AZERBAIJAN: ISLAM IN A POST-SOVIET REPUBLIC By Anar Valiyev*

The collapse of the and the demise of Communist ideas paved the way for an Islamic revival in . Being one of the most secular Muslim republics of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan is facing a dilemma concerning how to address contemporary religious issues. A suppression of religious activities and organizations could lead to internal opposition and radicalization. In contrast, freedom of religious activities could allow the neighboring state of to export an Islamist revolution and encourage the development of a radical brand of local Islamism. The high percentage of poor people, as well as the presence of over 700,000 refugees in the country, create a dangerous breeding ground for radical organizations to recruit members and sympathizers for future struggles.

For centuries, was an integral and places of worship were restored; dozens of binding part of public life in Azerbaijan. religious organizations were registered; new Since antiquity, almost all wars, reforms, and religious schools () opened; and political processes occurred under the banner many young are attending of religion. Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Muslim religious universities in Saudi Islam enriched the and Arabia, Egypt, Iran, , and Pakistan. have had a huge impact on the formation of Islam permeates Azerbaijani social life. It the identity of the Azerbaijani nation. Today, is now common to encounter young people Azerbaijan is experiencing a religious observing the Muslim traditions or young revival. Ideological disorientation, the search women dressing in accordance to Islamic for national and cultural identity, and the traditions. Religion is also actively used by Karabakh conflict with are three political leaders as a means of pursuing their major factors which define the place of Islam interests. After the fall of the Communist in modern Azerbaijan. regime, political leaders began to observe About 93.4 percent of Azerbaijan’s Muslim traditions. Heydar Aliyev, then populations are Muslim, 2.5 percent are and a former KGB Russian Orthodox, 2.3 percent are Armenian general, was the first Azerbaijani political Orthodox, and 1.8 percent are classified as leader to visit Mecca in 1994. However, more “other.”1 Due to the outflow of Russians, the than anything else, this simply demonstrates number of adherents to Christianity in how Islam is being manipulated by relatively Azerbaijan is steadily decreasing. secular politicians. Meanwhile, Islam is experiencing a During the seventy years under renaissance. Over the past few years, Communist rule, the people were prevented hundreds of new were built; former from practicing Islamic traditions. However,

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Anar Valiyev during the USSR’s era, below 72,000 Azeri manat (US $15) per Azerbaijanis identified themselves more with capita per month.6 the Islamic than the Turkic world. For The picture is exacerbated by high example, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah numbers of refugees and internally displaced Khomeini was a popular symbolic alternative persons. The occupation of about 20 percent to the Soviet system. His picture was often of Azerbaijan’s territories by Armenian displayed in people’s homes, despite the fact forces has resulted in the mass movement of that these individuals were unfamiliar with people seeking refuge. By the end of 2002, his ideology and did not sympathize with his there were 783,200 refugees and internally worldview.2 displaced persons in Azerbaijan, accounting Indeed, this apparent religious revival for approximately one-seventh of the remained rather superficial. Polls conducted country’s total population.7 The Iranian in 2000 showed that believers constituted Hizballah and Saudi missionary organizations 63.4 percent of all respondents, though only are very active in refugee camps, attempting 6.7 percent considered themselves “firm to recruit and to establish future terrorist believers.” In contrast, 10.4 percent cells. pronounced themselves agnostic and 7.1 Another potential problem is the division percent as non-be lievers. An additional 8.6 of the population between Shi’a and Sunni percent said they were indifferent. Just 3.8 Muslims. Due to a lack of statistics, at percent of the respondents categorized present it can only be assumed that out of themselves as “firm atheists.” However, more than 7.6 million Azerbaijanis of Muslim when asked about their observance of the background, a majority of between 65 to 75 religious commandments, only 17.7 percent percent are connected to Shi’i traditions; the of the “believers” indicated observance of rest consider themselves Sunni. It is one of the main pillars of Islam: namaz important to note that although for the most (prayer). Thus, 82.3 percent of the part, religious knowledge is very poor, the “believers” do not abide by this injunction.3 inhabitants of the different regions of the Despite its usefulness for the country’s country have preserved aspects of their Shi’a leaders, the revival of or Sunni heritage. Until 1992, the division of was nonetheless dangerous for the incumbent Azerbaijanis between Shi’a or rulers. One factor involved was the material was nominal. It was even possible to be a deprivation of the population, making them member of the Communist Party and be inclined to seek a drastic alternative to the atheist, but to preserve Shi’a or Sunni cultural status quo. According to the UN Human traditions. In Azerbaijan, Islam, whether Development Report, 49.6 percent of the Shi’a or Sunni, was considered a culture population lives below the poverty level.4 rather than a religion.8 Traditionally, Sunni Although the Azerbaijani government Muslims populate the northern and western decreased the poverty level from 61 percent part of Azerbaijan, while other sections, in 1995 to 49.6 percent in 2001, the life of including the capital and its suburbs, almost half of the population remains in are home to Shi’a Muslims. 5 desolate conditions. Seventeen percent of A new element in the picture is the Salafi the total population, or 1.3 million, lived in radical Islamists who are actively seeking to extreme poverty, with monthly consumption establish their influence. They have had some

