A member group of Lock the Gate Alliance www.savethereef.net.au Dr Andrew Jeremijenko [email protected] 0438372653 Chad Kirby [email protected] Dr Libby Connors [email protected] 0429487110

Gladstone Review Secretariat PO Box 787 Canberra ACT 2601 Email: [email protected]

Submission to the Independent Review of the Port of Gladstone

Thank you for this opportunity to make a submission. Save the Reef would like to respond to points a) to e) of the terms of reference. a) all previous review findings and information used as a basis for the current approvals for development in the Port of Gladstone;

Save the Reef has concerns about the approvals process. There is the suspicion that pressure has been applied at all levels from the inception of the idea, where World Heritage Status and the Outstanding Universal Value of Gladstone harbour and Curtis Island was not properly accounted, through to the Environmental Impact Statements that minimised the environmental sensitivity of the area and did not adequately assess the risks, through to the approval process at both state and federal levels.

Coordinator-General Decision-Making Process

Three CSG/LNG plants are currently being constructed on Curtis Island. Additionally, the statutory authority, Gladstone Ports Corporation [GPC] is undertaking major coal terminal expansion and preparatory work for potential additional csg/LNG plants on the mainland. In order to support this infrastructure Gladstone Ports Corporation is undertaking the largest dredging operation ever attempted in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area. The Ports Corporation plans to dredge 46 million cubic tonnes from Gladstone Harbour and the LNG sites. Much of the spoil dug up in that dredge is being stored behind a newly constructed 8-kilometre wall right opposite the World Heritage listed Curtis Island. This area used to contain precious seagrass. The scale of the dredging and the possibility the dredge spoil could contain contaminants rang alarm bells for many environmental scientists. The excess spoil has been dumped in an ocean disposal site 400 metres from the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. The Park Authority's chairman, Dr Russell Reichelt from GBRMPA regarded the dumping of dredge spoils as not acceptable in the World Heritage property and gave that advice to the department. This advice was ignored and the decision was taken to proceed.

In early 2009 the projects (CSG/LNG Plants and Western Basin Dredging) were declared to be projects of state significance. Environmental impact statements were undertaken and reviewed by the Coordinator-General. The Commonwealth Environment Minister also determined whether the projects would be approved. The projects were referred to him under • Sections 12 and 15A (world heritage properties) • Sections 15B and 15C (national heritage places) • Sections 18 and 18A (listed threatened species and communities) • Sections 20 and 20A (listed migratory species). The projects were approved by the Coordinator General, and later the Federal Commissioner for Sustainability Environment Water Population and Communities (SEWPaC). It was reported in the Courier Mail that there may have been political pressure applied to approve the CSG projects and the Western Basin Dredging Project. It was also reported that risks associated with the projects were ignored.

This was further complicated by a lack of independent audits after approvals were given.

Contentious Legislative Amendments

It is also important to review the legislation which is used as a basis for current approvals and developments and their recent changes. There is a good summary of recent changes to state legislation in appendix 4 of the AMCS / WWF document of recent state changes. There are some recent federal changes also discussed below such as the Sea Dumping Act.

There are a number of pieces of legislation that have been changed recently to allow development around Curtis Island and Gladstone harbour.

1. Sea dumping Act. In 2009 under Federal Labor, the government removed strict provisions that previously governed sea dumping in Australian waters. Those amendments included removing the distinction between contaminated and non-contaminated materials and removing the distinction between environmentally sensitive and non-environmentally sensitive areas. This is particularly important with respect to Gladstone Harbour developments as its sediment contains acid sulphate soils and potential acid sulphate soils and heavy metals such as aluminium, iron and arsenic. The dump site is also within a World Heritage Area.

This has been approved despite the Queensland acid sulphate soil manual stating: “Receiving marine, estuarine, brackish or fresh waters are not to be used as a primary means of diluting and/or neutralising ASS or associated contaminated waters.” “Ideally, ASS in or adjacent to the habitat of particularly sensitive protected species (eg. frogs and fish) should not be disturbed due to the potential threat to the species. Provisions of state legislation including the Nature Conservation Act 1992, and protection of environmental values under the

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Environmental Protection Act 1994, and the Commonwealth’s Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 must be addressed when making decisions that may impact on protected species.”

Offshore disposal of ASS carries high risk to the receiving environment. The State Coastal Management Plan – Queensland’s Coastal Policy August 2001 policy 2.1.8 states: “Dredging from land below highest astronomical tide (eg. within coastal waters) provides navigational and economic benefits to Queensland, and is to be appropriately located and sustainably managed to avoid or minimise adverse impacts on coastal resources and their values”. Any offshore disposal of dredged materials must also comply with the federal Environmental Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981. This act is supported by the National Ocean Disposal Guidelines for Dredged Material 2002. In addition, any proposals for offshore disposal of ASS would need to ensure compliance with the state Environmental Protection Act 1994 and the federal Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. "

“Risks associated with offshore disposal of ASS include: smothering of marine organisms with sulfidic sediments; acidification of the marine environment; and contamination of the marine environment with heavy metals or other toxicants. Generally unacceptable management strategies include those where there is high environmental risk; management strategies have been generally ineffective; and/or a lack of scientific data to support their sustainability.”

“For clarity, seawater neutralisation should not be a management method for new developments/disturbances.”

(It was noted in the Coordinator General’s report that " DERM (Queensland Acid Sulfate Soil Investigation Team—QASSIT) had expressed concern that the proposed methodology for handling and treatment of untreated PASS in the reclamation area does not qualify as strategic reburial. DERM maintains, in the absence of scientific proof, no untreated PASS material should be located within the reclamation area above mean low water (AHD -1.67 m at RL 0.67 m), unless DERM approves an alternative method of disposal to prevent oxidation of sulphides. With mean low water as an upper limit the capacity of the reclamation area for disposal of much of the anticipated PASS material, would be reduced or require expensive treatment prior to placement of such spoil.” The need to properly manage land disposal of PASS then contributed to pressure to dump dredge spoil despite the waters surrounding Gladstone Harbour falling within the parameters of the world heritage area.

2. The Economic Development Bill 2012 has amended the Environmental Protection Act. This provides for the disposal of toxic mine waste into the Fitzroy River. Our concern is that it will flow towards the delta and to Balaclava and North Curtis Islands and The Narrows where it will accumulate and contaminate the area. The river is home to threatened species such as the Snubfin Dolphin which was only identified in 2005. We do not know what the long-term effects of these discharges will be on the marine environment. No one is carrying out systematic testing of heavy metals and other contaminants from mine water on the Fitzroy delta and Keppel Bay, even though it has been known for years that many heavy metals bio- accumulate causing irreparable harm to marine environments. This may cause significant problems if North Curtis, Port Alma and Balaclava are developed.

3. Changes to Queensland’s Nature Conservation Act and other legislation affecting the Great Barrier Reef. The Newman Government recently made changes to legislation to allow large-

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scale private development inside Queensland’s National Parks. This could affect Curtis Island where there are proposals for a resort at Turtle Beach which is now more likely to be approved.)

4. Amendments to Piloting laws by federal government in 2010. Gladstone Harbour infrastructure development has been required to facilitate very large LNG tankers. We are concerned about their associated risks in the harbour and on the reef, especially given media reports that piloting laws are not being properly enforced. According to a report on the current affairs program PM ,“Marine pilots responsible for navigating big ships through the Great Barrier Reef have revealed a number of near-miss groundings and collisions were not reported to authorities.... The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) says there's been a lack of accountability for managing safety risks in marine pilotage.” [Broadcast Oct 24, 2012, available at: . Australian Maritime Safety Authority’s response is available at:

The Sydney Morning Herald also reported the federal government’s negotiations with the United States to not enforce 2007 piloting regulations in 2011. This information came to light as a result of Wikileaks material; it means effectively that boats are not piloted through the treacherous Torres Strait even though recent incidents such as the Shen Neng have illustrated the need for pilots in the Southern Great Barrier Reef as well. [12 September 2011, available at:

5. Coastal Development laws have also recently been revised without consultation and despite the warning by UNESCO regarding the “potentially significant impact on the property’s Outstanding Universal Value resulting from the unprecedented scale of coastal development currently being proposed within and affecting the property.” Commentary by the World Wide Fund for Nature details the changes and its potential impact on the Great Barrier Reef and Gladstone. [19 October 2012, available at:

Potential for Litigation

We have been in discussion with multiple groups who have received advice that despite many of these legislative changes there is a legal avenue to challenge these projects in particular the Western Basing dredging project in both federal and state courts.

Gladstone Harbour is part of a World Heritage area, and Australia’s international treaty commitments to conservation in World Heritage Areas must be considered. Natural and cultural properties considered to be of 'outstanding universal value' and which meet the strict criteria of the World Heritage Convention may be entered on the list compiled by of UNESCO. This Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Australia was one of the first countries to ratify this convention in 1974.

The government must act in accordance with the convention as they have ratified it. There are legal obligations in international and national law to preserve the environment. Whenever a development such as this, is challenged in a World Heritage Area the Courts have a public duty to consider and apply the various statutory rules.

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As Gladstone Harbour’s biodiversity and marine ecosystems have been threatened by these developments, the environmental treaty obligations found within the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 stand. The objects of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) are (a) to provide for the protection of the environment, especially those aspects of the environment that are matters of national significance; and (b) to promote ecologically sustainable development through the conservation and ecologically sustainable use of natural resources; and (c) to promote the conservation of biodiversity (etc.) The CSG/LNG and Western Basin Dredging and Disposal projects challenge these principles. There are issues with respect to the impact upon marine fauna, water quality, the distribution of large volumes of acid sulphate soil, and emerging World Heritage concerns with respect to the Great Barrier Reef as evidenced in the UNESCO mission reports and independent reports such as the FFVS Gladstone report. (See Gladstone Fishing Research Fund Report, available at: Save the Reef’s has been advised that these projects were “clearly unacceptable” under s74B EPBC Act. It has been advised that we could obtain an injunction to stop works through the Federal Court under the EPBC act. Save the Reef suggests under Section 475 these projects have engaged, propose to engage in conduct consisting of an act or omission that constitutes an offence or contravention of this Act or the regulations.

Challenges under the state system are also possible in the Queensland Planning and Environment court. This independent review of Gladstone Harbour should assess the legislative changes and the risk of litigation under the current legislation. It is our belief that costs have been the primary reason legal action has not been taken by the community to date. The potential legal costs are high and the possibility of costs and damages are prohibitive if the case is unsuccessful.

Failure to Assess OUV

There was no official consideration in any of the documents on Gladstone harbour that these projects may lead to international embarrassment and UNESCO threats of “In Danger” listing. UNESCO itself was concerned about the lack of reference to the Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) with regard to these developments. The CEO of Gladstone Ports Corporation was aware of the conflict as he wrote to all state and federal members of parliament requesting Gladstone harbour be removed from the World Heritage Area. (Later Jeff Seeney supported this position as reported on Qld ABC TV News broadcast 12 April 2012, available at: ) The Ports Corporation is aware that its activity may harm the World Heritage Area and sought to have its area removed from the world heritage zone.

