Wolfgang Pusztai Key factors of instability in

I. Introduction in 1923, resistance continued in until 1930 and in Cyrenaica even until 1931, a fact The start of the Battle for in April 2019 that the people in the south and east are very marked the beginning of a new dramatic proud of. Once independent in 1951, the phase in Libya’s ongoing civil war. This war Kingdom of Libya had Tripoli and , began in 2014 with the ousting from Tripoli of the largest city in the East, as twin capitals the then internationally recognised govern- and had a federalist constitution. After oil had ment together with the elected parliament by been discovered, the constitution was the Islamist-led Operation Libya Dawn, and amended in 1963 and Libya became a more with Khalifa Heftar’s Operation Dignity in centralised state. With Gaddafi’s coup in 1969 Benghazi, which aimed to end a bloody the constitution ceased to have any practical Islamist assassination campaign. significance. The east and the south were neglected by the regime, as most of the Since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in income of Libya’s tremendous oil wealth was 2011, Libya has been struggling to regain funnelled towards coastal Tripolitania, a stability. Various international initiatives to situation well remembered in Cyrenaica stabilise the country have not brought the and Fezzan.1 After the revolution, many anticipated results. Today Libya is a failed easterners saw some good reasons to state. But what are the different factors anticipate that nothing would change. contributing to the current situation? It is This reinforced federalist tendencies in crucial to understand the key factors of the Cyrenaica. instability as a precondition for defining a new, more successful approach to the The work of the administration under Gaddafi stabilisation of Libya. was always characterised by an inefficient bureaucracy, inadequate infrastructure and II. Key factors of instability wasteful government spending. It was a principle of Gaddafi’s leadership to change Those factors can be grouped into six areas, administrative boundaries and entities every namely governance, international relations, couple of years and to thus prevent the demography, economy, social standards, and establishment of any firm social, admini- security, which are all interrelated. strative or political structures and relation- ships which could eventually challenge his II.1 Governance and domestic political factors rule. There was no noteworthy civil society and no culture of dialogue. Conflicts between Libya’s three historic regions – Tripolitania, tribes were settled by the regime and any Cyrenaica and Fezzan – have developed form of opposition was violently suppressed. more or less separately for thousands of The only exception was Saif al-’s re- years. The territory of today’s Libya was only conciliation process with jailed members of united through the Italian colonisation of 1911. the radical Islamist ‘Libyan Islamic Fighting But while Tripolitania was finally subjugated Group’ (LIFG), which ended with the signature

1 For more about the history of Libya see: Chorin, Exit the Colonel, 2012; Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya, 1994; and St. John, Libya from Colony to Independence, 2008.

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of the so-called ‘Jihadi Code’ and the The UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement renouncing of violence by those (former) (LPA), signed on 17 December 2015 in jihadists. But despite these – ultimately Skhirat, Morocco, confirmed the HoR as failed – efforts, there is a lack of experience Libya’s internationally recognised parliament in dialogue and conflict resolution practices. and institutionalised a Presidential Council With the notable exception of mediation and a Government of National Accord (GNA), by tribal elders in some local conflicts, both led by prime minister Fayez al-Serraj, there is simply no culture of dialogue to who was hand-picked by then UN Special solve conflicts. Representative Bernardino Leon. Further- more, a High Council of State (HCS) based There has been no continuity in leadership on the remaining elements of the GNC was whatsoever since the ouster of Gaddafi in established as an advisory body. Although 2011. Nine (!) persons have been prime recognised by the UN Security Council by 23 minister of Libya, or at least have claimed to December 2015, the GNA was never elected be. Currently, there are three prime ministers by the Libyans or appointed by a legal Libyan and two parliaments that could be considered institution. An endorsement of the GNA by the in some way legitimate. Abdullah al-Thinni is HoR, as foreseen by the LPA, never took the prime minister of the Interim Government place. In fact, the GNA has been hostage to (IG), appointed by Libya’s internationally local militias in Tripoli without any real free- recognised parliament, the House of Repre- dom of action since its arrival in March 2016. sentatives (HoR), which was elected on 25 June 2014, although merely 15% of the The level of corruption in Libya has always population of voting age participated in the been very high, but now it is entirely out of elections. Al-Thinni was internationally recog- control.2 In the west as well as in the east, the nised until December 2015 and serves on as situation is far worse than it was before the a prime minister of the IG. revolution. There are some cases in which companies have been awarded contracts for After al-Thinni and the HoR were ousted from a specific project despite not having any Tripoli in September 2014 by the Islamist experience of relevance. At times, bidding ‘Operation Libya Dawn’ they moved to the periods are cut short with no warning notice eastern cities of Al Beida and Tobruk. On in order to prevent serious bidders from 6 November 2014, Libya’s Supreme Court forwarding their offers in time. Policies ruled – under heavy pressure from Islamist designed to reduce corruption have been militias – that the June elections were un- introduced but are far from efficient. constitutional and the HoR must be dissolved. Based on this decision, Libya’s first elected Libya’s Interim Constitutional Declaration interim parliament, the General National (2011) guarantees freedom of media and Congress (GNC), reconstituted, albeit with expression as well as civil rights, but the rule fewer than 80 of the original 200 members. It of militias and threats by Islamists as well as appointed the Islamist-leaning National some of the practices of Marshall Heftar’s Salvation Government (NSG), ultimately Libyan National Army (LNA) undermine these led by Khalifa al-Ghwell. The significance rights in most parts of the country. In 2013-14, of the NSG had faded away by October civil rights activists and journalists were 2016, although al-Ghwell still claims to priority targets of the Islamist assassination be prime minister. campaign in Benghazi together with the