2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic success, especially among ethnic minorities When the Safavid Empire was established in such as the Avars and of northern the sixteenth century, its founder, , Azerbaijan. The anti-Shi’a feelings of many declared Shi’ism the official religion and Sunni Salafi Islamists could raise the expelled Sunni clerics. There were also possibility of clashes between the two Islamic political considerations behind these actions. streams. The Azerbaijani state was the rival of the How Islam will develop in Azerbaijan and , where Sunni Islam was the its influences on society and politics is one of official religion. In retrospect, Ismail’s the most important issues the country faces. decision also helped preserve an Azeri identity separate from that of other Turks and HISTORICAL BACKGROUND the Ottomans.11 More than 2,100 years ago, Azerbaijan The Russian conquest of Azerbaijan became the center of Zoroastrianism, whose during the first quarter of nineteenth century founder was, according to legend, born in changed the situation. The Russian South Azerbaijan (today northern Iran). Until authorities were inclined to eliminate Muslim the seventh century, the religion dominated influence from the to make this Azerbaijan and played an important role in region Christian, and thus pro-Russian.12 shaping the worldview and traditions of the During the first ten years of Russian rule, Azeri people. The main holiday of Azerbaijan 100,000 Azeris were expelled from Erivan, remains Novruz Bayram, which announces Nakhichevan, Karabakh, and Lori to the the start of spring and now coincides with the neighboring countries and were replaced by Islamic New Year. Zoroastrian traditions can Armenians and Russian colonists. still be found in the country’s legends, However, the vast and long-term nature of fairytales, and music.9 this project led to a change in Russian policy. In the fourth century, Christianity arrived, The new policy aimed to establish Muslim though some churches date back to an even provinces that would be loyal to the Russian earlier time. 10 In the seventh century, a empire and would be governed by Russian Muslim Arab army defeated Persia and officials. In 1823, the position of Shaykh al- conquered South Azerbaijan, which was part Islam was established in Tiflis, and Akhund of the Persian Sasanid Empire at the time. (Minister) Muhammad Ali Huseynzadeh was While Islam treated Christians and Jews with appointed to this position. In 1872, the tolerance, it persecuted Zoroastrians as Russians created a Shi’a and Sunni spiritual pagans to the point that the religion soon department, which made the religious leaders disappeared from Azerbaijan. servants of the government. The creation of After the death of Muhammad, the two spiritual departments, headed by Mufti political struggle in the Arab Califate was for Sunni and Shaykh al-Islam for Shi’a, reflected in Azerbaijan as well, with the pursued the aim of strengthening state control division of Islam into Shi’a and Sunni over mosques and fueling Sunni-Shi’a streams. Iranians, in part due to a sense of differences. By the end of the Czarist Empire, having a separate history and identity from there were 23 Shi’a and 16 Sunni judges in the Arabs, chose to become Shi’a. Most Azerbaijan. 13 Azerbaijanis, feeling closer to the Persians Historically, the proportion of Sunni than to the Arabs, followed the same course. Muslims in Russian-occupied Azerbaijan was