Paragraph 172 of the Operational Guidelines of the World Heritage Convention invites any state party to the World Heritage Convention to inform the Committee of any intention it has to either plan or authorise major restorations or new constructions that might potentially affect the outstanding universal value of a site. The choice to make Curtis Island, which is part of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area a CSG / LNG gas precinct must be examined and the lack of notification of the developments to the World Heritage Committee.

Dredging Port Curtis (below) and dumping in the World Heritage area (below)

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The Federal environment minister stated he imposed scores of guidelines to ensure water quality and protect marine life. These guidelines have been amended and poorly enforced. (see below in monitoring section) Curtis Island development was approved by the minister just six weeks after he took office. The circumstances surrounding the approvals process at both federal and state level need to be examined.

Failure to Consider Alternative Sites

It should be noted that the CSG pipelines could have gone to facilities anywhere between and Gladstone. The potential exposure to international court cases to block these developments and the international scrutiny of these developments by the UNESCO mission suggests alternative sites such as Rubayanna Bundaberg should have been considered. It may have been a better option for these CSG/ LNG plants and prevented the possible “In Danger” listing. A Four Corners program detailed the international repercussions of this decision and of continued development in November 2011.

Options such as building a structure similar to a deep water "receiving terminal" as planned in the Adriatic Sea may have avoided the need to dredge. In this case the terminal could have transferred the gas to the LNG vessel rather than the LNG vessel to the shore. Private correspondence with Oil and Gas executives has confirmed that this was possible. "On the manufacturing case (like Curtis Island), if the ships were coming into a terminal offshore but the gas was liquefied on Curtis Island, then the pipelines would need to be very well thermally insulated as the sea water will put significant heat into LNG (liquid) stream going out to the boat. I would be comfortable that on the receiving case like Adriatic Italy, the gas would leave the terminal (heading towards the beach) in gas phase already, so thermal insulation would not be quite as big as an issue on the opposite case. So there may be a little engineering to that one – may not have been done before." [Personal email to Dr Jeremijenko, 12/3/2012] These receiving platforms offshore would mean there is far less dredging of the Gladstone harbour thus reducing the impact, such as high turbidity and metals over ANZECC guidelines.

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Inadequacy of EIS Process

The Environmental Impact Statements (EIS’s) alternative options were never fully considered. There was a lack of emphasis on the risks associated with developing a World Heritage Site and harbour. We believe it is time for the whole EIS process to reviewed as environmental consultants have become “captured” by industry. The system rewards environmental consultants who successfully work with the resource companies and get the preferred options through. They are rewarded with further work while those who raise objections and push more expensive but less environmentally damaging options are punished by less work. The independence of these consultant has over time been lost as they are mainly funded by industry and hence support industry objectives.

Environmental consulting company, Vision Environment, were employed to write the EIS for the WBD&D project. An independent scientist wrote of this EIS, “The principals of this company have a long history of working for the GPC, which brings into question the independence of their analyses and interpretations. In general, there is no evidence in the EIS that someone with sufficient training or background in chemistry, biogeochemistry or environmental toxicologist was involved in evaluating the contaminant data. Results were poorly done, as the methods, particularly sample treatment and analytical methods, were unclear and ill-defined. “ An Independent Expert Scientific Committee (IESC) also found fault with the Arrow Energy’s Surat Gas Project Environmental Impact Statement written by Coffey’s environmental consultants. (http://www.abc.net.au/rural/news/content/201303/s3713291.htm) “The committee has found that the Environmental Impact Statement for Arrow Energy does not adequately address potential impacts to matters of national environmental significance. It considered the EIS modelling inadequate as it does not assess cumulative impacts and found the project has the potential to significantly impact on aquifer integrity in the region. Coffey has prepared many of the EIS’s for the CSG industry. This demonstrates how broken the EIS process has become. Independent scientific experts for the government now must review the work of the companies “independent” environmental consultants. It is clear these consultants who are paid for by industry are not independent and the quality of their work is questionable. To date only one case in NSW and no cases in Qld have been pursued in the courts against environmental consultants that gave incorrect, suboptimal or poor quality advice. The Shell CSG Plant EIS for Curtis Island written by Coffey states in the Marine Quality and Sediment chapter, in section 16.3.4 that the overall environmental sensitivity of Port Curtis was low. Yet in the same chapter in Table 16.5, it states if an area has World Heritage listing the value is very high. This mistake means that table 16.15 is incorrect. Some of the impacts such as accidental discharge may have medium sensitivity, however ,the significance of this impact in a World Heritage Area would be high. Even if the magnitude of dredging impact is calculated as low, the correct environmental sensitivity would give a moderate significance of the dredging impact. The EIS states there are high amounts of metals such as aluminium and other metals as well as acid sulfate soils, which are known marine toxins. The true significance of dredging impact in this World Heritage Area may be very high and this is reflected in UNESCO's decision to threaten the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area with the “in danger” listing. (Other chapters such as Chapter 19 give similar errors where Mangroves and saltmarsh significance was stated to be moderate but should be listed as very high.)

The EIS states that ARROW Energy's coal-seam gas liquefaction plant will have widespread and "possibly irreversible" impacts on some of the Great Barrier Reef's critically endangered animal

7 populations. It predicts that up to 1.1 million cubic metres of sea floor will need to be dredged in waters off Curtis Island to accommodate the massive ships designed to ferry the resource to international markets. The EIS study area is home to six of the world's seven surviving species of marine turtle, two of which, the leatherback and hawksbill, have been deemed "critically endangered" by the International Union for Conservation of Nature. The area is situated entirely within a state-imposed dugong protection area, where herds of about 140 animals are known to feed on abundant seagrass. Even if speed limits and propeller guards were imposed on vessels accessing the plant, Arrow's EIS says the impact of boat strikes on marine turtle and dugong populations would be "widespread, long-lasting and result in substantial and possibly irreversible change". However, the EIS says, the overall significance of boat strikes to turtles, dugongs and cetaceans would be moderate, defined as "short-term and result in changes that can be ameliorated with specific environmental management controls". Save the Reef believes that this project will also be approved as have the previous project and it may have international ramifications including pushing UNESCO to put the Great Barrier Reef on the “In Danger” list.

It has been noted by UNESCO that Shell will be breaking a decade long promise to not develop oil and gas facilities in World Heritage Areas UNESCO stated in the mission report ANNEX X "It is noted that the leading commitment to the principle of World Heritage Sites not being subject to extractive industry is the 2003 biodiversity commitment of Shell, which states that 'We will not explore for, or develop, oil and gas resources in natural World Heritage Sites.' As the leading industry practice this provides a policy benchmark that does not on first analysis appear to be met by the Curtis Island location having been selected." (Arrow is owned by Shell 50% / PetroChina 50%)

The international energy giant, Shell has been requested to withdraw from its partnership with Arrow energy to develop a Liquefied Natural Gas plant on Curtis Island. The company made statements in November 2012 that it was concerned about the financial viability of the project but they have also been asked to withdraw on the grounds that the project conflicts with Shell’s public commitment to not ‘explore for, or develop, oil and gas resources in natural World Heritage Sites Shell first made this commitment to not operate in World Heritage Areas in 2003 and re-affirmed it after commissioning a report on World Heritage Sites and Extractive Sites in 2012. The company’s commitments are still available on the company’s global website as is the commissioned report. The Shell (Arrow) current request for approval suggests it is breaking its promise at a time when the world is watching. This is embarrassing for itself, for Australia and the whole industry. The Shell- Arrow LNG plant exemplifies how our regulation does not prevent resource companies from undertaking projects in World Heritage Areas, even though that company has promised not to build oil and gas facilities in World Heritage Areas. It appears that our legislation, Gladstone Ports and the Queensland Resources Council is out of step with international best practice when it comes to recognising some areas are too important to mine or develop extractive industries within their boundaries. Some of the world’s biggest miners are members of the International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM) and worked with Shell to develop this policy just last year in 2012.

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Gladstone turbidity 5.8 NTU on average (2004) Gladstone Turbidity averages ~20 NTU 2011

Water quality

The UNESCO mission listed concerns including:

 Reduced water quality from dredging;  Inadequate independent, scientific oversight in monitoring water quality;  Lack of government response when water quality targets were exceeded;  Lack of transparency in port decision making; management issues.

James Cook University researchers have studied satellite images of the spread of dredging sediment from the harbour plagued by diseased fish. The report contradicts a government commissioned report that last year found dredging did not affect water quality and was not connected to skin lesions and cloudy eyes found in locally caught fish. (JCU satellite report)

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Turbidity over the 99th centile for over a week in Gladstone Harbour September 2011.

Turbidity over the wet season 99th Centile. Gladstone Ports used the Wet Season limit on the graphs to the public before it was approved. The change from 20th November to 1st October when this graph was posted on their website had not been approved. They stoped dredging on the 26th, 48 hours over the wet season limit, rather than 48 hours over the dry season limit.

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Another example of this scientific dishonesty can be found in the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project - Environmental Impacts Briefing - October 26th 2011. “The WBDDP approval required GPC to establish a technical reference panel prior to and for the duration of dredging operation to oversee all aspects of water quality monitoring.” “The panel assesses any exceedence of trigger values and seagrass changes at key monitoring locations and advises changes to dredging practices up to and including moving, suspending or altering the work patterns of dredging operations. This group has had no cause to implement any changes to date.” This is despite the fact that they were over the 99th centile at a number of sites for well over 48 hours. They continued to dredge but apparently altered dredging on the 24th October and stopped it on the 26th October. In September there had been multiple exceedances for long periods of time and DERM had requested them to stop dredging and noted disparities between its data and the ports data. They had already applied to have the higher wet season limits brought forward from the 20th November to the 1st October and were already using these wet season triggers on their graphs. This was at a time when contact with the harbour water had triggered human illness and there was confusion regarding the fish disease and the human illness. The scientific panel to study the fish disease had only just begun its work and the harbour had only just been reopened because “red spot disease” and a parasite had been described. More information about turbidity and associated heavy metals will be discussed in other sections of the submission.

Fish health

There have been a number of other reviews in including the scientific fish panel, CSIRO sediment report as well as the water quality reports. The scientific fish panel report did not find the cause for the fish disease, but the Minister stated that the fish were safe to eat. Dr Andrew Jeremijenko one of Save the Reef’s scientists was concerned by the opening of the harbour and the proclamation that fish were safe to eat at a time when there was confusion over the disease process.

