in Africa and Europe facilitate an explanation of the

conceptual differences between security in developed and developing countries (Ayoob

1995; Azar and Moon 1984; Buzan 1992; Job 1992). The state is a product of historical

circumstances. Conceptually, the state influences social and economic processes and

provides an organic order that is central to major societal developments. Ayoob (1984)

identified the problematic history of state formation, patterns of elite recruitment, regime

establishment, and maintenance as elements of state inadequacy within the Third World

that aid violence. He emphasized that European countries have strong cohesive

bureaucracies, while African countries have weak bureaucratic structures. African states

are weak because they are artificial creations within which there is little consensus

surrounding political issues or citizen support. Developing Africa countries were forced

to unify various ethnic groups into a single nation, unlike developed countries of Europe

that emerged from comparatively homogenous ethnic groups. According to Ayoob,

therefore, the nature of weak political institutions, combined with distorted economic

development, creates situations that give rise to civil threat.

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Henk (2001) claimed that threats are embedded within African states and modeled

on the security practices of colonial administrations. Colonial leaders were concerned

about the security of their regimes and the resources they exploited. Whether broad

support existed for their political agendas was not a concern, and they operated freely

without such support. Henk argued that this inherited state system, combined with the so-

called Westphalian model, did not complement regional political and economic

traditions. Moreover, it did not prepare African states to deal with issues affecting their

security. As a result, African governments have done little to understand the nature of

security beyond the notions inherited from colonial administrators.

The human-security approach accommodates the internal, nonmilitary threats

from social sources. Within Nigeria, nationalist historians emphasized that a current

internal threat to security was created when the British forced variant ethnic groups to

live within a single administrative unit. These historians further suggested that the

historical legacy of colonialism within Nigeria established several structural divisions

that acted as a collective “fault line” for the current problem of SALW proliferation.

While external factors may account for the availability of SALW in this post-Cold War

environment, the demand for, and use of, lethal weapons are ultimately dependent upon

conditions rooted in the internal development of Nigeria. Many scholars have argued that

the social structure of Nigeria relations between state and civil societies, as well as the

prolonged military rule, have caused violence at both local and national levels (Ihonvbere

2002; Musah 2002; Mustapha 2002).

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According to Mustapha (2002), “Much of what has been characterized as the

‘prebendal’ nature of the Nigerian state has . . . roots in the colonial state” (166). Indeed,

Ihonvbere (2002) viewed the militarization of Nigerian society as simply an extension of

the colonial period because the violent, undemocratic, inaccessible, essentially abhorrent

state was not dismantled at political independence. It was simply “Africanized,”

modified, and repackaged to serve the interests of the emerging African elite (242). There

is a modicum of truth in these assertions; however, intrastate conflict within Nigeria is

also a reflection of factors with only an indirect link to the colonial period. As Mustapha

explained, “There was nothing inevitable about the exact scope of the territories unified

to form modem Nigeria. If anything, integrative pre-colonial patterns of commercial,

cultural, ecological, military, and religious interaction were often counterbalanced by

perceptions of threat and difference” (156). In a lecture presented to the National Institute

for Policy and Strategic Studies in 2004, the director of the Nigerian Institute for

International Lagos and current minister of foreign affairs advanced that the

amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 accomplished little toward unification of the various

ethnic and tribal groups of the country. The British colonial administrators emphasized

individuality among these groups and implemented a skillful divide-and-rule strategy

known as indirect rule. As a result, the foreign minister noted, Nigerian leaders faced the

task of welding various groups into a modem nation at independence. Additionally, they

were expected to deliver the dividendsof self-rule to an impatient populace with

expectations that democracy would automatically create the prosperity previously

enjoyed by the colonial administrators.

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According to Gyimah-Boadi (1996), to ensure the security of the regime, Nigerian

leaders maintain and expand the hierarchies of rule inherited from colonialism, and many

Nigerians seek refuge in kin- and religious-based organizations to reduce the hegemonic

influence of the state. This excessive pursuit of regime security has exacerbated the

problem of threats to human security. According to Nigeria’s foreign minister, Nigeria’s

weakness as a state is clearly evident, especially in the fragility of its strategic sectors.

These encompass the political sector, which is the repository of legitimate authority and

governmental processes; the economic sector, which is the foundation for the

developmental underpinnings of the society; and the social/cultural sector, which depends

on the political and economic sectors. The government has little credibility, and the

country is not economically or politically stable within its weak political and economic

structures. The minister argued that the crisis of legitimacy faced by Nigerian leaders

explains the inordinate focus by Nigerian leaders on regime security than human security.

Regimes in states such as Nigeria are primarily interested in “self preservation”

(Ayoob 1984; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Clapham 1997). According to

Cillers (2004), many African states exhibit a “shell of the territorial state where security

is equated with that of the governing elite” (10). The problems of insecurity within many

developing countries are not caused by threats to territorial integrity and state

sovereignty. Cillers reported that “state security is not threatened by armed attack by

other countries but by more insidious measures, many of which flow from the very

weakness of the state and its absences of control over its territory” (9). Ekeh (1998)

suggested that the African citizen ends up with loyalty to a primordial society rather than

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to the state. The African state is an alien concept, and African governments often use

coercive force as their most decisive instrument of negotiation with their citizens. This

reliance on violence implies the support of violence as an efficient instrument of

negotiation. As a result, many Africans have adopted violent patterns as a manner of

negotiation with the state.

The State as a Coercive Apparatus for Insecurity

The literature reviewed in this current research highlighted among other factors,

the predatory nature of the Nigerian state, which has served as a basis for the insecurities

spurring citizens to acquire arms in order to counter these insecurities. Arguments

surrounding security and the nontraditional threats to human security that have created

the demand for SALW within Nigeria tend to create questions related to whose security

matters the most—individuals, groups, communities, or the state. Obi (1997) reported

that the debate on security, from the state perspective, has focused on “whose interests

national security should serve, the economic context of Nigeria’s relationship with the

external world, and what core values the nation should defend and project at all times”

(4). The inclination toward an external orientation in foreign policy produces, in most

cases, a disarticulation on the economy (IIDEA 2000, 136). State-centric security

dominates the security agenda of Nigeria. According to Obi, “The Nigerian’s perception

of security is reflective of a realist paradigm of projecting its power within a state-centric

system, and a clear separation between foreign and domestic policy” (4). Within Nigeria,

internal security is focused on law and order, and external security is focused on external

military threats. As Obi recognized, “this perspective is increasingly becoming

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problematic for two reasons: in a Post-Cold War context marked by rapid globalization, a

state-centric perspective is becoming more of an anachronism, along with growing

internal opposition to the hegemonic statist perspective of national interest and security”

(4).

Within Nigeria, the state remains a coercive instrument of rule that is weak and

ineffectual. Many such African states are unable to control violence and, for Nigeria, it is

the state that is a source of insecurity. Nigeria clearly demonstrates the features of

postcolonial states—weak institutional development, areas of the country that are outside

government control, and a lack of unity caused by embedded ethnic differences. These

features are all consequences of inorganic development, and internal violence is the result

of such state weakness. Today, Nigeria is carved into private zones defended by violence,

which in many cases, involves SALW. Cillers (2004) posited that the difficulty is with

the inability of African governments to regulate the number of weapons dispersed

throughout their country. A number of substate groups have obtained SALW and

challenge the authority of the state. Ballentine and Sherman (2003) supported this

representation of the current scenario, noting

The relative capacity of the state to perform core functions, including the provision of security, effective governance throughout its territory, and the equitable distribution of public goods, has a direct bearing on the incidence of armed conflict. Indeed weak and failing states have been identified as both cause and consequence of armed conflict.. . . Importantly state weakness is a critical component of the opportunity structure that makes violent challenges militarily and economically feasible. (9)

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The Conceptualization of Threat

Economic Dimension

Threat perception is conceived via combinations of factors that lead to either

proximate or long-term threats. Threat triggers manifest from within the socioeconomic

and political sectors of Nigeria. Relative deprivation has been a major factor in the

emergence of Nigerian conflict. From an economic perspective, assessment, poverty, and

inequality have played key roles in the insecurities created by conflict. The evidence for

this lies in the fact that Nigeria is currently among the poorest and least-developed

countries in the world, with a socioeconomic profile that places it in the highly indebted

category of poor countries (UNDP 2004; World Bank 1995). The United Nations Human

Development Index ranked Nigeria 158 in 2005, and 70 percent of Nigerian citizens live

on less than US$1 per day (UNDP 2004). Between 1990 and 2003, 70.2 percent of

Nigeria’s more than 120 million people subsisted on less than US$1.00 per day. If the

US$2.00 level is employed, the outcome remains one of absolute poverty because 90.8

percent of the population meet criteria for this category.

Despite enormous resources, Nigeria is a poor country by almost any standard

(UNDP 2005). An examination of the basic indicators for a measurement of quality of

life indicates a country with poor human security for the vast majority of its citizens. Per

capita income during 2003 was a mere US$1,050, which was measured in purchasing-

power parity. This oil-rich countryis poor, even by African standards. The comparable

figure for Sudan is a per capita income of US$1,910. Ghana more than doubles Nigerian

figures in this regard with a per capita income of US$2,238. Even the devastated

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Rwanda, which endured a violent genocide, has a higher per capita income than Nigeria

at US$1,268 during 2003. There is no doubt that this decline contributes to the rate of

violence within Nigeria as the income gap aggravates the inequalities and polarization of

this Rentier state. A statistical review of the attitudes and perceptions of the Nigerian

people (Lewis and Alemika 2004) indicates that “Nigerians believe that their standard of

living is going down and since the end of [the] petroleum boom in [the] early 1980s,

economic hardships and austerity have eroded living standards for most Nigerians” (32).

Poverty has led to increased crime and violence within Nigeria. According to

Lewis and Alemika (2004), 57 percent of Nigerians are currently unemployed or without

full-time work. The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution ([IPCR] 2003) noted that

high youth unemployment is a common factor in nearly all conflict zones. The IPCR

recognizes that demand for employment can lead to violence by Nigerian youth, stating,

“Alienated youths are always ready to take advantage of other issues for their own

immediate gains” (47).

Poverty is further deepened by the large losses produced by conflict. For example,

since 1999, many Nigerians have lost their homes and livelihoods as a result of

communal conflict. In the Tiv/Jukun crisis, “widespread destruction of homes and

buildings” was reported (Human Rights Watch 2002, 6). Within Jos, “extensive damage

to mosques, churches, schools, shops, homes and vehicles” was described (Human Rights

Watch 2001, 2). The International Society for Human Rights (2002) noted that the

“destruction of commercial towns, farmlands and properties of the Tiv people in Taraba,

Nasarawa and Benue itself is worth $200 million dollars” (2). Many people have been

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forced into temporary refugee camps, while others have become internally displaced.

“Over 900,000 Tiv people were displaced and are now in different refugee camps in

Benue and Plateau State . . . 550,000 people are living in squalid conditions without

adequate water supply or toilet facilities” (1).

Human insecurity is linked to the competition for resources. The underlying

economic factor fueling the conflict within Nigeria, apart from poverty and declining

economic opportunity, is this competition for scarce resources. According to the IPCR

(2003),

The allocation of Nigeria’s massive income from oil has a deeply pervasive effect on the political system. Many Nigerians see politics as a competition for resources derived mainly from oil.... Oil has had a profound economic effect arising from its dominance of the economy... internally, oil draws economic activity towards itself, sterilizing other sectors of the economy. (28)

By attempting to spread resources evenly, Nigeria has created deep resentment within oil-

producing areas, and residents attempting to raise the issue have too often been dismissed

as separatists and suppressed with violence.

Within the Middle Belt, territorial space and economic resources have dwindled

and land scarcity has contributed to pressures on the agrarian community. In Taraba and

the Plateau State, for example, competition for land remains a key conflict trigger (IPCR

2003,15). Consistent with the relative-deprivation thesis, Tiv farmers claim that the issue

is not so much the division over land, but the perception of differences in political and

social status associated with being viewed as either indigenous or a settler, as well as the

effect this status has on access to political power in disputes over land. Within Jos, the

perception of exclusion caused by the indigenous-settler question, as well as the

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institutionalized forms of discrimination, have fueled conflict. Within the Niger Delta,

Warri is rich in oil resources, and coupled with tenancy questions, armed conflict over oil

access has assumed a high profile in the economy of the country. The perceived

inequitable distribution of oil resources between the government and the state has also led

to conflict. Such conflict has been “exacerbated by the presence of oil and/or other

natural resources [and] the policy of designating certain communities (example where oil

is actually drilled) as ‘host communities’ has been problematic and a source of

contention, as there are several other communities that are impacted by the oil industry”

(189).

In an interview conducted within Bayelsa State during August 2005, the then

deputy governor and current governor of Bayelsa State explained that oil dominates the

Nigerian economy and accounts for at least “70 percent of the foreign exchange earnings,

but then a substantial part is sent out through the input into that sector.” The development

of the oil sector is important for revenue, which is an element of state security. The state

uses this revenue to arm its security forces and deal with pressures from those who feel

they have been “shortchanged” by the state. Following years of neglect, the people took

up arms to call attention to social inequities. The government responded through the use

of force and the displaced, marginalized, and insecure responded in turn by arming

themselves.

Outside the oil economy, the decline in agriculture has increased the insecurities

of a population that is largely farmers, as in Plateau and Taraba state, or fisherman within

Niger Delta. Over the past several years, Nigeria has experienced low or negative growth

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in the annual production of staple foods such as yams, cassava, maize, rice, sorghum,

millet, and beans. Prior to the dominance of the oil sector, each region in the country

relied principally upon agricultural exports to obtain foreign exchange and tax receipts,

and this guaranteed that each region would enjoy a measure of fiscal autonomy. By the

time of the most recent Nigerian democratic transition during 1999, oil exports accounted

for 90 percent of Nigeria’s foreign-exchange earnings and 80 percent of its central-

govemment revenues (Lewis, Robinson, and Rubin 1999). Each year, oil-export receipts

generate in excess of US$10 billion for the central government. Under prior

administrations, a major share of this revenue was diverted into the private, off-shore

accounts of the military rulers, while as much as 25 percent was used to pay off

strongmen in exchange for their continued political support (Diamond 1995).

Although the majority of Nigerians depend upon the agricultural sector for

employment, this segment of the economy provides far less revenue to the government

coffers. As a result, agriculture has been neglected as oil production has increased. The

neglect of agriculture is a significant problem and reflects the nature of the Nigerian state.

The power bloc within the country is built upon oil, and people within the agriculture

sector have little influence in policy making. During 1986, the directorate of Food, Road

and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI) was created to administer an integrated rural-

development program with the nominal aim of decentralizing economic production and

reducing reliance on oil revenues. In practice, however, “through formal and informal

political networks, regional elites embraced DFRRI projects as a new source of

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accumulation, converting federal funds provided for DFRRI projects into personal use”

(Vaughn 2003, 259). According to Vaughn,

The custodians of the state diverted DFRRI resources into an entrenched patronage network that has sustained their class interests since decolonization and has intensified with the conspicuous consumption that regional bureaucrats, businessmen, contractors, technocrats and military officers welded to this federal patronage development initiative. Thus, the bleak outcome of DFRRI projects had little to do with the declared goals of the agency or a lack of imagination in local communities. Rather, it must be attributed to the predatory culture of politics and the centralization of state power. (260)

Oil revenues are primarily used to build industrial infrastructures and provide subsidies.

A development bias exists toward industrial development, and this focus on industry

marginalizes and displaces small farmers and peasants, rendering them insecure. This

disempowerment feeds into a sense of hopelessness and ultimately into discontent. The

threat to personal welfare and security further contributes to the pressures causing

conflict within Nigeria.

Sociopolitical Dimension

Nigerian politics is an important source of human-security threats because “power

struggles within the political class often involve the manipulation of the people who are

inevitably less informed about the essence of the political struggle. The elite and the

politicians often influence governmental policies for their own selfish purposes” (IPCR

2003,24). The Nigerian elite and politicians have been cited as a source of weapons

diffusion to actors of conflict. The IPCR contended, “In competing for political positions,

ethnic differences are sometimes used for selfish interests leading to casualties in

violence that erupts. As well, migrations by ethnic groups have amplified the

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indigene/settler questions that are a common category in conflicts in Jos, Plateau State

and, Tiv/Jukun in Taraba State” (32). Within the traditional institutions, the struggle over

suzerainty also provides a powerful conflict trigger.

Human-capital assessments of poverty also indicate declining conditions. The

Nigerian health system has collapsed and continues to deteriorate. Many health

professionals moved overseas, dramatically reducing the morale of remaining staff.

Political crises slowed donor funding during the 1990s, which resulted in the creation of a

private health care system beyond the reach of citizens earning less than mid or high

incomes. Additionally, during 1986, the Federal Ministry of Health reported that 1.8

percent of the Nigerian population had HIV/AIDS, and current projections to 2009

indicate that close to five million Nigerians will develop AIDS. During 2003, life

expectancy within Nigeria was only 43.4 years. A significant 46 percent of Nigerians

bom between 2000 and 2005 cannot expect to live to the age of forty. During 2003, only

a low 2.4 percent of the population was over sixty-five years of age.

During 2002, the per capita health expenditure was US$43, a low figure even by

African standards. During the same year, a low 48 percent of the population was

immunized against tuberculosis, and an even fewer 35 percent were protected against

measles. Corresponding figures for Rwanda, which ranked 159 on the United Nations

Human Development Index—one position lower than Nigeria—were 88 percent for

tuberculosis and 90 percent for measles. Skilled health personnel only attend 35 percent

of all births within Nigeria. This is again poor even by African standards. For example,

70 percent of births are attended by skilled health personnel in Swaziland, 60 percent in

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Cameroon, 60 percent in Lesotho, 55 percent in Gambia, 58 percent in Senegal, and 61

percent in Malawi.

During 2003, 29 percent of Nigerian children under five years of age were

underweight, and 38 percent of these children were below average height. A low 49

percent of Nigerians had access to an improved water source during 2002, and only 38

percent of the population had access to improved sanitation during the same year. The

doctor-patient ratio, which is 27 per 100,000, is the only statistic indicating an

improvement in Nigeria over other African states. Public spending on health care within

Nigeria highlights the low commitment to health security, which is a key measure of

human security. With a miniscule 1.2 percent of the gross domestic product invested in

health, Nigeria has one of the worst health care systems in the world. With the exception

of Burundi and Sierra Leone, all the states ranked lower than Nigeria on the Human

Development Index commit more resources to public health.

During 2003, the adult illiteracy rate for Nigerian adults fifteen years of age and

older was 33.2 percent. While this is comparable to many Third World countries, it

remains below what other developing countries have achieved in broad education

security. Dismal as these statistics are, the insecurity of Nigerians is even worse when

allowance is made for social class. Data from the health sectors reveal this fact quite

forcefully. There is, for example, glaring distortions in the area of births attended by

skilled personnel. While only 12.2 percent of the poorest Nigerians have access to this

type of health care, the figure is 70 percent for the richest 20 percent of the population.

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While only 13.9 percent of the poorest children have been fully immunized, 58.1 percent

of the children from the richest families have received this protection.

According to current data (World Bank 2006), while the infant mortality rate for

the richest 20 percent is 68.6 per 100,000, it is 102.2 per 100,000 for the poorest 20

percent. For children five years of age, the infant mortality rate is 119.8 per 100,000 for

the richest 20 percent compared to 239.6 per 100,000 for the poorest 20 percent. Human

insecurity is directly related to inequality, and the health care data clearly indicate that

Nigerian people suffer from inequality throughout the health care system. However, such

inequality is not confined to health care. During 2003, the bottom 50 percent of the

population received 16.5 percent of the total income, while the top 10 percent received

33.2 percent.

Environmental Dimension

Nigeria is significantly affected by several environmental problems, (e.g.,

degradation of local ecosystems, soil erosion, desertification, and ecological imbalances).

Okonta and Douglas (2003) contended that oil spills have “polluted farmland and rivers

and creeks, destroying flora and fauna in the process” (66). Within the Niger Delta, they

noted that oil-generated environmental pollution has resulted in land infertility and the

destruction of aquatic life. Ponds, creeks, and rivers have been polluted by oil spills, and

farming and fishing are impossible or extremely difficult in oil-affected areas. According

to Oladele (2003), “For every dollar derived from crude oil and associated gas extracted

from the Niger Delta, imagine the costs, in terms of pollution and environmental

degradation, left behind for the defenseless people there” (6-7).

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Much of the oil production within Nigeria is located within the Niger Delta.

Those living within this region should benefit from the presence of this industry;

however, this is unfortunately not the case. For example, a major oil evacuating terminal

is located within Bonny of Rivers State that accounts for 17.8 million barrels out of the

approximately 49 million barrels exported from the country on an annual basis, which

renders this community one of the largest oil-evacuating terminals within Nigeria

(Eresia-Eke 1993). Rather than providing benefits to residents, the oil industry has caused

food shortages, health hazards, loss of land, pollution, forced migration, and

unemployment. Air pollution caused by gas flaring is another serious threat to

development within the Niger Delta area. Gas flaring releases hydrocarbons, carbon

monoxide, and carbon dioxide into the atmosphere (IIDEA 2000). The link among oil

and natural-gas development, environmental degradation, and human security is palpable

within this region.

Marginalization

The marginalization component of the human-security perspective provides a

very powerful explanation for Nigerian conflict, and it is also a prime motivator for such

conflict. The problem of marginalization is highly observable within the area of

employment. There is a definite relationship between ethnicity and the spoils of state

employment. The conflict within the Niger Delta, for example, is caused by economic

(i.e., the struggle for benefits derived from oil production), ethnic/communal, and

political factors (IPCR 2003). The issue of marginalization is clearly a side effect of the

manner in which the state came into existence and how current African elites and

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transnational corporations have continued the style of government developed by earlier

colonial authorities.

One of the characteristics of modem African states is the enormous amount of

land they have conceded to foreign multinational firms. Research has shown that this has

not only occurred within Nigeria, but also other developing countries such as Columbia.

According to Guaqueta (2003), Columbia has conceded considerable autonomy to

foreign, multinational oil companies. This autonomy reinforces the dialectics of

marginalization and threat perception on the one hand and weaponization on the other.

Such a development warrants attention in the present study because of the manner in

which multinational oil companies have emphasized the securitization of economic

relations and private property rather than meeting local needs. Guaqueta illustrated how

the oil companies within Columbia use private security firms to preserve social and

economic order. She noted that, as a result of the “preventive measures by corporations

seeking to ensure the security of their operations and personnel, there is continuing

danger of companies inadvertently contributing to the conflict through their reliance on

unaccountable security services and perhaps becoming more directly complicit in the

strife” (86). This is precisely what has happened within the Niger Delta.

Access and Flow of Weapons

Both the inherent attributes of SALW and their demonstrated accessibility in the

actual or threatened execution of conflict have contributed to their rising popularity

among nonstate actors of the developing world. The accessibility thesis rests on the

straightforward assertion that accessibility of SALW correlates to violence (GIIS 2001).

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The economic tensions that threaten human security within Nigeria are complicated by

the lack of law and order in many parts of the country. By conventional standards,

Nigeria is underpoliced. The United Nations recommends a ratio of one police officer for

every 400 civilians. The latest figures for Nigeria are one officer for every 1,000 civilians

(Fayemi 2003).

According to Aborisade and Mundt (2002), “A popular perception that the police

are excessively arbitrary and brutal has led to a number of riots and violent attacks on the

police in recent years” (220). The high level of corruption among Nigerian police remains

problematic. Lewis and Alemika (2004) found that 70 percent of Nigerians perceive the

police as corrupt. As an institution charged with defense of the nation, the police have

been accused of acting as a source of weapons diffusion in conflict, and accounts from

field reports have indicated that the police rent weapons to conflict actors. In fact, as a

result of the perceived ineffectiveness and nonprofessionalism of the Nigerian police,

many communities and groups have replaced them with armed militia squads. As

described by Aborisade and Mundt (2002), “Lack of confidence in police protection has

inevitably led to citizens taking the law into their own hands. Vigilante groups have not

only closed off whole neighborhoods to nighttime traffic, they have sometimes meted out

justice on the spot” (221). Vigilante groups are common within some communities

because they uphold a measure of law and order.

The IPCR (2003) reported that

The deployment of troops elsewhere in West Africa is perceived as a major cause of the “leakage” of small arms into the hands of unauthorized persons. There is also extensive smuggling and the incidence of mercenary involvement, especially

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in the conflicts of the ethnic/communal hue notably in the Northern zone and the South West. (21)

The reported presence of hired guns from neighboring African countries, such as Chad,

Niger, and Cameroon, supports the following IPCR observation: “Mercenaries from Chad

and Niger are also fingered as factors in the conflicts in Taraba, and Kaduna States” (24).

The massive retirement of soldiers, most of whom are from the Middle Belt, has

also aided the diffusion of arms in conflicts of the region. During August 2005 in

Washington, D.C., the vice president of Nigeria stated in a personal interview that many

of these retired soldiers come from the Middle Belt zone, and they provide weapons and

training to their own ethnic groups during violent outbreaks. They have provided easy

access to weapons and some have participated in peacekeeping missions in the West and

returned home with additional weapons. Retiring these soldiers without proper

disarmament has led to arms diffusion directly to conflict actors, as was observed in the

Tiv-Jukun conflict. Many Middle Belt conflicts have involved groups trained by retired

soldiers. Locally produced SALW are a neglected, but growing, source of small arms

within Nigeria. The use of locally made weapons was noted in conflicts within the

Middle Belt. There is a thriving local arms market within the South East region that

provides local conflict actors with easy access to SALW. Informants in the field reported

that the nature of the porous Nigerian borders has encouraged black-market gunrunners to

import illicit arms into the country.

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Deprivation and Social Inequality

The current component structures of inequality that exist within Nigeria were

formed during the extended period of colonial rule, and the divide along class and ethnic

lines created during this period has been aggravated by the emergence of an oil economy.

Oil has generated enormous wealth for those connected to it; however, the wealth is

highly concentrated in the upper strata of the population, amplifying the sense of injustice

among the lower classes. In other words, the formal structures of inequality that were

present during the colonial period have continued into the postcolonial era. It is not a

question of magnitude of income. It is a question of justice or perceived social inequality,

and a significant portion of human-security literature has addressed the relationship

between injustice and insecurity. Therefore, relative deprivation should always be

understood as a sense of deprivation. An individual who is relatively deprived need not

be objectively deprived. It is possible for an individual to be deprived in an absolute

sense. For example, if the number of deprived individuals are disaggregated for

educational opportunities and health care on the basis of social class, relative deprivation

is found. If the number is disaggregated for class, deprivation is found to be weighted at

the lower end of society.

When the Runcinman (1966) notion of sense is added to the equation, the

evidence for deprivation produces a sense of deprivation; in other words, it has some

symbolic and rhetorical value. That is, an individual may be able to feed, clothe, and

house his or her family, but will have a sense of injustice based upon a set of perceptions

surrounding inequality and injustice. Thus, such individuals construct what Fanon (1961)

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referred to as a Manichean world that is divided in two and compartmentalized. This

sense of a Manichean world divided along class and ethnic lines has been aggravated by

the emergence of an oil economy. This economy in Nigeria has generated fantastic

amounts of wealth for those connected to it; however, since this wealth is highly

concentrated, it has amplified a sense of injustice for many people. This is particularly the

case within the Niger Delta. It is important to recognize that this exists in a double

sense—(1) a sense of injustice exists at a material level (i.e., a sense of socioeconomic

exclusion); and (2) it exists in a symbolic sense because marginalized groups during the

postcolonial period imagine current injustices in the language and assumptions of the

earlier colonial period. Put simply, postcolonial injustices are considered a continuation

of colonialism.

Material Deprivation and Symbolic Construction

As Runcinman (1966) stated, “Relative deprivation is such as to involve the

comparison of the imagined [emphasis mine] situation with some other groups” (11). The

other reference groups exist in two ways—at the material level and relationally. For

example, the oil “boom” in Nigeria created expectations of what the wealth would bring

to daily life and personal economic situations, which were not in line with the effects of

wealth generated by the oil economy. Therefore, as noted by Taylor (2002), “in the

subordinate group, the ‘sense’ of grievance label[ed] relative deprivation is said to be

motivated by the desire to rise in the hierarchy of class, status and power” (14). Taylor

considered relative deprivation as “feelings of unfairness” or a lack of “perceived

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entitlements [and concluded that] relative deprivation may entail perpetual comparisons”

(14).

Within Nigeria, perception is everything. According to Lewis and Alemika

(2004), 36 percent of Nigerian survey respondents viewed their identity groups as

economically worse off or much worse off than other groups, compared to 29 percent

during 2001. In fact, the results suggested that the perceived sense of injustice has grown

to 22 percent of respondents during 2003 compared to 12 percent during 2001. These

results indicated that many Nigerians view other ethnic groups as treated more fairly than

themselves by the government. The survey results also indicated that “perceptions of

injustice vary among identity groups [and that] economic identities are most likely to feel

aggrieved than ethnic, religious or class groups (39). However, this perception is also

gradually shifting. The numbers are largely reinforced by the finding that self-

identification, in terms of ethnicity and religion, remains common among Nigerians, and

more Nigerians are likely to identify themselves in terms of their ethnicity (e.g., 48

percent identified with an ethnic group during 2003 compared to 28 percent during 2001).

Sense o f Group Position

The evidence presented by Runcinman (1966) becomes critical because, apart

from the socioeconomic elements, other elements are imagined. A sense of injustice is

perceived from the position within which a group finds itself. Taylor (2002) wrote that

there is “a sense of kingship with other members of one’s membership group” (15). As

Taylor elaborated, the Runcinman translation of inequality can also be viewed in another

light; that is, the “translation of equality into grievance” (15). In other words, “downward

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relative deprivation must be understand [sic] by extrapolation from the dynamics of

upward relative deprivation” (16). Taylor noted that “when lower manual workers in

mid-twentieth century England responded with relative deprivation to manual workers’

gains, the roots was [.vie] the nonmanual workers’ desire to maintain a relatively

privileged position to maintain a diminishing difference” (16). In this sense, attempts by a

subordinate group to prevent further gaps in deprivation are matched by resistance from

the dominant group, all of whom “are anxious to preserve for their groups a diminishing

return” (16).

Taylor (2002) posited that constructs of upward mobility are also relevant because

dominant-group reactions to encroachment by subordinate groups is also relative

deprivation. In other words, “the sense of a group’s position is at the very heart of

relation of the dominant group to the subordinate groups and provides a framework of

perception” (19) as losses may be more psychologically poignant than blocked gains.

Influenced by the Blumer essay on prejudice as a sense of group position, Taylor

contended that race prejudice entails the collective deprivation of a subordinate group and

includes the following four elements: “(1) feelings of superiority; (2) feelings of

differentiation; (3) feelings of ‘proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and

advantage’; and (4) [a] sense that those privileges and advantages are threatened by the

subordinate groups. It is the fourth element that fully activates Blumer’s race prejudice.”

(19).

The concept of sense developed by Runcinman (1966) is important for the present

study because it forms the conceptual bridge between the material and the nonmaterial

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dimensions of conflict. The sense of encroachment by the subordinate group is met by

resistance from the dominant group anxious to maintain their privileged position.

Marxism is inappropriate for explaining the sense of injustice that often manifests within

subordinate groups because Marxists have been unable to progress from material

deprivation to symbolic construction. This is because Marxist identity is primarily based

upon terms of class contradiction. However, in the case of Nigeria, injustice has multiple

sources. Additionally, there are socioeconomic, regional, ethnic, and religious dimensions

to injustice. While the Marxist tradition can indeed address the socioeconomic dimension

of injustice, it can only infer the other three dimensions. As opposed to the limited

Marxist explanation for injustice, the human-security framework can move with ease

between its material basis and the other socially constructed dimensions. Consequently,

this framework is sufficiently flexible to accommodate both the material and discursive

evidence of conflict.

