Restructuring America's Ground Forces

Restructuring America’s Ground Forces: Better, Not Bigger September 2007 Dr. Steven Metz is chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and research professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. He has also been on the faculty of the Air War College, the US Army Command, and the General Staff College; has served on many national security policy task forces; and has testified in both houses of Congress. Dr. Metz currently serves on the RAND Corporation Insurgency Board and is at work on two books: Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy and Perdition’s Gate: Insurgency in the 21st Century. Frank Hoffman retired from the Marine Corps in 2001 at the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, after 24 years of professional expe- rience. He worked at the Pentagon as a management and policy analyst for a decade, and was a DoD political appointee during the Clinton administration. He served on the professional staffs of two national commissions; including the Hart-Rudman Commission and three Defense Science Boards. Extensively published, he is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Evolving Threat Environment early in the war on terror that counterinsurgency was and US Security Strategy the most logical framework—albeit an imperfect one.1 In the past six years, countering and undercutting vio- As in classical counterinsurgency, American strategy lent Islamic extremists has become the core of combines direct action against terrorists using military, American security strategy. Other threats are second- law enforcement, and intelligence assets with defensive ary, even peripheral. Regardless of the interests measures and policies designed to undercut support for involved or the nature of other challenges, US policies extremism and, more importantly, the ideas that give and programs are invariably assessed by the extent to rise to them. Like a counterinsurgency campaign, which they contribute to or detract from the conflict American strategy has both short- and long-term objec- with Islamic extremists. Security organizations and the tives; it combines defensive and offensive actions; and military have been redesigned for the “war on terror.” it integrates political, military, intelligence, and psycho- Not since the Cold War has the United States been so logical components. concentrated on—some might even say obsessed with—a single security problem. The architects of today’s American strategy, like their predecessors who argued for the containment of com- Strategic theorists often contend that focus is the hand- munism, have insisted that this is a different kind of maiden of coherence. Those who aim at nothing, as the war and that success will be long in coming. Therefore, old saying goes, are guaranteed to hit it. A strategy that the fact that the global Islamic extremist movement cannot or does not focus on a primary threat or chal- seems no weaker now (and might even be stronger) lenge is, by similar logic, condemned to meandering than it was six years ago does not mean that the strat- incoherence. Whether that is true or not, an American egy itself is flawed. The only “indicator of success” that strategy for dealing with Islamic extremism has taken a seems to matter is the absence of major attacks in the clear form. In its broadest contours, this strategy is a United States itself, confirming statements that global counterinsurgency campaign, reflecting the America must remain on the offensive and meet threats insight of analysts like David Kilcullen who argued overseas rather than at home. Policy Analysis Briefs are thought-provoking contributions to the public debate over peace and security issues. The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation, nor do they represent the official position of the US Department of Defense, US Army, or US Marine Corps. The authors’ affiliations is listed for identification purposes only. 2 In the absence of a catastrophic attack on the air defense, operations to secure the perimeter of American homeland, something like the existing US territory were often seen as lesser tasks, partic- strategy is likely to be sustained no matter who the ularly for active duty forces. (The National Guard next president is. There undoubtedly will have to was, of course, often used for disaster relief and, be decreases in scope and tempo, as well as changes more rarely, for support to law enforcement during in methods and in specific operations. In all likeli- civil disturbances.) Based on both strategic require- hood, US involvement in Iraq will diminish under ments and a military culture traumatized by either a Democratic or Republican chief executive. Vietnam, large-scale conventional war was seen as Yet in light of intelligence projections about a com- the most important function for the American ing “perfect storm” of ethnic- and identity-based armed forces. conflict, and the threat posed by Al Qaeda and similar groups, the core assumptions and structure of With the demise of the Soviet Union, some strate- American strategy will persist.2 gic theorists such as Martin van Creveld contend- ed that low-intensity conflict would be not only This has profound implications for the US mili- the dominant form but the only form of organ- tary. It means that involvement in irregular war- ized violence in the post-Cold War world.3 Within fare and stabilization operations in weak and the US military, though, the focus on large-scale failing states will be its most common activity— conventional war persisted, reinforced by the perhaps its only major one. 1991 Gulf War. However, as Iraqi military power eroded throughout the 1990s, the Russians gave The Grand Debate: Missions Other Than no sign of renewed aggression, and as the chance High-Intensity Conventional Warfare of traditional interstate conflict with the Chinese The renewed strategic significance of irregular or North Koreans seemed small, the US military warfare and stability operations has rekindled an paid somewhat more attention to other forms of old debate. For more than 50 years, the US mili- low-intensity conflict. The complex conflict in the tary has sought to balance its capability for large- Balkans seemed a better portent of the future scale conventional or nuclear warfighting with more than did Desert Storm. what has, at various times and in various guises, been known as irregular warfare, small wars, But at the turn of the millennium, the conven- counterrevolutionary war, counterinsurgency, tional warriors still dominated thinking (and counterterrorism, fourth-generation warfare, spending priorities) within the American mili- low-intensity conflict, peace enforcement, asym- tary. Most major weapons programs were metric warfare, stabilization operations, post- designed for conventional war. Most of the force conflict peacebuilding, and operations other than was focused on it. war. Today the Defense Department and other government agencies use two overlapping terms: Then came September 11. In the ensuing years, as irregular war (IW)—which includes counterin- the conflict with Islamic extremism moved to the surgency, counterterrorism, and military activi- center of American strategy, the likelihood of ties—and stability, security, transition, and large-scale conventional war against the military reconstruction (SSTR) operations.” Historically, of another state receded just as involvement in irregular warfare has been treated and perceived IW, SSTR, and homeland security operations as a secondary mission to be handled by special were not only a possibility but a reality. The pecu- operations units and, when necessary, general liar demands that intrastate conflict present have purpose, conventionally focused units are tem- generated a number of proposals for capabilities porarily assigned to it. and skill sets that are not as highly prized or developed in a force that is concentrating on Homeland defense has often had the same ancillary “fighting and winning the nation’s wars.” status. During the Cold War, with the exception of That is where we are today. We know—or believe IW/SSTR missions have some of the same require- 3 we know—that IW and SSTR will be the primary ments, including the ability to undertake combat, missions of the US military for at least a decade. often in difficult environments such as urban areas The increased emphasis on homeland security— where restraint and precision are vital to avoid not just air defense as in the Cold War years—will hurting civilians and undermining the local legiti- also likely persist. But what does this mean? macy of US or international efforts. As with con- Military leaders, policymakers, and defense ventional warfighting, IW/SSTR require the ability experts almost universally agree that it would be to “surge”—to deploy forces quickly, often to a mistake to shift the US military completely to areas with extremely poor infrastructure and a IW and SSTR capabilities. One reason that major range of physical and human challenges. Unlike theater war is unlikely is because of America’s conventional operations, IW/SSTR usually require prowess. The odds are so stacked against a con- intensive interaction with civilian populations and ventional aggression that no state is likely to nonmilitary skill sets. Such operations may require undertake it. But if America’s conventional capa- the US military to provide capabilities that are bility atrophied, conventional aggression could usually under the purview of civilian agencies, at become an attractive (or at least a feasible) least until indigenous or multinational civilian option. This means that the US military must find capabilities can arrive or be developed. These a way to be acceptably successful at IW, SSTR, include policing, maintenance of governance and and homeland security while retaining its prepon- civil authority, infrastructure reconstruction, and derance at large-scale conventional war. the provision of humanitarian assistance.

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