Fisheries Minister Craig Wallace said tests showed diseased fish were not a food safety or human health issue. Mr Wallace said the decision to reopen the area had not been made lightly and had been taken after tests confirmed affected fish had a disease called red spot and a parasite endemic to Queensland.” It is now known that “red spot” was only found in a fish from Port Alma and not in any other fish to date from Gladstone harbour. This was repeated again when the scientific panel came in with its results. . The report was inconclusive in determining a cause for the high parasitic levels and noted the fish were likely "stressed". ‘Fisheries and Marine Infrastructure Minister Craig Wallace welcomed the report and its finding that handling the fish was not a health risk."The panel was established to provide an independent scientific assessment of fish health in Gladstone, and we now know conclusively that there is no risk to human health from handling fish with the identified parasites, lesions or redness," Mr Wallace said.’

The whole history behind the closure of the harbour and the re-opening including the statement fish are safe to eat needs to be examined closely. The human health review of infections associated with Gladstone Harbour was suboptimal. Dr Andrew Jeremijenko has treated two confirmed cases of Shewenella and there have been multiple cases of Vibrio infections associated with dirty harbour water. Though no statistically significant increase in fishermen could be demonstrated as there is no baseline data, the fact these unusual marine bacteria also found in sick fish as well as humans,

11 suggest that the turbid marine water may have played a role in the aetiology of these infections. There are articles about the rare Shewenella infections “Patera Foot” in medical literature.

Save the Reef is concerned that to date there was no independent review that specifically looked at dredging practices and its impact on water in Gladstone harbour. This is the “elephant in the room.” Many of the fishermen and the Gladstone community were concerned about the dredging. The human illness and fish illness was related in time to the dredging project and yet the terms of reference for the scientific fish panel did not ask for them to assess dredging despite the fisherman stating they believed the dredging was contributing to the disease. Indeed the word dredge, or dredging was only used in the final report text once (and in the tables twice). It was suggested that the panel was specifically tasked to not look at dredging and its impact on fish health. They were asked to examine water quality and fish health. This is a massive dredging project and the dredging practices need to be examined. The technology and techniques used, comparison to international standards and specific ways to minimize impacts from dredging. As an example silt curtains can be used and closed systems for contaminated soils. Though in the approvals it is stated that all dredge related deaths must be notified, there has to our knowledge been no dredge related deaths notified to the department. It is possible no dredge related deaths have occurred, but as the definition of dredge related death is not clear, (e.g. death within 5 km of dredging zone) they more likely have occurred but have not been recorded as dredge related. There was a lack of baseline studies. All the reports are that fishing catches, prawn catches are significantly reduced, but because of a lack of baseline studies this reduction in population is not being recorded as dredge related.

b) current and future planning, development and management of the Port of Gladstone, having regard to the Gladstone Ports Corporation 50 Year Strategic Plan and associated developments and activities within Gladstone Harbour and adjoining land and offshore areas;

Save the Reef has been told to “give up” on Gladstone Harbour because it is ruined. There are two main reasons why Gladstone harbour is important. First it is the model for future port developments throughout the Great Barrier Reef. The water quality monitoring, the seagrass assessments, will be repeated in other sites. The second reason is that if it is managed well, Save the Reef believes there can be some recovery from the current environmental devastation. Save the Reef is aware of the planned future developments of the Gladstone Ports Corporation. These projects include The duplication of the channel in Gladstone Harbour, Port Alma, Balaclava Island and North Curtis are all part of the 50 year strategic plan. Some of these areas were specifically mentioned in the UNESCO report as pristine and their ongoing approvals process, flies in the face of the UNESCO recommendation.

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It was noted that the ’s Great Barrier Reef Ports Strategy was released a few months after the threat of the “In Danger” listing. The Queensland Government seemed to twist UNESCO’s advice about consolidating existing major ports and turned it into a blue print for expansion, by allowing everything that was already planned to go ahead.

The complete omission of any reference to Gladstone Ports Corporation and the environmental impacts in the Great Barrier Reef Ports Strategy 2012-2022 was very worrying. The failure of government regulation to protect the environment from Gladstone Ports Corporation expansion over the past 16 months and the poor marine health that continues has decreased any confidence that the government is capable of producing a strategy that finds “the right balance between economic development and environmental protection” The plan above would allow Gladstone Ports to cause further environmental devastation at Balaclava Island and Port Alma which are not part of Gladstone harbour - they are intrinsic to Keppel Bay and the Fitzroy Delta. ‘Expanding minor ports and mismanagement of existing ports does not fit UNESCO’s criteria and will lead to it declaring the Great Barrier Reef as World Heritage in Danger.’

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Picture of the Fitzroy Delta during a King tide. This pristine area with significant risks of inundation is being planned to be turned into four major ports. Port Alma, Balaclava Island, Fitzroy Terminal and North Curtis.

A government report has undermined the Great Barrier Reef Ports strategy and the economic argument put forward by the state in the 10 year Port Strategy for the Great Barrier Reef.

"The key policy implication from the above report is that our existing port capacity can handle the traffic volume in terms of ship calls with current proposed improvements and expansions, for the years up to 2022. As we are not using the existing port efficiently, there is no need to ruin pristine areas. No need to dredge the nursery of the Great Barrier Reef and dump the dredge waste in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage area. Save the Reef argued that the "state party" should heed the recommendation of the mission about "no new port development outside of existing facilities". It concerned us that the government released the 10 year strategy to expand ignoring the mission’s recommendations, when there is no need to expand. It suggests the current state government and Gladstone Ports is not listening to its own and international scientists.

The key policy implication of the report is that our existing port capacity can handle the traffic volume in terms of ship calls with current proposed improvements and expansions, for the years up to 2022 as presented below:

(1) Given the historical trend, the total number of ship calls across the GBR region is likely to reach a traffic volume of 4641 ship calls by 2022.

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(2) By the year 2022, even if the trade volume increases by 60 per cent from the base trend (six per cent annual growth), the total ship calls is unlikely to increase beyond 6100.

(3) With expected increases in coal and LNG exports (BREE forecast), there could be up to 1400 additional ship calls by 2022. In this case ship calls could reach a maximum of around 6100 by 2022.

(4) Overall, the total number of ship calls is not likely to exceed 6100 by 2022 even with very optimistic forecasts of the volume of trade. According to the reef wide shipping study comissioned by the Abbot Point Working Group, the maximum number of calls would be just over 7400 by 2020. The report highlights that this forecast is likely to be ‘on the high side’. Ship call forecasts by other agencies, available in public domain, are not supported with the methods adopted and therefore could not be verified and compared.

(5) The highest number of ship calls so far recorded by the ports in the GBR region was 4487 in the year 2010. The increased ship calls under all projected scenarios will represent around 30 per cent increase to the 2010 ship calls.

(6) Based on the BREE report and others, it is likely that GBR regional ports are operating below the installed capacity and there may be opportunities to further optimise port capacity. It should be noted however it has been assumed that full capacity is available regardless of infrastructure ownership.

There should be no expansion by Gladstone Ports Corporation into North Curtis, Balaclava Island, Port Alma and the Fitzroy delta. By using Gladstone more efficiently this pristine area with high flooding risks could be preserved.

Alternatives Many other areas in the world now are having problems with port expansions due to environmental concerns. Woodside for instance wanted to put a gas receiving terminal in California, but movie stars and celebrities at Malibu beach opposed an onshore terminal, so they moved the receiving terminal offshore. It eventually was moved to Mexico, but the idea can be used in Gladstone instead of dredging. We could reasonably ask instead of dredging a second channel in the harbour they could look at putting a pipe to a deeper part of the harbour, similar to a receiving terminal or even offshore. Potentially it could even be piped outside the barrier reef. It would increase costs which is most likely why it was not considered. There are some papers regarding this technology attached below. Abstract The world’s first offshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage and re-gasification terminal located in the Northern Adriatic Sea, Italy is a project by Adriatic LNG, a joint venture between affiliates of Qatar Petroleum, ExxonMobil and Edison. Receiving terminals are an integral part of the LNG value chain with those offshore providing access to gas markets in locations where the coastline is fully developed or inaccessible. This paper discusses key challenges and subsequent learnings gained from executing this unique, international project encompassing a vast array of technical and government interfaces, several new technologies and industry firsts.

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It is noted that Shell is leading the oil and gas industry with regards to floating LNG and it is possible instead of dredging that they could look at other technologies to minimise environmental impacts from the Shell (Arrow) CSG plant on Curtis Island. “The Prelude FLNG Project’s environmental impacts were assessed under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 through a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that assessed potential impacts and proposed mitigants for the duration of the Project. The EIS demonstrated the Prelude FLNG Project will have a low impact on the environment including matters of National Environmental Significance, and that compared to developing the gas via a similar onshore facility, it will produce less CO2 and use significantly less materials and land and seabed area.”

Shell has the technology and the expertise to reduce environmental impacts but they have chosen to break a 10 year promise and develop Oil and Gas facilities in a World Heritage Area instead.

c) environmental concerns in the Port of Gladstone, including the environmental performance of consented developments and operations and the impacts of other contributory factors, such as natural causes, catchment runoff, established industrial operations, urban expansion and floodplain changes;

Turbidity

There has only been one Environmental Protection Order given to Gladstone on the 10th January 2012 despite multiple exceedances when turbidity breached the 99th Centile for more than 48 hours.

Attached are a series of graphs downloaded from the Gladstone Ports website, (turbidity) which show high turbidity over the 99th Centile on multiple occasions and multiple breaches of the 99th centile for over 48 hours. They tend to go over the turbidity limits on spring tides (the full moon) as the current causes problems. As discussed previously a Transitional Environment Programme (TEP) was allowed to fix this "turbidity problem." The water quality reports at the time stated “Results of water quality investigations between September 2011 and May 2012, with the exception of a cluster of elevated metal concentrations around South Trees Inlet, have shown that none of the water quality properties measured was of significant environmental concern." This is despite the GPC admitting that the leaking bund wall and associated dredging has contributed to the high turbidity in the harbour having approved the TEP to fix the Bund wall leak, and approving dredging above the turbidity limits.

“And in breaking news, the GPC has admitted that a leaking section of bund wall around the Fisherman’s Landing reclamation area had contributed to higher turbidity levels. In a media release, it said the reclamation area would undergo extra works over the next month to seal porous sections of the wall. Western Basin project manager Peter O'Sullivan said leakages through the bund wall were contributing to increased turbidity in the harbour during high spring tides, as the water seeped through and under the wall and scoured the ocean floor directly in front of the wall. "GPC became aware of the bund wall leakage in September last year and took remedial action by building an internal wall and sealing the southern cell of the reclamation area," Mr O'Sullivan said. "However, as this area has filled, it is now imperative the northern bund wall is sealed." The works, carried out under a Transitional Environmental Program (TEP) issued by Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, will be implemented and overseen by the independent Dredge Technical Reference Panel. The

16

sealing process allows for continual dredging over a total of 30 days. However, the panel's scientists and engineers were in agreement that this was the most effective way to resolve this problem and help restore seagrasses in the harbour. The Telegraph has sighted a copy of the TEP application which also states that "while possibly exceeding the water quality trigger values for a short tenn, environmental hann by the activity would be reduced, as the issue of a leaking bund wall will eliminate further loss of material which causes these exceedences on an on-going basis".