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CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

Traditional research focused on SALW transfer, proliferation, and diffusion deals

with equally traditional national-security issues. This presents some problems for

investigators in the field. First, a sizable proportion of all transfers of SALW is illicit or

borders on grey trade and, therefore, the information is unobtainable. Second, national

governments are hesitant to release any information related to SALW, claiming national

security necessitates nondisclosure. Inherent to this problem is the high risk of

researching arms proliferation among a population exhibiting a high level of militancy

(i.e., numerous insurgents and warlords) and in societies suffering from deep-seated

animosity. These two major problems are compounded during research within a

developing country where data surrounding SALW are improperly archived or wherein

the researcher is viewed as an agent of the government.

With these problems in view, the researcher in the current study began fieldwork

during 2003 within the Abuja area of Nigeria to find suitable methods for collecting data.

The initial aim was to examine the empirical fact of small-arms proliferation in conflict.

From background information gathered during this period, a general strategy was adopted

to avoid the usual Cold War approaches to explanations for arms transfer that would have

focused on gathering extensive data on government transfer and procurement. Rather, the

focus was on the demand side of arms proliferation and the relative effect of human

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security on the eventual militarization of only some conflicts, excluding others—a

strategy that yielded much of the qualitative data presented in this research.

The field research for this study was structured to obtain data that would provide

explanations for conflict militarization and investigated two primary issues. The first was

the supply-side of proliferation, which entailed (1) the sources, suppliers, and recipients;

(2) the actual number of weapons in circulation; and (3) weapons seizures within the

country, during conflict and within the three geopolitical zones under study. The second

issue was the demand-side approaches and militarization, which included (1) identifying

specific conflict hot spots for obtaining SALW data, (2) identifying key groups involved

in the conflict, (3) identifying the structural basis and its relationship to the colonial state

formation, and (4) finding appropriate ways through interviews and document review to

gather additional information surrounding the conflict and SALW without the need to ask

sensitive questions likely to go unanswered.

Research Setting

This research began by selecting data sampled from the six geopolitical zones

within Nigeria (see fig. 1), which encompass thirty-six states. For purposes of

comparative analysis, the six zones were grouped into the following dated administrative

units: the Northern region, the Middle Belt region, and the Southern region. The sample

within these zones was stratified and two states were selected from each zone—one that

had experienced violent armed conflict and another that had experienced neither violent

armed conflict nor limited armed conflict. This method enabled data comparison to

uncover reasons for the demand for, and use of, SALW. The sampling was restricted to

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www.theodora.com/maps NIGER CHAD

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Fig. 1. Nigeria and its 36 states and neighbors. Source: Theodora maps. 2006. www.theodoracom/maps (accessed 27 January 2006).

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three geographic regions. This was a practical decision in terms of time and number of

cases. In an ideal world, a representative sample from throughout Nigeria would have

been gathered; however, that would present a daunting, if not impossible, task for such

research.

The present study implemented a historical narrative method, conducted content

analysis of case histories related to Nigerian conflicts, and applied a descriptive-

analytical approach designed to evaluate the extent, dimensions, and impact of selected

armed conflict within Nigeria during the 1980s. These methods of investigation were

chosen because of the complex, historical nature of the phenomena under study. The

analyses of the case histories incorporate underlying causes of conflict (i.e., human

insecurities) and the relationship between SALW and human insecurities. Descriptive

analysis is considered appropriate for generating the type of data required for this study.

The aim of this research was to assess the relationship between the proliferation

of small arms and human insecurities in relation to civil conflict. Nigeria was selected for

study because of its many characteristics as a state with a central authority that has

remained firm. This region possesses the steel frame of its central bureaucratic apparatus;

however, it has been unable to extend that authority over the peripheral state apparatus.

As is the case within other West African states, Nigeria faces many problems due to

violence and internecine ethnic conflicts linked to the proliferation of small arms. The

region struggles with a democratic system undermined by many years of military coups,

general political immaturity, and a colonial legacy that forced several powerful ethnic

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groups to unionize. Although Nigeria exhibits features of a strong central state, it also

demonstrates attributes of a state struggling to balance deep social inequities.

Research Design

Obtaining information from a wide variety of sources and informants captures the

action and dynamic sequences of, and relationships within, conflict. The data collected in

the current study indicate a booming market for SALW within regions engulfed in

conflict, which has heightened threats to human security, increased loss of life and

damage to property, and generated unprecedented numbers of internally displaced

individuals and the attendant social consequences. The data provide important answers

surrounding why weapons diffuse in some conflicts and not in others. Adopting the

framework of human security, the present study examined the interests of conflict actors

and focused strongly on links between human security and the underlying causes for the

use of weapons. The study was guided by the following research questions:

1. Is the supply of SALW an important predictor of civil conflict?

2. Does marginalization of specific population groups increase both the demand

for arms and militarization of conflicts?

3. Do perceptions of threats increase the demand for arms?

Interview data and document analysis form the primary sources of information for

the case studies presented in the current research. Each examines the same general

patterns and trends and provides an overview and description of a conflict from outbreak

to escalation and de-escalation. The case-study method was employed to develop a clear

understanding surrounding the general historical activity that underlies conflict and the

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reason for SALW proliferation. Therefore, each case study consists of qualitative

narratives and information related to weapons proliferation. The following criteria were

applied to select six conflicts for study: (1) geopolitical or zonal representation and

categorization, (2) supply factors, and (3) date of conflict. While the cases occurred in

proximity to each other, differences existed in the nature, causes, and evolution of each

conflict. The difference in the degree of arms diffusion rests on differences in the level of

human security and perceptions surrounding threats and marginalization. These factors

may account for the difference in use of weapons between conflicts.

Regional Categorization

To achieve regional representation in the analysis conducted for this research, two

conflicts were selected from each of the three regions after a thorough review of all

reported conflicts. Regional representation is used because “there are so many layers and

instances of conflict in Nigeria, active and latent, that it has proved impossible to ‘map’

them all in a geographical sense” (IPCR 2003, 16). In its analysis of Nigerian conflict, the

IPCR recognized that conflicts exist within all zones, and it is difficult to measure the

geographical spread due to deep tensions within some areas that have not yet erupted into

violent conflict. Despite the “huge number of specific conflicts in each zone, many

causes are essentially similar and can be explained within a single national typology of

conflict” (16); however, the sources of threat may differ. For example, ethnicity lies at

the center of some conflict, whereas religion may be the focus in others, or as is the case

of the Niger Delta, the threats may revolve around a specific industry such as oil.

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While a regional representation of conflict has been included in the case studies

selected for this research, the causes of conflict, whether ethnic or religious or political,

have largely been attributed to economic factors. A number of investigators have

analyzed the economic aspects of conflict and have suggested that resource competition

is often at the root source of such civil unrest (Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier 1999,

2000; Grossman 1999; Homer-Dixon 1999; Klare 2001). Klare posited that the scarcity

of resources underlines the majority of conflict. For example, the Niger Delta of the

Southern zone has moved from disputes over environmental degradation and

compensation to disputes over resource control. Within the Northern region, although the

Kaduna and Kano conflicts appear to be motivated by religious differences, the actual

focus is on the perception that settlers are taking over commerce. Within the Middle Belt

region, conflict (i.e., the Jos and Taraba disputes) centers on the indigene-settler question;

however, a secondary trigger is who controls the land. Therefore, conflict within the

Middle Belt zone is viewed as economic in nature (Ogoh Alubo, personal interview, 22

August 2005).

The IPCR (2003) emphasized the importance of “prebendal politics” and

suggested, “Nigeria’s present and future depend upon a prior understanding of the nature,

extent and persistence of a certain mode of political behavior, and of its social and

economic ramifications” (17). The nature of prebendal politics in Nigeria, according to

Joseph (1990), is based upon the idea that “all aspects of life (i.e., economic, social, and

cultural) have become politicized, indeed ‘over-politicized,’ as factions jockey for

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advantage in the distribution of the national cake, again, principally revenues from the

publicly-owned energy resources” (1).

Supply Factor, Access, and Date o f Conflict

A link is assumed between the proliferation of small arms and the increased

presence of weapons in civil conflict. The extent of diffusion depends upon the ability of

conflict actors to gain access to weapons. Therefore, it is also assumed that the supply

factor is at the same level in each case. The heavy use of weapons in one conflict while

not in another is based upon differences arising from the levels of both availability and

access. The conflict selected for study in this research occurred after 1980 because heavy

weapons and the phenomenon of SALW diffusion became both a Nigerian and global

problem during this period, which parallels the disintegration of the Cold War. Many of

the conflicts initially reviewed for selection had historical causes; however, recent reports

of conflict within Nigeria indicate that, although some of the disputes are rekindled

hostilities, others may have more recent causes. Additionally, conflicts have become

progressively more violent since the 1980s. Recent reports more thoroughly document

the actors; causes; and, to some extent, weapons seized during the conflicts than earlier

reports.

Final Cases

Based upon the outlined criteria, six case studies providing a representation of

conflict across Nigeria were selected for this research. After an initial review of reported

conflicts from 1980 to 2005, a sample was developed based upon geopolitical location.

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These cases were then screened according to their level of arms supply and location.

Table 5 summarizes the cases, and a review of the conflict reflects assumed proliferation

in the Tiv-Jukun ethnic clash within the Middle Belt zone. This dispute involved the

extensive use of guns and severe casualties, while few guns were used in the ethno

religious crisis within Jos. In the North, heavy use of SALW was evident in the Kaduna

conflict; however, few SALW were used in the Kano dispute. Within the South, the

conflict among the Ijaw was highly militarized, while the Ogoni dispute was militant but

not weaponized.

Table 5. Six Conflicts Selected for Case Study

Conflict Ethnic Location Region State Configuration Conflict

Middle Belt North Central Plateau State Tiv, Idoma, The Jos Zone Yoruba, Hausa, conflict Gwari, Kamberi, etc.

North East Taraba State Kanuri, The Tiv-Jukun Hausa/Fulani, conflict Jukun, etc.

Northern Zone North West Kaduna State Hausa/Fulani The Kaduna conflict

Kano State Hausa/Fulani The Kano conflict

Southern Zone South South Rivers State Itsekiri, Ijaw, Ogoni conflict Urhobo, etc.

Delta State Delta Ibo, Edo, Warri conflict etc.

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Data Collection and Analysis

The Middle Belt Zone

The Jos and Tiv-Jukun conflicts were selected in the Middle Belt region as one

case study. Although the historical antecedents of each were analyzed, the focus is on the

recent flare during 2001. Jos is the capital city of Plateau State. The conflict involves

complex elements that account for the nature of arms diffusion. Primary sources were

used to determine the availability of weapons and the relative deprivation and

marginalization that determine conflict outcome. Data collection was accomplished by

discussion with various groups within the community. Five focus groups were conducted

for this research within Plateau State with several key scholars from the Nigerian

National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Nigeria’s foremost policy “think tank”

located in Jos, as well as other actors.

The study interviews explored the various dimensions of conflict within the

region, including the Taraba and Plateau disputes, and sought a historical framework for

causes of these conflicts that would include socioeconomic issues as well as those of

ethnicity and religion. The marked effect of SALW proliferation on national integration

was also investigated along with the effects of domestic production and how conflict-

resolution mechanisms failed to foster national unity. Further focus groups were also

conducted with approximately thirty local residents within Shendam, Qu’an Pan, Mikang,

Langtang North, Langtang South, and the Wase area o f Jos. Resident participants

included schoolteachers, traditional community leaders, leaders of community-based

organizations, and ethnic and religious vigilantes. Personal interviews were held with six

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senior police officials at the Nigerian police command headquarters and with the

commandant at the military headquarters located in Jos. The participants identified

discrimination, unemployment, and control of the economy as potential conflict triggers.

They also identified the problem of cattle rustling and the increased use of a potent

alcoholic drink called goskolo,5 which induces a narcotic-like effect. The commandant of

the Jos army base attributed the violent nature of new conflicts to goskolo.6

The second Middle Belt case study involved conflict within Taraba State, which

has experienced a number of disputes. Two focus groups were held with youth leaders

and community leaders in Wukari, Taraba State. Participants in the focus groups were

drawn from parties involved in the conflict. Thirteen members from the Tiv (i.e., five

youth leaders) and Jukun (i.e., seven youth leaders) ethnic groups identified the following

sources of violent conflict: ethnicity, land ownership, and intense political rivalry.

The Northern Zone

Within the Northern zone, the same approach for determining access and flow,

and the same process determining deprivation and marginalization, were implemented. I

used the assistance of a local male researcher to obtain information because interaction is

prohibited between men and women. The Northern region is populated primarily by

Muslim groups (i.e., the Hausa/Fulani) and a few Christian tribes. This zone includes the

core Muslim states of the former Sokoto Caliphate and an Islamic state that existed

5 A strong local brew, also known as “burukutu,” made from a combination of vodka, brandy, and Indian hemp (i.e., marijuana). 6 Contacts were also made by telephone or mail with other researchers within Abuja, which included the former director of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution; professors from the University of Abuja; and researchers from the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, Lagos. All provided background information surrounding SALW proliferation within Nigeria.

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before the Nigerian colonial period (IPCR 2003). The zone has been divided into North

East, North West, and North Central zones (see fig. 1). The majority of the population are

farmers and pastoralists. Sharia law is a strong alternative to federal law, and conflicts

often revolve around religious ideology.

Within the Northern region (i.e., Kano and Kaduna), focus-group discussions

focused on the needs of communities and on conflicts in general, as well as the specific

conflicts of Kano and Kaduna. This information complemented the data obtained from

secondary sources such as published government documents and records. The focus

groups were comprised of a representative sample of individuals from communities that

had experienced conflict. The group discussions were carefully planned to create a

nonthreatening environment within which members were free to talk openly and

encouraged to express their opinions and respond to the opinions and questions of others,

as well as questions posed by the researcher. As a result of cultural differences and the

Islamic tradition precluding men and women from sitting together, the interviews and

focus groups were conducted on tape by an assistant researcher to questions written out

by me and transcribed by the investigator.

The Southern Zone

The Southern population of the region of Nigeria is primarily Christian, with the

exception of the southwestern portion, which is 50 percent Muslim. The Southern region

was divided into the South West, South East, and South South zones. Ethnic groups

include the Ibos within the South East, the Yoruba tribe within the South West, and many

tribes within the South South such as the Ijaw, Ogoni, Itsekeri, and Edo. The tribes of the

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South South speak various languages, unlike the monolingual Ibos within the South East

and the Yorubas of the South West. Conflicts within the South South revolve around

resource control. The South South is referred to as the Niger Delta, and this area is a

“hotbed” of violent armed conflict and the source of major weapons diffusion throughout

the balance of Nigeria (IPCR 2003). Fishing is the major occupation throughout this

region; however, pollution from oil exploration has destroyed many of the rivers and

caused high unemployment rates, which are key factors in frequent armed confrontation.

Within Warri, Delta State, focus-group participants were drawn from the

communities of Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo, which were the scenes of violent armed

conflict. Four prominent community leaders from each of the three communities

volunteered for the focus group, which was conducted on tape and transcribed by the

researcher.7 Within the South South, the role of the researcher was completely revised.

As a female, there was disbelief and awe among some participants while in the Northern

states that a woman could move freely among men. This was not such an issue in the

South; although, some questioned a female researcher wanting to work within a male-

dominated field.

Participants from three different groups were interviewed—conflict actors, state

officials, and researchers. Within the Niger Delta, the governor of Bayelsa State provided

a state perspective on insecurity and SALW proliferation throughout the region. Civilians

including members of a women’s group were also interviewed. Discussion focused on the

specific characteristics of a major oil-producing state that is largely underdeveloped. The

7Focus groups conducted w ithin the conflict zones were led by a local researcher due to the danger involved for the investigator o f this study and the inability o f the host to guarantee safety upon entering the z o n e .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. commissioner of police and commissioner for women’s affairs provided useful insight

surrounding threats that emerge from lack of economic opportunity and gender

marginalization. While attempts were made to speak to the leader of the militia group

(i.e., the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force), it was not possible due to his travel to the

Pro-National Conference Organization meeting in Abuja. His spokesperson was clearly

rigid in his belief that violence is the only avenue toward ensuring demands are met.

Through his participation in the study interviews, the level of militancy and the length the

militias will go to achieve their aims was made clear. It was also clear that the militias

possess arms; however, this spokesman refused to indicate the quantity. The stance of the

group on the use of force is backed by their firepower. The commissioner of police

commented that even the police force does not have access to the type of weapons

possessed by the militants. With their leader jailed, a new group known as the MEND has

continued the insurgency. Since their emergence during 2006, they have managed to

destabilize the world’s oil supply with their militant activities and use of heavy firepower

such as grenades and rockets.

The director of the Center for Youth Development spoke of youth involvement in

the conflict. We discussed the insecurities and the youth perspective of such civil dispute.

Two well-known activists and researchers who have written extensively on the Niger

Delta conflict spent hours discussing the historical evolution of the conflict, the

manifestations o f militancy in current disputes, and the manner in which arms diffusion

has shaped the nature of current conflict. The early history of the Niger Delta was

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reviewed, as well as the various phases of the conflict, which began as a battle over

control of resources and has transformed into a full-scale demand for self-determination.

Role o f the Researcher

The researcher in this study arrived at the field sites of each case with no

foreknowledge of what to expect. Each site presented its own set of problems. Within the

Middle Belt, people are suspicious of anyone from an ethnic group that is not their own.

Years of warring have left a clear imprint on the population, and tension is written on

virtually every face. The study participants, and even some community leaders, were

under the impression that researchers are actually conducting a form of espionage for the

government; consequently, many refused to take part in the study. Within Wukari, many

of the women turned down the invitation to participate because their culture restricts

females from leaving the home. The police were frugal with information related to

SALW; however, they did provide background data regarding conflict. The police

continued to withhold information even after letters of authority were obtained from their

headquarters in Abuja.

While in Jos, with academics open to discussion and readily providing

information, both the military and police forces were reticent with data related to SALW

seizures or the numbers of arms in circulation, either those involved in conflict or in

general circulation nationally. While the police in Jos were surprisingly eager to help,

they appeared to have limited, incomplete records on weapons seizure. A local resource

was subsequently used to obtain such records from emergency declaration documents

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housed within the government archives of Plateau State. Informants from both sides of

the conflict divide attempted to portray each other as the aggressors.

While in the Niger Delta zone, the researcher of this study was literally under

twenty-four-hour guard. While in Bayelsa, one of the informants offered transportation to

Olobiri; however, our safety could not be guaranteed by our host if we strayed outside

designated areas. Therefore, the focus-group session was recorded by a third party.

Within all of the focus groups and interviews, questions were declared in advance to

guide the discussion and notes were taken related to the following questions: What

patterns emerged? What are the common themes? What new questions arose? What

conclusions seem accurate? A summary of the notes was created after each focus group.

One advantage of such discussion groups is the depth and complexity of responses, and

participants often stimulate new thoughts in other participants. However, there were also

limitations to this approach. For example, focus groups typically consume a greater

amount of time per respondent than do individual interviews, and some participants feel

uncomfortable speaking openly for fear of reprisal.

The tense atmosphere of the study sites and the threat of kidnapping necessitated

the use of mobile police for protection. Therefore, interviews were guided by telephone

because the researcher was not allowed to leave the government house or move freely for

fear that the militia would abduct her or her children. State officials and police escorted

the investigator to each Niger Delta location visited during the study. The danger was

evident when the spokesperson for the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force announced

that the ten or so mobile police guarding us, and the commissioner of police sitting across

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from us, could not protect the researcher or her children if he wished to have us

kidnapped. He stated, “We can whip [the Baylesa State Commissioner of Police] and his

boys [the bevy of policemen that provided round-the-clock protection for the researcher

and her family]. The police guns cannot match our weapons” (Kimi Engozu, personal

interview, 25 August 2005).

The reluctance to release information or participate in the study may have been a

result of the affiliation of the researcher with the current vice president of Nigeria. It was

very difficult to get information directly from key informants and other sources. The

researcher was either perceived to be a government agent or a spy. One informant

reported that information related to SALW proliferation threatens national security;

hence, this type of information cannot be released. In general, study participants were

ready to air their grievances. However, it is noteworthy that some responses and stories

were exaggerated so it was important to balance this via triangulation information with

other local sources. The site visit to Jos and the Niger Delta presented many accounts of

gloom.

It was critical for the investigator to ask other researchers to double-check

information, particularly because it was often reported that the information received was

unavailable. Therefore, the following efforts were made to ensure data were cross

checked:

1. In each locale, the researcher used a local resource person with established ties

to the community to build trust with the local community focus groups and interviewers.

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This resource person helped the investigator to establish an “inroad” with the community.

Many of these resource people were college professors or university students.

2. Discussion questions were prepared before each session. General questions

surrounding the participants included their personal backgrounds and the nature of their

work. Specific questions related to conflict (e.g., sources), SALW data (e.g., number),

and socioeconomic factors, were also included.

3. Facts were cross-checked by researchers and professors within the local area

and with secondary information available in the field or among respondents and

secondary records.

Data-Collection Limitations and Analysis Techniques

Cataloguing the small-arms trade, especially illicit proliferation, presents a high

level of difficulty. As succinctly described by the GIIS (2001),

In this climate of increasing transparency, international efforts have led to increasingly accurate assessments of the scale and dimensions of the diverse range of weapons jeopardizing international peace and security. However, SALW remain an exception to this trend [and] one of the last areas where policy is seriously hindered by lack of basic information. (59)

While a diverse body of research has examined the proliferation of conventional

weapons, the same cannot be said about the relationship between global arms transfer and

subnational SALW proliferation. Even rough estimates of existing SALW and their

regional distribution do not allow for disaggregation along national lines. Much of the

literature on SALW is comparatively recent and filled with empirical gaps (Boutwell and

Klare 1999; Laurance 1992; Sislin and Pearson 2001). Not only are there no reliable

estimates of the number of SALW within Nigeria, but the selected conflicts under study

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and the key focal point (i.e., weapons held by nonstate actors that were obtained through

black- or gray-market channels) are shrouded in unknowns resisting investigation.

This field research conducted in this study was also not free of problems. Security

agencies were suspicious and cautious with regard to release of information related to

SALW seizures. This is common with research examining issues related to national

security. Another major problem was the paucity of available small arms. Data

maintained by the police force were difficult to access by any means. This includes

current data, and information was not properly catalogued when it did exist. In short,

Nigerian police do not have detailed data on SALW, and the information they do have is

not well organized. The police did not even maintain comprehensive data on arms seizure

until Nigeria established the National Committee on SALW during 2001. As mentioned

earlier, this committee is responsible for policy guidance, research, and monitoring all

aspects of SALW proliferation, control, circulation, trafficking, and reduction. It

registers, detects, and organizes the destruction of all illicit and surplus weapons. The

committee is composed of officials and representatives from sixteen governmental and

nongovernmental organizations.

Part of the difficulty in obtaining information on SALW from Nigerian police is

the restriction that they only release such data to the National Committee on SALW.

Only the inspector general can dispense the information, and only on a “need-to-know”

basis. The committee only began recording data during 2003, and it is reluctant to release

the information. Consequently, secondary sources (e.g., human rights reports, United

Nations records, and databases such as that of the Norwegian Initiative for Small Arms

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Transfer) are used to triangulate data in the present study. The difficulty is made acute by

the paucity of relevant case studies of arms proliferation within Nigeria. There are few

reliable databases containing comprehensive inventories of small arms and the

distribution of these weapons including the production and distribution of the automatic

rifle, the most popular small arm. O’Callaghan and Wood (1999) reported that research

on the political economy of SALW proliferation is relatively underdeveloped. Wood and

Peleman (1999) also noted the lack of research examining the role of nonstate brokers

identified as playing major roles in the illicit-arms trade.

Although the role of SALW in several national, intragroup and intergroup

conflicts [most notably in West African states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigera]

has been examined in case studies (Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Boutwell and Klare

1999), there remains a paucity of data surrounding SALW at not only a national level, but

also a subnational level. Nevertheless, it is clear that the diffusion of SALW to nonstate

actors has increased dramatically within Nigeria since the early 1980s. Given its size,

political importance, and oil resources, Nigeria is a unique case. Rather than achieving

the status as a democratic state with a decent standard of living, Nigeria has evolved into

a weak, authoritarian state. Unfortunately, the root causes of the weak government in

Nigeria and problem with SALW proliferation have only been examined via a

conventional arms- transfer approach. According to Mandel (1998), “most writing on the

subject continues to be atheoretical and descriptive” (1). As Mandel suggested, the field

of SALW proliferation lacks “conceptual studies that allow for the placement of arms

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proliferation in specific emerging post-Cold War realities . . . in a broad explanatory

context” (1).

Within Nigeria, there is no identifiable research linking proliferation to

militarization with the exception of a few conflict studies (IPCR 2003; Otite and Albert

2001). The current study was designed to fill this gap in the literature through an

examination of the interplay between small-arms proliferation and the diffusion and

militarization of conflict within the historical context of Nigerian development into a

nation. Therefore, the present study applies a human-security approach accommodating

the multidimensional characteristics of this conceptual combination and captures the

interplay between the internal dynamics and external influences impacting proliferation.

Efforts made to overcome the difficulties presented in this research include obtaining

permission from the Nigerian police to conduct interviews and employing the aid of local

researchers and interpreters to assist with language barriers and in cases where interaction

with males was discouraged because the researcher is female. Many of the actors spoke

various Nigerian languages, while the researcher was limited to English. The level of

illiteracy encountered with distance from the city centers was surprising. Lastly, the use

of escorts discouraged aggressive behavior toward the researcher; however, this use also

hindered the study because conflict actors sometimes viewed them in the same manner as

they did the government agents they fought. In such instances, the security team was

asked to remain in the background.

The present study adopted a human-security approach to the analysis of arms

diffusion. This method facilitated the identification of demand-side factors leading to the

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demand for arms. The analysis included a review of the empirical evidence surrounding

the conflicts under study and the categories of demand-side issues that facilitated the

respective conflict dynamics. A pattern was subsequently identified to match the

predicted framework of (1) relative demand, (2) threat perception, and (3) access.

Patterns matching these three casual factors enhance internal validity.

The Qualitative Case-Study Approach

A case-study approach was implemented in the collection and analysis of

empirical evidence (Yin 1984) in this research. It was also used to document the various

factors that impact armed conflict. According to Yin, “The case study is an empirical

inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context: when

the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which

multiple sources of evidence are used” (23). The qualitative techniques employed include

interviews that provided first-hand details that fill the gap caused by the absence of or

limited information regarding small arms in Nigerian civil conflict. Interview questions

were open-ended, and all interviews were conducted in single sessions. Questions were

prepared that were designed specifically for the various population groups involved in the

conflict within the different regions of the research zone. The questions served as a

guideline for introducing discussion. This technique tends to relax interviewees who then

often provide answers beyond the questions asked.

Focus groups were also conducted in this study. These interactions generated data

that helped contribute explanations for insecurity, proliferation, and militancy. Although

participants sometime presented content from their perspectives, the role of the researcher

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was to remain neutral and simply record all information. Document review determined

general patterns and trends surrounding the impact of SALW demand on the selected

conflicts under study. The case-study comparison method was used to examine and

compare the structural characterizations and processes leading to arms proliferation; for

example, the historical backgrounds and geography of each region that experienced

conflict, the sources of arms supply, and an analysis of the interactive effects of SALW

proliferation. This method produced data on seminal episodes, organizations, groups, or

subcultures involved in conflict; the role of involved organizations; and key relationships

among conflict actors.

The topic of weapons in general is a very sensitive issue for conflict participants

and government officials. On the federal level, a deliberate effort to avoid providing any

information on small arms is clearly evident. With persistent questioning, a response

informing that release of such information would threaten national security was received.

Conflict actors who store arms are more likely to exhibit their weapons, but will also

refuse to disclose the total number within their armory. They were more likely to provide

information related to the conflict itself and their grievances. Investing the time to listen

to participants and visit conflict locations proved to be important, creating a sense of trust

and empathy between the researcher and interviewees and focus-group members.

Interviewees and Secondary Data Sources

Data were collected from both governmental and institutional sources, such as the

military and police, because to establish demand, it is necessary to confirm the actual

number of weapon seizures and/or weapons in circulation. A number of the officials

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their records were inconsistent. However, other evidence of diffusion was obtained from

oral reports made by informants within the field and from newspaper records. The local

population was also used to cross-check official sources of information. Members of civil

society groups, scholars, conflict actors, and others with direct knowledge of the issues

were interviewed. Some of these individuals were members of warring factions,

representatives of the local community, militia members, or members of other

nongovernmental organizations. Local conflict actors were able to provide information

surrounding the socioeconomic factors that drive the conflicts, which were primarily

questions of settler-indigene status, resource control, and cultural or religious factors. No

general measure exists from official sources regarding SALW. Therefore, problems

emerge when precise numbers are required as official records are often inconsistent or

incomplete.

To address Research Question 1, data relevant to the empirical scope of the legal

and illegal arms trade within West Africa and Nigeria were obtained from the GIIS

(2001, 2002, 2005). The U. S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1999) of the U.S.

State Department also provided relevant background. The databases of the Norwegian

Institute for Small Arms Transfers and the Stockholm International Peace Institute were

analyzed for content. To uncover the nature and dimensions of access to SALW, it was

necessary to identify the patterns o f the postcolonial arms trade and its effect on current

trade. This historical perspective facilitated identification of weapons activity during each

historical time period in West Africa and the respective impact on communities. It also

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provided a reference for post-Cold War SALW proliferation. General information

regarding conflict actors, the illicit arms trade, and the relationship between arms

recipients and suppliers was derived from data sources, interviews, and secondary

documents such as newspapers and archival sources.

To address Research Questions 2 and 3, consolidated and zonal reports of Nigeria

by the IPCR (2003) were reviewed. This in-depth documentation was based upon an

analysis of the causes of Nigerian conflict, responses to the conflict, and policy-related

options and strategies. Cases analyzed in the consolidated reports covered historical time

lines of widely known conflicts documented prior to March 2002. The focus is on

conflicts within each zone and the reports map the dynamics of the disputes. The list of

conflicts is not comprehensive; however, in-depth data, including the ethnic makeup of

the zones, are independently presented. Additionally, the key actors, seminal events (i.e.,

“triggers,” as they are referred to in the report), and contributing variables such as

socioeconomic inequality and religious and ethnic tensions, are also presented.

Another source of data addressing Research Questions 2 and 3 was the study

conducted by Otite and Albert (2001).Their publication provided a theoretical overview

of conflict within Nigeria and included nine ethnographic studies of disputes within

several Nigerian states or regions including Tiv-Jukun and the religious conflict in Kano.

Otite and Albert also included a detailed analysis of events and the internal dynamics of

particular communities. Their research exemplified the case-study approach applied in

the present study. The third source is composed of (1) an Africa Peace Review survey of

conflicts within Nigeria devoted to a general examination of zonal disputes (National

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War College 2003); (2) a publication focused on the Warri conflict (Imobighe, Bassey,

and Asuni 2002); and (3) research conducted by Okonta and Douglas (2003) that

provided a good background on the Niger Delta region and, in particular, the Ogoni

conflict. The National War College Survey highlighted historical conflicts and provided

explanations for these disputes. The Imobighe, Bassey, and Asuni research, coupled with

the Okonta and Douglas study, provided a retrospective analysis and reviews surrounding

conflict within the Niger Delta region.

