Aleksi Mainio

Петербургский исторический журнал № 4 (2017) ertion. The exact number of refugees who arrived to Finland during the years of Petrograd, sofleeingtoFinland didnotnecessarilyrequireenormousphysical ex- come independent,waslocated nexttotheRussianEmpireanditsoldcapital role in the history of the Russiandiaspora. The country, which had recently be- against theSovietUnionwasoutofquestion. the motivation,socialrelationships,andcapital without whichcrediblecombat to Bolshevismanddrivingforcesforthecounter-revolutionary struggle.Theyhad were leftbehindintheoldhomeland.Manyrefugees becameunappeasableenemies a great dealduring the political turmoil: possessions, social influence, and homes class andleadtoa“braindrain”fromtheeast west.Therefugeeshadlost The revolutionsof1917hadexiledasignificantportion oftheoldRussianupper- Russian CombatOrganizations in1918–1939 The Elite onthe Warpath — Finlandandthe Aleksi Mainio The geographicalposition ofFinlandhadasignificantimpactonshaping its The ArrivaloftheRefugees These eventsinFinlandwereverymuchapartofthehistoryRussianelite. In thisarticlebasedonmythesis resentatives alsoparticipatedinvariousplotsandeventerroristattacks. tionary combatorganizationsoperatinginFinland,butgovernmentrep- combat againsttheSovietUnion.Notonlywheretherecounter-revolu- tions thatoperatedintheFinnishterritory1918–1939andtheirarmed 1 I examinetheWhiteémigréorganiza- УДК 94(480) ity 1922 therewereapproximately33,500formerRussiansubjects the RussianrevolutionandCivilwarisunknown.Accordingtooneestimate,in mir Kokovtsov Vladimir Volkonsky andthe former Prime Ministers AlexanderTrepov and Vladi- of theupper-class.Thesemembersoldeliteincluded,amongothers,Prince thorities andinfluentialpoliticalleaders,academics,prominentrepresentatives slowing down different partsofRussiaandneighboringareas assassinations andsmuggledclandestineinformation toWhitearmiesoperatingin act secretly behind the Bolsheviks’ backs. They organized bomb attacks, arsons, and support areas.Theideawasthatthesemoreorless competing organizationswould which usedCentralEuropeandtheneighboringcountriesofSovietRussiaastheir of theWhiteforcesestablishedtheirownintelligenceandcombatorganizations, tine operationsoftheRussianoppositionforcesduring1918,atlatest.Activists Aleksi Mainio Aleksi through theborderparish Terijoki. tives wereledfromFinland bysendingsecretagentstoSovietRussia,inparticular ferent partsofRussia.Espionage, sabotageoperations,andotherclandestineinitia - ganization established close tiestoPetrograd and the White forces operating in dif - close to his staff. The unit’s mission was to gather information from Russia. The or- Petersburg. Inthespringof1919,GeneralYudenich createdasecretespionageunit negotiations withGeneralGustafMannerheim,even discussingtheseizingofSaint into PetrogradeitherbyitselforwiththeFinns,for example.Yudenich heldsecret wanted to assemble an army in the Finnish and Baltic region, to lead the attack most significantémigréleader. Thismilitarycommander, whohadfledtoFinland, similar effects eral Yevgeni MillernearArkhangelskandMurmanskatthebeginningof1920had stadt rebellionandthedisintegrationofNorthernArmyledbyLieutenantGen- the Balticsatendof1919initiatedawavemigrationtoFinland.TheKron The defeat suffered by the Northwestern Army led by General Nikolai Yudenich in born in Finland,werelegitimateheirstotheRussiancrown. Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. He and his son Vladimir Kirillovich, who was and Finns of whichwereGreatRussiansandtherest,inparticular, Ingrians,EastKarelians, 5 Refugees cametoFinlandespeciallyfromPetrogradanditsimmediatevicin- Authorities fromdifferentcountrieswereforcedtotakeastandontheclandes- White CombatOrganizations1918–1920 By 1919,NikolaiYudenich, ageneralintheRussianImperialArmy, becamethe Another significantgroupofrefugeesconsistedhigh-rankingWhiteofficers. . Manyofthearrivalswerespecificallyhigh-rankingcivilianandmilitaryau- 3 . Duringthe1920s,numberofrefugeesfellquicklyatfirst,then 7 4 . . 6 . TherefugeesalsoincludedthecousinoflastEmperorRussia, 8 . 2 inFinland,19,000 221

Saint-Petersburg Historical JournalN 4 (2017) Петербургский исторический журнал № 4 (2017) ertion. The exact number of refugees who arrived to Finland during the years of Petrograd, sofleeingtoFinland didnotnecessarilyrequireenormousphysical ex- come independent,waslocated nexttotheRussianEmpireanditsoldcapital role in the history of the Russiandiaspora. The country, which had recently be- against theSovietUnionwasoutofquestion. the motivation,socialrelationships,andcapital without whichcrediblecombat to Bolshevismanddrivingforcesforthecounter-revolutionary struggle.Theyhad were leftbehindintheoldhomeland.Manyrefugees becameunappeasableenemies a great dealduring the political turmoil: possessions, social influence, and homes class andleadtoa“braindrain”fromtheeast west.Therefugeeshadlost The revolutionsof1917hadexiledasignificantportion oftheoldRussianupper- Russian CombatOrganizations in1918–1939 The Elite onthe Warpath — Finlandandthe Aleksi Mainio The geographicalposition ofFinlandhadasignificantimpactonshaping its The ArrivaloftheRefugees These eventsinFinlandwereverymuchapartofthehistoryRussianelite. In thisarticlebasedonmythesis resentatives alsoparticipatedinvariousplotsandeventerroristattacks. tionary combatorganizationsoperatinginFinland,butgovernmentrep- combat againsttheSovietUnion.Notonlywheretherecounter-revolu- tions thatoperatedintheFinnishterritory1918–1939andtheirarmed 1 I examinetheWhiteémigréorganiza- УДК 94(480) ity 1922 therewereapproximately33,500formerRussiansubjects the RussianrevolutionandCivilwarisunknown.Accordingtooneestimate,in mir Kokovtsov Vladimir Volkonsky andthe former Prime Ministers AlexanderTrepov and Vladi- of theupper-class.Thesemembersoldeliteincluded,amongothers,Prince thorities andinfluentialpoliticalleaders,academics,prominentrepresentatives slowing down different partsofRussiaandneighboringareas assassinations andsmuggledclandestineinformation toWhitearmiesoperatingin act secretly behind the Bolsheviks’ backs. They organized bomb attacks, arsons, and support areas.Theideawasthatthesemoreorless competing organizationswould which usedCentralEuropeandtheneighboringcountriesofSovietRussiaastheir of theWhiteforcesestablishedtheirownintelligenceandcombatorganizations, tine operationsoftheRussianoppositionforcesduring1918,atlatest.Activists Aleksi Mainio Aleksi through theborderparish Terijoki. tives wereledfromFinland bysendingsecretagentstoSovietRussia,inparticular ferent partsofRussia.Espionage, sabotageoperations,andotherclandestineinitia - ganization established close tiestoPetrograd and the White forces operating in dif - close to his staff. The unit’s mission was to gather information from Russia. The or- Petersburg. Inthespringof1919,GeneralYudenich createdasecretespionageunit negotiations withGeneralGustafMannerheim,even discussingtheseizingofSaint into PetrogradeitherbyitselforwiththeFinns,for example.Yudenich heldsecret wanted to assemble an army in the Finnish and Baltic region, to lead the attack most significantémigréleader. Thismilitarycommander, whohadfledtoFinland, similar effects eral Yevgeni MillernearArkhangelskandMurmanskatthebeginningof1920had stadt rebellionandthedisintegrationofNorthernArmyledbyLieutenantGen- the Balticsatendof1919initiatedawavemigrationtoFinland.TheKron The defeat suffered by the Northwestern Army led by General Nikolai Yudenich in born in Finland,werelegitimateheirstotheRussiancrown. Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. He and his son Vladimir Kirillovich, who was and Finns of whichwereGreatRussiansandtherest,inparticular, Ingrians,EastKarelians, 5 Refugees cametoFinlandespeciallyfromPetrogradanditsimmediatevicin- Authorities fromdifferentcountrieswereforcedtotakeastandontheclandes- White CombatOrganizations1918–1920 By 1919,NikolaiYudenich, ageneralintheRussianImperialArmy, becamethe Another significantgroupofrefugeesconsistedhigh-rankingWhiteofficers. . Manyofthearrivalswerespecificallyhigh-rankingcivilianandmilitaryau- 3 . Duringthe1920s,numberofrefugeesfellquicklyatfirst,then 7 4 . . 6 . TherefugeesalsoincludedthecousinoflastEmperorRussia, 8 . 2 inFinland,19,000 221