2 Transparency International, Libya, 2019.

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security forces. At least 23 journalists have activities with one of Libya’s governments. been murdered in Libya since 2011,3 with Most of the neighbours and nations involved many more harassed and jailed. in Libya pursue a combination of various complementary interests. There are severe shortfalls in human rights, in particular regarding the use of excessive Security-related interests are mostly con- force by militias and security forces on all nected with the various Islamist groups, the sides, modern slavery, religious minority ungoverned spaces and Libya’s porous land abuse and women's rights. Most of Libya’s and sea borders, which allow all kinds of prisons are under the control of one or the smuggling and human trafficking. These facts other militia. Conditions are widely terrible. and activities contribute to the destabilisation Inmates are often subject to torture and of Libya’s vulnerable neighbours in Africa remain jailed without a trial. but are also of concern for Europe. Countries with security-related interests in Libya include II.2 International relations all the bordering countries, Italy, France, the EU in general and – to a more limited Several countries have important, some even extent – the United States. vital strategic interests in Libya which motivate them to interfere in Libya by directly siding In contrast, economic interests are primarily with one of the conflict parties through related to the hydrocarbon industry, revenues supporting international mediation efforts from this industry, and Libya as a place of and/or through bilateral political and economic work. Economic interests in Libya are of

3 UNESCO, UNESCO observatory of killed journalists – Libya, 2019.

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particular relevance for , Tunisia, Italy Egypt has a particular role as a powerful and . But Russia, China and the US neighbour heavily affected by the instability in must not be forgotten. Thirdly, value-related Libya. Having had major troubles at home interests focus on the promotion of demo- with various Islamist groups, including the cracy or political Islam. The main countries so-called Islamic State (IS) and MB, it wants furthering democratisation are European. to prevent a terrorist safe haven or even an Qatar and Turkey support political Islam, Islamist government on its western border by whereas the UAE and are doing all means. But Libya is also of significance for their best to counter it. These interests led to Egypt for economic reasons. It is an important Turkey’s and Qatar’s strong support for labour market for previously two million the international outlawed NSG when it migrant workers (now about 900,000) and was established in 2014. offers access to cheap energy.

