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Key Factors of Instability in Libya

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Key Factors of Instability in Libya Wolfgang Pusztai Key factors of instability in Libya I. Introduction in 1923, resistance continued in Fezzan until 1930 and in Cyrenaica even until 1931, a fact The start of the Battle for Tripoli in April 2019 that the people in the south and east are very marked the beginning of a new dramatic proud of. Once independent in 1951, the phase in Libya’s ongoing civil war. This war Kingdom of Libya had Tripoli and Benghazi, began in 2014 with the ousting from Tripoli of the largest city in the East, as twin capitals the then internationally recognised govern- and had a federalist constitution. After oil had ment together with the elected parliament by been discovered, the constitution was the Islamist-led Operation Libya Dawn, and amended in 1963 and Libya became a more with Khalifa Heftar’s Operation Dignity in centralised state. With Gaddafi’s coup in 1969 Benghazi, which aimed to end a bloody the constitution ceased to have any practical Islamist assassination campaign. significance. The east and the south were neglected by the regime, as most of the Since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in income of Libya’s tremendous oil wealth was 2011, Libya has been struggling to regain funnelled towards coastal Tripolitania, a stability. Various international initiatives to situation well remembered in Cyrenaica stabilise the country have not brought the and Fezzan.1 After the revolution, many anticipated results. Today Libya is a failed easterners saw some good reasons to state. But what are the different factors anticipate that nothing would change. contributing to the current situation? It is This reinforced federalist tendencies in crucial to understand the key factors of the Cyrenaica. instability as a precondition for defining a new, more successful approach to the The work of the administration under Gaddafi stabilisation of Libya. was always characterised by an inefficient bureaucracy, inadequate infrastructure and II. Key factors of instability wasteful government spending. It was a principle of Gaddafi’s leadership to change Those factors can be grouped into six areas, administrative boundaries and entities every namely governance, international relations, couple of years and to thus prevent the demography, economy, social standards, and establishment of any firm social, admini- security, which are all interrelated. strative or political structures and relation- ships which could eventually challenge his II.1 Governance and domestic political factors rule. There was no noteworthy civil society and no culture of dialogue. Conflicts between Libya’s three historic regions – Tripolitania, tribes were settled by the regime and any Cyrenaica and Fezzan – have developed form of opposition was violently suppressed. more or less separately for thousands of The only exception was Saif al-Islam’s re- years. The territory of today’s Libya was only conciliation process with jailed members of united through the Italian colonisation of 1911. the radical Islamist ‘Libyan Islamic Fighting But while Tripolitania was finally subjugated Group’ (LIFG), which ended with the signature 1 For more about the history of Libya see: Chorin, Exit the Colonel, 2012; Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya, 1994; and St. John, Libya from Colony to Independence, 2008. ORIENT IV/2019 47 Wolfgang Pusztai of the so-called ‘Jihadi Code’ and the The UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement renouncing of violence by those (former) (LPA), signed on 17 December 2015 in jihadists. But despite these – ultimately Skhirat, Morocco, confirmed the HoR as failed – efforts, there is a lack of experience Libya’s internationally recognised parliament in dialogue and conflict resolution practices. and institutionalised a Presidential Council With the notable exception of mediation and a Government of National Accord (GNA), by tribal elders in some local conflicts, both led by prime minister Fayez al-Serraj, there is simply no culture of dialogue to who was hand-picked by then UN Special solve conflicts. Representative Bernardino Leon. Further- more, a High Council of State (HCS) based There has been no continuity in leadership on the remaining elements of the GNC was whatsoever since the ouster of Gaddafi in established as an advisory body. Although 2011. Nine (!) persons have been prime recognised by the UN Security Council by 23 minister of Libya, or at least have claimed to December 2015, the GNA was never elected be. Currently, there are three prime ministers by the Libyans or appointed by a legal Libyan and two parliaments that could be considered institution. An endorsement of the GNA by the in some way legitimate. Abdullah al-Thinni is HoR, as foreseen by the LPA, never took the prime minister of the Interim Government place. In fact, the GNA has been hostage to (IG), appointed by Libya’s internationally local militias in Tripoli without any real free- recognised parliament, the House of Repre- dom of action since its arrival in March 2016. sentatives (HoR), which