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Aborted transition: T he case of the failure of the democratization process in Algeria, 1989-1992
Al-Hadban, Ibrahim Naji, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1993
Copyright ©1994 by AI-Hadban, Ibrahim Naji* All rights reserved.
UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
ABORTED TRANSITION: The Case Of The Failure Of The Democratization
Process In Algeria, 1989-1992
Dissertation
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University
By
Ibrahim Naji Al-Hadban, B.A., M.A.
*****
The Ohio State University
1993
Dissertation Committee: Approved by
R. William Liddle
Anthony Mughan
Alam Payind Advisor
Department of Political Science To My Parents
To My Wife Ghada and to My Children
Dana, Ghofran, and Naji
11 Acknowledgments
It was because of the mercy and blessings of Allah almighty
God that this work was completed. The support of all my family members was a crucial factor that helped me during my study. I will never forget both the financial and moral help of my brother Yehia Al-Hadban through critical moments.
The moral help and support of my mother, my sisters and my in-laws in Kuwait gave me the enthusiasm to finish. On the other hand, the support of my wife’s family also assisted me during my work. To all of them goes my deepest and most sincere appreciation.
To the Muslim community in Columbus goes my sincere gratitude and appreciation. I will never forget those loving brothers who offered their support when I was in need of it.
To my sisters in Columbus whose prayers were the determining factor that helped me get my degree. I ask Allah almighty God to give them his blessings and mercy.
Finally, I would like to thank my advisor Professor William
Liddle for his precious guidance, understanding and support.
Thanks also go to Professor Alam Payind who was like a big brother to me, and to Professor Tony Mughan.
Ill VITA
March 3, 1961 ...... Born in Lebanon
1984 B.A. Political Science
Kuwait University
1986 M.A. Ohio State University
Fields Of Study
Major Field : Political Science
Minor Field : Political Sociology
IV Chapter I
Introduction
On December 30, 1991, the results of Algeria’s first democratic elections at the national level were declared, and the Islamic Salvation Front, FIS, won a majority in those elections. The results were for the first round of the legislative elections, and the FIS won 47.26% of the votes. In terms of seats the above percentage allowed the FIS to get
81.4% of the total number of seats secured at that round of the elections. However, several days later, on January 11,
1992, President Chadli Benjedid was forced to resign by the leaders of the military, who cancelled the elections and banned the FIS.
Leaders of the military first established what was known as the "High Security Council" that was made up of five men, some of whom were military leaders, including Defense Minister
Khalid Nezzar. Several days later, another council was formed, this time known as the "High State Council", which also included Colonel Nezzar and other military figures. The state began a wave of arrests against leaders of the
FIS, and against thousands of its supporters. This act
forced the movement to go underground, and many of its
activists formed para-military groups that targeted top government and military figures, as well as military
installations. Ever since that time the country has been
living under unstable conditions, where explosions and clashes with the security forces are daily incidents.
In this dissertation, the author will try to analyze the
incidents that took place in Algeria, and try to look for the reasons that caused the failure of the democratization process
in that country. The process had a good start in 1989 when
President Benjedid installed the first multi-party system in
Algeria, since independence. Many parties were established, and several of them contested the municipal and provincial elections that were held in 1990.
The author will try to find the reasons behind the abortion of the transition to democracy in Algeria. For that purpose, the author will trace the democratization process from its beginning to its end, and will analyze the factors that led to the its beginning. It will then be necessary to follow things, as they were developing between the regime and opposition parties. Therefore, the author will try to answer some questions,
such as: When did the democratization process begin in
Algeria? Why did it begin? To what extent did the historical
background of Algeria, affect the path of the transition? What
was the role played by the leaders of the government, and of
the opposition, during the transition? What were the factors
that caused the halt of the process?
On a broad theoretical level, this dissertation is trying
to show that it is due to "proximate" factors rather than to
"background" factors that the outcome of the transition to
democracy has been determined. The role played by the
leadership of the regime, and of the opposition, the mobilization of the people in the streets by the opposition,
and a severe political or economic crisis that the country might be witnessing, are all factors of the proximate type.
Background factors are important, yet they do not
determine the outcome of the process. By background factors
the author means legacies of the colonization period, the
political culture of the people, the political structure in
the country, the relation between state and society, and the
existence or absence of political institutions in the country.
There are several theoretical approaches that deal with
the democratization process. The author will deal with those approaches in Chapter II, but would like to mention the
two most important approaches here.
The first approach is the one that focuses on the effect
of proximate factors on the transition. This approach could be
found in the writings of Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe
Schmitter, Alfred Stepan, and Donald Share.‘ These writers
focus on factors such as:
1. The role played by the leadership in the transition
2. Popular mobilization and its effect on the transition
3. Democratization due to external factors, such as an
external conquest or military defeat.
4. The role played by the hard-liners and soft-liners in the
democratization process
As for the background approach, it could be found in the
writings of Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin
L i p s e t . 2 As was mentioned earlier, the factors that this
approach deals with are:
1. The effect of the historical and colonial legacies on the
democratization process.
2. The effect of the political culture
3. The role played by ethnic cleavage
4. The relation between state and society
5. The existence of political institutions in the country 6. Socioeconomic development in the country
As was mentioned the author believes that the proximate
factors are the crucial factors that have influenced the
outcome of the democratization process. In the case of
Algeria, the author will precisely focus on the dynamic
interaction between the major opposition party, the FIS, and
the regime, especially on the process of "demand" and
"response". Demands made by the leadership of the Islamic
Salvation Front, FIS, and by its supporters, will be studied,
as well as the regime's responses to these demands.
The plan for this dissertation will go as follows:
First, the author will deal with the literature that
focuses on the process of democratization, with special
attention given to those approaches that are relevant to our
case. Second, the author will analyze some background factors,
as well as some proximate factors, and will try to integrate
the evidence that is available, with the literature.
Understanding the factors that caused the failure of the
democratization process in Algeria will help us understand
similar cases in the Arab and Muslim Worlds. Despite the fact
that each case has its special circumstances, yet many
similarities do exist between the conditions in Algeria and in
other countries in the Muslim World. Being able to pin point the causes of the failure would help us avoid such causes in
the future with the other cases.
In the present time, the World is witnessing the fall of
many dictatorships, and the rise of several democracies.
Therefore, understanding the factors that cause the failure
and the success of these transitions, helps guaranteeing
successful transitions. F oo-tn otes ClneLpt eir I
1. Guillermo O ’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence
Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 2nd ed.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
2. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset,
Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, inc., 1988). Chapter II
Literature Review
Many political scientists have written in the last ten to
fifteen years about the issue of democratization and about
transition to democracy. However, before we start reviewing
this literature, we will define some of the concepts that we
are dealing with.
A. Basic Concepts:
The first concept that we would like to define is that of
"democracy". There are two approaches by which one can define
democracy. One approach is the procedural approach, the other
is the substantive. The author will try to show the difference
between both approaches.
1. The Procedural approach:
This approach is concerned with the procedures that
political regimes apply and follow in making decisions.
Therefore, democracy according to this approach is looked upon
as a procedure or a method that is used to make political
decisions. As an example, in his book. Capitalism. Socialism,
and Democracy. Joseph Schumpeter states that:
"the democratic method is that institutional arrangement
8 for arriving at palitical decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote. "‘
Similarly, according to Samuel Huntington in his article
"Will More Countries Become Democratic?":
"A political system is defined as democratic to the
extent that its most powerful collective decision
makers are selected through periodic elections in which
candidates freely compete for votes and in which
virtually all the adult population is eligible to
vote. "2
A third example of the procedural definition of democracy could be found in the definition given by Larry Diamond in his article "Strategies for Democratization":
"a system of government that meets three essential
conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among
individuals and organized groups (especially political
parties) for all effective positions of government
power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of
force: a highly inclusive level of political
participation in the selection of leaders and policies,
at least through regular and fair elections, such that
no major (adult) social group is excluded ; and a level
of civil and political 1iberties- freedom of 10
expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and
Join organizations— sufficient to insure the integrity
of political competition and participation.
Another example could be found in the writings of
Guillermo O ’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, who in their book,
"Transition From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, talk about a "procedural minimum" required for a political democracy, such as:
"secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular
elections, partisan competition, associational
recognition and access, and executive accountabi1ity. "*
Therefore, as we can see from the above examples, the procedural definition deals with practical steps and procedures that a political system needs to follow in order to be called democratic.
2. Substantive approach:
This approach equates democracy with equality and other
ideal values, such as social justice and liberty. An example of the substantive approach is the definition given by Peter
Bachrach, in his book. The Theory of Democratic Elitism, where he states that the paramount objective of a democratic system of government is the: 11
"maximization of the self-development of every
individual.
Another example could be found in the writings of Robert
Dahl in his book Polvarchv: Participation and opposition, where he states that a democratic political system is one which is:
"completely or almost completely responsible to all its
citizens.
As we can see from the above demonstration, the concept of democracy can be defined in several ways, using different approaches. However, after we have defined democracy we need to know what does "democratization" mean? Most current definitions of democratization follow the procedural approach.
According to O ’Donnell and Schmitter:
"Democratization refers to the processes whereby the
rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied
to political institutions previously governed by other
principles (eg., coercive control, social tradition,
expert Judgment, or administrative practice), or
expanded to include persons not previously enjoying
such rights and obligations (eg., non-taxpayers,
illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign
residents), or extend to cover issues and institutions 12
not previously subject to citizen participation (eg.,
state agencies, military establishments, partisan
organizations, interest associations, productive
enterprises educational institutions, etc.).'"’
Another definition of democratization is given by Donald
Share in his article, "Transitions To Democracy And Transition
Through Transaction". According to Share:
"Democratization will refer to the establishment of
institutions and procedures that allow for all three
aspects of the definition of democracy:
First, free and contested elections for the selection of
political representatives. Second, basic civil rights.
Third, clearly established "rules of the game" that
protect these democratic 1iberties. "®
Finally we need to know the definition of one more variable, and that is "liberalization", since the democratization process is usually a gradual process that usually starts with a small degree of opening in the political system, and that might eventually lead to a democratic system.
According to Donald Share, liberalization is the:
"...easing of repression and restoration of civil
1iberties.
A more profound definition is given by O ’Donnell and 13
Schmitter:
"By liberalization we mean the process of making
effective certain rights that protect both individuals
and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts
committed by the state or third parties. On the level
of individuals, these guarantees include the classical
elements of the liberal tradition: habeas corpus;
sanctity of private home and correspondence; the right
to be defended in a fair trial according to
preestablished laws; freedom of movement, speech, and
petition; and so forth. On the level of groups,
these rights cover such things as freedom from
punishment for expressions of collective dissent from
government policy, freedom from censorship of the means
of communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily
with other citizens.
B. The Literature:
As we have seen from the above discussion, there are some
similarities and some differences in the ways by which democracy and democratization are defined. Similarly, there are differences among writers and political scientists about the
causes and the factors that lead to democracy. The literature 14
deals with two questions:
First, the genetic question: the main interest here, is
the way in which a democracy comes into being.This question
usually represents the concern of students of developing
regions.
Second, the functional question: this question deals with the factors that help preserve a functioning democracy.‘2
In this dissertation, the author is concerned with the genetic question. Algeria has been ruled by a single party for the last thirty years, and has just begun witnessing a transition to democracy. Therefore, our concern is not with the preservation of an existing democracy, but with the genesis of a new one, since no democracy has ever existed in
Algeria.
There have been several approaches to the study of the democratization process. In the following pages, the author will try to focus at some of these approaches, giving a brief
idea about each approach.
I. Dankwart Rustow: "A dynamic model of transition":
Dankwart Rustow tried to come up with a genetic theory of democracy in which he laid out a "dynamic model of 15
transition.3 Rustow's model was preceded by a number of
propositions:
First, "the factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the
ones that brought it into existence."i*
Second, "correlation is not the same as causation, a genetic
theory must concentrate on the latter."i®
Third, "not all causal links run from social and economic to
political factors."*®
Fourth, "not all causal links run from beliefs and attitudes to
actions.
Fifth, "the genesis of democracy need not be geographically
uniform: there may be many roads to democracy."*®
Sixth, "the genesis of democracy need not be temporally
uniform: different factors may become crucial during
successive phases."**
Seventh, "the genesis of democracy need not be socially 16
uniform: even in the same place and time the attitudes that
promote it may not be the same for politicians and for common
citizens."20
Eighth, "empirical data in support of a genetic theory must cover, for any given country, a time period from just before
until just after the advent of d e m o c r a c y 2 »
Ninth, "to examine the logic of transformation within political
systems, we may leave aside countries where a major impetus
came from abroad."22
Tenth, "a model or ideal type of the transition may be derived
from a close examination of two or three empirical cases and
tested by application to the rest. "23
From the above propositions it is clear that Rustow
denied the existence of a universal theory of democratization,
that would work for all cases, at all times. He was stressing
the fact that each case had its own circumstances, and what
might work for one case, might not work for another.
Rustow also tried to make it clear that causality and
correlation are two different things, and that it would be
good to assume a two-way flow of causality, or some form of 17
circular interaction between politics on one hand and economic
and social conditions on the other.
In his model, Rustow first talks about only one
background condition that he thinks essential for democratic
transition. This condition is national unity. To him other
factors such as economic and social factors are not crucial
and enter the model only indirectly.2s
Rustow then talks about a second or "preparatory phase",
in which a prolonged and inclusive political struggle sets off
the democratization process. This struggle is usually carried
out by new social classes that used to be depressed in the
past .2 6
The third phase is the "decision phase", where a decision
or the choice of democracy is made by the leaders of different
groups who played an important role in the struggles of the previous preparatory phase. This decision represents an
agreement among leaders of different groups and is
characterized by the following:
First, it will be considered as a compromise made by all groups, and will be considered as the second -best for all parties involved. This agreement will not represent any agreement on fundamentals. Second, there will also be differences even on procedures. Third, the agreement worked 18
out by the leaders will not be universal, and will have to be
transmitted to professional politicians and to the citizenry
at large.2’
The final phase is the "Habituation Phase", where
democracy wins ground and becomes more acceptable with the
passage of time,2» in this stage people get used to democracy
and eventually it becomes the norm in society.
However, Rustow realizes that his model is only a general
framework, and that its detailed application differs from one
place to another.
The problem with Rustow’s model is that it deals only
with a transition from oligarchy to democracy, and does not
deal with other types of transition. For instance, the model
does not distinguish between types of regimes, whether they
are authoritarian or totalitarian. These stages may or may not
be the same for different types of regimes.
However, Rustow's model is an example of one approach to
the study of transition. As was mentioned earlier, there are
other approaches that the author will deal with.
II. A second approach: "Paths Towards Re-democratization":
Another approach is the one that suggests several paths
to democratization, in contrast to the single path given by 19
Rustow. A clear example of this approach is found in the
writings of Alfred Stepan. Stepan lists several alternative
paths from nondemocratic regimes to democratic ones.s* These
paths are:
1. Internal restoration after external conquest.
2. Internal reformulation.
3. Externally monitored installation.
4. Re-democratization initiated from within the
authoritarian regime.
5. Re-democratization initiated by the civilian or
civilianized political leadership.
6. Re-democratization instituted by the military-as-
government.
7. Re-democratization led by government-as-institution.
8. Withdrawal of support by the mi 1itary-as-institut ion from
a civilian authoritarian regime.
9. Movement of mi 1itary-as-institution against a
civilianized populist military figure.
10. Societal-led regime termination.
11. Party pact with (or without) consociational elements.
12. Organized violent revolt coordinated by democratic
reformist parties.
13. Marxist-led revolutionary war.3° 20
These paths can be used for typological and
classification purposes. However, reality is not as simple.
The way transitions happen is usually more complicated and may
include more than one path. In other words a transition to
democracy may include a combination of several of these paths.
However, this approach followed by Stepan is an alternative
approach to the one followed by Rustow who gives a single
model of transition that applies to political regimes
regardless of the differences among them.
The purpose of listing the different paths given by
Stepan is to show another approach that some writers use when
dealing with the issue of transition to democracy. Therefore,
the author will not give details about each path mentioned by
Stepan.
III. Political Culture and Democratization:
Another approach tries to find whether there exists a
relationship between political culture and democracy. This
approach looks at several political cultures, and tries to
find a relationship between the tendency to democratize, and
between certain cultural characteristics. In other words, it
tries to see whether certain political cultures are more
encouraging to the process of democratization. It studies 21
political beliefs and political attitudes towards the government, politics, and towards participation. These studies help show the degree of tolerance and pragmatism among citizens of different countries. Gabriel Almond and Sidney
Verba in their well known book. The Civic Culture, represent this approach.3 1
IV. A profound look at individual paths:
Some writers have taken a fourth approach, in which they focus on one of the paths of democracy, then study it profoundly, and find cases to which this particular path is applicable. Examples of this approach could be seen in the work of Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring. 32 Share and
Mainwaring define "transition through transaction" as:
"one in which the processes of liberalization and
democrat izat ion are initiated and control led by the
authoritarian elite themselves^^
In their work, Share and Mainwaring also focus on certain qualities of political leadership, that facilitate the transition to democracy, through transaction. According to them, these qualities are:
"a willingness to promote democratization, a capacity to
negotiate and persuade, and an ability to sustain the 22
momentum and regulate the timing of the reform."^*
Share and Mainwaring also mention five conditions for
"transition through transaction". These conditions are:
First, " that the authoritarian regime should be well
established and widely supported".
Second, " that the authoritarian regime should be capable of
control 1ing subversive threats".
Third, " the democratic opposition must accept some limits and
rules set by the authoritarian regime".
Fourth, " Transitions through transaction require limited
levels of mass mobilization".
Fifth, " Transitions through transaction require skillful
leadership". ^s
These are the five conditions that Share and Mainwaring
think are required for the success of the democratization process according to the path of "transition through transaction".
From the above conditions and from the qualities of the political leadership we see that a very important condition
required for the success of the transition is " pragmatism". 23
Both the leaders of the government and the leaders of the
opposition should be pragmatic while dealing with one another.
They both have to realize that the agreement they reach is for the good of both the government and the opposition. On the other hand, if political leaders of both sides showed
intolerance and inflexibility, the whole process of transition could collapse.
Share and Mainwaring also stress the fact that a high
level of "mass mobilization" makes a negotiated transition extremely unlikely. When the hard-liners in the regime see that the opposition has an ability to mobilize a good number of people in support of a certain policy, or in protest of another, they usually fear for their positions, and might change their minds about going along with the democratization process.
The author thinks that the lack of pragmatism among the
leaders of the regime and of the opposition in Algeria had a great effect on the failure of the process. On the other hand, mobilizing the masses in great quantities, made the leaders of the regime suspicious about the process and influenced their decision to call it to a halt.
A very important question that Share and Mainwaring try to answer is: 24
Why do political elites in authoritarian regimes begin
to democratize?
Share and Mainwaring believe that there are several
reasons behind the decision of the leaders of the regime to
democratize. Some of these reasons are: First, factionalism
among the ruling elites in the regime. Second, the search for
legitimacy by the regime. Third, the increasing view of
democracy as a successful political system in the post World
War 11 era.^ ®
On the other hand, this type of transition has several
characteristics: First, it is elite led. Second, it is
evolutionary to a greater or lesser degree. Third, an attitude
of cooperation must exist among the majority of the elite, while the extreme elements are isolated.3?
A very important factor that really characterizes
"transition through transaction" is that of "continuity". In this type of transition, there is a great amount of continuity
in terms of elites, and in terms of social and economic
structures and political institutions. In the new system,
leaders of the current regime share power with leaders of the opposition.
As has been mentioned earlier this represents an approach different from that followed by Rustow, who suggests 25
a single model of transition. It is also different from the
approach followed by Stepan who makes a typology of all
possible paths to democracy. Share's approach is the most
common one among political writers, where a specific
transitional path is chosen, and cases that apply to the path
are dealt with, and are explained.
V. Background factors, or proximate factors?
There is a fifth approach that focuses at the type of
factors that usually influence the beginning of the
transition, as well as its outcome. This approach tries to
determine if the variables that influence the beginning and
the outcome of the process are of the background type, or of
the proximate type.
A. Background Factors:
The background factors consist of variables such as:
1. The political culture of the people in the country
that the scholar is dealing with.
2. The political structure in that particular country.
3. the level of economic development in the case country.
4. Historical and colonial legacies that the country might
have passed through at a certain period of time. 26
5. Ethnie cleavage and conflict that might exist among
the people in that country.
6 . the existence of political institutions such as
legislatures, and institutions that help resolve conflicts
among different parties.
Examples of this background approach could be found in
the writings of Samuel P. Huntington, who in his essay, "Will
More Countries Become Democratic?", talks about preconditions
to democracy. These preconditions are:
First, economic wealth and the level of economic
development. Second, social structure and the type of social
classes that exist in the country that is being studied.
Third, the political culture of the people in the case we
are studying. Fourth, the external environment and the nature
of external pressures on any given case.3*
Another example of the background approach could also be
found in the writings of Larry Diamond, who talks about
similar factors, such as:
1 . historical and colonial legacies.
2 . political culture.
3. ethnic cleavage and conflict.
4. the relation between state and society.
5. the existence of political institutions.s* 27
Diamond explains that these factors actually affect the
success and the failure of the transition.
B. Proximate Factors:
On the other hand, some writers do not agree with the
background approach, and think that it is due to factors of
the "proximate" that the beginning and outcome of the process
would be determined. Proximate factors are those immediate and
current factors that cause the success or the failure of the
transition. Examples of this type are:
1. The role played by the political leadership of the
government, as well as the opposition. In other words the
existence of hard-liners and soft-liners in the ranks of
both the government and the opposition, and the role
played by both.
2. The impact of certain political or economic crises that the
country might be facing at a certain time on the
process of transition to democracy in that country. These
crises could be a military defeat or an external invasion, massive riots and disorders due to food shortages, or due to
declining and deteriorating economic conditions.
3. Military intervention which would interrupt the
democratization process due to fear in the military as an
institution of the outcomes of the transition. 28
This approach could be found in the writings of Donald
Share, Scott Mainwaring, and Alfred Stepan as discussed above,
and also in the work of writers like Jose Maria Maravall and
Julian Santamaria (1986) and several others.
The author believes that both approaches are important.
The background approach gives us a better view of the case
that we are dealing with, allowing us to understand the
specifics of that case. However, the author believes that the
proximate factors play a more important role in determining
the beginning, and the outcome of the democratization process.
In this dissertation, Algeria is going to be used as a
case study to argue this point. The proximate factors that the
author will focus on are:
First, the role that was played by the political
leadership of both the government and the opposition, in
pushing the democratization process forward or backward.
Second, the deteriorating economic conditions, and their effect on the President’s decision to start the democratization
process.
Third, the opposition’s ability to mobilize hundreds of
thousands of people in the streets, and whether this mobilization worked for the success or for the failure of the
transition. 29
Fourth, external factors and their role in influencing the
outcome of the democratization process. This factor could be
in the form of a direct intervention in the country, or an
indirect effect on the leaders of the country. Similar to the
mobilization factor, the external factor may push the
democratization process forward or backward.
The author will follow the approach followed by Share,
O ’Donnell, Schmitter and others. The basic focus will be on
the effect that the proximate factors played in the process.
As was mentioned, the case of Algeria was chosen, and the
author will present the necessary evidence from that case that
show that the proximate factors were the crucial factors in
determining the outcome of the process.
This was an overview of the literature on the
democratization process. The author tried to explain some of
the different approaches that political writers have followed in dealing with the process. The author will now move
to another theoretical subject that deals with Islam and the
concept of an Islamic State. We need to define this concept,
since it plays a major role in the case that we are dealing
with. 30
The Islamic State:
A very important concept that needs to be defined in the
very beginning is that of the Islamic State. Since this
concept is frequently used by all Islamic movements in the
Muslim World, and since the Islamic Salvation Front FIS, the
major opposition party in Algeria, had called for the
establishment of such a state, one needs to shed some light at
the concept. However, before dealing with the concept of the
Islamic State, the author thinks that it is important to
explain "Islam”, since many people in the West either do not
know much about Islam, or are misinformed about it.
C. What is Islam ?
For Muslims around the world, Islam means the submission
of the will of the created to the will of the creator, who is
Allah. Muslims believe that Allah Almighty GOD, created the
universe and every thing in it, including the human being. Rules and regulations were set by Allah for the way this
universe is run.
According to Muslims, the first rule is the submission of
all the universe to the will of Allah. By submission a Muslim
accepts that the control of all natural phenomena is in the
hands of Allah, and only Allah. 31
Therefore, according to this definition, Islam includes
all the messages that were sent down to mankind through a
chain of messengers and prophets since Adam, until Mohammed,
since, according to Muslims, all those messengers were teaching the same thing, and that is the submission to Allah.
Among the often mentioned messengers and prophets mentioned in
the Quran are Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Ishmael, Josef,
David, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammad (peace be upon them).
The first and most important principle in Islam is that
sovereignty belongs to the creator not to the created. In
other words, sine Allah is the one who created man kind, then
he is the one who knows what is best for mankind.
There are two kinds of actions in this life:
First, involuntary actions, which occur beyond the
control of human beings, such as the beating of the heart, the
running of the blood in the arteries, the movement of the sun, the earth, and the solar system. These, and several
other natural phenomenon, are controlled by Allah.
Second, voluntary actions, deciding what to do and what
not to do. Deciding on where to go, and what to eat, and what
not to eat. These, and other decisions by humans, are of the
voluntary type. Accordingly, each human is going to be judged
in the day of judgement, based on the voluntary behavior in
which he engages. 32
D. The Political System In Islam :
In Islam there is no separation between the state and religion. The head of an Islamic State rules in the light of
the Shari’a (Islamic laws), which are deduced from the Quran
and from the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad. The state in
Islam has certain features that need to be explained. Some of
these features are:
First, in this state, all citizens accept and agree to
obey the laws of Allah. This willingness to obey is a
voluntary action, since it is up to the humans to obey or not
to obey. In this state, each citizen knows that he (she) is a
deputy, or a vicegerent (Khalifa) of Allah on earth.
The citizen agrees to work according to the rules of Allah,
that are mentioned in the Quran, and that came through the
"Sunna" (sayings and deeds of the prophet Mohammad).
Second, in this state, sovereignty belongs to Allah and
only to him, as it is the case in any theocracy. However, the
difference between Islam and other theocracies is that , there
is no group of priests or scholars who monopolize the
vicegerency position. In Islam all Muslims as individuals and
as a group are responsible for this position. Muslim scholars (ulama), are not supposed to contradict
any rule of the Quran or of the Sunna. Those who try to give some interpretations to suit the desires of the rulers are
often exposed by the people and by other scholars. The rules
that were mentioned in the Quran and the Sunna are called
Hodood which could be translated as boundaries. There are
several Hodood that are dealt with in Islam such as :
First, in the field of economy there are several laws
that should be followed, such as the right of private
property, the right of conducting business through lawful
means, the duty of paying zakat (alms) which is 2.5% of a
persons wealth every year, the forbidding of Riba (usury), the
forbidding of gambling, the forbidding of monopoly, and the
law of inheritance.
All these are clear cut rules that Allah talks about in
the Quran, and are discussed by the prophet in the Hadith (his
sayings) and in his deeds.
Second, as for the social life, adultery is forbidden in
Islam, and if some one commits it, he or she will receive a
certain type of punishment depending on his or her marital
status. There are certain rules and regulations for marriage
and divorce, as well as for adoption.
Third, eating and drinking have their rules as well. As 34
an example, it is unlawful to eat pork or any of its products,
and it is also unlawful to eat meat that was not slaughtered in a certain way. It is unlawful to drink alcohol, or any thing
that might cause the loss of consciousness.
These are examples of acts and things that "Shari’a"
(Islamic Law), has dealt with. As for modern problems that did
not exist at the time of the Prophet, Islam opened the door
for ijtihad, which means that, Muslim jurist scholars with
extensive knowledge of Quran and Sunna. These scholars follow
two practices, one is ijma’ (consensus of scholars), and the other is qiyas (juristic reasoning by analogy), in order to
reach rulings concerning modern concerns. However, there are two conditions for these rulings:
First, any ruling has to be based on the spirit of the
laws of Islam. Second, any ruling by these scholars should have a strong dalel, which means proof from the Quran and the
Sunna.
As in the field of ijtihad, disagreement between scholars on certain issues might occur. However, this disagreement is not a source of disturbance to the society, since it does not contradict the Hodood.
The Hodood are those areas that deal with what is lawful and what is unlawful according to the Quran and the Sunna. 35
Therefore, when Muslims demand the application of Shari'a in
their countries, it means that, they want Islamic juris
prudence with all its components, to be implemented by the
state.
Third, this Islamic state is an intellectual state that
is based on faith. Those who run an Islamic state should be
Muslims. As for those who are not Muslims, they have almost
the same rights as Muslims have, except the right of taking
important positions in the state, especially those crucial
positions that may affect the state.
Human rights, dignity, and the security of non-Moslems
all guaranteed by the Shari'a. Protection of the rights and privileges of non-Muslims have been common practice at the
time of the prophet, and later under the Islamic Khulafa
(caliphs).
Fourth, this state is based on faith which is Islam
regardless of color, ethnicity, language, or geographic
region. Therefore, when Islam came to North Africa, and was
accepted by the indigenous population, the Berber, they
themselves took leadership and carried Islam across the
Mediterranean sea to Spain. For Muslims, Islam is a universal 36
religion that came to all the people on earth, not to the Arabs
only.
Fifth, the general policy of the state is controlled by
piety and fear of Allah. Therefore, in Islam the goal does not
justify the means, and all means should be based on what is
lawful, and should be based on the spirit of Islamic
teachings.
Sixth, there are basic goals and duties of this state,
such as the achievement of social Justice among all people,
enjoining what is permissible and forbidding what is
prohibited, and the establishing of justice and equality in the Muslim society. In Islam, people are equal in both rights
as well as duties before the law. Equality also applies to the
services that are supplied by the state to citizens.
One of the principles of Islam is the paying of zakat by
every Muslim who can afford. Zakat is equal to 2.5% of a
Muslim's wealth, and as for those who cannot pay, the state must provide them with their needs.
The social, political, and economic life of a Muslim is
therefore, based on the above rules. In any activity, a Muslim
should watch for what is lawful and what is not, keeping in 37
mind piety and righteousness. Therefore, a merchant or a
businessman cannot cheat in merchandise or in the prices. He
also cannot monopolize things that are essential for people, such as food and drinks.
A political candidate cannot use unlawful methods to get
the position he wants, and cannot expose the personal secrets
of others just to get the position he or she wants. Serving
in any position in the state is a responsibility before
Allah, and the higher the position, the higher would be the
responsibility of the employee.
The author will not go into more details about the
Islamic state, although there are many examples in the history of Islam where the above principles were applied.
However, the author has explained the principles of an Islamic
state since it is the demand of most Islamic parties. Usually
all Islamic parties have the same goal, which is the
establishment of an Islamic state. However, they differ in the
route and the method that must be taken in order to achieve
such a goal.
As was mentioned, this has been a brief explanation of
the concept of an Islamic State. Later on in the dissertation
the author will deal with the political program of the Islamic
Salvation Front, FIS, the main opposition party in Algeria, 38
and will show the resemblance between its program and the
principles of the Islamic State that were mentioned above.
The author finally needs to make a distinction between an
Islamic State and a Muslim State. As for the term Islamic
State, the author has tried to explain its principles.
However, the term "Muslim state" refers to those countries in
which all, or the majority of the population are Muslims, and
in which the majority of the rulers are Muslims.
Islamic movements and parties have some problems with the
rulers in the Muslim World. These rulers may be practicing
Islam or may not be practicing. In most cases, Islamic movements ask those rulers to rule by Islamic Laws and not by secular laws. However, nearly all Muslim rulers refuse to apply the Shari’a, and continue to rule according to imported
laws that came from Europe. As a result, several of those movements challenge those rulers and consider them non-Muslims based on the following factors:
First, the fact that some of them do not practice Islam, and do not pray , fast or give zakat simply means that they do not apply the principle of Islam. Therefore, they are considered non-Muslims.
Second, some of them drink alcohol, commit adultery, gamble, even torture and kill many Muslims who oppose them. 39
Third, the fact that they refuse to apply Shari’a, while
there exist several verses in the Quran that clearly state,
that who ever would not apply the laws of Allah, then they would be considered non Mu slims.*2
This was an overview of some basic Islamic concepts that must be known by those who study the Muslim World. In our
case, these concepts are also important, since the main opposition group in Algeria, the FIS, is an Islamic movement, which was demanding the establishment of an Islamic State.