Saint-Petersburg Historical JournalN 4 (2017) Петербургский исторический журнал № 4 (2017) Finland letters andweaponsover the borderanddeliveredreports and otherinformationto tions andintelligenceservicesfromFinlandtoPetrograd.Themessengerssmuggled or Petrograd andtheneighboringareas. In defiantspirits,theso-calledPetrograd CombatOrganization revolutionary agentsandsaboteurs Both wereconnectedtoPetrogradandelsewhereinSovietRussiathroughcounter- the émigréorganizationsweredifficult,ifnotimpossible,toseparatefromeachother. of sharedagents.Inpractice,theconspirativeactionsFinnishgeneralstaffand lished inSeptemberof1924 andnamedtheRussianAll-MilitaryUnion a commonumbrellaorganization forwhiteofficers.Thiscoalitionwasofficially estab- Army PyotrWrangel triedtomaintain thecombatreadinessofhistroopsbysettingup disintegrated intosmallerparts. Thesituationwasdire.commanderoftheWhite from otherproblemsaswell. AftertheRussianCivilWar, TheRussianWhiteArmyhad been murderedduringtheRussianCivilWar. the orderofsuccessionoriginatedfromfactmost logicalRomanovheirshad and theotherstandingbehindGrandDukeNikolay Nikolayevich. Thedisputeover resulted intwocompetingcamps,onesupportingGrand DukeKirillVladimirovich The refugeecirclescouldnotreachaconsensusonwho shouldwearthecrown.This in theearlyyearsof1920s,butitsinfluencenever reachedthelevelitcouldhave. head outfornewideologicalwinds.Thesupportmonarchism especiallyincreased the combatorganizationsarrivedtoVyborg andtheIsthmusfromCentralEurope ship ofthecounter-revolution,Kronstadtfortress.Dozensambassadorsfrom had finallycome.InFinland,refugeeactiviststightenedtheircontactstotheflag- ruary 28,1921,theémigrécirclesbegantothinkthatendofSovietRussia 222 of theworld,thrustinfrontcounter-revolution” All-Russian CongressofSovietsemphasizedthatFinlandwas“becominganoutpost ish regionhadbeenusedasasupportareaforespionageandbombings as alarmingbytheSovietRussiansecurityservices.TheyconcludedthatFinn- the Tagantsev Conspiracy —wentthroughthecouriersofactivistorganiza- The mostimportantcommunicationsofthePetrogradCombatOrganization — The émigréorganizationsandtheFinnishmilitaryintelligencehadanabundance The monarchists’ schism impeded the fight against Bolshevism, which was suffering The monarchists’schismimpededthefightagainstBolshevism, whichwassuffering The setbacksinthecounter-revolutionarystruggle forcedtheémigrécirclesto ROVS When theProvisionalRevolutionaryCommitteelaunchedrebelliononFeb- Kronstadt Rebellion 12 The Elite on the Warpath — Finland and the RussianCombat Organizations in 1918–1939 . While the clandestine activities died down in 1921–1922, they were seen 9 . 14 . 11

had beenformedin 15 i. e. , 13 . Eventhe ROVS 16 . 10 . had continuedforyearstotheROVS representativessmuggledintoMoscow a mission giventoanOGPUagent.Hewasordered revealthedeceptionwhich by émigréactivists.Evidently, thefirststepinshuttingdownorganizationwas dangerously closetobeingexposedanditcouldnolonger curtailtheterroristplots The operation of Trust was no longer worthwhile, because the fake organization was The secretpoliceoftheSovietUniondrewitsown conclusionsonthesituation. by theOGPU,thenanyone couldbeatraitor Intelligence Service(SIS)ofGreatBritain aged towinthetrustofbothFinnishgeneralstaffintelligenceandSecret actually monitoredbytheOGPU,pretendedtooperateinSovietUnion.Itman- simply tions, themostfamousofwhichwasMonarchistUnionCentralRussia,ormore police oftheRussianEmpire.OGPUcreatedfakecounter-revolutionaryorganiza- using atacticwhichwasheavilyinfluencedbythehistoryofOkhrana,secret to Paris raising concerns deal ofconcernintheSovietUnion.ThesecretpoliceOGPU intense and the discussion focused on initiating a counter-revolutionary bomb war Alexander KutepovhadbeenallowedintoFinland. Atmosphere atthemeetingwas guest ofhonorfromParis. “Theactual leaderoftheRussianMonarchistémigrés” Attending themeetingwereTrust liaisonsandgeneralstaffofficers,butalsoasecret in theFrolovVillaTerijoki, protectedbytheFinnishgeneralstaff intelligence. misfortune. plain tothemselveswhycounter-revolutionaryoperationsmetwithever-increasing to emerge.Theémigréactivistsandwesternintelligenceofficersfoundithardex- Russia in1921–1927 other clandestineoperationsbyvariouswesterncountriesandtheémigrésinSoviet Lubyanka anditssubdivisioninLeningradmanagedtocontroltheintelligence Aleksi Mainio Aleksi Kutepov andhisalliesdecided tolaunchaterrorcampaignagainsttheSovietUnion. revenge. Inthespringof1927, theleaderofarmedwingROVS Alexander shocked bytherevelation, butnotparalyzed.TheémigrégeneralsinParis wanted land usingsecretroutesovertheeasternborderandbackintoWestern Europe was locatedintheKarelianIsthmus.ROVS agentstraveledthroughSouthernFin- within theROVS. OneofitsmostimportantRussianroutes,so-called“windows”, The scandalousnewsquicklytravelledtoHelsinki and Vyborg andfromthere The collaborativeinitiativesbetweentheémigrésandtheiralliescausedagreat The IsthmusWindow The situationculminatedinthebeginningof1927.InMarch,ameetingwasheld With thehelp oftheTrust, the headofthesecretpoliceSovietUnion A secret combat organization led by General Alexander Kutepov was created Trust. Thisorganization,whichpresenteditselfasanti-Bolshevist,butwas 20 . Theschemewassuccessful,butgraduallysuspicionsbegan 23 . If an organization like Trust could have been controlled 19 . 24 . TheleadershipoftheROVS was 18 decidedtofightback 22 . 17 223 . 21 .

Saint-Petersburg Historical JournalN 4 (2017) Петербургский исторический журнал № 4 (2017) Finland letters andweaponsover the borderanddeliveredreports and otherinformationto tions andintelligenceservicesfromFinlandtoPetrograd.Themessengerssmuggled or Petrograd andtheneighboringareas. In defiantspirits,theso-calledPetrograd CombatOrganization lished inSeptemberof1924 andnamedtheRussianAll-MilitaryUnion a commonumbrellaorganization forwhiteofficers.Thiscoalitionwasofficially estab- Army PyotrWrangel triedtomaintain thecombatreadinessofhistroopsbysettingup disintegrated intosmallerparts. Thesituationwasdire.commanderoftheWhite from otherproblemsaswell. AftertheRussianCivilWar, TheRussianWhiteArmyhad been murderedduringtheRussianCivilWar. the orderofsuccessionoriginatedfromfactmost logicalRomanovheirshad and theotherstandingbehindGrandDukeNikolay Nikolayevich. Thedisputeover resulted intwocompetingcamps,onesupportingGrand DukeKirillVladimirovich The refugeecirclescouldnotreachaconsensusonwho shouldwearthecrown.This in theearlyyearsof1920s,butitsinfluencenever reachedthelevelitcouldhave. head outfornewideologicalwinds.Thesupportmonarchism especiallyincreased the combatorganizationsarrivedtoVyborg andtheIsthmusfromCentralEurope ship ofthecounter-revolution,Kronstadtfortress.Dozensambassadorsfrom had finallycome.InFinland,refugeeactiviststightenedtheircontactstotheflag- ruary 28,1921,theémigrécirclesbegantothinkthatendofSovietRussia revolutionary agentsandsaboteurs Both wereconnectedtoPetrogradandelsewhereinSovietRussiathroughcounter- the émigréorganizationsweredifficult,ifnotimpossible,toseparatefromeachother. of sharedagents.Inpractice,theconspirativeactionsFinnishgeneralstaffand 222 of theworld,thrustinfrontcounter-revolution” All-Russian CongressofSovietsemphasizedthatFinlandwas“becominganoutpost ish regionhadbeenusedasasupportareaforespionageandbombings as alarmingbytheSovietRussiansecurityservices.TheyconcludedthatFinn- the Tagantsev Conspiracy —wentthroughthecouriersofactivistorganiza- The mostimportantcommunicationsofthePetrogradCombatOrganization — The monarchists’ schism impeded the fight against Bolshevism, which was suffering The monarchists’schismimpededthefightagainstBolshevism, whichwassuffering The setbacksinthecounter-revolutionarystruggle forcedtheémigrécirclesto ROVS When theProvisionalRevolutionaryCommitteelaunchedrebelliononFeb- Kronstadt Rebellion The émigréorganizationsandtheFinnishmilitaryintelligencehadanabundance 12 The Elite on the Warpath — Finland and the RussianCombat Organizations in 1918–1939 . While the clandestine activities died down in 1921–1922, they were seen 9 . 14 . 11