In line with these interests, the various II.3 Demography stakeholders are supporting one side or the other – or both. The GNA is strongly endorsed Libya’s population, which is concentrated by the UN, Italy, the UK, Germany, Turkey, in the coastal areas, in particular around Qatar and in a more lukewarm way by the US Tripoli and Benghazi, is very young. About and France. On the other side, the LNA is 42% of its 6.7 million people are younger than mainly backed by Egypt, the UAE, Saudi 25 years, while only about 10% are older than Arabia and Jordan. The most important 55.5 This demographic pyramid makes a military supporters of the warring factions recovery of Libya even more challenging. are Turkey and Egypt. More than 100,000 new jobs would be required every year just to keep the current Turkey has very strong historic ties to youth unemployment rate6 of about 42% western Libya, in particular to the city stable. However, many of the young people of . Actions in and with regard to are ‘employed’ by militias. Libya are primarily driven by the support for political Islam and by economic interests. The population is homogenous. 97% are Erdogan’s4 troubled economy is in dire or of mixed Berber-Arab or Ottoman- need of Libya as an important export desti- Arab descent. Several hundred thousand nation and is seeking a major share in Kouloughlis, descendants of Ottoman Turks reconstruction. The survival of the GNA and and local Arab women, live in Misrata, Tripoli a leading role for Misrata are essential and eastern coastal cities.7 The rest includes for Ankara’s economic interests in Libya. widely disfranchised Berber (Amazigh), Turkey has given permanent residence Touareg and Toubou minorities. As a to several prominent former LIFG leaders, consequence of the revolution and its members of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood aftermath, more than one million Libyans (MB), prominent former Benghazi and have left their country and sought refuge Derna fighters and Libya’s Grand Mufti, mainly in Tunisia and Egypt. Many of them the Salafist Sadekh al-Gharyani. Their are still there. Nearly 200,000 were forced to influence is utilised to pursue Turkish leave their homes because of the current interests in Libya. battle for Tripoli. Altogether, up to half a

4 Al-Etihad, Libya And The Turkish Occupier, 2019. 5 CIA, The World Factbook – Libya, 2019. 6 World Bank, Libya – Unemployment, youth total, 2019. 7 Muradoğlu, Kuloğlu’nun ahvâlini sorana.., 2015; and Haasu, Kod adı Şakir, 2014.

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million people live in various parts of Libya the Justice and Construction Party was as internally displaced persons. established as the political wing of the MB. Today the Brotherhood, which is strongly Libya is a Muslim country. Roughly 97% are supported by Turkey and Qatar, has a huge Sunnis, about 1% Ibadis. In the 19th century influence on the GNA, in Misrata and within the Senussi, a Sunni Sufi order, rose in the economic entities. Unfortunately, it also importance. By the end of the century they provides a fertile ground for the recruitment were a dominant political force in many of terrorists. parts of Libya and became a driving element behind the resistance against the Italian Libya has been a tribal society over the occupation. Although Idris, the head of centuries. Today the influence of the tribes is the order, became King of Libya after in- still very important outside of the main towns, dependence in 1951, the order itself vanished particularly in the east and south. They during the colonial rule. However, Sufism provide a framework where the state is non- remains deeply rooted with many Libyans. existent. Although also present, tribes have Most Libyan Sufis are peaceful and do not much less significance in the larger cities in adhere to violence. the northwest of the country.8

Salafists, followers of an ultra-conservative II.4 Economy movement within , have grown in importance in Libya since 2011, and they Libya’s economy is heavily reliant on the have raided and destroyed many Sufi hydrocarbon industry.9 It is an extreme case mosques and tombs along with other radical of a rentier state economy. The country ex- Islamists. Their militias apprehend alcohol ports crude oil and natural gas but needs to and drug dealers as well as homosexuals. import almost everything else. A low payment The Salafists are far from being a united morale and a lack of legal certainty makes group. While Madkhalists accept a more Libya a risky country for foreign investments. secular form of government, Salafi activists like the Grand Mufti seek an Islamist state Under Gaddafi, expatriates from Western, based solely on the Islamic law, the , Asian, and neighbouring countries were the and firmly oppose the GNA. The means of the backbone of many branches of economy. Salafi activists include involvement in the Black Africans carried out most of the lower- political process. Salafi jihadists, like many of class jobs. However, unemployment was not the terrorist groups, pursue a similar aim but a big issue for the Libyan people. Now, most use all kinds of violence. Madkhalists are of the Western expatriates and many of the fighting for Marshall Heftar as well as within others are gone and the economy is in tatters. Tripoli’s Special Deterrent Force, one of the The recovery of the Libyan economy depends key militias protecting the GNA. primarily on the security situation, on the containment of corruption and on the future The Muslim Brotherhood was forbidden and performance of the hydrocarbon sector. Since forcefully suppressed by Gaddafi. Many of its the occupation of the oil fields and terminals in members were jailed until 2006, when the the Sirte Basin by the LNA in 2016, years-long reconciliation agreement facilitated by Saif blockades have ended, and production has al-Islam was signed. After the revolution increased to about 1.1bn bpd currently – still

8 For more about Libya’s tribal society see: Varvelli, The Role of Tribal Dynamics in the Libyan Future, 2013. 9 For more information about Libya’s economy see: Akl, The Libyan Political Economy: Political Conflict, Crisis Management and Structural Reform, 2016.