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Anar Valiyev much higher than among the Azeris of Iran. country, but by 1933, only 17--eleven Shi’a, Russian statistics from the 1830s show that two Sunni, and four mixed (where Shi’a and the ratio of Shi’a to Sunni was almost even, Sunni Muslims prayed together)--had with the latter having a small edge. 14 The survived. proportion of Sunni, however, declined During World War II, as the Soviets were remarkably. By 1860, figures indicate that attempting to mobilize support among Turkic Shi’a of the Jafari rite held a clear people--some of whom were rebelling against majority of 2:1. The decrease in the Soviet rule--this policy of religious proportionate strength of the Sunni element persecution was changed slightly. On April was the result of their immigration to 14, 1944, the Spiritual Department of Turkey15. The main reason for immigration Muslims of the Transcaucasus was restored was the hidden pressure of the Czarist regime and headed by a Shi’a with a Sunni-deputy. on the Sunni. Due to the long-term resistance The authorities began re-opening mosques all of Imam Shamil in Northern Caucasus, the over the country. 17 Czarist administration feared a Sunni uprising Out of 100 Muslim religious leaders, only in Azerbaijan. sixteen had received theological training at The Russian revolution and the the Islamic University of Tashkent or the Mir establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Arab in Bukhara. 18 Allahshukur Republic (ADR) shook the dominant Pashazadeh, the future Shaykh al-Islam of the positions of Islam. During the transition era Caucasian Muslims, was among them. from 1918 to 1920, the founding fathers of Whereas in 1976 there were only sixteen the ADR tried to build a modern state geared registered mosques and one madrasa in toward the Western world. The establishment Azerbaijan, by the end of the Soviet period, of Bolshevik power in Azerbaijan led to there were 200 mosques,, including waves of terror in which 48,000 people died. unregistered places of worship. 19 At first, though, the Bolsheviks considered Still, the manifestation of Islamic identity- Islam as an ally in the struggle against the profession of faith, pilgrimage to Mecca, imperialistic states and even argued that the month of the Ramadan fast, almsgiving, Islam’s view of politics and society did not and the five daily prayers--remained largely contradict Marxism. While the Russian non-existent.20 As an ideology, Islam has Orthodox Church in was totally been put on the margin of survival during the destroyed, Islamic institutions in Azerbaijan seventy years of Soviet totalitarianism and cooperated with authorities and were atheistic propaganda. The majority of the integrated into the state. 16 clergy was arrested, killed, or isolated from The Bolshevik policy toward Islam the community. At best, they were turned into suddenly changed in 1927. All Shari’a and agents of the Soviet system. This docile adat (traditional) courts, which dealt with clergy created a negative attitude towards domestic and religious matters, were spiritual leaders, which is still present today. liquidated. Mustafa Guliyev, the people’s There were, however, those who continued to commissar for education of Soviet act as independent representatives of Islam in Azerbaijan, organized the shutting down of Azerbaijan and maintained the continuity of the mosques. He stated that in 1929 there piety and tradition. These included those of were 960 Shi’a and 400 Sunni mosques in the

4 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic seyid (saintly) descent who maintained holy considerable number of the places allocated places (pirs). by Muslim states for Azerbaijani pilgrims are given to representatives of the government. ISLAM IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA The Law on Freedom of Worship itself At the dawn of the democratic movement underwent changes in the Aliyev years. in Azerbaijan (1988-1991), the clergy joined Having encoutered a number of unexpected the struggle for national independence. Yet, problems, such as Christian missionary while secular nationalists and pious Muslims activity and Salafi and Iranian propaganda, cooperated, the political parties were amendments were introduced to limit concerned with maintaining Islam as a missionary activity and to subordinate the strictly ethical and religious element in social independent religious communities to semi- life, one that would not seep into the political state control. The religious department was arena. also restored to a cabinet level ministry. During the rule of the national democrats Consequently, Islam during Aliyev’s (1992-1993), the Law on Freedom of government appeared integrated in and Worship was adopted. All property taken by subordinate to the state system. Thus, the the Soviets from mosques and religious religious revival did not generally appear to communities was to be returned. The conflict with the hegemony of nationalism Spiritual Department of Transcaucasus and the stability of the regime. New Islamic Muslims was separated from the state, and educational institutions opened, mosques state grants to the department and religious were built, and pilgrimage to Mecca and communities were stopped. For the first time Medina became possible. Aliyev became the in 200 years, the religious figures ceased to first Azerbaijani leader in modern times to go receive state salaries and resorted to on Hajj, visited mosques on holidays, and collecting donations from the public.21 encouraged numerous Islamic conferences.22 Though the post-Soviet government feared This process continued throughout the the growth of an Islamist movement, it 1990s. However, while encouraging official granted full freedom of worship in order to spiritual leaders and activities, the state--and maintain believers’ support for state building. its supporting clerics--opposed independent Heydar Aliyev’s government, which came preaching. Shaykh Hajji Allahshukur to power in a 1993 coup, used official Pashazade, head of the Clerical Management religious figures extensively to legitimize its Institution, rejected “self-appointed mullahs” rule. The clergy generally cooperated with who were uneducated and not connected to this program, in part because they supported his organization. Azerbaijani nationalism over political Yet despite the revival of Islamic Islamism. The president of the secular state traditions in Azerbaijan, public knowledge of swears fidelity to the constitution and to the Islam still is at a low level. Fortunetellers Koran; in exchange, the Spiritual Department insist that they are foretelling the future by gives its a stamp of approval and creates using the Koran. Many Shi’a claim that the propaganda so that government actions are flagellation ritual on the tenth day of viewed as conforming to Islamic norms. The Muha rram is the most important ceremony head of state occasionally visits a , under Muslim law, even though they do not some of which display his picture, and a pray or know any of the basic principles of

