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Home , Central Ontario, Francis Bond Head, Holland Landing

The Central Anishinabe and the Rebellion, 1830-40

RHONDA TELFORD Hamilton, Ontario

This paper is not intended to be a technical military history or an exhaustive revision on the subject of all Upper Canadian Native Peoples in the Rebellion. It will primarily consider the situation, aims and goals of the central Ontario Chippewa and Mississagua, who supported of the gov­ ernment at Holland Landing, Rice Lake and elsewhere during the '' rebellion from December 1837 into 1839. Several colonial policies or practices concerning presents, land trans­ fers and control of Aboriginal property coalesced to produce a potentially volatile and uncertain situation for the Chippewa at Coldwater and the Narrows by the eve of the Upper Canadian rebellion. For example, by 1837, colonial policies concerning the content of the presents meant that most Native men had no working guns. More serious, however, was the alleged land surrender of the Reserve at Coldwater and the Narrows, in 1836, which the Chippewa afterward claimed had been forced on them by Lt. Governor Sir Francis Bond Head. The Mississagua were in serious dispute with the Lt. Governor over the ownership of islands in their lakes. At first glance, one might well wonder why they supported the govern­ ment at all. The implications of many of its policies were clearly not ben­ eficial to either the way of life or the land base of the First Nations. The rebellion was a small and relatively unimportant episode in the lives and circumstances of the central Anishinabe. While First Nations supported the Crown in order to preclude the possibility of annexation by the and the imposition of a massive removal policy similar to the one that was underway south of the border during the 1830s, Aboriginal peo­ ple in Upper during the same decade were already familiar with the relocation aspirations of Bond Head. The Americans would likely have been more aggressive occupiers, but the British colonial government continued along in the same manner after the rebellion as it had before, occupying and taking their lands and exploiting their waters and other resources. Yet, as we shall see, the Chippewa and Mississagua were able to use the fact of rebellion, and particularly the government's fear of American invasion in some positive and empowering ways. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 553

Most secondary sources on the Upper Canadian rebellion consistently fail to give much weight to the role of the Native peoples in the defence of the province. Aboriginals appear to be parachuted into the rebellion as random elements acting in someone else's play rather than as primary actors in their own right with their own immediate and different history and their own agendas. The Rebellion has not been considered from a Chippewa and Mississagua perspective.

BEFORE THE REBELLION Since at least the 1820s, there had been a concerted effort on the part of the Crown and colonial administrators to encourage Aboriginal assimi­ lation and civilization along European agricultural lines. One of the ways in which this was done was through the manipulation of the annual pre­ sents. Originally these were given by Sir William Johnson, "General Superintendent of all the North American Indians", representing the crown to solidify the Peace and Friendship Treaties with the various Aboriginal nations during the 1760s and particularly in 1764. This last- mentioned treaty, signed at Niagara, promised presents in perpetuity in exchange for peace and alliance. By the 1790s, if not before, administra­ tors seemed to have forgotten the reason why presents were given to the Nations and by the 1820s, administrators were modifying the status and content of the present lists to facilitate agricultural pursuits at the expense of hunting, trapping and fishing ones. These activities, nevertheless, did not die out. By the late 1820s the designation "Extra Articles" started appearing on present lists and included some important hunting equip­ ment and all the fishing and trapping equipment. Indeed, the Indian Department sold most of the Indian guns below cost at public auction prior to the rebellion and at its outbreak raided the remainder to make up the deficiency in the arsenals. This particular administrative adjustment had important implications by 1837, namely, that at the outbreak of the Upper Canadian rebellion, the Chippewa and Mississagua (as well as other nations) had very few guns (working or otherwise) in their possession. They, therefore, viewed their