In this chapter, the author tried to shed some light on the literature that deals with the transition to democracy. An overview was given of the various approaches that deal with the process. Two specific approaches were singled out, the one that focuses on background factors, and the one that focuses on proximate factors. As was mentioned earlier, the author thinks that the proximate factors are more important in determining the beginning of the democratization process, as well as the outcome of the process. Therefore, the author will study the case of Algeria, will try to prove that the proximate factors caused the failure of the transition. 40
Footnotes CheLF»ter 11
1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism, and Democracy
(New York: Harper and Row, 1950): 242.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become
Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99.2 (Summer 1984):
193-218.
3. Larry Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism:
Strategies for Democratization," The Washington Quarterly
(Winter 1989): 142.
4. Guilleremo O ’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions
From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain
Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986): 8.
5. Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism
6 . Robert Dahl, Polvarchv: Participation and Opposition (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
7. O'Donnell and Schmitter, ibid.: 8.
8 . Donald Share, "Transitions To Democracy and Transition
Through Transaction," Comparative Political Studies 19
(January 1987). 41
F o o tn o tes Ctietr^ter* 11
9. Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transition Through
Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain," Political
Liberalization In Brazil ed. Wayne Selcher (Boulder: Westview,
1986): 177.
10. O ’Donnell and Schmitter, ibid.: 7.
11. Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," Comparative
Politics 2.3 (April 1970): 340.
1 2 . ibid
13. ibid
14. ibid
15. ibid
16. ibid
17. ibid
18. ibid
19. ibid
2 0 . ibid
2 1 . ibid
2 2 . ibid
23. ibid 346
24. ibid 344
25. ibid 352 42
Footrxotes Chetf?ter 11
26. ibid.
27. ibid.: 357
28. ibid.: 358
29. Alfred Stepan, "Paths Towards Re-democratization:
Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives ed. Guillermo
O ’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
30. ibid.: 66-84.
31. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
32. Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transition Through
Transaction," Political Liberalization In Brazil ed. Wayne
Selcher (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); also see Donald
Share "Transition to Democracy And Transition Through
Transaction," Comparative Political Studies (January, 1987).
33. ibid.: 177.
34. ibid.: 199.
35. ibid.
36. ibid.: 186.
37. Donald Share, ibid. 43
Footnotes Ch.ap>ter' 11
38. Huntington, ibid.
39. Larry Diamond, Democracy In Developing Countries: Africa
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989): 6-24.
40. Abu Al-Ala Al-Mawdudi, Khilafa and MuIk [Caliphate and
Kingdom] (1966) translated to Arabic by Ahmad Idrees (1978)
9-10.
41. ibid.: 34.
42. ibid. Chapter III
The Historical Background
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, some political
science writers believe that it is due to background variables that the beginning and the outcome of the democratization process is usually determined. To these writers, factors such as, the legacies of the colonization period affect the outcome of the process. However, the author of this dissertation believes that the determining factors are not of the background type, but of the proximate type. By proximate, the author means those current and direct factors that were
influencing the process as it was developing.
These include factors such as the positions taken by the
leaders of both the regime and the opposition; and factors such as the mobilization of the masses in support of a policy or in protest of another, and the effect that this mobilization usually have on the process. A sudden incident or an economic crisis that might show up during the transition, might lead to the failure or the success of the transition.
These are examples of the proximate factors that the author believes are crucial and influential to the process.
However, the author does not reduce the importance of the
44 45
background factors, that might have an indirect affect on the
process. Therefore, the author will study the history of
Algeria, and the legacies of the colonization period, and will
try to show that these legacies did not influence the outcome
of the transition in that country,
1. The French Colonization
A. The invasion of Algeria, 1830 :
In June 1830 the French army landed near the city of
Algiers, and after a fight between the Muslim army and the
French army, the Dey (ruler) of Algeria surrendered. According
to the French, the reasons for the invasion were two:
1. To take revenge from the Dey of Algeria who offended the
French consul, when he hit him with a fly wisk in front of
other diplomats.
2. To stop the piracy that was waged from Algeria, and that was
annoying all Europe.
According to the Algerian side, the reasons for the
invasion were:
1. To escape payment of an Algerian loan that was given to
France, without interest, in 1794 when France was under a
British blockade.
2. To enhance the popularity of the unpopular regime of King
Charles X. 46
3...T o compete with other European powers, in creating a new
empire.‘
The French signed an agreement known as the Convention of
Algiers with the Dey, in which they promised to respect the
dignity and religion of the Algerian people. They also
promised to respect the dignity of the Algerian women, and of
property and customs.2 However, these promises were not kept,
and once the French put their feet on the Algerian land,
hundreds of thousands of people were killed, women were raped
and sold as slaves, children were killed, and mosques were
destroyed.3
B. The struggle of Prince Abulqadir (1832-1847)
The first organized resistance was waged by Prince
Abdulqadir, and it was carried out under the banner of Islam,
against the French infidels. When Prince Abdulqadir was
elected in 1832 to lead the "jihad" (holy war) against the
French, he was around twenty five years old. His father was
Shaikh Muheddin, who was a well known Islamic scholar in the
"Oran" region. Prince Abdulqadir was taught the Quran, and was
given Islamic education.« The most important thing to be done
was the unification of all Algerian tribes against the French.
Since some tribes were cooperating with the French, they had
to be forced to submit to the leadership of prince
Abdulqadir.^ 47
The unification of the tribes was crucial for Abdulqadir,
in order to fight the French as a single unified front to
avoid the wasting of efforts. This strategy was later used in
1954, when the National Liberation Front, the FLN declared the
Jihad against the French. The reason for this was that after
more than a century of the French occupation, many people felt
that military struggle against the French was fruitless.
Therefore, some people who were cooperating with the French,
or who thought that they could become French citizens, had to
be "convinced" otherwise.® The struggle against the French by
Prince Abdulqadir ended in 1847, by his defeat and surrender.’
However, the struggle continued by the tribes against the
French, and the French were only able to claim ccntrol on the
tribes by 1904.®
3. Three political approaches:
In the twentieth century, the French were able to
suppress all kinds of military resistance against their
occupation. However, most of the military resistance was
carried out in the country side, and in the desert. As for the
cities, a different kind cf struggle was taking place. This type was political rather than military, and ranged from the
calls for the assimilation with the French to the calls for 48
total independence from France. The political work of these
three movements, paved the way for the National Liberation
Front, the FLN, which later on led the military struggle
against the French, that led to independence.
1. The Liberal Assiroilationists:
This group represented the intellectual and political
elite in the Algerian society. Members of this group were
educated in the French scholastic system, and many of them
studied in France itself. They were therefore detached from
the mass of Algerian Muslims. Officially this group was
represented in an organization called the "Federation of
Elected Muslim Algerians", which was established on the 11th
of September, 1927 in Algiers, the capital of Algeria.
On many occasions, the French administration would choose
some members of this group, to represent the Algerian people,
then a small portion of the indigenous population would be
allowed to choose from this group.®
To the Assimilationists, nothing was wrong with
cooperating with the French, a move which would be denounced
by other organizations. They also believed in the necessity of the policy of fusion between France and Algeria. They looked at Algeria as part of France, and they called upon France to 49
give French citizenship to all Algerians. They also called upon
the Algerians to get educated in the schools which used to
teach the French language, and urged the Algerians to adopt
the French culture.
However, due to the rejection by the French
authorities,the French colon, and the Algerian Muslims to
these ideas, the Assimilationists group was later forced to
change their positions several times. Therefore, members of
this group moved from a position that advocated full
integration with the French in the middle of the 1930's , to a
position that called for a full independence from France, a
decade later.> *
The demands of this group could be summarized in the
following points:
First, the right of representation of the Algerians in
the French National Assembly. Second, equality between the
Algerians and the French in the military service. Third,
equality in treatment between the Algerians and the French,
especially in the laws of labor. Fourth, permission for the
Algerians to immigrate freely to France. Fifth, the
cancellation of the law of the indigenous population. Sixth, development of the education system for the Algerians , as well
as, the technical training. Seventh, the application of the 50
French social laws on the A l g e r i a n s .‘2
However, this group had no real popularity among the
Algerian population. They were looked down upon by both the
Algerians and from the French. If one of them would go to
court for any reason, and would tell the judge that he was an
Algerian, the judge would tell him: "No, you are French". If
he would demand to be treated as a French citizen, the judge
would tell him: "No, you are an Arab".‘3
At the end this group had no alternative other than
cooperating with the nationalist movement, when the revolution
was declared in 1954. People who belonged to this group felt
frustrated when the French authorities continued to ignore
their moderate demands. They tried their best to accept the
myth that they were truly regarded as French citizens by the
French colonizers.
They were alienated from their own people, the Algerians,
by adopting the French slogan " that Algeria was part of
France", and they even denied the existence of an Algerian
nation. All these concessions fell on deaf ears in the French
community, and led with the passage of time to the belief
among the Assimilationists, that they and the French could
never be unified.
The leader of this group, Ferhat Abbas, once wrote in an 51
article published in 1936:
"Sad I discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a
nationalist and I would not blush as if I had committed
a crime. ... However, I will not die for the Algerian
nation, because it does not exist. I have not found it.
I have examined History, I questioned the living and
the dead, I visited cemeteries; nobody spoke to me
about it. I then turned to the Quran and I sought for
one solitary verse forbidding a Muslim from integrating
himself with a non-Muslim nation. I did not find that
either. One cannot build on the wind.^*
This same person moved away from the idea of integration
with the French, to that of total independence from France,
due to the discriminatory policies of the French government,
that never really regarded the Algerian Muslims as equivalent
to the more civilized French citizens.*®
2. Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama:
During the time of World War I, many Algerian Muslim
scholars moved to neighboring countries. Before the war, the
French authorities totally neglected the scholars, and made it
difficult for them to teach in schools and institutes that
belonged to the state. One of these scholars, Abdulhameed Ben 52
Badis left to Tunisia where he got his education. Later on he
travelled to Mecca to make the pilgrimage. On his way back he passed by Egypt, where he was honored and well treated. His
education in Al-Zaytoona University in Tunisia, and his
travelling brought him in touch with the movement of Islamic
reformism.
While in Egypt, he was influenced by the thoughts and
ideas of scholars like Mohammad Abdoh and Rachid Rida, who called for the necessity of the development of the mentality of Muslim scholars in a way that would allow them to meet the new challenges of modernization. At the same time, Ben Badis was influenced by the ideas of Shaikh Mohammed Ben Abdul
Wahhab who was in the Arabian Peninsula.
Shaikh Abdul Wahhab urged Muslims to go back to the true teachings of Islam, which existed in the Holy Quran and in the
Sunna of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him). In those days, there were many ideas that were introduced to Islam, and practiced by the people because of their ignorance. As an example the idea of the existence of holy men or saints, who would have certain spiritual powers that would enable them to heal and to inflict pain on people. A kind of mystical powers that were introduced to Islam by pagans, and by false saints, and Sufis who benefited from those practices. 53
Shaikh Mohammed Ben Abdul Wahhab fought against such Sufi
practices in the Arabian Peninsula. Later, when he returned to
Algeria, Shaikh Abdulhameed Ben Badis called for the
purification of Islam from mysticism. The French at the time
were supporting such mystic practices, because it kept Muslims
passive and indifferent to them. All that the French had to do
was to support and control those "saints", who would guarantee
the obedience of the Algerian Muslims.'®
In 1924 Ben Badis approached other scholars, such as
Shaikh Al-Bashir Al-Ibrahimi and suggested the establishment
of an association for Algerian scholars (ulama) that would
teach and educate the Algerian people about Islam. After
nearly a hundred years of colonization, the Algerians were in
a state of social and moral defeat, therefore, the best way of
fighting the French colonialism (according to the ulama) was
not through bullets and blood, but through education. This
would eventually raise their level of understanding, give them
confidence in themselves, and make them more able to demand
their rights.
The association was actually established in 1931 and the
program of the Ulama had three sections; religious, social, and political (although the political was not stated openly).'’
The constitution of the Association of the Algerian Muslim 54
Ulama stated that:
First, the association will not concern itself with
political issues at all, and that it is basically an
intellectual and moral organization. Second, its goals are to
fight social diseases, such as alcohol, gambling,
unemployment, ignorance, illiteracy, and anything forbidden by
Islam, by human mind , and by common practice. Third, the
association will use all the legal and legitimate methods in
order to achieve its goals.
The ultimate goal of the association was to separate
Algeria from France, but this was not stated in its
constitution. However, this was clear in the famous statement
made by its leader Ben Badis in 1932: "Islam is our religion,
Arabic is our language, and Algeria is our country", and in
1936 he said : "the Algerian nation is not France, it can never
be France, and it does not want to be France."i®
The work of the ulama was in the schools, in the mosques,
and in the press, where they had several newspapers, such as
Al-Muntaqid, and A l - S h i h a b .20 The association attacked two
forms of social illnesses in the society: first, the mystic practices of some Sufis who claim to have supernatural powers.
The association considered these practices as un-Islamic, and
as a form of intellectual colonization that the French 55
supported.
The main reason why such a phenomenon existed, according
to the ulama, was due to the ignorance of many Algerians about
the basic teachings of Islam. Therefore, the solution was to
teach people their religion, and to explain to them that those
mystic Sufis were fake.
The second issue that the ulama wanted to deal with was
that of the French citizenship. The French government called
on some Algerians, who were educated in French schools to
become French citizens. The ulama fought against such a call
since it threatened the Islamic and Arabic identity of the
Algerians. The ulama played a very important role in
preserving the Islamic and Arabic identity of the Algerian
people.
Since 1912, and until his death, Ben Badis and the
Association of the Algerian Muslim Ulama tried to fight
illiteracy in Algeria, in order to achieve the intellectual
independence of the Algerians before achieving the political
one. The basic valuable characteristic of the ulama was their
pragmatism, which enabled them to deal with different nationalistic factions in Algeria. They were able to deal with
both the moderate faction of the nationalist movement, as well
as with the extremist factions. In the Algerian Islamic 56
Conference that took place in June 1936, the ulama even
cooperated with the Algerian Communist Party.21
This characteristic is very important, because it enabled
it to represent a wide base of the society. The importance of
the work of the ulama and of Ben Badis could be seen in the
fact that most of the current Islamic parties and movements
have claimed that they represent a continuation of Association
of Algerian Muslim Ulama, and Ben Badis.
3. The North African Star, ENA (Etoile Nord Africaine):
This party was established in March 1926 in Paris, by a
group of North Africans. It included members from Tunisia,
Morocco, and Algeria. However, the Tunisian and Moroccan members gradually left the party, hence it became an all
Algerian party. The basic goal for this party was to defend
the material and moral interests of the North African people.
Many North African workers used to live in France, and
some of them were ex-soldiers in the French army during World
War II. Also, some North African students, who were studying
in France, were also members in the party. There was very
little connection between the party in France and the people
in Algeria.22
The real goal of the party was to achieve total 57
independence of Algeria. The famous Algerian member of the party was Messali Al-Hadj who later on became the president of
the party. Although the North African Star was a left-wing party that grew with the support and help of the French socialists and communists, it usually used Islamic slogans when addressing the Algerian people. The membership card was addressing "our Muslim brothers", and some verses of the Quran were written in the card.^ 3
This shows that the nationalist movement in Algeria had to depend on the religious sentiments of the Algerians in order to get the support it needed. As we have mentioned earlier, the struggle and resistance against the French from the very early days was carried in the name of Islam against the non-believers. However, the North African Star represented a radical and revolutionary party that sought total
independence from the French by all possible means.^ *
The founders of the ENA had two types of demands: short term and long term demands. Some of the short term demands were :
First, the immediate abolition of the Law of the indigenous population "code d ’indigenats", which was a very repressive law against the indigenous population, which allowed the confiscation of land of the Algerians, and the 58
group responsibility of the Algerians for any "hostile" act against the F r e n c h . 2s
Second, amnesty should be given for political prisoners and for those exiled. Third, freedom of the press, freedom of political association and the freedom to call for public meetings. Fourth, access to all levels of education to all
Algerians, and the governmental support for schools that teach
Arabic language. Fifth, financial assistance should be given to Algerian peasants, in the form of loans.2 6
As for the long term goals of the ENA, which were stated in early 1927:
First, the independence of Algeria. Second, the withdrawal of French troops. Third, the formation of a national army. Fourth, confiscation of the large agricultural property that was taken by force by the settlers, and then the distribution of this land among the peasants. Fifth, the respect of small and medium property holdings. Sixth, the return of lands and forests seized by the French state.
Seventh, the confiscation of banks, mines, railways, harbors and all other public administrations that were seized by the French invaders. Eighth, free and compulsory teaching of Arabic at all levels. Ninth, the recognition by the
Algerian state of the workers’ rights to set up trade unions 59
and to strike. Tenth, the promotion by the Algerian state of
welfare programs in favor of popular strata.2 ?
The ENA was banned by the French authorities first in
1929, and again in 1937. In that same year, Messali formed a
successor to the ENA called the Algerian People’s Party, PPA
(Parti du Peuple Algérien), which was dissolved in 1939. The
same party was reconstituted again in 1946 under another name,
the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD).^®
When the first congress of the MTLD took place on the
15th of February, 1947, a paramilitary organization was
established. It was called the Special Organization (OS)
(Organisation Spéciale) which was founded to carry out
terrorist operations against the French.
The OS was uncovered by the French secret service, and it
gave rise to another violent organization known as the
Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA) which was
established by Ahmed Ben Bella, who later became the president of Algeria after independence .2 « As a result, the
MTLD witnessed some disagreements among the leaders, and later
on the National Liberation Front was established by some
members who were unhappy with the MTLD, and with its leader
Messali Al-Hadj.
As we can see from the above demonstration, the 60
nationalist movement in Algeria before independence was
represented in different currents. The Assimilationists thought that it was impossible for Algeria to gain
independence from France after 130 years of colonization. As a result, they called upon France to grant them the French citizenship, and to treat them equally with the French citizens. They knew that they had no audience among the masses, therefore, they always tried to justify their positions to the Algerian masses who refused to become French.
To the Algerian layman, what really mattered was his being a Muslim, and his right to practice Islam. However, the
French record on treating Muslims was terrible, and all
Algerians remembered what the French did to the mosques when they came as invaders. The majority of Algerians regarded the struggle against the French as a struggle between Islam and
Christianity, and they knew that they could not trust the
Christian colonizers who killed women and children.
Into this environment came the Association of Algerian
Muslim Ulama. Their goal at the time was not to fight the
French physically. They wanted to educate the people, teach them Islam, and teach them Arabic language which was neglected for nearly a hundred years by the French. They wanted to show the Algerians that they were different from the French in 61
their religion, culture, and language. This kind of
enlightenment would lead down the road to a natural rejection
of the French.
The first enemy that the ulama, and specially their
leader. Shaikh Abdulhameed Ben Badis, had to deal with was
mysticism. They wanted to fight those fake persons, who
convinced the people that they were "saints" who could make
miracles. Those fake "saints" really represented the "opium"
for the Algerians. Islam is a system of life, which urges
people to work for the best, and not a religion that asks
people to submit to some proclaimed "saints". This was the
message that the ulama wanted to give to the people, a message
that was well received by the Algerian masses.
The problem with the method followed by the ulama, was
that it was time consuming, and could only give results in the
long run. However, many Algerians were already frustrated by
the policies of the colonizer, and they were sure that France
was not going to let Algeria go peacefully. The North African
Star, and later the Algerian People’s Party, the PPA, and the
Movement for Triumph for the Democratic Liberties, were
movements that represented the radical wing in the nationalist
movement. Although their path was bloody, but it was quick,
and would stir the situation. 62
With the creation of the special organization, the OS,
the radical wing brought a massive amount of revenge on the
Algerians by the French. Although many Algerians were killed,
this approach exposed the brutality of the French colonizers
to the whole world. This created a great amount of pressure
against the French both externally and internally, and
eventually the French withdrew from Algeria, after 130 years
of colonization.
2. The National Liberation Front, the FLN, and Independence:
As we have mentioned earlier, the Special Organization,
the OS, which was the military faction of the MTLD, the
Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties was used to
wage military operations against the French. This organization
was uncovered in 1950 by the French secret service, and was
eventually replaced by another organization, the
Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Aotion, the CRUA.
This organization was also military in nature, and was
founded by Ahmad Ben Bella, who was a dissident from the MTLD,
and an ex-French army soldier.3® Ahmad Ben Bella, along with
eight other people, all known as the "historic chiefs" of the
Algerian revolution, established the CRUA, which dedicated
itself to the violent overthrow of the French colonial system. 63
The nine leaders were : Ahmad Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider, Hocine
Aït Ahmad, Belqasem Krim, Rabah Bitat, Mohammed Boudiaf,
Moustafa Ben Boulaid, Al-Arabi Ben Mhidi, and Murad
Didouche.^i
This group was divided into two sub-groups:
First, the "externals", were those who were assisting the
revolution outside Algeria, and were basically located in
Egypt. The externals were: Ahmad Ben Bella, Mohammed Khidr,
and Hocine Alt Ahmad.
Second, the "internals", were those who were actually
leading the war against the French inside Algeria. The
internals were : Belqasem Krim, Mohammad Boudiaf, Ben Boulaid,
Ben Mhidi, Murad Didouche, and Rabah Bitat.^ 2
The revolution actually started in November, 1954, when
the National Liberation Front was declared. The leaders of the FLN were the same nine leaders of the CRUA, with the same
division of labor between the externals, and the internals.^ a
The most important thing about the FLN is that it
contained several political and cultural approaches, that were
contradictory on some occasions. One approach called for the
establishment of a secular state after independence. Another
called for a state in which Shari'a (Islamic Laws) should be
applied. Some called for an Arab state, where the Arabic 64
language would be the official language of the state. Others
called for a bi-lingual society, where both Arabic and Berber
languages would be tolerated, and basically those were the FLN
members who were of Berber origins.
Some looked at a society in which the French language
would continue to be the official language.^ * All these
contradictions floated to the surface immediately after
independence, and took the shape of a power struggle.
A very important conference, known as the "Tripoli
Congress" took place in Tripoli Libya, in May 1962, two months before independence. This conference was organized by the FLN,
to bring closer together all the different points of view of the different factions. Therefore, the FLN wanted to come up with some general goals around which the different factions would agree. These goals were:
1. Assurance of the Arab identity of Algeria.
2. Agreement on the necessity of an Arab and an Islamic
developmental project for future, independent Algeria.
3. Building the economic national capabilities of the
country.
4. Adoption of an anti-imperialist position and a commitment to
agricultural reform.
5. Achievement of a society of equality and Justice. 65
Generally speaking, the Tripoli Congress, tried to
combine the principles of Islam and those of socialism.3®
These goals were general and lacked specifics. This led later
on around independence to the clashes that took place between
the FLN political bureau, under Ahmad Ben Bella, and Houari
Boumedienne on one side, and between Ben Yousef Ben Khidda the
head of the provisional government, and some Wilaya (regions)
leaders, who represented the internal fighters on the other
side. These fights ended with thousands of Algerian casualties
caused by Algerians themselves.
These general rules of the Tripoli Congress also show
that the FLN was a front that tried to combine different
ideologies and aspirations of those who participated in the
revolution. It was not (at least during that period ) a
political party that had a clear program. Later on, when
President Ben Bella tried to take the FLN and the country to
the left, then strong opposition grew against the FLN, since
it was no longer representing the general trend of the
Algerians. As a result. President Ben Bella had to go.
The power struggles that took place immediately after
independence showed that the leaders of the revolution failed
in institutionalizing the revolution. The Algerians unified
their position, and forgot about their differences only 66
temporarily, until independence was achieved. Once it was
achieved, then these differences floated to the surface. In
the coming section, we will try to shed some light on these
differences and how they affected post-independence Algeria.
3. After Independence:
French President Charles De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an
independent country on July, 3, 1962. Later on the same month,
members of the Provisional Government of the Algerian
Republic, the GPRA (Gouvernment Provisoire de la République
Algeriénne), headed by Ben Yousef Ben Khedda arrived in
Algiers. They installed themselves as the provisional
executive.
However, Ahmad Ben Bella, one of the nine historic
leaders, did not approve this step, and therefore, allied himself with Colonel Houari Boumedienne the chief of staff of
the ALN, the National Liberation Army. They both moved to the
capital, and after some bloody clashes in several fronts, Ben
Bella was installed as the president of A l g e r i a . The most
important point here is that Ben Bella, along with
Boumedienne, and the army that took over power, represented
the external leadership. Those who were fighting the war
against the French, and who suffered most, were robbed of 67
their own victory.
The army that took over Algiers was a fresh army that was kept in Morocco during the war of independence. After
independence, this army along with the external leadership took over the leadership of the country. This point is
important, since many Algerians who voted against the FLN in both the municipal and parliamentary elections, say that the secular faction in the FLN stole the fruits of the revolution, that was originally waged in the name of Islam.3’
This argument was used by the Islamic political parties
in the recent elections, and is still used. We will deal more with this point later in the chapters that deal with the current period.
1. The presidency of Ahmed Ben Bella:
In September, 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella was selected by the
National Constituent Assembly, as the first Algerian president after independence. The National Assembly that chose him was elected by a single list of FLN-approved candidates.^ » From the original list of 180 candidates, who were to be approved by the FLN before being elected to the Assembly, 60 were purged by the political bureau, and the names of Ben Bella’s supporters were placed i n s t e a d . ^9
As was mentioned earlier, until this moment, the FLN was 68
a front that represented different tendencies. However, in a
move like this, Ben Bella was drifting with the FLN away from
its original nature, of combining the adversaries. He began
using the FLN to strengthen himself, by installing his
supporters. Later on, in 1964, his efforts to drift to the
"radical left" with the FLN were evident in the first Party
Congress that was held on April 16, 1964.
This congress came up with what was known as the "Charte
d ’Alger", which was a clear drifting of the country to the
left. What the charter contained was:
1. The end to the coalition nature of the FLN, that included
several different trends.
2. The declaration, that the country’s ideology would be
the radical ideology, that was based on the scientific
and socialist revolution.
3. The disconnection with the traditional classes of society,
and the alliance with the working class, and the
revolutionary intelligentsia.
4. The assurance of legitimacy of the FLN, and its control
of all other political formations.4°
5. Popular militias, which Defense Minister Boumedienne
opposed, were to be formed, but the army would be able to
control them in time of war.^i 69
It is very important to keep in mind here that Ben Bella came to office by the support of the army and its leader
Houari Boumedienne as we mentioned earlier. However, President
Ben Bella dismissed or tried to force some cabinet ministers who were close allies of Boumedienne out of office. He also transferred pro-Boumedienne officers to less important posts, and later on, tried to build a People’s Militia as a counterforce for the army. Because of these steps. President
Ben Bella was forced to go. On June 19, Ben Bella was deposed by a bloodless military coup, led by Defense Minister Houari
Boumedienne.^ ^
2. The presidency of Houari Boumedienne:
Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne, and leader of the coup, immediately suspended the constitution. The goal of the coup was the " re-establishment of the principles of the revolution toward an authentic brand of socialism, and an end to the internal divisions of Ben Bella’s regime and the personal nature of the role".*3 He formed the Council of the
Revolution, which was constituted of twenty six members, and was headed by Boumedienne. This council was the "supreme political body in Algeria", and was largely made up of military men.^ * 70
The support base for Boumedienne was made up of former
internal military leaders during the war of independence,
leaders of the ANP (People's National Army, and a new class of
young technocrats.45 Although Boumedienne succeeded in
achieving stability in Algeria, however, this stability was
made at the expense of public participation in the political
process.* ®
As in the case of Ben Bella, Boumedienne surrounded
himself with close allies, and s u p p o r t e r s . D u r i n g the 1968-
1972 period Boumedienne succeeded in putting the country on
the path of heavy industry, especially the petroleum and gas
industry. Later on in 1976 a new national charter and a new
constitution were approved. Boumedienne was elected the
president of the republic, and according to the new
constitution, he became the head of the state, head of
government, commander in chief of the armed forces, head of
national defense, and the head of the FLN.**
In 1978 Boumedienne died and left behind him a power
vacuum, which was to be filled by the army's nominee. Colonel
Chadli Benjedid.
3. The presidency of Chadli Benjedid:
Chadli represented the choice of the military. After the 71
death of Boumedienne, two political figures, aspired to the
position of the president. One was Mohammad Salah Yahyawi, FLN
coordinator, and former head of the military academy. He had
the support of party mass organizations, some elements in the
military, communists, and socialist Ba’thists.*®
The second candidate was Abdelaziz Boutefliqa, who was
the foreign minister under Boumedienne, and who had no power
b a s e . 50 Neither person was acceptable to the military, which
had its own choice Colonel Chadli Benjedid, the commander of
the Oran wilaya (state), one of the five military districts of
the country.®i
When he came to power. President Benjedid got rid of many
Boumedienne sympathizers. This was in preparation for the policies of liberalization and opening the country to the West.
The first thing that he did was cancelling the exit visa that
Algerians had to get before being allowed to travel abroad. He
released many political prisoners such as ex-President Ben
Bella, who was placed under house arrest since 1965, when
Boumedienne came to p o w e r . 52
A great degree of change also took place in the economic
policy. Some of the economic policies that President Benjedid
adopted represented a move away from socialism. Some of these
policies were: 72
First, the breaking up and the decentralization of state- owned enterprises. Second, giving greater role for the private sector in agriculture. Third, increasing the emphasis on light industry and commerce and making a shift away from heavy industry. Fourth, the regime showed greater tolerance for private initiatives. Fifth, the re-allocation of the hydrocarbon revenues toward the service sector and towards internal consumption.53
Other changes that the Chadli regime made were:
First, opening up the Algerian economy to foreign investors. Second, diversifying arms purchases away from the
Soviet Union and toward Western manufacturers such as Britain and the United States. Third, lowering Algeria’s once highly visible profile in global and Third World affairs.s#
However, it is very important to note, that these openings in the system did not mean that political groups were allowed to challenge the authority of the system. Therefore, when the government was faced with some challenges from
Islamic fundamentalists, university students and ethnic
Berber, who have challenged the religious, education, and language policies of the regime respectively, it did not hesitate in using force against those groups.5®
In 1985, when several demonstrations took place in 73
Algeria against economic deterioration, the government used the
police and special anti-demonstration forces to break up those
demonstrations. Many people were killed, including children
who were choked by tear gas used by the police. The casualties
among the policemen were around eighty, and the authorities
arrested around one thousand demonstrator.®®
Also in October 1988, clashes between the people and the
police were bloody. The number of the people killed was around
161, and the reason for the demonstrations was the
deteriorating economic conditions in Algeria.®?
Therefore, despite the liberalization of the regime under
President Benjedid, coercion continued to be the one of the methods by which the regime responded to the demands of the
people.
However, after the riots of October, 1988, President
Benjedid promised to open the political system. He promised a
multi-party system, where all political parties would be
allowed to work freely. Political parties according to the
president, would be allowed to contest both the municipal
elections and the parliamentary elections.
The monopoly of the FLN, the National Liberation Front,
on the political arena was to be broken, and a multi-party
system was to take place. The people approved a new 74
constitution in a referendum in February 1989. This new constitution included the political liberties that were promised by the president, especially the ones that dealt with
the right of establishment of political parties, and the
rights of those parties to contest the e l e c t i o n s . s»
In June 1990, the first municipal and provincial
elections were held, and the Islamic Salvation Front, the FIS won most of the municipalities. Later, in December 1991, the
first round of the parliamentary elections was held, and again
the FIS won most of the seats. Therefore in January 1993,
President Benjedid resigned, the military took over, and the elections were cancelled.
Conclusion:
This has been an overview of the historical background of
Algeria. The author tried to cover the period between 1830, which was the time when Algeria was invaded by the French, and
1992, when the democratization process was halted. The author does not believe that the legacies of the colonial period have
led to the failure of the democratization process in Algeria.
However, there were some indirect affects of that period, that might have had an indirect affect on the process:
First, the colonial period created the boundaries of 75
modern Algeria. It was due to the boundaries drawn by the
colonizers that North Africa was divided into several
countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.
Second, during colonization, France discriminated against
the Islamic movement and the ulama. As it will be shown in the
next chapter, the French colonizers taught a group of
Algerians in the French schools, and gave them important
posts. This group was in charge of the bureaucracy after
liberation, while the religious Algerians, who did not have
access to modern education, could not occupy important
positions.
Third, the war of liberation led to the exhaustion of the
internal leadership, whose members were the ones who fought
the war. This allowed the fresh army that was stationed
outside Algeria, and whose leaders did not fight, to grasp
power easily after independence.
These externals were the military leaders who ruled the
country using the legitimacy that they got from the FLN.