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Islam. The most widely celebrated religious continued to spread anti-Islamic views after holiday remains the non-Muslim Novruz their return. 24 Bayram. Another indicator of the unique Even such a basic ritual as the funeral Azerbaijani view of Islam concerns women’s service--the ceremony most often connected rights. Nayereh Tohidi, a researcher from with Islam in Azerbaijan--is sometimes California State University, describes the carried out with errors contradicting Islam. attitude of the average Azeri woman towards Existing practices or the ignorance of mullahs veiling. “In June 1992, when a delegation of are simply too deeply entrenched. No one 22 Islamist women headed by Zehra would think, for example, of reciting a sura Mostafavi, daughter of Khomeini, visited (line) from the Koran at a wedding. Such an Baku, Azerbaijan, wrapped in heavy individual would simply be thrown out of the in the heat of summer, they were met with wedding having created a funereal stares and disdainful reactions everywhere atmosphere or, even worse, might be branded they went. On one occasion, a middle-aged as a Salafi or Wahhabi adherent. Of course, Azeri woman asked, ‘Do not you feel hot Wahhabi Islam is unlikely to have any under this heavy black garment in this hot success among the predominantly Shi’a summer?’ ‘But the fire in hell is much hotter Azerbaijanis. if one fails to follow ’s orders,’” one of While most Azerbaijanis consider Islam a the Iranians replied. Baffled by her response part of their national identity, any mixing of the Azeri woman mumbled, “What a cruel religion with the political sphere is rejected God you have! The Allah that I know is much by the vast majority of the population. kinder to women.” 25 Critical to understanding this issue is that the However, the points noted above do not Azerbaijani view of Islam is one of a necessarily indicate that the situation will common national characteristic, inseparable forever remain as it is. Some other countries from its Turkic ethnic identity, which no with a relatively high level of secularism or single group can try to monopolize for its moderate interpretation of Islam have seen a own rhetoric. As such, it lends little appeal as large portion of their people turn in a militant a driving or dividing force in the political direction. In the so-called “Islamist belt” of arena.23 the country’s southern districts, Iranian One startling point about the shallowness preachers have been active. In villages near of the Islamic revival in Azerbaijan is that it Baku one can see portraits of Khomeini and is probably the only country in the Muslim Islamic quotes in the windows of houses and world where the quota allocated by the on walls. The rallies staged by the Union of government of the for a Hajj Azerbaijani Forces in 2002 became one of the pilgrimage remains unclaimed. Vacant places biggest protest actions by the opposition, with are resold to pilgrims from the Chechen many Islamists carrying green banners of Republic and . In 1998, the king of Islam and shouting “Allahu Akbar” Saudi Arabia offered to cover the expenses of participating. A couple of years ago, few 200 Azerbaijani pilgrims. However, there could take the threat of in were some ardent atheists among those who Azerbaijan seriously. However, the threat of accepted and went, and these individuals Islamic fundamentalism now seems imminent.

