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Classifying the Methods of Middle Eastern Terrorist Recruitment

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Classifying the Methods of Middle Eastern Terrorist Recruitment INEGMA Special Report No. 11 Conduits to Terror - Classifying the Methods of Middle Eastern Terrorist Recruitment Amira Choueiki, Intern, Georgia Institute of Technology Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director of R&D, INEGMA November 2010 Copyright © INEGMA 2010 Any party interested in quoting this study or reproducing it in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, information storage and retrieval) may do so on the condition of providing full attribution to the author and to INEGMA. Reprints are available on request. The views expressed in this Special Report are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the official views of any government. Established in 2001, the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) was set up as a Middle East think-tank focusing on military and strategic affairs of the wider region. INEGMA also provides a range of specialist services to clients in government, military, and commercial companies operating in Middle East defense and security, including; Strategy and Risk Management, PR and Marketing Consultancy, and Events Organization. INEGMA is a Free Zone Limited Liability Company based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Beirut, Lebanon. Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis Special Report No. 11 Introduction Over the past decade, world security forces have faced a phenomenon of the “KKK-gone-global”: religious extremist organizations that not only act domestically, but around the world. Knowing that it is too difficult to defeat the United States and other world powers militarily, al-Qaeda and its supporting organizations and franchises have pledged to fight their opponents in two ways: by draining them economically and keeping them distracted, and spread thin by creating threats around the globe. Critics argue that Western powers have succumbed to these tactics, by focusing and committing resources and intelligence on a specific arena such as Iraq or Afghanistan. In doing this, they are “forgetting that al-Qaeda has always been a networked transnational movement with an existent central leadership along with affiliates and associates and assorted hangers-on scattered across multiple operational environments.”1 Backing local causes and also acquiring these activists for their own greater agenda, it is significant to note that with the Christmas Day Bomber in 2009, Al- Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) retaliated against the U.S presence in Yemen not on local soil, but internationally. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claims support of the Time Square bomber, and encourages the targeting of nations with troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan.2 Today, government officials and experts in defense and terrorism are debating whether terrorist organizations in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asian regions are growing “stronger” or “weaker.” Objectively speaking, it is extremely difficult to define the meaning of what makes a terrorist organization “strong” and “weak.” To quote the Irish Republican Army (IRA) after a failed 1984 assassination attack on then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Brighton, England: “Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always.” As long as allied forces are committed to the region in conflict with troop casualties almost daily, radicalized western citizens and immigrants are being discovered crossing borders into Afghanistan and Pakistan to join these groups, events such as the 2009 Fort Hood shooting and 2007 London Bombings, and even failed attempts such as the Times Square bomber of May 2010 or the Belgian case in December 2008, they are strong enough. While we are able to understand some of the mindsets and characteristics of organizations like these from past examples, many of their operations have truly developed with new technologies and access to communication channels. Today, we find a more decentralized, flatter web structure – inside Afghanistan alone, there are more than 150 distinct groups connected to the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda.3 This is in addition to other affiliates and terrorist organizations around the region, some of which are noted in Table 1. While deferring in their missions and visions, these groups come together under an age-old unifier – a common enemy. So many groups working both in tandem and individually creates a two sided conundrum for the forces working to combat them. Scattered around a country like Afghanistan or a region as large and diverse as the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, leadership hierarchies can become less concrete, orders more likely to be diffused, internal competition strong, alliance loyalty shifty, and operations often barely structured. While this can result in failed mission attempts due to internal organizational chaos, it also creates a “leaderless resistance”4 providing flexibility and vitality when being chased by counterterrorist efforts.5 This also quickens the “operational tempo”6 at which 1 Hoffman, Bruce, “American Jihad,” The National Interest, No. 107, May/June 2010, pp. 17-24 2 Byman, Daniel L. “Coming to America: The Rise of Al Qaeda Affiliate Groups.” Brookings Saban Center for Middle East Policy. September 19, 2010. 