However, the real leaders of the FLN were either arrested or
expelled outside the country. These political leaders of the
FLN, came back in the late 1980's to settle their old scores
with those externals.
Several of the internals were also leaders of the Islamic 76
movement who were fighting France in order to establish an
Islamic State, but who found out that the secularists
controlled the country after independence. These negative
feelings continued until the present time, and it could be
found in several statements made by leaders of Islamic
movements.
However, in spite of the fact that all Islamic leaders
had this same feeling about the secularists and the war of
liberation, however, it was not a factor that led to the
abortion of the process. For example, Abbassi Madani, Mahfoud
al-Nahnah , and Abdulla Jaballah are leaders of three Islamic
movements, FIS, HAMAS (Harakat Al-Mujtama’ Al-Islami), and
Ennahda (The Movement of the Islamic Renaissance).
They witnessed the period of colonization, and were
imprisoned by the French and later by the secularists. All of
them believe that the revolution was robbed from the masses
who were fighting for the establishment of an Islamic State,
not for a secular State.
However, no one can claim that it was due to this feeling that the leaders of the FIS were rigid, therefore, the
democratization process collapsed. While Abbassi Madani was inflexible at some point in dealing with the leaders of the
regime, Mahfoud al-Nahnah and Abdullah Jaballah were very 77
flexible, although they passed through the same colonization
experience. On the other hand, in the FIS itself, it was
obvious that some young leaders, like Ali Belhadj, who did not
witness the colonization period, were more rigid than Abbassi
Madani and some others who did.
Therefore, the author believes that it was not due to the
legacies of the colonization period that the democratization
process in Algeria was halted. 78
F o o t n o t e s dneLf) t e r III
1. Belkacem Saadallah, The Rise Of Algerian Nationalism:
1900-1930 (University of Minnesota, 1965): 1.
2. Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa:The Maghrib
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962): 213.
3. Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria: 1830-
1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 36-43); also see Mohammed Vananish, Al-Haraka Al-Istiolalivah Fi Al-
Jaza'ir Bavna Al-Harbavn [The Independence Movement in Algeria
Between The Two Wars] (Algeria: The National Company for
Publishing and Distribution, 1982): 27; also see Yehia
Bouaziz, Thawrat Al-Jazaer [The Algerian Revolution] (Algeria:
Al-Ba'th publication, 1982): 31; also see S a ’adallah, ibid.:
4; also see Alf Andrew Heggoy, The French Conquest of Algiers:
1830 (Ohio: Center of international studies, Ohio University,
1986): 23.
4. S a ’adallah, ibid.: 28.
5. Yehia Bouaziz, ibid.: 17.
6 . John Entelis, Algeria. The revolution institutionalized
Boulder: Westview Press, 1986): 51. 79
F ootn otes C]neLp>ter III
7. William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political
Leadership:Algeria: 1954-1968 (Massachusetts: The M.I.T.
Press, 1969): 4.
8 . S a ’adallah, ibid.: 46.
9. ibid.: 400.
1 0 . ibid.
11. Entelis, ibid.: 37.
12. S a ’dallah, ibid.: 406.
13. ibid.
14. Entelis, ibid.: 38.
15. Entelis, ibid.: 41.
16. Mohammed Al-Ja’di, a lecture given in June 1992, in
Columbus Ohio)
17. S a ’dallah, ibid.: 452.
18. ibid.: 453.
19. Abdulrahman Ibn Al-Aqoun, al-Kifah al-cawmi Wal Sevasi [The
National and Political Struggle] (Algeria: National Book
Institute, 1982): 210.
20. S a ’dallah, ibid.: 55.
21. Ibn Al-Aqoon, ibid.: 10. 80
Footnotes Cteipt& r~ III
22. Abu Al-Qasem Sa'dallah, Al-Harakah al-Watanivah al-
Jaza* iriyah 1 [Algerian Nationalist Movement] (Algeria: Dar
Al-Adab press, 1969): 425.
23. ibid.
24. Entelis, ibid.: 46.
25. Sa'adallah, ibid.: 84-85.
26. Mahfoud Bennoune, ibid., 1988): 79.
27. ibid.
28. Entelis, ibid.: 48; also see Bennoune, ibid.: 80.
29. Entelis, ibid.: 49.
30. Entelis, ibid.
31. William Quandt, ibid.: 91.
32. ibid.
33. Yehia Bouaziz, ibid.: 301.
34. Mohammed Harbi, "al-Jaza’er Wa Maseeraha," [Algeria and Its
Destiny] Ashara Al-Awsat newspaper 5163 (January 16, 1993): 6.
35. Al-Munsif Wannas, Addawla Wal Masa'la Athaoafiva Fi Al-
Jazaer [The State and Cultural Issue] (Tunisia: Arabic
Publisher, 1989): 51.
36. Harold Nelson, Algeria: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.:
The American University, 1979): 65-66. 81
F o o t n o "te S CIneL-p t e r I I I
37. Shaikh Mahfoud Nahnah, in an interview with this author in
Columbus, Ohio, January, 1993.
38. Quandt, ibid. 175.
39. Nelson, ibid. 66
40. Wannas, ibid. 54 ; also see Quandt,
41. Quandt, ibid.
42. Nelson, ibid. 6 8 .
43. ibid.
44. ibid.
45. Entelis , ibid. : 60.
46. Entelis , ibid. : 61.
47. ibid.: 62.
48. Entelis , ibid.
49. Yahia Zoubir, From Authoritarianism
14.
50. ibid.
51. Entelis , ibid. : 64.
52. ibid.
53. Zoubir, ibid. 15.
54. Entelis , ibid. : 65.
55. Entelis , ibid. : 66. 82
Footnotes Chetp t e r III
58. Al-Shira’ magazine, (May 5, 1985): 23.
57. Al-Khaleei newspaper (June 14, 1991)
58. Al-Shira* magazine, ibid. Chapter IV
Culture and Society
In this chapter the author will deal with Algerian culture. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, Algeria is a Muslim country, with a majority of its population of ethnically Arab. Therefore, it shares a lot of its cultural characteristics with the rest of the Arab and Islamic World.
As was mentioned in Chapter 11, some theories that deal with the transition to democracy, focus on the political culture of the people, and try to find a relation between cultural norms and political behavior.
Focusing on the effect of the culture and the political culture on the democratization process represents one form of the background approach. As was earlier mentioned, this approach assumes that background variables, such as historical legacies, culture, and political structure in a country, effect the outcome of the democratization process.
The author, however, believes otherwise. According to the author, it is due to current and immediate factors, known as the proximate factors that the outcome of the democratization process is determined. Therefore, in this chapter the author will analyze the Algerian culture and political culture, and
83 84
will try to show that it was not a cause in the failure of the
democratization process in Algeria.
1. The Algerian Political Culture;
In order to deal with the Algerian political culture we
must first define two terms, "culture", and "political
culture". In 1871 E. B. Taylor defined culture as:
"that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief,
art, morals, and any other capabi1ities and habits
acquired by man as a member of society."^
Anthropologist Franz Boas gave a similar definition of
culture :
"Culture embraces all the manifestations of social habits
of a community, the reactions of the individual as
affected by the habits of the group in which he lives,
and the products of human activities as determined by
these habits."2
As for the term "political culture", Gabriel Almond was
the first to introduce this concept in 1956:
"Every political system is embedded in a particular
pattern of orientations to political action, I have
found it useful to refer to this as the political
culture."2 85
In The Civic Culture (1963) Gabriel Almond and Sidney
Verba defined "political culture" in terms of political
orientations and attitudes held by individuals in relation to
their political system:
"When we speak of a political culture of a society, we
refer to the political system as internalized in the
cognition, feelings, and evaluations of its population.
People are induced into it Just as they are socialized
into nonpolitical roles and social systems."*
Almond and Verba talked about three types of political
culture :
1. Parochial type: In this type of political culture,
individuals have low expectations and awareness of
government, and generally they are not involved.
2. Subject type: In this type of political culture,
individuals are aware of the outcomes of government but
do not participate in the processes that result in policy
decisions.
3. Participant type: In this type of political culture,
individuals are active and are involved in the system as
a whole, that is, in both the input and output p r o c e s s e s . s
However, a very good definition that summarizes most of
the definitions above, is the one given by John Entelis: 86
"The concept of political culture looks at the
orientations and psychological predispositions of a
population toward pel it ical life. For any society
political culture involves the linking of those
dimensions of an individual’s thoughts, feelings, or
behaviors to the creation and maintenance of a
society's fundamental political order. Moreover,
political culture provides an explanation of how such
sentiments influence political action, the way in which
the people respond to authority, the political roles
they play, and their degree of participation in
political affairs. In other words, political culture
guides the behavior of political actors and contains
the catalysts as well as the constraints to political
actions."®
2. The Algerian culture:
Algeria is an Arab and a Muslim country that has many
common cultural features with the rest of the Arab and Muslim world. Before the invasion of Algeria by the French, tribes
were the major social units, to whom individuals showed
loyalty and obedience.
The colonialists realized from the very beginning that 87
tribes could represent a threat to their existence because of the cohesion among members of each tribe. Therefore, the
French colonialists broke tribes into more manageable units.
This was done by means of forced movement of tribes from one place to another, and by cancelling tribal possessions of
land.
In the past each tribe would claim an area of land that would be sufficient for pasture and grazing. This land would be eventually the possession of the whole tribe. The colonizers changed this system, and replaced it with the system of private ownership of the land, in which members of the tribe, as individuals, would own a piece of land. This way the authority of the head of the tribe on members of the tribe declined. Also the cohesion among members of the tribe declined as well.
Later, with the forced movement of people and tribes from one place to another members of tribes were further scattered
in cities and in different regions of the country. The family became the basic social unit in Algeria similar to most of the countries of the Arab world. In the present time, the family is still the major social unit in Algeria.
The family in Algeria is of the extended type, where the sons with their wives and children live in their parents’ 88
house. Usually the grandparents also live in the same house,
since it is the responsibility of a Muslim to take care of his
or her parents and the old relatives in the family like grand
parents or old uncles and aunts. The final say in the house
often belongs to the parents, and to the older son.’
The society in Algeria is divided into four social
groupings :
First, a bureaucratic class, that is made up of educated
technocrats. This group is small and works for the state, in
positions such as managers of national industries, directors
of state enterprises, teachers, professors, administrators,
scientific experts, engineers, lawyers and army officers. This
group is modernist, populist and egalitarian in ideological
orientation.®
Second, a business class that represents owners of small
businesses. This group does not have an important political
role to play in the society due to its small size, and to the
restrictions put on it by the previous socialist regime.
Third, blue collar workers, who also work in factories
owned and run by the state. This group is totally dependent on
the state for its subsistence.
Fourth, the group of the unemployed, which includes the peasants who have moved from rural areas to cities, and who do 89
not have technical abilities. It also includes thousands of
youth who have graduated from the schools and universities,
but cannot find jobs. The unemployment rate is 20%* , and one
can fined many of the Jobless sitting in the streets doing
nothing.
This particular group is important because it is composed
of the young generation who did not witness the revolution,
therefore it has no loyalty to the ruling party, the National
Liberation Front, FLN, which led the war of independence, and
takes its legitimacy from that war. To the contrary this group
witnessed the failures of the economic policies of the FLN,
and the corruption of its leaders, and as a result this group
would support any political party that would contest any
election against the FLN.
Therefore, as it will be shown later, when the Islamic
Salvation Front, FIS, promised social and economic changes and
well being to all Algerians, and promised to punish the FLN
leaders who were responsible for the deterioration of the
economy, it got a great deal of support from the unemployed.
This is not to say that only the unemployed were unhappy
with the FLN. The FLN was suffering from the failure of its economic policies, and from the corruption of some FLN leaders.
Therefore, it was resented by members of all social groups in
the country. 90
I. Islam and its effect on the Algerian culture:
Islam entered North Africa in 647 AD. Later in 670 AD,
Muslims founded the city of Kairouan in the center of current
Tunisia, and in 710 all North Africa was under the rule of
Muslims.10 The Berber, who were the indigenous population,
accepted Islam, and even carried the banner of Islam to Spain
and to the borders of France. Islam played a great role in
shaping and preserving the culture of the Algerians, and it
was the main barrier against the French policies of
eradicating the Algerian identity.
Since the early days of the French colonization in 1830,
the struggle for independence against the French was waged
under the banner of Islam. The war itself was called "jihad",
a war that was waged against the non believers who wanted to
destroy Islam. Those who fought, were called "Mujahedeen", and
those who were killed were called "Shuhada", meaning martyrs.
Islam and Algerian nationalism became inseparable.
1. Official Islam:
After independence, the leaders of the revolution
continued to use the banners of Islam as symbols to urge the
people to build the country. Most of the secular leaders
wanted to apply socialism in Algeria, and the only way to
achieve that goal was through convincing the people that 91
socialism was compatible with Islam.Therefore, since
independence, Islam had been used by the government to give
legitimacy to the regime.
The government appointed some ulama (scholars) to praise
the government and socialism. This type of practice is very
common in the Arab and Muslim countries, as well as, in other
Third World countries. Preachers who would praise rulers and
regimes usually get rewarded, and those who oppose the
government get suspended, fired, imprisoned or even tortured.
In Algeria, as in many Muslim countries, the ministry of
religion is headed by a bureaucrat whose sole job is to find
the best way to put Islam in the service of the regime. The
success of the minister in his mission guarantees his
durability in his position.
The first minister of religion after independence was
Tawfiq Al-Madani who possessed the kind of sectarian secular balance that the regime was looking for. The second was Mouloud
Qassim who devoted himself to one major task which was to
prove and convince the people that the government's socialist
policies were not contradicting Islamic principles. Bouaiem
Baki is another minister who was appointed by President
Benjedid in 1979. However, due to the growing power of Islamic
fundamentalism, the regime replaced him in 1980 with a person 92
who was more visibly identified with Islamic activism.12
Therefore, the government of Algeria, similar to many
Muslim governments, never had the intention of applying
Islamic law (Shari’a) but only wanted to respond to the
demands of the masses within certain limits. As an example in
1971, during the time of President Boumedienne, the government
wanted to replace the "family law" which was inspired by the
Shari’a with a Western law. However, due to massive pressure
from the Algerian people, the government had to withdraw its plan. Also in 1981, and due to the popular will, the government passed a new family law that was closer to the
Islamic Shari’a than the previous one.is
The above mentioned facts indicate the existence of a dual culture in Algeria. One is the culture of the ruling elite, which is secular and in many cases European in its orientation. The other is the culture of the non ruling elite and of the masses which is more Islamic and seeks the application of Shari'a.i*
This duality can also be found in any other Muslim country. Many people in these countries would like to see
Islamic laws applied. Therefore, whenever the people are allowed to express their wish at the voting booth, we find that the majority votes for the Islamic parties whose programs 93
seek the application of Shari’a. This could be seen in the
parliamentary elections in Algeria, in Jordan, in Kuwait, and
even in Egypt where a good number of the nominees of the
Muslim Brethren won seats in the parliament.
2. Populist Islam:
We first talked about official Islam, where the
government tried to use Islam as a source of legitimacy for
its programs. When some people see the government building
mosques and sponsoring Islamic conferences, they think that it
is doing more than enough. In his essay, one Algerian writer,
Yahia Zoubir, claimed that the state in Algeria favored the
spread of Islamic ideology by building thousands of mosques,
founding Islamic institutes, and flooding television with
religious programs, and by allocating substantial resources to
the holding of international seminars on Islamic thought.*®
He also stated that another author, Khelladi, was correct
in posing the following question: "How can one accuse the
state of having fought Islam when most of its [state’s]
representatives have always been careful, often in a
pathological fashion, to present themselves as ’irreproachable
Muslims?’."*® Arguments like this are very shallow because the
government in Algeria, as in the case of many other Muslim 94
countries, has not addressed the real aspiration of the
majority of the Algerian people which is the application of
Islam as a law that runs the day to day life.
One would find the demand of applying the Shari'a raised
in the streets of Algeria, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait,
Tunisia, etc...and in the streets of all the Muslim countries
that allow people to express their demands publicly. When the
majority of the Algerian people voted for the FIS in the
municipal elections in June 1990, they knew that one of its
major goals was the application of Shari'a.
Later on, in the parliamentary elections in December
1991, the FIS won the majority of the seats of the parliament
while still adopting the demand of applying Shari'a, and the
establishment of an Islamic state, beside other demands.
Therefore, the people knew what they were voting for, and the
political program of the FIS was very clear.
Similar to the FIS, all the other political parties in
Algeria both Islamic and secular had promised to work hard to
solve the economic crisis and to work for a better Algerian
society. However, only the FIS declared that it was seeking
the establishing of an Islamic State, and based on this goal
it won a majority in both elections. Even the moderate Islamic
parties like HAMAS and Ennahda, who sought to gradually reform 95
the society before reforming the state on Islamic lines^*, did
not adopt the goal of establishing an Islamic State, as the
FIS did.
However, in response to the official brand of Islam that
the government adopted, a popular brand of Islam appeared.
This popular Islam is not new to Algeria, but as John Entelis
puts it: "As elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa,
there has been a re-Islamization of politics in Algeria during
the last decade". However, Entelis makes it clear that the
factors that led to this are internal and not external.i*
Popular Islam is made up of two currents, one is
moderate, reformist, and pragmatic, the other is confrontational, revolutionary, and rigid. The first approach
goes back to the days of the Association of Algerian Muslim
Ulama, which was established in 1930. The leader of the
Association was Shaikh Abdulhameed Ben Badis who was a
reformist whose goal was to educate Algerians about Islam, and
reform the society that had drifted away from the teachings of
Islam.
During the French colonial rule, Ben Badis tried, through
the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama, to get concessions
from the French through peaceful methods. On many occasions he
would write to the prime minister in Paris to ask 96
him to ease the pressure on Algerians, or to request a free hand for the Algerian ulama in taking care of the religious
issues of the Algerian people.20
This moderate and pragmatic tradition that was followed by Ben Badis and the ulama was preserved among a section of
the Algerian scholars and leaders of Islamic movements and political parties. Leaders like Shaikh Mahfoud Nahnah, the
leader of the Islamic political party HAMAS, and Shaikh
Abdullah Jaballah, the leader of Ennahda Islamic party. These
leaders think that it would be better to follow the gradual pragmatic path in dealing with the government, rather than
following a violent path.
As we have just mentioned, the representatives of this moderate stream among the Algerian Islamic parties are both
HAMAS and Ennahda. Both parties follow the path of dialogue with the Algerian government to get more concessions, and both are against violence. They also follow the route of reforming and educating society, and building a better Muslim generation that understands Islam better.
This task might sound easy, but to the contrary it is very painful and time consuming. It is very easy to start a confrontation with the authorities, but it is very hard to educate and build a new generation. As both Shaikh Nahnah, the 97
leader of HAMAS, and his deputy, Shaikh Bouslimani have said in two separate interviews with this author, it is easy to tingle the emotions and the hearts of the masses, but what is really hard is to talk to the minds of the people.
The other current of popular Islam is confrontational and more rigid than the moderate one. This type has developed as a reaction to the policies of the secular leadership in Algeria.
The secularists took the lead in the country, and ruled it under the banner of socialism. As was mentioned in Chapter
III, the revolution was led by a mixture of Islamic and nationalistic tendencies, therefore, secularism was resented.21
Islamic leaders refused to accept the secular government.
However, several of them were detained, and, there was very little that the people could do. Boumedienne’s rule was coercive and authoritarian, and, people did not dare to oppose him. Later on, under President Benjedid the pressure and coercion was eased, and it was now easier for the Islamic leaders to demand the application of Shari’a.
Although the application of Shari’a is a popular request that both the moderates and the militants seek, the difference is in the method by which this goal can be reached. While the moderates think that the gradual path is the best path, the 98
militant current thinks that it should be applied immediately,
by any possible means.
This current is represented by the Islamic Salvation
Front FIS, which is made up of several wings, such as "Takfeer
and Hijra" (a single group that considers the head of the
state a non-Muslim, and asks people to flee the non-Muslim
society), which does not mind using violence against a government that it considers as non-Muslim. However, and for the sake of fairness and justice, we should mention that the
FIS initially tried to play by the rules set by the government when it contested the elections.
It was the government that intimidated the FIS and pushed
it to the corner. After that, it was much more difficult for the leaders of the FIS to control the many supporters who saw the regime robbing the victory that they achieved at the election booth. The politically non-experienced FIS was easily
intimidated, and the many different types of supporters that
it had were hard to control.
The reason for this is that the FIS did not have organizational channels that would allow it to control all its
supporters.22 in Chapter VI the author will give in details the composition of the FIS.
So far, the author has been trying to show that Islam was 99
and is the main factor that shapes and affects the culture of
the Algerians. The whole identity of the Algerians was
preserved by Islam, since the liberation war was regarded as a
fight between Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslim scholars (ulama)
participated in the war against the French, and were the ones
who sparked the resistance against the French since the early
days of the French invasion.
However, besides Islam, there are other factors that
affect the culture, and the political culture of the
Algerians. For instance the Arab-Berber ethnic division, and
the Francophone-Arabphone cultural division, have their
influence on the Algerian culture.
II. The Ethnic Factor:
A very important factor in the study of the Algerian
culture is ethnicity. When Islam first came to North Africa,
it came in the form of Muslims who came from the Arabian
Peninsula. The indigenous population in North Africa at that
time was made up of the Berber tribes.
The origin of the Berber is a mystery, but archaeological
and linguistic evidence show that they are originally from
southwestern Asia, and that their ancestors migrated into
North Africa, as early as the third millennium B.C .23 Once 100
the Berber became Muslims, they carried Islam to Spain which
became known as Al-Andalus. Only Islam was able to unite
Berber tribes, and eventually, two kingdoms were established
by the Berber Muslims.
The first kingdom was that of Al-Murabitun (Almoravids)
in the eleventh century, which reached from Ghana, to the Ebro
River in Spain. The second was Al-Muahhideen (Almohads), which
was around 1160.2*
However, with the passage of time, the distinction
between the Arabs and the Berber became less significant,
since they were mixed together and married to one another.
Therefore, we find that the present day Berber and the Arabs
are descendants of largely the same indigenous stock, and as a result, to distinguish the two groups physically is
impossible.2s
However, there are two groups of the Berber that
continued to live in their own communities. The first group
lives in the Kabylie Mountains east of Algiers (the capital of
Algeria), known as the Kabyles, and the second group is the
Chaouias of the Aures range south of the Algerian city of
Constant ine.2 6
When the French invaded Algeria in 1830, the struggle
against them was carried out by all the people in the form of 101
a jihad or what is known in the West as a Holy War without any
distinction between Arabs and Berber. Only under the French
colonization did these differences began to appear, due to the
policy followed by the French of favoring the Berber. The
French also tried to isolate the two communities, by claiming
that the Berber culture was more democratic in its nature than
that of the A r a b s .27
The French colonial policy favored the Kabyles, who were
governed by special ordinances, and they were offered
particular educational opportunities which were never offered
to the Arabs.2 8 This advantage allowed many of them to occupy
important positions in the state apparatus after independence.
The Berber or the Kabyles have their own language that is
different from Arabic. However, the majority of them speak
Arabic besides their own language. As for those who still live
in the mountains and in the totally Berber communities, they
speak Kabyle.
As was mentioned earlier, the French tried to plant the
seeds of factionalism between the Arabs and the Berber, by
treating the Berber favorably, and by allowing them access to
the French educational system. This eventually made the Berber
fluent in French and this became a source of living for them,
since a lot of them would migrate to France in search of 102
better job opportunities and better living conditions.z*
In their villages, the Berber live in groups that are
based on kinship relations. They have a village council that
is called djemma, which includes all adult males who meet and
legislate according to the Kabyle traditions.^o This practice
is seen by many Europeans as a democratic practice that does
not exist in the traditional Arab village or tribe, where the
head of the tribe makes the decisions. However, in the Arab
tribes, the head of the tribe consults with some elder and
young males in the tribe before making a decision.
Due to their French education, many of the Berber
immigrated to France at the beginning of the 20th century. In
France, the first radical liberation movement was established
among the North African immigrants. The first movement, The
North African Star, was headed by Messali Al-Hadj an Algerian
who was a Berber. The name of this movement changed several
times to become the Algerian People Party or the PPA, and
later the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties or
the MTLD.
In all three organizations, the Arab-Berber issue had
always represented a continuous source of conflict and tension
among the leaders. On many occasions some members of these
movements were thrown out because of their Berber tendencies. 103
The leaders of the liberation movement wanted all Algerians to
work together for the liberation of Algeria, regardless of
ethnicity.
Later on, when the National Liberation Front, FLN, was
established, these divisions and struggles continued to exist.
The Berber who kept bringing up the ethnic issue were afraid
that their language and identity might be overshadowed by the
Arab majority.
This was never an issue before the French invasion in
1830, due to the fact that Algeria was considered a Muslim
land that belonged to the Islamic Khilafa (State) under the
Ottomans. However, in 1919 when the Khilafa was destroyed by
Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, and Arab nationalism began to grow in
the Arab World, the Berber were afraid that their identity and
their language would be eradicated by the Arabs.
Under French colonization, and during the war of
independence, any ethnic tendencies were banned for the sake
of preserving national unity. In 1949, three Berber students
who used to belong to the nationalist party the MTLD were
expelled because they signed a statement that called for some
demands for the Berber. They stated that the existence of a
common language among the majority did not mean the denial of
the right of some ethnic groups of establishing their own 104
nations. Also they stated that other cultures and languages
should be supported by the Arab majority in the party.3*
In 1954 when the National Liberation Front the FLN was
established, the Arab-Berber issue was also there, because the
FLN was made up of different groups which had several
tendencies. It included Berbers and Arabs, the religious and
the secular, the moderate and the extremists. These tendencies
led on several occasions to violent clashes and struggles in
the ranks of the FLN.^z
After independence several power struggles occurred among
the leaders of the FLN. Some of those struggles included the
ethnic factor although were not necessarily caused by it. As
an example, after independence, Houcin Alt Ahmad (who is a
Berber himself), led several ethnic outbreaks in the Berber
Kabylie region. He was then captured and sentenced to death,
but was later reprieved by President Ben Bella because of his
popularity in the Berber areas.as
The Berber represent 17.8% of the total population in
Algeria according to the official census. Another estimated
percentage is 25%.s# The main argument of the Berber leaders
is that the Arabic language should not dominate their own, and
that their language and identity should be p r e s e r v e d . 3s The
famous Berber slogan says "you said Muslims, we said yes; you 105
said Arabs, we said Berber".
In August 1963, the National Assembly approved the
constitution, in which Arabic was acknowledged as the official
language.36 This was followed by the policy of Arabization,
which represented a very aggressive move by the government to
teach and spread Arabic language in the country.
This was seen by the Algerian government as a national
goal that would counter the destructive effects of the linguistic policy of the French that tried to eradicate the
Arabic language totally. However, this Arabization policy led
to some resentment and alienation among the Berber especially
those who live in the Kabylia region, who feared cultural
suffocation and economic decline.
The fact is that for the Berber, the ability to speak
French was a source of income, since it was the only avenue of
economic escape to France and Europe where jobs could be
found.37 In April 1980 these fears and tensions led to
clashes with the police and army in the city of Tizi-Wazzoo
the regional center of the Kabyles. The clashes broke out,
after the government prevented Professor Mouloud Ma’mari (who
is a Berber) from giving a lecture on Berber poetry.3 8
Several political parties that have contested the recent parliamentary elections in December 1991 have used the Arab- 106
Berber issue to get some votes in the Kabylia region. Parties
like the FFS, the Socialist Forces Front represents the
Berber. This party is headed by Hocine Alt Ahmad, one of the
nine historical leaders of the Algerian revolution, and the
one who led the Berber outbreaks in the Kabylia region which
eventually caused the bloody clashes with the government in
1964. It won 25 seats in the last parliamentary elections that
were cancelled by the present military regime.
The danger was evident in the willingness of Alt Ahmad to
use this ethnic factor at any time. As an example, in May
1991, when the FIS, the Islamic Salvation Front called on its
supporters to strike and to occupy some public squares in the
capital Algiers, Alt Ahmad called on his Berber supporters to
go into the streets and move the FIS supporters from the
public squares.39
This act could have led to bloody clashes between both
groups, if it was not for the close contacts between other
party leaders and Alt Ahmad that convinced him to keep his
supporters off the streets. Alt Ahmad also threatened to seek
the help of the United Nations for the Berber as a minority group against the government. At the same time France declared
that it was willing to help the minorities in Algeria if they asked for it.♦° 107
Another Berber party is the ROD, which is headed by
Sa'eed Sa’di who also represents a Berberist cultural movement, and was one of the first who asked the government to step in and to cancel the elections when his party did not win any seat in the elections.**
However, although it is very important to understand the ethnic division between the Arab and the Berber in Algeria, this factor should not be given more than its real weight.<2
Since the entry of Islam in North Africa, and in Algeria, the
Arabs and the Berber have integrated. The current Algerian population is made of the product of this integration. The pure Berber could only be found in the mountains, and in the
Kabylia region, and the 25 seats that the FFS won in the legislative elections were actually won in that region.
Many of the leaders of the Islamic movement, as well as of the FLN, and the regime, are of Berber origin, yet nobody has ever called for a separate state for the Berber. The ethnic factor could never have led to the abortion of the democratization process, since it was working for the interest of the Berber. They as an ethnicity would have had a better opportunity to express their demands and concerns. The multi party system would have served the Berber and others in a much better way than the single party system that used to exist in 108
the past, or the military system that exists at the present
time.
III. Education and the Francophone-Arabphone factor:
Under French colonialism the people of Algeria were not
allowed to study Arabic in the government schools. This led to a boycott of the French schools by the Arabs. However, there were some Islamic schools that were unofficial and were
sponsored by Muslim scholars (ulama). These schools had very
limited resources, and were not able to teach a large number of the population.43 Therefore, one would find that all the social and political movements at that time demanded the teaching of Arabic language in the government schools.
As a matter of fact schooling was not compulsory for the
Algerians even in French. Therefore, the illiteracy rate was high among the Algerians, and was estimated at 80% in 1962 at the time of independence.** The capacity of the unofficial schools that were teaching Arabic was very limited, and teaching was traditional. They were basically teaching Quran and Arabic language.
Even this traditional form of education was declining since the French were not funding it.*® Under French colonization, all national movements had one of their major 109
demands, the preservation of the Arabic language and of the
Arabic identity.*®
In 1890 the French began educating a small number of
Muslims in French schools. The curriculum was entirely in
French and did not allow Arabic studies.*? Those Muslim
students who were educated in those schools were called the evolved ones (évolués). Many of those évolués claimed later on
that Algeria was part of France. Therefore, they supported the
policy of fusion of the Algerian society with the French.*®
After independence, the French managers and employees
that were running the Algerian bureaucracy and factories left
the country by the thousands. The Algerians were not trained
to run factories or businesses, and as was mentioned earlier,
the illiteracy rate was 80% at the time of independence.
Therefore, the only group that was qualified to run the
bureaucracy was the French educated elite or the évolués,*^
This led to two problems:
First, although the policy of Arabization was on the list
of priorities of the leaders of the new state, the interest of
these French-speaking elite, which was on top of the
bureaucratic pyramid in Algeria, was threatened by the new policy. Therefore, they did not work for the success of this
policy.®“ 110
Second, the belief of those in charge of the bureaucracy that the Arabic language was not able to assist the country in its goal of achieving materialistic and scientific progress.
As an example, in 1972 the minister of information and culture stated that: "we need the French language as an open window on technical civilization until Arabic adapts itself to the modern world".® %
This duality in the culture led to a duality in the educational system in Algeria. As a result two types of education could be found in Algeria after independence:
First, education in the Arabic language for the elementary level, that gradually grew with the children who joined schools after independence to the intermediate and secondary levels. Second, the scientific education and education at the university level and higher was all in
French.
Those who studied in French were promoted and became the new elite in society, and as for the new generation who studied in Arabic the doors for jobs in the modern industrial sector and in the bureaucracy were closed. More and more people who studied in Arabic were graduating only to be faced with the fact that there were no jobs for them.s2
The identity problem was more important than economic Ill
considerations. The problem of identity comes up every time
someone talks about the policy of Arabization or about those
who studied in French. The struggle is between those who
believe that Algeria is an Arab and a Muslim country that
should keep its Arabic and Islamic identity by making the education system and the bureaucracy fully Arabic, and those
who believe that the French language should stay because it is
the only way to modernity and progress.
To make things even worse, one finds that there is
another group in society that fears the policy of Arabization.
Those are the Berber who for economic and cultural reasons which were mentioned earlier fight this policy. They are
afraid of the domination of the Arabic culture over their own.