Saint-Petersburg Historical JournalN 4 (2017) Петербургский исторический журнал № 4 (2017) ing teamstotheSovietUnionfromareanorthofLakeLadoga gré activistGeorgyRadkovich,arrivedtoFinland,sendingtwotwo-personbomb- campaign. InAugustof1927,thenewleaderKutepov’scombatorganization,émi- a partyclubhousebytheMoykaencouragedattackerstocontinuebombing on Lubyanka’sdormitorywasafailure,butthedevastatinggrenadeassassinationat predecessor AlexanderKutepov, healsowantedtoincreaseunderground contacts was farfromenviable.While Millertookamorereservedviewonterrorismthan his of RussianTruth ROVS waslosingitsabilitytotakeaction,anotheractivistorganization,Brotherhood the governmentdidnotwanttoseveralloftheirtieseasternneighbor. Asthe out intheSovietUnionhadunnervedFinnishpoliticalleaders.ThePresidentand ties hadbanishedRussianactivistsfromthecountryafterterroristattackscarried 1928–1930. Thechangeresulted,inparticular, fromthefactthatFinnishauthori- regions intoindependentcountriesanddidnotshyaway fromviolentmethods activist organizations attempted to turn Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and many other operations bySovietnationalminoritiesintensified intheturnof1930s.New case” andothersimilarincidentswerepartofalarger chainofevents:underground staff intelligenceandtheSecretIntelligenceServiceofGreatBritain ROVS activistsinLeningradandMoscow, withthesupportofFinnishgeneral viet Unionhadbeensevered,whichwasbelievedtopredictwar. The situationseemedopportune,astherelationshipbetweenGreatBritainandSo- 224 afraid thatOGPUhadinterferedinToll’s clandestineundertakings events intheSovietUnionandevencontributingtoterroristattacks,buttheywere cern intheFinnishsecurityauthorities.Theywerestillinterestedinfluencing arrangements inseveralotherdirections.Toll andhiscontactsinBerlin causedcon- Finland. Brothernumber213senthisspiesintoLeningradfromtheIsthmusandmade terrorists intoCaucasiafromFinlandintheearlyyears ofthe1930s the generalstaffintelligenceand Toll attemptedtosneakArmenianfreedomfighter intelligence servicesofvariouscountries.Thiswasespecially clearinthecasewhere both theclandestineundertakingsofbrotherhood andtheirconnectionstothe Most terrorplotsbyToll andhispartnersweredoomedtofail.OGPUwasawareof When GeneralYevgeny MillerwaselectedtoleadtheROVS in1930,hisposition The SkoblinAffair ROVS’s mostactiveclandestineoperationsintheKarelianIsthmusbegantofade From BrotherhoodtoSeparatists The expectantatmosphereculminatedwithterroristattacksattemptedby The concerns were justified as the secret police had infiltrated the brotherhood. The concernswere justified asthe secretpolicehadinfiltrated thebrotherhood. The Elite on the Warpath — Finland and the RussianCombat Organizations in 1918–1939 27 anditsleaderinFinlandAnatolyToll intensifiedtheiroperationsin 28 29 . . The“Armenian 25 . Theattack 26 . 30 . ligence channelfromtheKarelianIsthmustoSovietUnionin1933 into theSovietUnion.Oneaspectofthiswasattempttoestablishanewintel- security authoritiessawthe SovietUnionasagiantwithfeetofclay, whocould without theactiveandpassive supportoftheFinnishauthorities.Some clear thatmostterroristattacks andespionageplotswouldhavelosttheirvitality to useterroristattacks,sabotage, andassassinationstohelpreachtheirgoals. Itis system and return to their homeland, one way or another. Some did not hesitate of the republic. Therepresentatives of the old elite wanted to overthrow the Soviet old eliteoftheRussianEmpireinparticularhadakey role,operatedintheregion revolutionary struggle.Severalintelligenceandcombat organizations,inwhichthe erations ceasedwiththesigningofMolotov–Ribbentrop Pact inAugust1939 republic wasoncemoretobeusedasasupportarea forterroristsandspies,butop- White émigréorganizations.ThisalsoreflectedquicklyonFinland.Theregionofthe activated, leading to a momentary warming of relations between Germany and a few pened just before the Second World War. The Russian policy of Nazi Germany was supported theidea at theFinnishgeneralstaffErikMalmbergannouncedthat later, GeneralMillerreceivedaletterfromFinland, inwhichtheheadofintelligence tions couldbeestablishedwiththehelpofFinnishsecurityauthorities émigré officer whoresidedin Vyborg suggestedin1933thattheintelligenceconnec- Aleksi Mainio Aleksi valuable thaneverbefore could notrelinquishtheirémigrécontactsastheinformationtheyprovidedwasmore international situationgrewtenseinthefinalyearsof1930s,generalstaff seems stubborn at first, but it wasbased on somerational justification. Whenthe general staffintelligenceofficerstoendthe ROVS cooperationforgood.Thepolicy eration onthepreviousscaleafter1936. Union’s sideoftheborderandcancelledagreement,nevercontinuingcoop- their waytoLeningrad.ThegeneralstaffwasunnervedbythefirefightonSoviet ROVS haddeliveredtoFinlandwerenotonlyexposed,butverynearlycapturedon tween theintelligenceofficersand ROVS didnotworkasplanned.Theagentsthat attacks andevenassassinateJosephStalin.Despitethebigtalk,cooperationbe- gather informationfromtheSovietUnion,butalsotoattemptcarryoutterrorist intelligence channelforROVS andthegeneralstaff.TheROVS activists wanted to He madearrangementswiththeFinnishintelligenceofficersregardingshared Miller tightenedhiscontactswithMajorGeneralSeverinDobrovolsky It canbesaidthatFinlandhadasignificantroleas support areaforthecounter- In Conclusion While the Skoblin affair ended in a failure, even that did not convince the Finnish While theSkoblinaffairendedinafailure,eventhatdidnotconvinceFinnish Major GeneralNikolaiSkoblinwasnamedtoheadthenewintelligencechannel. 34 . 35 . Thefinalboomofcounter-revolutionaryactivismhap- 31 . 33 . Alittle 32 . The 225 36 .

Saint-Petersburg Historical JournalN 4 (2017) Петербургский исторический журнал № 4 (2017) ing teamstotheSovietUnionfromareanorthofLakeLadoga gré activistGeorgyRadkovich,arrivedtoFinland,sendingtwotwo-personbomb- campaign. InAugustof1927,thenewleaderKutepov’scombatorganization,émi- a partyclubhousebytheMoykaencouragedattackerstocontinuebombing on Lubyanka’sdormitorywasafailure,butthedevastatinggrenadeassassinationat of RussianTruth ROVS waslosingitsabilitytotakeaction,anotheractivistorganization,Brotherhood the governmentdidnotwanttoseveralloftheirtieseasternneighbor. Asthe out intheSovietUnionhadunnervedFinnishpoliticalleaders.ThePresidentand ties hadbanishedRussianactivistsfromthecountryafterterroristattackscarried 1928–1930. Thechangeresulted,inparticular, fromthefactthatFinnishauthori- predecessor AlexanderKutepov, healsowantedtoincreaseunderground contacts was farfromenviable.While Millertookamorereservedviewonterrorismthan his regions intoindependentcountriesanddidnotshyaway fromviolentmethods activist organizations attempted to turn Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and many other operations bySovietnationalminoritiesintensified intheturnof1930s.New case” andothersimilarincidentswerepartofalarger chainofevents:underground staff intelligenceandtheSecretIntelligenceServiceofGreatBritain ROVS activistsinLeningradandMoscow, withthesupportofFinnishgeneral viet Unionhadbeensevered,whichwasbelievedtopredictwar. The situationseemedopportune,astherelationshipbetweenGreatBritainandSo- 224 afraid thatOGPUhadinterferedinToll’s clandestineundertakings events intheSovietUnionandevencontributingtoterroristattacks,buttheywere cern intheFinnishsecurityauthorities.Theywerestillinterestedinfluencing arrangements inseveralotherdirections.Toll andhiscontactsinBerlin causedcon- Finland. Brothernumber213senthisspiesintoLeningradfromtheIsthmusandmade terrorists intoCaucasiafromFinlandintheearlyyears ofthe1930s the generalstaffintelligenceand Toll attemptedtosneakArmenianfreedomfighter intelligence servicesofvariouscountries.Thiswasespecially clearinthecasewhere both theclandestineundertakingsofbrotherhood andtheirconnectionstothe Most terrorplotsbyToll andhispartnersweredoomedtofail.OGPUwasawareof ROVS’s mostactiveclandestineoperationsintheKarelianIsthmusbegantofade From BrotherhoodtoSeparatists When GeneralYevgeny MillerwaselectedtoleadtheROVS in1930,hisposition The SkoblinAffair The expectantatmosphereculminatedwithterroristattacksattemptedby The concerns were justified as the secret police had infiltrated the brotherhood. The concernswere justified asthe secretpolicehadinfiltrated thebrotherhood. The Elite on the Warpath — Finland and the RussianCombat Organizations in 1918–1939 27 anditsleaderinFinlandAnatolyToll intensifiedtheiroperationsin 28 29 . . The“Armenian 25 . Theattack 26 . 30 . ligence channelfromtheKarelianIsthmustoSovietUnionin1933 into theSovietUnion.Oneaspectofthiswasattempttoestablishanewintel- security authoritiessawthe SovietUnionasagiantwithfeetofclay, whocould without theactiveandpassive supportoftheFinnishauthorities.Some clear thatmostterroristattacks andespionageplotswouldhavelosttheirvitality to useterroristattacks,sabotage, andassassinationstohelpreachtheirgoals. Itis system and return to their homeland, one way or another. Some did not hesitate of the republic. Therepresentatives of the old elite wanted to overthrow the Soviet old eliteoftheRussianEmpireinparticularhadakey role,operatedintheregion revolutionary struggle.Severalintelligenceandcombat organizations,inwhichthe erations ceasedwiththesigningofMolotov–Ribbentrop Pact inAugust1939 republic wasoncemoretobeusedasasupportarea forterroristsandspies,butop- White émigréorganizations.ThisalsoreflectedquicklyonFinland.Theregionofthe activated, leading to a momentary warming of relations between Germany and a few pened just before the Second World War. The Russian policy of Nazi Germany was supported theidea at theFinnishgeneralstaffErikMalmbergannouncedthat later, GeneralMillerreceivedaletterfromFinland, inwhichtheheadofintelligence tions couldbeestablishedwiththehelpofFinnishsecurityauthorities émigré officer whoresidedin Vyborg suggestedin1933thattheintelligenceconnec- Aleksi Mainio Aleksi valuable thaneverbefore could notrelinquishtheirémigrécontactsastheinformationtheyprovidedwasmore international situationgrewtenseinthefinalyearsof1930s,generalstaff seems stubborn at first, but it wasbased on somerational justification. Whenthe general staffintelligenceofficerstoendthe ROVS cooperationforgood.Thepolicy eration onthepreviousscaleafter1936. Union’s sideoftheborderandcancelledagreement,nevercontinuingcoop- their waytoLeningrad.ThegeneralstaffwasunnervedbythefirefightonSoviet ROVS haddeliveredtoFinlandwerenotonlyexposed,butverynearlycapturedon tween theintelligenceofficersand ROVS didnotworkasplanned.Theagentsthat attacks andevenassassinateJosephStalin.Despitethebigtalk,cooperationbe- gather informationfromtheSovietUnion,butalsotoattemptcarryoutterrorist intelligence channelforROVS andthegeneralstaff.TheROVS activists wanted to He madearrangementswiththeFinnishintelligenceofficersregardingshared Miller tightenedhiscontactswithMajorGeneralSeverinDobrovolsky It canbesaidthatFinlandhadasignificantroleas support areaforthecounter- In Conclusion While the Skoblin affair ended in a failure, even that did not convince the Finnish While theSkoblinaffairendedinafailure,eventhatdidnotconvinceFinnish Major GeneralNikolaiSkoblinwasnamedtoheadthenewintelligencechannel. 34 . 35 . Thefinalboomofcounter-revolutionaryactivismhap- 31 . 33 . Alittle 32 . The 225 36 .