Data addressing Research Questions 2 and 3 were also drawn from studies

conducted by the Human Rights Watch (2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2005a, 2005b, 2006),

which provided detailed accounts of recent violent conflict within Nigeria. These reports

were reviewed for data related to conflict within Benue, Kaduna, Niger Delta, Jos, and

Warri. The collective review revealed that, since 1999, the hotbed of conflicts remained

within the North and Middle Belt regions. Other secondary data were drawn from the

survey results published by Lewis and Alemika (2004), which addressed public attitudes

and attempted reform within Nigeria. The survey involved a nationally representative

sample of 2,428 Nigerians from all geopolitical zones. The study analyzed public

thinking surrounding the economy, politics, and the transition from military to civilian

rule, among other issues. Important data supporting the argument of relative deprivation

were clearly apparent because the survey found “widespread deprivation and increased

pessimism about personal conditions” (viii).

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CHAPTER 5

CASE HISTORIES: THE MIDDLE BELT ZONE

Quest For Identity

The Middle Belt zone is located at the center of Nigeria and includes the states of

Benue, Taraba, and Plateau. The region has the largest concentration of ethnic minority

groups and is, therefore, culturally heterogeneous and ethnically diverse. There are claims

that the Bantu have lived in the area for the past 40,000 years (IIDEA 2000); however,

indigenous ethnic groups “range from the Nupe, Igbirra, Alago, Jukun, the Igala (who

had various forms of centralized state system[s]), to the Idoma, Berom and Tiv (who

governed themselves through clans and village groups)” (281). There are “several

ethnic/linguistic groups who co-existed without clear-cut territorial boundaries because of

the continuous migratory activity that characterized the area up to the arrival of the

colonialists” (282). IIDEA noted that the Middle Belt was incorporated into the emirate

system of Northern Nigeria through a jihad (281). Therefore, the zone serves figuratively

as a transition between the Christian south and the Muslim north, representing an

imaginary boundary between Christianity and Islam. This has rendered it a region of

intense religious competition.

Thejihad of Usman Dan Fodio moved through the Northern emirate at

approximately the same time as the colonists arrived in Nigeria, “spreading] not only

Islam but also [opening] up the area for trade and immigration of the Hausa Fulani ethnic

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nationalities” (IIDEA 2000,283). As a result, “conquered areas of the Middle Belt were

incorporated in the emirate system, institutionalizing their inferior status, creating socio

economic disparity and alienation” (281). The colonial authorities that arrived later used

the jihadists as “foot soldiers to conquer the peoples of the Middle Belt... and

administered as part of the Northern protectorate under a policy of indirect rule. In

implementing the indirect-rule policy, emirs functioned as intermediaries in

administering the colonial territories” (283). This indirect rule introduced an emirate

system “based on Islam and ... manned by the Fulani elite” (283), and this system

created a fault line rendering the region a conflict hot spot.

The colonial authorities allowed Christian missionaries to work within the Middle

Belt area, and “the missionaries, who had been chased away from the Islamic north by

the colonial authorities, brought an alternative religious view to a people looking

desperately for something to counter the dominance of Islam, which they associated with

O Q Fulani oppression” (284). The fault line was solidified by colonial policies and a

military authoritarian system that created a “lack of identity; lack of autonomy and calls

for devolution of power [and] ethno-religious conflicts” (281). With such a diverse

cultural and ethnic landscape, and no clear identifying ties to the North or South, the

Middle Belt sought to create what the people of the region defined as a Middle Belt

8The emirate oppression and exploitation took the form of heavy taxes, forced labor, expropriations of farmland and rivers, forceful religious conversion, and religious discrimination. The emirate system had a severe impact on the communities that lacked a centralized state system or a universal religion (IIDEA 2000 ). 9The “fault line” refers to the inherent contradictions in the system. Colonialism preserved Islamic structures such as Islamic education and a centralized system of government in the North, yet colonial services were based upon western education, and the colonial authorities hired mainly Christian Igbos and Yorubas from the south. These two groups subsequently dominated the public service, the professions, and private businesses as others from the south, attracted by colonial administrative and commercial centers, migrated to the area (IIDEA 2000,284).

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identity. Therefore, identity dynamics, often encapsulated in the settler-indigene divide,

are a central feature of recent conflicts.

In addition to the underlying settler-indigene dichotomy existing within the

Middle Belt zone, the various ethnic groups that inhabit the region compete for land. The

interrelationship of complex elements manifested in intense rivalry and competition for

control of socioeconomic and political power. Nwachukwu and Ojugbana (2002) noted

that the Middle Belt was one of the last areas within Nigeria to come under central-

govemment control, and one of the last areas to receive education and public services.

They contended that this has

made the struggle for access to resources, be it access to farmland, electricity, employment or political power, fierce in the extreme.... The narrowing of economic opportunity has produced a frustrated and angry underclass of unemployed youths [and] it is to this disempowered group that politicians look for support with disastrous consequences in the region. (133)

The popular perception is that current conflicts within the Middle Belt region are

linked to the struggle for political rights. For example, Asuni (1999) suggested that nearly

all the Tiv, as well as a section of the Jukun, trace their conflicts back to the introduction

of Nigerian party politics. Historically, however, the zone has been embroiled in resource

and identity conflicts fueled by settler-indigene issues and further complicated by “the

introduction of Sharia (Islamic) law and in part by increasing Christian fundamentalism”

(IIDEA 2000,281). With 29 percent of Middle Belt communities considered poor, and 42

percent of the population within the poor or low-income range, the struggle over

economic opportunities is a key cause of conflict.

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Taraba State and the Tiv-Junkin Conflict

Taraba State is bordered by the state of Adamawa on the northeast and the states

of Plateau and Benue on the west and southwest (see fig. 1). With the current Nigeria

zonal structure, it is located in the North East zone centered within the Middle Belt. The

Republic of Cameroon lies on its eastern border. The state was created in 1991 out of

land known as Gongola State, covering approximately 60,000 square kilometers. The

2006 census places the population at 2,300,736 million (National Population Commission

2007). There are sixteen local government areas within Taraba State—Wukari is the

largest commercial center in the region and is surrounded by vast, arable, fertile

farmland. The major occupation of the residents is agriculture with communities along

the banks of the rivers Benue, Taraba, and Donga engaged in fishing (Federal

Government of Nigeria 2006). Crops such as maize, rice, millet, cassava, and yams are

produced in commercial quantities. Livestock, such as poultry, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats,

and rabbits, are farmed commercially, especially on the Mambilla Plateau and along the

Benue and Taraba valleys. Taraba is predominately a rural community.

Conflict Origin

The genesis of theTiv Jukun conflict goes back several years. The introduction of

the Taraba and Benue States created new minorities within both states and attendant

problems. While the Jukun are the major ethnic group within Taraba, the Tiv are one of

the largest of the numerous ethnic minorities throughout Nigeria, yet this population

group is the minority within the state (Best, Idyorough, and Shehu 2001; Human Rights

Watch 2002). In Benue State, which shares a common border with Taraba State, the Tiv

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are the majority group and the Jukun are the minority (Best, Idyorough, and Shehu 2001).

There are also sizeable groups of Tiv within the states of Taraba, Nassarawa, and Plateau,

as well as a small Jukun group within Benue (Abubakar 2003; Human Rights Watch

2002). As a result, the southern region of Taraba and the northern area of Benue became

a collective conflict zone between the two groups. This zone includes Wukari, Bali, Ibi,

Gassol, Donga, and Takum—all of which are in Taraba State—and Ukum within Benue

State.

The Tiv and Jukun have been engaged in violent conflict since 1953. Precolonial

relations among ethnic groups have fueled sources of latent tension. As reported in the

article entitled “Focus on Central Region Tiv/Jukan Clashes” (2001), since the onset of

violent conflict during the early 1950s, there have been sporadic outbreaks (i.e., in 1964,

1976, and from 1990 to 1992). The most recent outbreak of violent armed conflict

continued from September 2001 to January 2002 among organized groups of Tiv and

Jukun (Human Rights Watch 2002). This conflict was equally affected by “cross

accusations and mutual suspicion [that] characterize relations between the groups”

(Nwachukwu and Ojugbana 2002,143); Tiv and Jukun consider each other the

aggressors. This is encapsulated in the views of Adeniyi (2001) who described the Tiv-

Jukun conflict in the following manner:

The trouble between the Tiv people and their neighbors has been a perennial problem, right from the colonial days. And as long as they maintain their expansionist tendencies, so long will they have problem with their neighbors . .. it is a problem that has to do with the culture of migration and territorial acquisitive tendencies of the Tivs. (1-14)

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Within Taraba State, the Jukun are the dominant ethnic group and perceive

themselves as the original inhabitants of the state and, as a result, the ‘“indigenes’10 and

‘non-indigenes’11 disputes have surfaced in different contexts” (Human Rights Watch

2005a, 9). The conflict can sometimes be rooted in political position (Asuni 1999; Avav

2002; Best, Idyorough, and Shehu 2001; Hagher 2002; Otite and Albert 2001). In other

cases, it revolves around land. Nwachukwu and Ojugbana (2002) contended that the

“violence between the Tiv and Jukun, coexisting in Benue and Taraba States ... relates

to disputes over land, traditional rulership, political authority, and fears of domination

and marginalization” (132). Best, Idyorough, and Shehu also found that a Tiv-Jukun

conflict that lasted for two years in Taraba was sourced in relative threat perceptions and

marginalization. As the dominant ethnic group in Taraba, the Jukun view their dominant

position as threatened by the Tiv who are the dominant minority tribe within the region

with a large population spread across several states.

10“The definition of the term ‘indigene’ is commonly understood to be based on a person’s place of origin, but many people bom and brought up in a particular area are not accorded that status, even though they may never have lived in any other part of Nigeria. No official document or legislation defines these categories precisely or sets out clear criteria as to how a person’s ‘indigeneship’ is determined.”. .. [Therefore], the way in which the concept of ‘indigeneship’ has been applied has been fundamentally discriminatory and constitutes a violation of Nigeria’s obligation under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)” (Human Rights Watch 2005a, 8). Human Rights Watch (2006) extensively examines the issues emerging as a result of this distinction. "indigene and nonindigene factors revolve around ethnicity. According to Osaghae and Suberu (2005), “Ethnicity is generally regarded as the most basic and political[ly] salient identity in Nigeria.” As these authors explained, the category of ethnoreligious identities initially owed its origin to regional formations. It has been useful for differentiating the predominately Muslim north from the predominantly Christian south. This category has also helped to differentiate the dominant Muslim north from the non-Muslim minorities within the region. This concept of indigene status distinguishes the host (i.e., the original owner) and settler (i.e., the immigrant) within the community and is meant to “help guarantee Nigeria’s more than 250 million ethnic groups the power to preserve their unique identities—their culture, traditions and traditional institutions of governance” (Human Rights Watch 2006, 5). Conflict occurs as a result of the fear of domination by another major ethnic group (Alubo 2004).

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According to many researchers (Avav 2002; Hagher 2002; Human Rights Watch

2002; Otite and Albert 2001), much of the tension between the Tiv and Jukun is due to

each group believing it should control Wukari, the traditional Jukun center. Other factors

have made the Tiv-Jukun conflict intractable such as feelings of hostility resulting from

disputes over the setting of the boundary between Benue and Taraba States, [and the] respect (or disrespect) for boundary demarcations and political control of the border towns and villages.... Over the years, communities have found increasing difficulty in living together peacefully. Over time, political polarization gradually turned into physical segregation, too. (Human Rights Watch 2002,16-17)

In essence, Benue became a Tiv state and Taraba a Jukun state. Arguably, the

contemporary Tiv-Jukun crisis was created in the 1910s when the Tiv were encouraged

by the colonial administration to migrate in large numbers into areas considered Jukun

territory including Wukari (Best, Idyorough, and Shehu 2001; Mustapha 1997).

According to Mustapha, “The Tivs were not only a large group; their population also

expanded much faster than those of their neighbors” (15). In some areas within Tiv

territory, particularly in Kwande and Vandekya to the south, population pressure was

acute, rising to 190 people per square mile by 1937 (see table 6) and, by 1952, some areas

in Shangeve had more than 600 people per square mile.

Mustapha (1997) reported, “Colonial policy, reflecting the idiosyncratic attitudes

of various officials on the ground, had quite contradictory effects” (15). He explained

that, while the colonial authorities encouraged Tiv migration to Wukari, government

officials believed that, because the Tiv lacked a centralized state structure, the region

should be brought under the rule of the Aku Uka of Wukari, the paramount head of the

Jukun. However, the migration of Tiv farmers into Wukari during the early years of

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Table 6. Population of the Wukari Division by Ethnic Group, 1946

Tribe Total Percentage of Total

Tiv 40,400 37

Kuteb 20,284 19

Jukun 10,867 10

Ichen 6,775 6

Hausa 5,287 5

Chamba 4,500 4

Others 20,229 12

Source: Onuigu Otite and Isaac Olawale Albert, ed. 2001. Community Conflict in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation. Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books.

colonialism became a subject of concern for the colonialists, and they deliberately sought

to keep the Tiv from what they believed was Jukun territory. This concern was based

upon anthropological studies that suggested the Jukun culture would be corrupted by the

Tiv once they migrated in large numbers into Wukari (Best, Idyorough, and Shehu 2001).

There was also the perception that the Tiv were generally inferior to the Jukun, which led

to attempts toward segregating the two groups. As Asuni (1999) pointed out, an example

of this deliberate attempt at exclusion was “the establishment of the Wukari Federation

local council, 1 which"J included all other main ethnic groups, but excluded the Tiv as they

I2According to Best, Idyorough, and Shehu (2001), the Wukari Federation included the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Nupe, and Igala. The Jukun claim they are related to the Hausa, Kanuri, and Fulani, but even more closely to the Kanuri with whom they had earlier migrated from Yemen. While the Kanuri settled in Chad, the Jukuns moved southward and established the Kwararafa kingdom. The Tiv migrated into the Benue valley from the Cameroon during the eighteenth century, by which time the Kwararafa kingdom had

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were considered migrants” (1-14). Consequently, Tiv areas, such as Katsina Ala, Zaki

Biam, and parts of Kwande, were administered by the Wukari Federation. It was not until

1926 that a Tiv Division was created, bringing most of the Tiv areas under a common

administration (Mustapha 1997).

As their population grew, the Tiv expanded into the territory of their neighbors in

search of fresh, fertile land. Attempts to introduce more sustainable farming methods

failed and, by 1948, colonial officials claimed that Tiv expansion was not caused by land

hunger or uneconomic methods of farming, but by a “traditional code demanding

expansive advance in a predetermined direction” (Mustapha 1997, 16). Colonial policy

was idiosyncratic at best and contributed to the lack of integration of the groups. After

attempting to confine the Tiv to avoid corruption of the Jukun population, Mustapha

noted that, during the late 1940s, colonial authorities encouraged Tiv migration “in the

Northerly and Easterly directions” (16).

The Tiv, who were now perceived as “hardworking,” were encouraged to move

into the territory of the “lazy Jukun” (Mustapha 1997,16); therefore, the Tiv began to

settle within Wukari, Muri, Shendam, Lafia, and Wamba. By 1914, a Munshi (i.e., the

colonial name for the Tiv) wall had been erected to the south and west. The decision to

encourage Tiv migration into Jukun territory reflected a reversal in colonial thinking

surrounding both groups. According to Mustapha, the “superior” Jukun, with their history

of a centralized state, were not expanding as economically and demographically as the

become a dominant political entity. The Tiv claim they settled in Wukari when the Jukun were settled in Kwararafa approximately 83 kilometers north of Wukari (88-89). Best, Idyorough, and Shehu argued that both groups (i.e., the Jukun coming from the south and the Tiv migrating from the north) would have met in Wukari.

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“inferior” Tiv (16). Best, Idyorough, and Shehu (2001) noted that the colonial

administration integrated the Tiv and Jukun because it was advantageous from the

standpoint of tax revenue, territory, and prestige. As described by Mustapha, “The

economic and demographic inertia of the Jukun had a direct bearing on the capacity of

the colonial state to raise tax revenue. Wukari was now described as having a ‘decaying

population’ while the Tiv were superior in every way to all the peoples by which it is

surrounded.” (16)

By the 1990s, the Tiv were the majority within Wukari. Not only were the

“strangers” wealthier than their “hosts,” they now had the population base to gain

political ascendancy (Mustapha 1997,16). The 1946 census, which recorded a

breakdown of the Tiv and Jukun within Wukari, attested to this growth (see table 7).

Table 7. The Tiv and Jukun Populations within the Wukari Federation/Taraba State, 1946

District Tiv (%) Jukun (%)

Wukari 51.00 24.00

Takum 32.00 2.35

Donga 33.80 0.59

Source: International Society for Human Rights. 2002. Genocide and Nigerian Army Massacre of Tiv Civilians in Central Nigeria, http://www.ishr.org/sections-groups/ wae/tic.htm (accessed 18 July 2007).

Members of both ethnic groups reside in the states of Taraba and Benue; however, the

growth of the Tiv population, their access to political power, and their contention that

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they were denied political and citizenship rights by the Jukun have created latent

tension (Avav 2002; Hagher 2002; Otite and Albert 2001) reinforced by the violent

politics of the region.

The Role o f Politics

The breakdown in relations between the Tiv and Jukun occurred during the 1954

election. The Jukun belong to the Northern Peoples Congress, and the Tiv belong to the

United Middle Belt Congress (Asuni 1999) through which they gained political

ascendancy in the 1956 federal elections for the national assembly (Best, Idyorough,

and Shehu 2001 ).13 This resulted in the 1959-1960 Tiv riots between supporters of the

Northern Peoples Congress, which was the dominant party within northern Nigeria, and

the United Middle Belt Congress. Newspaper accounts (Avav 2002; Hagher 2002)

stated that the Jukun elite seemed to be threatened by the political gains of the Tiv

immigrants, especially after the appointment during 1979 and 1983 of two Tiv men to

prominent government positions within Taraba State. During 1979, as the country

prepared for general elections, the Tiv-Jukun conflict, which had been simmering for

decades over resources and Tiv expansionism, reached a higher level of tension. The

first skirmish occurred during 1987 when the Babangida administration initiated local

government elections on a nonparty basis. A Hausa was elected chairman of the Wukari

local government. The Jukun were clearly an electoral minority within what they

regarded as their home territory (Best, Idyorough, and Shehu 2001; Mustapha 1997).

13The Northern Peoples Congress, to which the majority of the Jukun belong, adopted a policy of northemization, which called for the replacement of southerners by northerners in the northern public service (IIDEA 2000).

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When party politics returned after the end of military rule during May 1999,

tensions increased between the Tiv and Jukun communities over political control of

Taraba. As Best, Idyorough, and Shehu (2001) contended, “The control of the

government council was only an instrument with which both groups sought to use to

achieve other broader goals” (101). During September 2001, fighting erupted anew

between the two groups, with a series of attacks and counterattacks within the border

towns and villages. Leaders of the Jukun community mobilized Jukun youths to drive

the Tiv from Taraba before the 2003 elections to gain political control of the area

(Hagher 2002). Accounts of the conflict reported that, with the new violence between

Tiv and Jukun during early October 2001,14 the federal government deployed troops to

the borders between Benue and Taraba (“Focus on Central Region” 2001). On 10

October, government troops were ambushed and captured near the border at Vatse by

the Tiv militia. A few days later, their mutilated bodies were found within a primary

school in nearby Zaki Biam, a Tiv stronghold. Locals said the killing was prompted by

incidents involving armed men in uniform attacking several Tiv communities.

According to the informants, the army retaliated by killing approximately 200 residents

of Zaki Biam, leveling the town with armored cars, grenades, and bombs.

The 2001 Tiv-Jukun conflict proved to be a turning point. It was the bloodiest and

most brutal of the conflicts within the region and attracted national attention due to

involvement of the federal government. The Tiv strongly suspected that elements within

the military were backing their Jukun rivals (“Focus on Central Region” 2001). The

14The first major confrontation occurred between 1990 and 1992 when approximately 6,000 people were killed by beheading or fire. Pregnant women and children were also killed during this conflict (International Society for Human Rights 2002).

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Nigerian government sided with the Jukun (Hagher 2002) and the support was considered

an abuse of executive power and widely condemned both at home and internationally. By

the end of the conflict, more than 900,000 Tiv were said to have fled their homes to

refugee camps within Benue and Plateau (International Society for Human Rights 2002).

Threats and Insecurities

Fear o f political domination. The level of threat was based upon the Jukun fear

that the Tiv would eventually dominate the political and economic spheres of Taraba

State. The Tiv allege political marginalization by the Jukun. Insecurities associated with

conflict exist on two levels—(1) individual and group, and (2) communal and state. The

mutual distrust between the conflict actors of both sides equated to a state of constant fear

of attack. The perceived military and police involvement, and the porous borders through

which arms flowed, coupled with the presence of armed retired soldiers, led to a gradual

buildup of arms, which were freely used in the frequent and violent eruptions.

The control of the local government council and political appointments have been

main concerns of the Tiv community and an area within which they feel marginalized.

The Tiv want the enlarged Wukari Traditional Council to accommodate them so they can

participate in the decision-making process. The Jukun have rejected the idea of creating a

separate traditional council for the Tiv in Taraba. According to Abubakar (2003), “The

presence of the Tivs in Wukari division constitutes a real threat to their [Jukun] survival”

(60). This indigene-settler issue, and the relevant fear of political domination, affect the

sense of security for both population groups. Colonial structures of power divided the two

ethnic groups, and Jukun and Tiv elites fragmented their people along political, social,

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and ethnic lines. The struggle for political control has manifested because those with

political power have clear access to resources and political positions.

The Tiv, even within the Jukun territory, believed that forming a strong cohesion,

as did their brothers in Benue, would facilitate retention of their ethnic identity (Best,

Idyorough, and Shenu 2001, 94). The Runcinman (1966) theory of fraternal deprivation

becomes important here because the group solidarity exhibited by the Tiv provided a

sense of kingship that assisted them in channeling their grievances. Hagher (2002)

emphasised that Jukun elites sought to maintain their position and protect their relative

gains from the threat of Tiv upward mobility. This led to the elite mobilization of Jukun

youth to drive the Tiv from Wukari. The politics of indigenous versus settler were used to

motivate the youth. The key fact remains that the Jukun sought to protect their privileged

position as the original inhabitants of the land and had no desire to share power with the

Tiv. The Jukun wanted to preserve a “diminishing return” (Taylor 2002,16) for their

group. The perception of exclusion by the Tiv, who were labeled as settlers within Taraba

State by Jukun traditional authorities, meant that political participation in party politics

by the Tiv often resulted in violent conflict because the Tiv considered electoral victories

a mandate to dominate the Jukun.

As noted earlier, one of the sociopolitical arenas of threat was the political sector

where “power struggles within the political class often involve the manipulation of the

people, who are inevitably less informed about the essence of the political struggle. The

elite and the politicians often influence governmental policies for their own selfish

purposes” (IPCR 2003, 24). Politicians have been cited as a source of weapons diffusion

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to conflict actors in Tiv-Jukun disputes. As the IPCR contended, “In competing for

political positions, ethnic differences are sometimes used for selfish interests leading to

casualties in violence that erupts” (24).

The divide over land. The high level of fragmentation between the Tiv and Jukun

over land was another key source of conflict. Continuing disagreement is rooted in arable

land taken by the Tiv and claimed by the Jukun (Best, Idyorough, and Shehu 2001). The

Tiv are subsistence farmers and are rapidly increasing in population, which is placing

pressure on available land. The Jukun contend that the “the presence of Tivs in the

division [Wukari] not only exerts enormous pressure on land but undermines their

legitimate ownership of Wukari chieftaincy and the territory” (Abubakar 2003, 60). The

Tiv appropriation of arable land claimed by the Jukun has led to a series of conflicts

within Taraba. Asuni (1999) observed that

while land is frequently mentioned, it is in reality only a vent for political and other forms of conflict.. . . Although it is often said that the Tiv are encroaching on the farmlands owned by the Jukun, it turned out that the real issue is that the Tiv do not follow the traditional laws of land administration, which require them to obtain permission from the village head, ward head, district head and paramount ruler before starting to farm on a piece of land. (1-14)

This has been a sensitive topic with the Tiv who view this as a way of affirming their

nonindigene status. Disagreements surrounding land remain a key conflict trigger. As one

interviewed informant succinctly stated, “Our farms are our source of livelihoods.”

The population within the Middle Belt region is primarily agrarian, and the

constant search by the Tiv for arable land continues. The agricultural output of the area

has declined, which has affected much of the population, and many residents within the

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state have left for other areas. The decline in agricultural products has weakened rural

communities by causing malnutrition and disease and by creating an exodus of the

population to other towns and cities. Economic decline has eroded confidence and upset

the traditional balance of economic and political power between the ethnic groups of the

region. These human-security threats have caused insecurity at the household level. Many

people suffer from hunger and poverty, and disruption in government services and social

relationships have led to domestic violence.

High unemployment exists, particularly among Taraba youth, making them easy

targets for recruitment into militia groups. Table 8 presents a sample of the income levels

of fifty youths, including leaders, within Wukari and Zaki-Biam, which reflects low

levels of income and high unemployment. The low socioeconomic indices not only imply

that these youth cannot purchase arms alone, but they also suggest that these young

people can be easily bought and influenced by the rich and powerful.

Table 8. Monthly Income of Youth within Wukari and Zaki-Biam

Weekly Income in Naira Number in Wukari Number in Zaki Biam

Less than 500 ($4) 2 4

501-1000 ($4—$10) 14 7

1001-2000($10-$20) 18 21

2001-3000 ($20—$30) 11 14

4001-5000($30-$40) 2 -

5001 and above ($40 & up) - -

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As the focus-group participants of the study noted, the catalyst for conflict can be

found in the high level of poverty. In the Middle Belt, residents considered settlers, such

as the Tiv, are discriminated against in terms of land ownership, control of commerce,

and jobs and education, regardless of how long they may have lived in the area (Otite and

Albert 2001). Therefore, at some point, the discontent and frustration of some groups

may cross a critical threshold, spurring them to act violently against other groups

perceived to be the agents of their economic misery.

Militias and the flow o f small arms. The sharp social divisions evident in the land

disputes led to high community mobilization by both sides of related conflict. “Organized

bands of Tivs, Jukuns, and Fulanis were responsible for scores of civilian deaths and

widespread destruction of homes (Human Rights Watch 2002, 17). Both attempted to

portray the other as a violent ethnic group. According to Human Rights Watch (2002),

Tivs complained of prosecution in Taraba and talk of deliberate campaigns of “ethnic

cleansing,” primarily by the Jukuns allied with the Fulanis and backed by the military

(17). Conflict actors began to use SALW, such as grenades, pistols, AK-47s, G-3 pump-

action rifles, and locally made rifles, as disputes intensified. The Tiv-Jukun conflict was

not only bloody, but the use of SALW increased the level of brutality and the extent of

militarism. Momodu (2001) described the military reprisal carried out against the Tiv

community. His dismay at the level of brutality demonstrated by the Tiv is evident in the

following excerpt:

I was filled with rage at the bestiality of those people (referring to the horrific mutilations of the Nigerian soldiers) who with relish butcher fellow human beings.... I was drenched and weakened completely at the inhumanity of a

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people so bestial, so cannibalistic, so mindlessly murderous, so wild, so animalistic, so savage and so, so cruel. (1-11)

The Taraba focus-group participants in this study described the direct connection

between use of SALW in conflict and the long traditional rivalry between the Jukun and

Tiv. This rivalry emerged as a result of the collective threats sourced in perceptions of

deprivation and social injustice. Both sides began to compare the relative threats that

accrued from the actions of the other group and, as a result, both sides obtained SALW

because they believed the other side was also purchasing arms. As mutual resentment

grew, the Tarabans claimed that the Tiv acquired SALW to take over Jukun land, and the

Jukun obtained SALW to defend themselves. The Tiv did not deny their acquisition of

arms to defeat the Jukun.

Since the Tiv-Jukun conflict has been protracted, stockpiles of weapons have

accumulated over time, many provided by decommissioned soldiers. The presence of

large numbers of retired military personnel within the Middle Belt has created easy

access to weapons. Both groups have received help from retired soldiers who provided

paramilitary training to their own ethnic militia groups located either within urban centers

or small towns. These soldiers have remained a constant source of SALW for the Tiv and

Jukun in times of conflict. As group relations deteriorated, the Tiv and Jukun enlarged

their militia movements. Although these militias have remained relatively small, they

have caused concern among observers due to the heightened sense of threat they present

and the militant actions and words exchanged by the groups. The Jukun militia group has

its base within Wukari, Taraba, while the Tiv militia uses Zaki Biam as its headquarters.

The Jukun militia group has a hierarchical, military-style command structure. The

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members are predominantly unemployed youth looking for ways to fill their free time.

The youth groups within Wukari have four regiments—Gondoku, Mekinfawo, Judoku,

and Pwnchuen. According to informants, all of the youth groups within Jukun villages,

such as Nyochuku within Ayvi, are under the control of a central body and take orders

from the headquarters in Wukari, which is believed to have coordinated attacks during

conflict.

Informants in the field have stated that the Tiv militia has an organizational

structure very similar to the Jukun. Informants have also stated that a central youth group

known as the Bakassi controls the operation of all other youth groups located in the

border villages, and the central group also links with other groups within other areas of

Tiv land. The killing of the nineteen soldiers during the last conflict confirms this

organizational structure. While the soldiers were caught within the village of Vaase, they

were brought to Zaki Biam for execution. In the Tiv and Jukun case, urban centers have

served as arsenals and command centers during conflict. Jukun militia groups are known

as the “Jukun Boys,” while Tiv militias are commonly referred to as the “Ambaye.”

There is a splintering of the militia groups within Wukari and Zaki Biam; such

reorganization could lead to a local arms race.

In addition to the militia groups, mercenaries from Niger and Chad have been

employed in the Tiv-Jukun conflict since 1997. The involvement of mercenaries has

militarized the conflicts o f Taraba. Nwachukwu and Ojugbana (2002) claimed that

witnesses to the disputes “attribute the sophistication of many attacks to the presence of

elements from the army and police in militia groups as mercenaries, sons of the ethnic

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groups and lately, agents of [the] state” (133) that provided weapons to members of

their respective ethnic groups involved in the conflict. In all of these conflicts, SALW

and machetes were freely used. The types of arms used ranged between locally made

pistols to light weapons such as machine guns; however, the majority were small arms.

It is important to note that larger arms (i.e., machine guns) were likely purchased in

bulk. Study participants informed that politicians supplied these weapons.

The cost of SALW varies considerably and depends upon whether they are new

or recycled, locally made, or imported. Table 9 summarizes the black-market prices

provided by focus-group participants for arms within Taraba.

Table 9. Black-Market Prices for Weapons within Taraba During 2005

Type of Arms Make Black-Market Price in Naire

Revolver Local 4,000-6,000 Self-loading pistol Foreign 13,000-17,000 Double-barrel I Foreign 13,000-20,000 Double-barrel II Local 10,000-15,000 Carbine Foreign N/A Assault rifle Foreign 17,000-25,000 Submachine gun Foreign 20,000-30,000 Kalashnikov Foreign N/A

The Taraba State police reported that weapons seized during the crisis were one

Lar rifle; thirteen single-barrel, locally made guns; two locally made pistols; and charms.

The focus-group participants reported that light arms, such as AK-47s, G-3 rifles, pump-

action rifles, and locally made guns, were the weapons actually used. According to a

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participant who formerly worked in security service, the Avtomat Kalashnikov and Israel

Uzi were also used. The number of weapons seized by the police does not tally with the

number provided by the study participants, nor is it representative of the extent of conflict

militarization. This disparity illustrates how difficult it is to assess the number of SALW

within the region.