Also they find in the French language a source of income,
since a lot of them usually immigrate to France seeking a better living, and searching for jobs.^s
Since the language factor is very important in Algeria,
political parties have taken positions on this issue. Islamic parties like FIS, HAMAS, and Ennahda support total Arabization
in the educational system and in the bureaucracy. s* As for the
secular and Berber parties, especially the FFS and the RCD,
they think that the French language is needed for the advancement of the society, therefore, this dual system should 112
stay. They also think that the Berber language should be
considered the second national language in the country along
with the Arabic language.®®
As a result, and under the popular pressure on behalf of
the policy of Arabization, the minister of justice announced
that trials would be conducted in Arabic, although for the
time being reports and verdicts would also be delivered in
French.® ®
It is very important to deal cautiously with the issue of
education, along with the tensions that arise over the policy
of Arabization. The language that will be taught in schools,
and that will be officially used in the bureaucracy, is the
language with which the Algerians will identify. They either
adopt the Arabic language, identity, and culture, or they
identify with the French culture.
There are some general features of the political culture
in Algeria. Some of which are:
First, there has always been a sense of mistrust among
the leaders of the country. There were nine leaders who
officially declared the beginning of the Algerian
revolution in 1954. There were the "internals' who were
leading the war inside Algeria, and the "externals" who were
directing the war from outside Algeria. 113
After independence, the externals under the leadership of
Ahmad Ben Bella, and with the support of the military under
the leadership of Houari Boumedienne took power from the internal leadership by force. Ben Bella became president, and
those who opposed him were either killed, jailed or were
forced to leave the country.
As an example, Belqasem Krim was assassinated in
Frankfurt in 1970®’ , Abban Ramadan was also assassinated for
criticizing the revolution®® , Hocine Alt Ahmad was arrested
in 1964®* , Mohammad Khidr was assassinated in Spain in 1967
after he had escaped with the money of the revolution earlier
in the 60’s®° , and Mohammad Boudiaf left for Morocco
immediately after independence in 1963 because of disagreement
with the FLN leadership.®i Finally, President Ben Bella was
later ousted by defense minister Boumedienne in 1965, and was
eventually put under house arrest.®z
These incidents, and many others, show that there had
always been continuous struggles among the leaders of the
revolution, which was caused by the mistrust among those
leaders. This mistrust is also evident in the present time,
since those leaders are still playing important roles in the
political life of today’s Algeria.
Second, political differences amcng policy makers in 114
Algeria are usually interpreted as personal differences. As was
seen from the above demonstration, when someone disagrees with
the leader or the president in Algeria, he is either expelled or assassinated. When President Chadli Benjedid came to power in 1979, he began a policy of "de-
Boumedienization" in which the allies of the previous president, were replaced by people who were considered to be
loyal to President Benjedid.
When President Mohammad Boudiaf was brought to power in
1992, after the results of the parliamentary elections were cancelled by the military, he ignored the leaders of the FLN who earlier in 1963 were responsible for his expulsion to
Morooco.® 4
Third, members of the political leadership in Algeria usually take their political decisions as a group, and no single leader makes the important decisions. In other words they like to play as a team. When someone starts making decisions alone, and isolates the rest, then he becomes targeted by the group, and it eventually expels him.
As an example Ahmad Ben Bella was ousted, in 1965, because he concentrated all the political power in his hands.
Also Benjedid had to go when he began playing one group against the other. Finally when president Boudiaf tried to be 115
independent in his decisions from the rest of the group,
especially from those who brought him to power, he was
assassinated.
Fourth, there is a strong belief among the elites in
Algeria for the need for a strong centralized s t a t e . %%
other words, there is a strong feeling about the necessity
of national unity in Algeria. No separatist movements are
tolerated, whether they are based on ethnic differences, or any other claims.
Fifth, in Algeria, as it is the case in any Arab country, there is usually a difference between the political culture of the masses and that of the elite. The masses identify with
Islam and Islamic symbols®’, while the elite group usually
identifies with either a capitalist, a socialist or a communist ideology.
The elite is usually a minority, and has no popular base.
However, it usually allies itself with the armed forces, which
guarantees the obedience of the masses by means of coercion.
Conclusion:
In this chapter, an overview was given of the political
culture in Algeria. The author tried to show that the main
source of culture and political culture in Algeria is Islam. 116
This was evident during the time of the revolution, and later
after independence. This fact was evident in the demand made
by several Islamic groups for the application of Islamic laws.
The author also tried to show the duality that exists
between the political culture of the ruling elite, and that of
the masses. This duality led on many occasions to clashes between both groups.
The author also tried to show the role played by ethnic divisions, and by the Francophone-Arabphone division. Although
these divisions are important, and represent a source of diversity in the political culture in Algeria, yet they could not have caused the halt of the democratization process. The author tried to show that the country's cultural integration
is too profound to be threatened by these divisions. The national unity and the Arab identity are two facts that are adopted by the majority of the population, and that cannot be threatened by the minority. 117
F ootnotes dnetj^ten IV
1. Ronald Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics (Boulder,
Westview Press, 1981): 218.
2. ibid.
3. Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of
Politics 18 (August, 1958): 396.
4. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963): 14.
5. Chilcote, ibid.: 224.
6. Entelis, ibid.: 156.
7. ibid.: 71.
8. ibid.: 74.
9. Shareef Al-Shobashi, "Majlis al-Dawla Bil Jaza’er Youmathel
Itijahan Mukhtalifan," [The State Council In Algeria
Represents Two Different Directions], Al-Ahram newspaper,
January, 18, 1992, p.5)
10. Harold Nelson, ibid.: 14.
11. Entelis, ibid.: 76.
12. Entelis, ibid.: 82.
13. Shaikh Mahfoud Al-Nahnah in a special interview
with the author, January, 9, 1993) 118
Footnotes ClieLjpten IV
14. Entelis, ibid.: 156.
15. Yahia Zoubir, ibid.: 37.
16. ibid.
17. the preliminary political program of the FIS (March, 1989).
18. Hugh Roberts, "A Trial Of Strength: Algerian Islamism,"
Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis ed. James
Piscatori: 136.
19. Entelis, ibid.: 83.
20. Abdulrahman Ben Al-Aqoon, ibid.: 9.
21. al-Nahnah, ibid.
22. Fadeel Al-Ameen, "Demoqrateyat al-Jaza’er Ala Muftaraq
attoroq," [The Democracy of Algeria at the Cross roads], Al-
Amal magazine (September,1991): 35.
23. Nelson, ibid. 7.
24. ibid.: 17-18.
25. ibid.: 76.
26. ibid.
27. Mohammad Harbi, ibid.: 6: also see Al-Munsif Wannas, Al-
Dawla Wa Al-Masala Al-Thaoafeva Fi Al-Jazaer [The State and the Cultural Question in Algeria] (Algeria, Alif Press, 1989):
59; also see Nelson, ibid.: 78. 119
Footnotes dnetr^ten IV
28. Harbi, ibid.
29. Entelis, ibid.: 95.
30. Nelson, ibid.: 78.
31. Mohammed Harbi, Ashara Al-Awsat newspaper 5163 (January 16,
1993): 6.
32. ibid.
33. Nelson, ibid.: 67.
34. Wannas, ibid.: 165.
35. ibid.
36. Nelson, ibid.: 66.
37. Entelis, ibid.: 95.
38. Wannas, ibid.: 273.
39. Mohammad Bouslimani, personal interview.
40. ibid.
41. Yehia Zoubir, ibid.: 32.
42. Mahfoud Al-Nahnah and Mohammad Bouslimani, ibid.
43. Abdulrahman Ben Al-Aqoon, ibid.: 23-26.
44. Wannas, ibid.: 58.
45. Nelson, ibid.: 39.
46. Wannas, ibid.: 49.
47. ibid. 120
F o o t n o t e s C]neLF»t e r I V
48. Entelis, ibid.: 38.
49. Nelson, ibid.: 73.
50. ibid.: 82.
51. ibid.: 80.
52. Entelis, ibid.: 97.
53. Nelson, ibid.: 82.
54. FIS preliminary political program; also see Ben Sliman,
"Ahzabuna Asseyasia," [Our Political Parties] Al-Irshad
magazine 14 (September 1992): 7.
55. Ben Sliman, ibid.
56. Nelson, ibid.: 82.
57. Wannas, ibid.: 267.
58. ibid.: 191.
59. ibid.: 246.
60. ibid.
61. Mohammad Harbi, Ashara Al-Awsat 5157 (January 10, 1993): 5
62. Entelis, ibid.: 65.
63. ibid.
64. Qusai Saleh Al-Darweesh, "Assassination,...Isolation,...
and Solution," Ashara Al-Awsat 5168 (January 21, 1993): 10. 121
F oot n o te S Ch.a.F>ter IV
65. ibid.
66. Entelis, ibid.: 158.
67. ibid. C hapter V
The Economy
When the French colonized Algeria, they were aware of the wealth of the country. The wealth was in both the fertile soil, and in the natural ports that the coastal cities had.
The French wanted to make Algeria the garden that could supply
France with its agricultural needs. They established a dual economy in Algeria, that was made of two sectors to better serve their needs.
The first sector was technically advanced, and used large pieces of land, in the form of plantations, to plant commercial crops, where fertilizers and modern machinery were used extensively. The second sector was that of the indigenous population, which lacked any technology, was limited in size, and was barely sufficient for the needs of the indigenous population. The goal of the plantations, which were totally owned by French citizens, was to export crops to France and
Europe, and the two major crops that were planted were cereals and grapes.
The exploitation of land for the purpose of planting grapes began in 1880, when 40,000 hectares were planted.
However, by 1940, the area of these plantations increased to
122 123
405,000 hectares. As a result the production of wine and
alcohol doubled eight times during this period.' On the eve of
World War II, Algerian alcohol exports represented one third
of the total exports.2
In the south, on the other hand, cereals were planted by
the settlers, also to be exported to France and Europe. The
area of land that produced cereals in 1910 was 1,195,456
hectares.%
After independence, in the period between 1962 and 1965,
when Ahmad Ben Bella was president, several economic
challenges faced the new Algerian government. Some of these
challenges were:
First, the vacuum that was left by the departure of the
French colonizers who used to own the plantations, and the
factories that represented a good source of income to the
country. Second, the Algerian government had to decide on the
proper method to deal with the foreign capital, and companies
that were mining for oil and natural gas in the country.
Third, the newly independent country had a social, an
economic, and a moral commitment to the families of those who
were killed in the war of independence, and those who became handicapped or maimed because of that war. Fourth, the
increase in the percentage of unemployment, which was due 124
to the destruction of the economic infrastructure by the colon
before they had left. *
The most important fact is that, by the time of
independence the leaders of the country did not have an
economic framework, that could help them in setting future
economic policies. The basic economic features of the period
of Ben Bella were:
First, the application of the system known as
"autogestion", were the agricultural workers formed
cooperatives that had a goal of running the plantations and
the factories that were deserted by the French colonizers who
fled the country. In this system, the workers would elect a
council or a group of people among themselves, to make the
decisions in the plantation or in the factory. The government
would have a representative or a manager who would coordinate
with these councils.
This was similar to the system applied in Egypt after the
1953 revolution. As in the case of Egypt the state "manager"
would end up making the important decisions in the factory or
in the plantation, and not the elected workers, or farmers’
counc ils.
Second, the growth of a local bourgeoisie which grew due
to the high tariffs that the government enforced against 125
imported goods. This enabled the local bourgeoisie to flourish
and grow, especially in the textile and food business.
Third, the absence of a major economic role of the
government, in the form of public enterprises. The only
exception was the establishment of SONATRACH, the state oil
company, in December, 1963. SONATRACH was a state company of
research, production, transport, processing and marketing of
hydrocarbons.®
Fourth, this was also a period of economic recession and
a period when unemployment was high. The unemployment rate was
33% in the agricultural sector and 28% in the other sectors.®
Fifth, from these early days the hydrocarbon industry
began dominating all other industries.’
When Houari Boumedienne came to power in 1965, he took
the country away from the "autogestion" policy, and into a
more state-directed economy, which witnessed a great deal of
expansion.® The main policy during the days of Boumedienne was
that of nationalization of French enterprises. The Boumedienne
regime focused basically on industrialization.
The economic advisor of the Algerian government was the
French economist, G. Destanne de Bernis. According to him, the Algerian farmers were not able to find work in the
agricultural sector, because of the limitations that were 126
facing this sector, such as the lack of technology, the lack of
fertilizers, and the lack of machinery. As a result, those
farmers were forced to move the urban centers and to the
cities were they would work in the industrial sector.
According to de Bernis, once the industry was established and was strong, it could produce the fertilizers and machinery for agriculture, as well as form a market for the resulting agricultural output. As a result, de Bernis thought that the country should invest basically in the
industry, and direct all its resources to make
industrialization succeed.®
The industries that de Bernis had in mind were of the type known as "industrializing industries", that would produce other types of industries. Examples of these industries are the manufacturing of iron and steel, the production of mechanical machinery and of electrical power. Also the development of the industry of electronics, chemical
industries, and industries that specialize in producing power and energy.
As we can see, the goal behind these industries was not the production of consumer goods, but the building of the infrastructure for future industries. In other words the idea was that Algeria would produce the machinery and the tools 127
that would be necessary for the production of consumer goods,
and for the agriculture.
However, the great attention that was given to the
industry led to the neglect of other sectors such as
agriculture, consumer goods, and social services. As a result,
we find that by 1978, when President Boumedienne died, the
industrial sector consumed 61.8% of the total government
investment, while investment in agriculture was only 4.5%,
investment in consumer goods was 7.6%, and in social services
we find that investment in health services during the period
1974-1977 never exceeded .4%.*°
The basic economic characteristics of the Boumedienne
period could be summarized as follows:
First, there was an increase in the degree of dependency
on other countries. This dependency was in the form of
technological dependency, as well as dependency in the form of
food imports. Technological dependency was evident in the
industrialization process, since the Algerian government used
to sign contracts with foreign companies to build factories.
The Algerians themselves did not build those factories,
and did not have the necessary technology to do so. As a result a foreign company would build the factory, import the machinery from foreign countries, and even produce the product 128
which the factory was supposed to produce. After the factory
was ready, another form of dependency began. Now the Algerian
government would depend on foreign countries or on the
contractor for the purpose of maintaining the machines in the
factory, and for supplying parts for those machines.''
As for the other type of dependency, which is the
dependency on food imports, it was obvious that, since
investment in agriculture was very low as we have seen
earlier, the country had to import its food needs from other
countries. Therefore, while in 1966 the value of food imports
was 731 million Algerian Dinar's, it increased to 4,049
million AD in 1977.'3
This forced Algeria to borrow money from foreign banks
and countries, in order to pay for the food imports.'* This
food dependency led to the accumulation of foreign debt, as
will be shown later, and also placed the country in a
vulnerable position, where it would be at the mercy of other
countries for its food supplies.
Second, during the time of Boumedienne corruption was
widespread in the administrative and bureaucratic apparatuses.
Some members of the National Liberation Front, top
bureaucrats, and some of those who fought the war of
independence, used their positions to accumulate personal 129
wealth. Corruption took the form of bribes, nepotism, and
illegal profiting of top bureaucrats from state projects.
State officials and bureaucrats would use their positions to
get rich quickly.
This pattern continued after the death of President
Boumedienne, under the presidency of Chadli Benjedid.
Increases in imports occurred in several areas, such as in the
imports of food products. In 1979 its value was 5.1 billion
AD, and it became 8.8 billion AD in 1984.
Imports of semi-finished products increased from 7.7
billion AD in 1979, to 15.2 billion AD in 1984. Imports of
capital goods, such as construction engines and vehicles
increased from 12.4 billion AD in 1979 to 15.6 billion AD in
1984. As for consumer products, imports increased from 4.8
billion AD in 1979, to 7.2 billion AD in 1 9 8 4 .'6
Therefore, economic dependency increased under Benjedid
in the form of imports of food and many other items.
Dependency on the revenues of exporting oil and natural gas
placed the country at the mercy of the fluctuating oil prices.
Corruption, bribes, favoritism, nepotism and unlawful wealth made by top bureaucrats and military leaders were widespread.
The country was also suffering because of the loans that
it took with high interest rates from foreign banks, and 130
foreign countries. Inflation was high, as well as unemployment,
and the country was faced with a housing problem, where the
cities were facing a great deal of pressure from people who
moved from the rural areas, in search of jobs.
The numbers are the best indicators of the seriousness of
the economic problem that Algeria was facing under President
Benjedid:
First, in 1990, Algeria’s dependency on hydrocarbons’
exports (oil and natural gas), reached 97%, and when in 1985-
1986 the price of crude oil dropped by half, from $28 to $14
per barrel, Algeria’s government revenues declined 21% and
imports dropped by 3 5 % . Also between 1980-1989 there was a
loss of $5.1 billion a year in natural gas revenues.’®
Second, Algeria was vulnerable to Western interest rates,
since it was heavily indebted to Western banks, governments
and monetary institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This fact forced Algeria to pay $6 billion a year to its creditors, three fourths of
whom were private banks. Algeria was also paying 97% of its
earnings from its exports to pay the interests of its debt.
Its debt to foreign banks, to other countries, and to monetary
institutions ranged between $25-$27 billion.20
In March 1990, Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche declared 131
that the foreign debt had reached $25 billion, and in order to
pay all the debt, Algeria had to pay $7 billion a year. The
problem was that Algeria’s national earnings, according to
Hamroushe, averaged around $10 billion, and $9 billion of
those earnings were needed to import food and basic needs.
Third, during the time of Benjedid, Algeria was also
facing a housing problem in the urban centers and in major
cities. In 1966 only 38% of Algerians lived in the
cities. In 1978 this percentage increased to 48%, and in 1984
the percentage became 54%.22 a look at the housing in the
capital, Algiers, could give us an idea about the seriousness
of the problem. Although Algiers could not absorb more than a
million people, yet more than 3 million were living in it in
1985.
The houses themselves in the cities are in a bad shape,
and some of them have actually collapsed. As an example, in
1985 in al-Qasaba neighborhood lived around 100,000 people while it had only 1,800 old houses, one third of which were not
fit for living. Another one third needed major repairs, some
needed minor repairs, and only 12% of these houses was fit for
living.2 3
Fourth, there was widespread corruption among state
officials, military leaders, FLN members and top bureaucrats. 132
This factor is very important in explaining the mass resentment of the Algerian people to any governmental figure. The amount of money that was illegally taken by government officials was
in the billions of dollars.
Some political writers think that the reason that the
Islamic party, the FIS, won a majority in the election was due to the fact that the Algerian people were fed up with the corruption of the FLN members, who used their position in the government to get rich.z*
One can give several examples that show the degree of corruption among state officials:
First, in 1962 China gave 15 million dollars to Algeria as assistance. The money was never enrolled in the government records, and the opposition accused President Ben Bella of keeping the money for himself. The opposition also accused Ben
Bella of keeping the money that was collected after independence for the purpose of building the country, for himself.2 5
Second, during the presidency of Chadli Benjedid, investigations of corruption and misuse of position took place against two previous state officials. These two officials were the previous Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Boutafliqa and
Mohammed Yahyawi, who was in charge of the F L N . 26 133
Third, in the Summer of 1988, some allegations took place
concerning the son of President Benjedid, who (according to
the allegations) illegally transferred $17 billion to his
account from the External Bank of Algeria.z?
Fourth, in March 1990, the previous head of the government, Abdulhameeed Al-Ibrahimi accused state officials of illegally taking some 26 billion dollars in commissions
from foreign companies.2» All political parties, including the
FIS, used this information to wage an attack against the FLN, and the government before the 1990 municipal and provincial elections.
Fifth, in 1992 the previous President Ahmad Ben Bella accused President Benjedid of unlawfully taking 10 to 15 billion dollars from the state’s money.z*
Sixth, in 1989 a top military leader, Mustafa Blousif was accused of using the state’s money for personal purposes, such as buying an expensive apartment in Paris and furnishing and decorating it. For this apartment, Blousif spent 80 million
French Francs of the government’s m o n e y . 1989, a special military committee that was responsible for the investigation of the unlawful transfer of money to Blousif’s account, stated that two other high ranking military officers were also involved in money laundering and other money related unlawful behavior. 134
Before he was sent to prison, Blousif declared that it
was a common practice among military officers to use the
budget and resources of the ministry of defense to build and
decorate their apartments. He also said that he was going to
present a list that contained the names of such o f f i c e r s .
Seventh, in 1992, President Mohammed Boudiaf who was
brought to power by the military after the resignation of
President Benjedid, was determined to fight the corruption in
the state, and among top FLN members. As a result President
Boudiaf was soon assassinated, and his wife declared that it
was the Algerian economic "Mafia" that assassinated him.3%
The people knew about these practices, in which
presidents, their associates, military officers, and FLN
members were involved, therefore, they were fed up with all the political figures of the regime. This might have caused the
electoral victory by the FIS against the FLN and all the other
parties. One might say that the people wanted to punish the
FLN and all the political figures of the regime, by voting for
the Islamists who promised to clean the government from
corruption.
Conclusion:
This has been an overview of the deteriorating economic conditions in Algeria. The people were facing economic 135
hardships of all kinds, while the government officials were
enjoying the wealth of the country. The country became
dependent on foreign countries for its basic needs, while
shortages were obvious every where. All this led to the
explosion of October 1988, when the people demonstrated and
rioted in the streets, in protest against the economic
conditions, and against the corruption.
Clashes took place between the rioters and the security
forces, and many people were killed. It was only after these
demonstrations that President Benjedid promised to democratize
and to move the country from the single-party system to a more
open multi-party system. There is no doubt that the Benjedid
government faced serious economic problems, and that these
problems stimulated political change.
However, we should keep in mind that the people were not
asking for democracy during their riots, but were asking for
equality and justice. It was the decision of the leadership of
the regime to change the political system in Algeria. The role
played by the leadership of the regime was crucial in
initiating the democratization process. Of course, the
responses to these initiations by the leaders of the
opposition were also crucial in determining the outcome of the process, as it will be shown in the next chapter. 136
Footnotes dnsLpter- V
1. Sameer Amin, Al-Maghreb Al-Arabi Al-Hadeeth [The new Arab
Maghreb] (Beirut: Dar Al-Hadatha publishing, 1981) 35.
2. Abdulateef Benachenhou, Takawon Al-Takhaluf Fi Al-Jaza’er
[The Creation of Underdevelopment in Algeria] (Algeria: Al-
Sharika Al-Wataneya Li Annashr Wa Al-Tawzee' publishing, 1979)
139-142.
3. Mahfoud Bennoune, The making of contemporary Algeria: 1830-
1987 (Cambridge University Press,1988) 64.
4. Mohammed Easa, "al-Tajruba Al- Jazaereya Fi Al-Tanmeya; Min
Ayn Wa I la Ayn?" [The Algerian Experience in Development: From
Where and to Where?] al-Manar magazine 68 (August, 1990): 66.
5. Bennoune, ibid.: 100.
6. Easa, ibid. : 68 ; also see Benachenhou, ibid. : 41.
7. Easa, ibid.
8. Entelis, ibid.: 112.
9. ibid.: 113.
10. Easa, ibid.: 70.
11. ibid.: 71.
12. US $1 = 22.01 dinars; 1,000 AD = $45,442)
13. Bennoune , ibid.: 216. 137
F o o t no t e s ClneLpt e r V
14. Easa, ibid.: 73.
15. ibid.: 73.
16. Bennoune, ibid.: 285.
17. Joe Stork, "North Africa Faces the 1990s," Middle East
Report (March-April 1990): 7.
18. Mahfoud Bennoune, "Algeria’s Facade of Democracy," Middle
East Report (March-April 1990): 9.
19. Stork, ibid.
20. Bennoune, ibid.: 11; also see Hassan Al-Subaihi, "Al-
Jaza’er: Man Yakhsar Wa Man Yaksab Wa Kaif?," [Algeria: Who
Wins and Who Loses, and How?] Al-Itihad newspaper (June 12,
1991).
21. Saleh Qalab, "Al-Jaza’er: Sira’ Al-Ajniha Mostamer,"
[Algeria: the Struggle of the Wings is Continuing] Al-Ma ialla
magazine 528 (March 1990): 29.
22. "Saba’ Ayam Hazat Al-Jaza’er," [Seven Days Shook Algeria]
al-Shira’ magazine (May, 1985): 22.
23. ibid.: 23. 138
F o o t n o t e s Œneir* t e r V
24. Jamal Amiar, "Clear Rejection of Socialist Past," The
Washington Report On Middle East Affairs (July/August 1990):
9; also see Mohammed Qanawi, al-Islam al-Sevasi [Political
Islam] (June 1991): 14.; also see Izzat Safi, "Diuf Jabhat Al-
Tahreer Fi Al-Jaza’er Yabdaoun Al-Raheel," [The Gustes of the
FLN Start to Leave] al-Khalee i newspaper (March 31, 1991): 21;
also see Adel Rida, "Mowajaha M a ’a Al-Ameen Al-Aam Li Jabhat
Al-Tahreer," [A Confrontation With The General Secretary of the FLN] Akher S a ’a magazine (March 1991): 15.
25. Uthman Tezghart, "Harb Al-Fasad Fi Al-Jaza’er," [The War of
Corruption in Algeria] al-Ma ialla magazine (July 1992): 52,
26. Masudi Zaytooni, "In a Parliamentary Investigation in
1990," al-Ma ialla magazine 647 (July, 1992).
27. ibid.: 50.
28. ibid.
29. ibid.: 51.
30. ibid.
31. ibid.: 53.
32. Uthman Tezaghart & Asma’ Ramadani, "Man Qatal Boudiaf?,"
[Who Killed Boudiaf?] al-Ma ialla magazine 654 (August 1992);
19. Chapter VI
The Islamic Salvation Front FIS
And Other Islamic Organizations
The Algerian Islamic movement became visible and active after February 1989 when the constitution allowed for a multi party system. This particular opening in the Algerian political system, and in the constitution was basically caused by the economic and social crises that the regime was facing, and that ultimately led to the riots of October 1988. During these riots, that were later called the "bread riots" or the
"hunger riots", many people were killed due to clashes between the rioters and the army.
There were several Islamic parties in Algeria that were established after those riots. Some of those parties were: the Islamic Salvation Front known as the FIS, the Movement for an Islamic Society known as "HAMAS", and the Movement of the
Islamic Renaissance MNl, known to many Algerians as "Ennahda".
There are also several other Islamic parties with a relatively small number of followers, such as the Algerian Renewal Party, the National Algerian Party, and Al-Omma Party.‘
139 140
In this chapter the author will try to provide an
extensive look at the FIS, and an idea about the rest of the
parties. The reason for giving the FIS more attention is due
to the fact that it had the greatest number of supporters, and
it won in two elections. The first one was the municipal
elections of 1990, and the second was the first round of the
legislative elections of 1991.
1. The Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut)
"FIS":
The FIS, known in Arabic as (AL-Jabha Al Islameya Li 1
Inqath), was founded in February 1989. Its political program
called for the application of the Islamic Law, known as the
Shari’a, as is the case with many Islamic movements in the
Muslim World. However, compared to the other Islamic parties,
its approach was more revolutionary and confrontational
especially in dealing with the government.
The FIS used mosques all over Algeria to build its
popular base, and to mobilize the masses in the streets of
Algeria, for or against any governmental policy. Its
confrontational approach was appealing to the people, who
admired the FIS's officials for their courage in criticizing
the government. Usually in the Arab World, when you criticize 141
the decision maker, you end up in prison. Therefore, those who
criticize the government are usually admired and have large
audiences.
In Algeria, when the people were given the chance to
express their support to the FIS in the ballot box, they did
not hesitate. In June, 1990 the municipal and provisional
elections were held, in which the FIS obtained 54% of the
vote. This enabled it to gain control of the Popular
Assemblies in 32 of Algeria’s 48 Wilayat (provinces), winning
a landslide majority in virtually all the major cities.% In
those elections, the ruling party, the National Liberation
Front, the FLN, got only 17.49%, and came s e c o n d . ^
As was mentioned earlier, the FI S ’s approach to change
was revolutionary rather than gradual or reformist, like the
other Islamic parties HAMAS and Ennahda. It. openly called for
the removal of the president, and for the change of the whole
political system, and as a result, it became very popular
among the people, who were fed up with the regime.
Knowing that the masses were very upset and angry with
the system that led to the deterioration of economic
conditions, the FIS promised that once in power, it would improve the economic conditions of the Algerian people.
Therefore, the political program of the FIS became appealing 142
not only to the religious, but also to those in the lower
classes, who were suffering because of the policies of the FLN
government.*
The supporters of the FIS included members of all social
classes and economic strata of society. Among the FI S ’s
supporters, one would even find some ex-members of the ruling
party the FLN, who were not pleased with the way by which the
FLN was running the country.
A. The leadership of the FIS:
The FIS was led by a Consultative Council known as
"Majlis Al-Shura". The word "Shura" in Islam means
consultation, which is what the ruler should do before making
decisions. This process of consultation is mandatory to every
leader or ruler, and even the prophet Mohammad was told by
Allah in the Quran to consult with his companions and with the
rest of the believers, before making a decision.® The Prophet
Mohammad also stressed the importance of Shura.®
There were two prominent leaders on top of the FIS, and
those were Abbassi Madani, and Ali BelhadJ. Abbassi Madani was
a university professor in the department of sociology. He was
one of those who started the 1954 revolution against the
French under the leadership of the National Liberation Front,
FLN. He was then caught by the French and sentenced to seven 143
years in prison. After independence he was set free and
deserted the FLN since the government that was pronounced
after independence was secular, socialist and leftist.?
The other leader, Ali Belhadj, was the most popular and
the powerful speaker of the FIS. He was born in 1954,
therefore, he represents the young generation that has not
witnessed the war of independence, and to whom the main
figures of the revolution did not mean anything.
According to some writers, Belhadj represented the hard
liner wing in the leadership of the FIS, while Abbassi Madani
represented the pragmatic, soft-liner one.® However, others
think that both Madani and Belhadj were hard-liners and that
the moderate elements were people like Abdulqader Hachani, Ben
Azzouz Zebda, editor of the F I S ’s newspaper, Al-Munqith, A 1-
Hashimi Sahnouni, Shaikh Murrani, and Al-Bashir Faqih.* Among
the soft-liners were some of the founders of the FIS along
with Madani and Belhadj, but who rejected the confrontational
style of those two leaders.
Generally speaking, the FIS used to have several
political wings:
First, theleadership that founded the FIS, including
Abbassi Madani, Ali Belhadj, and the rest of the Consultative
Counci 1. 144
Second, some members who joined the FIS later, and who were influenced by the ideas of Takfeer and Hijra, a religious movement that was originally founded in Egypt in the 70's.
Takfeer and Hijra was a radical movement, which represented a violent reaction to the highly oppressive measures that the
Egyptian government took against the Muslim Brethren (Al-
Ikhwan Al-Muslemeen) in the 5 0 ’s and the 6 0 ’s.
During the presidency of Nasser, the Ikhwan were imprisoned and tortured by the thousands in Egypt. Some of those who were severely treated considered those responsible for their suffering in the government as non-Muslims.
Therefore, their decision was to consider the ruler and his associates as non-Muslims. Those prison guards, and security forces who carried out the orders, were also considered non-
Mus1ims.
This group was later called the Takfeer and Hijra, which could be translated as those who consider the regime and its people non-believers, and who call on others to emigrate and leave this regime. Members of this group believed that it was permissible to kill those top leaders of the regime. They also believed that it was permissible to destroy the property of the political regime. The "Takfeer And Hijra" group even condemned the leadership of the Muslim Brethren, for not 145
approving violence as a response to the oppression by the
Egyptian government. This group had its supporters in Algeria
as well, and some of its members joined the FIS, as was Just
mentioned.
Third, the Jaza’ra group, which was influenced by some
Algerian Islamic thinkers, who had nationalistic tendencies.
This group was specially active in the university, and it
joined the FIS after the success that the FIS had achieved in
the municipal elections, in 1990.
Fourth, some ex-FLN activists and supporters who used to
occupy important positions in the government, and who joined
the FIS after being expelled from the government. They joined
the FIS as a form of objection to the policies of the FLN, and
to get revenge from it.
Fifth, many unemployed young people who were suffering
economically, because of the economic policies of the FLN.
Members of this group may or may not have been religious, and their ultimate goal may not have been the establishment of
an Islamic state.