Save the Reefbelieves that the multiple breaches over the 99 th Centile for greater than 48 hours was contravening their conditions of their approvals. The Ports were not held accountable except for the one EPO on January 10th 2012. The ports continued to escape prosecution under the w2 c1ause ­ "the natural variation clause" - The Courier Mail wrote about this loophole that allowed the ports to dredge over the agreed limits.

Previously the ports and government departments had been explaining the high turbidity away due to natural variation so that they were not punished for each exceedance (e,g, blaming tides or winds.) The W2 clause states - " Should turbidity levels exceed the above levels it is not a contravention of condition (W I) when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the administering authority that elevated turbidity is the result of external factors (for example erroneous or invalid data, wave height, rainfall, tides, wind etc) and not affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the dredge management plan.

"Presuming that the leaking Bund wall contributed to the high turbidity which was admitted in the media and in the requests for the TEP, than some of that turbidity was not due to natural variation but due to the leaking bund wall. This therefore makes those exceeedances breaches of their conditions. http://www.gladstoneobserve r. com.au/newslbund -wa ll -progress-glad stone-h arbourl l 4533491

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17 A picture from the Space station of Gladstone Harbour, after the floods. After the floods turbidity went up to almost 300 at site STl and over 100 at site OE4. The GP( was allowed to dredge from the 27th Jan uary onwards despite the high turbidity because all light monitors were fine. The astronaut picture taken from the space station on 29th Janua ry, 2013 showed clea rly the brown harbour and dredging at this time would have increased the sediment and contribute to seagrass death. Dredging continued throughout this period of brown turbidity because the rules are so relaxed that with light monitoring they can dredge 24 hours a day despite high turbidity.

The DEI-IP/DERM disguised these breaches explaining them away as natural variation when this was not the case. They continued to not enforce the rules despite month ly exceedances sometimes fortnightlyexceedances. This was the background to introducing the new light monitoring. Under that scheme hi gh turbidity was not a breach as long as the light monitoring was within normal limits. As li ght monitoring has a 14 day rolling average, it wou ld not pick up a breach until turbidity was well over the limits fo r over a week. In effect light monitoring has meant they are now allowed to dredge during periods of high turbidity. For example after the recent floods in January 2013 they started dredging when the turbid ity was 300 NTU.

Save the Reefwas particularly concerned about the end ofOclober, where turbidity had exceeded the dry season li mit for over 48 hours, but dredging was not ceased until 96 hours. This was raised with It was noted that the Ports were on their website showin g the turbidity 99!1I centile as wet season when in actual fact it was the dry season and their request to alter the dates had not been approved. It was assumed that they used the new limits and did not stop dredging until 48 hours after the wet season limits instead of the dry season limits.

18 Gladstone turbidity 5.8 NTU on average (2004) Gladstone Turbidity averages - 20 NTU (2011)

The picture above gives a quick understanding. The harbour used to be blue and clear and now it is muddy and murky. The graphs below tell the true story of turbidity in Gladstone harbour. The turbidity rises and falls with the tides. The ports state this is natural variation, The soil is loosened by the dredging and the leaking bund wall leaks more on the big tides. The 99th centile meant normally only 1 day in 100 would be above this level. The graphs show that on average 5 to 12 days a month are above the 99th Centile. Average turbidity used to be 5 to 8, now average turbidity is over or close to the ANZECC gu ideline of 20. These graphs are downloaded from the GPC website

,

Save the Reef was particularly concerned about the end of October, where turbidity had exceeded the dry season limit for over 48 hours, but dredging was not ceased until 96 hours. Thi s was raised with It was noted that the Ports were on their website showing the turbidity 99th centi le as wet season when in actual fact it was the dry season and their request to alter the dates had not been

19 approved. It was assumed thatlhey used the new limits and did not stop dredging until 48 hours after the wet season limits instead of the dry season limits.

From: Andrew Jeremijenko [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, 24 October 2012 12:55 PM To:

Thank you for talking to me today. I appreciate your time and your explanations. I would like you to clarify for me the actions regarding turbidity from the 22nd to the 26th October. By my reading of the turbidity graphs they went over the wet season limit on the 24th October and stopped dredging on the 26th October. (see media statement attached) As is the practice of the Gladstone Ports, they stopped dredging before reaching 48 hours over the wet season turbity limit.

The issue is they went over the dry season limit on the 22nd October. (see turbidity graphs attached) It would appear that they have applied the wet season limit before getting offical approval to change the wet season limit on the 31st October. This means the Gladstone Ports dredged over the limit for more than 48 hours indeed they continued dredging for around 90 hours over the limit.

My question is did Gladstone Ports Corporation breach their approval between 24th and 26th October, 20ll? You suggested they may have had verbal permission to change the limits. Perhaps there were some emails sent regarding this early changing of the limits. If you can advise me on what approval was given them to change the limits before the Ports actually had the signed approval from the department it would be appreciated. Regards Andrew

Dale: Wed. 31 Oct 2012 10: 14:08 +1 000 From : To: [email protected] CC. Hi Andrew I have reviewed further infonnation surrounding the events of late October 2011 where turbidity levels at all sites clearly exceeded the wet and dry season limits for an extended period. On this occasion, before any site exceeded the turbidity limits for more than 48 hours, GPC on behalf of the dredging contractor (VODI) submitted a Turbi dity Management Plan (TMP) for comment/acceptance. This TMP set out management actions to be undertaken as per the requirements of the 'adaptive management approach' specified in the Water Quality Management Plan which was approved and accepted by all parties, including SEWPaC. The departm ent agreed this was an acceptable proposal to minimise turbidity in the event of an exceedence. There was agreement between all parties including the Dredge Technical Reference Panel, (DTRP) to operate under this (first) TMP. Essentiall y this TMP required that dredging cease (initially), whenever the rate of change of tide exceeded 0.1 m/15 minutes, (Stage 1). These stoppages became longer iflwhen turbidity levels did not drop back below compliance levels (Stages 2, 3 and 4). W hile this TMP did appear to reduce the peaks previously encountered it was not reducing the actual levels sufficiently to achieve compliance. The department allowed dredging to continue under this TMP beyond the 48 hours based on the evidence submitt ed to the department (then DERM) by the operators showing that other harbour sites were also exceed ing, despite being out of the zone of impact of dredging. This is a W2 exemption, (re-stated below for your infonnation). (W2) Should turbidity levels exceed the above levels it is not a contravention of condition (Wi) when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the administering authority that elevated turbidity is the result of external factors (for example erroneous or invalid data, wave height, rainfall, tides, wind etc) and not affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the dredge management plan. It was known at the time that all sites within the harbour, including reference/background sites (where no dredge impact was likely) were also significa ntly elevated.

20 Looking at the levels shortly after 261h October 2011 when the dredge stopped completely, it confirms that dredging was not impacting substantially on the spring tide turbidity peaks that are characteristic of spring tides in Gladstone Harbour, especially so when the low water levels are extreme, as in this case. I hope this information has clarified any issues and please contact me if you have any questions regarding this email, Thanks

enVlrOllmental Services ancl RegUl auon Gtads.tone

Review of the Water Quality reports which can be found at this address. hltp:l/www.ehp.qld.gov.au/gladstone/reports.html#water quality indicates there is high turbidity in each report. There are also high metals particularly aluminium in each report. This is not reflected in the media releases which accompanied each water quality report. hIt p:1/ www.ehp.qld.gov.au/gladstone/med ia -re leases.hi m I Nor is there any discussion about the bund wall leak or the relation of dredging to high turbidity except in an early report released on 4 November 2011 . . "It can be seen in Figure 10 that the turbidity measurements are generally highest closest to the dredging operations, both close to dredging activities and outside of the bund wall (which holds dredging spoils). Sealing of the bund wall has apparently resulted in reduced turbidity at BW2. The northeast corner of the Bund Wall had high turbidity as fast currents were scouring over the mudflats."

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In the last report the "eleventh update it stated "Turbidity levels decreased at about half the sites for both near surface and near bottom depths in August 2012. The highest turbidity levels across the region in August 2012 were measured from subsurface and near bottom depths at site E3a near the current dredging activities (up to 187 NTU ). It is possible that the ongoing dredging related operations contributed to higher turbidity levels at these sites." This last report is one of the only

21 times when the government has admitted that dredging and high turbidity arc related. Previous reports they put the high turbidity due to natural variation ..

Aluminium

The Aluminium results and quotes from the supplementary report are given below. "The total aluminium concentrations measured at the sampling sites in the September 2011 survey were mostly aluminium associated with the particles in the water column and a very sman amount was in the dissolved fonn in the water (Figure 6). Aluminium is often closely associated with the amount of sediment in the water. There is a strong relationship between total aluminium and turbidity at the sites (R2 = 0.90) (Figure 7).

As turbidity is used as a proxy for the measurement of total suspended sol ids in a water column, this means that approximately 90% of the variation in total aluminium concentrations is explained by the total suspended solids concentration of the waters in and around Port Curtis." - -

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Aluminium is always likely to be a culprit as Gladstone area is a major centre for the Aluminium industry. As lead is high around Mt Isa, aluminium is high around Gladstone. It the site two refineries and a smelter making Gladstone one of the most important aluminium centres in the world. Rio Tinto Alcan Yarwun (RTAY) is situated in the Yarwun area, 10km north-west of Gladstone in Central Queensland. QAL operates the Gladstone Alumina Refinery, on a site relati vely close to the harbour. Rio Tinto and QAL have both had to significantly improve emissions control and environmental performance including reducing alumina dust. (an example replacing the chute for loading of alumina recently at the wharf facility reduce alumina dust emissions significantly.) Both refineries produce a white powder (alumina dust) that is used to make aluminium metal. The process includes grinding the bauxite, di ssolving aluminium hydroxide from the bauxite, then separating and precipitating the alumina and removal of water to produce alumina powder. This powd. er is ..stored for shipment to domestic and international customers. Pollution with Alumina dust IS an ongotng Issue.

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The Boyne Smelters, one of the largest in the world, turns alumina into the metal aluminium. The Boyne smelters also have been required to improve their handling of alumina dust. The Boyne Smelter Development (BSD) which will be completed by 2012 will improve the plant's alumina handling equipment and will reduce alumina losses / alumina dust around the site. This will have positive effects on the environment with respect to alumina dust.

Escaping Alumina dust in Gladstone.

It is unavoidable that with 2 refineries and a smelter that over the decades significant amounts of fine particulate alumina dust and other materials have polluted the Gladstone Environs. Though reduction attempts have occurred and are still underway, there has been and will continue to be a significant legacy of alumina dust. Much of this alumina dust will find its way into the harbour either directly through the wind or indirectly as run off during heavy rains.