Saint-Petersburg Historical JournalN 4 (2017) Петербургский исторический журнал № 4 (2017) and madeactiveresistancedifficult. thus attemptingtocontroltheirundergroundoperations.Thetacticwassuccessful Bolshevik authorityinfiltratedtheirprovocateursinsidethecombatorganizations, of thesecretpoliceSovietUnion,Lubyanka.Theintelligenceofficers trails ofmanyexposedespionageand terror plotsledstraight to theheadquarters enough basisinfacttoseemplausiblewerepublicizedatconvenienttimes.The on whichitwasabletousemasterfully. Purpose-orientedanti-Finnishviewswith provided thepoliticalleadershipofSovietUnionamajorpropagandaweap- of thecounter-revolutionaryforcesandevensupportedthem.Thisphenomenon noticed inMoscowthattheFinnishauthoritiesturnedablindeyetoactivities be “a and the security authoritiesoftheSoviet Union often defined theFinnish regionto also onknowledgeoftheproblemsgnawingatSovietUnion.Thepoliticalelite pear during the 1930s. This view was based on an anti-Bolshevist worldview, but collapse atanytime.Thisbeliefwasitsstrongestinthe1920s,butdidnotdisap- 226 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 9.1.1919 andIntelligenceSummaryofInformation14.12.1918. ligence Branches,ExtractfromMilitaryIntelligenceSummary 11,SituationinSovietRussia (TNA), Lontoo, War Office (WO) 106/6101, General InformationReceivedbyMilitaryIntel- kumous viekodin.S.76;Nevalainen P.Viskoi kuinLuojakerjäläisiä.S. 18–19,26–27. over theice.Upto5,000of comersreturnedtoRussianduringthe1920s.Haimila M.Kun of beatenrefugeesconsisting of 6,500–8,000 sailors, officers, andciviliansarrivedto Terijoki the beginningof1920.When rebellionintheKronstadtfortresswassquashed,alargegroup Approximately 1,000refugeesoldiers exhaustedbythenorthernfronttraveledtoFinland at liikehdintä Suomessa1917–1927. Licentiatethesis.Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki,2005. 1935. P. 530–531; Pankakoski Kokovtsov V. OutofMyPast. TheMemoirs ofCountKokovtsov. Stanford:StanfordUniversity, dia. Utopiastavankileiriensaaristoksi.Otava,2012.S.128, 365–373; to February 1922.NewYork: Clarendon, 1981.P.trage- 105–123; Jussila O.Neuvostoliiton Extraordinary CommissionforCombatingCounter-Revolution and Sabotage.December1917 Helsinki: WSOY, 1971.S.63;Leggett G. Polvinen T. refugees remainedataround18,000,fromwhereitdeclinedto 14,000 by1938. According tooneestimate,in1927–1935thenumberofRussian, Ingrian,andEastKarelian Cold War. Temple UniversityPress,2002.S.61. S. 307; Marrus M. koi kuin Luoja kerjäläisiä. Venäjän pakolaiset Suomessa 1917–1939. Helsinki: SKS, 1999. paenneet venäläiset1917–1927//Historiallinenarkisto.1998.N111.S.61;Nevalainen P.Vis- Helsinki: UniversityofHelsinki,1983.S.7–8;Haimila M. Kopteff G. gré” canbeusedtomeanallpersonswhoarrivedFinland,regardlessoftheirnationality. speaks aboutRussians,itusuallymeansGreatRussians.Theterms“Russianrefugee”and“émi- nians, or, forexample,Ingrians,whohadpreviouslyaRussiancitizenship.Whenthisarticle ambiguous concept:atthetime,itcouldjustaswellbeusedtodescribedGreatRussians,Arme- dents, whoweredividedintodozensofdifferentnationalities.“Former Russiansubject”wasan It shouldbekeptinmindthatbeforetherevolution,Russianempirehadover130millionresi- pesä. SuomijataisteluVenäjästä 1918–1939.Siltala,2015. alueena 1918–1939.Doctoralthesis.Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki,2015;2)Terroristien Mainio A. 1)Näkymätönsota.Suomivastavallankumouksellisenterrorisminjavakoiluntuki- country ofWhitebandits” and even “a den ofterrorists” The Elite on the Warpath — Finland and the RussianCombat Organizations in 1918–1939 Venäläisten emigranttienjärjestötoimintaSuomessa1917–1945. Master’sthesis. Venäjän vallankumousjaSuomi1917–1920II.Toukokuu 1918 —joulukuu1920. The Unwanted,EuropeanRefugeesfromtheFirstWorld War Throughthe J. Varjonyrkkeilyä itärajalla. Venäläisten emigranttienpoliittinen

