Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack

Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W. Kagan SEPTMEBER 2019 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W. Kagan Executive Summary The U.S. should conduct a military strike in military attacks, including shooting at (and response to the Iranian attack on the Abqaiq oil shooting down) multiple American drones, firing facility in Saudi Arabia in order to deter rockets and mortars at U.S. positions in Iraq, and continued Iranian military escalation. The attack repeatedly attacking Saudi oil infrastructure and should most likely focus on Islamic a desalination plant. It has also escalated its Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) targets in violations of the nuclear deal. Increasing Syria rather than in Iran itself. The U.S. stands a American economic pressure has not deterred better chance of persuading Iran’s leaders that it Iranian military or nuclear deal-violation can and will deprive them of positions in Syria escalation, and American military actions have that they regard as existentially important than of only changed the precise shape of Iranian military the U.S. impressing them with limited strikes on escalation, if that. The U.S. has not therefore Iranian territory. The risks of such a retaliatory identified a non-violent means of deterring future strike are high, but the risks of failing to respond Iranian escalation. to the Abqaiq attack are higher. Separating the U.S. from its partners in the Gulf, The attack on Abqaiq was planned and executed particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab by Iran and most likely launched from Iranian Emirates, was one of Iran’s central objectives in territory. It was part of a pattern of Iranian the Abqaiq attack. The Iranians likely chose this military escalation in response to the Trump escalation step over others because it hit Saudi Administration’s “maximum pressure” Arabia alone and thereby forced the U.S. to campaign. choose explicitly whether or not it would defend a front-line state exposed by the “maximum The al Houthi claim to have conducted the attack pressure” campaign. American inaction, which was part of a skillful information operation includes encouraging the Saudis to conduct a intended to divert the Western discussion away military retaliation of their own, will further this from Iran’s role and focus it instead on the war in Iranian objective by solidifying the belief in Yemen and on Saudi Arabia’s misdeeds. That Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that the U.S. will not information operation has succeeded to a defend front line states even against serious considerable extent as the U.S. debate has indeed Iranian military attack. focused excessively on the question of attributing the attack, on Saudi Arabia’s culpability for the The U.S. has vital economic interests in the humanitarian situation and its own bombing defense of Saudi (and more generally Gulfi) oil campaign in Yemen, and on the horrific murder infrastructure even though America imports little and dismemberment of Jamal Khashoggi. Gulf oil. Oil is a fungible commodity, and its global price rises and falls depending on global The U.S. and Iran are escalating along parallel supply and demand. Americans will pay higher tracks that do not interact with one another in the prices for petroleum products if large amounts of way the administration desires. The U.S. has Saudi oil remain off the market, regardless of steadily increased sanctions and other economic America’s technical “independence” of Saudi oil, pressure, has deployed limited military forces to because the global price will rise. America’s the region to bolster its own and its allies’ allies, who do depend on Saudi oil, could be defenses, and has formed a maritime defensive economically devastated by a protracted operation to deter Iranian seizures of oil tankers. disruption in Saudi oil exports. Such damage to Iran, its allies, and its proxies have escalated 2 Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W. Kagan vital American trading partners would severely in allied states in Europe or Latin America; it damage the American economy as well. could interfere with the movement of ships through the Strait of Hormuz; or it could attack Reducing the “maximum pressure” campaign or more vital targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. seeking negotiations with Iran without military The U.S. and its allies can mitigate these threats retaliation will establish the precedent that to varying degrees, but never completely. We America and the West will surrender to military must recognize, however, that Iran is on a attack, thereby increasing the likelihood of future military escalation path and may well decide to military attacks by Iran or other adversaries. The conduct such actions even if the U.S. makes no U.S. must first demonstrate a willingness to response to the Abqaiq attack. On the contrary, respond to unjustified aggression and attacks on trends suggest that inaction may encourage