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This is a box plot of how much aluminium fume or dust is released from Boyne Smelters in Gladstone in comparison to other smelters in US The box plot compares international data to Boyne Smelters: • Minimum and maximum overseas – are small blue dots at the bottom and top of the range • 3rd quartile – the top of the enclosed rectangular box is the 3rd quartile limit • Median - the line within the box is the median, • 1st quartile – the bottom of the box is the 25%ile • Whisker – a whisker line extends both upward and downward represents the statistical limits beyond which values are considered anomalous • Mean – is the red cross (Boyne smelters mean dust levels are much higher than internationally)

The QAL refinery has used a seawater neutralization process for its red mud for over 40 years. Red mud is the fine-grained residue left after alumina has been extracted from bauxite at the QAL refinery. The red mud is washed several times with water to recover caustic soda. Sea water is then added to neutralise any remaining caustic soda, before being pumped to the Residual Disposal Area (RDA) on Boyne Island. The overflow from the dam discharges into South Trees Inlet. Magnesium depleted seawater that is contaminated with iron, copper and aluminium is returned to South Trees Inlet. During the heavy rainfall such as occurred in the floods, the seawater neutralization may have been suboptimal due to the freshwater influx. This may have led to higher levels of contaminants entering South Trees Inlet. A better understanding of the process can be found at this link. http://www.outotec.com/imagevaultfiles/id_558/cf_2/case_study-_queensland_alumina_ltd.pdf

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Red Wall Dam Boyne Island Gladstone

Testing by DEHP found five sites with aluminium levels above the trigger value - all five were in the South Trees Inlet area. The levels could be a threat to fish health and linked the high metals to the red mud dam at the refinery. DEHP has asked QAL to conduct further toxicity and chemical tests. “DEHP has requested Queensland Alumina Limited to carry out tests on waters being discharged from its red mud dam and the waters of South Trees Inlet to determine if they are safe for aquatic species," Aluminium is toxic to the marine environment especially if combined with acid sulphate soils. A study of the Port Curtis estuary region shows the estuary is poorly connected with the offshore region seaward of Facing Island and wouldbe prone to the sedimentation of aluminium dust. The e- folding flushing time for the estuary is of the order of 19 days in January 1999. (This was evident in flushing, passive tracer and particle analyses. Tracers are transported efficiently throughout the estuary but inefficiently transported out of the estuary to offshore regions. This estimate is not expected to dramatically alter seasonally.) This flushing time is large in comparison with the time required for most particulates to settle from the water column, in particular aluminium hence the estuary may accumulate aluminium and other contaminants in the sediment over time.

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Seagrass

The seagrass in the inner harbour continues do to do poorly. All the seagrass reports show that 99% of the inner harbour seagrass is dead, yet the Ports continue to dredge over the 99% limit, despite the lack of seagrass regrowth. The Ports dredged over the limit generally once but often twice a month since dredging monitoring in August 2010. They also dredged over the limit to ‘fix’ the leaking bund in June, July and August 2012 wall and have continued to dredge over the limit every month since then.“ They continue to ask for exemptions based on light monitoring, including October, November, December, January and March 2013. It is predicted they will also dredge over the limit from April to October and continue to ask for light exemptions.

The high turbidity has contributed to the seagrass’s inability to recover during the growth season and continues in conjunction with the floods in 2011 and 2013 smother the grass to impede its regrowth. “The state government has ruled because the light monitors on top of the dead seagrass say the light is OK the Ports can keep dredging. This will continue, because the light monitors work on a 14 day rolling average while turbidity is on a 6 hour rolling average, which means that the dredging can continue 24 hours a day despite high coverage.

The Ports have continued to dredge over the limit on Christmas, Easter, Australia day and Labor day. CSIRO sediment data showed high arsenic levels in the sediment. It is possible this may be contributing to the high arsenic found in the turtles from the Great Barrier Reef. Tests released by the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection found high arsenic levels above trigger values. Testing of diseased turtle blood in Gladstone Harbour has also found high arsenic levels.

The high aluminium levels that are in the sediment tests support earlier testing that found high total aluminium in the water and high aluminium content in the gills of the barramundi, prawn and dewfish. This cocktail of heavy metals and metal compounds that is coating seagrass and partially

26 inhibiting its growth, may also be contributing to turtle illness. The reason why Aluminium was not an exceedance in the CSIRO report is that currently there is no trigger value for aluminium in sediments. These sediment results are further evidence of high metal concentration in the dredging area and therefore dredging these sediments will increase these metals and their bioavailability in the environment. Dumping these dredge spoils will also increase the harm and this is also shown in the sediment testing of the dump spoil areas, (e.g. aluminium 18000 mg/kg) The high metals in dredge spoils can contribute to environmental harm

The government and the ports are ignoring the science and the pictures of ill health in multiple species and are moving in the wrong direction with these new turbidity levels. The new levels are: Site turbidity QE4 - 28 Nephelometric Turbidity Units (NTU) to 30 NTU (dry season); and 34 to 55 in the wet season. Site turbidity ST1 - 24 NTU to 35 NTU (dry season) and 38 to 65 in the wet season.

The Department of Environment and Heritage Protection may have misled the public about the turbidity levels in Gladstone harbour. Mr Chesterman has stated "that sediment in Port Curtis generally contains low amounts of contamination which means that dredging is not releasing contaminants into the waters at concentrations likely to cause environmental harm." The results show high levels of heavy metals such as aluminium, iron and arsenic in the sediment particularly at the dredge spoil disposal areas. These metals are known to be toxic in the marine environment.

The dramatic pictures of the Queensland flood plume taken by astronauts show a brown muddy harbour from outer space (January 2013), yet Gladstone Ports Corporation’s [GPC] water quality monitoring program says it is safe to dredge the inner harbour. Gladstone Ports Corporation’s light monitors say conditions are OK in a flood plume despite turbidity over 300 NTU in some areas. This is because of the 14 day rolling average, and shows what a poor tool light monitoring is to control dredging.

The Queensland Environment Minister Mr Powell has been reported expressed his concern that the plume would deposit sediment on seagrass meadows, severely damaging them. The once rich seagrass meadows of Gladstone Harbour hosted a large herd of dugongs earning the harbour the classification of dugong sanctuary but the latest survey of dugongs recorded no juvenile dugongs in the whole of the southern Great Barrier Reef.

Despite high turbidity, the light monitoring continues to indicate there is no problem but any lay person can see from the flood plume photos that light cannot reach the harbour floor and the seagrass will struggle to survive. For the last 6 months, these light monitors above already damaged seagrass beds kept saying that the seagrass was getting enough light and should regrow but it didn't.

Pertinent media reports

http://www.sunshinecoastdaily.com.au/news/just-317500-fees-dump-spoil- reef/1731262/

Just $317,500 in fees to dump spoil on the reef

25th Jan 2013 9:51 AM

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THREE Queensland port corporations paid the Federal Government just $317,500 in fees to allow them to dump more than 27 million cubic metres of dredge spoil in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area in the past 12 years. The ports at Gladstone, Mackay, Townsville and Hay Point applied for a total of 22 permits to dump dredge spoil within the limits of the WHA between 2000 and September last year. Of the total 22 permits applied for, 21 were approved by the Federal Government, allowing more than 27 million cubic metres of dredged sea bed to be dumped in the world heritage-listed site. The latest application, for a permit to dump a further 3.4 million cubic metres near Townsville, has not yet been approved by the nation's environmental regulator. Under the Sea Dumping Act, the government charges ports to dump the dredged spoil, with applications to dump more than 100,000m3 costing $23,500 each, and those less than 100,000 cubic metres, charged $16,500. The act has been updated several times since it was first created in the early 1980s, with most changes to marginally increase the cost of permit fees for port authorities. But in the latest changes, which came in 2009 under Federal Labor, the government also removed strict provisions that previously governing sea dumping in Australian waters. Those amendments included removing the distinction between contaminated and non- contaminated materials and removing the distinction between environmentally sensitive and non-environmentally sensitive areas. The 2009 changes to the Act also removed the fee category payable for permits allowing more than 500,000 cubic metres of dredged material to be dumped - a move which removed higher fees for the larger amount of dumped sediment. Since those changes were made, 10 of the 19 applications approved have been for sea dumping permits more than 500,000 cubic metres - ranging between 548,000 cubic metres and 11 million cubic metres of spoil. The figures of approved sea dumping permits were released after Federal Environment Minister Tony Burke answered questions Queensland Greens Senator Larissa Waters posed last year during Senate Estimates. In addition to the 21 permits already approved by the regulator, 12 other applications within the marine park boundaries were also approved under the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act. Those applications totalled more than 25 million cubic metres of dredge spoil, largely for maintenance projects at ports at Hay Point, Cairns, Abbot Point and fishing marina Rosslyn Bay.

Barge dumped dredge spoil 'to safeguard crew and vessel'

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5th Dec 2012 5:40 PM

A BARGE working on the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal project dumped dredge spoil in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, breaching Commonwealth environmental approval conditions, in January this year. The dumping of 730 cubic metres of dredge spoil within the World Heritage Area led to a $6600 fine for the Gladstone Ports Corporation. As part of federal environmental conditions on the massive dredging project, spoil could only be dumped in approved areas, including the East Banks Sea Disposal Site. But a spokeswoman for the Federal Environment department said the dumping of the spoil outside of the disposal site had contravened environmental approval conditions. She also confirmed the spoil was dumped within the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, although the department did not believe it resulted in any adverse impacts on the reef. Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project Manager Peter O'Sullivan confirmed the breach occurred on January 28 at 5.10am, after a split hopper barge was loaded with dredge spoil by backhoe dredge Razende Bol. Mr O'Sullivan said after the loading of the spoil, the barge set sail for the disposal site, but "when confronted with rapidly deteriorating weather conditions", the captain decided an emergency dump was needed to safeguard the crew and vessel. "This decision was based on the hydraulic pressure in the system controlling the opening of the split hopper being approximately 50bar above the nominal level of 250bar, indicating that an excessive amount of water had entered the hopper and increased the downward pressure on the hopper," he said. Mr O'Sullivan said the barge was about 1.25 nautical miles from the approved disposal site when it was forced to dump the spoil. He said there was 730 cubic metres of dredge spoil dumped, and the spoil was not potential acid sulphate soil. The dredge contractor, Van Oord Dredging International, had since made changes to more accurately predict weather forecasts, including wave heights and strong winds. "The dumping procedures and the use of the alternative sailing channel were reviewed to limit the risk of any reoccurrence," he said. "At this time there are no backhoe dredge tug and barge combination barges working on the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project." Mr O'Sullivan said the dump position was recorded and both state and federal environmental regulators were notified, before video cameras were towed through the area to show the dump had no impacts on marine plants or corals. "A repeat survey was done to ensure material had not migrated out of the area. All these reports were provided to the regulators," he said. The departmental spokeswoman said the payment of such fines "should not be taken as an admission of liability for contraventions of national environmental law". The $6600 fine was the maximum amount the federal environment department can charge a company for breaches of approval conditions under the Environmental Protection, Biodiversity and Conservation Act.