Various reports from conflict actors indicate the numerous SALW used during the

Tiv-Jukun conflict. Anecdotal evidence presented by the Tiv reflect that 70 to 100

Kalashnikov machine guns, and 100 to 120 submachine guns, were used by the Jukun,

while both sides used an estimated 30 to 40 revolvers and pistols. The most popular gun

among conflict actors appears to be the AK-47, while retired soldiers supplied other more

sophisticated weapons. Additionally, weapons such as Lar rifles, single-barrel locally

made guns, and Dane guns were also used during the conflicts. Focus-group participants

reported that pump-action guns have been found in the possession of traders within the

community.

Sources, suppliers, and supply routes. Mercenaries brought most of the arms used

in the Tiv-Jukun conflict in from Chad and the Niger Republic and from as far as the

Republic of Congo. Military members and retired soldiers played an important role in

securing arms for their respective ethnic groups involved in the conflict. The Nigerian

vice-president reported that SALW used within the North Central zone, which includes

Plateau, Benue, and Taraba, were obtained in this manner (Atiku Abubakar, personal

interview, 18 August 2005). Retired soldiers not only arm the militias, but also train

them. While they have since been dismantled, there was evidence of training camps at the

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border of Benue and Taraba where retired soldiers trained youth (Habu Galadimah,

personal interview, 18 January 2007). The Nigerian vice president noted that the majority

of Nigerian soldiers are from the Middle Belt zone, and many retired soldiers are

members of militia groups within this zone. The presence of retired soldiers has made

these militias effective fighting units. For example, the militia that ambushed and killed

the nineteen soldiers displayed a high level of organizational skill.

As noted earlier, SALW are either manufactured locally or obtained on the local

black market. Arms obtained on the local black market have been supplied largely by

politicians who took advantage of the crisis to gain political advantage, and they are the

major financiers of the militia groups. A Cold War still exists between Tiv and Jukun

communities. According to key informants within the focus group of this study, there was

an attempt to settle the conflict; however, no action was taken by either government or

nongovernment agencies to disarm the Tiv and Jukun militias. Consequently, each

community is maintaining possession of its arms. Neither were weapons of arrested

individuals seized.

Summary

The social and political landscape of the Middle Belt has created a basis for

friction. The region has the largest number of mixed nationalities and languages

including Yorubas from the southwest and Hausa-Fulanis from the north (IIDEA 2000).

While the Fulanis “have direct historical, ethnic and religious ties with the Islamic

north,” the Middle Belt Fulanis claim they are Christians and a minority group (291).

IIDEA noted that “constructing a rigid Middle Belt identity, particularly with an

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overwhelming Christian element, will be very difficult beyond the creation of

temporary political platforms or coalitions over [a] one-agenda issue” (292).

Consequently, the perception of threat to identity that lie at the heart of the Tiv-Jukun

conflict will remain a key conflict trigger. In general, the Jukun believe the Tiv are

settlers and do not deserve the same rights as indigenes. This is complicated because the

Tiv are a small minority within Jukun territory but with a faster growing population and

expansionist tendencies that are a source of threat to their neighbors. Additionally, both

groups claim they are threatened and marginalized by the other group, and this

perception accounts for the militarization of conflict.

On the surface, it appears that the political divisions exploited by the elite class

fuel the Tiv-Jukun conflict; however, more deeply rooted grievances exist over land

security within this community where the majority of the population are farmers who

depend upon land for subsistence. As Otite and Albert (2001) suggested, “Land questions

touches [sic] on territoriality” (103). In essence, “territory has become a factor for the

management of political communities in Nigeria [for] quite apart from its relationship to

land and resource, control and distribution, territory is also firmly connected to the

political questions” (Nwachukwu and Ojugbana 2002,137).

The Jukuns fear they will eventually have no land as a result of the growing Tiv

population and the Tiv appetite for increasingly more land. The Jukun might have a case

because “the Tivs occupied 75 percent of the rural farm lands [and] supposedly

aboriginal communities found themselves [more] materially worse [off] than their so

called settler populations” (Otite and Albert 2001,104). In short, the Jukun exhibit an

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acute fear of Tiv colonization (IPCR 2003). According to Nwachukwu and Ojugbana,

“The problem is the persistence of relative threats ... because [the] Nigeria Land Use

Act 1978 is based on the colonial interpretations that leaves control of most rural lands to

‘customary law’ administration” (144). These researchers observed that the Nigeria Land

Use Act of 1978 does not recognize resident migration, but rather, “assumes there is a

single community in the area and totally disregards the population movements and

cultural mosaics in places like the Middle Belt” (144).

Apart from the relative threat of land deprivation, the role of traditional

institutions is at the heart of the Tiv-Jukun conflict. Traditional institutions are integral to

the system of governance within Nigeria and play an important role in the political

process, as well as in the marginalization of specific communities. Therefore, all

residents in a given community owe allegiance to traditional leaders who play a quasi-

govemmental role in the organization of their communities. In this sense, the Jukun

believe the Tiv refusal to pay taxes to relevant Taraba authorities exhibits disrespect for

Jukun traditional authority (IPCR 2003). In this instance, the Tiv perception of

marginalization lies in their apparent exclusion from any authority role in the traditional

council in Wukari because they are considered migrants. The relative threats and

perceptions of marginalization contributed to the excess weaponry throughout the region.

Informants suggested that the lack of adequate policing made it possible to supply arms

to the Jukun. Additionally, large numbers o f people from the Middle Belt are members o f

the Nigerian army. During 1986, many of these soldiers were decommissioned following

the introduction of structural adjustments toward the rationalization of civil servants

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(IIDEA 2000). Many of these retired soldiers proved to be a valuable source for weapons

diffusion to their various respective ethnic groups involved in conflict.

Plateau State and the Jos Conflict

The Politics o f Religion and Geographic Origin

Plateau State is located within the Nigerian North Central zone. Prior to the

conflict within the state during 1994, and again during 2001, Plateau had always prided

itself in the tranquil peace that reigned throughout the region. Based upon the relative

peace that had characterized the relationships among the diverse ethnic, cultural, and

religious communities throughout the state, Plateau was referred to as the “home of peace

and tourism” (Bawa and Nwogwu 2002,107). The state covers approximately 26,899

square kilometers and borders the states of Benue, Nassarawa, Kaduna, Taraba, Bauchi,

and Gombe.15 Danfulani (2006) contended that 54 of the 295 ethnic groups residing

within Nigeria come from Plateau State “where Bantu and Kwa sub-families of the

Benue-Congo and the Chadic-sub [sic] group of the Nilo-Saharan or Afro-Asiatic family

meet” (1).

Plateau State has undergone several boundary adjustments. During the formative

years of British colonialism throughout Nigeria, much of Plateau State was part of Bauchi

Province. During the early 1920s, it was part of the Northern region. The name was

changed to Benue Plateau in 1967 (Gotan 2004) and Plateau State in 1976. Plateau has a

multicultural population; however, it also suffers from the politics of the settler-indigene

issue, as is evident in the following excerpt:

15Plateau State is the most endowed state within Nigeria (Plateau State Government 2004).

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The state capital Jos is inhabited by Christians who form the majority, with Muslims constituting a significant minority. It is home to several groups, which fall into two broad categories: those who consider themselves “indigenes”16 or the original inhabitants of the area—among them the Berom, the Afizere and the Anaguta—and those who are termed “non-indigenes” or “settlers,” composed in large part of Haus . . . southern Igbo, Yoruba and other ethnic groups. (Human Rights Watch 2001, 5)

The 2006 census recorded the population of Plateau State at 3,178,712 (National

Population Commission 2007). The state is a sparsely populated area when compared to

the national population density of ninety-six people per square kilometer. According to

Ityavyar and Gundu (2004b), “Jos city like many urban centers in the country is

heterogeneous. Nearly all the ethnic groups that constitute the present day Nigeria are

found in Jos” (5). The discovery of tin and the serene, convivial atmosphere of the city is

one reason for the influx of people from other parts of Nigeria.17 According to Danfulani

(2006),

The town of Jos, the Tin city was established in 1915 as a tin transportation camp and its early history was closely linked to the prosperity of the tin mining industry.... Christians formed 84.5 percent of the population of Jos town, with Muslims making [up] 12 percent and adherents of traditional religious the remaining 3.5 percent. (2)

Gotan (2004) observed that, under colonial authority,

the British divided the city [of Jos] into three parts, the government reserved area occupied by the Europeans; the township occupied by mostly the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba and other Africans who occupied the artisan and administrative positions.

16Questions surrounding geographic origin again arose in the Jos conflict, similar to the key issue indigene status represented in the Tiv-Jukun conflict. An indigene is a member of the population group representing the original inhabitants of a particular region and who can therefore claim rightful “ownership” (Human Rights Watch 2006, 5) This distinction was viewed as a form of exclusion and marginalization in the Tiv-Jukun case. Alubo (2004) contended that “the distinction between indigenes and settlers is at the root of some of the recent challenges . .. because geographic origin is by descent, which in addition to violating the constitution, makes it impossible for ‘settlers’ to realize full and inclusive citizenship in their place of domicile. In this sense integration is problematic because one cannot become a citizen irrespective of duration of residency” (145). 17Jos is reputed to have the best weather conditions in all of Nigeria.

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From this initial design of Jos city the indigenes were not made to be part of it as a deliberate colonial policy. (71)

As Gotan revealed, the colonial authorities adopted a different administrative style for

each ethnic group. The natives were under an indirect rule system, while the migrant

laborers of the mining camps were subject to Hausa herdsmen who administered them as

if they were separate from the rest of the population. Gotan suggested that this laid the

foundation for the perception of separate identities between indigenes and nonindigenes,

“particularly the Hausa who had a different religion and culture from the indigenous

tribes [which] led to the subsequent entrenchment of the settler/indigeneship tussles”

(71). The indigenous ethnic groups, or natives who lived within the area prior to

colonialism, included the Berom, Anaguata, Afizere, and Basa, all of whom considered

themselves the rightful owners of land within the region (Ityavyar and Gundu 2004a,

2004b). Farming is the primary occupation of the natives, while other commercial

activities are essentially run by settlers. While Plateau State is sparsely populated, Jos has

a large population, partially due to the mining, industrial, and commercial activities

concentrated in and around the city. Tin mining led to the influx of migrants, such as the

Igbos, Yorubas, Hausa/Fulani, and Europeans, who are considered settlers (Ityavyar and

Gundu 2004b).

Scope o f the Conflict

Plateau State has witnessed a series of ethnoreligious conflicts since 2001, with

the most recent during May 2004. These disputes occurred within Jos, the state capital,

and to a lesser extent, Bukuru, the town neighboring Jos. This is the battleground because

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of the cosmopolitan nature of these areas and because the Hausa claim to have founded

these towns. Conflict did not occur in other areas with Hausa populations (e.g., Bischi,

Dorowa, Dogo na Hauwa, Mai Adiko, Sabon Gida Kanar, and Gindin Akwati) because

the political and traditional pressures and demands are different from those within Jos.

However, the conflict in Jos usually spilled beyond the city center, primarily because the

indigenes conducted what they considered to be defensive attacks against the religious

kin of the Hausa and sometimes Fulani communities.

The Jos conflict involves the Hausa/Fulani, who are considered settlers, as well as

indigene groups such as the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere. The Hausa/Fulani quest for

political prominence and traditional rulership, coupled with the resistance of indigenous

populations, created the initial background for heightened tension within the city. This

competition has often led to violent confrontations between Hausa/Fulani settlers and

indigenes, as was the case during 1994,2001, and the years immediately following. The

Hausa/Fulani are examined in the present study as an analytic category; however, they

are actually two different ethnic groups. They speak different languages—Fulfulde18 for

the Fulani and Hausa for the Hausa. Investigators have categorized the Fulani and Hausa

collectively as Hausa/Fulani because both groups have embraced Islam and are

associated with Dan Fodio jihad politics and religious communities within northern

Nigeria. The jihad led the defeat of the Hausa-ruling dynasties and the imposition of

18The Fulani are referred to as “Bulbe” (in the plural) or “Pullo” (in the singular). They speak fullata or fulfulbe and are composed of various clans. Members of the Torodbe clan forsook their pastoral heritage and live in towns as Islamic evangelists. They were critical actors in the Dan Fodio jihad and have integrated with the Hausa. They constitute the bulk of the Fulani gida or Fulani Zaure in Hausa (i.e., Town Funlai). A large number of Fulani keep large herds of cattle and retain their pastoral heritage. These people are referred to as, the Fulani daji or Hausa (Azarya 1978; Hopen 1958; Stenning 1959; Wilson-Haffenden 1967).

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Islam. The Hausa, in turn, used their culture to conquer the Fulani through assimilation.

This has led to the Hausa/Fulani designation, even though both groups maintain distinct

identities. This designation sometimes refers to the elite, or aristocracy, which the

colonial authorities nurtured within northern Nigeria between 1900 and I960.19

In present-day Jos, the term Hausa/Fulani is more of a northern Islamic phrase

than ethnic and linguistic. It encompasses the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Terawa, and other

northern Muslim groups. Yoruba and other southern Muslims are not considered

members of the Hausa/Fulani community within Jos. Islam and the Dan Fodio jihad are

viewed as defining characteristics for Hausa/Fulani identity. Although other Plateau

indigenes practicing Islam are not linguistically Hausa/Fulani, nor referred to or defined

as Hausa/Fulani, they find shelter among the Hausa/Fulani in times of violent conflict

because they are Muslim. For some time now, the indigenes and settlers of Jos,

specifically the Hausa/Fulani nonindigenes, have been involved in ongoing battle for

control of Jos—a conflict rooted in indigene-settler dynamics. Competition and conflict

typically result from debate over who is an indigene and who is not and the rights and

privileges derived from being viewed as an indigene. Nonindigenes are not entitled to

certain rights and privileges, and therein lies the conflict trigger.

19The Fulani recently objected to use of the term Hausa/Fulani, viewing it as a forced and inappropriate association with the Hausa. They argue that they were never consulted by those who introduced the term, and its origin is unknown to them. Fulani leadership argues that, with specific reference to the Jos conflict, they have been unnecessarily attacked as a result of the use of the term Hausa/Fulani because the two groups are assumed to be one in the same. They have often come under attack for problems initiated by the Hausa people. The Hausa elite have no problem with the combined term. 20This occurs when populations indigenous to Plateau attack their own kin who practice Islam because they do not trust them. In some locations, such as Vom, Du, and Pankshin, the natives have attacked members of their own group who practice Islam. Generally, most indigenous groups of Plateau distrust their coethicists who are Muslims, believing they side and conspire with the Hausa/Fulani Muslims. In violent conflict, religion, especially for Muslims, assumes a more important role than ethnicity.

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The Hausa/Fulani migrated to Jos along with other Nigerians from other parts of

the country during the early part of twentieth century and insist they are the indigenes of

Jos. The indigenes of Jos (i.e., Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere) maintain that the

Hausa/Fulani cannot be indigenes because they cannot trace the origins of Hausa/Fulani

ancestors. Danfulani (2006) observed that “despite many years in Jos the Hause/Fulani

muslim community failed to integrate fully into the Jos Plateau Society” (4). The natives

point out that other Nigerians who moved to Jos at approximately the same time as the

Hausa/Fulani or earlier (e.g., the Yoruba, Igbo, Urhobo, Idoma, and Igala) do not claim to

be indigenes of Jos. This brings the Hausa/Fulani claim under suspicion and has

heightened native fear that the Hausa/Fulani have an Islamic agenda and plan political

domination and eventual takeover of Jos.

There are also groups considered secondary, or “shadows,” to the Jos conflict.

These groups were identified by primary parties to the conflict and by virtue of repeated

reference to them by informants and observers in the field. These secondary parties

include other indigenous ethnic groups within Plateau such as those from the former Jos

Division, which is now the Plateau North Senatorial District (i.e., the Irigwe, Amo, Buji,

and Jere). Other Plateau ethnic groups from outside the Plateau North Senatorial District,

such as the Ngas, Mwaghavul, Ron, Mushere, Pyem, Goemai, Taroh, Memyang, and

Monto, also have an interest in the Jos conflict. It has been suggested that Hausa/Fulani

groups from the far northern region o f Nigeria are also involved. Additionally, it is also

believed that the military manpower, which serves as the militia for the incessant attacks

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within Plateau State, comes from neighboring countries, notably Niger, Chad, and Mali.

Although none of these positions can be verified, they are widely held beliefs.

Conflict Trigger

An interesting and illuminating factor explains the nature of the Jos conflict and

whether it is a militarized dispute or lies within the competing and conflicting

interpretations of its history before, during, and following colonial rule. There are three

different views of the history of Jos, and these variant perspectives provide a foundation

for other levels of conflict. The marginalization claimed by the conflict actors is

subsumed under the historical interpretations of political participation and quest for

prominence. This struggle for political control has translated into mutual dislike among

ethnic groups. The Jos crisis represents a classic example of the Blumer (1958)

perspective on social stratification (Taylor 2002). In a sense, it is a struggle for

prominence and positioning of the various population groups comprising the power

hierarchy of the state. The Fulani feel threatened because they are not considered the

indigenes of Jos; however, the Hausa/Fulani believe they are the first settlers of Jos.

As a leader of the Hausa/Fulani community within Jos, Ali, the Turakin Jos,

presented a lecture to the Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies explaining that Jos has

historically been viewed as a Hausa settlement. He stated that this was confirmed by

Ames, a colonial administrator, who reported that the population of Jos town in 1950 was

10,207, out of which 10,000 people were of Hausa/Fulani origin. As Ali observed, the

present location of Jos was a virgin land prior to settlement by the British. Current

settlement patterns indicate no concentration of Beroms or any of the neighboring tribes

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now found within the heartland of Jos.21 This view is shared by Hausa/Fulani leaders who

argue that no one lived within Jos when they arrived in the area at the beginning of the

twentieth century; the region now referred to as Jos was virgin land. The Hausa also

claim that precolonial Jos was part of Kasashen Bauchi (i.e., the land of Bauchi),

implying that the Bauchi emirate had sole authority over the area.

Adamu (1978), a Nigerian historian supported the view that the Kasashen Bauchi

encompassed the entire Plateau State and beyond to Benue State. In the traditional

Hausa/Fulani/emirate view, therefore, the Jos Plateau was part of the Bauchi emirate,

which referred to the vast highland territory of the Plateau dar-al-jabal (Plateau State

Government 2001). The emirate did not consider the Plateau as part of their empire

because the area was conquered, but because of their activities with the region. It is not

clear how Plateau was subdued by Bauchi or how it came under the authority of the

Bauchi emirate prior to colonialism. The indigenes question how Bauchi could have laid

claim to the Plateau when, in reality, all attempts made by the precolonial Bauchi emirate

to conquer and subjugate the area following the Dan Fodio jihad failed. However,O')

Bauchi emirate authorities always considered the Plateau a region of the emirate.

Discontent caused by the perception of group position within the Jos social and

economic structure has surfaced among other populations involved in conflict. The

Berom claim that they settled and dispensed autonomous administration of Jos, along

with the Anaguta, prior to the arrival o f the colonialists. Once Jos was transformed into

21The Berom criticize this conclusion, insisting that the figure cited as the Jos population was for nonindigenes in Jos including Igbos, Yorubas, and Urhobos. 22See also the various submissions of the indigenes to the Fiberisima Commission of Inquiry, as cited in Fiberisima (1994).

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an administrative center by the colonialists, the Hausa were brought into the city to work

within the tin mines. The Anaguta agree with the Berom and Afizere viewpoints. They

contend that the Hausa/Fulani have no share in Jos because it is not a facet of their

heritage and the land does not belong to them. The Anaguta argue that they were already

settled within the region when the Europeans arrived in Jos. The mutual struggle by these

groups to dominate the politics of Jos on the basis of indigeneship has created insecurity,

and the threats created by the social position of each group correlate to triggers that

influenced subsequent conflict.

The desire by the Hausa/Fulani and indigenous groups to control the affairs of Jos

in a manner excluding other groups has led to Hausa/Fulani schemes excluding indigenes

from the Jos North Local Government Authority. For example, the formation of the

Jasawa23 Development Association in 1987 created a platform for articulating and

advancing Hausa/Fulani political, social, and cultural interests. The indigenes contend

that the origin of discord between the Hausa/Fulani and indigenous communities began

with the creation of this association because it “sowed the seed” of distrust (Plateau State

Government 2001). Threat perceptions increased after the creation of the Association,

and it was followed by several conflicts—(1) the 1994 conflict over the appointment of a

Jasawa member rejected by the indigenes, (2) the Bukuru Gyero Road incident during

1998, (3) the indigene certificate conflicts during 1999, and (4) the September 2001 crisis

over the appointment of a poverty-eradication program coordinator who was a Hausa

rejected by the indigenes. However, the immediate cause of the September 2001 crisis

23 Jasawa is a term for the Hausa of Jos. It can also include groups residing in Jos who are not ethnically Hausa such as the Kanuri, Terawa, and Fulani who share the politics and aspirations of the Hausa-Fulani, but are Muslim (Human Rights Watch 2001).

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was attributed to blocked streets around a mosque during Friday prayers in the Congo-

Russia district of Jos and the perceived expansion of Sharia (Danfolani 2006).

The perception of threat related to the social disunity spurred conflict. The

perception of division, characterized by the indigene-settler dynamics, formed the basis

of latent tension. Therefore, on 7 September 2001, when violence finally erupted within

the Congo-Russia24 area of Jos as a result of the incident at a local mosque, city tension

was already high. The relationship between the mosque authorities and the Congo-Russia

community residents deteriorated to the worst point on 7 September 2001 when a non-

Muslim girl reportedly insisted on passing through a congregation of Muslims outside the

mosque at prayer time. She was asked to wait until after the prayers, or select an

alternative route, and refused. Some reports were that she was allowed to pass, but then

returned a second time. An argument ensued between the girl and Muslim paramilitaries

at the mosque, allegedly resulting in rough physical treatment of the girl. Within minutes,

reports reached the non-Muslim community and conflict between the Congo-Russia and

Muslim communities was the outcome (Bawa and Nwogwu 2002; Human Rights Watch

2001). In reality, the incident provided a necessary vent for the pent-up emotion of years

of tension between the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani.

On a broader level, the described incident involving the actions of the non-

Muslim girl during prayer at the site of the Jos Mosque can be further understood

when viewed in structural terms, providingan avenue for identifying the various

24The Congo-Russia is an old settlement of tin miners and retired soldiers who served in Congo peacekeeping operations. It is a slum where many people drink too much buruturu (i.e., local beer) and goskolo. Some Hausa now live in this area. A clash of cultures (i.e., civilizations) is therefore inevitable within this the area.

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levels of proximate causal evidence. While the proximate issue was access, the

underlying conflict was caused by the amalgam of insecurities throughout the

community. The Bawa and Nwogwu (2002) account of the conflict suggested an

explanation consistent with the inequality explanation raised by many conflict

actors. They described poverty and marginalization, which were enshrined by

rampant “institutionalized discrimination” expressed in a religious form (110).

However, beneath this religious divide were the lingering insecurities of exclusion

and powerlessness. As Bawa and Nwogwu explained, “In terms of access to

resources and opportunities in day-to-day life, the distinction between ‘indigenes’

and ‘non-indigenes’ is critical. In practice the two groups effectively have

different rights resulting in discrimination and inequalities of access in many

fundamental areas of life and human well being [s/c]” (111).

Bawa and Nwogwu (2002) asserted that the impact of the marginalization

perceived by the Jos indigenes was evident in

education and employment, where an informal two-tier system operates. For example “non-indigenes” have to pay higher fees to enter public schools.... “Non-indigenes” complain of discrimination and harassment in their search for employment especially in the civil service and in deferral institutions, where many senior positions are seen as effectively reserved for “indigenes.” (Ill)

Bawa and Nwogwu suggested an economic rather than religious motivation for

confrontations in the following excerpt:

The violence stemmed froma longstanding battle for control of political power and economic rivalry between different ethnic groups and between those labeled as “indigenous” and “non-indigenous” inhabitants of Jos. As grievances built up over time all sides appealed to religious sentiments to manipulate popular emotions and eventually to inflame the situation to a level where it could no longer be controlled. (110)

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The discontent arising from years of complex social divisions culminated in the

first clashes within the vicinity of the Congo-Russia mosque. The mosque was eventually

destroyed, and the location lies fallow to this day. Homes and businesses belonging to

both Christians and Muslims were destroyed. By the evening of Friday, 7 September

2001, much of Angwan Rogo and Congo-Russia Russia was a virtual battlefield. The

conflict became uncontrollable after reports of people killed, wounded, or displaced

spread to other areas of the city.

Security and Insecurity

The IPCR (2003) strategic conflict assessment of the North Central zone

recognized that under the

sources of antagonism and triggers are deeper systemic issues at the center of which are the relationship between political power and access to economic resources and opportunities. Poverty, unemployment and limited alternative routes to economic gain; governance that is not open or responsive to the needs of the people; and inadequate provision of security and to basic services also contribute to this central relationship. (160)

The IPCR and others (Sislin and Pearson 2001) have drawn a casual link between SALW

proliferation and conflict and have noted that deprivation and marginalization have had a

positive effect on conflict dynamics. The demand motivation (Best, Idyorough, and

Shehu 2001; Best and Von Kemedi 2005a) for SALW lies in the exclusion and

polarization of indigene groups and in the structural system left by colonialism that have

solidified the dynamics forming the basis of conflict.

The insecurity that permeated Jos was replaced by the desire for revenge and

justice and turned a dispute surrounding access into a bloody battle (Human Rights

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Watch 2001). The fiercest fighting occurred on the second and third days of the conflict

(i.e., 8-9 September 2001). Passions were high and exaggerated reports of the Friday

incident had spread throughout Jos. Bodies of the dead were transported to neighboring

villages for burial. The arrival of the casualties spread the conflict to Berom villages,

such as Dilimi, with large numbers of Hausa/Fulani Muslim residents. This resulted in

further destruction of property and loss of life. The dismal performance of the police

opened the way for ethnic and religious militias and rapidly assembled gangs to enter the

conflict. In an interview conducted during August 2005 in Jos, the military commandant

reported that armed bandits crossing the border, as well as a militia group commonly

referred to as the Taliban, had introduced arms into the conflict. Although the violence

did not manifest within all areas of Jos, those even indirectly affected by the violence

experienced panic and anxiety, whether or not friends and family were lost in the conflict.

Upon his return from an overseas trip, the Plateau State governor broadcast an

extraordinarily brief message to citizens. He assured them that all was under control and

called upon the people to return to their normal activities. Citizens had just begun to

return to their normal schedules when violence ensued again on the following Wednesday

(i.e., 11 September 2001), coinciding with the terrorist attacks within the United States.

The most violent fighting occurred within the Dilimi-Gangare areas of Jos, a

Hausa/Fulani stronghold, and resulted in heavy loss of life and property. The violence

weakened the morale of the people and eroded their confidence in the crisis-management

capabilities of the government. The immediate crisis was brought rapidly under control,

but not before it wreaked havoc on the residents of Jos.

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After the initial Jos crisis, both sides of the conflict continued a cycle of attacks

and counterattacks until these exchanges culminated in the Yelwa revenge killings, an

incident within which Christians massacred 650 to 700 Muslims during May 2004 (Best

and Von Kemedi 2005a; Human Rights Watch 2001). One account reported that “a low

intensity conflict spread to the surrounding countryside where the mainly Christian

farmers clashed repeated[ly] with the predominantly Muslim livestock herders”

(“Nigeria: 800,000 Internally Displaced” 2004,1-17). Danfulani (2006) noted that the

majority of Plateau State indigenes are Christians tied to the land as peasant farmers or workers in the civil service, while the mainly Muslim minorities are Hausa dry-season farmers and cattle rearing Fulani, with the Igbo, Urhobo, Yoruba and Hausa dominating the business life of the metropolis . . . thus land remains an important emotive factor to a region that is predominately inhabited by peasant farmers. (3)

Source o f Conflict

Clearly, the threat of political domination led to threats and counterthreats that

culminated in subsequent violence. Prior to the September 2001 crisis, intimidation and

threats were evident between the Hausa/Fulani Muslims and the Anaguta, Afizere, and

Berom due to the appointment of a new Hausa/Fulani local-govemment chairman for Jos

North by the military (Aliyu 2004; Danfulani 2006). Additionally, the appointment of

another Fulani25 as poverty eradication coordinator of Jos North was considered a

provocative act by some residents (Bawa and Nwogwu 2002; Ityavyar and Gundu

2004b). During the campaign against this appointment, a group of youth posted

threatening, unflattering inscriptions and handbills throughout the city (Human Rights

25Ityavyar and Gundu (2004b) noted that the individual appointed was forced to relinquish his earlier position of chairman of the Jos North local government due to accusations of falsified credentials.

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Watch 2001). It was also believed to be indigene youth that vandalized the office of the

newly appointed coordinator. The Jasawa Development Association—a Hausa group—

claimed human feces were smeared around the office, and they believe this act “set the

stage” for subsequent violence.

Through the Jasawa Development Association, the Hausa community reported the

described events to the governor of Plateau State in a letter dated 20 August 2001. They

distributed copies to the Nigerian president, vice president, leaders of the National

Assembly, and key security agencies within Nigeria. The letter claimed that the Hausa

community was provoked by disgruntled citizens and tribal cohorts. The Hausa appealed

to the governor to stop the group and warned that, if the government failed to

immediately check their activities, “the peace, unity and tranquility of this area cannot be

guaranteed” (Human Rights Watch 2001, 6). The reaction of the Jasawa Development

Association was reinforced by earlier frustrations, which were described in the letter. The

Association referred to the nullification of the 1994 appointment of the local-govemment

chairman and the rejection of an individual appointed as education secretary of Jos North

during 1996. The Association also complained that a Hausa had won the 1998 party

primaries for chairman of the Peoples’ Democratic Party during 1998, but was relegated

to the position of deputy chairman by the party hierarchy. The letter noted that

Hausa/Fulani people within Jos North were refused indigene certificates, lacked

employment opportunities, and were marginalized by the Jos North Local Government

Authority.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The status of indigene within Nigeria refers to residence within the region of

origin for ancestors who thrived beyond living memory. This definition is endorsed by

the Fiberisima (1994) Commission of Inquiry report. The institution of the indigene is

more than a cultural artifact. It is directly linked to the security/insecurity of Nigerians.

Indigene certificates, which confirm place of origin, are issued by local governments, and

indigene certification is practiced throughout Nigeria. It is not unusual for those who

have resided within an area for generations to be denied indigene certificates because

their ancestors originated in other areas. Receiving a refusal for indigene certification is

interpreted as disempowerment and marginalization. When entire groups are decertified,

the resultant insecurity has led to protest including armed conflict.

One week after the described Jasawa Association letter was sent to the governor, a

group of indigenous youth from Plateau distributed a letter to the Plateau State

government (Human Rights Watch 2001). The group not only protested the propaganda

of the Hausa/Fulani youth, but issued the following warning to the governor: “We are

finally giving you sir and the security operatives 48 hours to call these so called [sic]

Jasawa to order OR we will SURELY call them to order” (6). Members of this

indigenous group include youth from across Plateau State. They view themselves as the

vanguard progressing the interests of the Plateau indigenous people who are defined as

people who inhabited the Plateau before colonial intervention and who view the

Hausa/Fulani with suspicion. On 31 August 2001, the Plateau State Youth Council held a

press conference and announced, “The constitution of Nigeria allows ‘any’ citizen of the

country to live in any place of his/her choice, therefore any person or groups of person

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is/are welcome to stay in Plateau State. Equally the constitution recognizes the rights of

indigenes as the owners of that given place” (6).