1. Treaty of Niagara, 7 July to 4 August 1764 (with Chippewa, Mississagua &c). The papers of Sir William Johnson v.XI, ed. by Milton W. Hamilton, (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1953), 262-280. NAC, RG 10, v.504:202-203, letter, 17 November 1840, Chief Supt. Jarvis to Col. Napier. 554 RHONDA TELFORD participation in the rebellion as a means to obtain new guns and access ammunition, which was also in short supply. Not only would the young men be able to obtain "warrior" status, afterward they expected to keep the guns and would be able to better continue their hunting. In addition, lending their military support to the government had had other advantages in the past, such as the customary issue of clothing, rations and presents.2 In the depressed economy of the late 1830s, these were welcome bonuses. The Chippewa Nation under consideration here, resided principally in the area between Coldwater and the Narrows, but also around Penetan­ guishene and Notawasaga. The Mississagua Nation, considered below, primarily lived at the River Credit, Grape Island then Alnwick, Rice, Mud and Balsam Lakes. From at least 1830, the Chippewa were expending large sums of money in building houses, a school and grist and saw mills at Coldwater. Within a few years, the Chippewa wanted to take complete control of the school and regain management of the Coldwater saw mill from its present lessee. Preparations were made early in 1835 to begin the erection of Yellowhead's mill at the Narrows, near . But even before the end of the year, Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs Samuel Peters Jarvis had leased this mill to Barret and Stennett without Yellow- head's knowledge or consent and he was very angry. Another issue, flaringshortl y prior to the rebellion, was that of the upkeep of the 14 mile road between the Narrows and Coldwater running through the Chippewa Reserve. The local white inhabitants petitioned Lt. Governor Bond Head wanting the Native people to perform statute labour for the maintenance of the road, despite the fact that they themselves had done nothing. This prompted their local Superintendent T.G. Anderson, to note that it was the whites and not the Natives who conducted heavy transport over the road, deriving all the benefit from it, as they similarly had from Indian mills at Coldwater. Anderson saw no reason why the Chippewa should be forced to repair the road from which they obtained "scarcely any profit."3

2. Benn 1993:17-21; special thanks to Carl for allowing me to interview him regarding this paper. 3. NAC, RG 10, v.59:60240-42, letter, 30 November 1835, Anderson to Givins See also, NAC, RG 7, G16C, v.44:251-252, 8 June 1838, Civil Secretary to Gerald Alley RG 10, v.503:124-126, 15 April 1839, Jarvis to Macaulay. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 555

By the fall of 1836, the Chippewa had sharpened their earlier sugges­ tions concerning the control of their property, now demanding unilateral rule of the schoolhouse and mills and wanting their land divided into 50 acre lots for each head of family. While the Lt. Governor acquiesced in the Chippewa running their own affairs, he refused to sanction the divi­ sion of land.4 The reason, although not expressly stated, was that the Lt. Governor wanted to purchase the Reserve, a request he appears to have made when he visited the Chippewa at the Narrows sometime in the late summer or early fall. Bond Head did indeed take a surrender, although that course had been strongly objected to in an article in the Christian Guardian, after his whirl-wind surrender tour of 1836.5 In this concerted campaign, beginning in August, the Lt. Governor obtained alleged surrenders of Manitoulin Island, its out-islands and the southern Saugeen lands, of parts of the Huron and Moravian Reserves, and finally, in , of Coldwa­ ter and the Narrows. The First Nations involved in these so-called "trea­ ties" complained either that they had never agreed to them or that the verbal treaties were not accurately represented on paper by Bond Head. Only days before the Coldwater Treaty was signed, Anderson reported to Givins that he had received an application to rent the saw mill, located on the first fall of the Severn River a few hundred yards from . Anderson recommended the rental, even for a small amount, as he argued that if it was left in its present state it would soon fall down. Anderson's fatal mistake was that he did not consult with the Chippewa on this matter. As we shall see, the physical possession of the mill and who had the right to dispose of it would be the most contentious

