Classifying the Methods of Middle Eastern Terrorist Recruitment

INEGMA Special Report No. 11

Conduits to Terror - Classifying the Methods of Middle Eastern Terrorist Recruitment

Amira Choueiki, Intern, Georgia Institute of Technology Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director of R&D, INEGMA

Any party interested in quoting this study or reproducing it in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, information storage and retrieval) may do so on the condition of providing full attribution to the author and to INEGMA. Reprints are available on request.

The views expressed in this Special Report are solely those of the authors and do not reﬂect the ofﬁcial views of any government.

Established in 2001, the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) was set up as a Middle East think-tank focusing on military and strategic affairs of the wider region. INEGMA also provides a range of specialist services to clients in government, military, and commercial companies operating in Middle East defense and security, including; Strategy and Risk Management, PR and Marketing Consultancy, and Events Organization. INEGMA is a Free Zone Limited Liability Company based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Beirut, Lebanon. Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis Special Report No. 11

Introduction

Over the past decade, world security forces have faced a phenomenon of the “KKK-gone-global”: religious extremist organizations that not only act domestically, but around the world. Knowing that it is too difficult to defeat the United States and other world powers militarily, al-Qaeda and its supporting organizations and franchises have pledged to fight their opponents in two ways: by draining them economically and keeping them distracted, and spread thin by creating threats around the globe. Critics argue that Western powers have succumbed to these tactics, by focusing and committing resources and intelligence on a specific arena such as Iraq or Afghanistan. In doing this, they are “forgetting that al-Qaeda has always been a networked transnational movement with an existent central leadership along with affiliates and associates and assorted hangers-on scattered across multiple operational environments.”1 Backing local causes and also acquiring these activists for their own greater agenda, it is significant to note that with the Christmas Day Bomber in 2009, Al- Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) retaliated against the U.S presence in Yemen not on local soil, but internationally. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claims support of the Time Square bomber, and encourages the targeting of nations with troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan.2

Today, government officials and experts in defense and terrorism are debating whether terrorist organizations in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asian regions are growing “stronger” or “weaker.” Objectively speaking, it is extremely difficult to define the meaning of what makes a terrorist organization “strong” and “weak.” To quote the Irish Republican Army (IRA) after a failed 1984 assassination attack on then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Brighton, England: “Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always.” As long as allied forces are committed to the region in conflict with troop casualties almost daily, radicalized western citizens and immigrants are being discovered crossing borders into Afghanistan and Pakistan to join these groups, events such as the 2009 Fort Hood shooting and 2007 London Bombings, and even failed attempts such as the Times Square bomber of May 2010 or the Belgian case in December 2008, they are strong enough.

While we are able to understand some of the mindsets and characteristics of organizations like these from past examples, many of their operations have truly developed with new technologies and access to communication channels. Today, we find a more decentralized, flatter web structure – inside Afghanistan alone, there are more than 150 distinct groups connected to the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda.3 This is in addition to other affiliates and terrorist organizations around the region, some of which are noted in Table 1. While deferring in their missions and visions, these groups come together under an age-old unifier – a common enemy.

So many groups working both in tandem and individually creates a two sided conundrum for the forces working to combat them. Scattered around a country like Afghanistan or a region as large and diverse as the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, leadership hierarchies can become less concrete, orders more likely to be diffused, internal competition strong, alliance loyalty shifty, and operations often barely structured. While this can result in failed mission attempts due to internal organizational chaos, it also creates a “leaderless resistance”4 providing flexibility and vitality when being chased by counterterrorist efforts.5 This also quickens the “operational tempo”6 at which

1 Hoffman, Bruce, “American Jihad,” The National Interest, No. 107, May/June 2010, pp. 17-24 2 Byman, Daniel L. “Coming to America: The Rise of Al Qaeda Affiliate Groups.” Brookings Saban Center for Middle East Policy. September 19, 2010. 3 Frontline. “Behind Taliban Lines.” Public Broadcasting Service. February, 2010. 4 Joyce-Hasham, M. “Emerging Threats on the Internet.” The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Briefing Paper: New Series No. 15. 2000. 5 Weimann, G. “Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges.” Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006. 1