29 http://www.sunshinecoastdaily.com.au/news/companies-dump-dredge-great-barrier- reef/1729527/

Companies dump dredge in the Great Barrier Reef

 24th Jan 2013 10:00 AM

TWO Queensland port corporations paid less than $100,000 to dump nearly 2.5 million cubic metres of dredge spoil in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area last year. Under the Federal Government's Sea Dumping Act, companies can apply for permits to dump dredge spoil and other things such as marine vessels at sea. In the last financial year, the Environment Department handed out 14 approvals for sea dumping, 10 of which were for dredge spoil to be dumped around the country. Of those approved, three applications came from the North Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation and the Port of Townsville, to dump a total of 2.44 million cubic metres of dredged sediment in the World Heritage Area. The approvals were for new dumps at the Townsville and Mackay ports under the Sea Dumping Act and one at Hay Point port under the approval of the Great Barrier Marine Park Authority. In total, the 10 sea dumping application approved would see more than 100,000,000 cubic metres of dredge spoil dumped at sea in Australian waters. The majority of that dumping would be conducted on the Western Australian coast, as part of massive off-shore gas projects near Onslow and Port Hedland. Under the Sea Dumping Act, any dredge spoil dumping application involving more than 100,000 cubic metres can only be approved if the company pays a fee costing $23,500. Sea Dumping approvals for dredged material under 100,000 cubic metres costs a company only $10,000. For the four approvals in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, each company paid the fee, totalling $80,500, as the Hay Point proposal was for only 17,000 cubic metres. The Federal Environment Department did not turn down any applications for sea dumping permits in 2011-12.

Santos Gladstone LNG fined for late reporting of oil spills

11th Dec 2012 6:00 PM

THE company behind one of Queensland's massive gas projects, Santos Gladstone LNG, was fined nearly $20,000 for the late reporting of oil spills and other breaches of environmental approval conditions in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area last year.

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The fines totalled $19,800 and were related to the company's late reporting of five minor oil spills and two increases in turbidity levels near the Curtis Island site in the World Heritage Area (WHA). The first public references to the fines were released in a departmental report tabled in parliament in late October this year. A Santos spokesman confirmed the spills were of no more than 40 litres of biodegradable hydraulic vegetable oil, and all spills occurred between March 21 and September 17 last year. The delay between the first spill and the actual reporting of the spill was about eight months, with all five oil spills reported on November 29, last year. That was despite Commonwealth environmental conditions on the Santos GLNG project demanding the proponent report any such breaches to the federal environment department within five business days of the breach occurring. A departmental spokeswoman confirmed the three infringement notices also related to the late reporting of two increases in turbidity levels in the WHA during the same period. She said the two increases in turbidity levels resulted from "inadequate sediment and erosion controls following significant rainfall events" at the Santos GLNG project. "The conditions associated with infrastructure development at Curtis Island allow for the close monitoring of incidents that may adversely impact upon the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area," she said. "These conditions were put in place to allow the timely and thorough appraisal of any potential impacts." She said the department believed the five oil spills had not resulted in any adverse impacts on the reef WHA, and the fines should not be taken as an admission of liability for contraventions of national environmental law. A spokesman for Santos said the company had stringent reporting requirements required by the state government, Gladstone Ports Corporation, Marine Safety Queensland and the Federal Government. He said that while the company had reported "every incident" within the required timeframe to the state government, GPC and MSQ; the reporting to the Commonwealth agency was late. The company spokesman said the company undertook an "internal reporting change in November 2011", and since then, no reporting timeframe had been missed, and all reports were made in accordance with federal environmental approval requirements. He said the company took its environmental responsibilities seriously, and the fines related to a "technical breach of a state government-imposed condition", despite the fines being imposed by the federal government in relation to its approval conditions. The three fines, of $6,600, were each the maximum individual amount the department can fine a company for breaches of approval conditions under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act.

Recent environment fines on the Great Barrier Reef:

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 Santos LNG: Three fines totalling $19,800 for five minor oil spills and turbidity increases in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area during 2011.  Gladstone Ports Corporation: One fine, of $6,600, for a load of 730 cubic metres of dredge spoil dumped in the WHA in January, 2011.  Hope Star Shipping Company: Company fined $5000 and captain fined $300 for dumping food waste in the WHA in June, 2012.

d) planning arrangements and design standards for the optimisation of port development and operation that accord with best practice environmental standards that may be applicable to ports in the Great Barrier Reef Region; and There is a need with increased shipping on and through the Great Barrier Reef and Gladstone harbour to address the systems that protect incidents. To prevent incidents in and around Gladstone harbour it is important with increased shipping that regulations are tightened not loosened as occurred last year, including pilots and bonds. The Shen Neng incident on the Great Barrier Reef was a fatigue related accident. The first mate may have fallen asleep at the wheel and not taken the corner. The alarms that should have worked did not. Fatigue related accidents have occurred on the reef before. “any competent crew could navigate that passage” (Patrick Quirk) The Peacock hit the Piper reef in 1996 because the person in charge fell asleep at the wheel and didn't turn the corner. The Exxon Valdez was also a fatigue related accident. Around 10% of fatal truck accidents in Australia are fatigue related. In the maritime industry fatigue is a problem. Save the Reef’s view is that we should not be letting fatigued people (which are like drunk people) steer cargo ships through the Great Barrier Reef. Legislation to prevent fatigue in international crew is ineffective. They work until the job is done. (They often do work more then 12 hours a day in the maritime industry) With our own pilots we can regulate their hours, ensure proper fatigue management guidelines are put in place and they can wake up the sleeping first mates on the vessels if they do fall asleep. Sailors coming into town and "socializing" all night long help people understand that fatigue is not just about work hours. It is important to discussing fatigue and its dangers and the need to have Australian pilots on board ships that travel through the Great Barrier Reef. It was lucky that the Shen Neng did not break up as the MV Rena did in the Bay of Plenty. The oil spill, that affected the nearby islands, the 3 km scar and the anti fouling paint TBT (Tributyltin) on the reef will ensure that shipping accidents continue to occur in the Great Barrier Reef that harmf the reef and causes a huge scar that can take decades to repair.

The ID Integrity incident was another near miss and again flags that increased shipping may lead to a disaster for the Great Barrier Reef, is that it did not have cargo on board and it managed to release enough ballast so that its underside would not hit Shark Reef as it went over it. This occurred out to sea, where pilots would not be required and could not prevent the accident. If this engine failure had happened on the way out with a full load of cargo, then the probability is the ship would have struck the reef, potentially tearing a hole in the ships tanks and dumping oil into the sea. Wikileaks released that a deal was done in 2009 that allowed owners and masters of vessels that fail to use a pilot to navigate the narrow and hazardous Torres Straight channel to not face any penalty if they do not subsequently call at an Australian port This does not appear to have been reversed. It is important if we are to protect the Great Barrier Reef that pilots are used throughout the Great Barrier Reef including the Southern part of the reef. Protection that has been removed needs to be put back in place.

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The SMH article shows how international companies and countries are continually lobbying the government to reduce controls in the Great Barrier Reef. This is to do with money and time. Shipping companies will continue to lobby governments such as US and Singapore to get Australia to relax contros and they are winning. This occurred in 2009 but we didn't find out about it until a Wikileaks released it in the cables in 2011. This shows how international countries and shipping organisations are continually lobbying to reduce controls. The government by saying we will not enforce the rules has decreased controls in the Great Barrier Reef rather than increased them. If we look at how many large commercial ships use the Great Barrier Reef without pilots it is a significant portion. The southern part needs to be protected as well as the northern parts with pilots. There was also an important ATSB document in 2012 that recommended improved pilot system. I have attached a few links below. The area is contentious due to costs and workforce issues. But the cost per large vessel eg $10000 is small compared to oil spill etc. http://kurrawa.gbrmpa.gov.au/corp_site/info_services/publications/sotr/downloads/SORR_Shipping. pdf

Between 1987 and 2004, 33 of the 700 incidents recorded (including 11 collisions and 22 groundings ) were considered significant. In recent years, significant ship groundings include the following: • MV Global Peace – Gladstone Harbour on 24 January 2006 • MV Karma – stranding near Agnes Waters on 14 November 2003 • MV Doric Chariot – Piper Reef in July 2002 (Media Release) • MV Bunga Terati Satu – Sudbury Reef in November 2000 (Media Release) • MV New Reach – Heath Reef in May 1999 (Media Release) • MV Peacock – Piper Reef in July 1996 • MV Svendborg Guardian – Kurramine Beach in June 1995 • MV Carola – South Ledge Reef in March 1995

[GBRMPA, Management Status: Shipping and Oil Spills, 2006, p.4. ]

Bonds for Shipping using the Great Barrier Reef

With increasing shipping around the Australian coast and variable international standards for the maintenance and crewing of that shipping there are an increasing number of shipping incidents – breakdowns, collisions, running around etc.

Where these incidents occur in and around the Great Barrier Reef the risk of these incidents is borne by government, other companies, the public and local businesses – and currently represents an ongoing subsidy from these bodies.

Already the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority has a bond for development projects that have been enforced to cover environmental restoration when they are abandoned that have been used effectively.

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By the shipping industry posting a bond to cover the costs of damages to local tourism business (including those that host recreational fisheries) and commercial fisheries this subsidy is removed. Damages for the worst accident possible as can be established by reputable accountancy, national and international references to similar shipping incidents. All other coasts incurred both State and Federal Governments in addressing a given incidents will also be recovered by this bond.

It is up to the shipping industry body as a legal entity to pay funds as deemed by the bond agreement and to recover those funds from the responsible parties.

By establishing bonds;

- fines and court prosecutions can be lessoned or eliminated - the shipping Industry has an opportunity to self regulate - monitoring funded by the deeming interest of 3.5% of the calculated total potential damage bill is shared by all shipping using the Great Barrier Reef waters on a formulae calculated by industry through an industry body established for the purpose and funded by the shipping industry - The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority manages this monitoring employing university of state institutions, such as the Museum of Queensland to undertake monitoring and uses commercial fishing catch records adjusted for effort and changes of efficiency tp monitor fisheries. - Monitoring is overseen by a body representing all identified potentially affected business, companies and other parties.

To reduce this risk and financial exposure to it shipping travelling through and adjacent to the Great Barrier Reef can contribute to a bond calculated to cover the worst case scenario for shipping incidents and share the cost of that bond and ensure its payment by appropriate parties when it becomes necessary..

e) key current and proposed management, monitoring and reporting programs and arrangements within the Port of Gladstone, and surrounds and report on their adequacy, and if necessary, provide advice on any significant areas for improvement. This analysis should consider any potential areas of duplication, perceived monitoring gaps, opportunities for integration and other areas where governance arrangements may be improved.