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well below the 1.6bn bpd from before the II.5 Social factors revolution. This is unsurprising as the oil and gas infrastructure was damaged by fighting Basic foodstuffs and fuel are heavily and terrorist attacks in many parts of the subsidised by the state in order to keep country. Furthermore, it has been degraded the prices low for everybody. While this is by disuse and a lack of maintenance due certainly beneficial for the population, it makes to the absence of foreign specialists. smuggling these goods into neighbouring Occasional blockades of fields and pipelines countries very attractive. It is doubtful that by workers and militias in western Libya the current level of subsidies can be main- hamper production, too. tained for very long if the economy does not recover soon. The living costs of the Quite uniquely, although there are several population have increased significantly as ‘governments’, the country's most important the Libyan dinar has devalued, at least on economic institutions – the National Oil the black market. Although most families Corporation (NOC), the Central Bank of have as a minimum a basic income from the Libya (CBL) and the Libyan Investment state, access to cash is very difficult. It is a Authority (LIA) – have managed to remain usual picture in Tripoli and many other cities by and large the sole representations of their that people wait in long lines in front of the country in their respective business areas banks just to be able to withdraw a couple of over the years. This was made possible hundred dinar in cash. by the refusal of the international community to deal with anybody else but the ‘original’ Water supply is guaranteed as long as the NOC, CBL and LIA. Even though about Great-Man-Made-River, Gaddafi’s gigantic 80% of the hydrocarbon infrastructure is freshwater system drawing water from currently under the physical control of the aquifers beneath the and channelling LNA, all the revenues end up with the GNA it along a network of pipelines and pumping through the NOC and CBL. A large part is stations to the coastal areas of Libya, is used to pay and equip the enemies of the operational. But looting, local protests, a LNA on the battlefield. This excites the anger lack of maintenance and power cuts have of many in the east and south. interrupted the flow of water in western Libya more than once. The capital is suffering The black economy, in particular the from this in particular. Furthermore, IS smuggling of fuel and all kinds of consumer terrorists have already attacked its facilities goods, costs the state several billion Libyan in remote areas on occasion, as these are dinars every year. Some militias, including an easy target. those loyal to the GNA, and tribes are heavily involved in this business and fight ruthlessly Libya’s power grid is in urgent need of main- for its control. While most of the militias in tenance. Supply of gas to the power stations Tripoli support the GNA, first and foremost is frequently irregular for various reasons. they care for their own interests and Due to outstanding debts, electricity cannot businesses. All of them are deeply involved be imported from Tunisia and Egypt as in black market money exchange, protection before. Mobile powerplants provided by inter- rackets, large-scale fraud, especially with national companies have been withdrawn so-called ‘letters of credit’, and control of because of security concerns and a lack of access to cash.10 payments. Frequent power outages and even

10 Eaton, Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness, 2018.

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blackouts are the consequence. Fezzan and at times in combination with fighting what is northern Tripolitania are the most affected perceived a return of the Gaddafist. The parts of the country. Misrata have strong relations with descen- dants from the city living in the east for Healthcare under Gaddafi had relatively high centuries and the eastern Kouloughlis. standards for an African country. Nowadays, the situation is terrible and in dire need of Tripoli – and the GNA – is now under control urgent and significant improvement. There is of a few powerful militias. The government a lack of all kinds of medical supplies, skilled is not able to make any decisions against health professionals and maintenance. Who- their will, a fact which is frequently ignored ever can afford it travels abroad for medical by foreign diplomats. Those militias have care. Many of the war injured are evacuated the objective of maintaining the status quo, to Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt or Jordan. as they benefit strongly from the weakness of the GNA, also in pursuing their own II.6 Security factors criminal businesses. There are hundreds of local militias all over the country that are Libya’s fragmented security landscape is city-based or tribal, ranging from a couple characterised by the use of force for political of dozen fighters to several thousand. motivations, influence, control of resources, While they are at times considered part as well as terrorism and counterterrorism. of a large alliance like the LNA, or ‘pro-GNA,’ Crime is a major problem in Libya today. most of them are just loyal to their local The capital and the coastal road to Tunisia communities. They want to maintain or are especially plagued by criminal gangs expand their area of influence and get their and rogue militias. share of the national wealth.