The Cheka:Lenin’sPoliticalPolice.All-Russian Kun kumousviekodin.Suomeen 37

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Petrozavodsk: KompanijaRIF, 2004.S.177–178. služby Finljandiii ihrazvedyvatelnajadejatelnostnaSevero-ZapadeRossii.1914–1939gg. 301–310, 176–177,195. 19.07.1921; ChekaspecialassistantYakov 24.01.1923; “finalsummaryofMatvei diplomaattinen edustusulkomailla, 5C18,ReportsfromtheMoscowembassy,ambassador P. 140; TheMinistryofForeign AffairsArchives(UM),UlkoasiainministeriöjaSuomen Vyborg subdivision,23.03.1927; Robinson P. KA, EK-Valpo,émigrés.Folder 2825,SecretlettersignedbyEskoRiekkitotheheadof itärajan takana.YleisesikunnantiedusteluNeuvosto-Karjalassa 1918–1939. Brook-Shepherd G. 1918–1939, butforclarity,thisarticleonlyusesone. Объединенное государственноеполитическоеуправление.OGPUhadothernamesin S. 468. Russkaja vojennajaemigratsija20–40-hgodov, dokumentyi materialy. T. 6.M.:RGGU,2013. respondence, correspondencebetweenKutepov’srepresentativesandHögström,1924–1926; Bakhmeteff Archive(BAR),ColumbiaUniversity, New York. ROVS Collection.Box9.Cor- Русский общевоинскийсоюз. Kronštadtskaja tragedija1921goda.Kn.2.GPUemployeeMikhail Петроградской боевойорганизации(ПБО). L. Tsentr deistvija//StateArchivesofRussian Federation (GARF). F. 5784.Op.1.D.100. assistant directorVladimirStyrne05.02.1925. F. 76.Op.3.D.356.L.1–8,TopsecretreporttoKRO’shead ArturArtuzovsignedbyKRO’s Kutepov’s letterstoBunakov,years1925–1926;RGASPI.Felix EdmundovichDzerzhinsky. P. 288. RegardingtheBritishagency,seealso:BAR,ROVSCollection. Box9,correspondence, of Britain’sSecretIntelligenceService.MurderandMayhem 1909–1939.Dialogue,2010. KRO’s headArturArtuzovsignedbyVladimirStyrne05.02.1925; Smith M. Moscow. FelixEdmundovichDzerzhinsky.F.76.Op.3.D. 356. L.1–8,Topsecretreportto 2014. S.172–184;Rossijskigosudarstvennyiarhivsotsialno-polititšeskoi istorii(RGASPI), Intelligence ServicejaSuomi1918–1941.Doctoralthesis.Helsinki: UniversityofHelsinki, 2012. S.112–122,296–297;Kotakallio J.“KaikkiallaläsnäolevaLontoonSecretService”. secretary Georgy I.NovitskytoVladimirTagantsev 05.05.1921.S.177–181,128–129. gedija 1921goda.Kn.2. Tagantsev’s statementtoCheka24.07.1921; letter fromDavidGrimm’s K 80-letiju nezavisimostiFinljandskoiRespubliki.SPb.,1997.C.189–190;Kronštadtskajatra- Tšernjajev Ju.V. Finljandskisledv“deleTagantseva” //Rossijai Finljandija vXXveke. Shepherd G. vidualnyi polititšeskiterrorvRossii,XIX —natšaloXXv. M.:Memorial,1996.S.163;Brook- rodiny i svobody. F. 5872.Op.1.D.19.L.1–7,ReportonSavinkov’s Organisation,1918. P. 35; GosudarstvennyiarhivRossijskoi Federatsii (GARF).Moskova,Narodnyisojuzzaštšity 2002. P. 418–437. obozrenije, 2003;Spence R. V tiskah provokatsii.Operatsija “Trest” i russkajazarubežnajapetšat.M.: Novojeliteraturnoje Cook A. AceofSpies.TheTrueStorySidneyReilly.Tempus,2004. P. 221;Fleishman L. Oxford UniversityPress,2002.P. 98–102. Solti, 2010.S.234,243;Robinson P. Goldin V. I. Rossijskajavojennajaemigratsijai sovetskijespetsslužbyv20-egodyXXveka. Korhonen K. dustelukeskus 1919–1920,communiques183and441,July29 October 21 National Archives.TheSörnäinenoffice(SA),pikkukokoelma(PK)2414,suojelukuntaintie- Zubarev D.I. “Krasnajatšuma”i belyiterrorizm(1918–1940)//K. 1920–1932. Tammi, 1966.S.57–58. 46–51; Laidinen E.P.,Verigin S.G. Iron Maze. The Western Secret Services and the Bolsheviks. Pan Books, 1999. Naapurit vastoin tahtoaan. Suomi neuvostodiplomatiassa Tartosta talvisotaan I . Laidinen E.Vakoilua Iron Maze.P. 255–256,283–290;Elfvengren E., Trust No One. The Secret World of SidneyReilly.FeralHouse, The WhiteRussianArmyinExile1920–1941.Oxford: Finskaja razvedka protiv Sovetskoi Rossii. Spetsialnyje A. Komarov’s delo”,representativeStepanLebedev S. Agranov’s communiquetoLenin08.09.1921.S. The WhiteRussianArmyinExile 1920–1941. V. N. Pavlov’s presentation Morozov (Ed.)Indi- Helsinki: Minerva, 1919. Six. AHistory 227

Saint-Petersburg Historical JournalN 4 (2017) Петербургский исторический журнал № 4 (2017) and madeactiveresistancedifficult. thus attemptingtocontroltheirundergroundoperations.Thetacticwassuccessful Bolshevik authorityinfiltratedtheirprovocateursinsidethecombatorganizations, of thesecretpoliceSovietUnion,Lubyanka.Theintelligenceofficers trails ofmanyexposedespionageand terror plotsledstraight to theheadquarters enough basisinfacttoseemplausiblewerepublicizedatconvenienttimes.The on whichitwasabletousemasterfully. Purpose-orientedanti-Finnishviewswith provided thepoliticalleadershipofSovietUnionamajorpropagandaweap- of thecounter-revolutionaryforcesandevensupportedthem.Thisphenomenon noticed inMoscowthattheFinnishauthoritiesturnedablindeyetoactivities be “a and the security authoritiesoftheSoviet Union often defined theFinnish regionto also onknowledgeoftheproblemsgnawingatSovietUnion.Thepoliticalelite pear during the 1930s. This view was based on an anti-Bolshevist worldview, but collapse atanytime.Thisbeliefwasitsstrongestinthe1920s,butdidnotdisap- 226 3 2 1 7 6 5 4 9.1.1919 andIntelligenceSummaryofInformation14.12.1918. ligence Branches,ExtractfromMilitaryIntelligenceSummary 11,SituationinSovietRussia (TNA), Lontoo, War Office (WO) 106/6101, General InformationReceivedbyMilitaryIntel- Cold War. Temple UniversityPress,2002.S.61. S. 307; Marrus M. koi kuin Luoja kerjäläisiä. Venäjän pakolaiset Suomessa 1917–1939. Helsinki: SKS, 1999. paenneet venäläiset1917–1927//Historiallinenarkisto.1998.N111.S.61;Nevalainen P.Vis- kumous viekodin.S.76;Nevalainen P.Viskoi kuinLuojakerjäläisiä.S. 18–19,26–27. over theice.Upto5,000of comersreturnedtoRussianduringthe1920s.Haimila M.Kun of beatenrefugeesconsisting of 6,500–8,000 sailors, officers, andciviliansarrivedto Terijoki the beginningof1920.When rebellionintheKronstadtfortresswassquashed,alargegroup Approximately 1,000refugeesoldiers exhaustedbythenorthernfronttraveledtoFinland at liikehdintä Suomessa1917–1927. Licentiatethesis.Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki,2005. 1935. P. 530–531; Pankakoski Kokovtsov V. OutofMyPast. TheMemoirs ofCountKokovtsov. Stanford:StanfordUniversity, dia. Utopiastavankileiriensaaristoksi.Otava,2012.S.128, 365–373; to February 1922.NewYork: Clarendon, 1981.P.trage- 105–123; Jussila O.Neuvostoliiton Extraordinary CommissionforCombatingCounter-Revolution and Sabotage.December1917 Helsinki: WSOY, 1971.S.63;Leggett G. Polvinen T. refugees remainedataround18,000,fromwhereitdeclinedto 14,000 by1938. According tooneestimate,in1927–1935thenumberofRussian, Ingrian,andEastKarelian Helsinki: UniversityofHelsinki,1983.S.7–8;Haimila M. Kopteff G. gré” canbeusedtomeanallpersonswhoarrivedFinland,regardlessoftheirnationality. speaks aboutRussians,itusuallymeansGreatRussians.Theterms“Russianrefugee”and“émi- nians, or, forexample,Ingrians,whohadpreviouslyaRussiancitizenship.Whenthisarticle ambiguous concept:atthetime,itcouldjustaswellbeusedtodescribedGreatRussians,Arme- dents, whoweredividedintodozensofdifferentnationalities.“Former Russiansubject”wasan It shouldbekeptinmindthatbeforetherevolution,Russianempirehadover130millionresi- pesä. SuomijataisteluVenäjästä 1918–1939.Siltala,2015. alueena 1918–1939.Doctoralthesis.Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki,2015;2)Terroristien Mainio A. 1)Näkymätönsota.Suomivastavallankumouksellisenterrorisminjavakoiluntuki- country ofWhitebandits” and even “a den ofterrorists” The Elite on the Warpath — Finland and the RussianCombat Organizations in 1918–1939 Venäläisten emigranttienjärjestötoimintaSuomessa1917–1945. Master’sthesis. Venäjän vallankumousjaSuomi1917–1920II.Toukokuu 1918 —joulukuu1920. The Unwanted,EuropeanRefugeesfromtheFirstWorld War Throughthe J. Varjonyrkkeilyä itärajalla. Venäläisten emigranttienpoliittinen