While the primary interest of native communities is for nonnative Muslim

communities to recognize their ancestral and traditional rights over land, traditional

institutions, and territorial jurisdiction, they also demand the right to control political

processes within Jos. Muslim residents object to some of these demands and want native

communities to recognize their rights to political inclusion. The religious needs of both

groups are a sensitive matter that complicates their other needs and demands. The focus-

group participants in this study claimed that population groups unable to air their

grievances turn to small arms to back up their demands. The residents of Congo-Russia

were mostly non-Muslim. The mosque where the incident occurred between the non-

Muslim girl and Muslims praying was located at the border between non-Muslim Congo-

Russia and two Muslim strongholds. One of these strongholds is on Bauchi Road, just

across the stream from Congo-Russia, and the other is located at Angwan Rogo and

Angwan Buzaye, immediately northwest of Congo Russia. Angwan Rogo was largely

populated by Muslims. It had a small non-Muslim population who were expelled during

the crisis.

Congo-Russia is an area known for its relative poverty, slums, and locally brewed

alcohol known as goskolo. In an interview conducted during August 2004, the

commandant o f the mechanized armored division within Jos reported that goskolo is

either purchased by youth or given to them before they become violent. Just as the

Congo-Russia junction mosque had been an irritant to non-Muslims within Congo-

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Russia, the local reputation of non-Muslims as alcoholics was an irritant to Muslim

inhabitants. The mosque where the conflict began hosted Friday Juma’at prayers that

attracted large crowds from outside the immediate neighborhood. This disturbed the

community, which already felt threatened by the religious activities of Muslim residents.

During the Friday prayers, the road leading to Congo-Russia from Bauchi Road was

closed to the public. This is the only access road, hence non-Muslims found it difficult to

tolerate the road closure, even though the actual prayer itself lasted a brief twenty

minutes; the road was closed for just over one hour. Muslim members of the community

did not understand the objections of the indigenous community.

When a confrontation between the Hausa/Fulani and indigenes caused a religious

divide, a general perception of threat from the settler Muslim community of Jos had

already been ingrained within the community as a result of the earlier 1994 incident

between the authorities of the mosque and the non-Muslim community within Congo-

Russia. In a letter to the Plateau State commissioner of police, dated 11 March 1996,

eighteen non-Muslim elders of the Congo-Russia community complained about the road

closure in the following manner:

The Divisional Police Officer of Nasarawa Gwong went in company of one of us to communicate your directives disallowing the mounting of roadblocks thereby preventing the residents in this community to gain access to their respective homes. Alhaji Tijani (mosque proprietor) has vowed not to comply and has threatened that hell will let loose and there will be chaos and bloodshed if anybody tries to stop the mounting o f road blocks during their Juma’at Friday Muslim worship.... The community is not afraid of any bloodshed as declared by Alhaji Tijani, but they do not want to take the law into their hands.

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The proprietor of the Congo-Russia mosque denied threatening or confronting the elders.

He argued that he maintained a cordial and peaceful relationship with his Muslim and

non-Muslim neighbors, which ended when violence erupted at the mosque during

September 2001.

Access to Arms and Violent Confrontation

SALW may not have been commonly used in the Jos conflict because of their

high cost. For example, firearms cost between N 10,000 and N20,000; however, knives,

cutlasses, and axes cost between N300 and N800. Best and Von Kemedi (2005b)

emphasized that these high costs made it impossible for most groups to purchase SALW,

rendering bows and arrows and machetes more common fighting instruments. However,

locally made firearms, especially Dane guns and shotguns, were sought by both Muslims

and non-Muslims (Best and Von Kemedi 2005a). Local SALW manufacturers are

scattered throughout Nigeria and serve as one source of SALW for conflict actors. These

SALW are less expensive than those imported; consequently, they are affordable by

villagers as well. The Jos police disclosed that 80 percent of the weapons seized both

during and after the Jos conflict were locally made. Conflict actors and focus-group

participants from the Nigerian National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies

identified a well-known arms dealer in the area. They also stated that politicians and

community leaders supplied arms.

According to Best and Von Kemedi (2005b),

Nearly all the ethnic groups residing within the conflict-affected areas have formed armed militia or community defense groups. Members with previous military experience usually train these. These included the Berom, Anaguta,

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Afizere, Irigwe, Hausa-Fulani in the north, and the Taroh, Gamai, Memyang, Demak, Kwalla, Yom, Ter, Nontol, Hausa of Wase and Hausa of Yelwa in the south. (39)

As an informant in the Plateau State cabinet office revealed on 18 April 2006, these

militias or defense groups are composed of between 5 and 500 members. According to

Best and Von Kemedi, non-Muslim groups purchase their arms from the southeastern

region of Nigeria, while Muslims obtain their weapons from Chad and northern Nigeria,

with “additional sources [including] other Nigerian conflict zones, such as Kaduna,

Nasarawa and Taraba. Also, well-connected local arms brokers facilitated trafficking”

(39).

Insecurity permeated Plateau State, and residents began to place blame on the

government, security forces, and outsiders for inflaming conflict. The state police became

agents of coercive force, perpetuating insecurity among the population within specific

conflict areas. Bawa and Nwogwu (2002) noted that “the police were also themselves

directly responsible for human rights violations during the crisis” (116). Government

security forces sent to keep order were accused of inciting attacks on local communities,

and “non-Muslims contend that Islamic communities outside the state support their

brethren in the Plateau by providing resources and arms. The Muslims on the other hand,

blame the church and Christian leaders, for perpetrating and promoting armed violence

against them” (Best and Von Kemedi 2005a, 31). However, the heavy presence of

military personnel and surveillance affected the manner in which the conflict was

prosecuted. Unlike the Tiv-Jukun conflict, Jos communities had fewer opportunities for

separate community mobilization as a result of this heavy presence of security personnel

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within the conflict zones. Bawa and Nwogwu (2002) suggested that “military

intervention is widely credited with having saved the situation but during the early days

of the crisis the military merely patrolled the streets and issued threats” (124).

Data surrounding the use of SALW in the Jos conflicts are not systematically

documented, which demonstrates the key problem in any study of small arms. The

evidence of arms circulation presented in this current research was collected from

interviews conducted at military command and from the focus groups at the National

Institute. This evidence reveals a general increase in arms proliferation during and around

the time of the Jos conflict. According to focus-group participants, most of these arms

were smuggled through the western border of Nigeria that is shared with the Republic of

Benin. Informants working within the security services also reported that most the SALW

were brought from other parts of the federation, especially northern and southeastern

Nigeria, either by arms traders, gunrunners, or mercenaries. Although the commandant of

the military base in Jos denied that retired soldiers and security personnel sell or rent

SALW to conflict actors, Best and Von Kemedi (2005b) did find that “corrupt security

agents sometimes also hired out their weapons, only for short periods, sometimes only

overnight” (40).

The Jos police force does not possess much data surrounding the number of

weapons in circulation. The police command of the state revealed that they seized

approximately 414 weapons of various calibers, both foreign and locally made (see table

10). The figures released by the Plateau State government in the official account of the

state of emergency were also different from police figures. As a facet of the measures

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implemented to reduce the number of arms in circulation, the state government offered

money in exchange for weapons. A total of 255 weapons and 274 rounds of ammunition

were surrendered during this initiative (Plateau State Government 2004).

While tension and disagreement were indeed evident in local-area politics,

ethnoreligious clashes and conflicts did not manifest until the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Given the history of peace enjoyed by the Plateau North Senatorial District, these

comparatively recent disputes indicate that the root of conflict may not be as deep as

documented for other regions. Unlike other areas, the conflict within Plateau is not

historical in nature. However, as the data collected in the present study indicate,

perceptions of inequality and injustice affect the level of agitation. As described by Gotan

(2004),

[There] were fears of domination, for example, of certain groups by others, fear of loss of identity, loss of power, loss of access, and lack of control of resources or [of the] power [of] various stake holders [sic] in Jos.. . . Those who see themselves as “indigenes” fear being dominated and excluded in processes in their ancestral land; those who [are] tagged “settlers” are frustrated by the “indigenes” for trying to keep them out of the scheme of things. (73)

A related assertion by Danfulani (2006) assumed that Jos conflict was fueled by politics

and the dispute between indigenes and settlers as it related to their participation in local

government. Bawa and Nwogwu (2002) also contended that “the strain between

‘indigenes’ and ‘non-indigenes’ is most visible in Jos in the competition for political

posts” (108). In essence, the political space in “Jos is polarized by the ‘indigene’ and the

‘settler’ divide [therefore] it was easy for politicians and other vested interests angling for

relevance and political space to exploit the grievances, creating divisions and fueling

crisis” (Ityavyar and Gundu 2004b, 7).

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Table 10. Weapons Seized During Jos Conflict

Arms/Ammunition Quantity Place Captured

B2 rifle with magazine 1 Ginmi Wase local-govemment areas

Single

Rounds of 7.62 4 N/A

Arrows 16 N/A

Assorted weapons 55 Wase local-govemment areas

Rounds of 7.62 mm special 17 Dadin Kowa, Langtang South local-govemment areas

Rounds of 7.62 mm special 49 Jos-Zaria Road

Locally made pistols and Zomo Village, Mikang local- cartridges 1 piston and 2 cartridges govemment areas

Locally made pistols and Jos-Abuja Road cartridges 2 pistols and 2 cartridges

AK-47 rifle with magazine 1 Langtang

G3 rifle with magazine 1 Langtang

Locally made rifles 39 N/A

Dane gun 1 Bashar, Wase local-govemment areas

Rounds of 95 Man 2 Langtang North, local- govemment areas

Rounds of 7.6 mm NATO 2 Yelwa, Shendam local- govemment areas

Police SMG rounds 20 Yelwa, Shendam local- govemment areas

Source: Plateau State Government 2004. Making Peace, the Plateau Experience: Official Account o f the State o f Emergency. Jos, Nigeria. Government Printers.

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There were no clear lines of inequality within Jos; however, the conflict had a

political, economic, social, religious, and psychological impact on many communities.

The economy was affected by the damage done to property and businesses. Although

there is no quantitative estimate of the economic impact of the conflict, it is clear that the

result was unprecedented, large-scale destruction of private and public property. Normal

business operation was disrupted for at least two weeks during the first outbreak of

violence and for longer periods in subsequent outbreaks. Perhaps the greatest economic

impact was the destruction of the ultramodern market at the center of Jos. Commerce in

the city has yet to recover from this act. Neither the state government nor the trader

associations have been able to replace this city center, nor find a convenient alternative.

The Jos conflict is a clear case of insecurity producing yet more insecurity through

conflict that is violent but not militarized. Jos is an urban city, and perhaps the presence

of military personnel restricted the proliferation of small arms.

As discussed earlier, the local government of Jos has been polarized for a lengthy

period of time, and further division of the political elite is evident. As a result of conflict,

the slightest political event in Jos, such as the Ward Congress of the People’s Democratic

Party, generates violent confrontation along religious and political lines, as was the case

during 2002. A culture of fear and suspicion has developed among rival groups. Specific

areas have been ethnically cleansed of particular ethnic and religious groups. For

example, informants indicated that there are nearly no non-Muslim people living within

the Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rimi, and Bauchi Road areas, and there are almost no

Muslims in Angwan Rukuba, Jenta Adamu, and Hwolshe.

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As the focus-group participants in this study stated, residents of Jos have

developed distorted perceptions leading to even deeper and more frequent use of social

stereotypes. Informants claimed that, in spite of messages of peace and the activities of

the government and NGOs, citizens have been reluctant to return to certain residential

areas considered unsafe for their tribal groups. For example, non-Muslim students at the

University of Jos will not accept accommodations within Angwan Rogo, in spite of its

proximity to the university. They have refused appeals by members of the Angwan Rogo

community to return to the area because they consider the community hostile to non-

Muslims. Informants also indicated that religious fundamentalism remains a potent

source of insecurity and plays an important role in defining group identities within Jos;

however, it did not cause the conflict. Rather, it created a sense of separateness that

fueled the independent identities and ideologies needed to mobilize conflict.

Summary

Although seemingly innocuous, the issue of identity (i.e., settler/nonindigenes vs.

indigenes) appears to be at the core of many conflicts within Nigeria. The politics of

ethnic bias and identity fuel the sense of deprivation and marginalization among

nonindigenes. Every Nigerian is a citizen of Nigeria, but no matter how long Nigerians

reside within an area outside their ancestral home, they are assumed to be nonindigenes.

This obviously contradicts the democratic republican concept of citizenship enshrined

within the Nigerian Constitution. Yet, many Nigerians believe in the concepts of indigene

and nonindigene, and the state has done little to solve this problem. Minimal communal

conflict within Nigeria involves issues other than geographic origin.

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From the onset, British colonial authorities employed a policy of indirect rule.

They retained traditional institutions primarily based upon post-Dan Fodio jihad emirates,

and native chiefs ruled the people as their representatives (Kirk-Greene 1968). Colonial

authorities depended upon the emirates of northern Nigeria to execute indirect rule within

the region because they were more developed than other chieftaincy institutions, as was

the case on the high Plateau. When indirect rule was initiated, the high Plateau was

governed as part of Bauchi Province because Bauchi was the nearest emirate to the

Plateau. In their view of the conflict, however, the Plateau State government (2001)

claimed that this situation was founded on faulty information, stating, “This was based on

the misleading information provided at the emirate palace, on the pseudo claims of

emirate administration over all the non-Muslim polities in the highlands. Accordingly,

the whole area of the highlands was called Bauchi Plateau. This lasted from 1902 to

1926” (2).

Anthropological studies commissioned by the colonial authorities led to a clearer

understanding of Plateau polities. During 1926, the Plateau was composed of non-

Muslim polities and separated from Bauchi Province after the introduction of the Pagan

Administration (i.e., non-Muslim) and administered as Plateau Province. The Berom and

Anaguta resided within Plateau Province; however, the largest proportion of the Afizere

population was left in Bauchi Province. Many other non-Muslim regions of northern

Nigeria were also reorganized. During 1976, some Afizere people returned to Plateau

State to join their kin in Gwong District; however, many remained within Bauchi State.

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Prior to 1900, there was no urban center within Jos or anywhere within the

Plateau. The population groups inhabiting the Plateau lived within small communities

and villages, and their political makeup was based upon clans or tribes, with varying

degrees of functionality and different levels of development. The settlements were

scattered across the state. The land was divided into settlements, farmland, sacred

religious areas for ritual and sacrifice, and hunting grounds. Jos is located on land that

served as past farmland and hunting grounds of indigenous groups such as the Berom,

Anaguta, and Afizere. The people who farmed and hunted this land lived within

settlements such as Kabong, Du, and Gwong. Even though the indigenes now disagree on

the ownership of Jos, they all agree on their high level of interaction with the land of this

region. The ownership of Jos is complex. On one hand, the indigenes have a strong case

because they consider the land indigenous farmland and hunting grounds. On the other

hand, the Hausa/Fulani have a strong case because they established Jos. The Jos conflict

is a direct result of this disagreement.

While violent conflict is relatively new within Jos, competing (i.e., conflicting)

interpretations surrounding the history of the city before, during, and after colonial rule is

the basis for the conflict. Such historical interpretations are used to justify the demands of

each group for political participation and residential rights. According to the Human

Rights Watch (2005a),

These grievances should be seen in the context of longstanding political tensions and rivalries between the predominately Hausa population of the north and a multitude of other ethnic groups in the south and other parts of the country.... [The conflict has] ethnic, political, economic, and religious components, which over time, have become inextricably linked.... As the different groups have sought to recruit additional allies to support their cause, the conflict has become

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increasingly complex, drawing in an ever larger number of ethnic groups. It has also spread geographically to different parts of the state, leading to a convergence of conflicts originally rooted in different locations. (7)

Even though the issues that led to the Jos conflict are complex, the most important factor

is the indigene-settler question and how each group uses its historical narrative to justify

political, economic, and cultural claims These claims have help define the character of

the conflict. While there certainly was a marked presence of weapons in the conflict,

various informants stated that the Jos conflict was not heavily militarized.

Jos is an urban city with a large number of security personnel. Other parts of the

state have low numbers of people; however, the numerous ethnic groups and their

interaction has made it difficult for these populations to mobilize as they did in the Tiv-

Jukun conflict. Consequently, while the key issues of relative deprivation and

marginalization remain conflict triggers, access to, and possession of, weapons is

restricted because of the high price for arms and because Jos is patrolled by various

security agencies. It is therefore difficult to move weapons to and among conflict actors

within the city. Although the socioeconomic history of deprivation and marginalization

remain triggers for armed conflict, the inability of the Jos conflict to militarize appears to

negate the impact of these factors and results in conflict that is less weaponized.

At first glance, Jos conflict appears to result in heavy casualties, significant

property damage, and subsequent reprisals; however, closer examination indicates that,

compared to the Tiv-Jukun conflict, militarization is never really achieved. Focus-group

participants stated that the police and other security agencies have repeatedly failed to

guarantee law and order and have not arrested and prosecuted conflict participants. They

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their own security, which led to insecurity. Therefore, while there is indeed evidence of

weaponry in Jos conflict, there remains a weak association among the three factors of

relative threat, marginalization, and access to arms.

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CHAPTER 6

CASE HISTORIES: THE NORTHERN ZONE

Islam Politics and Ethnic Division

Similar to the Niger Delta, regions of the Northern geopolitical zone have also

experienced violent conflict. This Northern zone includes the Sharia states of Katsina,

Sokoto, Kebbi, and Zamfara. As described by the IPCR (2003), “all of these states fall

within the former Sokoto Caliphate, an Islamic state and government that existed before

the colonial period” (306). These states are referred to as the Core North. According to

the 1991 census, 22,277,297 people live within this northern area of Nigeria (Bande

2003). Hausa is the dominant language, and the Hausa/Fulani is the largest ethnic group

(IPCR 2003). Islam is the dominant religion, followed by Christianity and traditional

religions. Religion has been politicized within the Northern zone and played an

important role in the insecurity that led to conflict in the area, as is evident in the

following excerpt: “The Sokoto Caliphate [had an] impact on the nature of [the]

relationship between religion and politics and [on] the politicization of religion.

Consequently, issues, either local or national, that are economic and political in nature

tend to take [on] some religious coloration” (306). The Sokoto Caliphate was

established by Shehu Usman Dan Fodio during the first decade of the nineteenth

century. It had a centralized system of government, unlike the stateless societies in other

parts of the country, and it was theocratic, with governance revolving around Islamic

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law or Sharia. The Caliphate was solidified by Dan Fodio, a Fulani Islamic cleric, who

led a jihad (i.e., holy war) against the Hausa/Habe regime and created an empire from

Nupe to the northeastern side of Yorubaland (Library of Congress 1992). This “jihad

which began in Gobir in 1804 aimed at the formation of an Islamic state based on

Sharia” (Kenny 1996, 8).27

Habu Galadimah (phone interview, 18 January 2007) stated that the makeup of

ethnic groups becomes important when considering conflict within the Northern region of

Nigeria. He noted that, in Kaduna, a division exists along religious and ethnic lines that

coincides, and is reinforced, by geographic divisions. The Muslims and the Hausa/Fulani

population live within the northern region of Kaduna, and the Christians and minority

populations reside within southern Kaduna. “Relationships between Hausa/Fulani and

minority tribes are tense as Southern Kaduna had suffered decades of repression and

violence at the hands of the powerful Hausa of Zazzau” (Human Rights Watch 2006,47).

The nature of indirect rule solidified the marginalization of Christian and minority

groups. Additionally, the minority groups still feel threatened by the traditional rulers of

Kaduna that continue to bear Hausa titles from the emirate dynasty, which is resented by

the minorities (Habre Galadimah, letter to author, 18 January 2007).

26The jihad of the nineteenth century was one of the most important developments in Nigerian history and led to the collapse of the Hausa state and the emergence of the Sokoto Caliphate dynasty (Falola et al. 1991,19). The jihad was a continuation of earlier efforts made by pious scholars in isolated regions of central Sudan to reform Islam and establish a government based upon Islamic principles. In essence, they were seeking a revival of orthodox Islam. 27See Falola and colleagues (1991), Sulaiman (1986), and Olumfemi (1985) for a full discussion of the emirate.

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The Kano State Conflict

Kano was founded during the seventh century by Abagayawa immigrant

blacksmiths who came to mine iron ore from the iron-stone outcrop of Dalla Hill (Albert

2001). Kano began as a small city-state, and many factors contributed to its expansion

into a full-fledged city and, subsequently, into a kingdom rich in iron ore. The presence

of iron ore contributed to the increase in craftsmen who produced various commodities

ranging from farm implements to war armaments. The production of war armaments (i.e.,

spears; arrows; shields; armor; and later, guns) protected the kingdom and its inhabitants

from external aggression. This explains the large number of local arms manufacturers

within Kano state. The 2006 census figures placed the population of Kano at 9,381,681

(National Population Commission 2007).

Islam was introduced in Kano around the fourteenth century, and Islam became

entrenched with subjugation of the state during the jihad (Albert 2001). During 1812, the

Hausa dynasties were absorbed into the Sokoto Caliphate, and the Caliphate came under

British rule during the partition in 1903. Kenny (1984) examined the Sharia and Islamic

revival within Nigeria and observed that the British gained complete authority over the

northernmost area of Nigeria during 1902. The British “preserved all existing institutions

under the rulership of the emirs who were under the British High commissioner” (1). This

system of indirect rule enabled the British to maintain control and economic interest

throughout the region. During the postcolonial period, the political fortunes of these

traditional rulers increased almost in tandem with the political fortunes of the country.

Albert explained,

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Colonialism opened up Kano migrants from Southern Nigeria who introduced Christianity to the city and now control sizable proportions of the city’s informal economy. [At the same time] the practice of Islam also experienced dramatic changes as different sects of Islamic movements started establishing their presence in the city, especially in the colonial and post-colonial periods. (274)

This became a major fault line that spurred conflict within northern Nigeria. The history

of the Kano State is unlike that of other zones analyzed in the present study because of its

unique religious and ethnic characteristics and attributes. During recent years, both Kano

and Kaduna State have experienced violent clashes between Muslims (i.e., primarily the

Hausa-Fulani) and Christian minority groups who are often considered settlers. The

causes of conflict within this area are complex, and relationships between the different

ethnic groups are complicated by religious fundamentalism.

Poverty and the Relative Threat

As noted earlier, Kano State, at its height, was the commercial center of the

Caliphate because of the rich iron deposits in the city and the production of various

commodities. Today, however, Kano and the Northern zone have a higher incidence of

poverty than other regions within Nigeria. According to Bande (2003), “25 percent of the

population of the country resides in the zone [yet] the ... of standard of living is low with

pronounced incidence of poverty, ignorance, disease, squalor, poor diet and poor shelter

more pronounced in this zone than all the other zones in Nigeria” (95). The IPCR (2003)

characterized poverty within the Northern zone as a high level of youth unemployment

and a general lack of health and educational services. The institute claimed that “the high

level of unemployment among the youth renderfs] them vulnerable to manipulation in the

hands of political, ethnic and religious elites” (310). IPCR noted that the national average

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. household expenditure during 1997 was N5, 194; however, this average within the

Northern zone was N2,941. A UNDP (1998) human-development report also found

regional disparity within education and life expectancy within the zone, noting that the

literacy rate is 10 percent in Bomu State and 62 percent in the southern state of Benin.

Life expectancy is thirty-eight years in Bomu compared to the fifty-one years in Benin

(IPCR 2003). These statistics, coupled with other relative threat factors, interacted with

“Islam and politics and the nature of ethnic divisions to influence the direction of

conflict” within the region (306).

The dominant ethnic groups within the Northern zone are the Hausa and Fulani

who consider themselves the true indigenes (i.e., particularly the Hausa); Christians and

other ethnic minorities are considered settlers. Most of the Christian minority is from

other regions of Nigeria who have migrated to the Northern zone to conduct commercial

activities. Most Christians live within Sabon Gari (i.e., New Town). The terms

southerner and northerner emerged as southerners, particularly the Ibo, began to threaten

the economic security of the far-reaching Hausa commercial empire based in Kano. Part

of the resentment toward settlers (i.e., members of southern tribes) living, and often bom,

in Kano is caused by the perception that their primary aim is to make money (Global

Security 2005). Indigenes believe the settlers are unwilling to adapt to the culture of

Kano and that they reject the values of the indigenous population (Albert 2001; Global

Security 2005). Indigenes do not perceive settlers as contributing to the community in

either a material or nonmaterial sense (Global Security 2005). The indigenes also believe

settlers disrespect the Kano indigenous population.

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To some extent, Muslims feel marginalized within their own country, which fuels

their grievances against the southern Christian settlers (Global Security 2005). Both sides

claim that increasing religious intolerance creates insecurity (IPCR 2003). Albert (2001)

identified this problem of cultural integration as a key factor in the conflict of the

Northern zone. Migrants controlled the economy of Kano, “which naturally led to hostile

dispositions towards the southerners” (279). Albert claimed that migrants refused to be

“hausanized”; that is, they refused to accept Islam and its cultural attributes. To reduce

hostility, the British established segregated communities—Sabon Gari for the migrants

and the Hausa-Fulani were restricted to the old walled city of Bimi (279). Physical

segregation was reinforced by political and legal segregation. Albert documented,

“Whereas the Bimi was put under the native authority system headed by the Emir of

Kano, the Sabon Gari was managed directly by the colonial authorities” (279). The

situation was made worse by the expansion of the Sharia legal system by the state

government, which deepened perceptions of threat and heightened the mistrust between

Muslims and Christians (IPCR 2003).

Intrareligious Insecurity

The roots of conflict within the Northern Zone can be traced to early life within

Kano State. During 1901, Lord Lugard, who led the occupation of northern Nigeria,

promised the Sultan of Sokoto, who headed the Sokoto Caliphate of which Kano was a

part, that he would do nothing to hinder the practice of Islam (Albert 2001). The British

tolerated the Sharia system; however, but they did not recognize it as the final law for the

emirates (Kenny 1984). In spite of its secondary position, the Sharia system has become

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ingrained within the Northern zone. During the 1980s, an Islamic sect28 known as the

Maitatsine was formed within Kano (Boer 2003; Hiskett 1987; Kastfelt 1989; Kenny

1996). This group followed the teachings of a mystical leader from Cameroon—Alhaji

Muhammadu Marwa—who became known as Maitatsine (Albert 2001; Hiskett 1987;

Kastfelt 1989; Kenny 1996). Marwa claimed to have divine revelations that superseded

those of the Prophet, and he preached against many forms of modem life “such as the use

of radios, bicycles, watches and the possession of money” [and] denounced the reading of

any book but the Koran as ‘paganism’” (Kastfelt 1989, 83). According to Falola (1998),

Marwa “drew on established religious tradition and created a doctrine.. . . His practice

was based on a mixture of Islam and sorcery” (144). The sect attacked what they saw as

“the corrupt religious practice of the established Islamic community of Kano” (Kastfelt

1989, 83).

Maitatsine appealed primarily to marginal, poverty-stricken urban immigrants

whose rejection by more established urban groups fostered this religious opposition. As

Bande (2003) observed, the conflict was “the revolt of the marginalized urban peasants”

(87). These disaffected people ultimately lashed out at the more traditional mosques and

congregations, which resulted in violent outbreaks within several cities of the North.

Falola (1998) documented that the conflict ensued on 8 December 1980 when Matatsine

went to preach at Shahuchi, an area in proximity to the central mosque and the palace of

the Emir of Kano. When the police attempted to stop the group, they turned on the 150-

28Global Security (2005) estimated that as much as 90 percent to 95 percent of the population is Muslim; however, different Islamic sects coexist. The traditional sects follow Sunni Islam and include the Qadriyya, Tijaniyya, Tariqa, Malikiya, Ahmadiya, and Islamiya. Another group—the Da’awa—which is an acronym for Hisba, enforces Sharia codes. New, more fundamentalist groups include the Izala and Shiites.

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man police force, killing some police and stealing their Berettas, tear gas, hand grenades,

and bullets. Emboldened by the action, the mob subsequently rampaged throughout the

city as members of the sect from other states joined the fray. According to Falola, it took

the Nigerian military to subdue them. “The Matatsine were bold warriors.... Their

tactics are bolder than the guerillas we read about fighting in Malaysia or in the jungles of

East Asia” (154).

In addition to the Maitatsine conflict, several other religious conflicts took place

in Kano and formed the background for others such as the 2004 Kano crisis. The 2004

Plateau State crisis, which culminated in the massacre of several hundred Muslims by

Christian militia within the town of Yelwa, sparked deadly reprisals by Muslims against

Christians in Kano (Human Rights Watch 2005a). These reprisals began on 11 May 2004

when

Muslim leaders in Kano organized a large but peaceful demonstration of several thousand people to protest against the Yelwa attack.... Muslim leaders had written to the police and the state government asking for permission [to] hold the demonstration, stating that they wanted to present the state governor with a protest letter addressed to the President. However, the police and the federal government advised the governor not to allow the demonstration to proceed, in view of the tension which had been building up in the city for several days but the governor said he supported the people’s right to express their views and gave his guarantee that the demonstration would remain peaceful. The demonstrators were granted permission to hold the rally, but only within the confines of the mosque compound. (52)

The Human Rights Watch also reported,

The rally proceeded and on May 11, a large crowd of Muslims gathered at the Aliyu Ibn Talib mosque, on Zaria Road, which is situated one or two kilometers from Government House (the state governor’s office) [and] a group of them, numbering several thousand, led by the ulama (religious scholars), went to Government House to hand the governor their protest letter to the President where they demanded that the killings be stopped. (52)

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While the demonstrators were meeting with the governor, violence

suddenly broke out in several areas of the town located some distance away from Government House as groups of Muslims started attacking Christians, and the violence escalated quickly. Killings and destruction took place in several parts of town, starting in Gyadi-Gyadi Court Road and Hausawa Zoo Road, then spreading to other areas, including Sharada and Shagari Quarters, Challawa, Panshekara, Doreyi, Ja’en, Tukun Kawa, Riyijar Lemo, Kabuga, and BUK Road (the road leading to Bayero University in Kano). (52)

During the two days of violence within Kano, Christians were hunted down and killed;

their houses, churches, and other buildings burned. Human Rights Watch reported that

the attackers used a variety of weapons including knives, machetes, axes, and locally

made guns. Most of the attackers were young men in their late teens or twenties.

Witnesses referred to the attackers as “yan daba, a term used to describe gangs of

unemployed youths in Kano. The gangs also included younger boys, some as young as 10

or 12, thought to be almajiris” (53).

Militia and Arms Flow

Militias within Kano are small, loosely organized vigilante groups known as

“yan daba” or “yan tauri.” Together with the almajirais (i.e., beggers), these groups

mobilize only in times of intraethnic, interethnic, or religious tension and/or

misunderstandings fomenting violence. The spontaneity with which they organize

suggests they are heavily influenced by local malams (i.e., Islamic scholars) or

politicians. They direct most of their attacks at shops and/or homes belonging to the Ibo

and other nonindigenous groups. The attacks are neither organized nor coordinated, and

29Over the years, almajiri has evolved from a word reserved for itinerant Qur’anic schoolchildren forced to become scroungers by their ill-equipped teachers and minders to a term used to describe a miscellany of street urchins and miscreants (Federal Government on Almajiri, 2006).

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they indicate that generalized feelings of insecurity fuel violence within Kano. The yan

daba and the almajiri groups typically employ traditional weapons such as cutlasses,

sticks, stones, machetes, charms, locally made pistols, and Dane guns. Falola (1998)

reported that the Matatsine were trained in the use of bows and arrows, and members of

the sect armed themselves at all times with swords, daggers, Dane guns, and double-

barrel rifles, among other implements.

Modem weapons were also used in Kano conflict such as AK-47s, Israeli Uzis,

pump-action rifles, and Berretta pistols. Many of the Ibo and Christian communities

interviewed for this study in Kano suspect that the Hausas and Muslims of the state

obtain their weapons from Niger. They pointed out that mercenaries from neighboring

Niger and Chad have been hired by Muslim communities, and these mercenaries used

submachine guns in past conflict. The Hausa and Muslim communities claim they use

knives, cutlasses, and machetes in lieu of guns, insisting that only the Ibo and their

Christians brothers employ SALW.

