Draft MCCLL April 2011 Newsletter.Mdi
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Volume 7, Issue 4 April 2011 Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 3, 1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward), offload supplies from an Osprey in support of Operation Steel Dawn in far southern Helmand Province. Read the MCCLL topical paper on supply and maintenance operations in Afghanistan. Inside this issue: Featured Articles Shaping and Mentoring the Afghanistan Police: The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has pre- Supply and Maintenance Operations in pared a newsletter with thirteen articles on the subject Afghanistan: This MCCLL topical paper provides ob- of training and mentoring Afghanistan police. servations and best practices concerning supply and maintenance operations of 1st Marine Logistics Group Transitioning to Stability Operations in Iraq: This (MLG) (Forward) in support of Regional Command report from the Joint Center for Operational Analysis Southwest (RC (SW)) and Task Force Leatherneck dur- (JCOA) addresses the transition from counterinsurgency ing Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10. to stability operations as U.S. forces have drawn down. Task Force Leatherneck’s OEF After Action Re- The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL port: 1st Marine Division (Forward) has prepared a Documents in the MCCLL repositories that very timely, wide-ranging, and detailed after action re- Website: have been accessed most often tend to highlight topics port (AAR) based on its deployment as Task Force Leatherneck, the ground combat element of Marine that Marines and other readers find most interesting. and coalition forces in the RC (SW) area of operations. The Role of High-Value Target Teams in Defeat- Two other recent OEF AARs provide additional ing Insurgencies: The National Defense University insights into infantry battalion and engineer support (NDU) has prepared a report that argues that one of the battalion (ESB) operations in Afghanistan: major factors in Iraq success has been the employment ⇒ 1st Battalion, 2d Marines’ OEF AAR and of interagency high-value target teams. ⇒ 8th ESB’s First 100 Days AAR. News Three items are highlighted this month: (1) information Lessons from Exercise Mountain Warrior (MW): (MCCLL) (MCCLL) on the Marine Corps response to the Japan earth- This MCCLL “Quick Look” report provides observations quake/tsunami/nuclear disaster, (2) the recent and recommendations from Third Marine Regiment, the announcement of a new portal for interagency APRIL 2011 NEWSLETTER Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, and collaboration , and (3) an article on Marine Corps plans 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3) on a recent exercise. to “Go Green” in Afghanistan. Lessons from Exercise Solid Curtain/Citadel Reading Lists and Book Review: Two books are Shield 2011: This Marine Corps Installations West featured: (1) Flags of Our Fathers from the (MCIWEST) briefing furnishes observations from Commandant’s List and (2) The Longest War, an command post personnel and subordinate installations overview of the War on Terror. on their participation in this February 2011 exercise. Roster of MCCLL Liaison Officers: This roster Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and Equipment provides points of contact information for MCCLL Accountability: MCCLL has complied observations representatives assigned at major Marine Corps and and recommendations from Marine Corps Logistics Joint commands and organizations. Command, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and the 1st MLG concerning TAV and in-transit visibility (ITV) for The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newslet- logistics distribution efforts in OEF. ter provides “initial impressions” summaries that identify key ob- Marine Corps Centerfor Lessons Learned servations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The ob- servations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not official USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the cur- rency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Questions or comments on this newsletter and requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list can be directed to: Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor Volume 7, Issue 4 April 2011 Supply and Maintenance Operations in Afghanistan 1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) (1st MLG (Fwd)) deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom 10 (OEF 10) in March 2010 with the mission of providing direct support (DS) tactical logistics support to 1st Marine Division (Forward) and general support (GS) to I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). In addition, the MLG was tasked with developing the logistics capabilities of partnered Afghan National Secu- rity Forces (ANSF). During its deployment, the MLG exercised both “push” and “pull” logistics support, depending on the specific class of supply under consideration. The dispersed nature of operations in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations also required the dispersal of skill sets among multiple and geographi- cally separated locations, with one of the main objectives being to provide mainte- nance support as far forward as possible. A motor transport mechanic with Combat In November 2010, a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) collection Logistics Regiment 15 (CLR-15), 1st MLG team conducted interviews with leaders and staff of the MLG in theater. The results (Fwd), works on the engine of a 7-ton truck at of these interviews have been documented in a MCCLL For Official Use Only Forward Operating Base (FOB) Dwyer. (FOUO) topical paper, entitled, Marine Logistics Group (Forward), Supply and Maintenance Operations in Afghanistan: Lessons and Observations from 1st MLG. Among the principle topics addressed in the report are: ■ the impact of distributed operations on unit readiness and on MLG manning, equipment and training, ■ the intermediate mainte- nance activities performed at various locations, ■ the role of embedded field service representatives (FSRs), and ■ the asset visibility provided by radio frequency identification systems. (Note that this latter topic is addressed in more detail in the MCCLL topical paper Total Asset Visibility and Equipment Accountability addressed later in this newsletter.) A complete set of FOUO comments and observations are included in the topical paper. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are: • Training: During training, it is difficult to replicate the types of vehicle recoveries required in OEF. In response to previous recommendations on this topic, the Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) staff has implemented increasingly chal- lenging recovery courses. v • Supply: The volume of requisitions handled by the Maj Luke Holian, Supply Company Commander, supply management unit (SMU) in theater was not sig- CLR-15 (Fwd): nificantly different from those experienced in CONUS; however, there were major differences in urgency, vol- “The biggest difference between supply operations in ume, and variety of tasks needed to provide responsive CONUS versus OEF is distribution, volume, and class of support. supply . .” ⇒ The widespread assignment of high priority/expedi- LtCol Michael Murchison, Commanding Officer, ted shipping codes (02/999) to repair parts resulted in CLR-15 (Fwd): their being prioritized equally and made it difficult to dif- “When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority . .” ferentiate varying levels of urgency in the processing and distribution of parts. • Maintenance. The repair of battle damaged vehi- cles is significantly different from non-combat related component replace- ments. For example, repairs to one major component often led to discover- ies of hidden damages to other components. The repair cycle for vehicles damaged in combat was significant longer than for other types of repairs. ⇒ Warranty programs were often underutilized in theater. Warranty policies should be widely promulgated, fully understood, and adhered to. • Field Service Representatives (FSRs). Contracted logistics services (CLS) and FSRs have been force multipliers and enablers due to the ex- pertise they provide and their persistence on the battlefield. The rapid de- ployment of new equipment has resulted in institutional training having a difficult time keeping up with requirements, with FSRs filling the void. Marines with Headquarters and Services • Principal End Item (PEI) Rotation. The metrics used for PEI rotation Company, 1st MLG (Fwd), set up a mobile post policies (including miles driven, hours operated, etc.) are not as applicable exchange aboard Observation Post Athens in the in theater. The established PEI rotation policy used in Iraq and other previ- Kajaki District of northeastern Helmand Province. ous operations did not correlate well to Afghanistan. Return to the Table of Contents! Page 2 MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED (MCCLL) Volume 7, Issue 4 April 2011 Task Force Leatherneck’s OEF After Action Report From March 2010 to March 2011, 1st Marine Division (Forward) (1st MARDIV (Fwd)) de- ployed as the ground combat element of Marine Corps and other coalition forces in the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations (AO) in Helmand and Nimruz Provinces of southwestern Afghanistan. Designated as Task Force Leatherneck, 1st MARDIV (Fwd) oversaw the doubling in size of the Marine Corps force in the AO dur- ing Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10.1 and 10.2 to about 13,000.