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis Special Report No. 11 these groups function. Bringing in recruits, Name Location Affiliate training them and deploying for an attack Al-Qaida Central Afghanistan/ Al-Qaida (Osama faster than in the past creates a situation in (AQC) Pakistan Bin Laden, which the event has a higher probability of Ayman al- occurrence because of fewer pre-operational Zawahiri) steps and opportunities to be discovered. At Al-Qaida Arabian Yemen Al-Qaida Peninsula (AQAP) the same time, this is not a careful plan with highly-skilled operators, resulting in botched Al-Qaida in the Land Iraq Al-Qaida of Two Rivers (AQI) attacks that occur on a much smaller scale. Al-Qaida in the Algeria, Nigeria, Al-Qaida (Abu From the perspective that people are the core Islamic Maghreb Mali, Niger Musab Abdel (AQIM) Wadoud) of any organizations’ sustainable Harakat Al-Shabab Somalia Al-Qaida achievement, and that manpower is a critical success factor for terrorists, this report will Brigade 313 Waziristan, Pakistan Al-Qaida investigate the recruiting and training methods and trends in terrorist organizations Taliban in Afghanistan Taliban (Mullah of the Middle East and Central Asia. The Afghanistan Omar) source of much disagreement today is whether recruitment is driven by a central Tehrik-I-Taliban Waziristan/Orakzai Taliban, Haqqani Pakistan (TTP) Pakistan (Baitullah leadership structure or more “bottom-up” in Mehsud) that actors self-radicalize and carry out an Haqqani Network Waziristan, Pakistan Taliban, Al-Qaida attack.7 The first camp, led by Marc (Jalaluddin Sageman8, feels that top Al-Qaida leadership Haqqani) Hezb-I-Islami Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, Taliban has been contained adequately and the focus Refugee camps in (Gulbuddin must shift to addressing self radicalization in Pakistan Hekmatyar) communities abroad, acting independently of Lashkar-E-Taiba Pakistan, but known Al-Qaida, TTP an international organization. The other, (LET) for attacks in 9 Mumbai defended by Bruce Hoffman, describes the Sipah-E-Sahaba Punjab, India and Al-Qaida, TTP very existence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliate Pakistan, Lashkjar-E- FATA, Pakistan organizations spreading across the globe as Jhangvi (LEJ), Jaish- E-Mohammed (JEM) proof that its ideology and centralized core Egyptian Islamic Egypt Al-Qaida are driving formal recruitment and allowing it Jihad/Qaida al-Jihad to thrive. The first step to defeating these Libyan Islamic Libya Al-Qaida organizations as this side believes is to Fighting Group eliminate the top leaders. Table 1: Some of the main terrorist organizations in the Obviously, understanding the origin of Central Asian/Middle East/North Africa region10 radicalization enables nations and communities to choose how best to invest resources and the insight required to build effective and appropriate counterterrorist programs to prevent this radicalization. Using a one-size fits all approach may not only result in ineffectiveness, but can also be counterproductive. But describing this as an either/or dichotomy is overly simplistic and inaccurate if we hope to understand a more complex reality. This report argues that strong evidence suggests that both streams, in addition to others, act simultaneously in less black and white

6 Hoffman, Bruce. “Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving Tool While Protecting Free Speech?” Written Testimony to House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment. May 26, 2010. 7 Picarelli, John T. “The Future of Terrorism.” National Institute of Justice Journal. Issue 264. November 2009. 8 Sageman, Marc. “Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century.” University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 9 Hoffman, Bruce. “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008. 10 For more on groups within Afghanistan/Pakistan, see “Inside Talibanistan” by Peter Bergen, Brian Fishman, and Katherine Tiedemann (Foreign Policy, November 2010).

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis Special Report No. 11 processes to feed the needs of the larger group. Just like any other organization, these extremist clusters utilize multiple methods to recruit for their operations, and work through different outlets for different purposes. Rather than blanket statements regarding overall capacity through solely bottom-up or top-down analysis, it is necessary to investigate individual parts and operations of these organizations to understand how they are adapting to the new forces around them in order to form our own intelligent action.

Conduits to Terror

Rather than beginning with theory to describe cases, this report began studying actual incidents of recognized terrorists, working backward to understand the pathways leading to their radicalization and action. It became clear that three main factors play into how a person is identified, “primed” for the message, integrated into the organization, and trained. We must throw out any preconceived notion of what a potential terrorist looks like. Unconfined to a specific geographic area, these organizations are unlike the monolithic entities we’ve faced in the past. An impoverished, uneducated and desperate child is not brought into Taliban operations the same way as an educated, middle class, radicalized German – and both types of fighters exist. In a 2006 RAND Corporation study, Gerwehr and Daly state, “hindering recruitment strikes a blow at [Al-Qaida’s] ability to function. A first step toward hindering [their] recruitment is to understand how it works— where al-Qaida recruits, what tools it uses, whom it targets, and why.”11 Determining a general model to describe how every single person within a terrorist organization joined is rather impossible, as motives and paths are as unique as every human. Most of the time, a person deciding to join an organization does so slowly, with repeated interactions with recruiters, other members of the organization, or (in in more of the Western cases) materials such as websites or books. However, by using a pathway thought process, terrorism is not seen as “the product of a single decision but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to violence over time.”12 The following is an attempt to build a framework using current cases of terrorists to assess where and how they were brought into the organization.

Institutional Presence and Influence: Location of the Target(s) and Role of Terrorist Organization in Society

The first point to identify is where the person is physically standing. How connected is their area to a central terrorist network (are they living in the tribal areas of Pakistan or suburban Virginia)? Is the influence and presence of the terrorist organization already occurring through close proximity to organized structure and resources? What is the role of the organization in the area; is it more covert (as in the Gulf) or overt (in northern Afghanistan)?

This factor separates in the way that the main origin-of-threat debate describes, but examples will soon show that they are both operational. For the purposes of this report, institutional influence can be considered at four levels: 1) The central core leadership of the organization, (ex. Osama Bin Laden); 2) Official affiliates of the organization, (ex. Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula or AQAP); 3) Loosely tied allied groups, (ex. the various smaller groups in Afghanistan that somewhat follow the Taliban but also adhere to an agenda of their own); and 4) Individuals or very small groups working in Western countries or away from the MENA/Central Asian region that identify (unofficially)

11 Gerweher, Scott and Daly, Sara. “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment.” The RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division. 2006. 12 McCormick, G.H. “Terrorist Decision Making.” Annual Review of Political Science. June 2003. p. 492.