The Kano State Police Command stated they seized more than 13,500 weapons

between 1999 and 2004; however, they did not give a breakdown of the seizures

because they claimed this information was an issue of national security and hence could

not be publicized. Although the exact quantity of weapons in circulation could not be

determined, their availability is apparent. There is a black market for used arms within

Kano that is operated by blacksmiths at the Wudil market. These blacksmiths are able to

replicate any type of weapon with a sample. Pistols are sold for at least N8,000, and

AK-47s and G3 assault rifles cost a minimum of N7,000. Some of the used foreign

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rifles were procured from Belgium, while other weapons were obtained from retired

military officers or young boys who stole them. The blacksmiths at the Wudil market

who reproduce these weapons can sell them for much less than the cost of used foreign

weapons.

Summary

The relative deprivation of poverty is an underlying factor in conflict. As noted

earlier, Kanos has higher unemployment than other sections of Nigeria. The national

average for household expenditures is N5,194; however, it is only N2,941 within the

Northern zone (IPCR 2003). The Kano conflict was based upon religious ideology. It was

predominately a rebellion against mainstream Islamic tenets, which generated feelings of

threat among the Christian population. The proliferation of various Islamic sects led

many Muslim groups to denounce Matatsine as heretic (Falola 1998), which in turn, led

to mobilization along a religious divide. The Matatsine appealed to the downtrodden and

poor and, according to Habre Galadimah (phone interview, 18 January 2007), the conflict

was a pagan revolt against the establishment. It was also a sectarian conflict involving

mercenaries and SALW.

The Kaduna State Conflict

Kaduna city is the capital city of Northern Nigeria (Ityavyar and Gundu 2004b,

10—11). Initially, it was a garrison town; however, during 1912, it became the

administrative capital of the Northern region. Ityavyar and Gundu reported that the

colonial policy of indirect rule resulted in the segregation of indigenous and settler

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communities and laid the foundation for the insecurities that fueled conflict within

Kaduna. Various ethnic groups30 inhabit Kaduna, which gives it a distinct character

within a state divided into predominately Muslims in the north and Christians in the

south. According to Abdu and Umar (2002), Kaduna is the one of the largest states within

Northern Nigeria (2002); its population is 60 percent Muslim and 40 percent Christian

(Maier 2000a). According to the 2006 census, 6,066,562 million people reside within

Kaduna. Kaduna has experienced a number of conflicts, including a dispute during 1987

and another conflict sparked by the introduction of the Sharia during February 2000.

Sources o f Conflict

Factors at the root of Kaduna conflict fall along a political, social, and economic

continuum. Past political disputes have resulted from the appointment of political leaders

in southern Kaduna who are considered settlers. Although there are several different

ethnic groups within Kaduna, they have not integrated into a cohesive society. According

to one informant, various segments of Kaduna society claim they are marginalized by the

Hausa/Fulani who consider themselves indigenes and attempt to stop settler groups from

participating in the decision-making process of the state. The political and social factors

reinforced by the process of colonialism have created a sense of insecurity and distrust

between the Christian ethnic tribes in southern Kaduna and the Hausa-Fulani Muslims of

the north. Additionally, the major economic structures of the state (i.e., industry and

30The ethnic groups include the Kamuku, Gwari, and Kadara in the west; the Hausa and Kurama in the north; and the Jaba, Kaje, Koro, Kamaton, Bajju, Kataf, Morwa, and Chawai in the northeast.

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government projects) were located within northern Kaduna, leading southern residents of

Kaduna to claim this as another sign of marginalization.

According to Abdu and Umar (2002), the nature of Kaduna society is a complex

structure of ethnic, religious, and cultural divides that intermix with traditional values.

As a result, there are often differences in opinion. As Abdu and Umar explained, “There

is also social differentiation and settlements based on economic and political status.

Kaduna has its fair share of high density areas, with high levels of joblessness; hardship

and unemployment, mixed with low-density areas inhabited by the cosmopolitan and

economically well off’ (85). The peculiar demographic structure of the state has also

formed a basis of conflict since colonial times and constitutes a major factor in disputes

within Kaduna. Abdu and Umar observed that several conflicts occurred between 1946

and 1966, all motivated by settler perception of marginalization by the emirate system.

However, since the 1980s, “political violence and crisis in Kaduna state have assumed

the additional dimension of a Muslim versus Christian dichotomy” (86). As Human

Rights Watch (2003a) reported, “Over several decades, Kaduna, like other states of

Nigeria, has experienced outbreaks of violence and fighting between different groups.

Most often, this has pitted Muslims against Christians, although the fundamental causes

can be traced to political and economic rivalries rather than religious differences” (3).

Islamic Revivalism

The Sharia crisis was precipitated by the revival of the Islamic religious code;

however, it was transformed with the creation of the chiefdom within Kaduna state

(Habu Galadimah, telephone interview, 18 January 2007). Kaduna Muslims readily

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adopted the Sharia Code after what they viewed as the failure of secular law to curtail

socioeconomic and political decay. During 1999, Governor Ahmed Sani proclaimed

that Zamfara State would adopt the Islamic criminal code; eleven states followed suit

(“Shariacracy on Trial” 2001). “Sharia supporters claimed that it would make Northern

Nigeria safer, wealthier and godlier” (3). By December 2000, within eighteen months of

the return to civil rule within Nigeria, all northwestern state governments had begun

using the Sharia to resolve criminal and civil disputes (“How Sharia Spread” 2001).

However, Kaduna Christians objected to the use of Sharia in criminal cases, and the

Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) objected to what they perceived as a “threat of

Islamization [by] the state and the imposition of Shariah on non-Muslims as it was done

during the precolonial and colonial periods” (Abdu and Umar 2002, 93). They claimed

the use of Sharia was “an attempt to Islamize Kaduna state” and generate crisis (88).

This objection to the use of Sharia resulted in the February 2000 conflict.

The Christian Association of Nigeria organized demonstrations to protest the

introduction of the Sharia, and Muslims viewed this as a threat. Abdu and Umar (2002)

described the scenario in the following manner:

While they were demonstrating, they [Christians] harassed us, asking us to say “no to Shariah” which many Muslims refused to pronounce; of course no Muslim will say that, they hit many Muslims who refused to obey their command. They smashed the windscreen of Muslim motorists until Muslims began to react in self- defense. I saw how they beat one man along Kasuwa because he refused to say “Ba Shariah” (No to Shariah). (93)

During February 2000, violence erupted while Christians were protesting, and “the

Jama’atul Nasir Islam reported that 797 Muslims were killed, while police reported a

total of 609 deaths” (97). At the end of February, the vice president of Nigeria led

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negotiations with the governors of five northern states, persuading them to temporarily

relinquish their attempts to institute the Sharia (“In God’s Name” 2000). As a result of

negotiations, the Kaduna government introduced a modified version of Sharia to reduce

religious tension. Under this system, the Sharia would only apply within predominantly

Muslim areas, while canon or customary law would apply in areas inhabited by

Christians and non-Muslims (“Nigerian: Focus on Tensions” 2001).

The Role o f Small Arms and Militia Groups

Weapons seized during the Sharia crisis by the Kaduna State Police Command

included military rocket launchers, medium-sized bombs, small grenades, AK-47s,

locally made pistols, and Dane guns (see table 11). According to information obtained

from the Kaduna State Police (2006) during July 2006,2,400 guns were seized from

armed robbers and illegal arms dealers during July 2001. The police destroyed these

weapons. The most popular guns in the region are the AK-47 and the Lar gun.

According to key informants, local blacksmiths produced the SALW used in the

conflicts.

Militia groups within Kaduna State use a range of sophisticated weapons

including semi- and fully-automatic rifles alongside more traditional weapons such as

spears and cutlasses. As in the Tiv-Jukun conflict, retired soldiers provided military

training for youth, employing military-style weapons (Habu Galadimah, telephone

interview, 18 January 2007). In retaliation to this threat from the Christians, the

Muslims entered their neighboring country of Chad to hire mercenaries who brought

weapons into the state. In the process, new armed groups were produced, and use of

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untrained civilian militias, ill-disciplined fighters, and mercenaries from Niger and

Chad deepened the violence. While the Kaduna conflict was caused by a combination of

ethnic and religious factors, it has a long and protracted history of tension that was

transformed with the imposition of the Sharia legal system. The southern Christian

population perceived the imposition of the Sharia code as a threat and yet another

example of the emirate system attempting to dominate over them.

Table 11. Weapons Seized During the Kaduna Conflict

Weapon Number Seized

Military rocket launcher 2

Medium-sized bomb 2

Small grenades 2

Guns of various categories 45

Source: Kaduna State Police Command. 2006. Weapons Seized During Kaduna Conflict. Kaduna, Nigeria. State Police Command.

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CHAPTER 7

CASE HISTORIES: THE SOUTH-SOUTH ZONE

Environmental Decay and the Politics of Oil Resources

The widespread diffusion of arms feeds conflict within the Niger Delta. However,

the link to the current wave of militancy is found in the relative threats and perceived

marginalization associated with lack of benefits from the oil supply of the region. As

Bassey and Obari (1998) reported, “More recent conflicts, and especially the militant

youth31 phenomenon, are historically attributed to the inequitable distribution of

resources” (189). Oil, which provides Nigeria with 90 percent of its revenue, is produced

within the Niger Delta; however, this region has remained grossly underdeveloped and

heavily marginalized. Ethnic groups residing within the area complain that basic facilities

and infrastructure, such as potable water, electricity, health care facilities, roads, and

access to employment opportunities, are lacking. Several decades of exploration and

production of crude oil by multinational oil corporations within the region have resulted

in environmental degradation, which has narrowed the range of economic opportunities

for resident minority groups.

Ethnic minorities within the Niger region have frequently argued that they

produce much of the oil wealth of the country; however, the resources are exploited for

3'“The termyouth in Nigeria has a more expansive meaning than is common elsewhere and can include men who are well into their thirties” (Human Rights Watch 2006, 54).

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the Nigerian state by foreign multinational corporations. Ethnic groups also accuse the

Nigerian state of gross neglect and insensitivity to their socioeconomic plight that is

largely produced by the exploration and production of oil and gas resources (Gambo

2004). Therefore, the Niger Delta conflict revolved around community perception of

unfair entitlement from oil resources. Communities of the region also battled over

perceptions of nonrecognition of their values. The key threat to Niger Delta residents is

the pollution caused by the exploration and production of oil and gas and its effects on

the fishing industry and farming, which are key occupations for people within the region.

Additionally, while oil production is the most important socioeconomic development in

the history of the nation, oil-producing communities have remained socioeconomically

dependent and marginalized, persistently disempowered and psychologically alienated.

Coupled with the problems associated with distribution of oil revenue, the

arguments over which groups should be considered residents of the Niger Delta persist

(IIDEA 2000). There is no general consensus on what constitutes the Niger Delta because

this oil-producing area has become a casualty of the intense politicking surrounding the

exploitation of oil and gas and the distribution of oil benefits. Groups considered

residents of the Niger Delta are eligible for federal revenue; however, many ethnic

minorities with oil-bearing land complain of marginalization by ethnic majorities and

denial of their fair share of the “national cake” (Osaghae 1995).

It is estimated that twenty million people live within the Niger Delta and,

although they are of different cultures and speak different languages, they are all

considered southern minorities. The Niger Delta is composed of the states of Abia, Akwa

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Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. The region is considered

a triangle with its apex between Ndoni and Aboh and descending eastward to the Qua

Iboe River at Eket and westward to the Benin River along the Atlantic coast between the

bights of Benin and Biafra (IIDEA 2000; Watts 1997). Politically, the Niger Delta is

defined as a group of six states within the South South zone—Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa,

Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers (IIDEA 2000; Isumonah 1998; Watts 1997). Another

definition makes a distinction between the core and peripheral of the Niger Delta

(Alamieyseigha 2003; IIDEA 2000). The core includes the states of Rivers, Delta,

Bayelsa, and to some extent, Akwa Ibom (IIDEA 2000; Isumonah 1998). Peripheral

states are Ondo, Anambra, Edo, Cross Rivers, and Imo. The definition of the Niger Delta

favored by those such as the former governor of Bayelsa State (Alamieyseigha 2003), is

the description encompassing both the core and peripheral states.

The Niger Delta is often referred to as a “rainbow region” due to its numerous

ethnic groups. Some believe there are only three indigenous population groups—the Ijaw,

a number of Edonoid groups, and the Ibibio (IIDEA 2000). Other ethnic groups of the

region are considered the Protestants and refugees who fled the harsh rule of the Bini, the

group dominating the area prior to British colonial rule. The Bini include the Ogoni,

Ikwerre, Ekepu, Ogba, Egema, Engenno, Abua, Opolo, Ijaw, Isoko, Itsekiri, and Kwale.

Ethnic groups considered to be newcomers migrated to the Niger Delta between 1886 and

1898. Although they share a common colonial experience, these groups are not

homogeneous, and the relationships among them are sometimes as intense as the

relationships between them and the ethnic groups who originated from outside the region.

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Tension exists between the Ijaw and Itsekiri, the Itsekiri and Urhobo, the Ikwerre and

Ijaw, and the Ogoni and Okrika ethnic groups, among others. The exploitation of oil and

the politics has complicated this tension, not only between ethnic groups, but also

between their elite (Ekeh 2004). The complex interaction among these different groups,

as well as the oil, money, and overall environment, have intensified conflict within the

Niger Delta and led to SALW proliferation. For purposes of this case study, distinction is

made between core and peripheral Niger Delta because the conflict was centered at the

core. There are also references to the general interrelationship of various conflicts within

the region.

Demographics and the Structural Antecedents of Conflict

The Niger Delta is a vast flood plain covering 70,000 square kilometers within the

southern region of Nigeria bound by the Atlantic Ocean (Adetula 1996). One of the

largest wetland areas in the world is within the Niger Delta, covering more than 2,000

square kilometers (Okonta and Douglas 2001). The area exhibits a complex interplay

between land and water (Adetula 1996; Onosode 2003) and is composed of four

ecological zones—coastal barrier islands, mangroves, swamp forests, and lowland

rainforests (Egunjobi 1999). The terrain of the Niger Delta is fundamental to regional

conflict. It is low and flat with poorly drained soil and an annual rainfall between 3,000

and 4,500 millimeters. Widespread flooding and erosion characterize the rainy season,

with flooding lasting more than six months of the year and usually accompanied by

contaminated drinking water (Okonta and Douglas 2001). This flooding also causes

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bacterial, viral, and parasitic outbreaks. The dry season creates swamps and poorly

drained pools along with a shortage of safe drinking water (Egunjobi 1999). Most Niger

Delta residents live within rural areas, and the population density is very high. Given the

amount of water within the Niger Delta, land is a major source of conflict (IIDEA 2000).

Oil exploration and crisis within the Niger Delta began when the Nigerian oil

industry was established during the colonial period with the passing of the 1914 Colonial

Mineral Ordinance, which granted “British or British Allied Capital” a monopoly in

Nigerian oil concessions (IIDEA 2000, 241). According to IIDEA, this law resulted in a

major oil conglomerate receiving a license that opened the entire Nigerian mainland to oil

exploration. The relationship between multinational oil companies and local communities

began in 1957 when this corporation surrendered 16,000 square miles to other

multinationals oil conglomerates and the Nigerian state. Nigeria was not involved in the

oil industry at this time, with the exception of a 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement

specified in the 1959 Petroleum Profit Tax Ordinance. According to a director of the

national petroleum corporation, “Under the concessionaire era, the oil industry was

dominated by the oil multinationals [and the] government’s role was limited to collecting

rents and royalties from oil companies and making laws to regulate the activities of the

industry” (144).

Although oil prospecting began during the early twentieth century, the discovery

o f crude oil within the Oloibiri oil field that brought Nigeria to the attention o f world oil

suppliers did not occur until 1958. However, it was during the mid-1960s, and

particularly during the Nigeria civil war between 1967 and 1970, that crude oil became

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the dominant source of federal revenue and a contentious issue for Nigeria (Adejumobi

and Aderemi 2001; Ikporukpo 2001). The phenomenal increase in the size of crude-oil

exports, the emergent importance of crude oil as a source of national revenue, and the

role of oil in the civil war between 1967 and 1970 forced the Nigerian federal

government to take control of the nation’s crude oil during 1969 (Ikporukpo 2001).

During this same year, Nigeria abolished the 1914 Colonial Mineral Ordinance and

transferred control and ownership of oil to the state (IIDEA 2000). Before it joined the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) during 1971, Nigeria also

required all companies operating in the Nigerian oil industry to abide by OPEC terms.

During 1971, the Nigerian government established an oil corporation and

acquired majority control of the oil industry through joint-venture agreements with

multinational oil companies (IIDEA 2000). For example, the government acquired 80

percent of a major oil conglomerate and 60 percent of six other such corporations.

Nigeria’s majority control of the former company was later reduced from 80 percent to

55 percent. These joint ventures continue to be the primary avenue of Nigerian

participation in the oil industry. Nigeria also became an owner in companies operating

downstream within the oil sector, although this ownership ended during the privatization

program of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Osaghae 1992). Newer multinational and

Nigerian corporations have emerged; however, the major oil conglomerates continue to

produce the majority of the two million barrels per day within Nigeria (Roberts1999).

Collaboration between the Nigerian state and the oil companies has been positive

for both the Nigerian government and the corporations because the Niger Delta holds an

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abundance of high-quality, low-cost oil (Ibeanu 2000). Additionally, there is easy access

from the Niger Delta to the United States, the world’s largest market (Roberts 1999). The

large reserves and access to a primary market render oil exploration within Nigeria very

attractive to multinational oil companies where they can produce oil for less money than

in any other country. One oil conglomerate admitted that production costs within Nigeria

are very competitive compared to other parts of the world. The return on capital

investment is among the highest in the world. During 1958, Nigerian land delivered 6,000

barrels per day (Okonta and Douglas 2001); it currently produces more than two million.

Oil Exploration, Environmental Degradation, and Human Insecurity

The exploration for, and production of, crude oil has had a negative effect on the

delicate ecosystem of the Niger Delta. The River Niger divides into six main tidal

channels forming a large number of creeks, streams, and swamps just before entering the

Atlantic Ocean (Okonta and Douglas 2001). The Niger Delta has a dynamic, self

regulating ecosystem that strikes a balance between constant erosion caused by flooding

and the deposit of new sediment (Onosode 2003). This delicate balance has been

disrupted by oil exploration and production, which is exemplified in the extensive

network of approximately 900 oil wells, 100 flow stations/gas plants, 450 kilometers of

oil and gas flow lines, and more than 1,500 kilometers of trunk lines through which oil

flows to the two main export terminals at Bonny and Forcados (Okonta and Douglas

2001). This activity has caused widespread environmental degradation throughout the

Niger Delta.

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Land is one of the scarcest resources within the Niger Delta because the area is

largely swampland with two-thirds underwater. Approximately 13 percent of the

remaining land is a national forest reserve (Roberts 1999). Oil companies compete with

the large population for this limited amount of land. Roberts reported that the largest oil

company operating within the Niger Delta uses 220 square kilometers, or 0.3 percent, of

the 70,000 square kilometers of the Niger Delta in its operations As a result, intense

competition for land has ensued, with the oil companies having greater leverage than

local communities because they enjoy preferential treatment from the Nigerian state. In

effect, the economic conditions that sustain the Nigerian state create the economic

insecurity of local people who depend upon land for their survival.

As noted, oil exploration within the Niger Delta has degraded the land. Onosode

(2003), who studied land degradation within Oloibiri, Boma, Kokori, Sanga, and other

host communities, observed that

significant portions of farmland, lowland rainforest, freshwater swamp forest, and valuable water and mangrove resources have been degraded. Such loss of habitat and resource [s] in communities ... dependent on natural resources is devastating, leaving the people in a vicious cycle of poverty. Poverty aggravates environmental degradation, perpetuating primordial dependence on overexploited land and water, trapping communities into the web of an inhibitive, triangular interaction between the industrial [and] ecological attributes of their environment. (27)

Environmental Pollution

Toxic waste. Toxic waste is a major source of environmental degradation within

the Niger Delta, and oil-exploration activities generate considerable amounts of waste

materials, some of them hazardous. For example, drilling spots require large amounts of

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chemicals. The Federal Environmental Protection Agency estimated that twenty million

gallons of waste oil are spilled each year within the Niger Delta (Ayonote 1996). These

spills contain both hydrocarbons and nonhydrocarbons. Nonhydrocarbons include rock

cuttings brought up by drilling and considerable amounts of mud, cement, iron, and steel

(IIDEA 2000). Waste materials are also discharged into the sea and, although waste

disposal is concentrated around drilling rigs and production platforms, the waste material

travels long distances and adversely affects fishing grounds (Roberts 1999). Additionally,

when oil fields and drilling facilities are shut down, the toxic residues become the

responsibility of the Nigerian state. Roberts found that the state does not have the

capacity to monitor oil companies and ensure compliance with its environmental

regulations nor ensure that environmental cleanup is properly and completely effectuated

when oil fields and their supporting facilities are shut down.

Oil spills. Oil spills are a constant problem within the Niger Delta, and 96 percent

of the spills are associated with exploration and production. Between 1976 and 1985,

2,005 cases of oil spills involving two million barrels of oil were reported and only

500,000 barrels were recovered (Roberts 1999). The remaining 1.5 million barrels of oil

remained in the environment. One oil conglomerate admitted to spilling 36,000 barrels of

oil during 1995 and, during 1998, approximately 40,000 barrels of light crude oil leaked

from the pipeline of another company within the state of Akwa Ibom (Anderson 1996).

Oil spills are caused by accidents, technological and production problems, and sabotage

(Osaghae 1995). The sabotage of oil installations has increased with the militant action of

oil-bearing communities within the Niger Delta. These communities concurrently blame

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most oil spills on the preference of the oil companies for laying flow lines on the surface

of the land rather than burying them, which would make them less vulnerable to damage

and old age. The communities also claim that the oil companies do not act with sufficient

rapidity to repair leaking pipes (Ibeanu 2000).

It is evident that sabotage accounts for the increasing number of oil spills within

the Niger Delta. It is common for young people residing within oil-bearing communities

to sabotage oil installations because they believe they are being exploited by the oil

companies and marginalized by the state (Anyaegbunam 1996; Roberts 1999). The oil

companies believe such sabotage is conducted for the compensation received for oil spills

on their farmland. This is a common argument among oil companies due to the protective

law prohibiting compensation for oil spills caused by sabotage (Osaghae 1995).

Farmland, aquatic life, and human health are immediate casualties of oil spills. The long

term danger of large-scale environmental degradation also exists, which has

consequences for the socioeconomic status of Niger Delta residents (Ayonote 1996).

Onosode (2003) conducted a seminal environmental study of the Niger Delta that found

damage to the mangrove resources that included fish and shell fish depletion after the

1980 spill at the Funiwa site. Ayonote found that oil spills within nine communities

irredeemably destroyed fishponds, economic trees, fishing channels, and farmland.

Approximately 5,000 people residing within Uzanu, Edo State lost their means of

livelihood when oil spilled into the River Obu, the only sourceof drinking water for the

community (Roberts 1999). Within Okaka, Yeroghoa, Bayelsa State, leaking oil pipes

released more than 1,000 barrels of oil into the environment.

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During 1994, the explosion of an oil well owned by a major oil conglomerate

devastated the Iko community within Akwa Ibom State (Ayonote 1996). The oil spill

from the explosion spread into local creeks and rivers, killing organisms, fish, shrimps,

and mollusks, as well as adversely affecting socioeconomic activities. During January

1998,120 communities were placed at risk when oil spilled from installations owned by

another major oil corporation within Eket, Rivers State, releasing 40,000 barrels of oil

into the environment. These oil spills were so damaging that the otherwise taciturn

officials of the responsible corporation warned local fishermen to “exercise caution”

(Bassey and Obari 1998, 36). Although the oil companies use chemical depressants to

clean oil spills, some residents claim that these depressants merely render the spill more

soluble and less visible to the eye rather than neutralizing the toxicity (Ayonote 1996).

The long-term effects of oil spills are overwhelming. Oil stunts the growth of

plants and endangers farmland because it blocks the oxygen supply of plants and destroys

essential nutrients, such as magnesium and nitrogen, in the soil (Roberts 1999). This

devastation is compounded by the fact that oil has the capacity to seep fifty kilometers

into the ground, having a negative effect on the environment for years into the future.

According to Ayonote (1996), oil from a 1970 oil spill at Ejama-Ebubu within Ogoni still

oozes from the ground. Over 2.5 million barrels of oil have seeped into the Delta

environment between 1976 and 1998, and these are only those spills officially recorded

by the Department of Petroleum Resources (Nwilo and Badejo 2001). Okonta and

Douglas (2001) suggested that the total number of oil spills within the Niger Delta is

actually ten times the official estimate. They also estimated that “oil companies in Rivers

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and Delta States spill about 9,000 cubic feet of oil in three hundred major accidents

daily” (66).

Gas flaring. The process of producing crude oil creates gas. It is possible to use

this gas as an additional source of revenue; however, Nigeria is lagging behind in this

technology and flares (i.e., bums) more gas than any other oil-producing country (IIDEA

2000). While the world average for flared gas is 4 percent of total production, Nigeria

flares 76 percent of its gas production. This also falls well below the OPEC average of 18

percent. During 1982, the major oil companies operating within Nigeria flared more than

thirteen billion cubic meters of gas within 145 communities. The worst culprit flared

nearly seven billion cubic meters of gas. In a particularly alarming case, a corporation

flared more than nine million cubic meters of gas within Sapele in Delta State. Gas

flaring is common because it is economical and improves profit margins. While the cost

of gas flaring is low for oil companies, it is high for oil-bearing communities. The roofs

of houses are corroded, the heat generated by gas flares affects food production and

reduces crop yields, and air is severely polluted. The constant noise and burning light is

so intense that many community residents no longer know the difference between day

and night (Onosode 2003).

The Nigeria oil industry relies upon the atmosphere for self-purification. This

assumption that the atmosphere can naturally cleanse waste released into it has created a

serious air-pollution problem within Niger Delta in the form of carbon dioxide and

nitrogen oxides. The low combustion efficiency of Nigerian flares (i.e., 80 percent)

equates to a large amount of expelled methane gas, which contributes to global warming.

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Residents near gas-flaring sites complain about acid rain, which acidifies the already

vulnerable soils of the Niger Delta, reducing crop yields (Kaladumo 1996). A random

sampling of rainwater within the region of Akwa Ibom, Rivers, and Delta indicate

widespread acid (Roberts 1999). Onosode (2003) also found a correlation between gas

flaring and the acidification of soils, corrosion of metal roofs, crop damage, and human

health hazards. Gas flaring releases carbon monoxide, chlorine, nitrogen and sulfur

oxides, acid aerosol, hydrogen sulfide, lead, and mercury into the atmosphere, and these

pollutants have been associated with an array of health problems (see table 12).

The Socioeconomic Consequences o f Oil Exploration

The reaction of multinational oil companies and the state to the degradation of the

environment and the socioeconomic consequences of oil exploration within the Niger

Delta has been” lukewarm.” Prior to 1979, protection of the environment was not

considered important by the oil companies or the Nigerian state; however, the

socioeconomic and environmental problems caused by oil exploitation have made the

relationships between the oil companies and oil-bearing communities contentious. The

ever-expanding area controlled by oil companies reduces available farmland and hunting

grounds, and this has created a constant struggle for land ownership.

In addition to the problems of scarce land and clean water, the Niger Delta has the

highest rate of youth unemployment within Nigeria. In an interview conducted during

August 2005, Governor Goodluck Jonathan noted that “although unemployment is a

national problem, it was complicated in the Niger Delta by the presence of the oil

companies.” Frustrated Niger Delta youth accuse the oil companies of hiring ethnic

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Table 12. Gaseous Pollutants and First Effects

Gaseous Pollutants First Effects

Carbon monoxide Headache/Heart problems

Aiphatic gasoline Dizziness/Nausea

Nitrogen oxides Irritation/Edema

Sulfur oxides Throat and lung irritation

Volatile organic compounds Lung/Heart problems

Ozone Lung/Heart suppression

Acid aerosol Irritant, burning sensation

Hydrogen sulfide Rotten-egg smell

Lead Neuro/Pulmonary problems

Mercury Fetal/Pulmonary problems

Beryllium Gene/Neuro/Pulmonary problems

Source: Gamaliel Onosode. 2003. Environmental Issues and Challenges o f the Niger Delta. Lagos, Nigeria: CIBN Press.

majorities rather than the ethnic minorities whose oil was exploited. Goodluck observed

that the “youths began to ask questions about the fairness of a system which [.v/c] denies

people their traditional means of livelihood, yet denies them the benefits of the oil

industry, which has made their traditional means of livelihood impossible.” Niger Delta

youth began to question the number of Bayelsa employed by oil companies and why no

one from the Niger Delta has oil blocks while those from other regions of the country

were allocated such blocks.

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High unemployment within the largely rural Niger Delta has forced migration to

urban centers in search of jobs and basic amenities such as electricity, clean water, and

health facilities. Oil companies provide these amenities to their staff, but not to

neighboring communities (Obi 1997). Even with its limited benefits, many farmers

provide casual labor for oil companies or their contractors within urban areas, which

increases the rural-urban imbalance. The rural-urban migration has also created a few

“boomtowns” such as Port Harcourt and Warri, which are typically the headquarters of

oil companies and associated service companies (Ikporukpo 2000). As a result of the

rural-urban imbalance, the associated symbiosis has collapsed within the Niger Delta and

disrupted the human-security networks of local communities. The rural area is also losing

its role as a source of agricultural commodities. The relationships between oil companies

and oil-bearing communities have created distrust between traditional rulers and their

citizens. In a 25 August 2005 interview conducted in Bayelsa with Dimieari Von

Kemedi, it was evident that Niger Delta residents regard their traditional rulers as “oil-

company chiefs.”

Women within the Niger Delta have been adversely affected by the environmental

and economic devastation caused by the oil industry. In an interview conducted on 26

August 2005, the Commissioner of Women’s Affairs in Bayelsa State, Remi Kuku, noted

that “the impact of the oil revenue on their lives is very minimal” and claimed that Niger

Delta women are neglected. She stated,

Education has been very low among our women, and this affects a lot of things. Many of our women are based in the rural areas, and they are affected by the environmental impacts of oil exploration. They are largely engaged in farming and fishing. The takeover of large expanses of land for oil exploration has reduced

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the land available to them. This is compounded by the pollution of the waters, which also makes fishing difficult, as the fishermen now have to go far into the sea. This imposes limitations on women who are engaged in fishing. These have contributed to the high level of poverty among women.

To earn a living, many young girls have turned to the sex industry, and this has created a

large population of children bom out of wedlock who lack the support of stable families.

Sexually transmitted disease, social disobedience, crime, smoking, and the use of mood-

enhancing drugs have also become prevalent within the Niger Delta (Adetula 1996).

Although the Niger Delta is considered the “treasure trove” of Nigeria, it fares

badly in three indicators of well-being. Duringl993/1994, only 30 percent and 35 percent

of Niger Delta households had access to safe water and electricity, respectively (IIDEA

2000). If the rates for the states of Edo and Rivers are removed from the equation, an

even lower 27 percent and 30 percent of Niger Delta households had access to safe water

and electricity, respectively. According to IIDEA, these percentages fall short of the more

than 31 percent and 33 percent of households that have access to these necessities of life

at the national level, respectively. During 1991, one doctor provided care for 39,455

Nigerians. The statistical rate was one doctor for every 81,800 Niger Delta residents, the

second largest ratio in the country following that of the North West. When the states of

Edo and Rivers are excluded, the average for the Niger Delta is one doctor for every

132,601 people, the highest ratio throughout Nigeria. The Niger Delta lags far behind

most other regions of the country in terms of infrastructure development. Roads are much

more expensive to constmct within the Niger Delta than in other areas due to the terrain.