Save the Reef has been disappointed with the monitoring of Gladstone harbour the lack of enforcement and the amendments. .

We are particularly disturbed by the lack of enforcement of turbidity limits in Gladstone Harbour. It is our understanding that the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority originally expressed concern to the Federal and State Governments about the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project (WBDDP) and specifically requested additional water quality monitoring for the duration of the project.

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Members of Save the Reef have consequently been following the publicly available data since late 2011. While the Ports Corporation has made turbidity monitoring publicly available on their website there have been delays in posting the information over holiday periods and changes to representation of the data (such as removing the 99th Centile line) to make its significance less apparent. More importantly, since dredging began, the publicly available turbidity levels at a number of monitoring stations in the harbour have been above Gladstone Ports’ environmental licence conditions for more than 48 hours. Rarely has any action been taken by the State Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (formerly Department of Environment and Resource Management). One environment protection order was given on the 10th January 2012 but similar episodes which included Christmas 2011 and Australia day, Easter and Labour Day holidays in 2012, were not enforced despite high recreational use by the boating and fishing public at such times.

There is also a pattern of changing the turbidity limits rather than enforcing them. GPC first relaxed the turbidity limits by commencing the wet season on the 1st October instead of 20th November 2011. The historical data in the Water Quality Management Plan identifies the start of the Wet Season as the 20th November. The water quality graphs released on the Gladstone Ports website stated that the “wet season was from 20th November to 31st March and the rest of the year would be considered the dry season.” When Gladstone Ports Corporation was asked why the dates were altered this was the response:

The changes were requested by the Dredge Technical Reference Panel when they advised the Department (DERM) the trigger values had been developed around the wet/dry season cut off being 1 October (and 31 March) and therefore necessitating a change to development approval SPDE01611411. SPDE01611411 is our state government approved development application. The season dates on those graphs (on our website) unfortunately was our mistake.

However it is clear that the trigger values had been developed around the wet/dry season cut off of 20 November. The Water Quality Management Plan1 was quite specific about the wet season dates. It is noted in the EIS Appendix K2 with regards to turbidity that the wet season is December to April and October and November are considered as part of the dry season. Baseline turbidity in those months was historically low. The BOM data shows that rainfall is on average not high in October or November in comparison to the wet season months of December to March.3 Changing the start times for the Wet Season allowed a longer period of high turbidity in the harbour.

We are concerned that no scientific justification was given to include months that are not historically linked to high rainfall events. It is also noted that the rainfall in October 2011 and November 2011 had less than half the expected average over those 2 months, so heavy rainfall was not a cause of harbour turbidity in 2011. To alter these dates without scientific data, at a time when there is still confusion around diseased fish and human illnesses was in our view not prudent.

The Gladstone Ports Corporation [GPC] was then allowed to raise their permitted turbidity levels in May 2012 by re-calculating the mean background turbidity of the harbour using both the pre- dredging data but also incorporating post dredging data. Two sites were changed - QE4 - 28 (NTU) to 34 NTU (dry season); and 34 to 55 in the wet season. ST1 - 24 NTU to 35 NTU (dry season) and 38 to 65 (wet season). The Queensland state government approved these higher 99th percentile turbidity limits amending the development approval again.

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It is notable that the federal government in their Water Quality Management Plan has stricter limits including an internal reporting trigger of the 80th percentile and external reporting trigger of the 95th percentile. These triggers appear not to have been enforced since the dredging program began in earnest in May 2011, despite many breaches.

We have also been disappointed by the composition of the Dredge Technical Reference Panel and the lack of publicly available data about its deliberations. The panel includes the contractors used by GPC for their monitoring program, representatives of the dredging contractors as well as government departments responsible for facilitating port development weighting the membership against those whose primary concern is environmental health.

From June to August 2012 Gladstone Ports Corporation was granted a Transitional Environment Programme(TEP) after GPC admitted that its leaking bund wall (part of land reclamation for the WBDDP) and associated dredging had contributed to high turbidity in the harbour. GPC introduced a light monitoring programme and were allowed to ignore the turbidity levels as long as the light monitoring levels were not exceeded under this TEP. During this time turbidity went to almost three times higher than the 99th percentile, yet the chosen light monitoring level remained within the normal range.

Furthermore the light monitoring has been an ineffective substitute for accurate water quality monitoring since seagrass recovery across the region remained poor even at the start of its Spring 2012 growth season. See the assessment in Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry’s latest seagrass report: http://www.westernbasinportdevelopment.com.au/media/pdf/Gladstone%20Permanent%20Transect %20Seagrass%20report%20August%202012.pdf

The 7th Water Quality report (EHP)4 released on the 22 June 2012, 3 days before the granting of the TEP states that “There was no clear pattern in the water quality results to suggest that dredging was having any major impact on water quality.” The 8th Water Quality report (EHP)5 released on 31st July during the TEP stated in the executive summary “Results of water quality investigations between September 2011 and May 2012, with the exception of a cluster of elevated metal concentrations around South Trees Inlet, have shown that none of the water quality properties measured was of significant environmental concern.” Neither report mentioned the UNESCO findings which stated that ‘Reduced water quality from dredging [and] inadequate independent, scientific oversight in monitoring water quality suggested lack of government response when water quality targets are exceeded…”6

In September 2012, when monitoring stations recorded turbidity above the new higher 99th percentile for over 48 hours, GPC informed us that they were now exempted from the turbidity trigger levels because a dual light monitoring turbidity measurement was now being used. If light monitoring is normal they do not stop dredging due to high turbidity. On 1st October 2012, they commenced wet season levels early again.

The inadequacy of the light monitoring program became apparent in January 2013. Flood waters turned Gladstone’s inner harbour into a muddy mess that was visible from space and photos of the flood plume were published in local newspapers. Even the state Environment Minister, Andrew Powell, expressed concern about the mud’s destructive coating of seagrass yet GPC’s self- proclaimed “world-class” light monitoring program continued to indicate that there was no problem with turbidity in the harbour.

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Without meaningful environmental measurement and state and federal regulators prepared to stand up to enforce environmental standards, it is difficult to see how either state or federal government levels will have the management capacity to regulate any further development in world heritage areas. Just one part of the environmental management required for this immensely important marine ecosystem, turbidity levels in Gladstone, have highlighted the failure of existing systems which have come to place industry needs ahead of natural values.

We wrote to GBRMPA about this matter and they wrote back to us stating that the federal government was going to amend its water quality plan. There were apparently 9 amendments to the Water Quality plan (Revision 9), but I have not been able to see that revision or any of the other 8 revisions. It also detailed there have been 7 Dredge Management plan revisions. .

It is easy for an observer to conclude that GPC’s non- compliance with water quality management is out of control, and what body if any is doing anything about this.

Save the Reef also has written to Shane Gaddes who is the Assistant Secretary Compliance & Enforcement Branch. His response highlighted the observation that the Federal Government leaves it all to Queensland, and the GPC

“The role of the Commonwealth in this matter is not to enforce State legislation or monitor approvals granted under State law. The regulation of the 99th percentile for turbidity trigger levels is a matter under the Queensland Government development approval. The Commonwealth regulates the 95th percentile under the approved Water Quality Management Plan. The Water Quality Management Plan required to be implemented under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 can be found at this link: Exceedances do not constitute a breach of Commonwealth conditions and is therefore the responsibility of the Queensland Government.” The State and Federal don’t have a common trigger level where turbidity is concerned. Queensland’s approval allows 99th centile and the Federal Government has ‘passed the monitoring over to Queensland. Queensland has altered dates, limits and now introduced light monitoring. We requested both Shane and GBRMPA to consider that light monitoring was inadequate. See letter below.

Dear Russell Recheilt,

Thank you for your letter dated 9th November.

I would first like to raise my concern about the amended water quality plan that the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (SEWPaC) is now considering. I believe that the recent seagrass reports indicate that light based monitoring in and of itself does not adequately protect the seagrass.

From the end of June to the current date, there have been periods of very high turbidity exceeding both the federal and state limits for long periods of time. This occurred during the TEP when light monitoring was first introduced and after the TEP in September 2012 and October 2012. Exemptions were granted that allowed continual dredging over the limits as long as light based monitoring was found to be

37 within normal limits. The light monitoring stayed within the limits, but the latest seagrass report with data from October 2012 has shown very little regrowth of seagrass in the high impact zones of dredging.

I would argue this may be evidence that light monitoring on its own is not enough to protect the seagrass.

I have attached the relevant results of the high and low impact zones from the report as an appendix. I would like to point out that the seagrass regrowth in the inner harbour is in stark contrast to the seagrass in Moreton Bay that has had high rates of regrowth in the recent SE Queensland healthy waterways report.

It is noted that in Gladstone Harbour there has been some recovery in some of the low impact zones, but not in the high impact zones which suggests that dredging and water quality may be having an impact on seagrass recovery.

I also noted that Gladstone Ports Corporation in a report from the Gladstone Observer, misrepresented the facts.

The CEO of Gladstone Ports Corporation (GPC) stated that seagrass at Fishermans Landing a high impact zone had "spectacularly improved" This statement and "GPC has released the October results of seagrass monitoring which showed increases in seagrass cover around Fishermans Landing, Pelican Banks North and Pelican Banks South" were incorrect as there has been no increase in seagrass cover around Fishermans landing.

The CEO also stated that "the report was proof that dredging was not to blame for the reduction in levels early this year." These statements do not reflect the report.

The rules that the state (EHP) currently enforce allow the Ports to dredge over the turbidity limits in the inner harbour and get an exemption if the light monitoring is within normal limits. This is despite less than 1% cover and very poor regrowth at most inner harbour sites.

I want to ensure that the Gladstone Ports does not misrepresent the facts of the report to GBRMPA as it has to the readers of the Gladstone Observer newspaper. Save the Reef believes the Gladstone Observer article should have reported. “Most of the seagrass in the inner harbour is dead. The Ports haven't fixed the turbidity problem after the TEP. They dredged over the limits in the TEP and continue to be allowed to dredge over the limits because the light monitors on top of the dead seagrass suggest the seagrass should be able to regrow even though this regrowth hasn’t occurred.”

I have had discussions with seagrass experts who have stated that in the Northern

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Territory a current dredging project dredges during the wet season but then gives the seagrass clean water (clarity) during known growth periods to allow the seagrass to regrow. Save the Reef would like to know if GBRMPA has considered this option.

It is possible clear water may assist in improving regrowth particularly after high sediments loads as in floods or dredging. It is possible that other factors associated with high turbidity may be affecting seagrass. This could include toxins such as heavy metals. It is noted that heavy metals found in the sediment by CSIRO including arsenic, aluminium and copper and that these total metals have been associated with high turbidity. Leonie Anderson has shown that seagrass in Gladstone harbour near dredging was found to have significantly higher levels of arsenic and aluminium. This is expanded after the letter as an appendix.