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with these groups. The two branches have been labeled the “Traditional” (but still present) and “Emerging” (and rapidly changing) pathways.

The more traditional path of recruitment takes place within an arena where an institutionalized central leadership targets or simply “shepherds in” people around them (Levels 1-3). The bottom branch, or emerging path, accounts for cases of radicalized individuals and groups living in the West, using everything from social networking technologies to finding radical message boards on their own to preaching within an immigrant community (Level 4). However, it is important to note that past events show that those that have gone forward to carry out an attack were in touch with overseas trained operatives that were from a formal organization. There are few cases of an individual who entirely self radicalized in Islam, planned and executed an attack of significant size entirely on their own having had no contact with a guiding support system.

Situation and Background: Profile of the Target(s)

This stage of the model factors in whether or not the audience/person in question is “primed” for the terrorist organization’s message. Here, we can learn much from research concerning the economic and social factors that drive people to join these groups. Questions to ask at this stage include: Is this already a conservative community or one that supports the institutional force present? How much convincing of the overall mission is needed? Is this a child or young person living in dire circumstances? What type of motivation to join these groups is present? Is this an immigrant in a western country living in an isolated community? Is this person a vulnerable target because of economic, security, or psychological issues?

It has also been repeatedly seen that the common perception of someone wanting to join a terrorist organization is not always correct. Mohammad Atta, an architectural engineer by training, was one of the main directors of the 9/11 attacks, and spurred several deeper investigations into non- traditional terrorist suspects. One study found an incredible representation of higher trained persons in radical organizations across the region of our study, discovering a history of engineers and other degrees earned in business, medicine and economics in countries ranging from Egypt, Palestine, Turkey, Saudi Arabia to Singapore.13 An astonishing 69 percent of the 404 members they studied across 30 nationalities and nine larger groups had completed at least some kind of higher education. One conclusion was that in this region, especially in the traditional Middle East, a lack of professional opportunities for middle-range graduates was increasingly frustrating populations. This issue of a rising bulge of young professionals seeking employment in a region unprepared for them has been a much-cited cause for resorting to radical activity.14

Community of the Target(s)

The final factor in determining the approach of recruitment is to examine the concentration of the audience being targeted. Does the individual exist in a “low” (ranging from a small target demographic audience to an isolated “floater” or small group of friends) or a “high” (more community level) setting? How easy is the recruiter able to reach a large amount of people? This will determine the specific types of actions and communication methods taken to capture the attention of the potential recruit(s).

Several researchers assert now that one of the strongest influences on organization members is their relationships with friends and family.15 They cling “not so much the Koran or religious teachings as a

13 Gambetta, Diego and Hertog, Steffen. “Engineers of Jihad.” University of Oxford, Paper #2007-10. 14 Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad and Dhillon, Navtej. “Stalled Youth Transitions in the Middle East.” The Middle East Youth Initiative, No. 8. October 2008. 15 Sageman, Marc. “Understanding Terror Networks.” Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2004.

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis Special Report No. 11 thrilling cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends.”16 Relationships are also crucial to the predominant17 “rational prospectors” theory of recruiters. In this, recruiters 1) identify a person with potential to be recruited and 2) use rationale, reasons for joining and opportunities for participation based on the individual.18 Even when it comes to suicide bombing, a seemingly a personal choice, research has shown that people making this extreme decision are often manipulated by the pressures and belief structures of the group. Whether a young girl from Palestine or a group of marginalized young Muslim men in Europe, it is important to understand the greater context of the social pressures surrounding them.

Applying the Framework

In order to provide empirical grounds for this conceptual framework, this report will now address a selection of recent terrorists and how they have been recruited through these various channels. The application of these dimensions in reality can also be described through historical examples of cult and extremist groups, and important lessons can be learned from past practices. Gerwehr and Daly also described communication methods (Figure 1) and recruitment models (Figures 2-4) they observed. Plugging this onto the end of the framework previously described, we can utilize some of this terminology in order to identify specific tactics to look for in different geographic and situational instances.

The Traditional Threat We begin addressing the top branch of the framework, believed by some to be a diminishing avenue for influence of terrorist groups in recruiting new members because of a disappearing core leadership. We find however, that this is very much untrue. While drone attacks rain on operation centers in Pakistan, organizations have adapted to be able to replace people in top positions as soon as soon as needed,19 20 maintaining a strong membership pipeline across Figure 1: Gerwehr and Daly several regional groups (as show in Table 1). As Hoffman describes, this “central-periphery” model, the best trained members hideout in safe havens, commanding and overseeing outside operations. While a smaller scale

16 Atran, Scott. “Pathways to and From Violent Extremism: The Case for Science-Based Field Research” Statement to the Sentate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities.” 17 Borum, Randy. “Understanding Terrorist Psychology.” Chapter 2 in Andrew Silke (Ed.) The Psychology of Counter- Terrorism (Forthcoming) Oxon, UK: Routledge 18 Brady, H., Schlozman, K. & Verba, S. “Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, pp. 153-168. 1999. 19 Authors’ interview with Afghani source for NATO forces, October 2010. 20 In a talk at the Brookings Institution, Bruce Hoffman describes the quick transition in Al-Qaida leadership after predators killed two top officials saying “they have a deeper bench than we thought.” The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism, May 28, 2008.

