Information Manipulation : a Challenge for Our Democracies

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Information Manipulation : a Challenge for Our Democracies AUTHORS Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, Alexandre Escorcia, Marine Guillaume, Janaina Herrera. ABOUT CAPS AND IRSEM The Policy Planning Staff (Centre d’analyse, de prévision et de stratégie), known as CAPS, created in 1973, reports to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Composed of around twenty experts, diplomats and academics, CAPS produces trans-disciplinary and forward-looking analyses of medium- and long-term developments in the international arena for the benefit of the French Foreign Minister and French authorities. It also proposes foreign policy recommendations and strategic options drawn from its own analysis and interactions with the world of think tanks and academic research in the field of international relations. The Institute for Strategic Research (Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire), known as IRSEM, created in 2009, is the research institute of the Ministry for the Armed Forces. Composed of around forty people, including both civilians and military personnel, the majority of whom hold doctoral degrees, IRSEM’s primary mission is to promote French research on defense and security issues. In addition to conducting research internally (for the benefit of the Ministry) and externally (for the wider strategic community), the IRSEM also encourages the emergence of a new generation of researchers (la relève stratégique), contributes to higher military education and engages in public debate on questions related to defense and security. CAPS and IRSEM each produce independent analyses that do not constitute official positions. Therefore, the opi- nions expressed in this report are only those of the authors and are in no way those of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for the Armed forces or, a fortiori, the French government. To cite this report J.-B. Jeangène Vilmer, A. Escorcia, M. Guillaume, J. Herrera, Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies, report by the Policy Planning Staff (CAPS) of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) of the Ministry for the Armed Forces, Paris, August 2018. This report is available in French and in English (this is an English translation of the original French document). Printed in Paris, August 2018. ISBN: 978-2-11-152607-5 Cover © Antonio/Getty Images. © 2018 CAPS (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs) and IRSEM (Ministry for the Armed Forces). INFORMATION MANIPULATION A Challenge for Our Democracies A report by the Policy Planning Staff (CAPS, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs) and the Institute for Strategic Rechearch (IRSEM, Ministry for the Armed Forces) CONTENTS FOREWORD �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 SUMMARY ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11 INTRODUCTION ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15 I. What are we talking about? ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18 II. Is information manipulation a minor issue? �������������������������������������������������������������22 PART ONE WHY? ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������27 I. Causes at the individual level ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31 A� Cognitive failings �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31 B� An epistemological crisis ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������33 II. Causes at the collective level ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������36 A. The crisis of confidence in institutions ���������������������������������������������������������������������36 B� The crisis of the press ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������38 C. Digital disillusionment ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������39 III. Who manipulates information and why? �����������������������������������������������������������������42 A� Non-state actors ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������43 1. Jihadist groups: the case of ISIS ��������������������������������������������������������������������������43 2. Ethnic and/or religious communities: the Indonesian case ����������������������������45 B� States ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������46 1. Manipulation targeting the local population ������������������������������������������������������47 2. Manipulation targeted at a foreign population ��������������������������������������������������49 a. Russia ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������49 INFORMATION MANIPULATION A Soviet tradition ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������51 The evolution of the Russian approach ������������������������������������������������������������53 The “new generation warfare” ��������������������������������������������������������������������������55 “Information warfare” �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������57 b� China ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������58 PART TWO HOW? �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������63 I. Vulnerability factors �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������65 A� The presence of minorities �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������65 B. Internal divisions �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������67 C. External divisions ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������68 D. A vulnerable media ecosystem ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������68 E. Contested institutions ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������70 II. The means of information manipulation ������������������������������������������������������������������70 A. Multiform levers and vectors �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������70 B. Calibrated narratives ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������75 C. Privileged places and mechanisms ������������������������������������������������������������������������������79 1� The places ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������80 2. Amplification mechanisms������������������������������������������������������������������������������������83 a� Bots ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������83 b� Trolls ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������84 D� Leaks �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������87 E. The falsification of documents �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������88 F� Electoral interference ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������89 III. Other regions affected by information manipulation ������������������������������������������95 A. The Middle East ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������95 1. Syria ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������95 2. The Gulf ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������97 B� Africa �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������98 1. The next playground for Russian “information warfare”? ������������������������������98 2� The anti-French campaign in Goma �������������������������������������������������������������������99 C� Latin America ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������100 PART THREE THE RESPONSES ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������103 I. Case study: the 15 French Lessons of the “Macron Leaks” ��������������������������������106 A. What happened? ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������107 B. Who is responsible? �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������108 C. Why
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