The LNA is the army of the HoR. Its There are several terrorist groups active commander, Marshal Khalifa Heftar, is widely in Libya. All of them share the vision of praised for his leadership in the east, but establishing a caliphate, a conservative condemned for his staunch anti-Islamist Islamist state based strictly on Sharia law. position by many in the west. Although Heftar Among the most important are IS and is arguably the single most influential person Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). in the east, he is dependent on the support After the defeat in Sirte, IS was significantly of some powerful tribal leaders. The LNA’s weakened, but not destroyed. The group is actions are driven by the fight against still present in many parts of the country and political Islam and terrorism (in their very has changed its strategy. Now IS uses south- wide definition). western Libya as a safe haven for operations in the wider region, while conducting in The militias from Misrata are the most Libya only a small-scale guerilla-style powerful military group in western Libya, campaign with occasional spectacular although they are weakened by internal attacks. Terrorists are also a serious threat quarrels. Some of them are Islamist or to the hydrocarbon industry and the Great- Islamist-leaning. Misrata militias are the back- Mman-Made-River. bone of the defence of Tripoli. The main driving elements for Misrata’s military forces III. Conclusion are the struggle for influence beyond its own territory, in particular in Tripoli and the oil Libya appears to be a rather unique case, crescent, and the support for Islamist groups, where the international community replaced a

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legitimate government with a new one without the enemy. The country is deeply divided the consensus of the local institutions. From a between east and west, between radical legal point of view, it is not entirely clear who Islamists and others, and between some governs Libya. Bad governance, corruption Arab tribes and the Toubou. There are also and ineffectiveness have led to a lack of conflicts between some Arab tribes. There confidence in the governing authorities. Since is no chance for a return of many domestic the revolution, the administrative situation refugees any time soon. A form of permanent has become even worse. In some parts of resettlement is maybe not ‘correct,’ but is the country, administration is virtually non- simply more realistic. existent. There is no trust in administrative regulations and the rule of law, as they Libya’s rentier economy is very vulnerable frequently cannot be enforced. Overall, this to blockades and terrorist attacks on the often ends with an arbitrary rule of the militias hydrocarbon industry, which is an easy and lawlessness. target. Most foreign investors are staying away from even the more secure parts of Foreign involvement is contributing to – the country because of very high levels of dependent on the point of view – the stabili- corruption, low payment morale and a lack sation or destabilisation of Libya. And of legal certainty. Urbanisation has the this will continue. The country is in a geo- consequence that many young people are strategically important location, is too much losing their tribal roots and can easily be of a risk for its neighbours, and offers too attracted by militias and radical Islamists. many economic opportunities to be left Militias make a huge amount of money and alone. It is simply not realistic for all of often pay their members very well. Therefore, those stakeholders to keep out of Libya civilian jobs are not so attractive for the voluntarily, as it is far too dangerous e.g. for young militiamen. There is also a kind of Egypt to end up with the lethal threat of Islamist nexus, as there are connections a terrorist safe haven on its western between many of the older Islamists from border, too risky for Turkey to lose its their common suffering under Gaddafi, but economic opportunities in Libya, or for it is doubtful as to how lasting this is among Italy to become disconnected from Libya’s the younger. oil and gas while being infiltrated by terrorists and experiencing an increase in IV. Outlook migration. But even if no more weapons are smuggled into Libya, the available stocks For now, major improvements to governance are enough to continue the war for many or social standards are not in sight. Realisti- more years. cally, foreign interference will continue until one side is defeated. Egypt is in the best Difficult living conditions have led to a geostrategic position to prevail with its local tense situation, in particular during the allies. This is only a question of how far the hot season in the capital Tripoli, which has country is willing to go. It will at least secure its probably been most affected by the power interests in eastern Libya, as it cannot afford cuts and water shortages. All of these a terrorist snakepit next door. problems are frequently blamed on the ‘others,’ although local incompetence and Libya’s demography and religious landscape corruption are often the more important also have several factors which will com- factors. This is frequently exaggerated by plicate the conflicts in Libya in the future propaganda to serve the bad image of even more than is already the case today.

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Keeping the unsolved security challenges Altogether, the situation in Libya is very in Libya in mind, the country's economic complex. It must not be simplified by reducing future is not too bright. The struggle for the conflict to a fight for or against Heftar resources is and will remain a main driving or the Islamists. The likely development factor in Libya’s civil war as long as there is of the factors discussed does not suggest no agreed formula for their distribution. that the situation will get better any time soon.

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All internet sources were accessed and verified on September 10, 2019.

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