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis Special Report No. 11 example, the IRA has demonstrated how a limited-size radical leadership group can command an organization that has broken up into various successive organizations throughout the 20th century,21 and as of September 2010, is still labeled a “substantial” threat to the UK. Yet another case of a small group able to hold onto power, the Red Army Faction in West Germany continued attacks throughout 1960-1990. With a management philosophy described as “centralization of decision and decentralization of execution,22” Al-Qaeda and the Taliban continue to attract new members and followers, despite recent wars in their territory. As Peter Bergen says, Al-Qaida is a “force multiplier,” while there may only be a few hundred, these people have experience, helping to train others.

Case 1: Institutional Power Present – Audience Primed – High Concentration This branch requires the least amount of effort required from a central organization. It is also extremely difficult for security forces to combat, because it requires the uprooting of the terrorist leadership in an area and a shift in the mindset of the community. This is where a majority of the groups’ “footsoldier” members come from. The recruitment drive can be public, and populations are responsive because they view the organization if at least not positively, as a means of security. Joining these forces can be seen as honorable to a family, a means for income, or even used by rebellious children as a means to leave home. Recruits do not require an initial convincing of the doctrine, since they are already accustomed to beliefs and practices. One example includes:

 Hafiz Hanif23: A 16 year old boy from Karachi, Hafiz left home to join the jihad. With a senior Taliban official Uncle, he originally planned join the group, but feeling excited to to use his Arabic and knowing it was considered more an elite force, instead joined Al- Qaida. He grew up surrounded by stories of a holy war against Russia, and was seven when the United States invaded. He was drawn in by activities organized that attracted children: getting to drive a car, truck, learn more than he would in school, eat good food and play games on a laptop. He was met by a recruiter who said he would “try and get him in”, thereby adding to the prestige and elusiveness of “being allowed” to join. Training in formal camps in northern Pakistan, Hanif fought eagerly in the names of the leaders he’d heard of.

Case 2: Institutional Power Present – Audience Primed – Low Concentration In this situation, targets are within close proximity of formal operations and also don’t require convincing, but is a smaller audience that the recruiters must approach more carefully. Examples include:

 AQIM quietly recruiting in Kenya and Tanzania within isolated communities and in poverty-stricken economic Figure 2: Gerwher and Daly situations: While these countries contain sizeable Islamic communities, they have not previously identified with larger global calls to Jihad, tending to be more nationalistic, sizing down the target size. Figure 2: Gerwehr and Daly

21 English, Richard. “Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA.” Pan Publishers, March 2004. 22 Al-Hammadi, Khalid. “The Inside Story of al-Qa'ida.” Part 4, Al-Quds al-Arabi, March 22, 2005. 23 Yousafzai, Sami and Moreau, Ron. “Inside Al Qaeda.” Newsweek, September 13, 2010.

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 However, with easy borders and weak state systems, a few spotting have shown that people in these communities are experiencing more outside coordinated efforts.24 This also applies to one of the models suggested, called “the infection.” (Figure 2)  Shamshato Camp, Peshawar: The TTP collects drug addicts from the street, continuing to inject them to maintain their state and dependence, and using them as unaware suicide bombers via remote control explosives.25

Case 3: Institutional Power Present – Audience NOT Primed – High Concentration Facing a recruitment decline in the late 1990’s due to emerging peace and other rising groups the IRA focused on recruiting children. This provided them with a number of benefits: children were a cheap investment, they didn’t need to be paid as high a salary, they were happier with less, they learned quickly, and perhaps most importantly, were not under as strict suspicion of authorities. The Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (LTTE), a secular Tamil nationalist group famously possesses a track record of being innovative in terrorist tactics, and has long used children not only as fighters, but unknowing suicide bombers. With 40percent of armed organizations of the world using children in 75percent of global conflicts, this has become an unfortunate trend.26 In several disturbing examples, children as young as eight had not even grown up in a community that supported terrorist organizations, or even had recruits from the area in the past, but were near enough to an institutional power that they were sucked in. In these cases, children were not predisposed to joining one of these groups, and were either made to by force or slowly indoctrinated.