Sixth, some of the Mujahideen (fighters), who came back
from Afghanistan and who thought that they could declare
"Jihad" against the government, similar to the Jihad that was
waged against the communist government in Afghanistan. 146
Therefore, knowing about all the above different groups
that were included in the FIS, it would be incorrect to assume
that the leadership of the FIS was able to control all the
people who belonged to it. Any one, even government agents,
could have penetrated the FIS and instigated any behavior,
for which the FIS could be held accountable.
After knowing about the background, and the composition
of the FIS, one needs to study the political program of this
movement. This would allow the reader to understand the kind
of government that the FIS would have installed, if it was
allowed to get to power.
B. The Political Program of The FIS
In this section the author will deal with the program of
the Islamic Salvation Front, the FIS, which represented the
strongest Islamic party during the electoral elections. The
FIS’s program contained some general guidelines which showed
the way by which it intended to run the country. As a matter of
fact, the FIS was the only political party that published its
political program a few days after its establishment.
To give an idea about the F I S ’s political program we
will look at its preliminary political program that was
published in March, 1989. The program contained ten sections, 147
ordered as follows:
1. The basic elements (principles)
2. Preface
3. The Islamic ideological framework
4. The political dimension
5. The economic dimension
6. The social dimension
7. The cultural and civil dimension
8. The information policy
9. The military
10. The foreign policy
The author will deal with some of these sections:
First, the basic principles:
According to the program, there were some basic principles
that represented the guidelines for the FIS’s political plan.
These principles were:
First, the plan should adhere to Islamic Laws (Shari’a).
Second, the plan should also recognize the laws of science and
knowledge. Third, the plan should also take into consideration
the psychology of the Algerian people at the time.
Fourth, the realities and the circumstances that were
facing the country at that time, were to be taken into
consideration. Fifth, the above principles would determine the 148
way by which the FIS should conduct its political activity and
the way in which it should deal with all other political
actors in the political arena.
Details on each of the above principles were further
explained in a 42 page official document. In the coming pages,
the author will explain and analyze the FIS’s program.
I. The economic policy:
First, the economic policy in the program was based on the principle of supply and demand, where a balance between production and consumption should be achieved. Leaders of the
FIS also believed that the economic policy should also take
into consideration the growth rate of the population, and the need to achieve economic independence.
Second, the program condemned the previous economic approach that was followed in the name of state planning, where the state was running the factories and agriculture, giving very little space for the private sector. As a result, the authors of the program believed, a great deal of waste took place in the economy, and economic motivation was killed, corruption was widespread, and inflation and unemployment
increased.
Third, the program also aimed at the creation of a solid 149
national industrial base, which should be self sufficient, and
would not place the country at the mercy of foreign countries.
The FIS disapproved the policy of importing primary materials
that were needed for the industry from foreign countries,
since this approach represented a form of economic dependency.
Leaders of the FIS also believed that it was essential
that those primary materials were manufactured in Algeria, in
order to achieve economic independence. They also insisted
that the manufactured products should be of high quality and
of sufficient quantities that would make the industrialization
policy efficient and worthwhile. Unless the above requirements
were fulfilled, then the governmental industrialization
project would represent a burden on the national economy.
Fourth, in agriculture, we find that the program
considered the agricultural sector as the most important
natural resource, therefore, it called for several measures
that would allow the utilization of this resource to the
maximum degree. These suggested measures were: a. the agricultural policy should be consistent with the
teachings of Islam, therefore, Islamic Justice would
forbid the unlawful confiscation of land from those who
own it.13 b. the usage of all known technical methods in treating the 150
soil to make it fertile and ready for planting. Then
divide the land among those who deserve it, regardless of
personal relations or of any kind of injustice.
c. taking good care of the cattle and life stock, in order
to decrease the rate of food imports, in the form of
meats and dairy products, and increase the national
production of these items. d. building large scale storage areas, in order to store
food in large quantities, which might be used in the
periods of food shortages and crisis. e. establishing agricultural research institutes, that would
improve the agricultural sciences in the country, and
also develop the necessary technology needed for the
improvement of agriculture in Algeria.
These were some measures that the F I S ’s agricultural
policy called for in its program. As we can see, they
represented specific measures, and not just general ideas. As
it shows, the plan called for the use of science and
scientific research in order to establish a strong
agricultural sector that could move the country away from its
food dependency on foreign countries.
Fifth, the program also dealt with the commercial sector
and the financial sector. It suggested several reform measures 151
that were needed for both sectors. These measures called for
free trade, and the forbidding of monopoly since it was forbidden in Islam. It also called for the establishment of a commercial sector, based on a scientific base. It also called for the prevention of the "black market" that used to exist, which was destroying the national economy.
Sixth, as for the foreign trade with other countries, the program stressed the necessity the foreign trade should not be a source of disrespect to the dignity and independence of
Algeria. It also insisted that the foreign market should not, by any means, harm the needs of the local market. It also called for the necessity of establishing a balance between exports and imports, in order to protect the local products, and reduce the dependency on imports.
Seventh, as for the financial sector, the FI S ’s program called for the establishment of Islamic banks that would not deal with interest, since interest was forbidden in Islam.
Eighth, at the social level, the FI S ’s program considered that the basic principle behind its social policy was the protection of the dignity of each human being, as was mentioned in the Quran. As a result each human being in
Algeria had the right of existence, and of enjoying a dignified life, where his basic human rights would be 152
protected by the state.
The program also called for taking care of the children,
women, and the elderly. It also considered the educational
sector, as one of the most important sectors, therefore, it
called for the necessity of spending generously to improve the
educational system. It also called for reforming this system
in a way that would guarantee education for every body. As a
result, the program called for making education compulsory
until high school.
Ninth, as for the health and medical sector, the program called for developing a better level of preventive medicine.
It also demanded that medical treatment should be available
for every citizen, poor or rich. At the same time, it demanded that medication should be available for every citizen.
In general, the program called for the application of
Islamic rules and principles in all aspects of life in
Algeria, especially those concerned with social and economic
justice, equality among individuals, personal freedom, and
respect for human dignity. The FIS carried the banner of
Islam, to fight the diseases of the regime such as, corruption, and unlawful wealth collected by state officials, while on the Job.
Economically speaking, the program could be regarded as 153
liberal. As it moved away from state planning and socialist
economics, it would give more space to the individual to work and produce.
In comparison, the ruling FLN had adopted, for many years, a socialist economic model, with more weight given to the public sector and to state enterprises, rather than to the
individual or to the private sector.
In its program, the FIS stated that it would apply Islam to all aspects of life in Algeria. This statement scared many people, especially the secularists, who were afraid that their personal freedoms might be restricted by the FIS. Therefore, many Algerians were afraid that the FIS might follow the
Iranian model and force people to behave or dress in a certain way.)*
For many years, people were living in a certain manner, dressing in what ever way they liked, and led a social life according to their personal beliefs and social backgrounds.
They were not willing to change their habits overnight, and they were afraid that the FIS might force them to do so.
Finally, a very important section in the F I S ’s program, was the one that dealt with the military. The program called for reforming the military in a way that would enable it to better achieve its mission. This section included several 154
points, such as:
First, reforming the military’s educational programs,
with priority given to building the ideology and moral of the
military.
Second, while reforming the military, priority should be
given to some characteristics, such as bravery, honesty, and
truthfulness.
Third, there would be a need to increase the technical
and scientific level of the Algerian military.
Fourth, it would also be very necessary to improve the
equipment and tools used by the military.
Fifth, the plan also sought the establishment of military
academies that would be of high standards, which could produce
the best and the most experienced military leaders.
Sixth, it would also be crucial to establish a military
industry, and encourage military research.
Seventh, the military should not involve itself with
political issues, and should remain as the protector of the
whole country. Such a task would make the people trust it even
further.
These were the main points concerning the military, in
the FI S ’s program. As we can see, they represented ideas that
would improve the professional level and the fighting ability 155
of the Algerian military. However, the fact that the FIS had
intended to reform the military, was not welcomed by the
leaders of the military, as will be shown later in Chapter
IX. » 5
This has been an overview of the FIS’s political program,
which was published in March 1989. As we can see, in its
program the FIS was trying to apply the teachings of Islam,
especially the moral aspects of it on all aspects of life in
Algeria. It was trying to run the government according to
moral virtues, such as, truth, honesty, justice, and equality,
in order to prevent the misuse of office by state bureaucrats,
as was the case with some FLN officials who used their
official positions for personal benefits.
Also, since the economy has deteriorated to a great
extent, the FIS's program was trying to pull the country out of economic dependence on foreign countries, especially the
country's dependence on food imports. Therefore, it tried to
encourage small businesses to establish themselves, by lifting
the barriers that were put by the socialist regime.
At the same time, the program supported the agricultural
sector by encouraging scientific research and by calling upon
the state to spend for the purpose of treating the soil, in
order to make it fertile. 156
As was shown, the program also dealt with the social
sector, the health sector, the educational sector, the
financial sector, the foreign affairs sector, and the military
sector. Therefore, it is obvious that the FIS was trying to
present a comprehensive program, that would deal with all
aspects of life in the Algerian society.
The fact that the FIS, which was only established in
1989, had such a program, means that its leaders were very
serious and dedicated to solve the problems of the country.
Moreover, since the FIS was not given the chance to apply its program, no body has the right to claim that its program would
have been unsuccessful.
When Ali Belhadj , the second man in the FIS, was asked about the FIS’s political program, he replied:
"A lot of people ask if the Islamists have a political
program. This question results from the lack of
knowledge of the nature of Islam.... This religion has a
clear political system, and a clear method of
functioning. It contains a social system, an
educational system, an economic system, and a cultural
system. Where is the problem? The problem is not in the
existence of a program, but in the existence of the
necessary conditions for the success of this program. 157
This has been a brief presentation of the ideas of the
Islamic Salvation Front FIS, which has played an important
role in recent Algerian political life. Its role became
obvious after the riots of October 1988. In 1990, the FIS
achieved a major victory in the municipal and provincial
elections, and later in December 1991, it achieved another
victory in the first round of the parliamentary elections.
However, the FIS lived only for three years, between the 20th
of February 1989 when it was founded, and the 9th of February
1992, when it was banned, by the High State Council.
2. The Movement of The Islamic Society (Harakat Al-Mujtara’a
Al-Islami), "HAMAS":
HAMAS was founded in December 1990, by Shaikh Mahfoud Al-
Nahnah and his deputy. Shaikh Mohammad Bouslimani.i? HAMAS represents a moderate political movement, which advocates non
violence and encourages dialogue with all political opponents,
including the government.
This approach is similar to the one that was followed by
the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars (Jameyat Al-Ulama
Al-Muslimeen) sixty years ago, which never called for a
violent revolt against the French but was continuously
demanding the freedom of Algeria, and the right of the 158
Algerians to run their social and religious affairs.
HAMAS evolved from a religious association, known as,
the Association of Guidance and Reform (Al-Irshad w a ’l-Islah),
which was founded by Shaikh Al-Nahnah in 1988. This
association used to emphasize the need to reform society
through Islamic missionary activity before it would be
possible to reform the state according to Islamic
principles.19 HAMAS believes that democracy, security,
stability, and the multi-party system is the natural
environment where the Islamic movement can flourish.20
The economic plan that was suggested by HAMAS to get the
country out of its economic crisis contains the following
steps :
First, the economy should move away from socialism, and
should be more open and liberal.
Second, the opportunity should be given to individuals, and
to the private sector to deal directly with foreign
countries.
Third, since the public sector is a burden on the economy,
then it must be reduced in size, and the door should be 159
opened widely to those in the private sector, to work and
produce.
Fourth, foreign companies should be given the opportunity to
invest in Algeria. However, their work should not be
allowed to threaten the sovereignty of the c o u n t r y . 21
HAMAS’s strong hold is the city of Boulaida where Shaikh
Nahnah is based.
3. The Movement of the Islamic Renaissance (Mouvement de la
Nahda Islamique), "Ennahda":
In Arabic its known as "Harakat Ennahda Al-Islamia". It
was founded in late December 1990 by Shaikh Abdullah Jaballah.
It does not seem to have a large support base except in
Constantine where the base of its founder Shaikh Jabullah is
located. In its non-violent approach Ennahda is similar to
"HAMAS". Its leaders are pragmatic, and accept dialogue with
all other democratic parties.
4, Union of the Islamic Mission: (Rabitat al-Da’wa al-
Islamiya):
This organization includes most Islamic parties including 160
FIS, HAMAS, and Ennahda. The goal of its establishment was to
bring all the Islamic parties closer together, and to solve
any problem that might occur among these parties. The head of
this association is Shaikh Ahmad Sahnoun, who is 83 years old
and who belongs to the old generation of the Association of
the Algerian Muslim Ulama.
Shaikh Sahnoun is a moderate figure similar to Shaikh Ben
Badees who had established the Association of the Algerian
Muslim Ulama in 1931. This organization is not a political
party that contests elections, but it represents an
organizational body for all the Islamic parties.
Conclusion:
In this chapter, the author has tried to draw a detailed
picture of the Islamic Salvation Front. The author tried to
describe it since its establishment in 1989. An overview was
given of its leadership and its composition. The author also
dealt with its political program, hoping to give a more
profound idea about the goals of the movement. Furthermore,
the author also shed some light on some other Islamic
organizations, that have some similarities and differences
with the FIS. 161
Footnotes dnaLg» t e r VI
1. Yehia Zoubir, From Authoritarianism to Democracy, a paper presented at the 26th Middle East Studies Association Annual
Conference (28-31 October, 1992): 30.
2. Hugh Roberts, ibid.: 134.
3. ibid.
4. Lahouri Addi, "The Islamist Challenge: Religion And
Modernity In Algeria," Journal of Democracy 3.4 (October
1992): 80.
5. The Quran. 3:159; also The Quran. 42:38.
6. Abu Al-Ala Al-Moududi, Al-Khilafa Wa Al-Mulk [Caliphate and
Kingdom]: 42.
7. Nora Fakhori & Mustafa Yahyawi, Al-Ma ialla magazine (July,
1991): 20.
8. Hugh Roberts, ibid.: 137.
9. Bouslimani, ibid.
10. ibid.
11. Lahouri Addi, ibid.
12. Yahia Al-Awad, "Mashahid Min Shita’ Al-Ghadab Fi Al-
Jaza’er," Asharc al-Awsat newspaper 1426 (February 9, 1992):
8. 162
F o o tn o tes ClneLp>ter' VI
13. As it was the case under the socialist regime of
Boumedienne.
14. Faleh Abduljabbar, Sawt Al-Kuwait Aldawli (February,26
1992)
15. Shareef Al-Shobashi, ibid.
16. Azzedine Layachi & Abdel-kader Haireche, "National
Development And Political Protest: Islamists In The Maghreb
Countries," Arab Studies Quarterly 14.2 & 3 (Spring/Summer
1992): 79.
17. he was interviewed by the author in November 1992.
18. Abdulrahman Al-Aqoon, ibid.: 209.
19. Roberts, ibid.: 136.
20. Shaikh Mahfoud Al-Nahnah, leader of HAMAS, in an interview
published in August, 1991.
2 1 . ibid. Chapter VII
The Role of the Leadership
Throughout the previous chapters, the author has dealt
with some background variables that helped shape the political
and social structure of today’s Algeria. The legacy of the
French colonization, the political culture, the deeply rooted
ethnic divisions, and the continuously deteriorating economic
conditions in the post-independence era, all had a great deal
of influence on the political life in Algeria. However, these
variables have not caused the failure of the democratization
process that Algeria was witnessing, as the author will try to
show in the following chapters.
After extensive research into the Algerian case, it has
become clear to the author that the major factor that caused
the failure of the transition was of the proximate type. It
was due to the factor of leadership in the context of domestic
and external pressure that the transition was halted.
A. Two types of leaders: hard-liners and soft-liners:
Transition to democracy in Algeria supports the theories
that deal with the role of political leadership in the
democratization process. These theories suggest that in many cases divisions occur among the leaders of political regimes,
in which two camps are formed, the camp of the hard-liner
163 164
leaders and that of the soft-liners.
The soft-liners push for reforms in the political system,
while the hard-liners try to keep their tight grip on the
system. It should be mentioned that when the soft-liners push
for political reform, they usually do it out of their belief
that these reforms would serve their interests.*
As was just mentioned, the division occurs between two
types of elites, the "hard-liners", and the "soft-liners". The
hard-liners are those who believe that the continuity of the
authoritarian rule is possible despite the difficulties that
the regime is facing, and despite mounting opposition from
different groups in society to the political system.%
These hard-liners may be composed of several factions,
some of whom resist the opening of the system out of
opportunism and fear for the removal of advantages and
privileges they currently enjoy. Others do it out of their
belief that democracy is an evil that threatens national
unity, and that does not have any good aspect.% As an example,
some hard-liners in the military do not trust either the
politicians or the multi-party system, because they believe
that partisanship threatens the national unity of the
country.* Therefore, to them the best way to rule the people
is by coercion and force, since democracy usually brings 165
anarchy.
Among the leaders of the Algerian military, one can find
many hard-liners who believe that democracy in the form of a
multi-party system contradicts the spirit of order and
discipline that they are used to. The most important thing for
the officers is national unity, and to them multi-party
systems and elections usually threaten this unity.
As for the soft-liners, they are members of the elite who
think that the regime could benefit from some degree of
electoral legitimacy.® They are moderate elements who realize
that the regime could not rule for a long time relying on
coercion. Therefore, they think that it is for the best
interest of themselves and of the regime that some opening
should occur in the political system.
One could hardly read any piece of literature that deals
with the process of democratization and not find some
reference made to the division of the elite into hard-liners
and soft-liners.®
When using the terms hard-liners and soft-liners most
writers refer to the governing elite. The author also believes that these terms should be used when referring to the
leaders of the opposition. Opposition leaders who accept
nothing less than the total change of the regime, and who are 166
willing to carry an all out confrontation with the regime to
achieve their goals may be considered hard-liners. As an
example in Algeria the two prominent leaders of the FIS,
Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj belong to this category, as the
author will show.
B. The hard-liners, soft-liners in the FIS:
Both Ali Belhadj and Abbassi Madani declared that they
were seeking the total change of the political system in
Algeria, and the replacement of the regime with an Islamic
State. Therefore, they insisted that the president should be
replaced and prosecuted for his mismanagement of the country.
Similarly, all the people who served in prominent positions in
all three previous administrations, and who misused their
authority, were to be brought to justice. It was out of their
belief that Benjedid’s regime was corrupt and that it had to
be removed, even if this led to clashes with the security
forces and to casualties.
As for the leadership that took charge of the FIS after
the imprisonment of Belhadj and Madani, the author considers
it the leadership of the soft-liners, who showed a great degree of flexibility. At that time the FIS was led by the
pragmatic figure Abdulqadir Hachani, who stated that the FIS
was ready to cooperate with President Benjedid until the end 167
of his presidential term. Hachani played according to the rules
of the game, and agreed to contest the parliamentary
elections, rather than seek the immediate establishment of an
Islamic State.
Later on, when the military moved in, cancelled the
elections, and banned the FIS, Hachani refused to mobilize the masses against the military, fearing for the lives of
thousands of people who might get killed in such clashes.
C. The willingness to forget and forgive:
If the transition is to be successful, opposition
leaders need to be willing to cooperate with the current
regime, in exchange for some political gains. This cooperation begins with the agreement between the regime and leaders of the opposition on the rules of the game. Opposition leaders
should understand from the beginning that this game can never be a zero sum game. Both sides should look at this cooperation as a marriage of convenience in which each side wins a little and gives a little in exchange.’
However, the hard-liners in the FIS gave enough reasons for the military leaders to feel suspicious of the party. In order for any transition to succeed, the opposition should accept to gain some and should be willing to give some.®
Leaders of the opposition should understand the rules that the 168
regime had set, and should show their willingness to play
according to those rules. Also, leaders of the opposition
should show their willingness to forget and forgive.’ Forget
old grievances, and forgive those who committed mischief
against their group.
In other words, the leaders of the opposition should
agree to give amnesty to those who are currently in power.
However, if leaders of the opposition threatened that once in
power, they would go after wrong doers who belong to the
current regime, then those in the current regime would make
sure that the opposition party would never get to power.
The hard-liners in the FIS were not willing to forget and
forgive, and were instead threatening to go after all those
who misused their position in the government since
independence. Previous presidents, military leaders, and top
bureaucrats who served under Ben Bella, Boumedienne, and
Benjedid were all at risk, and it was in the best interest of
those that the FIS would never be allowed to get to power.
D. Leaders of the regime:
As was mentioned earlier, most of the writers use the hard-liners, soft-liners division to describe the leadership
of the regime. In Algeria for instance, one could find the 169
hard-liners among the leaders of the military. Some military
leaders refused the democratization process all together,
especially if it was to bring the FIS to power. As an example
Defense Minister Khalid Nezzar and Colonel Mustafa Cheloufi
the secretary general of the ministry of defense were never
willing to allow the FIS to come to power.
They both are good examples of the hard-liners in the
regime, since they had decided earlier that if the legislative
elections would bring the FIS to power, then they would
intervene to abort the democratization process all together.
They never shied away from expressing their position as will
be shown by the author.
E. From liberalization to democratization:
As was mentioned earlier the transition to democracy
begins with some moderates among the ruling elite calling for
some reforms, which would eventually serve their interests and
the interests of the regime. The process usually passes
through a liberalization period, after which it may gradually
move into a period of democratization.‘°
However, one should also keep in mind that this path does
not necessarily have to be followed , since it may stop after
some basic political liberties have been given. It could also 170
regress back into authoritarianism if the hard-liners in the
regime felt that the liberalization process was threatening their interests.
During the liberalization period, some political
liberties are given, and usually some political prisoners and opposition leaders are released. Later on, the moderates among the elite, or the soft-liners might decide to go further, and might show some willingness to share power with the opposition. At this stage, the regime begins to witness a democratization process, in which democratic elections are held, and the opposition is allowed to share power.
When he first came to power in 1979, President Benjedid released some political prisoners such as Ahmad Ben Bella who was the first president after independence, and others such as
Shaikh Mahfoud Nahnah who was then an active figure in the
Islamic movement. Other prominent opposition leaders were allowed to return to Algeria from exile, such as Ben Yousef
Ben Khedda, who was the head of the provisional government before independence, and Hocine Alt Ahmad, one of the leaders of the Algerian revolution who had been in exile since 1964.
On the other hand Benjedid also marginalized the hard liners in the FLN and those who were loyal to the previous
President Houari Boumedienne. He feared that they might 171
represent an obstacle to his economic and political reforms.
As an example Abdulaziz Boutafliqa who was a close ally to the
late President Boumedienne was relieved from his
responsibility as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Also
Mohammad Yahyawi the Co-ordinator of the FLN was dismissed
from his post, since he was a strict supporter of the brand of
socialism that previous President Boumedienne had established
in Algeria.'‘
Generally speaking, President Benjedid felt that the FLN
was too powerful and could represent a challenge to his
authority. Therefore, its overall power had to be reduced. *2
Besides removing some strong FLN members from government,
Benjedid decided to reduce the political weight of the party
as a whole. His solution was to open the system politically,
and allow other political parties to compete against the FLN.
This would eventually keep the FLN busy trying to win some
seats in the parliament, and stop being a threat to the
president.
F. Transition through transaction or transition by collapse:
In this connection, it is very important to point out that the transition to democracy in Algeria was of the transition through transaction type, which Donald Share talked 172
about.13 This type has certain characteristics that could also
be found in the Algerian case:
First, in this type, leaders of the authoritarian regime
initiate democratic reform by their own choice, and exercise a
high level of discretion in choosing the proper time for doing
so. When President Benjedid began the liberalization process
in 1980, and the democratization process after the 1988 riots
he was not forced to do so by the people or by the opposition.
As a matter of fact, during the October riots of 1988, the
people were asking for equality and social justice and not for
democracy or for a multi-party system. It was Benjedid himself
who promised to replace the single party system with a multi
party system.i*
Second, in this type of transition, leaders of the regime
are usually in charge of the process, and do not allow it to
get out of hand. They usually decide how far would they allow
the process to go, and how many concessions they would be
willing to allow the opposition to get. However,it seemed
that the opposition in Algeria and especially the hard-liners
in the FIS did not realize this fact, or at any rate accept
this approach, and they were behaving as if they were in
control of the process.
For example they demanded on several occasions the 173
resignation of President Benjedid who was actually the patron
of the democratization process. On other occasions they
demanded the prosecution of wrong doers in the Benjedid
administration, as well as in the previous administrations.
These hard-liners' call for the immediate establishment of an
Islamic State, and for abandoning the elections and the
constitution, showed that they did not understand the game
properly. With the popularity they had, it was in their best
interest that the elections be held. Yet they took many
actions that gave the government the excuse that it needed to move against them.
As a matter of fact, this rigid position of the hard
liners in the FIS was welcomed by the hard-liners in the
government, who were not in favor of the democratization process in the first place. The lack of pragmatism among the
FIS’s hard-liners was used as an excuse by the government and
its media to wage attacks against the FIS. The more the hard
liners in the FIS challenged the regime, the more the hard
liners in the government rejected the democratization idea on
the basis that democracy was not fit for those
"fundamentalists" who would "assassinate" it the moment they
get to power.
While the leaders of the regime in Algeria were aiming at 174
a transition in which they would continue to be the actual
holders of power, leaders of the FIS were aiming at total
change that would remove those in power. However, in the
"transition through transaction" model of democratization,
leaders of the authoritarian regime should have a degree of
control over the pace and the nature of change, in order to maintain balance between the democratic opposition and the
supporters of the regime.*® The president and military leaders had this picture in mind. However, leaders of the FIS had a
different picture, and this is what caused the clash between
the two groups.* ®
Third, the "transition through transaction" model is usually characterized by a degree of continuity in terms of
elites, social and economic structures, and political
institutions. However, the hard-liners in the FIS wanted a discontinuity of all three.*’ It was obvious that the perception of the leaders of the regime was different than that of the FIS.
Fourth, according to this model, mass mobilization usually works against the success of the transition, since the hard-liners in the regime who were against the transition in the first place, would fear that they might lose control of the process, if the masses were mobilized against them. These 175
hard liners, especially those in the security forces are always
suspicious of the opposition, fearing that leaders of the
opposition might mobilize the masses in a revolution that
would strip the leaders of the regime of their power.
While the transition in Algeria was of the "transition
through transaction" model, the leaders of the FIS were
behaving as if it was of the "transition by collapse model",
in which leaders of the regime usually do not have either the
choice in the decision to democratize, or the control over the
process.1* Theories that deal with the "transition by
collapse" model consider that in this type the rules of the
previous regime would be totally rejected by the people, and
the ruling elite would be largely excluded.*®
On the other hand, in the "transition by collapse”
model, mass mobilization would be preferable since it would
demonstrate the extent to which the regime had lost its
legitimacy. Therefore, the mobilization of the F I S ’s
supporters in the streets would have helped the transition if
the political system in Algeria was collapsing and had no
control on the country. But to mobilize those supporters
while the leaders of the regime are in full control of the country was a fatal mistake. This is another example that shows
that leaders of the FIS did not accept the regime’s view of 176
the nature of the transition, since they were always mobilizing
the people in the streets in great numbers.
By explaining the difference between these two models of
transition the author is not claiming that the leaders of both
the regime and the opposition were aware of the differences.
The goal here is to show that both groups of leaders were
playing two different games which had different rules, and
that worked according to different mechanisms.
G. Two different games:
The game that President Benjedid and the leaders of the
regime were playing was of the "transition through
transaction" type. As was mentioned earlier, in this game some
leaders in the regime start the democratization process in
order to benefit themselves and their regime. One should not
think that these leaders had no choice other than to
democratize, because they could always resort to the use of
force and coercion to achieve their goals since they are
maximum benefit with the least cost.
Coercion could help the authoritarian regime control the
people, but it is very costly. The regime would need to spend on the security forces and intelligence. It also needs to
be prepared for retaliation from the oppressed people. Also 177
coercion creates an atmosphere of mistrust and fear in the
country, which would eventually lead to the flight of capital
outside the country. Foreign investors would also hesitate to
invest in countries that witness instability and insecurity.
Therefore, it became obvious to the authoritarian leaders that
coercion and the use of force would make things worse in the
long run.
Perhaps it would be correct for the author to claim that
the failure of the transition to democracy in Algeria was due
to miscalculations by the leaders of the regime, as well as by
the leaders of the opposition. Miscalculations were made by
President Benjedid and by leaders of the military on one hand
and by the hard-line leaders of the FIS on the other.
President Benjedid wanted to stayin office for a long
time, without having to worry about the opposition that might
be generated by the hard-liners in the FLN against him. When
Benjedid came to office in 1979 the FLN was still the source
of legitimacy for the political leadership in Algeria, due to
its role in the war of independence.2 o Originally, Benjedid
was not the party’s nominee, but the party had to nominate him
under pressure from the armed forces.
Later on, the FLN itself lost its legitimacy, and became insignificant to the people. This loss of legitimacy was due to 178
the fact that the country was ruled in the name of the FLN,
therefore, the deteriorating economic conditions were blamed
on the FLN. Also, several party officials who were holding top
government positions were corrupt, and the people blamed the
FLN for all the problems of the country. Therefore, instead of
being an asset for the regime, the FLN became a burden on the
regime.
Democratization theorists think that when a regime loses
its legitimacy, it might try to gain it back by giving more
political freedom and by beginning a democratization
process. 21 When President Benjedid felt that the FLN was no
longer providing him with political legitimacy, he decided to
sacrifice it, and to look for another source of legitimacy.
He hoped to build a base of popularity for himself among
the people by promising democracy and by ending the single
party system that had ruled Algeria for almost thirty years.
As was mentioned earlier, it was he who suggested the
transition to democracy after the 1988 riots. To democratize was his initiative, because the people did not ask for it
during the riots. The people asked for better economic
conditions and for equality, and he promised democracy.2z With
this popularity, and with the FLN marginalized, he would not have to worry about opposition parties since each party would 179
keep the other in check.
Benjedid wanted to install a multi-party system in
Algeria in which all political parties would compete for seats
in the National Assembly. Meanwhile, he would stay on top of
the political system as a president who would also be in
charge of the military and the police force. As the model
suggests he would always be in control of the transition, and
if things started getting out of hand he could always use the military and the police to bring things back in order.
H. Precautions or miscalculations?
President Benjedid took some precautions that would prevent the democratization process from getting out of his hands. First, although he changed the constitution and made it more democratic, yet he kept the military and the police force under his command. This would have enabled him to stop the process whenever he felt any threat to himself and to the
leaders of the regime. Second, the new constitution gave him the right to dissolve the National Assembly on certain occasions, which eventually gave him the upper hand over the
National Assembly.
Third, the constitution also gave him the right to appoint a prime minister without the need for the approval of 180
the National Assembly. He was also able to fire the prime
minister whenever he wished. This particular clause was very
important for Benjedid, since it enabled him to rule behind
the scenes while shifting the blame on to the prime minister
for the problems of the country. If popular dissatisfaction
then grew to a point that might threaten the regime then he
would release the pressure by firing the prime minister and by
appointing another one.
In 1989 he fired Prime Minister Kasdi Merbah and
appointed Mouloud Hamrouche claiming that Merbah was not
pushing the democratization process hard enough. However, when
tensions grew in the country in 1991 because of the new
electoral law, he fired Prime Minister Hamrouch, blaming him
for the tensions that were created because of the electoral
law, and appointed Sid Ahmad Ghozali in his place.
President Benjedid’s calculations also assumed that if
multi-party elections were held, several political parties would share the seats in the National Assembly. This would
guarantee that the rules of the game, in the constitution,
would not be changed, since it needs two thirds of the members
of the National Assembly to change the constitution. He never
thought that a single party would be able to win two thirds of
the seats of the National Assembly. 181
However, all these calculations did not come true,
because the FIS was able to achieve a majority in the first
round of the elections and it became obvious that it was going
to achieve a majority in the second round as well. With the
expected majority, the FIS could have changed the constitution
if it wanted to, and could have limited Benjedid’s ability to
renew his term in office. Therefore, the goal that President
Benjedid was seeking by initiating the democratization process
became even harder to achieve because of the unexpected victory that was achieved by the FIS.
Another precaution that President Benjedid had taken
earlier also backfired. The new electoral law that was
presented by his prime minister, and which was later approved by the FLN-dominated National Assembly, was supposed to prevent the FIS from achieving a major victory, since it would
allow the FLN to get more seats.
However, this new law was rejected by several opposition
parties and especially the FIS which called for a strike. This
strike then led to clashes between the supporters of the FIS
and the military and caused the declaration of a "State of
Siege" by President Benjedid. As a result, the stability of
the country was at risk, and his political tactics proved to be dangerous for the whole country. 182
As was mentioned earlier, one of the main reasons behind
Benjedid’s initiation of a multi-party system in Algeria was to stay in power for a long time. However, the victory of the
FIS in the first round of the legislative elections brought the military into the picture, and eventually Benjedid was forced to resign by the hard-liners in the military who believed that he was responsible for the victory of the FIS and for the instability that the country was witnessing.