The Cheka:Lenin’sPoliticalPolice.All-Russian Kun kumousviekodin.Suomeen 37

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Petrozavodsk: KompanijaRIF, 2004.S.177–178. služby Finljandiii ihrazvedyvatelnajadejatelnostnaSevero-ZapadeRossii.1914–1939gg. 301–310, 176–177,195. 19.07.1921; ChekaspecialassistantYakov 24.01.1923; “finalsummaryofMatvei diplomaattinen edustusulkomailla, 5C18,ReportsfromtheMoscowembassy,ambassador P. 140; TheMinistryofForeign AffairsArchives(UM),UlkoasiainministeriöjaSuomen Vyborg subdivision,23.03.1927; Robinson P. KA, EK-Valpo,émigrés.Folder 2825,SecretlettersignedbyEskoRiekkitotheheadof assistant directorVladimirStyrne05.02.1925. F. 76.Op.3.D.356.L.1–8,TopsecretreporttoKRO’shead ArturArtuzovsignedbyKRO’s Kutepov’s letterstoBunakov,years1925–1926;RGASPI.Felix EdmundovichDzerzhinsky. P. 288. RegardingtheBritishagency,seealso:BAR,ROVSCollection. Box9,correspondence, of Britain’sSecretIntelligenceService.MurderandMayhem 1909–1939.Dialogue,2010. KRO’s headArturArtuzovsignedbyVladimirStyrne05.02.1925; Smith M. Moscow. FelixEdmundovichDzerzhinsky.F.76.Op.3.D. 356. L.1–8,Topsecretreportto 2014. S.172–184;Rossijskigosudarstvennyiarhivsotsialno-polititšeskoi istorii(RGASPI), Intelligence ServicejaSuomi1918–1941.Doctoralthesis.Helsinki: UniversityofHelsinki, 2012. S.112–122,296–297;Kotakallio J.“KaikkiallaläsnäolevaLontoonSecretService”. itärajan takana.YleisesikunnantiedusteluNeuvosto-Karjalassa 1918–1939. Brook-Shepherd G. 1918–1939, butforclarity,thisarticleonlyusesone. Объединенное государственноеполитическоеуправление.OGPUhadothernamesin S. 468. Russkaja vojennajaemigratsija20–40-hgodov, dokumentyi materialy. T. 6.M.:RGGU,2013. respondence, correspondencebetweenKutepov’srepresentativesandHögström,1924–1926; Bakhmeteff Archive(BAR),ColumbiaUniversity, New York. ROVS Collection.Box9.Cor- Русский общевоинскийсоюз. Kronštadtskaja tragedija1921goda.Kn.2.GPUemployeeMikhail Петроградской боевойорганизации(ПБО). L. Tsentr deistvija//StateArchivesofRussian Federation (GARF). F. 5784.Op.1.D.100. secretary Georgy I.NovitskytoVladimirTagantsev 05.05.1921.S.177–181,128–129. gedija 1921goda.Kn.2. Tagantsev’s statementtoCheka24.07.1921; letter fromDavidGrimm’s K 80-letiju nezavisimostiFinljandskoiRespubliki.SPb.,1997.C.189–190;Kronštadtskajatra- Tšernjajev Ju.V. Finljandskisledv“deleTagantseva” //Rossijai Finljandija vXXveke. rodiny i svobody. F. 5872.Op.1.D.19.L.1–7,ReportonSavinkov’s Organisation,1918. P. 35; GosudarstvennyiarhivRossijskoi Federatsii (GARF).Moskova,Narodnyisojuzzaštšity Shepherd G. vidualnyi polititšeskiterrorvRossii,XIX —natšaloXXv. M.:Memorial,1996.S.163;Brook- 2002. P. 418–437. obozrenije, 2003;Spence R. V tiskah provokatsii.Operatsija “Trest” i russkajazarubežnajapetšat.M.: Novojeliteraturnoje Cook A. AceofSpies.TheTrueStorySidneyReilly.Tempus,2004. P. 221;Fleishman L. Oxford UniversityPress,2002.P. 98–102. Solti, 2010.S.234,243;Robinson P. Goldin V. I. Rossijskajavojennajaemigratsijai sovetskijespetsslužbyv20-egodyXXveka. 1920–1932. Tammi, 1966.S.57–58. Korhonen K. dustelukeskus 1919–1920,communiques183and441,July29 October 21 National Archives.TheSörnäinenoffice(SA),pikkukokoelma(PK)2414,suojelukuntaintie- Zubarev D.I. “Krasnajatšuma”i belyiterrorizm(1918–1940)//K. 46–51; Laidinen E.P.,Verigin S.G. Iron Maze. The Western Secret Services and the Bolsheviks. Pan Books, 1999. Naapurit vastoin tahtoaan. Suomi neuvostodiplomatiassa Tartosta talvisotaan I . Laidinen E.Vakoilua Iron Maze.P. 255–256,283–290;Elfvengren E., Trust No One. The Secret World of SidneyReilly.FeralHouse, The WhiteRussianArmyinExile1920–1941.Oxford: Finskaja razvedka protiv Sovetskoi Rossii. Spetsialnyje A. Komarov’s delo”,representativeStepanLebedev S. Agranov’s communiquetoLenin08.09.1921.S. The WhiteRussianArmyinExile 1920–1941. V. N. Pavlov’s presentation Morozov (Ed.)Indi- Helsinki: Minerva, 1919. Six. AHistory 227

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var 1922 —dekabr1936.MemosentbytheheadofKROArturArtuzovtoDmitri Colonel Ilmari Relander, 10.12.1927; Lubjanka, Stalin i VTŠK–GPU–OGPU–NKVD, jan - personal file10682,AlexanderShvetsov, Riekki’snotesonaphonediscussionwithLieutenant ti collection,5,EskoRiekki’slettertoambassadorPontusArtti,24.09.1927;KA,EK-Valpo, aukeaa. TiedusteluaNeuvosto-Karjalassa1920–1939.Ilias,2001.S.182–183;KA,PontusArt- port to the Minister of the Interior and Foreign Minister, 25.01.1928;Kosonen M. S. 413–414; KA,EK-Valpo, personalfile10170,GeorgandMariaSchulz,Esko Riekki’sre- Neobhodimo razrušitgnezdoterroristov vFinljandii//Izvestija.1927.04.10. 07.09.1938; KA,EK-Valpo, personalfile11160,Ivan, Yuri, andBorisSolonevich,passim. KA, EK-Valpo, émigrés,folder2829,Jalmari Sinivaara’sreport“Venäläiset emigrantit”, sonen M.Raja railonaaukeaa.S.81. Salokorpi, reportsonthegeneralstaffintelligenceoperation, 22.04.–22.05.1947,A. lokorpi andToll, 27.04.and05.08.1936.Seealso:KA,EK-Valpo. Personalfile4491, Toivo KA, EK-Valpo. Personal file10886b,Anatoly Toll, Sinivaara’snoticeson meetingswithSa- Prianishnikov B. novich” i. BAR, ROVS Collection.Box12,correspondence,SeverinDobrovolsky’slettersto“IvanIva- Severin Dobrovolsky, year1933. BAR, ROVS Collection.Box12,correspondence,correspondencebetweenYevgeni Millerand pik, 1979.S.269. Prianishnikov B. kymätön sota.P. 238–242. report ofameetingwithKaapreTynni andRomanSmal-Statski,18.4.1932;Mainio A.Nä- KA, EK-Valpo, foreignersinFinland,folder2755,refugeequestion,Stendahl andPajari’s P. 223–237. KA, EK-Valpo,sota. personalfile11041,AnushavanZatikjan,passim;Mainio A.Näkymätön interrogation 07–08.01.1929. KA, EK-Valpo, personalfile10886,Anatoly Toll, EskoRiekki’snotes05.01.1929and Toll’s Братство Русской Правды. Goldin V. I. 19.08.1927. Maria Schulz,topsecretreport,basedonthestatementofémigréinformantKirillPushkarjov, On Rosenström’srole,seealso,forexample:KA,EK-Valpo, personalfile10170,Georgand 2830, Schultz affair, interrogationofDmitri Monomakhov and Viktor Larionov, 15.09.1927. For moredetailedinformationontheterroristattacks,see:KA,EK-Valpo, émigrés,folder Kutepov Collection,box2and3,correspondence,Kutepov’smaterials onTrust, 1927. statement of émigréinformant Kirill Pushkarjov, 19.08.1927. Compare also:BAR, Alexander KA, EK-Valpo, personalfile10170,GeorgjaMariaSchulz,topsecretreport,basedonthe KA, PontusArtticollection,5,EskoRiekki’slettertoambassadorArtti,26.05.1927. tion, 05.09.1927. KA, EK-Valpo, personalfile10170,GeorgandMariaSchulz,GeorgyRadkovich’sinterroga- meeting withSeverinDobrovolskyandNikolaiSkoblin,30.01.1934. 11180, SeverinDobrovolsky, JalmariSinivaaraandKaarlo Stendahl’shandwrittennoteson 11180, JalmariSinivaara’stopsecretcommunique,20.08.1933; KA,EK-Valpo, personalfile 09.09.1927. P. 140. 10253, AlexanderKutepov,PehrJohansson’s“rapport25”,25.03.1927. Pontus Artti’sreport,01.09.1927.OnKutepov’strip,seealso:KA,EK-Valpo,personalfile The Elite on the Warpath — Finland and the RussianCombat Organizations in 1918–1939 e. Yevgeni Miller, 23.05and28.08.1933.Comparealso:KA,EK-Valpo, personal file Rossijskaja vojennajaemigratsijai Nezrimaja pautina,VTŠK-OGPU-NKVDprotivbeloiemigratsii. S.270–271. Nezrimaja pautina,VTŠK-OGPU-NKVDprotivbeloiemigratsii.M.:Tšas sovetskije spetsslužbyv20-egody XXveka. Raja railona Toll; Ko- I. Kursk, land from1917to1927.InFinnish]/Historiallinenarkisto.1998.T. 111. tary EmigrationandSovietSpecialServicesin1920s.InRuss.].Solti,2010. grant OrganisationsinFinlandfrom1917to1945].Master’sthesis.Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki,1983. from UtopiaintoaGulagArchipelago.InFinnish].OtavaPubl.,2012. Winter War. InFinnish].Tammi Publ.,1966. 1932 and theRussianpressabroad.InRuss.].Moscow:Novojeliteraturnojeobozrenije,2003. 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InRuss.].Moscow:Materik,2003. 1981. bating Counter-RevolutionandSabotage:December1917toFebruary 1922.NewYork: ClarendonPress., grants inFinlandfrom1917to1939.InFinnish].SKS,1999. 1918 to1939.InFinnish].Doctoralthesis.Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki, 2015. 1939 [The Invisible War: Finland as a Support Area for Anti-Revolutionary Terrorism and Espionage from the FightforRussiafrom1918to1939].Siltala,2015. thesis. Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki,2005. 1917–1927 [PoliticalActivityofRussianemigrantsinFinlandfrom1917to 1927. InFinnish].Licentiate University Press,2002. Revolution andFinlandfrom1917 to1920.InFinnish].Helsinki:WSOY Publ.,1971. gration from1920sto1940s.InRuss.]. Moscow:RGGU,2013. NKVD againstWhiteEmigration. InRuss.].Moscow:Tšaspik,1979. JUSSILA O. ELFVENGREN E.,EINARLAIDINENE. COOK A. AceofSpies:TheTrue StoryofSidneyReilly.Tempus Publ.,2004. BROOK-SHEPHERD G. IronMaze:TheWestern SecretServicesandtheBolsheviks.Pan Books,1999. References HAIMILA M. V.GOLDIN I.Rossijskaja vojennajaemigratsijai sovetskijespetsslužbyv20-egodyXXveka[RussianMili- KORHONEN K. KOKOVTSOV V. Out ofMyPast: TheMemoirsofCountKokovtsov.Stanford:StanfordUniversity, 1935. KOSONEN M. GEORGE K. FLEISHMAN L.Vtiskahprovokatsii:Operatsija“Trest” i russkajazarubežnajapetšat[Operation“Trust” LAIDINEN E.P., VERIGINS. Kronštadtskaja tragedija1921goda:dokumentyvdvuhknigah:kniga2[TheTragedy ofKronstadtin1921. KOTAKALLIO J.“KaikkiallaläsnolevaLontoonSecretService”:IntelligenceServicejaSuomi LEGGETT G. NEVALAINEN P. Lubjanka: Stalin i VTŠK–GPU–OGPU–NKVD: janvar 1922–dekabr [Stalin 1936 and Cheka–GPU– MAINIO A. MAINIO A. MARRUS M. POLVINEN T. PANKAKOSKI J. PRIANISHNIKOV B. Russkaja vojennajaemigratsija20–40-h godov:dokumentyi materialy:tom6[TheRussianMilitaryEmi - ROBINSON P. The WhiteRussianArmyinExile1920–1941.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2002. [Neighbours againstTheirWill: FinlandandtheSovietDiplomacyfrom theTartu PeaceTreaty intothe Terroristien pesä:SuomijataisteluVenäjästä 1918–1939[TheLairofTerrorists: Finlandand Näkymätön sota:Suomivastavallankumouksellisenterrorisminjavakoilun tukialueena1918– Neuvostoliiton tragedia:Utopiastavankileiriensaaristoksi[TheTragedy oftheSovietUnion: Venäläisten emigranttienjärjestötoimintaSuomessa1917–1945[ActivityofRussianEmi- The Unwanted: European Refugeesfrom the FirstWorld War ThroughtheColdWar. Temple Kun kumousviekodin:Suomeenpaenneetvenäläiset1917–1927[RussianEmigrantsinFin- Venäjän vallankumous ja Suomi 1917–1920: II: Toukokuu 1918–joulukuu 1920 [The Russian The Cheka:Lenin’sPolitical Police: TheAll-Russian Extraordinary CommissionforCom- Raja railonaaukeaa:TiedusteluaNeuvosto-Karjalassa1920–1939[FinnishIntelligencein Naapurit vastointahtoaan:SuomineuvostodiplomatiassaTartosta talvisotaan: I:1920– Viskoi kuinLuojakerjäläisiä:Venäjän pakolaisetSuomessa1917–1939 [RussianEmi- Varjonyrkkeilyä itärajalla:Venäläisten emigranttienpoliittinenliikehdintäSuomessa Nezrimaja pautina:VTŠK-OGPU-NKVD protivbeloiemigratsii[Cheka-OGPU- G. Finskaja razvedkaprotivSovetskoiRossii:SpetsialnyjeslužbyFinljandii Vakoilua itärajantakana:YleisesikunnantiedusteluNeuvosto- 229