 LET in northern India: Targeting around 20 young people for recruitment within Jammu and Kashmir, this effort was forced, often holding the youth at gun point and bringing them across the border to be trained. 27  Khor Fakken: This tiny eastern city in the United Arab Emirates was home to Fayed Banihammad, one of the hijackers aboard flight 175 that hit the south World Trade Center building. When he and younger boys in his town were around 10, they began attending youth-group like meetings Figure 3: Gerwehr and Daly and retreats at their local mosque. All from affluent and moderate families (Fayed’s father was an educated high school principal), the boys and their families thought they were simply participating in a religion class. However, over the next ten years, a radical Imam planted by Al-Qaida led activities such as being forced to recite Quran for hours, telling bloody stories of ancient war victories, walking the boys to graveyards in the middle of the night and being told to lie down on a grave. He was slowly psychologically altering the boys at key stages of

24 Rosenau, William. “Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 1. 2005 25 Authors’ interview with Afghani source for NATO forces, October 2010. 26 Singer, P.W. “The New Children of Terror.” Chapter 8 in “The Making of a Terrorist”, James Forest, ed. (Praeger, 2005) 27 Naseem, Ishfaq. “Huge Local Recruitment by LeT, Huji before J-K Polls.” Express India, February 3, 2009.

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development to a point at which they were vulnerable to radicalization. While some boys broke oath and told their families so that they would no longer have to attend, Fayed stuck with it, and at 20 left for “Umrah” in Saudi Arabia. Once there, he called home and said he would not be returning to the UAE, and would be doing Islamic Charity work. In truth, he was taken to Afghanistan for training, and the next time his family heard of him was on TV, identified as one of the 9/11 attackers. Many of the other boys, now young men, remain missing.28 (Communication: Private, Proximate) This reflects a combined “infection” and “funnel” model, demonstrating that groups are not afraid to send someone outside of their own safe zone to target potential recruits.  Following a precedent set by Saddam Hussein who created elite camps for selected children (called Ashbal Saddam - “Saddam’s Lion Cubs”), AQI has seized the potential for integrating children in Iraq into their forces, using videos targeted at young people.29

Case 4: Institutional Power Present – Audience NOT Primed – Low Concentration As security practices have become more proficient at detecting more traditional terrorist suspects, groups have begun to mimic the numerous (but quiet) examples of female attackers. Once again, the LTTE displays their creativity, using women as suicide bombers, including the prominent killing of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 when one woman hid explosives in such a way she appeared pregnant. This tactic has also been repeated by women of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the later 1990’s.30 Lebanese nationalist women used suicide attacks during the 1980s against Israel, while the first “Islamically” motivated female bombers appeared in the early 2000’s when Chechen women, called “Black Widows,” attacked Russian military and political targets. Inspiration spread and in 2002, Wafa Idris became the first Palestinian female suicide bomber, killing one and injuring dozens more.

Most of the groups this report focuses on are located within and create a culture of extreme Islam where women are not allowed to hold leadership positions or even truly participate in any type of activity outside the home. Females are not signing up en masse or feeling a strong sense of duty like their male counterparts, but gradually groups are incorporating targeted females into their ranks by pitching their recruitment in a way that appeals to women. In the West, we have seen how right- wing organizations, such as the KKK, Stormfront, and World Church of the Creator have been able to pull in women using issues most appealing to them. Now in prison, Shelly Shannon committed two acid attacks at women’s health facilities, as well as various arson and bombing attacks in 1992 and attempted murder of a doctor who performed abortions in 1993.31 We may see radical Islamist groups positioning their organization to women as the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has. FARC provides many of the social services in rural areas of Colombia (just as some of our groups do), and in their interactions with women, empathizes that they are disproportionately experiencing inequalities.32 With the success of these operations, as well as the increased media and attention they solicit, this phenomenon may continue to grow.

 In 2003, a Morrocan set of 13 year old twin sisters were stopped by an Imam who alerted authorities when they came to receive his blessings before suicide-bombing the liquor section of a supermarket and a royal event. They had been specifically recruited by an Al- Qaida affiliated group in their slum.33

28 Authors’ interview with resident and friend of the Banihammad family in the UAE, October 2010. 29 Bott, Catherine, et. al. ”Recruitment and Radicalization of School-Aged Youth by International Terrorist Groups.” Homeland Security Institute, April 23, 2009. 30 Cunningham, Karla J. “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 26, pp. 171–195, 2003. 31 Cunningham, Karla J. “Countering Female Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:113–129, 2007. 32 Stanski, Keith. “Terrorism, Gender, and Ideology: A Case Study of Women who Join the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).” Chapter 10 in “The Making of a Terrorist”, James Forest, ed. (Praeger, 2005) 33 McFadden, George. “Counterterrorism Beyond Shock and Awe.” Foreign Policy Forum, December15, 2007.

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 On June 20th, 2010, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a woman who killed two US soldiers and injuring several more bystanders using explosives under her burqa.  AQI is increasingly using women, while 9 percent of world suicide bombers are female, the number raises to 15 percent within Iraq.34 Recently, AQC released a video intro that looks eerily similar to the Twilight series movies, perhaps in an effort to attract a female audience. 35

The Emerging Threat Conduits The development of large isolated communities of immigrants in Western countries, citizens with an ancestral heritage of a country that is experiencing conflict or viewed inequality because of western politics, moderates-turned radical because of different economic, social or political factors, and smaller regional groups outside of the direct influence of core organizational leadership has created an even larger pool of unpredictable people ready to join the global jihad. A trigger event (such as a terrorist attack, the pastor in Florida threatening to burn Qurans, outbreaks of conflict in Palestine, etc.) presents a two-fold side effect for the terrorist organizations. On one end, it increases the number of recruits and donors, people willing to support the cause. On the other, heightened watch, awareness and focus from global authorities makes it difficult to run large, tight communication channels without detection.