Most roads are built by oil companies to facilitate their operations. The speaker of the

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Bayelsa House of Assembly revealed at the inception of a democratic government during

1999 that this state had only seventeen kilometers of tarred road.

Local Agitation, Human Insecurity, and the Evolution of Conflict

The following three key parties are involved in the Niger Delta conflict: (1) the

Nigerian state, (2) the multinational oil companies, and (3) the local community seeking

to promote its interests. The local communities have consistently accused the Nigerian

state and multinationals of exclusionary policies preventing Niger Delta minorities from

obtaining a fair share of the oil money. Community attempts to correct this imbalance

have resulted in the proliferation of weapons, as exemplified in the Warri crisis. Warri is

a city within the Delta State, and it has experienced violent armed conflict as a result of

social inequalities and marginalization. Rivers State, to a lesser degree, has also

experienced conflict as a result of the Ogoni struggle for upward social mobility and

equality. The governor (Goodluck Jonathan, personal interview, 25 August 2005) stated

that, until the late 1960s, Niger Delta residents made their demands for better services via

peaceful means; however, this began to change after the discovery of large quantities of

oil within the region by a major oil conglomerate, spurring a flood of additional oil

companies into the area. Ikporukpo (2001) categorized conflict within the Niger Delta

into the following four phases, but without providing clear time demarcation: (1) the

early civil society stage, (2) the Ogoni phase, (3) the Ijaw youth phase, and (4) the

wilderness stage.

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Early Civil Society Phase

During the colonial period, population groups within the Niger Delta violently

resisted the slave trade and, with the decline of the trade, European control of the palm-

oil industry. Okonta (2000) found that the British consul to the Niger Delta instituted

early inequalities with his concept of “gunboat diplomacy,” a process in which local

kings and princes were forced to sign treaties to allow the British unfettered access to the

area. Okonta argued that the sole purpose of this enterprise was the expropriation of

economic resources belonging to the local people and the institutionalization of violence

and coercion as instruments of political control.

The institutionalization of violence continued after independence, and the ethnic

minorities felt marginalized by the three major ethnic groups of the region (i.e., Hausa,

Yourb, and Ibo). Therefore, the rise of minority nationalism was a response to the

emerging domination of majority ethnic groups. It was aimed at liberation from the

perceived majority oppression through the creation of separate states for minorities

within the federation; the protection of rights to language, culture, and religion; and the

creation of a strong central government able to counteract the power wielded by the

largely autonomous regions (Osaghae 2001). Ethnic- minority unrest led to the

establishment of the Willinks Commission in 1956. Although the commission confirmed

the fears of the minorities, it fell short of recommending separate regions. It recognized

the challenges to development as a result o f the Niger Delta terrain and recommended the

creation of a development board that would focus on the special demands of the region.

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During 1963, the Mid-West Region was created out of the Western Region and

included the present-day states of Edo and Delta. Although this region was designed to

give ethnic minorities their own area, the new region did not address the overall problems

of the Niger Delta (Osaghae 2001). As a result of the historical colonial resistance, some

Niger Delta residents used violence to further their interests during 1967. The

independent Republic of the Niger Delta was created; however, it was destroyed eleven

days later. Boro (1982) alleged that the neglect, marginalization, domination, and

underdevelopment of the Niger Delta by the central government resulted in the attempt to

create the ill-fated Niger Delta republic.

With the destruction of the insurrected Republic to make their demands heard,

ethnic minorities of the region sent representatives to the Nigerian government and oil

companies. They placed advertisements in newspapers, organized peaceful

demonstrations, and occasionally disrupted the operations of the oil companies

(Ikporukpo 2001). The reaction of the government and oil companies varied. The

multinational corporations responded by becoming more engaged in the respective

communities. They supported community development projects, such as the construction

of schools and health facilities, and offered scholarships and jobs to residents of oil-

bearing communities (Haastrup 1997). These community services were usually token

events having minimal impact on the lives of the majority of individuals within the

region. In most cases, the oil companies designed these projects without consulting

community representatives. For example, when a major oil conglomerate provided a

community with a fish-preparation facility, it supplied no electricity generator to operate

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the facility, even though the community lacked electricity. Another major oil company

conducted a deworming project for school children within Delta State. These were the

first health care workers many communities had seen in ten years. These projects

contrasted sharply with the attention oil companies paid to the welfare of its expatriate

and senior workers. Shanty towns existed near well-planned neighborhoods for workers

with adequate electricity, water, and health facilities.

Several decades passed before the Nigerian state took the demands of Niger Delta

communities seriously. Before the demands became too pronounced to ignore during the

1960s, the sharing of federal revenue depended upon the principle of derivation. Under

this formula, 50 percent of federally collected revenue was returned to the region that

supplied the resource (Mbanefo and Egwaikhide 1998). Successive governments altered

this arrangement. For example, only 1.5 percent of federal revenue was returned to the

appropriate regions during the Buhari government (Osaghae 2001). Agitation by oil-

bearing communities was directly responsible for the 1992 creation of a special

commission known as the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Commission (OMPADEC). This

commission was charged with coordinating development projects within oil-producing

communities, conducting specific infrastructural development projects, and addressing

complaints of diverted revenue by state governments. OMPADEC was beleaguered by

large-scale corruption, boardroom bickering, and the dissatisfaction of oil-bearing

communities.

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During 1998, a committee was established to study the lingering crisis within the

Niger Delta and committed N10 billion (i.e., US$780 million)32 for roads, schools,

hospitals and other social services development (Human Rights Watch 1999). During

2001, the democratic government established the Niger Delta Development Commission

to perform virtually the same functions as the OMPADEC, but with major changes in its

composition and mode of operation. These initiatives did not stem the “rising tide” of

violence in the Niger Delta. Agitation was championed by the Movement for the Survival

of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and reached a climax during 1995 with the execution of the

leader of the movement by the military regime. Rather than reducing violence, this

approach was resisted by equally determined militant youth, which made the Niger Delta

the focus of the international community during the days of military rule. MOSOP and

Ijaw youth became more daring and forced a major oil corporation from its oil wells

within Ogoniland and occasionally placed the oil revenue of the national government at

risk.

Rivers State: Ogoni Insecurity and the Politics o f Oil

The Ogoni conflict took place within Rivers State, which was created during 1967

by the government of Yakubu Go won. The Ogoni are a minority ethnic group with

approximately 500,000 people residing within Rivers State that are spread across three

areas with different local government—Gokana, Khana, and Tai Eleme. The Ogoni do

not share a common origin myth as do most ethnic groups within Nigeria (Isumonah

32Calculated with the current exchange rate of N128 to one U.S. dollar. 33The Ogoni case study is summarized from introductions by Osaghae (1995) and Isumonah (1998). For more on the Ogoni wars, see Maier (2000b).

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1998; Osaghae 2001). Rather, they share a common language, customs, traditions, and

farming methods, as well as attitudes. Economic activities of the Ogoni include

subsistence agriculture, fishing, and hunting. Therefore, a healthy environment is critical

to their general economy and social security. One of the Ogoni communities is richly

endowed with oil, and a major oil corporation has been extracting crude within

Ogoniland since 1971 (Suberu 1996).

As was the case with many ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta, conflict between

the Ogoni and the oil companies was rooted in degradation of the environment by

activities related to oil exploration. Initially, the Ogoni were concerned about the

devastation of their farmland and rivers—their traditional sources of livelihood.

Analyzing the history of the Niger Delta, Loolo (1981) commented,

Although the oil industry has had tremendous impact on the Nigerian economy, its advantage to the Ogoni has been almost negative or at most minimal. After 20 years of oil exploration, Shell has only built one road (Chasal Mogbo/Bodo) and awarded 96 secondary school scholarships. Although the meager compensations paid for land acquisition and oil spillage have aided a few Ogonis to erect buildings and health centers, the people as a community have not felt any improved standard of living. Neither the federal nor the state government has shown any desire to improve the area or the quality of the life of the people. (45)

Ogoni resentment and fear led group mobilization, which in turn, resulted in the

formation of the Pan-Ogoni platform known as the MOSOP. Under the guidance of this

movement, the Ogoni articulated their demands in the Ogoni Bill of Rights, which was

produced as a reaction to a lack of development within the community, environmental

degradation and pollution, and lack of representation at the federal level (Von Kemedi

2003). The Bill of Rights and list of grievances positioned the Ogoni people against the

Nigerian state and the oil conglomerate within the region.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Okonta and Douglas (2001) reported that the reaction of the state to the demands

of the Ogoni was one of contempt and were largely ignored by both the government and

local media. However, the attitudes of the state and media changed on 3 November 1992

when the leaders of MOSOP issued an ultimatum to the oil companies operating within

Ogoniland to pay back rents and royalties within ten days or discontinue their land use.

On 4 January 1993, 300,000 Ogoni men, women, and youth gathered to protest the

continued environmental degradation by the oil companies and the continued denial of

their rights to self-determination by the government and to call for a fair share of oil

revenues (Maier 2000b; Okonta and Douglas 2001). The protest took a violent turn on 30

April 1993 when Biara villagers stopped an American pipeline contractor commissioned

by a large oil conglomerate from laying pipes on their newly planted farmland. The

Ogoni demanded compensation for the destruction of their farmland and a proper

environmental-impact assessment, as stipulated by Nigerian law. A contingent of the

Nigerian army was sent to protect the American company, and in the ensuing

confrontation, a nineteen-year-old protestor was shot and killed. Eleven other protestors

received gunshot wounds (Okonta and Douglas 2001). Demonstrations against the killing

engulfed Ogoniland as the highly mobilized population trooped into the streets to protest.

The strength of the protest forced the oil company out of Ogoniland.

Although the major oil corporation involved in the described conflict produces

only 30,000 barrels of crude oil a day within Ogoniland, compared to the nearly one

million drawn from other oil fields within the Niger Delta, the pullout bythis corporation

alarmed the state and other oil companies. The apparent success of the Ogoni to force the

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conglomerate off their land was likely to motivate other aggrieved oil-bearing

communities to pursue the same outcome in the same manner, which would disrupt the

oil industry within Niger Delta. For the Nigerian state, a disruption in oil exploration and

production would threaten its primary revenue base and overall security. Consequently,

the state could no longer ignore the activities of MOSOP. The state drew parallels

between the Ogoni and Eastern Nigerian secession bids during the late 1960s. To restore

order, the government asked the MOSOP leadership to table their demands; however, this

attempt at negotiation was unsuccessful (Okonta and Douglas 2001). MOSOP

encouraged the Ogoni to boycott the 12 June 1992 elections. It argued that the

constitution that would govern the new republic fell short of the demands for self-

determination contained within the Ogoni Bill of Rights. The Ogoni indeed boycotted the

election and leaders of MOSOP were arrested following the annulment of the 12 June

elections.

Four leaders opposed to the radical Ogoni faction were murdered. They were

killed because they were not sympathetic to the Ogoni cause. The radicalized faction and

eight others were quickly arrested, tried by military tribunal, and hanged in 1995 by the

government of General Sani Abacha. This angered the Ogoni people, and the involved oil

company has not been allowed access to its oil wells located within the heart of

Ogoniland since the time of the hanging. The Ogoni conflict did not involve militia

groups, but rather pitted the Ogoni people against the Nigerian military representing the

state and the oil conglomerate. The conflict was not militarized in the sense that no

clearly identifiable groups were involved. Some Ogoni participants in the present study

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claimed that the intra-Ogoni conflict was deliberately engineered to justify the use of a

large number of military personnel to weaken the resolve of the people in their continued

quest for self-determination.

Marginalization. Although the Ogoni conflict was indeed violent, it was not as

militarized as the Warri conflict within Delta State. The dispute was initially between the

Ogoni people, the Nigerian state, and the oil conglomerate. However, according to Ogoni

study participants, the government was able to break up the MOSOP into two

antagonistic camps—one fairly radicalized with an avowed commitment to securing self-

determination for the Ogoni people. The second camp was largely composed of elderly

individuals sympathetic to the government and opposed to the MOSOP agenda (Gambo

2004). The government created this division among the Ogoni because it feared their

success and the similar action it would likely provoke in other regional ethnic groups

threatening the corporate existence of Nigeria.

As the Ogoni struggle gathered momentum, the genuine fear existed that it would

lead to the formation of a pan-Niger Delta movement, challenging the survival of the

Nigerian federation. According to an interview conducted with a study participant during

2005, the “government initiated the strategy of divide and rule to make it exceedingly

difficult for the construction of a pan-Niger Delta platform for agitation against

marginalization, underdevelopment, domination, and neglect.” The Ogoni felt their

contribution to the nation should be given adequate representation at key decision

making centers within the Nigerian federation. At the core of the Ogoni struggle was the

desire to correct the structurally determined exclusion of the Ogoni from these critical

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centers. The Ogoni believed that their marginalization was caused by their political

powerlessness and, as a result, they demanded political autonomy within the Nigerian

federation.

Supply o f arms. Confrontation between state agents and Ogoni militants continued

across Ogoniland. According to an interview with a study participant during August

2005, it was when the soldiers and police began killing young men that the Ogoni

resorted to weaponry. Ogoni youth employed weapons against the security agencies as a

means of retaliating. The weapons used in the Ogoni conflict were not as sophisticated as

those employed in the Warri conflict. However, study participants did state that small

arms, such as locally made pistols, rifles, Dane guns, AK-47s, G-3 rifles, and pump-

action shotguns, were indeed used. According to one informant, SALW are smuggled

into the Niger Delta by refugees fleeing war zones outside Nigeria and Ogoni people

living within Liberia. These arms are easy to smuggle because it is almost impossible for

authorities to patrol the numerous creeks that cut across the Niger Delta. Soldiers who

participated in a Liberia war also brought SALW into the Niger Delta. Ogoni youth

purchased arms with the proceeds from oil bunkering; however, since the return of

civilian rule in 1999, politicians have also provided these youth with SALW. The

governor of Bayelsa State explained in the following manner why SALW have become a

common feature of conflict within the Niger Delta:

The soldiers who participated in the Liberian war returned with arms which were not checked at the point of entry into Nigeria. These soldiers are said to buy such weapons with the money they collected for participating in the war, and they sold them for profit when they retum[ed]. I said that because some of these weapons were traced. All the weapons supplied by the federal government for the Liberia

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war were numbered, and with this, it is very easy to trace. I can say for sure that the main cause of the conflict in the Niger Delta is unemployment and poverty. Whenever there is poverty, conflict is inevitable. But like I normally say, light weapons are part of our normal life in the Niger Delta and indeed most parts of Nigeria. I grew up to know my father with two local Dane guns. Among my mother’s people every man must have a local gun. By then there was no modem weapons, but [by] that time, both in my father and mother sides, a man must have a gun—either you use it for festival or burial. A hunter must have one. If you are a hunter, you must have two—one for hunting and the other for festival. (Goodluck Jonathan, personal interview, 25 August 2005)

Okonta and Douglas (2001) informed that a major oil conglomerate was

responsible for SALW proliferation within the Niger Delta. A substantial body of

evidence indicates that the company imports arms into the Niger Delta, allegedly to

defend its workers. Okonta and Douglas contended that, on 15 December 1993, a security

adviser to the oil company asked Nigerian police for permission to import US$500,000

worth of weapons for the supernumerary police guards employed by the corporation.

During July 1994, the police approved the request, contrary to Nigerian law, and the oil

company imported 130 Beretta 9 mm submachine guns, 30 pump-action shotguns, and

200,000 rounds of ammunition.

The response of the military government to the Ogoni crisis was aggressive and

caused conditions encouraging SALW proliferation. The Rivers State government

established the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, with personnel drawn from the

army, navy, air force, and Nigerian police force. The task force perceived that its mission

was to silence the Ogoni, and according to the commander of the task force, this mission

was pursued with the vigor of an army of occupation. Okonta and Douglas (2001) quoted

the commander as stating,

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The first three days ... I operated in the night. Nobody knew where I was coming from. What I will just do is that I will just take some detachments of soldiers; they will just stay at four comers of the town. They. . . have automatic rifle(s) that sounded death. If you hear the sound, you will just freeze. And then I will equally now choose about twenty soldiers and give them ... grenades... explosives ... very hard ones. So we shall surround the town at night... the machine gun with five hundred rounds will open up. When four or five like that open up and then we are throwing grenades and they are making “eekpuwaa!” what do you think people are going to be doing? (132)

In response to this type of military action, militant Ogoni youth established vigilante

groups to protect their communities, and it also became imperative for them to arm

themselves with SALW. Government authorities were unable to seize many of the

SALW within Ogoniland. A police officer who refused to be identified admitted that the

security forces were only able to seize 855 weapons from the Ogoni community—430

Dane guns and locally made pistols, 305 machetes, and 120 spears. Most of the weapons

were hidden before the security forces began the arms seizures. A campaign asking

citizens to voluntarily surrender their weapons was unsuccessful.

Delta State and the Warri Conflict4

Triangular war. Warri is home to the Urhobo, Ijaw, Itsekiri, and other major

indigenous clans such as the Delta Igbo and Isoko (Imobighe 2002; Okonta and Douglas

2001). The city is located within Delta State and has been experiencing bouts of violent

armed conflict among communities disputing the ownership of Warri. The struggle for

control of the city is one of the most militarized conflicts within the Niger Delta. The

most recent was triggered when the federal government created a local government

within an Ijaw area and, after three weeks, moved it to an Isekiri area (Imobighe 2002).

34Information about the Ijaw crisis is summarized from the work of Imobighe, Bassey, and Asuni (2002).

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The headquarters of the local government was situated within Warri South at Ogbe-Ijoh,

an enclave predominately inhabited by the Ijaw. This development angered the Itsekiri

who felt that the headquarters of the newly created local government should be located

within the Itsekiri enclave. However, it was discovered that what was “published under

the Federal Government decree No. 36 of 1996 creating the new states and local

government areas, was the creation of Warri South-West Local Government with

Ogidigben, an Itsekiri enclave, as headquarters” (44). The Ijaw considered this event to

be unfair and claimed that it was solely another effort by the Itsekiri to deprive them of

their political entitlement. Response to this event expanded until violent demonstrations

ensued, targeting the Itsekiri.

Battles to achieve dominant position have often characterized relations among the

Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo. This sense of group position is manifested in the struggle for

control of Warri. The status of Warri as an oil city and home to multinational oil

corporations has produced a climate “ripe” for oil-related business and economic

opportunities. Consequently, individuals from across the country and even outside

Nigeria have moved to Warri. Despite the number of ethnic groups residing within Warri,

three consider the region their homeland, as explained in a Human Rights Watch (2003c)

article in the following manner:

Warri itself, the largest town (though not the capital) of Delta State, is claimed as their homeland by three ethnic groups: the Itsekiri, the Urohobo, and the Ijaw. The Itsekiri, a small ethnic group of a few hundred thousand people whose language is related to the Yoruba (one of Nigeria’s largest ethnic groups), also live in villages spread out along the Benin and Escravos Rivers into the Mangrove forest and riverine areas towards the Atlantic Ocean. The Urhobo, a much larger group numbering some millions related to the Edo-speaking people of Benin City, live in Warri town and to the north, on land. To the south and east, also in the

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swampy riverine areas, are members of the Western Ijaw, part of the perhaps ten million-strong Ijaw ethnic groups, and the largest of the Niger Delta, spread out over several states. (3)

According to Imobighe (2002), “Warri is not the capital of Delta State [but] it is

the most prominent and fastest growing urban area in Delta State” (xiii). Since its

establishment during 1991, Warri has retained its status as the commercial center and

industrial “heart” of the state. The influx of Nigerians and foreign nationals has

transformed the city into a cosmopolitan center that mirrors the diversity characterizing

the balance of Nigeria. The peculiar sociocultural dynamics of Warri are quite striking.

Indigenous ethnic groups live in harmony with migrants; however, the relationship

among the indigenous groups (i.e., the Itsekiri, Urhobo, and Ijaw) is contentious. It is

therefore not surprising that the eruption of violent armed conflict within the state during

1997 and 2003 involved solely these three ethnic groups.

The majority of Warri citizens are Christians; few Muslims and followers of

traditional African religions reside within the city. Unlike the northern region of Nigeria

where religion has been a destabilizing social institution, religion has played no role in

the Warri conflict. Economic competition motivated by the potential for political control

over resources fragmented Warri along the following three fault lines:

1. It set local interests against the national political interests with a derivative

formula (i.e., the amount of oil profit that should be retained by the federal government

vs. the amount that should be distributed to the local government).

2. It pitted local interests against each other (i.e., determination of which

community has the right to receive and disburse oil profits).

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3. It created tension between multinational corporations and their local Nigerian

employees and security personnel (i.e., their perceptions of the lack in equal opportunity

to the profits accruing from oil drawn from their land).

The caveat is the deepening poverty exacerbated by the continual environmental

degradation that has robbed many of the communities of their livelihoods.

While Delta is one of the leading oil-producing states of the region, the

predominant occupations of the people are small-scale farming and fishing. Additionally,

because of the limited size of arable land, small-time trading thrives in locations such as

Warri and Asaba. The presence of multinational oil corporations within the city has

created employment opportunities for the inhabitants of Warri; however, the robust

lifestyle of the oil workers has created a steep increase in the cost of living, making life

quite difficult for those unemployed. In spite of its position as an oil-producing state,

widespread poverty and unemployment characterizes the Delta, which are factors

frequently cited as responsible for frequent outbreaks of violent conflict throughout the

state. Although intense political activism thrives, politics are not generally characterized

by violence. Violence is more-often employed to promote political interests, and

unemployed youth are recruited as armed “thugs” to harass and molest political

opponents. Each of the major indigenous groups (i.e., the Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo) is

consistently participating in keen competition for political power within the state because

politics is viewed as a means toward socioeconomic empowerment. In other words,

politics is widely perceived as an avenue to avoid widespread poverty within the state.

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Therefore, each indigenous group feels marginalized by the other ethnic groups due to the

lack of political harmony.

Conflict trigger. According to Imobighe (2002), and supported by the participants

in the present study, interethnic conflict involving the three frontline ethnic groups in

Warri (i.e., the Itsekiri, Ijaw, and Urhobo) dates back to the colonial period. The

interethnic conflict described, however, did not degenerate into full-scale violence until

March 1997. Land is a major factor in Warri conflict, closely followed by suzerainty

claims (i.e., the status of the traditional ruler of the Itsekiri within Warri). While the

ethnic group claims he is the Olu of Warri (i.e., the paramount ruler or traditional head of

Warri), the Ijaw and Urhobo reject this claim and contend that he is only the Olu of

Itsekiri. Both the Ijaw and Urhobo have challenged the Olu claim of suzerainty over the

whole of Warri. Based upon their position that all land within Warri belongs to them, the

Itsekiri insist that their leader is the Olu of Warri. The Ijaw and Urhobo vehemently reject

the authority of the Olu and demand recognition of their own traditional rulers.

According to Imobighe (2002), the Urhobo consider the Itsekiri migrants that they

helped in overcoming an occupational crisis at a given point in history. The Itsekiri argue

that they are the original occupants of areas referred to as “small and big Warri”, and that

they only gave farmland to their slaves (i.e., the Urhobo) because the Itsekiri were

primarily fishermen and traders. The Itsekiri claim that, regardless of the long-term

residence of the Ijaw and Urhobo within the city, they are intruders. An Itsekiri leader

stated that “over 26 court judgments have put it beyond dispute that the Itsekiri are the

owners of the land in Warri division, that the Urhobos and the Ijaws of Warri division are

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the customary tenants of the Itsekiris” (Human Rights Watch 2006,12). The Ijaw stated

that “a popular Ijaw account has it that ‘Ware,’ meaning house in Ijaw language, is the

historical origin of the name Warri and was the name Ijaw fishermen gave their abode

when asked by European explorers to the areas” (12). This issue of land ownership has

produced tense relationships among the three ethnic groups of Warri.

The Itsekiri claim to be the most important ethnic group within Warri has been

strengthened by a number of factors. This population group is located on the coast, and

they were the first people to make contact with the adventurous Europeans hundreds of

years before British colonialism. As a result of their location and contact with the

Europeans, they served as the “middlemen” in the infamous slave trade that once

pervaded the Niger Delta. When the trade in palm produce replaced the slave trade, the

Itsekiri once again played the role of the middlemen between the Europeans and the

people of the hinterland (Falola et al. 1991; Imobighe 2002). The three ethnic groups

involved in the Warri conflict identified marginalization and domination as a critical

factor in the conflict. The Ijaw and Urohobo have consistently maintained that the Itsekiri

are a privileged group within the city and are using this position to promote their group

interests. The Itsekiri claim the Urhobo and Ijaw are attempting to exterminate them.

Focus-group participants in this study identified the following needs of Warri

people: (1) socioeconomic development of the land reclaimed at the escaravos axis, (2)

additional employment opportunities, (3) repair o f the decaying infrastructure, (4)

creation of local government areas representing all ethnic groups and providing a sense of

inclusion, (5) mutual recognition of the traditional rulers of all groups and proper

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governance promoting the developmental aspirations of all Warri residents and

discouraging the violent instincts of the youth acting as key players in conflict. The

focus-group participants reported that the youth of all three major ethnic groups consider

emerging violence an opportunity to vent their anger at the neglect they perceive of the

poor within the city by the government and oil companies. As described in a Human

Rights Watch (2006) publication,

Despite being the base of Nigeria’s oil economy with... federal presence expressed in the extractive infrastructure, the oil economy in the Niger Delta forms an isolated enclave from the society that houses it. Several decades after the 1957 Willinks Commission which identified the Niger Delta as poor, backward and neglected, the area remains underdeveloped. (12)

The role o f small arms. The Warri conflict was heavily weaponized and

militarized. As Douglas and von Kemedi emphasized in an interview conducted during

August 2005, “The volume of guns when there is no civil war is alarming.... If this is a

fight over territory to control resources, it is getting increasingly militarized.” Indeed,

militancy has morphed into full-scale insurgency within the Niger Delta. Naagbanton

(2006) noted that, in “Warri, a major delta port, militants purchased $5 million worth of

weapons, [which] included rocket-propelled grenade launchers, hand grenades and a

variety of machine guns” (A10). The leader of the MEND, a new militant group that

became visible during approximately January 2006, claimed that his group has “the

capacity to be as ruthless and as callous as attacks witnessed in Iraq [and] we are capable

of setting off as many car bombs as we wish and pack[ing] them full of shrapnel to

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maximize casualty” (Gbomo 2007, 2).35 This militant leader alleges that his group has

five thousand members, two thousand of whom are active.

Cesart, Morrison, and Cooke (2003) warned of increasing insurgency within the

Niger Delta while concurrently observing an increase in the level of militancy, instability,

and alienations. Douglas and colleagues (2003) disagreed with that assessment, claiming

that it was the Nigerian state and oil companies that have fought to contain the legitimate

demands of the Ijaw by militarizing the Niger Delta. As Douglas and colleagues pointed

out, the problems of the Niger Delta are misunderstood and misdiagnosed. They noted

that the Center for Strategic and International Studies and others “misdiagnosed the

nature of the political crisis in the Niger Delta, [failed] to understand the political

dynamics of the Ijaw and minority politics in general [ignored] the role of some key

actors . . . and [downplayed] a number of fundamental political problems” (1). In a

personal interview conducted within Bayelsa State on 26 August 2005, Oronto Douglas

reported that there is “no evidence pointing to new lethal capacities.” However, the

commissioner of police informed that the quality of arms in conflicts clearly overwhelms

the police (C. P. Okoye, personal interview, 25 August 2005). Militia members claim to

have AK-47s, G3 rifles, automatic Kalashnikovs, and grenades, to which police weapons

are inferior.

Participants in the present study supported reports by researchers that the supply

of SALW played a leading role in igniting the Warri conflict (Okonta and Douglas 2003;

Human Rights Watch 2003c). Youth activists have accused expatriate oil workers of

35The interview was conducted by Brian Ross of NBC News. Gbomo claims that MEND is an amalgam of all arm-bearing groups within the Niger Delta who are fighting for control of oil revenues.

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militarizing Warri by smuggling in arms using oil-company airstrips. The youth implied

that community members used prostitutes to purchase the arms for expatriate workers

(Okonta and Douglas 2003). A senior Itsekiri community leader argued that oil

companies smuggle in arms to sell to communities in order to ensure they remain divided

and unable to pursue their demands for better treatment from the state and oil industry.

With the proliferation of SALW, contending parties have been encouraged to use violent

means to resolve historical and structural grievances.

The following weapons have been used in Warri conflict: full and semiautomatic

rifles, machine guns, and shoulder-fired rockets (i.e., “bazookas”). These weapons are

easily purchased within Warri for prices ranging from N80,000 (i.e., US$570) for a

shotgun, N120,000 (i.e., US$850) for a Kalashnikov rifle, and up to N300,000 (i.e.,

US$2,500) for a bazooka (Bisina 2003; see table 13). In an interview conducted during

August 2005, the executive secretary of the Center for Youth Development who works

with the militias stated that AK-47s cost between N20,000 and N250,000. He further

informed that the militias sell these weapons for between N300,000 and N350,000,

enabling the profit needed to purchase additional weapons. Table 13 provides the prices

of various weapons distributed throughout Nigeria. Participants in the present study

reported conflicting prices. For example, they stated that grenades cost approximately

N250,000 and foreign pistols cost approximately N350,000. However, an AK-47 costs

N300,000, and Kalashnikovs, assault rifles, and G3 rifles cost N280,000, N220,000, and

N180,000, respectively.

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Table 13. Types of Weapons Distributed Throughout Nigeria

Type Price (Naira)

AK-47 120,000

Bazooka 240,000-300,000

Pump-action shotgun 80,000

FN rifle 100,000

Uzi 120,000

Self-loading revolver 100,000

Submachine gun 70,000

Locally made pistol 20,000-30,000

Single-barrel gun 50,000

Double-barrel gun 70,000

Hand grenade N/A

Mark 4, Mark 3 N/A

Source: Joel Bisina. 2003. Reducing Small Arms, Increasing Safety, Security and Minimizing Conflicts in the Niger Delta. Paper presented at a roundtable organized by African Strategic and Peace Research Group, Benin City, Nigeria, 10 June.

The exact number of weapons in circulation within the Niger Delta is difficult to

determine. The authorities were unwilling to provide data, and records were not properly

kept. Participants in the present study claimed that many weapons seized by police were

sometimes sold back to the conflict actors. Bisina (2003) suggested that approximately

200,000 weapons are in circulation within the Niger Delta. In mid-2004, Davis and Von

Kemedi (2006) estimated that between twenty and one hundred AK-47s are stored in

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militant armories within the state. One informant in the field indicated that the three

communities have armories where sophisticated weapons are stored when not in use.

When asked about the number and type of weapons within this arsenal, the leader of

MEND responded in a 31 January 2007 e-mail message that he cannot reveal such

information because it would compromise the security and operations of his group;

however, he stated, “We are armed enough to engage the Nigerian army and whatever

they have. We have AK-47s and a lot of Russian weapons and ammunition in our arsenal,

surface-to-air missiles and rocket-propelled grenades. I cannot say more.” To reduce the

prevalence of weapons within Niger Delta in the past, the government has offered

amnesty to militants. In a guns-for-money exchange program, the government offered as

much as $1,000 for each rifle and $10,000 for each machine gun (International Crisis

Group 2006a, 4). This disarmament program collected 1,100 weapons (Best and Von

Kemedi 2005a, 38).