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var 1922 —dekabr1936.MemosentbytheheadofKROArturArtuzovtoDmitri Colonel Ilmari Relander, 10.12.1927; Lubjanka, Stalin i VTŠK–GPU–OGPU–NKVD, jan - personal file10682,AlexanderShvetsov, Riekki’snotesonaphonediscussionwithLieutenant ti collection,5,EskoRiekki’slettertoambassadorPontusArtti,24.09.1927;KA,EK-Valpo, aukeaa. TiedusteluaNeuvosto-Karjalassa1920–1939.Ilias,2001.S.182–183;KA,PontusArt- port to the Minister of the Interior and Foreign Minister, 25.01.1928;Kosonen M. S. 413–414; KA,EK-Valpo, personalfile10170,GeorgandMariaSchulz,Esko Riekki’sre- Neobhodimo razrušitgnezdoterroristov vFinljandii//Izvestija.1927.04.10. 07.09.1938; KA,EK-Valpo, personalfile11160,Ivan, Yuri, andBorisSolonevich,passim. KA, EK-Valpo, émigrés,folder2829,Jalmari Sinivaara’sreport“Venäläiset emigrantit”, sonen M.Raja railonaaukeaa.S.81. Salokorpi, reportsonthegeneralstaffintelligenceoperation, 22.04.–22.05.1947,A. lokorpi andToll, 27.04.and05.08.1936.Seealso:KA,EK-Valpo. Personalfile4491, Toivo KA, EK-Valpo. Personal file10886b,Anatoly Toll, Sinivaara’snoticeson meetingswithSa- Prianishnikov B. meeting withSeverinDobrovolskyandNikolaiSkoblin,30.01.1934. 11180, SeverinDobrovolsky, JalmariSinivaaraandKaarlo Stendahl’shandwrittennoteson 11180, JalmariSinivaara’stopsecretcommunique,20.08.1933; KA,EK-Valpo, personalfile novich” i. BAR, ROVS Collection.Box12,correspondence,SeverinDobrovolsky’slettersto“IvanIva- Severin Dobrovolsky, year1933. BAR, ROVS Collection.Box12,correspondence,correspondencebetweenYevgeni Millerand pik, 1979.S.269. Prianishnikov B. kymätön sota.P. 238–242. report ofameetingwithKaapreTynni andRomanSmal-Statski,18.4.1932;Mainio A.Nä- KA, EK-Valpo, foreignersinFinland,folder2755,refugeequestion,Stendahl andPajari’s P. 223–237. KA, EK-Valpo,sota. personalfile11041,AnushavanZatikjan,passim;Mainio A.Näkymätön interrogation 07–08.01.1929. KA, EK-Valpo, personalfile10886,Anatoly Toll, EskoRiekki’snotes05.01.1929and Toll’s Братство Русской Правды. Goldin V. I. 19.08.1927. Maria Schulz,topsecretreport,basedonthestatementofémigréinformantKirillPushkarjov, On Rosenström’srole,seealso,forexample:KA,EK-Valpo, personalfile10170,Georgand 2830, Schultz affair, interrogationofDmitri Monomakhov and Viktor Larionov, 15.09.1927. For moredetailedinformationontheterroristattacks,see:KA,EK-Valpo, émigrés,folder Kutepov Collection,box2and3,correspondence,Kutepov’smaterials onTrust, 1927. statement of émigréinformant Kirill Pushkarjov, 19.08.1927. Compare also:BAR, Alexander KA, EK-Valpo, personalfile10170,GeorgjaMariaSchulz,topsecretreport,basedonthe KA, PontusArtticollection,5,EskoRiekki’slettertoambassadorArtti,26.05.1927. tion, 05.09.1927. KA, EK-Valpo, personalfile10170,GeorgandMariaSchulz,GeorgyRadkovich’sinterroga- 09.09.1927. P. 140. 10253, AlexanderKutepov,PehrJohansson’s“rapport25”,25.03.1927. Pontus Artti’sreport,01.09.1927.OnKutepov’strip,seealso:KA,EK-Valpo,personalfile The Elite on the Warpath — Finland and the RussianCombat Organizations in 1918–1939 e. Yevgeni Miller, 23.05and28.08.1933.Comparealso:KA,EK-Valpo, personal file Rossijskaja vojennajaemigratsijai Nezrimaja pautina,VTŠK-OGPU-NKVDprotivbeloiemigratsii. S.270–271. Nezrimaja pautina,VTŠK-OGPU-NKVDprotivbeloiemigratsii.M.:Tšas sovetskije spetsslužbyv20-egody XXveka. Raja railona Toll; Ko- I. Kursk, land from1917to1927.InFinnish]/Historiallinenarkisto.1998.T. 111. tary EmigrationandSovietSpecialServicesin1920s.InRuss.].Solti,2010. grant OrganisationsinFinlandfrom1917to1945].Master’sthesis.Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki,1983. from UtopiaintoaGulagArchipelago.InFinnish].OtavaPubl.,2012. Winter War. InFinnish].Tammi Publ.,1966. 1932 and theRussianpressabroad.InRuss.].Moscow:Novojeliteraturnojeobozrenije,2003. Soviet Kareliafrom1918to1939.InFinnish].MinervaPubl.,2012. Karjalassa 1918–1939[EspionagebehindtheEasternBorder:IntelligenceofGeneralStaffFinlandin Aleksi Mainio Aleksi In Russ.].Moscow:ROSSPENPubl.,1999. University ofHelsinki,2014. 1918–1941 [SecretIntelligenceServiceandFinlandfrom1918to1941.InFinnish].Doctoralthesis.Helsinki: the SovietKareliafrom1920to1939.InFinnish].Ilias,2001. In Russ.].Petrozavodsk:KompanijaRIFPubl.,2004. Russia: TheFinnishSpecialServicesandtheirIntelligenceActivityinNorth-West Russiafrom1914to1939. i ih razvedyvatelnajadejatelnostnaSevero-ZapadeRossii:1914–1939gg.[FinnishEspionageagainsttheSoviet OGPU–NKVD. InRuss.].Moscow:Materik,2003. 1981. bating Counter-RevolutionandSabotage:December1917toFebruary 1922.NewYork: ClarendonPress., 1918 to1939.InFinnish].Doctoralthesis.Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki, 2015. 1939 [The Invisible War: Finland as a Support Area for Anti-Revolutionary Terrorism and Espionage from grants inFinlandfrom1917to1939.InFinnish].SKS,1999. the FightforRussiafrom1918to1939].Siltala,2015. thesis. Helsinki:UniversityofHelsinki,2005. 1917–1927 [PoliticalActivityofRussianemigrantsinFinlandfrom1917to 1927. InFinnish].Licentiate University Press,2002. Revolution andFinlandfrom1917 to1920.InFinnish].Helsinki:WSOY Publ.,1971. gration from1920sto1940s.InRuss.]. Moscow:RGGU,2013. NKVD againstWhiteEmigration. InRuss.].Moscow:Tšaspik,1979. JUSSILA O. ELFVENGREN E.,EINARLAIDINENE. COOK A. AceofSpies:TheTrue StoryofSidneyReilly.Tempus Publ.,2004. BROOK-SHEPHERD G. IronMaze:TheWestern SecretServicesandtheBolsheviks.Pan Books,1999. References HAIMILA M. V.GOLDIN I.Rossijskaja vojennajaemigratsijai sovetskijespetsslužbyv20-egodyXXveka[RussianMili- KORHONEN K. KOKOVTSOV V. Out ofMyPast: TheMemoirsofCountKokovtsov.Stanford:StanfordUniversity, 1935. KOSONEN M. GEORGE K. FLEISHMAN L.Vtiskahprovokatsii:Operatsija“Trest” i russkajazarubežnajapetšat[Operation“Trust” LAIDINEN E.P., VERIGINS. Kronštadtskaja tragedija1921goda:dokumentyvdvuhknigah:kniga2[TheTragedy ofKronstadtin1921. KOTAKALLIO J.“KaikkiallaläsnolevaLontoonSecretService”:IntelligenceServicejaSuomi LEGGETT G. NEVALAINEN P. Lubjanka: Stalin i VTŠK–GPU–OGPU–NKVD: janvar 1922–dekabr [Stalin 1936 and Cheka–GPU– MAINIO A. MAINIO A. MARRUS M. POLVINEN T. PANKAKOSKI J. PRIANISHNIKOV B. Russkaja vojennajaemigratsija20–40-h godov:dokumentyi materialy:tom6[TheRussianMilitaryEmi - ROBINSON P. The WhiteRussianArmyinExile1920–1941.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2002. [Neighbours againstTheirWill: FinlandandtheSovietDiplomacyfrom theTartu PeaceTreaty intothe Terroristien pesä:SuomijataisteluVenäjästä 1918–1939[TheLairofTerrorists: Finlandand Näkymätön sota:Suomivastavallankumouksellisenterrorisminjavakoilun tukialueena1918– Neuvostoliiton tragedia:Utopiastavankileiriensaaristoksi[TheTragedy oftheSovietUnion: Venäläisten emigranttienjärjestötoimintaSuomessa1917–1945[ActivityofRussianEmi- The Unwanted: European Refugeesfrom the FirstWorld War ThroughtheColdWar. Temple Kun kumousviekodin:Suomeenpaenneetvenäläiset1917–1927[RussianEmigrantsinFin- Venäjän vallankumous ja Suomi 1917–1920: II: Toukokuu 1918–joulukuu 1920 [The Russian The Cheka:Lenin’sPolitical Police: TheAll-Russian Extraordinary CommissionforCom- Raja railonaaukeaa:TiedusteluaNeuvosto-Karjalassa1920–1939[FinnishIntelligencein Naapurit vastointahtoaan:SuomineuvostodiplomatiassaTartosta talvisotaan: I:1920– Viskoi kuinLuojakerjäläisiä:Venäjän pakolaisetSuomessa1917–1939 [RussianEmi- Varjonyrkkeilyä itärajalla:Venäläisten emigranttienpoliittinenliikehdintäSuomessa Nezrimaja pautina:VTŠK-OGPU-NKVD protivbeloiemigratsii[Cheka-OGPU- G. Finskaja razvedkaprotivSovetskoiRossii:SpetsialnyjeslužbyFinljandii Vakoilua itärajantakana:YleisesikunnantiedusteluNeuvosto- 229