In this bottom section of the model, there is little or no institutional power present at the onset of a person becoming radicalized. In a new world with rising amounts of potential recruits and technologies that enable them to connect in loosely associated networks, methods are changing as extremists adapt to their surroundings. Some argue threats from this branch outweigh terrorist plots from more organized forces; acting autonomously and in control of their own actions, these actors can strike literally anywhere and often fly under the radar of typical surveillance. In 2009, there were at least ten Jihadi terrorist plots identified in the United States alone.36 Some of these cases, fortunately, were amateurs simply inspired by larger organizations, while more serious plots (including the tragic shooting at Fort Hood and June shooting at an Alabama military recruiting station) alarmingly included evidence of “an identifiable terrorist command-and-control apparatus.”37

While historical events have shown that more structured training and contact with a formal organization enables a more “successful” plan, there is evidence groups like Al-Qaida are recognizing the higher probability of detection by intelligence agencies and encouraging their followers to “do it on their own.” In the most recent issue of Inspire magazine, Al-Qaida’s publication from Yemen, the following recommendations were set for potential jihadists:

 Do not travel abroad for jihad – act on U.S. soil instead.  Do not use mobile phones and the Internet for any jihad-related communication – if you have to, use coded language and encryption tools.  If you are clean stay clean – do not interact with other activists.  Do not access jihadi websites – get your jihadi propaganda fix from anti-jihadi monitoring sites such as MEMRI and SITE.

Whether or not people will be able to follow this advice, however, is yet to be seen. As previously mentioned and shown in multiple examples, attackers who followed through on their activist beliefs

34 Hosenball, Mark. “U.S. Authorities Worried About Female Suicide Bombers.” NEWSWEEK. Jan. 25 2010. 35 Anzalone, Christopher. “Al-Qa’ida Central’s Media Attempts to Tap into Popularity of “Twilight” Film Series.” Views from the Occident. Oct. 3, 2010. 36 Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2010, pp. 13-17. 37 Hoffman, Bruce, “American Jihad,” The National Interest, no. 107, May/June 2010, pp. 17-24

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis Special Report No. 11 had interactions either via communication with a high-level official of a terrorist organization, training abroad, or were a member of a group. As several scholars have pointed out,38 we have yet to find examples of someone carrying out a large scale coordinated attack having been trained entirely online unaided, replacing the value of hands-on-training. While many resources are available, including suggested readings for jihadist-wannabees, lifestyle practices such as physical exercise, and even manuals for weaponry and videos on warfare tips, this is different than an organized training program. Peter Nesser calls these “practical tools for terrorism”39 and is certainly a launch point for an interested person, although not entirely competent alone.

Case 5: Institutional Power NOT Present – Audience Primed for Message – High Concentration We find examples of this situation in Western countries where a large community of more conservative Muslims exist. Here, the “net” model of recruitment, in which a person or group will publically preach to this open eared group is demonstrated. While perhaps not a formal seed planted by a larger organization, this person is often encouraging members of the community to join the fight or simply stirring up strong feelings of anger towards the larger region in which they live.

 Al Quds Mosque in Hamburg: The meeting place of several of the 9/11 hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, it had a history of preaching radical Sunni Islam until finally being closed in August 2011 by German officials. The men eventually worked with prominent Al-Qaida operatives who directed them to training camps in Afghanistan.  Somalian Communities in the United States and Europe: Condensed Somalian refugee populations, who had poor Figure 4: Gerwehr and Daly knowledge of English and western culture before being placed in large American cities, have been breeding grounds for extremism in places like Minneapolis, Minnesota. As AQIM and AQ affiliates in Africa grow, they have begun reaching out to populations in the United States and Europe.40 Over a year ago, Somali-Americans started disappearing from the Minneapolis-St Paul area and were tracked to Somalia, joining AQIM. Believing it to be an isolated event, American officials soon realized this was a growing trend, over 20 have gone missing from Minnesota and more cases are being discovered across the country. Many of these boys hung out at the local mosque, did not have jobs, and would not have been able to afford the expensive tickets to Somalia, evidence of larger involvement.41  Extreme Salafi mosques in the United States: One recent study of American mosques42 discovered Muslim houses of worship on the edge of creating similar environments to the Hamburg cell. One, Masjid at-Tawheed in Stone Mountain, Georgia stated on their website that they believed “Jews and Christians were waging a war upon Islam” and that

38 Stenersen, Amy. “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20, pp. 215-233. 2008. 39 Nesser, Peter. “How Did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20, pp. 234-256. 2008. 40 Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2009 by Dennis Blair and Michael Maples. 41 Elliott, Andrea. “A Call to Jihad, Answered in America.” New York Times, July 11, 2009. 42 Ahmed, Akbar. “Inside America’s Mosques.” Foreign Policy. September 9, 2010.

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“democracy” is a “criminal path.” While the members and Imam do not believe that people like Osama Bin Laden are correct and simply want to be left alone, it is important to note their existence and be aware of activists these communities may create.