Some organizations and actors played a critical mediatory role in Warri conflict

and attempted to combat the illegal-arms trade. For example, when the conflict had

clearly overwhelmed the police, soldiers were brought in to restore order in a campaign

named Operation Restore Hope. The campaign failed because all parties involved in the

conflict accused the soldiers of partisanship. An Itsekiri man contended that Operation

Restore Hope was fueling the crisis, rather than working toward peace, because the

soldiers were sympathetic to the Ijaw and Urhobo. The Ijaw and Urhobo accused the

soldiers of pandering to the interests of the Itsekiri who had prominent sons and

daughters within Abuja. They accused the men of Operation Restore Hope of providing

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the Itsekiri militia with SALW. Whichever was the truth, the underlying feelings of

economic, political, and cultural insecurity guaranteed a climate of distrust and violence.

The commander of Operation Restore Hope dismissed all claims and argued that each of

the parties was attempting to blackmail the military into supporting their group over the

other. A human-rights activist, who preferred anonymity, observed that the security force

of the government was also deeply divided. To support this, he cited a case in which an

Ijaw soldier killed his Hausa counterpart before shooting himself because the Hausa

soldier had harassed Ijaws. According to this activist, the Hausa soldier was attempting to

seize arms from a group of Ijaw youth; this angered the Ijaw soldier who then proceeded

with the shooting. This sad case evidences that even members of a national institution,

such as the military, do not totally identify with the state.

The role o f militias. The frequency of violence in Warri conflict has had an

impact on the operations of the local ethnic militias. Various accounts of armed conflict

during the first half of 2003 reported that the militias exhibited a great degree of

sophistication. A Warri youth activist, desiring to remain anonymous, stated that the

Warri conflict became heavily militarized when the Ijaw began implementing AK-47s,

Kalashnikovs, foreign-made pistols, and assault rifles. It was the use of these weapons by

the Ijaw youth militia that forced the Itsekiri to employ the same weapons for self-

defense. The Itsekiri were aware before the onset of violent conflict that they would be

forced to fight the Ijaw and Urhobo; hence, they ensured they had sufficient SALW to

match their opposition on the battlefield.

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Militias and cult groups are key factors in Warri conflict. According to Von

Kemedi (2006),

The cults groups, in common with militia and gangs have a strong traditional spiritual element, mainly based on the revival and strong influence of the Egbesu deity in Ijaw communities. Many of the cultists easily identify themselves as Christians but continue to rely on Egbesu for protection. Among the adherents of Egbesu, it is believed that when fortified [with Egbesu] metal objects such as knives, machetes and bullets will have no effect on them. (6)

Maier (2000b) described the strange relationship between belief in the Egbesu deity and

the diffusion of arms by reporting, “To this day, the Egbesu is believed to protect the

faithful from bullets and to punish anyone who defies the cult. The oracles are consulted

to root out evil in the community and to empower warriors for military battle” (124).

The Warri conflict was highly weaponized, and the combatants used sophisticated

SALW. The police commissioner of Delta State admitted that the groups who used these

weapons easily overwhelmed the police. The level of militancy has elevated Warri

conflict to low-level war. The elevation of the Warri militant conflict to full insurgency

demonstrates the unfortunate impact of SALW proliferation, and it underscores the need

to identify the sources of these arms. Calvert (2006) pointed out, “To youths without full

legitimate employment options, militancy holds considerable appeal... there is the

possibility of making real money by either being part of a militant group or engaging in

bunkering” (21).

Nigeria produces approximately 2.3 million barrels of oil daily (International

Crisis Group 2006b), much of it from the Niger Delta, and according to Davis and Von

Kemedi (2006), “as much as 70,000 to 100,000 barrels of crude oil is stolen each day and

this costs the country around $3.5 billion a year” (5). Other reports place the number of

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stolen barrels between 70,000 and 300,000 barrels a day (International Crisis Group

2006a). The governor of Delta State noted that as much as 300,000 barrels per day (or 15

percent of production) is lost to bunkering activities (Human Rights Watch 2003c). This

figure may be an overestimation. According to the oil companies, “Oil theft accounts for

150,000 to 200,000 barrels per day, much of it smuggled to refineries abroad by

international syndicates” (Davis, Von Kemedi, and Drennan 2006, 5). The International

Crisis Group (2006a) reported that “one day’s worth of illegal oil bunkering in the Niger

Delta (at 100,000 barrels and at $ 15/bbl) will buy quality weapons for and sustain a group

of 1,500 youths for two months” (8). According to Davis, Kemedi, and Drennan, the

amount of oil stolen within Nigeria has been increasing each year from 50,869,300

barrels during 2000 to 264,322,734 barrels during 2001 and 255,413,770 barrels from

January to October 2002. Collectively, between 100 million and 250 million barrels of

crude are stolen each year. This could earn the thieves between $1.5 billion and $4 billion

a year and “represents a loss to the government of between $1.48 billion and $3.72 billion

and to the oil producing companies about $113 million and $282 million” (5).

Magnitude and extent o f arms seizures. Given the widespread availability of arms

and ammunition within Warri, it would be exceedingly difficult to disarm militants and

the rest of the Niger Delta residents. A participant in the present study pointed out that

the number of SALW seized during Operation Restore Hope was far less than the number

of SALW remaining in circulation. A study informant indicated that, during Operation

Restore Hope, the authorities were only able to seize 1,265 arms and, in general, these

SALW were inferior to the weapons used during the conflict and considered no longer

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useful. In most cases, the security force was only able to seize such inferior or ineffective

SALW. Most combatants believe violent conflict will erupt again and that a total

surrender of arms would make them vulnerable to opponents. The combatants knew the

government was planning to forcibly disarm Niger Delta residents; consequently, only

less-sophisticated weapons were surrendered to authorities. For example, during

Operation Restore Hope, 150 Dane guns, 970 locally made pistols, and 145 machetes

were seized. As a result, the Niger Delta remains an armed camp, and any new conflict

within Warri will involve the use of sophisticated weapons.

Airstrips constructed primarily for use by the oil industry have often been used to

smuggle in SALW. Participants in the present study informed that expatriate oil workers

are a key source of SALW within Warri. In a personal interview conducted on 26 August

2005 with Fortune Dorgu, President of the National Council of Women’s Societies within

the Niger Delta, Dorgu claimed that the oil companies purchase guns for young fighters

to control the situation using a policy of divide and rule. She informed, “These weapons

are given to the youths by “us,” people who have money and power, so that they

empower and arm these boys to be on their side. After elections, these kids are not

rehabilitated. They need retraining; otherwise, tomorrow they will turn against us.”

Dorgu also pointed out that, although the multinationals are responsible for arming many

Niger Delta residents, the traditional rulers are also involved in arming their supporters.

She explained, “They buy guns for their supporters to help them control their own

kingdom.” Apart from the expatriate source of proliferation, study participants noted that

the military and police sell arms to communities or donate them to their respective ethnic

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groups to use against their opposing clans. According to Best and Von Kemedi (2005b),

security agents rent weapons during times of conflict. Field accounts also indicate that,

during renewed conflict within Warri, retired soldiers were accused of arming the militias

of their own ethnic groups. In an interview conducted for this research, Goodluck

Jonathan added that soldiers and police officers on peacekeeping missions often return

with illegal arms to sell or donate them to their respective ethnic groups.

Focus-group participants on both sides of Niger Delta conflict claimed that their

weapons were purchased for them by their leaders. Itsekiri participants supplied the

names of prominent Urhobos and Ijaw they suspected of arming their respective groups.

Similarly, the Urhobos and Ijaws supplied the names of prominent Itsekiri they suspected

of providing arms. It was evident from participant feedback that the elite of the three

communities are deeply involved in the provision of arms and ammunition to their youth.

These leaders must therefore take responsibility for the escalation of violence throughout

the region. Study participants also noted that the numerous creeks crisscrossing the Niger

Delta facilitate SALW smuggling and hence combatant acquisition of arms. This access

to SALW has instilled confidence in the combatants. Consequently, they are always

ready to confront law-enforcement officers. According to the Delta State police

commissioner, Niger Delta militias are combat ready with a high level of confidence.

The Nigerian government is also responsible for SALW proliferation within the

Niger Delta. Rather than employing peaceful means to resolve conflict, the government

has resorted to weaponry and coercive techniques to stop violence. When the crisis

erupted during 1997, the first reaction of the government was to deploy security forces to

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the affected areas to enforce and maintain peace. The use of armed forces to quell

violence follows a predictable pattern. The police are first deployed. When they prove to

be incapable of coping with the situation, units of the mobile police force who are

specially trained for riot control are dispatched. When it is evident that the mobile police

cannot cope with the situation, soldiers are dispensed to deal with the violence. Rather

than restoring order, such escalation to military force is likely to also cause the militias to

escalate the level of conflict.

The Warri conflict correlates positively to the widespread availability of arms

within the city. The conflict actors have used weapons of various types to undermine the

responsive capability of opponents. If arms were in short supply, there would be far less

violence in the conflict. It therefore appears that the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW

in any human settlement predisposes the use of violence to solve problems threatening

citizen security.

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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This current study was designed to examine the relationship between the

proliferation of SLAW in conflict (i.e., a supply-side dynamic) and threats to human

security that tend to create the demand for arms (i.e., demand-side dynamics). The

frequent use of small arms in civil conflict throughout the 1990s exerted a tremendous

influence on human security and provides an understanding of how poverty,

marginalization, and threats (i.e., factors of demand-side dynamics) can lead to armed

conflict. The effects of demand-side factors on proliferation have drawn research

attention because the supply-side approaches of the Cold War era do not adequately

explain the current problem of SALW proliferation. The key issue is that the new wave of

proliferation generated by nontraditional sources of threat (i.e., environmental and social

inequalities such as poverty) requires the consideration of insecurity factors to explain the

demand-side dynamics of diffusion in conflict.

This study sought to determine whether a causal link existed between

proliferation and human security and whether or not that link led to the militarization of

conflict. As a result of the inability of the conventional security approach to explain the

cause(s) of SALW proliferation in civil conflict, this research was designed to find an

alternative explanation for the militarization. The study is based upon the assumption that

perceptions of relative threat and marginalization, as well as the accessibility of weapons,

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create the conditions for SALW proliferation in such conflict. Through this framework,

the study makes a significant contribution to literature related to arms by providing

deeper insight into the relationship between proliferation and threats. Additionally, this

research challenges the idea of overemphasizing control efforts to limit the supply of

arms. Human security is measured via perceptions of threats, relative deprivation, and

flow of weapons. SALW proliferation is not a solitary phenomenon. It occurs in

conjunction with two core phenomena—(1) a sense of marginalization causing

individuals to take matters into their own hands due to belief that the government is

unwilling or unable to resolve the respective problem; and (2) a generalized and well

founded perception of the existence of threats to life or livelihood. When these two

phenomena are experienced in conjunction with easy access to SALW, conflict often

becomes militarized.

Within the framework of this study, the introduction of SALW immediately

correlates to demand-side dynamics. That is, social injustice and deprivation remain a

powerful explanation for SALW proliferation. The conflict that continues to plague

Nigeria has occurred because ethnic populations have internalized their perceptions of

their political and economic positions as steadily eroding. They perceive no benefit from

the enormous wealth generated by the oil industry on their land. This has created a gap

between expectations and reality that has formed the basis for conflict. In other words,

reactions to objective circumstances depend upon subjective comparisons (Walker and

Smith 2002,1).

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In the past, the study of proliferation considered the state as a strong actor in

weapons transfer, and such research was rooted in realist theory. As a result, the research

espoused that the interest of any state is of paramount concern, and weapons were viewed

as a form of defense against externally generated threats (Blanton 1996; Laurance 1992;

Wolfers 1952). Within the bureaucratic politics affecting weapons transfer (Neuman and

Harkavy 1979) weapons were an integral facet of the superpower client-state relations

that formed the geopolitical landscape. That is, the superpowers used weapons transfer to

gain friends and fight enemies within the Third World. However, analysts questioned the

efficacy of using traditional weapons transfer to explain proliferation as more and more

arms were used in civil conflict. It was generally accepted that the new wars emerging

within Africa were a result of endogenous conditions (Ayoob 1995) including state

weakness, processes of globalization (Held et al. 1999; Strange 1996), and the legacy of

colonization (Joseph 1990; Mbaku and Ihonbvere 2003; Musah 2001), among other

factors.

Human security became the discourse through which proliferation could be

visualized among the nonmilitary class. Interesting forms of the debate focused on the

motivation for weapons demand. Glatz and Muggah (2006) pointed to deep preferences

for personal security, social and economic security, political identity, representation, and

group status. SALW play a key role in Nigerian conflict; however, the manner in which

arms affect conflict varies. The focus-group discussions of this current study el icited

statements such as “The availability of these weapons has changed the way the campaign

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of violence is being carried out because people feel they can enforce whatever they want

right now because they are armed.”

The findings of this study support the proposition that SALW proliferation and

the militarization of Nigerian conflict are caused by human insecurity. To generalize, the

threats to human security are both proximal and distal. Proximally, the concurrent

community mi sunder standing—whether based on land or political access—provides a

path for ethnic hostility at the individual level. Once tension has climaxed and individuals

are killed or maimed, the conflict often becomes a collective memory and the social

distance between groups is increased. In all of the conflicts examined in the present

study, instances existed where proliferation was a result of the proximal and distal threats

associated with disputes over land, group perception of the opposing group as settlers or

indigenes, and competition for economic space frequently expressed in the form of a

religious divide. Although these insecurities were present within all the conflicts under

study, the lack of adequate access to, or flow of, weapons halted or at least slowed the

trajectory to militarized conflict.

To summarize the findings of the present study, militarization of conflict is a

result of a very complex process involving failure of the respective state to thrive, which

is a scenario rooted in the colonial socialization of the state and people of Nigeria. During

precolonial times, small communities and city-states demonstrated allegiance to kings

and clan heads. The process of consolidating these communities and city-states equated

to a rigid form of governance by colonial authorities and a growing use of firearms that

began during the Industrial Revolution. As noted earlier, arms became pivotal

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instruments in continental power relations; weapons were needed to colonize and control

the people of Africa. The colonial form of government concurrently created fault lines

that became the basis for the insecurities that facilitated the present-day demand for

SALW. The colonial period entrenched the use of weapons and became a feature of

colonial governance.

The nature of SALW proliferation changed during World War I when the

continental powers used African soldiers to fight proxy wars. During the Cold War,

SALW transfer intensified to balance bipolarity and promote Cold War ideology. The

end of the Cold War left many African governments without backing for their

superpower friends at a time when they faced increasing internal resistance. The role and

nature of the state became critical to the diffusion of arms. Migdal (1994) argued that

national officials attempted to dismantle state bureaucracies in order to deny potential

rivals a power base. Arms diffusion was inherently shaped by the exigencies of state

bureaucracy.

Emerging bureaucracies of African states lacked the ability to deliver public

goods to their citizens, including security. As a result, African leaders turned to the

patronage system to maintain shifting configurations of fealty (Joseph 1990). The impact

of the patronage system on the state, as well as the inherent demands for inclusion,

translated into militant opposition movements using small arms to negotiate with the state

(Mbaku and Ihonvbere 2003). Additionally, colonialism left a legacy of administrative

structures that restricted growth of the traditional, social, and political structures

necessary for providing avenues toward conflict resolution (Chazan et al. 1999).

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Weapons Diffusion and Insecurity

Marginalization

Particular sources of insecurity are common within all regions of Nigeria. For

example, feelings of deprivation are consistently present; however, the sources of

marginalization and deprivation vary. Within the Middle Belt zone, ethnicity is

paramount. To understand the role that SALW plays in regional conflict, an examination

of the various identities of the ethnic groups found within this zone is important.

Christianity has a considerable influence on the minority ethnic groups residing within

Jos, Plateau State, and Taraba, while Islam influences those within areas that were once a

part of the emirate system. The nature of resources within the Middle Belt also

encouraged the influx of some ethnic groups to the area. In the case of Jos, it was tin that

attracted migrants. The Middle Belt is largely populated by agrarian people, and there is a

great dependence upon land as a means of livelihood. Conflict therefore tends to center

on questions of ethnic identity (i.e., who is an indigene and who is a settler) and unequal

land distribution. These sources of conflict are entwined with exclusionary politics and

institutionalized discrimination.

Within the Middle Belt, land pressures and social exclusionary practices in the

form of the settler-indigene divide of natives against nonnatives strengthened the Tiv

perception of marginalization. The Tiv community has always felt marginalized and

excluded from the political process while continuing to demand a voice within local

government. They sought an increased number of seats on the Wukari Traditional

Council, allowing them greater participation in the decision-making process. The Jukun

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community has concurrently resisted these efforts, and the state government has opposed

recommendations for the creation of a traditional council for the Tiv. This systematic

attempt at marginalization, coupled with the nature of exclusionary politics practiced by

the Jukun, aggravated latent Tiv frustrations and led to protest and armed violence. It is

noteworthy that the same conditions of threat and deprivation existed in the Jos conflict

where grievances were largely institutionalized by colonial processes and further

perpetuated by the indigene-settler divide. This divide has meant the denial of

opportunities in employment and education for nonindigenes, as well as exclusion from

other spheres of the economy.

Access to resources must be considered during any examination of civil inequality

and marginalization as factors contributing to violence and militarization. Inequality and

marginalization alone cannot directly impact the emergence of militarized conflict;

however, once group perception of inequality is established and the availability thesis

holds, the capacity for the deprived or marginalized to socially mobilize can progress to

armed conflict. Notably, the issue of marginalization was present in every conflict

examined in the present study. As a result, community misunderstanding led to a

heightened sense of religious affiliation and ethnic identity, which in turn, led to the

creation of distinct markers between and among ethnic groups. This process, which

occurred in every case, with the exception of the Ogoni government conflict, increases

the social distance between and among groups. In each conflict, the perception of

exclusion or marginalization, based upon religious and/or ethnic differences,

accompanied feelings of resentment toward external groups, whether another ethnic

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group or government functionaries. In fact, the outcome of these conflicts reinforced the

ethnic or religious identity of many of the involved communities.

Within other regions, feelings of marginalization are sourced in a specific

industry, as in the Niger Delta conflict where multinational corporations wield great

influence on the politic of insecurity. The involvement of foreign multinational oil

corporations has adversely affected competition among the various ethnic communities

who were already engaged in a number of battles over state resources. Tension created by

the competition for oil resources, coupled with the continuing violence, has led many

youth to embrace a particular brand of radicalism and militancy toward the government.

Whether the phenomenon of marginalization is based upon political representation,

economic inclusion, or environmental degradation, it has had a negative effect on human

security and the chance of conciliation between communities involved in the conflict.

Within the Niger Delta region, violence is associated with the lack of economic

opportunities and political power that should be created by the oil resources of the region,

which is the main source of income for the federal government.

Within the Northern zone, there is a lack of social integration. In the state of

Kaduna and, to a lesser extent, Kano, various communities believe that Hausa/Fulani

groups exclude them from the decision-making process. The appointment of individuals

as political leaders who are considered aliens by indigenous groups within southern

Kaduna has created suspicion, bitterness, and frustration— all latent grievances that

fueled minor outbreaks of violence. Community members of southern Kaduna believe

there is an inequitable distribution of education and social amenities compared to other

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regions of the state. The introduction of the Structural Advancement Programme in the

mid- to late-1980s created untold hardship for many people within the southern region

of Kaduna, which in turn, caused acute unemployment. Participants in the present study

pointed out that industries and other government projects are primarily situated within

northern Kaduna, which has produced economic benefits for the people of this region.

The participants also alleged that individuals from northern Kaduna block minority

access to civil-service jobs and minorities are underrepresented in the Kaduna State

House of Assembly.

The problem of marginalization is made acute because the Kaduna is split almost

equally between a Muslim population in the north and a Christian population in the south.

This religious divide has often been the source of unhealthy rivalry, competition, and

antagonism. It has also adversely affected the interpretation of government action,

policies, and appointments. Within Kano and Kaduna, the significant influence of Islam

and its hegemony in the area effectively relegated non-Muslims to a different status and,

as a result, many indigenous groups feel marginalized within their own homeland.

Perception o f Threat

The findings of this study indicate that those involved in Nigerian conflict were

correct in their suspicion of threat to their personal security. When threat is perceived,

protective acts will ensue in response. This reaction accounts for the conflict examined in

the present study and SALW proliferation. In the midst and aftermath of the violence,

death, and destruction that characterize violent Nigerian conflict, those who feel

threatened by their opponents do not believe the state or any external apparatus can stem

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the violence. The fisherman of Niger Delta believe the activities of the oil industry

threaten their livelihood without providing any benefits from the oil resources of their

land. The findings of this study also indicate that environmental pollution, concerns over

resource control, and a perceived lack of opportunities for social mobility led to a

heightened sense of identity and a new collective consciousness. This, in turn, led to

militancy and agitation, which proved to be fertile ground for SALW proliferation. The

presence of SALW in the Niger Delta conflict raised the stakes and increased the threat to

human security within a region already reeling from years of tension.

There is a historical dimension to the Ijaw conflict. The ethnic groups of the

region have feuded in the past over land, resources, and political representation. These

feuds have increased the sense of identity for each rivaling group and provided the

confidence necessary to engage in conflict. The influx of SALW only served to

weaponize existing community tension. Within the Middle Belt and North West zones,

heightened awareness of ethnicity and religious affiliation created an “in-group” versus

“out-group” mentality, serving only to increase ethnic insecurity and hostility. Young

people were told there was nothing wrong with destroying the property of opposing

groups or killing their members because their cultures, religion, and/or way of thinking

was different from their own. Cloaked in indigene-settler tension, the conflict becomes

personal rather than simply macro; that is, community- or society-wide expressions of

disagreement.

Widespread SALW increase the potential for, and level of, violent conflict. The

use of arms for retaliation after loss of property and life became a common response to

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acts perceived to be unjustifiable attacks or insults. The need for revenge was a strong

factor in many violent conflicts, and SALW offered a devastating means for exacting

such revenge. Use of SALW increased the number of casualties and the amount of

property damage, as well as producing an unprecedented number of IDPs. Once one

group introduced SALW into a conflict, the opposing group felt forced to obtain arms for

defense and retaliation. The case studies presented in this research reveal that the use of

SALW is uneven and that arms proliferation and use is not automatic within communities

where tension exists. There were fewer SALW available or used within some of the

conflicts of the Northern region (i.e., Kaduna) and the Middle Belt region (i.e., Jos)

compared to the South South; however, use of SALW consistently created deep

resentment across all involved population groups. Places of worship were razed because

they were considered symbols of the oppressing group. In the process, religion was

fimctionalized as a dividing line of violence.

General Findings

The findings in the six case studies examined for this research reflect several

common themes. Many Nigerians live below the poverty line (UNDP 2004; World Bank

1995) and have no access to jobs (Lewis and Alemika 2004). Resources, such as land,

which provides a means of livelihood, are the focus of conflict because of population

pressures and large demographic movements (IPCR 2003). Land disputes are a frequent

occurrence between the Tiv and Jukun within Taraba and among the Urhobo, Itsekiri, and

Ijaw within Warri. Land therefore emerges as a potential trigger of conflict. Additionally,

Nigerians believe their “personal and economic welfare have turned negative” (Lewis

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and Alemika 2004, 31), increasing the sense of threat that spurs much conflict. Many of

the conflict actors are uneducated. Several of the interviewed study participants noted the

lack of educational opportunities as a basis for many social ills.

The long years of military rule have institutionalized a culture of violence and

intolerance and, as a result, various population groups have attempted to settle disputes

using violent means. Militarism is a culture that motivates the use of arms. Within the

Niger Delta, 70 percent of the population who are not active militants are potential

militants (Sunny Ofili, personal interview, 18 January 2007). Open insurgency is

currently tightly organized within the Niger Delta. Militarism is reinforced by easy access

to SALW. For example, the long, unmanned borders of Nigeria, coupled with ineffective

policing, make it easy to smuggle SALW into the country. Study participants also stated

that local arms manufacturers have contributed to arms proliferation. Although

widespread belief that local arms manufacturers had increased the number of SALW used

in conflicts was evident, no reliable information surrounding the number of weapons

produced by these manufacturers could be found. However, several regions of Nigeria are

known for their arms production.

The various institutions that support democracy and are able to institute a culture

of dialogue are extremely weak (e.g., pressure groups and interest groups). Civil society

is weak or co-opted, and nongovernmental organizations play limited roles because 80

percent of public life revolves around the federal capital and is under rigid government

control. No strong institutions to check the excess of militias exist, and the collective

actions of conflicting groups now border on full-scale belligerency. As a result, the

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government has become increasingly reliant upon the use of force to quell many of the

disputes. Corruption is embedded within every layer of Nigerian society. Public agencies

charged with law and order have been accused by many communities of selling arms.

This is reflected in the perception of corruption reported in the survey conducted by

Lewis and Alemika (2004), which found that 70 percent of Nigerians believe the police

are corrupt and 57 percent believe the border officials (e.g., customs and immigration

officers) are corrupt. Within the South, for example, the multinationals pay off

community leaders to ensure there are no disruptions to the oil industry, and this has

caused many groups to mistrust their leaders. At the federal level, derivation of 13

percent is paid to oil-producing states; however, no one seems to know how the money is

spent. Many communities complain that nothing is accomplished and, as a result, many

people have decided to back up their demands for resource control and self-determination

with violence. There are so many competing actors in many of the conflicts that issues

are easily “sidetracked” and ultimately highly politicized. In some cases, competing

groups do not seek a solution that will actually solve the respective problem.

Policy Recommendations

Widespread criticism of the Nigeria firearms law is evident because it does not

cover the stockpiling and brokering of SALW. It has been suggested that the problem of

SALW proliferation continues to be treated as a legal, security, and justice problem—a

routine security matter for handling by Nigerian security agencies with the police playing

the leading role. Nigeria leaders do not accept the need for special measures to deal with

SALW proliferation. They view the SALW problem from the perspective of national

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security rather than from a human-rights position. Nigeria is struggling to find a way to

curb the demand for SALW with so many arms already circulating within the country. In

a typical economic model, demand will respond only to factors related to supply;

however, within the geopolitical realm, such fundamental tenets may require revision to

fit the data.

It is clear from the many roundtable sessions (African Strategic and Peace

Research Group 2003) and commissions established to examine SALW proliferation that

efforts to control the illicit-arms trade have been unsuccessful. Therefore, the following

recommendations are offered as a way to reduce SALW proliferation within Nigeria:

1. Establishment of a citizen review board is recommended, to include a

government representative within each state to register gun owners. Past attempts at

collecting and destroying SALW have not only been unsuccessful in controlling their

flow, but have provided gunrunners with the ability to buy higher-quality SALW. For

example, buy-back programs (i.e., guns for cash) have provided these gunrunners with

the money to buy newer, more sophisticated SALW. The recommended review board

would not be a government entity. It would enable each community to track owners of

weapons. The suggested community registry would not be a large database listing

government stockpiles of leftover weapons from peace operations within the West

African region; rather, it would include information on individual gun owners within

each Nigerian state. The purpose of the registry would be to enable individuals to legally

purchase SALW. A citizen review panel would oversee the registry in collaboration with

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security agencies. This registry would create transparency within the process of

controlling SALW in Nigeria (Lumpe 1999).

2. Establishment of a coast guard is recommended that could patrol the coastline,

reducing the number of SALW smuggled into the country.

3. Establishment of the marshall plan called for by militants is recommended. The

federal government, along with its business partners (e.g., the oil companies, foreign

governments, and local business communities), would comprise a foundation created for

further development of the Niger Delta.

4. Localization of industry is recommended to ensure multinationals located in

local communities and mining oil are socially responsible. That is, the multinationals

should create an atmosphere within the oil industry that will spur other industries to

create proper infrastructures, employment, and a tax base for the government.

5. Creation of economic stability and cultivatation of domestic leadership by

multinationals interested in governance, rather than in obtaining small arms to further

their political ambitions, should be encouraged.

6. Institution of a peace economy by the federal government that addresses

excessive poverty, inequality, and social injustice is recommended. Postconflict

reconstruction efforts should not be focused on effective disarmament and

demobilization. Rather, a systematic approach should be employed that addresses human

security using programs and policies reducing poverty and inequality.

There should be an economic focus to peace building, and the resources of the oil

sector should be used to build networks to the nonoil sector. In other words, a “backwash

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effect” from the oil economy should be evident through integration of the oil industry

with other aspects of the Nigerian economy. This process should be achieved using short,

medium, and long-term strategic plans. Most importantly, the human-security component

should be emphasized through ownership and responsibility for local communities. If the

incorporation of a marshall plan is adopted, such strategic goals can be achieved if local

communities, multinationals, institutions such as the UNDP, and state and federal

governments effectively collaborate.

A short-term goal should involve a confidence-building mechanism encouraging

militants to negotiate with the government, restoring respect for federal authorities,

convincing militants that dialogue will achieve favorable outcomes, reducing the cost of

doing business for the government and multinationals, reducing insurgency, and instilling

confidence in the investment climate. The enormous resources of the oil sector must be

used to benefit the nonoil sector. For example, the minister of defense revealed that the

federal government lost approximately $4 billion to insurgent activity during 2006. This

lost revenue could have been directed to the Niger Delta to develop infrastructure such as

roads, schools, and hospitals; ensuring a clean water supply; reducing pollution; and jobs.

These are the basic social services that many people have demanded from several

government agencies. Government subsidies for the agricultural industry should be

reinstated. This will make a significant contribution toward reducing unnecessary

militarization. The federal government can either build peace or continue to fight

militarized communities.

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A medium-term goal should involve capacity building and the creation of jobs

and business opportunities for locals. In this case, capacity refers to the ability of local

institutions, which is not currently promoted within Nigeria; therefore, it must be

reinforced and resourced. This leads to the issues of competence and training. Foreign

organizations can contribute to building bureaucratic competence via modernizing the

skills of civil servants by providing training and education. This would reduce corruption

(e.g., bribery) and reduce the cost of doing business for multinational corporations.

Additionally, there should be capacity building among the general population, which

could involve training for alternative livelihoods (e.g., retraining displaced fishermen and

their families within the Niger Delta).

A long-term goal should involve engaging in discussion with local communities

to clearly determine their needs. This is particularly important within the Niger Delta

region. Community needs could be met at both state and federal levels, as well as by the

multinationals. This process must include targeted outcomes. The recommendations and

suggested goals presented are based upon the assumption that, if insecurity is reduced,

the link between a lack of upward social mobility and SALW proliferation spurred by

organized armed conflict to redress it, will be broken, introducing the potential for a new

era of unprecedented peace and civility for Nigeria.

New research suggests that focusing on the demand dynamics of small arms

proliferation has extended the frontiers of military conception attached to the

understanding of security; and in order to address the challenge to human security, the

gaps within the politico-social and economic development needed to be addressed. It is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. apparent that the literature on security remains theoretical in nature, hence, this

dissertation as is presented here from the perspective of the demand-side has considerable

practical relevance and is in fact one of the few studies critical of the traditional security

thought that can be operationalized. In contradistinction to the extant literature on human

security, this study has provided practical basis for policy formulation. On account of

that, it is able to provide the basis for specific policy recommendations such as have been

offered in this work. This of course, is only one attempt at embarking on a

theoretical/policy synthesis. The task is to build on this, drawing on more diverse cases

not only in Nigeria, but, from other regions of the world as well.

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APPENDIX

Types of Small Arms and Light Weapons Produced by Nigeria Defense-Sector Firm

Nigerian Rifle 1, model 7.6 mm (NR-7.62 mm)

Nigerian Pistol 1, Model 9 mm (NPI-9 mm)

Submachine gun (PM 12S, caliber 9 mm)

DICON SG 1-86 single-barrel shotgun

DICON M 36 hand grenade

7.62mm x 51 soft core (ball) cartridge

7.62mm x 51 blank bulleted

9 x 1 19mm parabellum cartridge

9mm blank StarBore shotgun cartridge

Source: Norwegian Institute for Small Arms Transfer. 2004. Production, Policy and Legislation, http://www.nisat.org (accessed 18 July 2005).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 261

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