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With a leadership of only semi-literate ISLAMIST RADICAL RGANIZATIONS mullahs boasting no more than a secondary AND PARTIES IN AZERBAIJAN school education, the IPA could not involve Due to its strategic geographical position members of the educated elite in its ranks. It and relative religious vacuum, Azerbaijan has appealed mainly to rural populations. The attracted the attention of many religious as party’s basic ideology is the belief that only well as radical organizations. Weak law- Islam can structure an independent enforcement agencies, a corrupt Azerbaijan. According to Hajji, the republic governmental system, a high percentage of will not be able to extricate itself from crisis refugees, and wide-spread poverty have until its leaders have accepted Islamic values brought Islamist radical groups to view and concepts of state building. Azerbaijan as possessing great potential for a The IPA preaches an anti-Turkic, anti- takeover. These radical religious groups have Semitic, and anti-American doctrine threaded come from three directions: with conspiracy theories. Considering any --The first and strongest “export base” is form of nationalism as Shirk (i.e., Iran. Through its affiliated organizations such worshipping anything other than Allah, as Hizballah, the Imam Khomeini Fund, and breaking strict Muslim monotheism), it others, Iran could spread its influence over rejects loyalty to a larger Turkic community large parts of Azerbaijan’s territory. as anti-Islamic. The main task of Muslim --The second, and less influential, group society, according to the party, is to block the are Turkish non-traditional religious spread of American civilization. But the true organizations, such as the Nurchular or principal enemy of the Muslim world is a Fattulachilar. Masonic conspiracy directed by Israel. In a --Last, but not least, are the Wahhabi or bizarre rapprochement with Russian neo- Salafi movements. The adherents of the fascist ideology, the IPA advocates an Salafi Islamists in Azerbaijan are growing alliance between Islamists and the Russian faster than any other stream of Islam. Orthodox Church to destroy the “enemies of humanity” at their Tel Aviv headquarters.27 The Islamist Party of Azerbaijan (IPA) Such ideas, propagated in the party’s The highest-profile organization in this organs Islam Dunyasi (Islamic World) and category is the Islamist Party of Azerbaijan Islamyn Sesi (Voice of Islam), were not well (IPA), which has been very much influenced received elsewhere in Azerbaijan since they by Iran. Iranian religious missionaries ha ve conflicted with the country’s generally held been energetic in southern Azerbaijan, as beliefs. The main influences on the IPA’s well as in villages around Baku, where the ideology are in fact external--late Soviet and population is predominantly Shi’a Muslim. Iranian ideas. Furthermore, there exists what The IPA was established in November 1991 might be called a crackpot tone to the IPA’s in the village of near Baku. The propaganda that does not play well in party was officially registered in 1992. Its Azerbaijan. It asserts, for instance, that leader, Al Akram Hajji, is a trained organizations like the UN, UNESCO, and philologist who, apparently unqualified in his OSCE are being manipulated by Masons and profession, long worked loading trucks and as Zionists to make Azerbaijan an American a food shop clerk.26 vassal. 28 This rhetoric stirs up antagonism

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Anar Valiyev within nationalist groups, because it echoes the Imdad Khomeini committee being one of Iranian attacks on Azerbaijan for cooperating the main such groups. By 2001, the with the and Israel. Finally, in committee had 415 offices across Azerbaijan. 1995, the party’s top leadership was accused The committee distributed humanitarian aid of a coup attempt and imprisoned. for free and built new houses and infrastructure while also illegally smuggling Hizballah radical religious literature from Iran into As early as 1993, the Iranian group Azerbaijan. Hizballah began working in Azerbaijani refugee camps. By early 1997, newspapers The Salafi Islamists reported that hundreds of young Azerbaijanis Numerous articles and news reports have had been trained in Iranian Hizballah camps. been published concerning Salafi Islamist After their graduation, they were sent back activity in Azerbaijan. However, most tend to home to proliferate Hizballah’s ideas. It is be antagonistic and superficial. Journalists, very difficult to analyze the activity of the government, and the official Shi’a clergy Hizballah in Azerbaijan due to the lack of have all helped create a negative public reliable information. In February 1997, a opinion of Salafi Islamists, tending to present famous Azerbaijani scholar, the academician them as either terrorists, heretics, or both. Ziya Bunyatov, was assassinated in Baku. Many Azeris often refer to Salafi Islamists in The Ministry of National Security (MNS) a derogatory manner and dismiss them as accused Hizballah of the political “Wahhabis,” sakkalilar (bearded people), or assassination. Leaders of Hizballah, garasakkalilar (black-bearded people). according to MNS, accused Bunyatov of Despite this campaign, the number and being an agent of the Israeli Mossad and of influence of Salafi Islamists in Azerbaijan is disseminating in Azerbaijan. Five steadily gr owing. Salafi ideas are becoming people were arrested and sentenced to long increasingly popular among the younger terms. However, the head of the organization, generation. In Baku alone, which is the ultra- Tariel Ramazanov, successfully escaped to secular capital of Azerbaijan, the number of Iran. Salafi Islamists has reportedly reached The death of this scholar became a signal 15,000. 29 for a full-scale attack against all Iranian- The first Salafi missionaries arrived in affiliated organizations. In the fall of 2001, Azerbaijan from the Northern Caucasus in the MNA arrested six citizens in possession the mid-1990s. The majority of them came of documents proving their connection with from Chechnya and Dagestan, where the Hizballah. Additionally, a network consisting Salafi Islamists had some influence primarily of thirty people was revealed. During the due to the Russian-Chechen wars. For a short interrogations, members of Hizballah openly while, Salafi Islamists made some inroads in rejected the secular regime of Azerbaijan. Chechnya and were even able to create their own self-ruled area in the Dagestani villages The Committee Imdad Khomeini of Karamaxi and Chobanmakhi. However, Ever since December 1993, Iranian Salafi Islamists did not stop in Chechnya and organizations have targeted Azerbaijani Dagestan, and instead, extended their displaced persons for extensive propaganda, activities into Azerbaijan. Initially, they did