Case 6: Institutional Power NOT Present – Audience Primed for Message – Low Concentration Several of the more high-profile cases have come from persons getting involved through this pathway. These people tend to self-recruit, either on their own or with just a few friends. They are already indoctrinated with extreme beliefs, and go looking for a way to get involved. Because there is not institutional power present, they often travel to a place where they can receive training.

 The “Christmas Day Bomber,” or Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was the son of a wealthy Nigerian banker. Attending international and British private schools before completing his university studies in engineering and finance at University College in London. Having demonstrated devout Muslim characteristics throughout his young life, no one found it strange when he attended an Arabic school in Yemen. However, after remaining there several years, skipping classes and withdrawing, he broke ties with his family and attended lectures by cleric Anwar al-Awlaki at Al-Eman University.43  Ahmed Abdullah Minni: This 20 year old from Virginia caught the attention of a Taliban recruiter in Pakistan when he posted comments on a YouTube Video that showed attacks on American troops. Beginning the dialogue on the YouTube posts, the recruiter than sent Minni a login and password for a Yahoo email address where he had left instructions in a draft email (to avoid a sent email being intercepted).44  The four actors of the July 7th London suicide bombings were later discovered to have tight ties to Al-Qaida, two having attended an official camp.45  Five Alexandria, Virginia men ranging in age from their late teens to their mid 20s were found in Pakistan among Islamic militants after their families alerted authorities they may have gone seeking to become members of an extremist group.46

Case 7: Institutional Power NOT Present – Audience NOT Primed for Message – High Concentration In some cases, a person on their own may not possess radical beliefs or any personal drive to join a larger cause. However, as John Horgan, director of the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University, found “individuals often join extremist groups in the same way that they might join gangs—through social connections, to gain a sense of belonging—and only later do they acquire extremist views.”47 Conversations within peers leading to extremism and the danger of “group think” can often begin with frustration regarding the host country’s foreign policy (such as the war in Iraq - cited by the failed bombers of the planned July 21st London attacks). Terrorist organizations may aspire to mobilize and covert large modern populations in western countries, but this sort of mass targeting effort is extremely difficult. The Taliban can’t exactly buy advertising time on an American network, but extremist media organizations are certainly becoming more sophisticated. In an attempt to be seen as a more modern, legitimate organization using English publications, websites and videos of various groups with increased in quality and content. Earlier this year, Bin-Laden even made a video including remarks regarding his view on climate change.

43 McDougall, Dan, et. al. “Umar Farouk Adulmutallab: One Boy’s Journey to Jihad.” London, The Sunday Times. January 3, 2010. 44 Scola, Nancy. “Virginia youth’s YouTube comments caught attention of Taliban recruiter.” Tech President, December 14, 2009. 45 Ross, Daveed Gartenstein and Dabruzzi, Kyle. “Is Al-Qaeda’s Central Leadership Still Relevant?” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2008, pp. 27-36. 46 Harwood, Matthew. “5 Muslim Americans Arrested in Pakistan; Believed to Want to Wage Jihad.” Security Management. December 10, 2009. 47 Stern, Jessica. “Mind over Martyr.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1, January-February 2010.

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 Abu Dharr al-Makki, a member posting on the Shumukh (”Pride”) forum announced the formation of an “Incitement Brigade” asking members to be responsible for 5 forums on a list he had created. He told them to join these other forums and post recruitment material.48

Case 8: Institutional Power NOT Present – Audience NOT Primed for Message – Low Concentration While certainly looking different today in an era of global connectedness, we come to one of the most traditional and utilized pathways of recruitment – the targeting of isolated individuals. Researchers have long studied the motivations for joining a cult, gang, or other extremist organization but some include: vulnerable people who feel humiliated and victimized, who find their identities by joining movements, who feel their opportunities have been blocked, as a means for reaction or rebellion, or in some way feeling a sense of “rootlessness or normlessness.”49 Recruiters prey on these types of people, and the internet has only helped to facilitate this search, especially in areas where they can’t physically visit. Comparing the characteristics of a terrorist “safe haven”50 and the “uses of the internet”51 by terrorists, Gray and Head conclude the internet can be classified as a safe haven for Islamic terrorist organizations.52

 Several types of internet pages are used for recruitment. As mentioned in Case 7, the group websites are normally for the broader audience, but often have secure logins to forums with more passionate discussion and increased aggressiveness. Recruiters will often pan Salafist or other conservative Muslim forums for frequent posters or people claiming to be ready for action, as these are easy targets. They may also sabotage moderate discussion forums, making “reasonable” arguments of their side (and posting accompanying videos or stories), hoping to possibly lure on-the-fence answer seekers to a more radical perspective.53  “Jihad Jane”: Colleen LaRose, an American woman arrested in 2009, self-recruited when she posted a video online saying she’d like to help suffering Muslims. Immediately, knowing her unsuspecting American look could be useful, online activists urged and guided her on to a point where she too began recruiting people to the Jihadist cause. Most of her activity was limited to online forums and chatrooms until she travelled outside the US to meet up with conspirators for a plot to kill a Swedish cartoonist. She’s been said to have had a “bumpy life” that included dropping out school before high school, a marriage at 16, and other struggles with family deaths.54