However, since we have talked about the calculations of
President Benjedid, we should mention the calculations of the leaders of the FIS, in order to show the difference between both. The main goal of the leaders of the FIS was the establishment of an Islamic state in Algeria, and this goal was announced in several public speeches that were given by top FIS leaders.2 3
Their problem was that they were overconfident of their ability. They thought that since they could mobilize thousands of people in the streets, then the regime could no longer confront them without risking a massive confrontation with the people. On several occasions they refused to cooperate with other Islamic parties since this cooperation would require some concessions to be given to the other parties, and they did not think that with their popularity they needed to make 183
concessions to anyone.z* This overconfidence made them keep the
pressure on the regime instead of showing their willingness to
compromise.
These calculations that were made by the hard-liner
leaders of the FIS did not come true, since the army
intervened, cancelled the elections and banned the FIS. The
possibility of the intervention of the military to halt the
process had always been there, but the overconfidence of the
hard-liners of the FIS prevented them from seeing things
clearly.
Leaders of the military were hearing about the intention
of the hard-liners in the FIS to prosecute them when they come
to power. They also remembered the executions of the military
and police leaders in Iran after the revolution. They did not
want to allow the same thing to happen in Algeria, especially
that their own lives were at risk.
I. A little too late:
The soft-liners in the FIS always feared the intervention
of the military and the cancellation of the democratization
process, especially after the hard-liners were imprisoned.
Therefore, the soft-liners urged the FIS supporters to keep
calm and not to respond to the intimidations by the security 184
forces. These soft-liners were willing to accept the rules set
by the regime, and were willing to cooperate with Benjedid.
However, it looked like the leaders of the military had made
up their minds about preventing the FIS from coming to power.
In the very beginning it looked like the military leaders
were supporting Benjedid’s democratization process, believing
that the process would improve Algeria’s image in the
International arena, and would trim the power of the FLN.
However, after the FIS had won in the 1990 municipal
elections, these leaders asked President Benjedid to ban the
FIS. Later on, in 1991 when the FIS called for the strike and
then its supporters occupied public squares and streets in
some cities, leaders of the army again asked Benjedid to ban
the FIS.
However, when the FIS achieved an electoral success in
the first round of the legislative elections these leaders decided to intervene in order to stop the FIS from getting
power, especially since President Benjedid was willing to
allow the continuation of the elections. In chapter IX the
author will give the evidence that shows the hostility of the
leaders of the military against the FIS and its leaders.
According to the theories of democratization, in order
for the transition to succeed an attitude of cooperation must 185
exist among the majority of the elite. Pragmatic members of the
regime and of the opposition should be in charge of the
process, while the extreme elements among the leadership
should be isolated.The leadership of the government and of
the opposition should show a degree of pragmatism. However, in
Algeria this condition was not fulfilled since in the
beginning it was the hard-liners in the FIS that were in
charge of the party, and were not willing to play according to
the rules set by the leaders of the regime.
Later on, when the hard-liners in the FIS were
imprisoned, then it was the hard-liners in the government that
refused to respect the rules of the game. The moderates in the
FIS agreed to cooperate with President Benjedid, and
President Benjedid declared that he was going to respect the
results of the elections that gave victory to the FIS, yet the hard-liners in the military intervened and stopped the
whole process.
At the beginning, leaders of the military thought that a
little opening in the system would not hurt, as long as their
authority was not challenged. Most of the theories that deal
with the role of the military in politics suggest that if the
interests of the military establishment were threatened then
the leaders of the military would be motivated to intervene in 186
politics to protect those interests.26
When the hard-liners in the military saw that FIS could
win two thirds of the seats of the National Assembly, they
then questioned the wisdom behind allowing the process to
continue. The FIS’s ability to mobilize hundreds of thousands
of supporters in the streets was a source of discomfort for
the leaders of the military. They hoped that President
Benjedid would take some actions to prevent the FIS from
enjoying its electoral victory. However, when Benjedid
declared that he was going to respect the results of the
elections, then the military leaders forced him to resign and
cancelled the elections.
Recognizing that the FIS had the ability to mobilize
hundreds of thousands of people in the streets, the leaders of the military were afraid that the FIS might have the
capacity to lead a social and a religious revolution similar
to the one that took place in Iran. They were not willing to
allow anyone to challenge their authority, and as a result,
from the very beginning they considered the FIS to be their
enemy.
The major players in the arena in Algeria during the
transitional process were President Benjedid, the leadership
of the military and the leadership of the FIS. It is very 187
important to mention that the democratization process in
Algeria was unique since it was the first of its kind in the
North Africa region. The author believes that the crucial
factor that caused the failure of the process was that of
leadership. The President as the leader of the executive
branch of government had his expectations of the process, while the leaders of the FIS had their own. Each actor played
the game in a way that differed from the other.
Meanwhile, the hard-liners in the regime were watching
the whole process carefully, reserving the right for themselves to intervene to stop the process whenever they felt
that the game was going to hurt their interests. It looked as
if they were just waiting for the process to fail to tell the president "we told you so", therefore, their expectation of the failure of the process was a self fulfilling prophecy.
Finally, besides the role played by these domestic actors, it is important to explain the role played by external actors. As we know, Algeria did not exist in vacuum, but was surrounded by several authoritarian countries that had declared war against the Islamic movement. These countries were watching carefully the outcome of the process in Algeria, and were sending signals of their displeasure with what they were seeing. 188
European countries such as France, and the United Kingdom were also sending signals through official and unofficial channels as the author will try to show in the coming chapters. These, signals were also monitored by the leaders of the regime, who eventually behaved in the light of those signals.
It is the author’s goal to show that it was due to the factor of leadership that the democratization process was halted in Algeria. This factor belongs to the proximate variables and not to the background ones. Therefore, it was not due to background factors such as the legacy of the French colonization, or the political culture of the Algerians that the transition to democracy failed in Algeria. However, one can say with comfort that the factor of leadership was the crucial factor that caused the halt in the process.
In the following chapters, the author will deal with several incidents that took place during the transitional period. These incidents will help prove the claims of the author about the democratization process in Algeria. The author will first deal with the new electoral law of 1991, which caused a great deal of controversy in the country.
Second, the author will explain the circumstances that led to the FIS's strike of May 1991. Third, the author will deal with 189
the first round of the legislative elections, and with the
FIS’s victory in that round. Finally, some light would
be shed on the military coup of January 1992, which put an end to the democratization process. 190
F ootn otes Ctxajster' V II
1. Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transition Through
Transaction," Political Liberalization in Brazil, ed.
Wayne Selcher: 1986; Donald Share, "Transition to
Democracy and Transition Through Transaction,"
Comparative Political Studies 19, (January 1987); Luciano
Martins, "The "Liberalization" of Authoritarian Rule in
Brazil," Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 2nd ed.,
ed. Guillermo O ’Donnell et al. ( Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press,1987) p. 81; Manuel Antonio
Garretôn, "The Political Evolution of Chilean Military
Regime," Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 99.
2. Guillermo O ’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter,
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. 3rd ed.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) p.
15.
3. ibid.
4. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Development of New
Nations.(1964).
5. ibid. 191
F ootn otes CheLF*ter VI I
6. O ’Donnell and Schmitter, Ibid.; Adam Przeworski,
"Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy,"
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 53 ; Robert R.
Kaufman, "Liberalization and Democratization in South
America," Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 94;
Alain Rouquié, "Demilitarization and Military-dominated
Polities in Latin America," Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule, p. 113; Luciano Martins, "The
"Liberalization" of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil,"
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 81; Manuel
Antonio Garretôn, "The Political Evolution of the Chilean
Military Regime," Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.
99.
7. Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy," Comparative
Politics 3, (April 1970).
8. Rustow, ibid.
9. John Herz, From Dictatorship to Democracy.
10. Alfred Stepan, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Comparative Perspective. 2nd ed., (1988); Share and
Mainwaring, ibid. 192
Footnotes CtieLïater VII
11. "Algeria," Middle East and North Africa (1993): p. 277.
12. ibid.
13. Donald Share, ibid.
14. Mahfoud Bennoune, "Algeria’s Facade of Democracy,"
Middle East Report (March-April 1990).
15. Share, ibid.
16. Hanan Fahmi, "Addemoqrateya Atta’eha Bayna al-Askar Wal
Osoleyein Fi al-Jaza’er," [The Lost Democracy Between the
Military and the Fundamentalists in Algeria], al-Wafd
newspaper 403 (January 16, 1992); Yahya Zoubir, ibid., p. 41;
Kamal al-Halbawi, "al-Azma al-Jaza’ereya Bayna al-Infijar Val
Infiraj," [The Algerian Crisis Between the Explosion and
Release], Qadava Dawleva 107 (January 20, 1992); Shareef al-
Shobashi, ibid.
17. From speeches given at the city of al-bolaida by Abbassi
Madani and Ali Belhadj in 1991.
18. Share, ibid
19. Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola, "Transitions to
Democracy: A Framework for Analysis," Comparative
Politics 21.4 (July 1989).
20. see Chapter III. 193
F o o t no te s CIneip t e r V I I
21. Share and Mainwaring, "Transition Through Transaction,"
Political Liberalization in Brazil (1986); Dankwart
Rustow, ibid.; Barrington Moore, Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1965); Adam
Przeworski, ibid. p.51.
22. Bennoune, ibid.
23. From speech by Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj in the
city of al-Bolaida in May 1991.
24. Mohammad Bouslimani and Mahfood al-Nahnah in two
separate interviews with the author in Columbus Ohio.
25. Share and Mainwaring, ibid.
26. S.E. Finer, The Man On Horse Back: The Role of the Military
in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962); Eric Nodlinger,
Soldiers in Politics (New Jersy: Prentice-Hal1, 1977). Chapter VIII
What Went Wrong?
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the author will
deal with several incidents that took place during the period
of transition to democracy. These incidents help shed some
light on the leadership factor, and how it contributed to the
failure of the democratization process in Algeria. As was
mentioned earlier, in order for the democratization process to
succeed, it needs an environment of cooperation between the
leaders of the opposition and those of the government.
Two key elements should exist in the relation between
these leaders, first, mutual trust, second, pragmatism. The
incidents that will be dealt with in this chapter, show that
neither element existed between the leaders of the government
and those of the FIS in Algeria.
The first incident is the new electoral law of 1991, that
was drafted by Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche, and was
ratified by the FLN-controlled National Assembly. It is worth
noting, that since the new constitution of 1989, the government had adopted no less than four electoral laws, in preparation for the legislative elections. These were the
first multi-party elections, at the national level, to be held
in Algeria since its independence in 1962.*
194 195
Changing the electoral law so many times in such a short
period shows that the leaders of the regime were trying to
make sure that the results of the elections would not deviate
from their expectations. The most important thing, as was
mentioned earlier, was that no single party acquire two
thirds of the seats of the National Assembly, which would be
sufficient to change the constitution. The main concern of the
president and of the leaders of the military was that if the
constitution was changed, then the opposition might limit the
privileges that the 1989 constitution had given to the
president.
Leaders of the government were afraid that the process might get out of their hands, therefore, they had to take some
precautions. At the same time, leaders of the FIS did not
trust the president or the government. It was an awkward
situation that did not provide the spirit of cooperation that
was necessary for the success of the transition.
This might have been true under the hard-liners in the
FIS. After the detention of those leaders the situation
changed a little, at least in the F I S ’s camp. The soft-1iners
in the FIS realized that the best alternative that they had
was to play the game according to the rules set by the regime.
This did not necessarily mean that they trusted the regime, 196
but that they had no other choice. This change in attitude did
not help much since the leaders of the military were
determined not to allow the FIS to get to power.
Therefore, it was clear that the whole atmosphere was not
healthy for the continuation of the process. The cooperation
among leaders of the government and of the opposition is
necessary for the success of the transition.% Leaders of the
government had a certain scenario in their minds, and since
that scenario did not come true, they intervened and stopped
the process.
In order to demonstrate this atmosphere of mistrust and
the lack of cooperation between the leaders of the regime and
of the opposition, the author will deal with the new electoral
law that was drafted by Prime Minister Hamrouche in 1991, and
that was later on approved by the FLN-contro1 led National
Assembly. The author will give some basic clauses in the law
and will explain the reason behind the objection of the FIS to
these clauses.
The second incident that the author will deal with is
the general strike that the FIS called for in objection to the
new electoral law. This strike helps demonstrate the rigidity
of the hard-liners of the FIS in dealing with the government.
Since they had detected that the government was trying to 197
manipulate the outcome of the elections, these hard liners
decided to play hard ball. The spirit of pragmatism was absent
from the speeches made by the FIS hard-liners.
The third incident will be the legislative elections
themselves. These elections were supposed to be held in two
rounds. However, after the first round the military intervened
and stopped the elections. Dealing with these elections will
help us see the popularity of the FIS among the people in
Algeria. It was clear that the people voted for the total
change promised by the FIS, since the FLN did not get much,
neither did the so called "democratic parties".
I, The electoral law of 1991:
In 1989, President Benjedid dismissed Prime Minister
Kasdi Merbah, using the special powers that the 1989
constitution had given him. According to Benjedid, Merbah was
dismissed because he was not pushing the liberal reforms fast
enough. Merbah was replaced by Mouloud Hamrouche who was
considered more liberal. The main achievement of Prime
Minister Hamrouche was the 1991 electoral law, which caused the major crisis of that year, and which eventually led to the
declaration of a state of siege by the president and the
dismissal of Hamrouche himself. 198
However Hamrouche tailored an electoral law that would give the FLN and the government an advantage over the other parties.^ New districts were created in the South and in rural areas, where the FLN had some support, and many seats were allocated to those areas.♦
The displeasure with the new law was tremendous, and many political parties, including the FIS, appealed to the National
Assembly to reject it. However, since the new law would serve the interests of the ruling party, it was approved by the FLN- dominated National Assembly in April 1991.
One of the main reasons behind the objection of the opposition parties to the new law was due to the fact that the opposition parties were not consulted before making the law.
Also there were several clauses in the law which made the opposition parties feel that the law would only serve the
interests of the government and its party the FLN.
In the following paragraphs, the author will try to shed some light on some clauses of the new electoral law, which caused the dissatisfaction of several opposition parties,
including the FIS:
1. The new law prevented political parties from using the
mosques for political purposes.
Leaders of the FIS felt that they were the target of this 199
clause, since the mosque represented the place where they come
into direct contact with the people. In the Friday sermon
(khutba), as well as in any religious meeting, many issues
would be raised by the speakers of the FIS, including
political ones.
Islam is a religion that deals with the society and the
state, therefore, it is hard to separate between what is
religious and what is outside the reach of religion. Also,
from the mosque, the leaders of the FIS were able to mobilize
hundreds of thousands of protestors and demonstrators in the
streets, in support of, or in protest of any governmental
policy. Therefore, the FIS found it difficult to abide by this
law, that would prevent it from leading and directing its
supporters.
Another problem with this particular clause, was that, it
allowed security forces to arrest any speaker in any mosque,
if his speech was considered political. Therefore, using this
clause as an excuse, the government arrested many FIS leaders
and speakers before and after the legislative elections.
2. The new law also prevented the usual practice of voting
by means of a power of attorney.
The old law permitted men to vote on behalf of their
wives, and on behalf of other women, who might be unable to go 200
to the voting booths themselves. All that they needed was a power of attorney. As for the new law, voting for someone else was no longer permitted, not even between a man and his wife,
except in the case of a severe illness, or if the wife was out of the country.®
The FIS considered that it was targeted by this clause
since the old law helped it win the 1990 municipal elections.
Among the FIS supporters were a lot of women who were
illiterate and who did not want to go to vote in person and would rather have a male relative vote for them. However, under the new law such a practice was no longer allowed, therefore the FIS felt that it would lose the votes of those women if the new law was approved.
3. Electoral constituencies would be divided according to
geographical factors, and not according to population
density.
Therefore, major provinces like Algiers, Tizee Vazoo,
Bjaya, and Bowaira that were dense in their population, were given only 72 seats, whereas the provinces of the South, that were not as densely populated were given 78 seats.*
Another example could be found in the case of Algiers and
Tizee Wazoo. According to the new electoral law, Algiers, the capital, which has a population of nearly 1.7 million person would be represented by only 21 seats in the National
Assembly, while the province of Tizee Wazoo which had a 201 population of only 900,000, would be represented by the same
number of seats.? Therefore, it did not sound fair that these
two provinces should be given the same number of seats.
As was mentioned in the previous example, Tizee Wazoo was
relatively dense in population when compared to other
provinces. However, it had much less population than Algiers,
yet it was given the same number of seats.
The FIS also realized, that Tizee Wazoo was a province
that would vote along ethnic lines, since most of its
occupants were of the Berber ethnic group. Therefore, all of
the 21 seats that were allocated to Tizee Wazzo were
definitely going to the Berber party, the FES, headed by the
Berber leader, Hocine Alt Ahmad.
Another reason for the rejection of this law by the FIS,
was due to the fact that most of the support for the FIS could
be found in the capital, Algiers. Therefore, it would be in
the interest of the FIS if Algiers was given more seats.
4. Conducting the elections in two stages, rather than in a
single stage: a. the first stage: In this stage all political parties
would be allowed to contest the elections. b. the second stage: In this stage, only the two parties
that were able to get the highest number of seats would
be allowed to contest the elections.
The FIS feared that, if it won the first round of the 202
elections, the FLN and some secular parties would unite
against it in the second round of the elections. Therefore,
the FIS preferred that the elections be held in a single
stage, then the secular so called "democratic" parties would
not have the opportunity to unite against the FIS.
5. Electoral committees would be established in each
province, and would include three people, the head of the
province (Wali), the head of the municipality, and a
judge.
All three would be responsible for monitoring the voting process, only in the first round of the elections. As for the
second round, only the heads of the provinces, who are appointed by the government would be allowed to monitor the
electoral process.
This particular clause gave the FIS and the other opposition parties the feeling that the government was planning to commit fraud in the second round if it did not win
in the first round. The problem here is that this act would
shake the trust between leaders of the government and those of
the opposition. The spirit of cooperation was then replaced by
the spirit of doubt and mistrust, which was against the
requirements of a successful transition to democracy.
The FIS rejected the idea that only the governments 203
appointees could monitor the second round of the elections, and
demanded instead that representatives of all political parties
should be allowed to monitor the electoral process in both
stages. This would secure against foul play by the government
in the elections.
6. The increase in the number of the members of the National
Assembly from 295 to 430.®
The increase in the number of members would make it difficult for the newly established FIS, and for the rest of
the political parties to compete with the well established
FLN, which had been the only political party since 1962. The
FLN had established offices all over Algeria since 1962, and was able to place as many candidates as it wanted in all districts, a task that was deemed impossible for opposition parties to achieve.
These clauses in the law gave the opposition parties and especially the FIS the feeling that the new electoral law was
tailored to fit the interests of the government.®
As was mentioned earlier, the new electoral law gave the
leaders of the FIS the impression that the government was not going to play according to the rules of the game, and that it was going to set new rules which would enable it to win. The
FIS distrusted President Benjedid, and the leaders of the 204
military. Therefore, the hard-liners decided to push forcefully
using the weapon of mass mobilization in order to send a
message to the regime that if the process was to be stopped
then there would be the risk of a confrontation with the
masses. This was clear in the strike of May 1991 that the
hard-liners called for, and that we will deal with later in
the chapter.
However, the mistrust between the leaders of the FIS and
of the regime had its roots even before the new electoral law
of 1991. It actually began with the 1989 constitution that
gave the president extra powers in regards to his relation
with the National Assembly. Therefore, the author thinks that
explaining those powers would help shed some light on at the
root of the problem.
The Powers of the President according to the constitution of
1989:
In the new constitution there was a constitutional
provision, that really made the FIS worried, and suspicious of
the president and of the regime. This provision was created in
1989, and it put the army and the police directly under the
control of the president. It also gave him the constitutional
authority to dissolve the National Assembly, and to declare a 205
state of emergency whenever he wanted.
Also, the president had the right to appoint any person
as the prime minister, and whoever was appointed, did not have
to be a member of the political party that achieved a majority
in the parliamentary elections. He could also dismiss any
prime minister without even consulting with the National
Assembly.‘*
Once the prime minister was appointed, he would then form
his cabinet, and would present it to the National Assembly for
approval. If the National Assembly would not approve his
cabinet, the prime minister would then form another cabinet,
and if the National Assembly would not approve this second
cabinet, then the president would dissolve the National
Assembly if he wished, and would call for new parliamentary
elections.
The right of the president to appoint and to fire the
prime minister was to be used by Benjedid as a safety valve
that would protect him in case dissatisfaction increased
against his policies. He could blame it on the prime minister
and would fire the prime minster to diffuse the tensions.
The main concern was with the fact that the president
could dissolve the National Assembly which was elected by the
people, and could call for new elections. This gave the upper 206
hand for the executive branch of the government over the
legislative branch. The president could use his right to
dissolve the National Assembly as a weapon against the
legislative body, and could therefore reduce its effectiveness
in dealing with the problems of the country.
As a matter of fact, the FIS had a previous experience
with the regime which made it lose its trust in the president
and in his real intentions concerning the democratization
process. In the 1990 provincial and municipal elections, the
FIS won 32 provinces out of 48 which was the total number of
provinces in Algeria.It also won 853 municipalities, out of
1539, winning 55.5% of the municipalities.is
Since it would have looked undemocratic to cancel those
elections, the government tried to prevent the FIS from
enjoying its victory by other indirect methods. The government
put some obstacles in the face of the elected FIS members
which made it difficult for those members to achieve anything
in their municipalities.'* Those obstacles were in the form of
measures, such as:
1. Prime Minister Hamrouche took away the financial support
from those municipalities that were won by the FIS. This
measure made it difficult for the FIS to fulfill its
promises to those who voted for it.'s As a result the FIS 207
lost its credibility among those voters.
2. The government also appointed administrators in all the
municipalities, who were eventually given powers and
authorities more than those of the elected officials.
If anything, this behavior gave the leaders of the FIS
the feeling that the government was not sincere, and was
trying to use the democratization process to serve its goals
and not to establish a democracy in Algeria. This also made
those leaders feel that democratic elections could not bring
genuine change, since the government could always set new
rules that would decrease the power of the elected officials.
Therefore, the FIS could not trust the president or the
government, especially with the president's new powers, given
to him in the 1989 constitution. Since according to the
constitution the president could dissolve the National
Assembly, and could call for new elections, then what would be the guarantees that he would not do just that if the FIS
won?
The government sent the electoral law to the National
Assembly to be ratified, and since the National Assembly was
dominated and controlled by FLN members, and since the new law
would serve the interests of the FLN, then it was ratified.
This took place in April 1991. The leader of the FIS, Abbassi 208
Madani, then appealed to the president to reintroduce the law
to-the National Assembly for another reading, but the
president refused. As a result, Abbassi Madani called for an
open ended strike that would start on the 25th of May, and
that would not end until the government fulfilled the FIS's
demands.>’
It is very important to notice that some times, by not
responding to demands made by the opposition, the government
indirectly pushes the opposition to become radical. If the
leaders of the opposition felt that they were ignored by the
government, then they might take some extreme measures in
order to show the government that they are strong and that
they should not be ignored. This does not necessarily mean
that the government should fulfil each and every demand by the
opposition, but that the government should keep the channels
open with the opposition.
The way the government treated the FIS after its winning
in the municipal elections, and the presentation of the new
electoral law show that the leaders of the government were not
seeking the installation of a true democracy in Algeria but
were trying to look democratic while keeping the country under
their control. Such an attitude could have convinced the
leaders of the FIS that even democracy could be manipulated by 209
the regime, therefore, it could not be a goal that was worth
seeking.
It seemed that this became the conviction of the leaders
of the FIS after the new electoral law was approved by the
National Assembly. They therefore decided to pressure the
government to respond to their demands, using the one and only
weapon that they had, the masses. After President Benjedid had
refused to reintroduce the law to the National Assembly for a
second reading, both FIS prominent leaders, Abbassi Madani and
Ali Belhadj called for a general strike, in a public speech in
the city of al-Bolaida. In the speech Madani referred to
President Benjedid as the rusted nail that had to be pulled
out.
In that same speech, the two leaders threatened those top
officials who had occupied important positions in previous
administrations and who misbehaved in office or misused their authority, that they would be prosecuted. It was clear
that the hard-liners in the FIS decided to confront the regime
in a show of force that would show the real weight of the FIS,
and would "convince" the regime to take back its electoral
law. In order to understand the role played by the hard-liners
in the FIS the author thinks that it is necessary to look at
the FIS’s strike. 210
II. The Strike of May 1991:
The strike that the FIS called for on the 25th of May
1991 was a peaceful one. Its goal was to protest the new
electoral law, which was created by Prime Minister Mouloud
Hamrouche, and was approved by the FLN-dominated National
Assembly. According to the leaders of the FIS, the new
electoral law would benefit the government and its party the
National Liberation Front, in the parliamentary elections that
were supposed to be held in June 1991.
This fact forced Abbassi Madani, and other FIS leaders,
to insist on the necessity of holding the presidential
elections along with the parliamentary elections.*® The FIS’s
leadership hoped that, if early presidential elections were
held at that time, then President Benjedid would definitely
lose, and would no longer be a threat to the FIS. The FIS
speakers were openly criticizing the president, calling him
the "rusted nail" that needs to be pulled out.*®
When the president refused to change the electoral law,
and also refused to set a date for early presidential
elections, Abbassi Madani called for a strike that would begin
on the 25th of May, 1991, and would continue until the F I S ’s
demands were met .20
However, it is very important to point out that the FIS 211
was not the only party that suggested the strike. Early in
April, 1991, several secular and leftist parties, known as the
"group of eight" also called for a strike to take place after
the month of Ramadan (the Muslim fasting month) as a form of
protest against the new electoral law. The "group of eight"
stated that they would prefer this type of protest to other
types such as marches or demonstrations.
Even top FLN members were convinced that the new
electoral law was biased. Showing his reservations about the
new electoral law, Abdulhamid Mehri, the secretary-general of
the ruling FLN, said in a BBC interview that the election
conditions were "not n e u t r a l " . 22 However, later on, the
secular parties changed their minds about the strike, and only
the FIS went along with the idea.
However, in order to understand the strike and its
effect, one should first deal with the goals of the strike.
The goals of the strike:
There were two major goals for the strike, first, the FIS
wanted to force the president and the leaders of the regime to
change the newly approved electoral law, which the FIS felt
was biased and serving the interests of the government.
Second, the FIS wanted the presidential elections to be held :i2
at the same time as the legislative elections, since its
leaders did not trust President Benjedid and his commitment
to democracy.
In an interview by the Italian newspaper, LA REPUBLICA,
FIS top leader, Abbassi Madani stated the goals of the strike:
"This unlimited strike will only end when the president
accepts our demands. . . " We want an early presidential
election, and we want the repeal of the electoral law
that altered the constituency boundaries and penalized
us. The repression carried out by the government will
not make us relent, and our mobilization will continue
throughout the country. ^ ^
Holding the presidential elections seemed to be the most,
important demand of the FIS. As was mentioned earlier, the
leaders of the FIS did not trust President Benjedid, and since the constitution had given him the right to dissolve the
National Assembly and call for new elections, they wanted him replaced by another person. If the presidential elections were held there would have been a very strong chance that a FIS candidate might have won the position, since the FIS was the most popular party at the time as the municipal elections had shown. 213
In another interview, that was conducted before his
arrest, and was published on 5 July, 1991, by Al-Wattan
newspaper, Abbassi Madani, the leader of the FIS was asked
about this issue:
Al-Wattan: Do you want presidential elections before the
parliamentary elections?
Madani ; We have not specified that the presidential
election should be held before the parliamentary
elections. We are demanding that they should take
place during the same period.
Al-Wattan; According to you, Algeria's problem, is its
pres ident.
Madani : Yes, he is responsible for everything that is
happening now.
Al-Wattan: Do you think that his departure, would sol\e
things?
Madani : Of course, the people will have the final word.
Any delay in this affair is a continuation of the
disease which will ultimately be fatal. The
people are having their wealth stolen and their
time wasted. The people are suffering.
Al-Wattan: Is the situation dangerous? 214
Madani : Undoubtedly, it will continue to be dangerous,
until President Benjedid responds.
Al-Wattan ; What should he do?
Madani : He must lift the state of emergency, give up
power, and allow the people to elect the
leadership they want. That is the only way of
overcoming the crisis.
The strike began peacefully, with people carrying the
Quran above their heads, and occupying public streets and
squares. The government played down the importance of the
strike, and the media did not cover the incident, and tried to
show that life was going on normally, and that people did not
respond to the FI S ’s call for the s t r i k e . 25
The feeling that they were ignored by the government and
by the media pushed the leaders of the FIS to escalate the
situation, and called on their supporters to turn the strike
into a demonstration, and called on people to march into the
streets and occupy public squares. Around 100,000 people
participated in the march.2*
It is very important to pause here and look at the
process of demand and response. First, the government started
by presenting an electoral law that would serve its interests.
Second, the FIS along with other political parties refused the 215
law and demanded from the president not to introduce it to the
National Assembly. Third, the president’s response was to
ignore the demand, and the law was introduced to the Assembly
and was approved by the assembly. Fourth, the F I S ’s response
was in the form of demanding from the president to reintroduce
the law to the National Assembly for a second reading. Fifth,
the response of the president came in the form of a rejection
of the FIS’s demand.
Here, the leaders of the FIS decided to escalate the
situation and to follow a more confrontational policy.
Therefore, the FIS’s response was to call for a general open-
ended strike, that would not end until the new electoral law was cancelled. The response of the president and the regime
took two forms, first, the refusal of the F I S ’s demands
concerning the electoral law, and second, ignoring the strike, and reducing its importance in the media and on television.
Finally, the government’s response was to fire those
striking workers from their Jobs, as a get tough policy against them. The realization by the hard-liners in the FIS that the government was ignoring them pushed them to a higher degree of confrontation, where they asked their supporters to turn the strike into demonstrations and marches. The response by the government was to call the police and army, and to 216
disperse the demonstrators by force. Several clashes took place, where several people were killed. However, the FIS did not end the strike.
At this stage the president decided to use two very
important weapons that were given to him in the 1989 constitution. First, on June 5, 1991, President Benjedid declared a state of siege^?, where he called on the army to take positions in the cities, and to disperse the demonstrators. At the same time he declared that he had accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche, who was responsible for drafting the unpopular electoral law?* and replaced him by another person. The new Prime Minister Sid
Ahmad Ghozali began a series of dialogues with the leaders of the FIS, which represented a softer response by the government.
This response did diffuse the situation, especially when the new Prime Minister, Sid Ahmad Ghozali, promised to revise the new electoral law which was the reason behind the strike.
At this point, the "response" of the FIS’s leaders was to call the strike off, claiming that their demands had been met.z*
On June 7, 1991, FIS leader Abbassi Madani declared that an agreement was reached between the FIS and the government, and that the strike was over. Next day Madani gave an 217
assessment of the strike, in which he summarized its results:
1. The collapse of the Hamrouche government (the author of
the unpopular electoral law).
2. Legislative and "presidential" elections to take place
within six months.
3. The reinstatement of workers who were dismissed by the
government because of their participation in the strike.
It is very important to study carefully the dynamics of
the strike period, and the process of demand and response that
took place between the FIS and the government. Again we should
point out that the regime started the democratization process
in a way that was consistent with the "transition through
transaction" model , in which the leaders of the regime begin
a gradual process of democratization.^i On the other hand, the
hard-liners in the FIS decided to push hard for a total change
of the ruling regime, in a way that was consistent with
another theoretical democratization model, which was the
"transition by collapse" model.
When the leaders of the regime felt that the process was
going to go out of their hands since it was not what they
expected, then they did not mind stopping the whole process,
and went back to even more repression and more
authoritarianism. While they were promising gradual and 218
limited reforms that would not threaten their political and
material benefits, they were faced with a situation that might
threaten even their beings.
III. After the Strike:
Abbassi Madani declared that the strike had achieved its
goals, and that it had ended. However, the army and security
forces were now pervasive in all Algerian cities. The army began a wave of arrests against FIS activists and supporters,
and all the mosques where FIS activists usually preach were
surrounded by the army. Clashes between the security forces,
and FIS activists occurred on a daily basis, and people were
killed on both s i d e s . Attacks on the mosques, where FIS
supporters usually pray, took place every day.