Save the Reef acknowledges there is a requirement to implement a move from turbidity based trigger levels to light based trigger levels. Save the Reef suggests it may be preferable to maintain the turbidity limits and introduce light monitoring and require both to be compliant initially, until evidence that light based monitoring can ensure better environmental outcomes than turbidity based readings. It does not have to be one or the other it can be both. The EHP exemptions that allowed dredging above the turbidity limits due to light monitoring may have led to harm. It is suggested that this is clarified by research. It may be that research demonstrates that both turbidity limits and light monitoring are required to protect the seagrass. We would suggest that GBRMPA may consider also allowing a period of clarity to allow the seagrass to recover.

Save the Reef would ask GBRMPA to urge SEWPaC not to amend the turbidity limits in line with the Qld government as Gladstone harbour water quality may be contributing to environmental harm. GBRMPA only allowed this project to go ahead after the Minister Tony Burke put water quality controls in place. It is our opinion that these Water Quality controls have been changed and broken altered on a number of occasions by the state agencies, including changing the dates of the wet season, changing the turbidity limits and there is no clear evidence that has found these alterations led to better environmental outcomes. Indeed there is evidence of environmental harm in the Inner Harbour

With regard to the wet season limits, Save the Reef would like to see documented evidence regarding the Wet season for Commonwealth approved trigger levels, which in your letter you state has always been interpreted to be from 1 October to 31 March. It is clear in the picture below taken from the original approval dated 24/6/2011 that at the beginning of the project wet season dates were from 20 November to 31 March. (see picture below). We would like to see a similar table from the commonwealth government that when dredging began the wet season was from 1 October to 31 March inclusive, and the rationale behind the different wet season dates for state and federal departments.

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It perplexes Save the Reef that the state government and federal government would have different wet season dates in the initial dredging approvals. Save the Reef would like to understand why the Commonwealth and GBRMPA initially

a) chose a date for the wet season that did not reflect the wet season,

b) did not reflect the historical background turbidity data from the EIS,

c) did not reflect the dates used in the Water Quality Management Plan in

(Click on water quality management plan)

Quotes taken from the Water Quality Management Plan

“Figure 9. Wet season turbidity at QE4 (20th November 2009 to 31st March 2010)” “Figure 17. Wet season turbidity at BG10 (20th November 2009 to 31st March 2010)” “Table 1. Water quality sampling dates from November 2009 to September 2010. Wet Season 20 Nov 2009 – 31 March 2010

The Water quality management plan states that if the 6 hourly EWMA is above the external reporting trigger level (95th percentile) for 1 week they are required to hold a DTRP meeting (step 4) and submit a report. (Step 5). As this did occur in October 2011 whether the wet season or dry season limit was applied, we would like to see the report that details the trigger level they used and how long they were over it for in October and the steps taken.

As you are aware the Ports requested that the state government amend that date and it was approved on the 30th October, 2011 to amend the wet season date to the 1st October. Save the Reef believes it was inappropriate for the state to change that date at the time when there was confusion around

40 human and fish illness in the harbour and wonders if GBRMPA knew about this change and if so did it voice any objection to this change. We note that this amendment was not made public nor the approval posted on their website.

We note the GPC WBDDP website has posted the EHP amended development approval (or permit for dredging) from early September 2012. http://www.westernbasinportdevelopment.com.au/project_approvals_permits/section/documentation http://www.westernbasinportdevelopment.com.au/media/pdf/Ammendment%20Development%20Ap proval%20ERA%2016.pdf

One amendment that we noted is the W2 clause. The amendment changed the turbidity limits from the original

“Should turbidity levels exceed the above level(s) it is not a contravention of condition (W1) when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the administering authority that elevated turbidity is the result of external factors, (for example, erroneous or invalid data, wave height, rainfall, tides, wind, etc) and not affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the Dredge Management Plan.” to

“Should turbidity levels exceed the above level(s) it is not a contravention of condition (W1) when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the administering authority that a) elevated turbidity is the result of external factors, (for example, erroneous or invalid data, wave height, rainfall, tides, wind, etc) or b) clearly the result of other dredging activities (e.g. CSDorBHD dredging being undertaken within 500 m of a monitoring site); c) all benthic PAR monitoring sites (TC1, BS1, DC1, GC1, WI5-2 and PM1) are receiving the minimum light requirement.”

The Ports may be in contravention of their development approval because they have breached the turbidity limits but blamed in on tides and used the original W2 clause (the natural variation clause). Save the Reef has had advice that the turbidity breaches (before the amendment) were affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the Dredge Management Plan. The Ports admitted that the bund wall was contributing to high turbidity and were granted the TEP to fix this. The breaches after the amendment (e.g. September 2012) do not contravene their development approval as all benthic PAR monitoring sites are receiving the minimum light requirement.

If the Ports are asking for a similar amendment from the Federal government with regard to turbidity and light monitoring, Save the Reef again urges the federal government not to allow this amendment as it in effect nullifies the need to maintain turbidity within the limits.

Save the Reef suggests if high turbidity occurs it should be investigated and if the turbidity is affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the Dredge Management Plan (ERA16 P 9 of 25) then appropriate action should be taken (e.g. repair the bund wall or reduce dredging)

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Save the Reef believes biological monitoring of the harbour is important. :Leonie Anderson’s 2002 study on transplanted oysters and the uptake of heavy metals in particular aluminium by the oysters shows how effective this can be. I have attached a copy of a summary of it below.

Andersen, L.E., Melville, F., Fabbro, L.D., Storey, A.W. and Teasdale, P.R. (2006). RG Tanna Coal Terminal 4th Berth Dredge Management Plan, An Assessment of the Effects of Harbour Dredging, Centre for Environmental Management, Central Queensland University, Gladstone. Andersen, L.E., Melville, F., Steinberg, A.N. Teasdale, P.R. and Fabbro, L.D. (2008a). PCIMP Biomonitoring 2007, North Harbour Zones, Port Curtis Integrated Monitoring Program, Centre for Environmental Management, Central Queensland University, Gladstone. Andersen, L., Melville, F., Fabbro, L., Wilson, S. and Teasdale, P. (2008b). An assessment of the effect of dredging on Fisherman’s Landing: Stage 2, Draft. Centre for Environmental Management, Central Queensland University, Gladstone. Andersen, L.E., Storey, A.W. and Fox, S. (2002). Assessing the Effects of Harbour Dredging Using Transplanted Oysters as Biomonitors. Centre for Environmental Management, Central Queensland University, Gladstone.

In her research on crabs, she has stated that shell disease is not infectious and she believes it is environmental. She has shown high metals in crabs in biomonitoring (see 2009 paper) I believe she knows that it has something to do with metals but they have not had the statistical power to really find the answer in her studies. Crabs, prawns and other marine life requires further study. I have attached a paper regarding aluminium in Barramundi, that points out the need to do biomonitoring and assess the impacts of heavy metals on fish. Other studies similar to the one below can be used to determine heavy metal exposures and should be considered.

See also Andersen, Boundy & Melzer, http://www.ozcoasts.gov.au/pdf/CRC/12- intertidal_fidler_crabs.pdf

The fiddler crab (Uca coarctata) was assessed for its biomonitoring suitability in Port Curtis. Fiddler crabs have a sedentary lifestyle and their feeding and burrowing activities expose them to water, dietary and sediment-derived contaminants. They are therefore potentially, a useful biomonitoring tool for assessing site-specific differences in contaminants, including metals. Fiddler crabs and sediments were collected from a number of sites in Port Curtis, representing increasing distance from the source of likely anthropogenic inputs. Crabs and sediments were also collected from reference sites outside the harbour and analysed for metal concentrations.

Overall, results did not indicate that any one site was more contaminated than any other site. Copper and metal burdens and to a lesser extent aluminium and cadmium,were elevated in fiddler crabs from inner harbour sites compared to outer harbour sites. Correlations were established between metal concentrations in fiddler crabs and sediment for copper and strontium, but no other metals although the relationships were not strong. Fiddler crabs appear to be able to play a role in

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monitoring programs, although, due to their abilities to regulate metals, they may not be as suitable for biomonitoring as net accumulators such as oysters or mussels.

Other relevant interviews and programmes.

Interviews

http://blogs.abc.net.au/queensland/2012/04/is-gladstone-harbour-part-of-the-great-barrier-reef.html http://blogs.abc.net.au/queensland/2011/10/gladstone-dredging-and-fish-problems-andrew-jeremijenko.html http://blogs.abc.net.au/queensland/2011/11/story-1-4.html?site=westqld&program=612_evenings http://blogs.abc.net.au/queensland/2011/12/gladstone-harbour-test-results-andrew-jeremijenko.html http://blogs.abc.net.au/queensland/2012/05/gladstone-harbours-water-turbidity-increased-3rd-may- 2012.html?site=goldcoast&program=612_evenings http://www.thepunch.com.au/articles/somethings-really-fishy-in-the-gladstone-waters/

Programmes http://www.abc.net.au/catalyst/stories/3593812.htm Catalyst, high turbidity and heavy metals. http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2011/11/03/3355047.htm Great Barrier Grief https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uGsa_-5uh-Q 7.30 report dead dugong, fish disease https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q_9Gr3mDMX0 Heritage authority worried by dredging https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVKlmvNApbc Gladstone Harbour Dredge Protest - LNG Coal Seam Gas Port - TV media coverage https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6AzHlxwj91Q Environmental concern over Gladstone harbour channel 'significant project' https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRLRcwgFHYI catalyst s13 ep18 GladstoneDredging https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EqPkP-CYfXY Seeney unhappy with UNESCO over Gladstone Harbour https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tRQVZE0uEgI Gladstone Harbour Fish Disease - Government Says Nothing Wrong https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5QUnMdtXy4 Harbour Mystery – high turbidity https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Qr5YJjZXGI Report Scientific Panel-Crab Health - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D-nGtbQmd-I New report blames dredging for Gladstone fish kills

43 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4Bm-eT-sW4 Senator Larissa Waters -Gladstone Harbour contamination - Ch 10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApbVL3fwEgA Gladstone residents warned over toxic chemical spill - ABC News https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t-K6B9G32zc Report to Scientific Panel EstuaryFish Health Gladstone Harbour November 2011

1http://www.westernbasinportdevelopment.com.au/media/pdf/Water%20Quality%20Management%20Plans.pdf 2 http://www.westernbasinportdevelopment.com.au/media/pdf/EIS%20Appendix%20K.pdf 3 http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/averages/tables/cw_039041.shtml 4 http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/gladstone/pdf/port-curtis-7th-update-report.pdf 5 http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/gladstone/pdf/port-curtis-8th-update-report.pdf 6 http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2012/whc12-36com-7BAdd-en.pdf

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