8 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic not gain wide support among Azeris, as is Gammet Suleyma nov, a graduate of the nationalism and pan-Turkism were much World Islamic University of Medina, a more popular than Islam. Moreover, in the leading center for the study and export of immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Salafism. USSR, Azeri society was not as deeply There are essentially three factors driving impoverished and divided as it is today. In the expansion of Salafism in Azerbaijan. addition, 65 to 70 percent of Azeris are First, the overwhelming majority of adherents of Shi’a Islam, and hence have indigenous Salafi Islamists are Sunni little regard for Salafi ideas. The Shi’a Muslims from ethnic minorities. This Muslims of Azerbaijan–for both historical constituency sees Salafism as a counter- and cultural reasons–are heavily influenced balance to the growing Iranian influence in by Iran, a country whose government is Azerbaijan. widely regarded as the archrival of the Salafi Second, the rapid polarization and Islamists. Given Azerbaijan’s Shi’a impoverishment of Azeri society has led to a complexion, the religious Sunni of rural pervasive disillusionment with traditional northern Azerbaijan form the primary institutions and modern Western democratic constituency of Salafism in the country. ideas. Salafi Islamists have cleverly tapped The second wave of Salafi expansion into this pool of profound discontent, started with the beginning of the Second frequently criticizing the corruption of the Russo-Chechen War in 1999. The Russian government, the decline of morality and military command tried to push Chechen traditions, as well as the rise of criminality in rebels–particularly those of Salafi the country. orientation–out of the Northern Caucasus into Thirdly, Salafi Islamists tout the the neighboring states of and universalistic qualities of their ideology, and Azerbaijan. Thus, some of the 8,000 Chechen the fact that it supposedly transcends all refugees who arrived in Azerbaijan in 1999- Islamist and traditions. This is 2000 were persecuted Chechen Salafi particularly appealing in Azerbaijan where Islamists.30 Meanwhile, missionaries from the sectarian rivalry between Shi’a and Sunni has Persian Gulf countries dramatically increased been on the rise. their activities in Azerbaijan. The government of Azerbaijan does not By 2003, 65 new Salafi-controlled condone Salafism or its adherents. In the mosques had been established in Azerbaijan. mid-1990s, the Azeri government tolerated One of the largest Salafi mosques in the Salafi Islamists, fearing that intolerance country is the Abu Bakr mosque. Built in would irritate the rich Persian Gulf states 1997 in Baku by the Azeri branch of the from whom it sought financial aid. From Kuwaiti society Revival of Islamic Heritage, 2001 to 2003, however, the situation changed Abu Bakr became one of the most successful dramatically, as the Azeri government began mosques in Azerbaijan. While the Shi’a or to persecute the Salafi Islamists. One of the Sunni mosques are usually able to attract main reasons for this policy shift was the approximately 300 people for Friday prayers, rapidly increasing number of Salafi mosques. the number of people visiting the Abu Bakr Another reason was the Salafi community’s mosque typically reaches 5,000 to 7,000 preference for electing their imams people.31 The imam of the Abu Bakr mosque