48 McCants, Will. “How Online Recruitment Works.” Jihadica, September 18, 2008. 49 Blazak, Raandy. “White Boys to Terrorist Men: Target Recruitment of Nazi Skinheads.” American Behavioral Scientist 2001. 50 Brafman Kittner, C. “The role of safe havens in Islamist terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 19(3), pp. 307-327. 2007. 51 Weimann, G. “Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges.” Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 2006. 52 Gray, David H. and Head, Albon. “The Importance of the Internet to the Post-Modern Terrorist and its Role as a Form of a Safe Haven.” European Journal of Scientific Research, Vol. 25 No. 3, 2009. 53 Musawi, Mohammed Ali. “Cheering for Osama.” Quilliam, August 2010. 54 Johnson, Carrie and Crites, Alice. “Jihad Jan suspect dropped out before High School…” The Washington Post, March 11 2010.

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Conclusion

Believing that terrorist recruitment is either facilitated by central leadership or entirely leaderless neglects a gray area where much activity is taking place. While terrorists who have acted on a global scale are almost always trained or guided by formal organization supervision, their introduction to radicalism can often occur because of loosely connected, “unofficial” independent extremists and groups. As the above framework captures, the ways people become involved with these organizations are complicated and the reasons for participating in the terrorist activities, even Jihadist among groups that have an established mission and ideology, are varied and diverse. With rapidly rising internet usage in the Middle East, high levels of youth unemployment, a continuing state of stagnant political situations, traditional recruitment will continue to occur and evolve. Core leadership may begin to shift locations and spread out, while still maintaining a small top-level core. Evidence of this can be seen by increased activity and recruitment in Somalia and Yemen, as well as shared styles, videos and talking points between AQC, AQAP and AQIM as Al Qaida as Afghanistan and Pakistan experience increased targeting from NATO forces.

Likewise, marginalized people (in whatever ways) in western countries will continue to be inspired by larger organizations and become unofficially affiliated “copy-cats.” In a mutually beneficial relationship, these two pathways – traditional and emerging – will coexist and cooperate. Websites can be deleted, servers shut down, community outreach programs implanted, jobs can be created, but the threat will never be entirely alienated to one specific target. Understanding the larger picture of how these organizations sustain themselves through membership can position our counterterrorist efforts to be that much more effective and to mitigate these violent movements.

Overall, terrorist recruitment is critical to understand, dissect, and mitigate. And it is a living organism in constant evolution and motion. Dedicating resources including intelligence and manpower and harnessing media to deprogram or halt the hiring of new foot soldiers by non-state terrorist actors will be critical in preserving the security of the Middle East and Near Asia regions and beyond.

The views expressed in this Special Report are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the official views of any government.

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www.inegma.com Special Report No. 1: Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs): Terrorism in the GCC and MENA? (September 2009) Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director, R&D & Ms. Ayat Toufeeq, Research Associate, INEGMA

Special Report No.2: Proliferation Assessment of Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East (November 2009) General (Ret.) Khaled Al Bu-Ainnain, Former Commander, UAE Air Force & Air Dubai Office: Defense and President, INEGMA Office 208, Building 6, Dubai Media City P.O. Box: 502066 Special Report No.3: Proliferation Assessment of Cruise Missiles in the Dubai, UAE Middle East (December 2009) Tel: +971 (0)4 390 2160 General (Ret.) Khaled Al Bu-Ainnain, Former Commander, UAE Air Force & Air Fax: +971 (0)4 390 8013 Email: [email protected] Defense and President, INEGMA Website: www.inegma.com

Special Report No. 4: Iranian Mining of the Strait of Hormuz - Plausibility Beirut Office: Markaziya Building, and Key Considerations (January 2010) 6th Floor, Downtown, Sabahat Khan, Analyst, INEGMA P.O. Box: 11-132 Beirut, Lebanon Tel: +961 (0)1 974 530 Special Report No. 5: A Vision for Transforming UAE Armed Forces into Fax: +961 (0)1 974 531 Network Centric Operations (February 2010) Email: [email protected] Website: www.inegma.com General (Ret.) Khaled Al Bu-Ainnain, Former Commander, UAE Air Force & Air Defense and President, INEGMA

Special Report No. 6: GCC Interoperability and Coalition Operations (April 2010) Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA & Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director, R&D, INEGMA

Special Report No. 7: Evolving Terrorist Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) Migration Across South Asia, Caucasus, and the Middle East (May 2010) Matthew Hedges, Research Assistant & Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director, R&D, INEGMA

Special Report No. 8: Summary Proceedings of “Examination on Yemen’s Current Status and Implications for the Region” (June 2010) Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director, R&D & Sabahat Khan, Analyst, INEGMA

Special Report No. 9: Emerging Architectures in Early Warning Networks and their Airborne Components (July 2010) Sabahat Khan, Analyst, INEGMA

Special Report No. 10: Lebanon's Defense Policy: Challenges & Possible Solutions (August 2010) Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA

Special Report No. 11: Conduits to Terror - Classifying the Methods of Middle Eastern Terrorist Recruitment (November 2010) Amira Choueiki, Intern, Georgia Institute of Technology Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director of R&D, INEGMA

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