3 Frontline. “Behind Taliban Lines.” Public Broadcasting Service. February, 2010. 4 Joyce-Hasham, M. “Emerging Threats on the Internet.” The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Briefing Paper: New Series No. 15. 2000. 5 Weimann, G. “Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges.” Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006. 1 Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis Special Report No. 11 these groups function. Bringing in recruits, Name Location Affiliate training them and deploying for an attack Al-Qaida Central Afghanistan/ Al-Qaida (Osama faster than in the past creates a situation in (AQC) Pakistan Bin Laden, which the event has a higher probability of Ayman al- occurrence because of fewer pre-operational Zawahiri) steps and opportunities to be discovered. At Al-Qaida Arabian Yemen Al-Qaida Peninsula (AQAP) the same time, this is not a careful plan with highly-skilled operators, resulting in botched Al-Qaida in the Land Iraq Al-Qaida of Two Rivers (AQI) attacks that occur on a much smaller scale. Al-Qaida in the Algeria, Nigeria, Al-Qaida (Abu From the perspective that people are the core Islamic Maghreb Mali, Niger Musab Abdel (AQIM) Wadoud) of any organizations’ sustainable Harakat Al-Shabab Somalia Al-Qaida achievement, and that manpower is a critical success factor for terrorists, this report will Brigade 313 Waziristan, Pakistan Al-Qaida investigate the recruiting and training methods and trends in terrorist organizations Taliban in Afghanistan Taliban (Mullah of the Middle East and Central Asia. The Afghanistan Omar) source of much disagreement today is whether recruitment is driven by a central Tehrik-I-Taliban Waziristan/Orakzai Taliban, Haqqani Pakistan (TTP) Pakistan (Baitullah leadership structure or more “bottom-up” in Mehsud) that actors self-radicalize and carry out an Haqqani Network Waziristan, Pakistan Taliban, Al-Qaida attack.7 The first camp, led by Marc (Jalaluddin Sageman8, feels that top Al-Qaida leadership Haqqani) Hezb-I-Islami Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, Taliban has been contained adequately and the focus Refugee camps in (Gulbuddin must shift to addressing self radicalization in Pakistan Hekmatyar) communities abroad, acting independently of Lashkar-E-Taiba Pakistan, but known Al-Qaida, TTP an international organization. The other, (LET) for attacks in 9 Mumbai defended by Bruce Hoffman, describes the Sipah-E-Sahaba Punjab, India and Al-Qaida, TTP very existence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliate Pakistan, Lashkjar-E- FATA, Pakistan organizations spreading across the globe as Jhangvi (LEJ), Jaish- E-Mohammed (JEM) proof that its ideology and centralized core Egyptian Islamic Egypt Al-Qaida are driving formal recruitment and allowing it Jihad/Qaida al-Jihad to thrive. The first step to defeating these Libyan Islamic Libya Al-Qaida organizations as this side believes is to Fighting Group eliminate the top leaders. Table 1: Some of the main terrorist organizations in the Obviously, understanding the origin of Central Asian/Middle East/North Africa region10 radicalization enables nations and communities to choose how best to invest resources and the insight required to build effective and appropriate counterterrorist programs to prevent this radicalization. Using a one-size fits all approach may not only result in ineffectiveness, but can also be counterproductive. But describing this as an either/or dichotomy is overly simplistic and inaccurate if we hope to understand a more complex reality. This report argues that strong evidence suggests that both streams, in addition to others, act simultaneously in less black and white 6 Hoffman, Bruce. “Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving Tool While Protecting Free Speech?” Written Testimony to House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment. May 26, 2010. 7 Picarelli, John T. “The Future of Terrorism.” National Institute of Justice Journal. Issue 264. November 2009. 8 Sageman, Marc. “Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century.” University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 9 Hoffman, Bruce. “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008. 10 For more on groups within Afghanistan/Pakistan, see “Inside Talibanistan”
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