was elected on 25 June 2014, although merely 15% of the The level of corruption in Libya has always population of voting age participated in the been very high, but now it is entirely out of elections. Al-Thinni was internationally recog- control.2 In the west as well as in the east, the nised until December 2015 and serves on as situation is far worse than it was before the a prime minister of the IG. revolution. There are some cases in which companies have been awarded contracts for After al-Thinni and the HoR were ousted from a specific project despite not having any Tripoli in September 2014 by the Islamist experience of relevance. At times, bidding ‘Operation Libya Dawn’ they moved to the periods are cut short with no warning notice eastern cities of Al Beida and Tobruk. On in order to prevent serious bidders from 6 November 2014, Libya’s Supreme Court forwarding their offers in time. Policies ruled – under heavy pressure from Islamist designed to reduce corruption have been militias – that the June elections were un- introduced but are far from efficient. constitutional and the HoR must be dissolved. Based on this decision, Libya’s first elected Libya’s Interim Constitutional Declaration interim parliament, the General National (2011) guarantees freedom of media and Congress (GNC), reconstituted, albeit with expression as well as civil rights, but the rule fewer than 80 of the original 200 members. It of militias and threats by Islamists as well as appointed the Islamist-leaning National some of the practices of Marshall Heftar’s Salvation Government (NSG), ultimately Libyan National Army (LNA) undermine these led by Khalifa al-Ghwell. The significance rights in most parts of the country. In 2013-14, of the NSG had faded away by October civil rights activists and journalists were 2016, although al-Ghwell still claims to priority targets of the Islamist assassination be prime minister. campaign in Benghazi together with the 2 Transparency International, Libya, 2019. 48 ORIENT IV/2019 Key factors of instability in Libya security forces. At least 23 journalists have activities with one of Libya’s governments. been murdered in Libya since 2011,3 with Most of the neighbours and nations involved many more harassed and jailed. in Libya pursue a combination of various complementary interests. There are severe shortfalls in human rights, in particular regarding the use of excessive Security-related interests are mostly con- force by militias and security forces on all nected with the various Islamist groups, the sides, modern slavery, religious minority ungoverned spaces and Libya’s porous land abuse and women's rights. Most of Libya’s and sea borders, which allow all kinds of prisons are under the control of one or the smuggling and human trafficking. These facts other militia. Conditions are widely terrible. and activities contribute to the destabilisation Inmates are often subject to torture and of Libya’s vulnerable neighbours in Africa remain jailed without a trial. but are also of concern for Europe. Countries with security-related interests in Libya include II.2 International relations all the bordering countries, Italy, France, the EU in general and – to a more limited Several countries have important, some even extent – the United States. vital strategic interests in Libya which motivate them to interfere in Libya by directly siding In contrast, economic interests are primarily with one of the conflict parties through related to the hydrocarbon industry, revenues supporting international mediation efforts from this industry, and Libya as a place of and/or through bilateral political and economic work. Economic interests in Libya are of 3 UNESCO, UNESCO observatory of killed journalists – Libya, 2019. ORIENT IV/2019 49 Wolfgang Pusztai particular relevance for Egypt, Tunisia, Italy Egypt has a particular role as a powerful and Turkey. But Russia, China and the US neighbour heavily affected by the instability in must not be forgotten. Thirdly, value-related Libya. Having had major troubles at home interests focus on the promotion of demo- with various Islamist groups, including the cracy or political Islam. The main countries so-called Islamic State (IS) and MB, it wants furthering democratisation are European. to prevent a terrorist safe haven or even an Qatar and Turkey support political Islam, Islamist government on its western border by whereas the UAE and Saudi Arabia are doing all means. But Libya is also of significance for their best to counter it. These interests led to Egypt for economic reasons. It is an important Turkey’s and Qatar’s strong support for labour market for previously two million the international outlawed NSG when it migrant workers (now about 900,000) and was established in 2014. offers access to cheap energy. In line with these interests, the various II.3 Demography stakeholders are supporting one side or the other – or both. The GNA is strongly endorsed Libya’s population, which is concentrated by the UN, Italy, the UK, Germany, Turkey, in the coastal areas, in particular around Qatar and in a more lukewarm way by the US Tripoli and Benghazi, is very young.
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