its allies before considering any significant further Iranian escalation. change in its overall policies toward Iran. The Russians could also use their advanced air Deterrence requires holding at-risk something the defense systems in Syria against U.S. aircraft and adversary is unwilling to lose and that the U.S. missiles attacking Iranian targets. The U.S. could might plausibly take away from him. Using mitigate that risk by deploying the force package military force simply to indicate U.S. strength or necessary to defeat those systems and prevent the displeasure will not deter a determined adversary. Russians from replacing or reinforcing them. A Few target sets on Iranian territory meet the detailed assessment of Vladimir Putin’s criterion of being something Iran’s leaders are objectives and constraints in Syria strongly unwilling to lose, and those sets would have to suggests that he is unlikely to engage in such a threaten the survival of the regime itself. Limited direct conflict, particularly if American strikes American military strikes against Iran do not rise avoid hitting Russian targets. The notion that he to the necessary deterrence threshold given the would initiate a global thermonuclear war over a existential nature of the threat the “maximum local conflict in Syria is absurd. pressure” campaign holds and Iran’s concomitant need to break it up. The U.S. cannot—and should The risks of inaction are enormous. not—plausibly aim at overthrowing the Islamic The Iranians are on a path to split the Saudis and Republic by military means, rendering deterrence Emiratis from the U.S. Success in that endeavor by attacking targets in Iran unlikely to succeed. would unravel the “maximum pressure” Iranian leaders have frequently identified Iran’s campaign that relies on those states to adhere to positions in Syria as vital to the regime’s survival. financial and other sanctions and to provide Those positions are far more vulnerable to military support to American objectives in the American attack than the Iranian regime is at region. It would create opportunities for both home. The threat of American action against Russia and China to gain firm footholds in the IRGC positions in Syria is also much more Gulf, transforming the regional security credible than the threat of a massive military challenge facing the U.S. regime-change operation in Iran. Presenting Inaction will also strengthen the convictions of Tehran with the choice of continuing its military Iran’s leaders that they can conduct large-scale escalation or seeing its positions in Syria severely devastating attacks against American allies at degraded is the best chance the U.S. has to deter will, particularly if they do not kill Americans. It continued Iranian military action. will therefore likely accelerate the very escalation The risks of such an attack include Iranian scenarios frequently offered as arguments against military escalation. Iran could attack Americans an American retaliatory strike. in Syria, Iraq, or elsewhere in the Gulf region; it could conduct terrorist attacks in the U.S. itself or 3 Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W. Kagan It harms every American alliance by undermining There is no safe course the U.S. can pursue after the belief of U.S. allies that America will come to Abqaiq. Both action and inaction carry great their aid militarily if they are attacked. Rhetorical risks. The balance of risk at the moment lies with dances around the lack of a formal American inaction—failure to respond militarily to the security guarantee to Saudi Arabia will not affect Abqaiq attack is far more likely to harm this fear, nor will reassurances that the U.S. American security and vital national interests, would defend this or that other ally. All such including economic interests, than is prudent rhetoric will be undermined by the fact of action. American inaction in this case and the much louder rhetoric from the White House about the need for other states to defend themselves. 4 Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W. Kagan Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack An Iranian information operation has origin but did not accuse Iran of directly successfully confused the policy discourse in the conducting the attack on September 18.6 U.S. about the drone- and missile-attack on Saudi US Secretary of State Pompeo quickly oil facilities on September 14, 2019.1 The attributed the attack to Iran and asserted Yemeni al Houthi movement quickly claimed the that there is no reason to assess the attack while Iran denied its involvement.2 The attacks originated in Yemen. Pompeo Trump Administration has assessed that Iran later affirmed that the attack did not conducted the attack using bases within Iran originate from Iraq either following a itself.3 Administration critics quickly attacked phone call with Iraqi Prime Minister those claims while arguing energetically against Adel Abdul Mehdi on September 15.7 US any meaningful American response to the attacks.

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