It was clear that once its forces were ready and in
control of the situation, the government decided to break the back-bone of the FIS. This was by arresting the leadership and
sympathizing members, and by keeping those thousands of
supporters who were on strike, out of their jobs. Although the president promised that the elections would be held by the end of the year, it was by that time clear that the leaders of the military would never allow the FIS to come to power.
Several incidents took place during the period between
the strike and the elections. The main ones were: 219
First, on June 30, 1991, the security forces arrested
Shaikh Ali Belhadj, the deputy of the leader of the FIS, and
several hours later the leader of the FIS, Abbassi Madani was
also arrested. Second, on July 7, 1991, Mohammed S a ’eed, the
new spokesman of the FIS was also arrested, although he was
considered a moderate person.
Third, on September 9, 1991, the acting leader of the
FIS, Abdulqadir Hachani was also arrested, and was later
released on October 9. Hachani represented the moderate
leadership in the FIS. However, he was later arrested again in
February, 1992, after the FIS had won the first round of the
elections, and he is still under arrest. Fourth, on October
15, 1991, President Benjedid declared that the first round of
the parliamentary elections would take place December 26,
1991, and the FIS declared later on, that it would participate
in those elections.
The effect of the leadership factor on the democratization process could best be understood by examining two events.
First, the role that was played by the soft-liner leadership of the FIS after the arrest of Belhadj and Madani. Second, the
role that was played by the same soft-liner leadership after the military leaders took control of the country, cancelled
the elections, and banned the FIS. 220
After the arrest of Belhadj and Madani, the FIS was led
by Mohammed S a ’eed, who was considered a moderate leader who
refused to mobilize the FIS supporters against the regime. On
the second occasion, the FIS was led by Abdulqadir Hachani who
was also a moderate figure, who refused to mobilize the people
against the military, who stopped the democratization process.
On previous occasions the FIS was able to mobilize
hundreds of thousands of people in the streets, and was able
to do the same thing this time as well. However, the
continuous message that the moderates were sending to the
people was to keep quiet and not to respond to intimidations
by the security forces.3*
It was clear that the regime was following the policy of
the "carrot and the stick" with the FIS and its leaders. On
one hand, it was continuously arresting the leaders of the movement and many of its activists. On the other hand, it declared that elections were going to be held before the end
of the year as it had earlier promised.
There were several reasons behind the regime’s decision
to follow such an approach, some of which were:
First, the regime did not want to wage an all out war
against the FIS and the millions of followers that it had.
Therefore, it sounded better to give with one hand and take 221
with the other in a gradual fashion that would not cut the path
for retreat whenever necessary. On the other hand too much
pressure might force the situation to explode in a violent
revolutionary way similar to what happened in Iran.
Second.it is possible that the regime thought, that by
arresting the two prominent leaders of the FIS, Abbassi Madani
and Ali Belhadj, the movement would collapse. Both leaders
were very successful mobilizers, and the regime probably
thought that the second line of leadership, could not mobilize
the masses successfully, and as a result could not lead the
FIS into victory in the legislative elections.
However, the date of the elections was set, and as we
have mentioned earlier, the first round of the elections took place on the 26th of December, 1991. The regime had its
own expectations of the elections, but these expectations
collapsed by the victory that the FIS was able to achieve. The military leaders however, stepped in, forced President
Benjedid to resign, and cancelled the elections.
In the coming pages, the author will try to show that the
FIS was killed by its own success, because of the victory it had achieved in the first round of the elections, and their
expected victory in the second round, could have given them
the ability to change the constitution. 222
IV. The Legislative Elections:
After firing Prime Minister Hamrouche, President Benjedid
appointed Sid Ahmad Ghozali as the new Prime Minister, whose
main task was to prepare for the legislative elections. as a matter of fact, Ghozali's government was the first government
that was not dominated by FLN members.
As was mentioned earlier,the first round of the elections
took place on the 26th of December, 1991, while the date for
the second round was the January 16, 1992. The total number of deputies that were supposed to be elected for the National
Assembly was 430, representing 430 districts. Before talking about the results of the elections, the author needs to explain the electoral law in Algeria, and its effect on the
results of the elections.
There are three types of electoral systems designed to elect legislators: the plurality system, the majority system, and the proportional-vote-system.^’ In a plurality system with
single member districts, as in the United States and Britain, the party or candidate securing the most votes takes all.3*
Therefore, a party might get more seats in the parliament than
its percentage of the popular vote.
In the proportional system also known as the "PR" system, the party’s share of parliamentary mandates is proportional to 223
its percentage of the popular vote.3* This system produces a
fractionalization of the party vote and hence a multi-party system in which no single party secures a majority of the parliamentary seats, and government by coalition must result.4 0 This system also gives small parties a number of seats that reflects the number of votes that they had secured.
Therefore, no single party would feel that it was punished by the winner takes all system.
The third system is the majority system, in which there are two ballots, and a candidate is elected if he or she attains an absolute majority of the votes cast.*' If no candidate receives a first-ballot majority, then a runoff is held in which the person with the most votes wins.*2
Similar to the plurality system, the majority system gives the political parties a number of seats in the parliament that is disproportional to the percentage of the popular vote.
The Algerian electoral system belongs to this last type, which was designed in a way similar to the French electoral system. Candidates of all the political parties were to compete for the seats in all the 430 districts. As we will see from the results of the elections, this system allowed the FIS to get more seats than its percentage of the popular vote. 224
while penalizing the other parties with a number of seats that
is less than their percentage of the popular vote.
Before dealing with the actual results of the elections,
the author would like to give some basic data about the number
of voters and candidates.
First, the total number of voters who registered to vote
was 13,258,554, but the number of those who actually voted was
7,822,825. This number was equivalent to 59% of the total
registered voters. Abstentions amounted to 5,435,929, which
represented 41% of the total registered voters.*3
Second, the total number of the candidates was 5712, and
out of those 4619 were representing political parties, and the rest were independents. Third, the official number of
political parties was 58, and 49 of those parties participated
in the elections.
Fourth, as was mentioned earlier, in order to be able to
win the first round of the elections, a candidate should get
more than 50% of the votes. As for the second round, only
those candidates who were able to get the highest number of
votes would have the right to contest the second round of the
elections. In order for a candidate to win a seat in the
second round, he or she should get the highest number of
votes. “ 225
V. The unexpected electoral victory of the FIS:
The results of the first round of the elections surprised all sides. Although it was expected that the FIS would be able to secure a good number of seats in the National Assembly based on its previous victory in the municipal elections, it was not thought that it would win with such a wide margin. In the first round 231 seats were secured by all parties out of which the FIS alone won 188 seats which represented 81.4% of the total number of seats secured at that round.
The ruling party, the FLN, secured only 15 seats, the FFS
Berber party secured 25 seats, all in the Berber regions, and
3 seats were won by independents.*® The details about the results achieved by these parties, and by the rest of the parties could be seen in the following table: 226
Table 1
The results of the first round of the legislative elections
% of % of
party votes total votes seats total seats
FIS 3,260,222 47.26% 188 81.4%
FLN 1,612,947 23.38% 15 6.5%
FFS 510,661 7.4% 25 10.8%
HAMAS 368,697 5.3% ------
Indep. 309,264 4.48% 3 1.2%
RCD 200,267 2.9% ------
NAHDA 150,093 2.17% ------
MDA 135,882 1.96% ------
Others 349,686 5.1% ------
source: Mohammed al-A’mash and Tawfiq Ghanem, Intikhab alJaza’er Wa Inqilabeha (Algerian Elections and the Coup),
Qadaya Dawleya, #109, February 3, 1992, p. 11).
It is very clear from the above table that the Algerian electoral system influenced the result of the elections to a great extent. Looking at these results, it is clear that each party's share of the seats of the National Assembly does not reflect its percentage of the popular vote. As we can see, the 227
FIS got 47.26% of the popular vote, however, its share of the
seats of the National Assembly was equal to 81.4% which was
translated into 188 seats.
As for the FLN, although its percentage of the popular
vote was 23.38%, its share of seats was equal to only 6.5%,
that was translated into only 15 seats. On the other hand, the
FFS's percentage of the popular vote was 7.4% which was much
less than that of the FLN, yet it got more seats than the FLN.
The FFS share of seats in the Assembly was equal to 10.8%
which was translated into 25 seats. As for the rest of the
parties, it is clear that the electoral system worked against
them, since they were able to secure a reasonable percentage
of the popular vote, yet they were not able to get any seat in
the National Assembly.
As an example, HAMAS political party secured 5.3% of the
popular vote which was close to the FFS 7.4%, however, while
the FFS got 25 seats, HAMAS did not get anything. Therefore,
it is clear that the system worked against the interests of
the small parties. If on the other hand, a proportional system was followed, then it would have allowed those small parties
to gain some seats in the Assembly.
A proportional system would also have enabled the president and the regime to achieve their goal, which was 228
the assurance that no single party would get more than two
thirds of the seats of the National Assembly which was
necessary to change the constitution. Since the leaders of the
regime did change the electoral law in 1991, one would wonder
why did not they make it a proportional system?
One obvious reason behind choosing such a system is that
the president followed the same system followed by the French.
It is common in the countries of the Third World to follow the
steps of their previous colonizers. Algerians have had a long
relation with France, which is still regarded by many
Algerians as the mother country.
VI. After the First Round of the Elections:
After the first round of the elections. President
Benjedid declared his willingness to respect the result of the
elections, and to work with the FIS.*® Abdulhamid al-Mehri the
head of the ruling party, the FLN, stated that the victory of
the FIS reflected the choice of the Algerian people.*’ Al-
Mehri, and the previous Prime Minister Hamrouche showed their
willingness to respect the choice of the people, and to work
with the FIS.* ®
On the other hand, Abdulqadir Hachani, the acting leader
of the FIS, met with President Benjedid, and declared that 229
the FIS was ready to work with President Benjedid. He also
stated that the FIS would guarantee personal freedoms for the
individuals, and for different groups, and would allow the existence of non-Islamic parties.** As for foreign policy,
Hachani announced that the FIS intended to respect all the state’s commitments with foreign countries.so
Hachani was so pragmatic that he nominated Hocine Alt
Ahmad, the head of the FFS and the well known Berber leader, to be the head of the parliament, in spite of the fact that his party was only able to win 25 seats.®’ The FIS also nominated Ahmad Talib al-Ibrahimi, who was a prominent figure in the ruling FLN, whose name was never tied to any corruption.® ^
It was clear that the moderate leadership in the FIS was willing to make concessions, and did not seek a total change of the regime as was the case of the hard-liners in the FIS,
Ali Belahdj and Abbassi Madani. It was also clear from the statements that were made by President Benjedid and the FLN leaders that they were willing to respect the results of the elections. However, the hard-liners in the military leadership came as the determining factor that decided to intervene against the political leadership of the regime, as well as against the democratization process. 230
The pragmatism that was shown by the soft-liners in the
FIS did not help convince the hard-liners in the military to allow the party to come to power. It could be that the military leaders had decided long ago that no Islamic movement would be allowed to come to power, or it could be that the damage that was done by the hard-liners in the FIS was too severe to be repaired. The author will try to show the reasons behind the abortion of the democratic transition in
Algeria. However, as for the rest of this chapter, the author will deal with military intervention and the cancellation of the process.
Since the small parties were not able to win any seat in the Assembly in the first round of the elections, they were very unhappy about the results. However, it was only the secular and the leftist political parties, the so called
"democratic parties", that demanded the cancellation of the elections. The behavior of these parties was anything but democratic, since they actually asked the military to intervene to stop the elections and to prevent the FIS from coming to power. They claimed that the military should intervene in order to "save democracy" from the FIS.
As an example, S a ’eed Sa'di the head of the Berber party, the RCD, called for the boycott of the second round of the 231
e l e c t i o n s . S3 Hocine Alt Ahmad, the head of the FFS, and a
famous Berber leader, stated that the FIS should be prevented
from coming to power, as a protection for democracy.s* He also
led a demonstration of 300,000 people, calling for the
necessity to save democracy from the FIS.ss These "democratic"
parties flooded the courts with accusations of election
f raud.s s
The literature that deals with military intervention in
politics states that the military often uses civilian anxiety
about political instability as a rationale for intervention.®’
In many cases the leaders of the military need a legitimate
cover for their intervention in politics, therefore, when
civilian politicians ask them to intervene they will do it,
especially if a segment of the population was mobilized in the
streets asking for this intervention. Therefore, this cover
was supplied to the military leaders by the so called
"democratic" parties.
VII. The Coup:
With the tension spreading all over Algeria, and with the
secular, so called "democratic" parties calling on the army to
intervene, the army then intervened. On January 11, 1992, and
at exactly eight o ’clock in the evening. President Benjedid 232
declared on national television that he had resigned.®®
According to many sources, Benjedid was forced to resign by army leaders, including defense minister Khalid Nezzar, who had been appointed by Benjedid after the 1988 riots.®®
Immediately after this televised statement. Prime Minister
Ghozali made another televised statement, in which he called on the army to spread all over Algeria to keep peace and order.® °
Benjedid's resignation took place just five days before the second round of the elections. However, the strange thing was that, he also stated that he had dissolved the National
Assembly earlier on January 4, without notifying anybody.It was however, hard to believe such a claim, and this action was interpreted as a move to prevent the head of the National
Assembly, Abdulaziz Belkhadem, who was a sympathizer of the
FIS, of becoming the president, as the constitution clearly states.®2
According to the constitution, since the president resigned, and the National Assembly had been dissolved, then the head of the Constitutional Council should become the president until new presidential elections could be held within 45 days.®® However, the following day, Sunday, 12
January, 1992, the Constitutional Council announced that its 233
head, Mr. Benhablis, could not become the president, since the
constitution would give him the right to become president, only in the case of the death of the president, and not the case of his resignation.**
Under these circumstances the army decided that the High
Security Council, which was an advisory committee that was appointed earlier by the president, and that consisted mainly of army and police officers, would replace the president.** On
Monday, January 13, 1992, the High Security Council cancelled the elections, and declared that it would have all the constitutional powers of the president. Next day, on January
14, this council announced the formation of the High State
Council, that would rule the country until the official term of previous President Benjedid would end in 1993.**
The head of the council was Mohammed Boudiaf, who had been living in exile in Morocco, since 1964. It included four other people, including defense minister Khalid Nezzar, who was the strongest person in the group, and the real instigator of the military intervention.*’
This has been an overview of the major incidents that took place in Algeria, during the legislative elections which eventually led to the military coup of 1992. The writer hoped 234
to pave the road for the next chapter, in which he will deal with the reasons that led to the failure of the democratization process in Algeria. 235
F ootnotes dnsLF*ter VI 11
1. Boutheina Cheriet, "The Resilience Of Algerian
Populism," Middle East Report (January- February 1992): 11.
2. Share and Mainwaring, ibid.
3. Mohammed al-A’mash, "al-Jaza’er Va Tajruba Jadida Min a 1-
Democrateya," [Algeria and a New Democratic Experience] Qadava
Daw leva 103 (December 23, 1991): 16.
4. Boutheina Cheriet, ibid.
5. Fadeel Al-Ameen, "Algerian Democracy At a Cross roads,"
al-Amal magazine (September, 1991): 30.
6 . Fadeel al-Ameen, ibid.
7. Mohammed Al-A’mash, ibid.
8 . "Kul Shai’ Hawl al-Jaza’er," [Every thing About Algeria]
al-Faier al-Jadid newspaper (February 12, 1992).
9. Uthman Tezghart, "Jabhat Al-Inqath Min Nash’tha I la
Kabwatha," [The FIS from its establishment to its fall] A 1-
Maialla m agazine 637 (April 22-28, 1992): 29.
10. Jill Smolowe, "An Alarming No Vote," Time magazine (January
13, 1992). 236
F o o tn o tes ClneLF»te r V I 1 1
11. Qusai Saleh Al-Darweesh, "Benjedid: Ana A1 Lathy Oqarrer
Man Yara’s A1 Hokooma," [ Benjedid: I am the one who will
decide who will head the government] Asharo Al-Awsat newspaper
(September 11, 1989): 1.
12. Hisham Fahim, "al-Jaza’er: Matha B a ’d Hal Jabhat al-
Inqath," [Algeria: What is After Dissolving the FIS]
13. Uthman Tezghart, ibid.
14. Ghazi al-Aredi, "Azmat Gheyab al-Democrateya," [The Crisis
of the Absent Democracy] a1-Xahar newspaper, 8168: 9.
15. Uthman Tezghart, ibid.
16. From an interview with Abd al-Hamid Obada the head of the
Constantine municipality, a 1-Alam magazine 416 (February 1,
1992).
17. From a speech by Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj in al-
Bolaida city in May 1991.
18. Peter Hiett, "The struggle of the giants," Middle East
International Journal (May 31, 1991).
19. From a speech by Madani and Belhadj in the city of al-
Bolaida.
20. "Mahatat Jaza’ereya," [Algerian Stations] al-Khalee i
newspaper (June 14, 1991).
21. FBIS (April 9, 1991). 237
F ootnotes Ctietp t e rVIII
22. Middle East International journal (June 14, 1991): 3.
23. FBIS (June 12. 1991): 3.
24. FBIS (July 5, 1991): 9-10.
25. Fadeel Al-Ameen, ibid.: 31.
26. FBIS (May 30, 1991): 6.
27. FBIS (June 5, 1991): 2.
28. MEi, ibid.
29. For more details about the strike also see FBIS (June 4,
1991): 4. ; also see FBIS (June 10, 1991): 7.
30. FBIS (June 10, 1991): 7.
31. Share and Mainwaring, ibid.
32. Mainwaring and Viola, ibid.
33. "Tasalsul al-Ahdath Fi al-Jaza’er," [The Sequence of
Incidents in Algeria] Ukath newspaper (January 13, 1992): 2.
34. "Ba’d Khams Asabi’," [After Five Weeks] al-Ma ialla magazine
(February 19-25, 1992).
35. Boutheina Cheriet, ibid.: 14.
36. Peter Hiett, "Government of technocrats," Middle East
International (June 28, 1991): 11. 238
F o o t n o t e s dneLp>terVIII
37. Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel C. Patterson, Comparing
Legislatures (Boston:Little, Brown and Company, 1979): 97.
38. David P. Conradt, The German Polity (New York: Longman,
1979): 120.
39. Conradt, ibid.
40. ibid.
41. Lowensberg and Patterson, ibid.
42. ibid.
43. "Algeria’s Coup," North African News (January, 1992).
44. Sawt al-Kuwait al-Dawli (1991).
45. Yahya Zoubir, ibid.: 59.
46. "The Return of the "Foreign Legion’," Impact International
(January 10, 1992): 26.
47. Qadava Dawleva 105 (January 6, 1992).
48. Impact International, ibid.
49. Qadava Dawleva. ibid.
50. ibid.
51. Fahmi al-Howaidi, "al-Jaza’er: Doroos Majjaneya Li 1
Islameyn," [Algeria: Free Lessons to the Islamists] al-
Ma ialla magazine 630 (March 4-10, 1992): 29.
52. ibid. 239
F’oo'tno'tes ŒneLg»teVI11 r
53. Qadava Dawleva. ibid.
54. ibid.
55. Mohammed al-A’mash and Tawfiq Ghanem, ibid.: 12.
56. Ruth Marshal and Scott Sullivan, "In Algeria ’The Victory
of God’," Newsweek (January 13, 1992): 37.
57. S.E. Finer, ibid.; also see Eric Nordllnger, ibid.
58. Mohammed al-A’mash and Tawfiq Ghanem, ibid.
59. Jamal Amiar, "Algerian Army and Islamists Are on a
Collision Course," The Washington Report On Middle East
Affairs (March 1992): 13; also see Jill Smolowe, "A Prelude to
Civil War?," Time magazine (January 27, 1992): 30; also see
North African News (January 1992): 6; also see Mohammed al-
A ’mash and Tawfiq Ghanem, ibid.
60. ibid.
61. North African News, ibid.
62. Jamal Amiar, ibid.
63. North African News, ibid.
64. Mohammed al-A’mash, and Tawfiq Ghanem, ibid.
65. North African News, ibid.
6 6 . al-Fair al-Jadid newspaper (February 12, 1992): 1.
67. Qadava Dawleva. ibid.: 12. Chapter IX
Why Did the Process Stop?
In the previous chapter the author tried to follow the incidents in Algeria as they were unravelling since the beginning of the democratization process. The search was basically for the reason or reasons behind the failure of the democratization process. The process began with the new 1989 constitution that had established a multi-party system in
Algeria, which was followed by the first multi-party elections that were held at the municipal level. These elections were followed by a new electoral law that was presented by the government, and that caused a great deal of controversy between the FIS and the government.
However, in spite of the bumpy road that the process was going through, the process continued and the first multi-party legislative elections were held in Algeria, in which the
Islamic party FIS was able to secure the majority of the seats of the National Assembly. However, while signs of mutual understanding between the regime and the FIS began to appear, the hard-liners in the military were not ready to accept such a relation. They decided to intervene in order to cancel the elections and to end the democratization process in Algeria altogether.
240 241
Before being able to determine the reasons behind the
failure of the democratization process, one nas first to pin
point the starting point of the process. This would eventually
help us deal with the major incidents that took place during
the transitional period, and would allow us to determine which
of those incidents was behind that failure.
A. When did the democratization process begin?
It is hard to pin point a specific time, in which the
transition to democracy began in Algeria. There are two points
of view concerning the beginning of the process. Some analysts
think that the democratization process began once Chadli
Benjedid became the president of Algeria in 1979, after the
death of President Houari Boumedienne.* Others believe that it
began after the October riots of 1988, when President Benjedid
promised to open the political system in Algeria, and to
establish a multi-party system.%
Benjedid was the son of the military establishment, and
he did not want to follow the socialist path, that Boumedienne
was advocating. Several social and economic policies that were
initiated by Boumedienne, were later changed by Benjedid. As
an example, Benjedid was not convinced that the policy of
industrialization of Boumedienne, that was cpncent.rating on 242
heavy industry was worth pursuing, and therefore, he stopped
the whole process, and directed the country towards the production of consumer goods instead.
As for his relationship with the FLN, Benjedid became the
secretary general of the party only after he had become the president. He was the nominee of the military and not of the
FLN. As was mentioned earlier, the party was trying to chose between two people, Mohammad Yahyawi and Abdulaziz Boutafliqa, who used to be close allies of Boumedienne. Benjedid was pushed to the front by the military, and specifically by Kasdi
Merbah, who was the head of the military intelligence at the t ime.
Once in office, Benjedid got rid of those who were loyal to Boumedienne, whether they were in the government or in the
FLN. Using the excuse of cleaning the government from corruption, Benjedid went after Abdulaziz Boutafliqa, the previous foreign minister, and a close Boumedienne ally. Later on, he got rid of Yahyawi, who was the strongest man in the
FLN at the time. Those two and several others would stand against his reforms, and would mobilize other FLN members against those reforms. In terms of hard-liners among the FLN who were against change and reforms, Yahyawi was one of the main hard-liners in the FLN. 243
In 1983 President Benjedid replaced Yahyawi with Mohammad
Shareef Messaadia, a moderate who did not represent a source of challenge to Benjedid's reforms in the FLN. However, in
1985 Messaadia led the opposition against Benjedid in the FLN, therefore, Messaadia had to go as well. The best time to get rid of him was after a major national crisis. Therefore,
Benjedid used the October, 1988 riots as an excuse to get rid of Messaadia, who was considered the strongest man in Algeria, after the president at the time.
Some Algerian specialists would go as far as hinting that
Benjedid himself was behind the 1988 riots, in order to get rid of some of his opponents, such as Messaadia and to push the reforms forward.^
By getting rid of his opponents in the FLN, it became easier for Benjedid to desert the policies of the Boumedienne era, and to introduce some social and economic reforms in the country. As was mentioned earlier, Benjedid released several political prisoners who were arrested during the days of
Boumedienne, such as the previous President Ahmad Ben Bella.
He also allowed some political leaders who were living in exile to come back to Algeria, such as Hocine Alt Ahmad the prominent Berber leader, and Ben Youssef Ben Khedda who used to be the president of the Algerian government-in-exi1e during 244
the war of liberation. As for the economic field, Benjedid
decided to redirect the Algerian industrialization policy
towards the manufacturing of consumer goods instead of
pursuing heavy industry as was the case under Boumedienne.
However, the most that could be said about Benjedid's
policy during the 1979-1988 period is that it was a. policy of
liberalization in which the system was witnessing some
opening. However, it was not a period of genuine
democratization, since the FLN was still the only political
party that existed openly and that was officially recognized
by the regime. It was also the only party that had a monopoly
on all important positions in the state.
However, after the riots of October 1988, President
Benjedid promised to start a democratization process, in which
a multi-party system would be officially installed. Therefore,
the new system began with the drafting of the 1989
constitution that was later approved in a referendum on the
23rd of February 1989 by 73.4% of votes cast by 79% of the
total electorate.*
The new constitution represented the beginning of the
democratization process, and the divorce with Algeria’s
"socialist" past. For example, the new constitution completed the separation of the state from the FLN and 245
permitted the 'creation of associations of political nature",
with certain restriction. s As an example the constitution
forbids the foundation of parties whose creation or action
rests exclusively on a religious, linguistic or regionalist
basis.® In the new constitution, the "irreversible commitment
to socialism" of the old constitution was abandoned, while the
army was entrusted with the sole task of defending the country
and not of "participating in the building of socialism’.’
It is also important to note that, in the new
constitution, executive, legislative, and judicial functions
were separated, and were no longer controlled by the FLN, but
by a Constitutional Council.® Therefore, these reforms that
were mentioned in the constitution did take the country away
from the dominance of and control by the FLN, to a more open
system in which the FLN was reduced to the position of a
political party that needs to compete for seats in the
parliament, just like any other party.
The ability of President Benjedid to remove the hard
liners of the FLN from their leading positions, and to reduce
the status of the party from that of a ruling party to that of
a regular political party, brings up an important question;
Were the FLN and its leaders really ruling Algeria? The answer
for this question would help us understand the real power 246
centers in Algeria, and the actual role that was played by the
FLN in that country.
B. The True Rulers Of Algeria:
The FLN was the party that led the war of independence
against the French in 1954. It was a political front that
included several political orientations, as was mentioned in
Chapter VI. After independence, the FLN was used only as a
legitimizing factor for those who ruled Algeria ever since.
The actual ruler of Algeria since independence had always
been the military.® Ahmad Ben Bella became the first president
of Algeria, only after his coalition with the army head,
Houari Boumedienne. However, two years later, in 1965,
Boumedienne got rid of Ben Bella, and ruled the country with
the help of the army. Yet, reference to the FLN, and to the
generation of the war of liberation, continued as a
legitimizing card in the hands of the president and the
mi 1 itary.
As a matter of fact, there had always been three pillars
on which the Algerian regime had stood. The first pillar was
the presidency, the second was the military, and the third the FLN.'o The president had always gotten his support from the
military establishment and his legitimacy from being a member 247
of .the FLN.
As was mentioned earlier, it was only due to the support
of the military that Ahmad Ben Bella became the president of
Algeria after independence. As we recall, there were several
internal leaders who were in charge of the war of independence
inside Algeria, and who were against Ben Bella. However, Ben
Bella allied himself with Houari Boumedienne who was the
leader of the military, and who guaranteed him the support of
the military establishment. However, two years later
Boumedienne removed Ben Bella and became the president of
Algeria.
After the death of Boumedienne, the leaders of the
military nominated Benjedid, and installed him as president
although he was not the nominee of the FLN. As it was in the
case of Boumedienne, President Benjedid was a top military
leader, who was in charge of the district of Oran. His main
support was from the head of the military intelligence Kasdi
Merbah, who was later appointed the prime minister by
Benjedid.
Similarly, after the victory of the FIS, it was Defense
Minister Khalid Nezzar, along with other military leaders who removed President Benjedid, and installed the High State
Council instead. Khalid Nezzar was the strongest man in that 248
council and despite many changes in the formation of the council, Nezzar stayed the commanding figure in it.
Meanwhile, the FLN had always been the source of
legitimacy for the regime. It was the party that led the war of liberation against the French, and with both its internal and external leadership was able to force the French out of
Algeria. The president, the military leaders, as well as top bureaucrats had also been leading members of the FLN. For the last 28 years the FLN had been the only political party that was allowed to participate in the legislative elections and in the decision making in Algeria.
However, this special position of the FLN was not a blessing for the party but a curse since all the failures of the regime were blamed on the party. The corruption of the leaders of the regime was blamed on the party since those
leaders were also members of the party at the same time. As a matter of fact, the FLN became the scapegoat for the president and for the leaders of the regime. They used it as a
legitimizing factor, and when it became unpopular and became a burden on them, they deserted it. After he was re-elected the president of Algeria for the third time in 1988, Benjedid left the FLN, claiming that he wanted to be a president for all
Algerians, and a non partisan figure. Defense Minister Khalid 249
Nezzar and other top military officers, did just the same
thing.
This has been an overview of the pillars of the Algerian
regime that included the president, the military
establishment, and the FLN. Gradually the number of these
pillars was reduced to include only the president and the
military establishment, and finally to include only the military establishment. As we know, after the forced
resignation of President Benjedid in a bloodless coup in
January 1992, the leaders of the military establishment came
from the shade and began to rule the country directly under
the command of Defense Minister Khalid Nezzar.
However, if the democratization process led to the
exclusion of the FLN from the decision making process in
Algeria, and to the ousting of President Benjedid from his position, then why did Benjedid start the process in the first place?
C. Why did Benjedid want to democratize?
Several Algerian specialists would question the motives behind President Benjedid’s decision to democratize, and to establish a multi-party system in Algeria. Those writers would state that, during the 1988 demonstrations, the people 250
demanded equality and social justice, and never asked for
democracy, or for a multi-party system.*‘ The only
disadvantaged party in such a move was the FLN since the new
system could have not threatened the president or the leaders
of the military.
Therefore, some writers believe that Benjedid used the
FLN as a scapegoat for the failure of his r e g i m e . This was
done by changing the status of the FLN, from the status of a
ruling party, to the status of a regular political party,
competing for seats in the parliament. He then excused himself
from continuing to be the secretary general of the party,
leaving the FLN alone facing the anger of the Algerian people.
Finally, the electoral law that was supposed to help the FLN
win some seats, backfired, and increased the resentment of the
people to the party.
The main problem that the country was facing and was a
major cause of instability in the country was the
deteriorating economy. As the author tried to show in Chapter
V, the country was under a great economic burden that was
causing a good deal of instability. With the foreign debt
mounting up to 26 billion dollars, the standards of living
deteriorating continuously, and with the high level of
dependency on food imports, the country was in bad shape.Many 251
Algerians had smuggled their money outside the country, because
they had no trust in the future of the country.
Corruption among top leaders of the country, including
Benjedid himself, and the mismanagement of the economy were
two major causes behind the economic problem. Instead of
dealing with the causes of the problem. President Benjedid
tried to reduce the tension caused by the crisis using two
methods.
First, when he saw that the level of resentment of the
FLN among the people was growing, he and his group deserted
the party and left it alone to face the anger of the people.
This was done by his continuous attacks on the hard-liners in
the FLN, and by actually changing its leaders. Also, by
withdrawing from the FLN along with the military leaders, the
party lost its back-bone. Such an action was supposed to
release the pressure that was built by the economic crisis.
Secondly, Benjedid tried to shift the attention of the
people away from him and from his group, since they were the
reason behind the corruption. This was done by promising
democracy immediately after the 1988 riots, and by actually starting the change in 1989. After the 1989 constitution, in
which a multi-party system was established, people were busy
forming opposition parties and preparing for the municipal 252
elections of 1990 and for the legislative elections of 1991.
His own interest was not threatened by the new system since he
had taken some constitutional precautions that would have
helped him secure his position.
As was mentioned, before beginning the democratization
process, the president wanted to have guarantees that things
would not get out of his hands. Therefore, according to the
1989 constitution, he stayed in control of the military and of
the police force. He also wanted some guarantees against the
National Assembly, therefore, he gave himself the right to
dissolve it, as it was shown in Chapter VIII.'^
D. Why was the transition halted?
Several reasons caused the abortion of the transition to
democracy in Algeria. The author believes that both the regime
and the opposition parties share the blame for such failure.
The hard-liners in the regime were suspicious of the process,
and have stated at several times that they would cancel the
process if some groups won. The soft-liners in the regime,
such as President Benjedid, were trying to manipulate the
process in a way that would serve their interests.
The hard-liners in the FIS were arrogant at some points,
and refused to play the game according to the rules set by the
regime. They wanted to force some new rules, using the 253
movements ability to mobilize the masses. Finally, the leaders
of the so called "democratic" parties were not very democratic
themselves, since they have actually asked the army to
intervene to "save" the country when the democratic elections
gave victory to the FIS, and left them with few seats.