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Anar Valiyev themselves rather than allowing the By the end of 2001, Azeri authorities government to appoint them. launched an unofficial campaign against the However, arguably, the most important Salafi Islamists. Taking into consideration reason is the Salafi Islamists’ serious that large groups of Salafi Islamists are opposition to the current autocratic Azeri Chechens, the authorities attempted to create regime. In their preaching, Salafi Islamists unfavorable conditions for Chechen refugees. blame the government for a number of As a result, Aslan Maskhadov, the leader of failures, ranging from the defeat in the the Chechen resistance, advised Chechens to Karabakh conflict with Armenia to the moral leave Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, the decay of society. Alarmingly for the Azeri authorities started a ruthless campaign against establishment, Salafi Islamists do not make a Azeri Salafi Islamists. For a short while, secret of their aspirations to acquire political many mosques were shut down and regional power in Azerbaijan. In 2001, the Court on police forces were instructed to crush Salafi Heavy Crimes sentenced twelve Azeris who cells by any means necessary. aspired to fight in Chechnya. During the trial, Suleymanov, the imam of the Abu Bakr Turkish Direction mosque (who is often referred to as “emir” The Turkish Islamist organization called rather than “imam” in order to differentiate Nurcular has expanded its network in himself from the Shi’a), was summoned to Azerbaijan as well. This organization has the court to testify. All the would-be founded several secondary schools in mujahideen had been frequent visitors of the Azerbaijan and has links with some Turkish Abu Bakr mosque and were recruited there politicians and companies. The Turkish mass by Chechen rebels. media reported that the Turkish Education Another trial concerning the Pan-Islamist Ministry is conducting an investigation, Hizb-ut Tahrir organization also revealed that which could result in the closure of many its members had visited the Abu Bakr educational institutions both in Turkey and mosque. In May 2002, the deputy minister of Azerbaijan, because they were set up by national security, Tofiq Babayev, stated that a followers of last century’s Islamic scholar number of Arab countries were interested in Said Nursi (1876-1960). Nurcular appeared spreading radical Wahhabism in Azerbaijan. in Azerbaijan right after the country gained According to Babayev, over 300 Azeris had independence. They began by creating a been trained in Wahhabi centers in Dagestan. television channel, but lacking a large The deputy minister identified three stages in audience, soon turned their priority to the effort to make Wahhabism a grassroots schools. This group, however, is not seen as a movement in Azerbaijan. First, there is the subversive threat. spread of Wahhabi literature and the provision of financial assistance to potential THE PROSPECTS activists. The second stage involves the As in many other countries, which have efficient training of the activists, and the final adopted the religion, Islam in Azerbaijan has stage deals with the mobilization of active always been unique because of the influence members for acts of terrorism designed to of the particular local history and conditions. destabilize the state.32 For Azeris, the pirs (the tombs of “saints” or people with extraordinary abilities) became

10 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic places of prayer and worship rather than between the average person and the top one mosques. For the majority of the population, or two percent who own everything;” and Islam was considered a tradition rather than a take advantage of the fact that “no one seems religion. That is why for many Azerbaijanis it to care” about democracy. 34 These signs, in a seems to be blasphemy or a form of country that neighbors Iran, should elicit intimidation to return to what foreign concern. Islamists consider to be “pure Islam.” It can Meanwhile, the proliferation of Salafi well be said that in Azerbaijan, Islam does Islamist ideas among religious and ethnic not act as an independent force in society or minorities could create powerful centrifugal politics. It is respected, it is used, but it is not forces that will in due course threaten the obeyed.33 Most likely, the secular tendencies national unity of Azerbaijan. Contrary to their of materialism and popular culture will own propaganda, the Salafi Islamists are prevail. exacerbating sectarian tensions in the However, things could change. Elements country. They have already destroyed several of today’s religious situation in Azerbaijan Shi’a places of worship, which has created ill are similar to those of Iran in the early 1970s: feeling. In the very worst-case scenario, disenchantment with a debauched and serious violence directed toward the majority corrupted government, concern over a grave Shi’a community could provoke some form economic situation, anger over repression, of Iranian intervention, not least because the and disappointment with democracy. If this Iranians are anxious to curtail Salafi situation continues, it is clear that religious influence in Azerbaijan. But more alarming is organizations with ample foreign financing the Salafi Islamists’ skillful exposure and will recruit more followers. After all, even manipulation of the establishment’s during the Iranian revolution a large portion incompetence, coupled with the increasing of the population did not want Islamism but impoverishment of the country, which could simply united behind an Islamist leadership make them a powerful political force in the to overthrow an unpopular government. mid- term. This will inevitably lead to a harsh As the leader of the opposition Popular security crackdown, which could, in turn, Front Party, Ali Karimli, stated in February provoke serious acts of terrorism in the 2005, due to the restriction of the secular country. Aside from destabilizing the political opposition, Islamists are getting government, the risks to the United States-- stronger. As Karimli put it, “On Fridays more which has made considerable diplomatic, than three or four thousand people turn up at economic and security investments in services in every mosque in a country where I Azerbaijan--are self-evident. cannot gather fifty people together for a meeting!” In discussing the issues being *Anar Valiyev is a Ph.D. candidate in Public exploited by Islamists he cited the Karabakh Affairs at the University of Louisville in conflict, arguing that though Azerbaijani Kentucky. His areas of interest include urban territory is invaded and there are four UN terrorism, public policy of post-Soviet resolutions supporting this, “because we are countries, governance, and democracy. The Muslim, our rights are not respected.” He author would like to thank Diana Schwarz for also pointed out that the Islamists highlight her insightful comments. the “extreme poverty and the huge inequality