Saint-Petersburg Historical JournalN 4 (2017) Петербургский исторический журнал № 4 (2017) ского университета. Helsinki. attacks. tions operatinginFinland,butgovernmentrepresentativesalsoparticipatedvariousplotsandeventerrorist their armedcombatagainsttheSovietUnion.Notonlywheretherecounter-revolutionaryorganiza- logue, 2010. in Russiathe19 ism from1918to1940]//InIndividualnyipolititšeskiterrorvRossii:XIX —natšaloXXv. [PoliticalTerror Jevropeiski Dom,1997. In Russ.] //RossijaiFinljandijavXXveke:K80-letijunezavisimostiFinljandskoiRespubliki.StPetersburg: 230 E-mail: [email protected] Майнио, Алекси —исследователь,факультетфилософии,истории,культурыиискусствХельсинк- Mainio, Aleksi —researcher, DepartmentofPhilosophy, History, CultureandArtStudies,Universityof Key words:Finland,Whiteémigréorganizations,SovietUnion,1918–1919. Author examines the White émigré organizations that operated in the Finnish territory in 1918–1939 and in 1918–1939 Aleksi Mainio.TheEliteontheWarpath —FinlandandRussianCombatOrganizations TŠERNJAJEV SPENCE R. Trust NoOne.TheSecretWorld ofSidneyReilly.Feral House,2002. M. Six. SMITH ZUBAREV D.I.“Krasnaja tšuma” i belyiterrorizm:1918–1940[“TheRedPlague”andtheWhiteTerror- The Elite on the Warpath — Finland and the RussianCombat Organizations in 1918–1939 th

JU. CenturyandattheBeginningof20 A HistoryofBritain’sSecretIntelligenceService:Murder andMayhem1909–1939.Dia-

V. Finljandski sledv“deleTagantseva” [TheFinnishTrail intheTagantsev Case. th Century. InRuss.].Moscow:Memorial,1996.

Союз переживалглубокий духовныйи политическийперелом,пресса проводил политикуперестройки и гласности(1989–1990). Тогда Советский годовщина Зимнейвойны и 31статья,посвященнаяей, когдаМихаилГорбачев в царили брежневские застой и же чтобыпредставитьдесятилетия финляндизации,когдав СоветскомСоюзе тей. Сорокалетняягодовщинабылавзятав качествемоментасравнения,а так- носятся к 40-летнейгодовщине—в1979–1980 иного десятилетияначалаи окончаниявойны.Первыетакиепубликацииот - лись в основномзанеделюдоилитечениенесколькихднейпослетого времен Зимнейвойны Преходящее и неизменноевобразеРоссии Финляндия и Россиявзатянувшейсявойне? Маркку Кангаспуро Helsingin Sanomat1979–2010 В качествематериаладляисследованиямнойиспользовались публикации финляндизации. войне, и на вопрос, изменилсялиобразРоссииврамкахдискуссиио Зимней дом СоветскогоСоюза.В статьепредпринимаетсяпопыткаответить ваемой финляндизации и константы в образеРоссиипериодСоветскогоСоюзаитакназы- как происходившиев публичнойсфереизменения,такинеизменные рых оцениваютсяРоссияи русские.Ярассматриваювсвоейстатье скости и Финляндии.Приэтомвойнызадаютжесткиерамки,вкото- ной частьюфинскогонародногоисторическогопредставленияо фин- Повествования о войнахпротивСоветскогоСоюзаявляютсянеизмен- если так, то сравнить изменения с консерватизм. Следующий отрезок гг., по большейчастистатьи,которыепоявля- в период, последовавший в гг. былоопубликовано18ста- интерпретациями периода 1991 УДК 94(480) — 50-летняя г. за начала распа-

Saint-Petersburg Historical JournalN 4 (2017)