To put it simply, the failure of the democratization
process in Algeria was caused by the leaders of the regime, of
the FIS, and of the other opposition parties, as will be shown
in the following paragraphs.
One can list the reasons behind the failure of the
democratization process in Algeria as follows:
1. The insincerity of the regime, and President Benjedid
about the democratization process in the first place.
The Algerian regime under President Benjedid was forced
to democratize, under the pressures of the economic crisis,
which led to a great deal of instability, including massive
demonstrations, and clashes with the police, that led to a great number of casualties.However, when the results of the
provincial and municipal elections showed the strength of the
FIS, then things had to change.
The president first started by taking away the financial
support, that was supposed to be given to those
municipalities, that were won by the FIS. Second, he tried to 254
tailor a new electoral law, that would enable the FLN to secure
a greater number of seats. Finally, he imprisoned the two
prominent leaders of the FIS, Abbassi Madani and All Belhadj,
and later arrested thousands of the FIS activists.
2. The FIS hurt by its own success:
It was clear that Benjedid had hoped for a situation, in
which no single party would dominate the political a r e n a . is
He never thought that the FLN would lose as much and as fast
as it did. He hoped for a situation in which the FLN, the
Islamists, and the secularists, would each have a good number
of seats in the National Assembly. The most important thing,
to him, was that no single party would hold two thirds of the
seats in the National Assembly, which would give it the right
to change the constitution.i*
What happened was just what Benjedid had feared, and the
FIS was able to achieve a majority in the provincial and municipal elections. Therefore, he wanted to prepare for the
legislative elections, by drafting the new electoral law, that
would give advantage to the FLN.
However, this law did not help, and the FIS was also able
to secure 188 seats in the legislative elections, and the
other parties dragged behind, with the FLN winning only 15 255
seats, and the FFS winning 25 seats. It was clear that the FIS
was going to win two thirds of the seats of the National
Assembly, which would have enabled it to change the
constitution.*’
3. The hard-liners in the FIS: "We will not forget and
forgive":
The hard-liners in the FIS were outspoken and they
declared on many occasions that their goal was to establish an
Islamic state. On other occasions, they threatened, that if
they won the elections, they would not forgive those who misused their authority. They stated that the list would
include each and every wrong doer, since independence.’® This
list would have included those who served under Ben Bella,
Boumedienne, and Benjedid.
To make things even worse, Madani and Belhadj, the two prominent FIS leaders, mentioned that those who were responsible for the massacre of October, 1988, would also be brought to justice. This statement was fatal to them and to the FIS, since it was Defense Minister Khalid Nizzar, who was
in charge of the 1988 operation against the rioters.’*
Therefore, threatening him, and those in the military who participated in the operation, did not make the military very 256
happy about the FIS, coming to power.
In order for any "transition through transaction” to
succeed, the leaders of the opposition should have the
intention to forget the abuses that were committed in the
past, and to forgive those who committed them. If the
opposition declared that once in power, it would prosecute
those who are currently ruling the country, then the current
rulers will never allow the opposition to get to power.
Therefore, by declaring that they were willing to go after the
leaders of the regime, the FIS signed its own execution order,
4. Threatening the military:
The hard-liners in the FIS, Abbassi Madani and Ali
Belhadj, threatened the military on several occasions. Such
acts increased the hostility of the military establishment
towards the FIS. It is very dangerous to threaten those who
have the guns, especially if you do not have anything yourself. Here, the author thinks that he must give evidence to
support his claim:
a. On June 31, 1991, in an interview with Al-Wattan newspaper.
Shaikh Abbassi Madani declared:
"if the state of siege is not lifted, this means that: 257
there is a military coup, and we will not accept a
regime of this type... if this lasts we will go
back to the jihad that tvas declared by Prince
Abdulqader.
b . In another incident Madani stated that:
"if you [the mi 1itaryJ were manipulated by foreign
hands, you shall know that the Algerian people are
ready for any eventuality".
Ali Belhadj also said that:
"the FIS wants an army in the service of Allah and of
the Shari ‘a and not in the service of Benjedid. The
blood of October [1988] has not dried yet. "21
c. In another incident, during a celebration at the end of
the month of Ramadan, Madani declared:
"our strike is going to be legal, and in case the
military intervened, I swear by Allah that we will
fight them until they col lapse. '2 2
5. The regime intimidating the soft-liners in the FIS:
It looked that the hard-liners in the regime were trying
to push the supporters of the FIS to a corner, in order to 258
make them make a mistake. It looked that those hard-liners
wanted an excuse to cancel the whole process, therefore, they
first arrested Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, the two
prominent FIS leaders. Later on, after both Madani and Belhadj were imprisoned, the acting head of the FIS, Abdulqadir
Hachani, who was so pragmatic, was also arrested.
The hard-liners in the regime did not want to hear pragmatism from the FIS. They tried to intimidate the FIS, as much as they could in order to force it to use violence. For
instance, security forces arrested Mohammad S a ’eed who was a moderate leader, then they imprisoned Hachani who also was very moderate and who continuously told FIS activists to keep calm.
The government then tried to prevent the supporters of the FIS from praying in those mosques where FIS members usually speak. Also, security forces continued intimidating
FIS members and actually arrested thousands of them.
The regime wanted to shake people’s trust in the FIS and the Islamists, therefore, it wanted to push them to the corner and force the militant elements of the FIS to react violently.
The government hoped that the people would walk away from the
FIS, if it could be blamed for the violence that was taking place. However, this plan failed because, Hachani and the 259
other moderate FIS leaders, would not be intimidated.
6. Military leaders: " The FIS must not rule"
The leaders of the military never liked or trusted the
FIS or the Islamists. On several occasions they asked
President Benjedid to dissolve the FIS. And during the
demonstrations of May 1991, that followed the FIS’s strike,
army leaders never hesitated in giving the orders to the
soldiers to shoot at the demonstrators. Finally, it was the
military that arrested the prominent FIS leaders, Abbassi
Madani, and Ali Belhadj, and later arrested Kachani.2 3
Long before the coup, several military leaders had
already stated that if the FIS won the elections, they would
intervene and would cancel the elections, and they eventually
did it. They forced President Benjedid to resign, cancelled
the elections, and arrested Hachani and thousands of the
members of the FIS.
In other words, the leaders of the military were willing
to respect the results of the elections, if the secular parties had won, but since an Islamic party won then the
process had to stop. There is much evidence for this
statement, including: 260
First, Defense Minister Khalid Nezzar made a promise to
prevent the FIS from getting to power, claiming that according
to the constitution the military can prevent the FIS from
taking power.2 *
Second, on two separate occasions, the leaders of the military asked President Benjedid to ban the FIS. The first
occasion was in June 1991, when the FIS called for the strike,
and the second one was in November, when a police station at
the border with Tunisia was attacked by some of the people who had come back from Afghanistan.2s
Third, in February 1990, a first warning was given to the
FIS by Colonel Mustafa Cheloufi, the secretary general of the ministry of defense, and a well known hard-liner:
"the Algerian military is not worried about the rising
social agitation and violence which have spread in the
country since the political liberalization [has been
instituted], but it will intervene to defend the
nascent democracy. We cannot tolerate the fact that
some people confound democracy with anarchy and freedom
of speech with violence or intimidation".
7. The secular "democratic" parties: " The elections should
be cancelled, and all measures should be taken to 261
prevent the FIS from coming to power”.
After the major success that the FIS had achieved in the
parliamentary elections, several secular parties, the so
called democratic, actually asked the military to intervene,
"to save democracy from the FIS". The following examples would
help prove the point:
a. A statement by the General Union of the Algerian Workers,
and the General Union of the Algerian Contractors claimed
that :
"the FIS will bury democracy and we should condemn it in
order to save democracy... a national committee to save
democracy has been established... and we call on all
national forces to make any urgent move to protect
democracy ".2 7
b. S a ’eed Sa'di, leader of the RCD party, a Berber cultural
movement that became a national party and which did not win
any seat in the elections, called upon his supporters to
boycott the second round of the parliamentary elections on
January 16th. He also said that "all measures" should be used
to prevent the second round from taking place. 262
c. The Vanguard Socialist Party also called for the
cancellation of the results of the first round of the
elections, as well as the second round.
Therefore, as we can see the parties that did not win any
number of seats, or that thought that the FIS should not be
allowed to rise to power, actually asked for the intervention
of the government or the military to stop the elections.
8. The external pressure:
The external pressure, from the Arab countries and from
the West, helped convince the military in Algeria that it was
not in the best interest of Algeria, that the FIS should be
allowed to come to power. Several statements made by Arab and
western officials showed the degree of discomfort that those
governments had felt about the results of the elections.
Examples are given to help prove the point:
a. After the FIS had won the first round of the legislative
elections. King Hassan of Morocco declared that, religious
fundamentalism represented a type of dictatorship.
b. In Egypt President Mubarak criticized those who claim to
belong to Islam. At the same time, his Minister of Interior 263
Abdulhaleem Mousa visited Tunisia after the Algerian
elections, and declared, along with the Tunisian minister of
foreign affairs, that something had to be done to clean the
North African region of the fundamentalists.2s
c. Claude Sheson, the previous French foreign minister said
that the existence of a fundamentalist government in Algeria
will lead to a civil war, which will affect other African
countries.^0
However, after the military had intervened, and had
cancelled the elections, a different tone was used:
a. President Mubarak said that Egypt was willing to help
Algeria in anything, and told the other countries to respect
the sovereignty of Algeria.21
b. The ministry of foreign affairs in Tunisia wished all the
best for President Benjedid after his resignation, and also wished the best for the Algerian people in facing the new
challenges. ^ 2 264
c. From Libya, President Qaddafi called Prime Minister
Gozali, and assured him of the support of his country.
d. Several French newspapers described the intervention as a
"white coup", in order to save democracy from the dictatorship of the FIS.
e. The British government declared that it felt sorry for the military intervention and the halt of the democratization process. However, ten minutes later the government speaker called the reporters to tell them to delete the phrase, "it felt sorry".^®
f. On January, 13 the state department in the United States of
America declared its support to the High State Council that took power, and said that the intervention was constitutional.
Two days later it declared a change in the position of the
American government, in regard to whether the intervention was constitutional or not.^s
All these reactions of the Arab and Western governments to both the success of the FIS, and then to the military intervention represented political signals that were sent by 265
those countries from one side, and were received by the hard
liners in the regime on the other.
There is no clear evidence, other than the above
statements and several others, to show that there was some
kind of a conspiracy between the hard-liners in the regime in
Algeria, and some foreign countries, to abort the
democratization process. But it is strange that some Western
countries would describe the coup as "constitutional", such as
the United States, while others would describe it as a "white
coup against the dictatorship of the FIS".
One should pause here for a second and question the
Western definition of the term "democracy". How could the FIS
that agreed, under the soft-liners, to play according to the
rules of the game set by the regime, and that represented the
choice of the majority of the Algerian people in the
elections, represent a threat to democracy? And how could the
intervention of the military, and the abortion of the
democratization process be called "constitutional", and be
welcomed by the countries that praise democracy?
Such behavior of the Western countries makes one question
the degree of commitment of the West to "democracy" when it
does not serve its interests. Therefore, the West determines
who is democratic and who is not, and who represents a threat 266
to democracy and who does not. This conception of "democracy"
is biased and seriously undermines the commitment of the
people in the Third World to it. It also gives an excuse to
the hard-liners in any opposition movement, especially the
Islamic ones, to oppose the idea of contesting elections, and
pushes them further into extremism.
As we can see, the "leadership" factor, which belongs to
the proximate factors, was the crucial factor behind the abortion of the democratization process in Algeria. The background variables, such as the historical background, the
legacies of colonization, and the political culture of the people could have had their impact on shaping the mentality of the leaders of both the regime and of the opposition. Yet it was the role played by those leaders that determined the outcome of the process.
In other words, the failure of the transition was not caused by the background variables but by the leadership variable which is a proximate variable. As was shown, the government was not sincere in its efforts to democratize, and the role played by the leadership of the military was also crucial, since it was determined from the very beginning, to prevent the FIS from ascending to power.
The leadership of the FIS was also to be blamed, since 267
the hard-liners refused to show their commitment to play
according to the rules of the game. However, when the soft-
liners tried to show a degree of flexibility, they were
rebuffed by the military. Finally, the leadership of the
secular parties, should have respected the outcome of the
elections, whatever that outcome might be. It would not be
fair to accept democracy, only if democracy was going to bring
the secular parties to power, and if not then we ask the
military to intervene. 268
F o o t n o t e sClrm pt e r IX
1. Mustafa Swaq, "al-Jaza’er: Khorooj Jabhat al-Tahreer Min al-
Hokum," [The Exit of the FLN] al-Havat newspaper (June 1,
1991): 4.
2. "Tareekh al-Neza’at Fi Al-Jaza'er," [The History of Disputes
in Algeria] al-Khalee i newspaper (June 28, 1991); also see
"Kul Shai’ Hawl al-Jaza’er," [Everything On Algeria], al-Fa ir al-Jadid newspaper (February 12, 1992).
3. Mahfoud Bennoune, "Algeria’s Facade of Democracy," Midd1e
East Report (March-Apri1, 1990): 12; also see Rachid Tlemcani,
"Chadli’s Perestroika," Middle East Report (March-Apri1,
1990): 14; also see Boutheina Cher let, "The Resilience Of
Algerian Populism," Middle East Report (January-February,
1992, p. 9)
4. "Algeria," Middle East and North Africa (1993): 279.
5. ibid.
6. Yahia Zoubir, ibid.: 26.
7. "Algeria," Middle East and North Africa, ibid.
8.ibid. 269
F’oo'tno'tes Ch.stp> t e r I X
9. Ahmad Belwafi, "Wa Akhiran Adat al-Jaza’er I la al-Hathira, "
[Finally Algeria Returned To The Barn] al-Sunna magazine 19
(December, 1992): 32 ; also see Abdel Ilah Belqzez, "al-
Jaza’er: a 1-Dawla Wa M a s ’1 at al-Shar’eia," [Algeria: the State
and the Issue of Legitimacy] al-Havat newspaper (March 5.
1992): 14 ; also see al-Sunna magazine 15 (August, 1992): 12 ;
also see Mahmoud Shammam, "a '-Azma al-Rahena Laha Juthooraha
al-Tarekheya," [the Current Crisis Has Its Roots In History]
(1992): 11.
10. Sal ah Add in Hafeth, "Man Ajhad al-Democrateya Fi al-
Jaza’er?," [Who Aborted Democracy In Algeria?] a1-Havat
newspaper (June 6, 1991); also see Boutheina Cheriet, "The
Resilience of Algerian Populism," Middle East Report (January-
February, 1992): 9.
11. Boutheina Cheriet, ibid.; also see Mahfoud Bennoune, ibid.:
12; also see Rachid Tlemcani, "Chadli’s Perestroika," Midd1e
East Report (March-Apri1, 1990): 14.
12. Ghazi al-Aridi, "al-Jaza’er: Azmat Gheyab al-Demoqrateya,"
[Algeria: the Crisis of the Absence of Democracy] al-Nahar
newspaper 8168: 9. 270
Footnotes Ctietp t e r IX.
13. As we have seen earlier, when he resigned or was forced to
resign, he claimed that he had dissolved the National
Assembly, a week earlier, although no one had ever heard about
it before that day, but the new constitution gave him the
right to do so.
14. Al-Fair AI-Jadid newspaper (February 12, 1992).
15. Interview with Mohammad Bouslimani and Mahfoud al-Nahnah.
16. Kamal al-HiIbawi, "al-Azma al-Jaza’ereia Bayn al-Infiraj
Wa1 Infijar," [The Algerian Crisis Between Release and
Explosion] Qadava Daw leva 107 (January 20, 1992): 2; also
Bouslimani, ibid. and al-Nahnah, ibid.
17. Impact International news magazine (January-March, 1992):
24.
18. Ali Belhadj, and Abbassi Madani, in a speech in the city of
al-Boulaida in May 1991.
19.Ghazi al-Aridi, ibid.
20. Fadeel Al-Ameen, ibid.: 34.
21. Yahia Zoubir, ibid.: 42.
22. "Elections in Algeria," Al-Bilad magazine (April 27, 1991).
23. a I-Ma ialla magazine 628 (February 19-25, 1992): 26. 271
Footrao-tess ClneLp t e r IX
24. Hanan Fahmi, Al-Wafd newspaper 403 (January 16, 1992).
25. Shareef Al-Shobashi, ibid.
26. Zubi r, ibid.: 41.
27. Al-Khalee i newspaper (January, 1st, 1992).
28. ibid.
29. "Algeria: The Battle Between the Quran and the Military,
Al-Omma magazine 3 (February 1992): 16.
30. ibid.
31. Salah Add in Ben Nusair, Al-Omma magazine 3 (February,
1992): 17.
32. ibid.
33. ibid.
34. ibid.
35. ibid.
36. ibid. C h a p t e r X
C o n c l u s i o n
In Algeria, what began as a democratization process,
ended up as a military coup. Through out the chapters of this dissertation, the author has tried to shed some light on the
democratization process in Algeria, and has also tried to find
the factors that led to the halt of the process. In the very
beginning, the author looked at the theories that dealt with
the process of transition to democracy, and tried to detect
some guidelines that would help him understand the Algerian
case.
The majority of theories that deal with democratization
suggest two types of variables, first, "background variables",
and second, "proximate variables".
Background variables, as the name suggests, deal with the
background of the case. They include variables, such as the historical background of the case, the colonial experience and
its legacies, the effect of political culture, the effects of ethnic cleavage in society, and the economic performance of the political system.
Proximate variables, on the other hand, deal with the current and direct factors that either enhance, or encumber
272 273
the transition. These variables include the role played by the
leadership of both the government and the opposition, the mobilization of the masses by the opposition, external factors
such as military defeat or foreign threat or conquest, and the
role played by the hard-liners and soft-1iners in the transition.
In most cases it would be hard to claim that the factors that influenced a transition were "exclusively" of one type or another, since it would be hard to isolate the influence of one type from the other. However, one could correctly determine the most critical variables that had influenced the outcome of the transition in one way or another.
Therefore, in this dissertation, the author tried to determine those variables that had caused the failure of the democratization process in Algeria, and tried to show to which group of variables did those variables belong.
I. The Military:
Since independence, Algeria had been ruled by the military, which, for the last thirty years, had used the
National Liberation Front, FLN, the party that led the war of
liberation from France, as a legitimizing factor. The military
itself lacked the legitimacy that would enable it to rule the 274
country. This was due to the fact that during the war of
liberation, the army had been stationed outside Algeria, in
Morocco and in Tunisia, and had not actually fought the
French.
Therefore, after independence, the army allied itself with Ahmad Ben Bella, one of the nine leaders of the FLN, who was installed as president in 1963. Ben Bella was just a symbol, but the person who really had the power in Algeria, was the head of the army. Colonel Houari Boumedienne. Later,
in 1965, Colonel Boumedienne carried out a coup, in which he became the president, and Ben Bella was sent to jail.
After the death of Boumedienne, the leaders of the military chose Chadli Benjedid, a military commander, to become the new president of Algeria. Meanwhile, the FLN was trying to chose between two FLN top members, and did not have
Benjedid on its list. As a matter of fact, Benjedid was forced on the FLN by the military. The FLN was not able to object, since the military was the actual ruler of Algeria.
II. The Economy:
Although Algeria had plenty of oil, natural gas, and mineral resources, it was in very bad economic shape. The country was drowning under a huge amount of foreign debt. 275
the standard of living of Algerians was deteriorating
continuously, and the country was importing most of its food
needs from France and Europe.
However, while the people of Algeria were suffering, the
president and his family, the top military officers, and top bureaucrats were actually stealing the wealth of the country. A
total of 26 billion dollars was unlawfully earned by state
officials, and was smuggled outside the country.>
Demonstrations and riots became frequent, and became the
only method by which the people could demand anything from the
state. The authorities would usually respond by the "stick",
followed by the "carrot". Therefore, during each
demonstration, the security forces would fire at the people,
then President Benjedid would announce some measures that
would release some pressure.
Most of the demonstrations took place during the 80’s,
especially the ones that took place in October, 1988, when
many people were killed by the police and by the army. As a
matter of fact, demonstrations became the most effective
method of demand in Algeria.
To the people, it was the FLN that was responsible for
the corruption and for the sufferings, since it was the ruling
party. Therefore, the FLN lost its legitimacy among the 276
people, to whom the war of independence was insignificant,
since 75% of them were born after independence. Therefore,
during the 1988 riots, the offices, slogans, and symbols of
the FLN were attacked and destroyed. Such an act gave the
impression among the leaders of the regime that the FLN could
no longer be used as a source of legitimacy.
President Benjedid promised to democratize the country,
and to install a multi-party system instead of the one party
system that had existed since independence. A new constitution
was approved, and the status of the FLN was reduced from the
status of the ruling party to that of a regular political
party that had to contest elections, and had to compete for
votes as any other political party. The president and top
military officers deserted the FLN, and left it alone to bear
the responsibility of all the problems that the country was
facing.
Meanwhile, the military leaders agreed with the
president, that some opening in the system could help reduce
the tensions in the country, and could improve the image of
the country in the international arena. A small change would
not hurt, as long as it did not represent a threat to the
regime.
The president and the leaders of the military hoped for a 277
situation where several parties would share the number of seats
in the National Assembly. They did not want any single party
to hold two thirds of the seats of the National Assembly,
since this number of seats would eventually enable any party
to change the constitution. They wanted the constitution
unchanged, since it gave the president certain powers, in
regards to his relation with the National Assembly.
III. The FIS:
The Islamic Salvation Front, FIS, was the only party that
could secure two thirds of the seats of the National Assembly.
While all the other political parties were calling for moderate reforms in the current system, the FIS was calling
for a total change. It challenged the FLN, the president, and the military, and called for the prosecution of all those who were responsible for the sufferings of the Algerian people.
The FIS was targeting the real disease in Algeria, which
was the corruption and irresponsibility of those in charge, whether it was the FLN, the president, or the military. The
FIS diagnosed it as a tumor, that had to be removed by means of surgery, and not by medication. To the FIS, the surgery was the establishment of an Islamic state in Algeria.
At least this was what the hard-liners in the FIS were 278
saying. The two top leaders of the FIS, Shaikh Abbassi Madani,
and Ali Belhadj were advocating such a cure, in which the
president would be removed and those corrupt officials would
be prosecuted. Both figures were populist figures, who were
able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of supporters in the
streets. This position by the hard line leaders of the FIS,
with their ability to mobilize massive numbers of people in
the streets, was alarming to the military leadership, which
never anticipated that the process of democratization could
threaten its own existence.
The leaders of the military were willing to accept the
secular parties, that did not have as many supporters as the
FIS did, and who were willing to play according to the rules
that the president and the military had set. But they were not
willing to accept the FIS, which called for the change of the
whole political system.
However, the popularity of the FIS was on the rise, and
it was able to achieve a good majority in the first round of
the parliamentary elections. It was obvious that if the second
round of the elections was permitted, then the FIS was going to win two thirds of the seats in the National
Assembly.
During this period, the soft-liners were in charge of the 279
FIS, since Shaikh Madani and Shaikh Belhadj were arrested,
Abdulqadir Hachani was a moderate leader, who continuously
assured the president and the military, that the FIS was
willing to respect the rules of the game and the constitution.
However, the military did not want to hear such pragmatism,
but wanted to push the FIS into a confrontation. The leaders
of the military were continuously intimidating the supporters
of the FIS, and since the soft-1iners in the FIS prevented the
people from responding to those intimidations, then those
soft-1iners were arrested by the military.
The military had to stop the FIS by any means, especially
after its unexpected electoral victory. Meanwhile, signals
were coming from France, Europe and the Arab World showing
that the FlS’s victory was not welcomed at all. Therefore,
such signals gave the leaders of the military moral support
and encouraged them to go ahead and cancel the elections.
After the military had stopped the process, signals of
support came from Europe and from the Arab World, showing the
satisfaction of those Western and Arab countries with the coup, and offering support. Eventually, financial aid
followed from France, Italy, Spain, and the Arab countries.
In order to gain legitimacy for its intervention, the
military brought Mohammed Boudiaf, one of the leaders of the 280
FLN, who was living in exile since 1964, to take part in the
new regime. Boudiaf was a dedicated enemy of the Islamists.
His first task was to ban the FIS and to declare that it was a
form of retardation to depend on religion as a guidance for
1 iving.
Meanwhile, the war against the FIS escalated, and
thousands of its supporters were arrested, which forced the
government to open new camps and prisons in the desert, to
absorb those numbers. These arrests pushed the FIS
underground, and allowed the hard-liners in the movement to
prevail and to wage war against the regime. Many attacks were
carried out against military posts by militant followers of
the FIS, who had no clear guidance to what they should do,
especially since the moderate leaders of the FIS were
arrested.
IV. It is not the past, it is the present:
This study of the failure of democratization in Algeria
has tried to pin point some major obstacles, that might stand in the face of democrat izat ion. As was mentioned earlier,
some political writers think that the crucial factors that
influence the beginning of the democratization process, as
well as the outcome of such a process, are of the background 281
type. Other writers believe that the proximate variables are
the crucial variables that determine both the beginning and
the outcome of the process.
The author found that while some background variables
might have had some indirect effect on the democratizat ion
process in Algeria, yet it was the leadership factor, which
belongs to the proximate type of variables that really led to
the failure of the process.
There were several important background variables, that
had their influence on both the leaders of the regime and
those of the opposition. Some of those variables were:
First, the scars from the past wounds had not healed yet,
The leaders of different Islamic movements in Algeria
mentioned on several occasions that the fruits of the war of
independence, which began as an Islamic war, were stolen by
the secular leaders. As was shown in Chapter III, the people
who ruled after independence were different from the people
who actually fought the war of liberation. The army that
assumed power after independence never fought the French, and
was stationed outside Algeria all the time.
Second, the source of legitimacy for the FLN and for the ruling group was the war of liberation. However, with the
passage of time and with the corruption among the top 282
leadership, the FLN lost its appeal among the people,
especially among those who were born after independence.
Therefore, the legitimacy of the ruling group as a whole
declined, since all the members of that group were also
members in the FLN.
Third, the deteriorating economy was a major reason
behind the regime's decision to democratize. It was only after
the 1988 riots that the president decided to install a multi
party system. However, many writers would question the motives
behind this decision. When all that the people were asking for
was equality and justice, why would the president promise a
multi-party system?
The obvious answer for such a question is that. Benjedid
decided to use the FLN as a scapegoat in order to reduce
popular tensions that were built by the deteriorating economy.
Since the FLN was no longer useful for him as a source of
legitimacy, then he decided to sacrifice it to reduce the
popular pressure.
After the 1988 riots, he blamed the FIN and its leaders
for the economic crisis, and immediately replaced his official FLN deputy Mohammad Shareef Messaadia, with the more
liberal Abdulhamid al-Mehri who was a close ally of B e n j e d i d . ^
Therefore, although the background variables are 283
important, in explaining the roots of the hostile relations
between the secular rulers and the Islamic groups, they do not
explain the reasons behind the failure of the process. As was
mentioned earlier, the author believes that the proximate
variables were behind such failure.
The leadership factor was the crucial factor that caused
the failure of the democratization process, and as we know
this factor belongs to the proximate variables. Basically, it
was the role played by the leaders of the government and of
the opposition parties, that caused the collapse of the
process.
First, the role played by President Benjedid, whose call
for democratization was not genuine, as the author has tried
to show. Benjedid was playing games all the time. First, he
gave himself extra constitutional powers, and strengthened his
grip over the military and the police force. Second, the new
constitution of 1989 allowed him to dissolve the National
Assembly on certain occasions, which eventually gave him the
upper hand over the Assembly.
Third, he made changes in the electoral law and
constituency law in a way that was supposed to allow the FLN
to gain a good number of seats. However, it looked like the
people’s anger with the FLN was tremendous, therefore, even 284
with the new changes, the party was not able to get more than
15 seats in the first round of the elections.
The leadership of the military also played a very
important role, that caused the failure of the democratization process. First, the hard-liners in the military stated from the very beginning that they were not going to allow the FIS to come to power. Second, they intimidated the FIS, by arresting its moderate leaders, and then by confronting its supporters in the streets, shooting many of them with live ammunition.
Finally, when all these measures did not prevent the FIS from winning a majority, the army forced Benjedid to resign, cancelled the elections, banned the FIS, and stayed in power.
As for the leadership of the FIS, and here we mean the hard-liners, represented by Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, it also had its share of the blame. First, these leaders showed no pragmatism or flexibility what so ever, in dealing with the regime. On several occasions, they called President Benjedid names, and asked him to resign, even before they had any power.
Second, they threatened all officials who took office since independence, that they would be prosecuted by the people. By this threat they alienated all the people who took 285
office in three administrations, the administration of Ben
Bella, of Boumedienne, and of Benjedid. Third, in their
speeches, they attacked the leaders of the military, and
threatened to wage Jihad against them if they stood in the way of the FIS.
The ability of the FIS leaders to mobilize people in the streets, by the hundreds of thousands, made the military feel
scared. They did not want an Iranian style revolution to occur
in Algeria, in which their own lives would be at stake.
In the Third World, the military intervenes in politics, and assumes power under certain circumstances. Several well known political writers have explained these circumstances, and some of these explanations apply to the case of Algeria.
As an example, in his book, Man on Horse Back. S.E. Finer,
states that the military would intervene, if the masses were mobilized in great numbers in the streets in the form of
riots and demonstrat ions ^ . Also, in his book. Political Order
in Developing Societies. Samuel Huntington states that the military would intervene to halt the rapid mobilization of
social forces into the streets^ .
Therefore, the actual mobilization of the masses by the
FIS alarmed the leaders of the military, who considered this mobilization as a threat to the stability of the country. As a 286
matter of fact, the stability of the country was at stake at
one point, when the secular parties also threatened to
mobilize their supporters into the streets, to confront the
supporters of the FIS.
Finally, the civilian leadership is to be blamed for
inviting the military to intervene, to keep order, every now
and then. First, Ben Bella asked the help of the army in 1962,
in order to become president. Second, when in 1988 the riots
broke. President Benjedid also called upon the army to
intervene, in order to protect the properties. Third in 1991,
when the FIS called for the strike, the president again called
upon the army to intervene, to keep law and order.
S.E. Finer also stated that when there would be an
increased civilian dependence on the military, this would
indicate that civilians had willingly surrendered the decision making process to the military. This would make it
easier for the military later on to intervene^.
Finally, as the author had tried to show, the external
factor also had its effect on the hard-liners in the regime,
encouraging them to stop the democratization process. The
negative comments that were made by Arab and European
countries about the results of the elections, and about the
threats of Islamic fundamental ism, encouraged the hard-liners 287
in the military to stop the process.
As was mentioned, the external factor did not influence
the process directly, but indirectly through the leaders of
the regime. Both the external factor, as well as the
leadership factor belong to the proximate variables.
As we can see, the "proximate" variables were the crucial
variables that led to the halt of the democratization process
in Algeria. Throughout the research, the author has tried to
use all the evidence and examples that he could find to prove
this point. However, the author has not tried by any means to
reduce the influence of the "background" variables. 288
Footnotes: CheLi^t & ir X
1. Mahfoud Bennoune, "Algeria’s Facade of Democracy," Midd1e
East Report (March-Apri1 1990): 11; also see Joe Stork, "North
Africa Faces the 1990s," Middle East Report (March-Apri1
1990): 7; also see Uthman Tezghart, "Harb al-Fasad Fi al-
Jaza’er," [The War of Corruption In Algeria] al-Ma ialla
magazine (1-7 July, 1992): 51; also see "al-Jaza’er: al-Asbab
al-Haqiqeya Li Soqoot al-Chathli," [Algeria: the Real Reasons
Behind the Fall of Chadli] al-Wattan al-Arabi magazine (14
August, 1992): 22; also see Izzat Safi, "al-Farasha Tanjo Min
Maqsalat al-Hokum," [The Butterfly Escapes the Gelatin] a 1 -
Khalee i al-Arabi newspaper (March 31, 1991): 21.
2. "Algeria", Middle East and North Africa (1993): 279.
3. S.E. Finer, ibid.
4. Samuel Huntington, ibid.
5. S.E. Finer, ibid. Abbas, Mohammad. "Jabhat al-Tahreer Tunathem Sufoofaha Listi’adat Mawqe’ha." [The FLN Reorganizes Its Ranks In Order to Take Back Its Position] Asharo al-Awsat September 12, 1989.
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