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Anar Valiyev

NOTES http://www.azstat.org/publications/yearbo 1 CIA, The World Factbook ok/2002/en/002_20.shtml. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factb ook /geos/aj.html. Religious affiliation is 8 Raul Motika, “Islam in Post-Soviet still nominal in Azerbaijan. In its surveys, Azerbaijan,” Archives de Sciences Sociales the State Statistical Committee does des inquire about religious affiliation. , Vol. 115 (Summer 2001), p.113. 2 A. Polonskiy, “Islam v Kontekste Obshestvennoy Jizni Sovremennogo 9 Anar Valiyev, Impact of Zoroastrianism Azerbaijana,” Istoriya, Vol. 28 (Winter on Mentality and Traditions of 1999), p. 11. Azerbaijanis (1999). Unpublished http://www.1september.ru/ru/his/99/his28 manuscript. .htm. 10 Farida Mammadova, Political History 3 Tair Faradov, “Religiosity in Post- and Historical Geography of Soviet Azerbaijan: A Sociological (Baku: Nashr, 1986), Survey,” ISIM Newsletter (September pp. 37-38. 2001), p. 28. 11 http://www.isim.nl/files/newsl_8.pdf. Valiyev, Impact of Zoroastrianism.

12 4 Human Development Report 2004 (New Ali Abasov, “Islam v Sovremennom York, United Nations Development Azerbaijane: Obrazhi I Realii,” in D.E. Program, 2004). Furman (ed.), Azerbaijan I Rossia: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/. Obshhestva I Gosudarstva (: Sakharov Foundation, 2001). 5 , “Azerbaijan in http://www.sakharov- Transition to the ‘New Age of center.ru/azrus/az_009.htm.

Democracy,’” Communist and Post- 13 Communist Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 Ibid.

(2003), pp. 342-43. 14 , “Azerbaijan:

The Hidden Faces of Islam,” World 6 Azerbaijan - Poverty reduction strategy Policy Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall paper and joint IDA-IMF staff 2002), p. 69. assessment, Vol. 1, World Bank report,

April 2003, p. 4. Access online at: 15 Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian http://www- Azerbaijan 1905-1920 (Cambridge wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_ University Press: Cambridge, 1985), p. 8. Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000160016_2 0030506140627 16 Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan: The Hidden Faces of Islam,” p. 70. 7 State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan Republic.

12 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2005) Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic

17 Abasov, “Islam v Sovremennom 29 Azeri Official Lauds Shrinking Clout Azerbaijane: Obrazhi I Realii.” of Missionaries. Azerbaijan TV station ANS, December 28, 2004. 18 Abasov, “Islam v Sovremennom Azerbaijane: Obrazhi I Realii.” 30 Anar Valiyev, “The Rise of Salafi Islam in Azerbaijan,” Terrorism Monitor, 19 Ibid. Vol. 3, No. 13 (July 1, 2005), p. 6. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/new 20 Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan: The s/article.php?articleid=2369735. Hidden Faces of Islam,” p. 72. 31 Interview with Imam of Abu Bakr 21 Law on Freedom of Worship, 1992. mosque, Kavkazskiy Vestnik. Accessed Azerbaijan Legislature. Baku, 1996. May 24, 2004. www.kvestnik.org.

22 Polonskiy, “Islam v Kontekste 32 Turan News Agency, March 17, 2001. Obshestvennoy Jizni Sovremennogo www.turaninfo.com. Azerbaijana,” p. 11. 33 Polonskiy, “Islam v Kontekste 23 Ibid, p. 11. Obshestvennoy Jizni Sovremennogo

24 Azerbaijana,” p. 13. Turan News Agency, September 3, 1998. www.turaninfo.com. 34 Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony Committee. Testimony by Zeyno Baran, 25 Nairi Tohidi, “The Global-Local Director of International Security and Intersection of Feminism in Muslim Energy Programs, The Nixon Center, Societies: The Cases of Iran and March 8, 2005. Azerbaijan,” Social Research, Vol 69,

No. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 853-54.

26 Polonskiy, “Islam v Kontekste Obshestvennoy Jizni Sovremennogo Azerbaijana,” p. 12.

27 Islam Dunyasi, April, 1994.

28 R.M. Hasanov, “Islam v Obshhestvenno-Politicheskoi Zhizni Azerbaijana,” Socis, Vol. 1 (Spring 2003). http://2001.isras.ru/SocIs/SocIsArticles/2 003_03/GasanovRM.doc.

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