4. NAC.RG 10, v.59:60337-41, letters, 11 December 1835, Anderson to ID; v.501:191- 193, 6 October 1836, Givins to Anderson. 5. Givins did not raise the issue of a previous suggestion to surrender the Reserve in his 6 October 1836 letter to Anderson. However, several following ones indicate that the Lt. Governor had left the Chippewa to think about and answer a "question," which was likely whether they would cede their land. See for example, NAC, RG 10, v.501:193, letter, 6 October 1836, Givins to Yellowhead & Givins to Mr. Lawrence, Innkeeper, Narrows. Anderson believed the author of the article in the Guardian, in which "great pains [were] taken to plant in the minds of the Indians, the blackest discontent on the subject of their removal from the Narrows, was Mr. Scott, the Methodist missionary at that place; see v.63:61953-56, marked "Private," 31 October 1836, Anderson to William Hepburn. A few weeks later, Givins warned Yellowhead not to come to Toronto without the other Chiefs and not until the Lt. Governor designated a time; see v.501:211, 17 November 1836, Givins to Yellowhead. This last was clearly foreshadowing the treaty which would alleg­ edly be signed in 8 or 9 days. 556 RHONDA TELFORD issue between the Chippewa, particularly Chief John Aisance, and the Indian Department in the rebellion and post-rebellion period. By the end of the year, Bond Head had decided that the "management of all their affairs," including the disposition of all property, was to be turned over to the Chippewa and Anderson was told to let them do what they wanted with the mill, which he was to turn over shortly afterward. The remaining property was not to pass into Chippewa control until March 31st the following year.8 Aboriginal contention that the treaty was Bond Head's idea and not their own is supported by the point that they had no idea where they were going to live. Anderson reported that "the Indians are in a quandary quite undecided where to take up their future residence, they do not know what is best for themselves, and unless the Governor be pleased to direct them, the probability is they will again be scattered about the country, wretched objects of misery..." Eventually, the Chief Naishkaiosay and two other Coldwater citizens chose an area in the Township of Rama, most of which was already settled. Although the Coldwater Chippewa would eventually move to Rama, they remained at Coldwater and the Narrows well into 1839. The Narrows Chippewa under John Aisance proposed to move to the mouth of the River Severn where they had land and their mills. Obvi-

6. Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, 1(1992), No. 45:112-113, 9 August 1836 (Manitoulin); No. 45 1/2:113, 9 August 1836 (Saugeen); No. 46:113-115, 20 & 26 Sep­ tember 1836 (Anderdon); No. 47:115-117, 25 October 1836 (Moravian); and No. 48:117, 26 November 1836 (Coldwater). At Anderdon, Ironside took the first treaty on 20 Septem­ ber, while Bond Head, arriving the following day, irregularly held a council meeting after the treaty had been signed and made additional outside promises, thus changing the treaty. Bond Head then gathered additional signatures on the paper dated the previous day with­ out changing the text: see Telford 1998. A similar irregular pattern appears to have sur­ rounded the Coldwater Treaty signed in Toronto only two months later. A handwritten treaty, dated 25 November, shows totems only beside the names of Chiefs Yellowhead, Aisance and Nanieshum [Nanigishkung]. Additional signatures follow with no totems, meaning that only the three Chiefs signed on the 25th; see v.797:130-131, Treaty, 25 November 1836. The published treaty, dated the 26th, shows the same Chiefs and two oth­ ers with totems by their names. To date, I have been unable to locate correspondence explaining this discrepancy. 7. NAC, RG 10, v. 124:96967, 96960, letters, 23 November 1836, Anderson to Givins; 1 December 1837, Anderson to Jarvis. 8. NAC, RG 10, v.124: 96963-5, letters, 6 December 1836, Wm. Hepburn to Anderson, extract, 31 March 1837, Hepburn (for Givins) to Anderson, (note) 1 December 1837 Anderson; v.63:62254-57, 17 December 1836, Anderson to Hepburn. 9. NAC, RG 10, v.63:62254-57, letter, 17 December 1836, Anderson to Hepburn. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 557 ously, there had been no great necessity for Bond Head to have unceremo­ niously compelled them to relinquish their community. It is not completely clear what Anderson did with the mill, but it is certain that he did not put its control into the hands of the Chippewa as he was supposed to. As a result, John Aisance, the principal Chief at Cold- water, and about 20 other citizens took forcible possession of the grist mill, commandeering the fall toll wheat. Aisance stated he took the mill so that he could feed the hungry children, but he was also ensuring that it would be included in the Coldwater property which he correctly expected to be turned over to him at the end of the following month. The local white inhabitants unsuccessfully petitioned the Lt. Governor against let­ ting Native people control the mill. Initially put off, Bond Head informed Anderson he could call out the civil authorities to prevent the Chippewa from initiating "similar acts of violence." Anderson's response to the mill takeover was instructive: childish and lusting for revenge, he predicted another "forcible entry" if control was not immediately passed to the Chippewa, while begging for "such instructions as will close their mouths, and let them float on their own bottoms which will only be for a short time, as they are already getting rid of all they can sell and, ere long they will ground on poverty and disappointment The disposition of this mill, as we shall see, continued to be an issue into the 1840s. The local militia captain recognized the immediate neces­ sity of securing the Chippewa as allies in the rebellion, a point which could not have been lost on the Indian Department itself. The only occa­ sions during the rebellion when that Department raised the question of the mills were when the immediate threats of US invasion passed.

10. On the tardiness of Bond Head to actually sell the Reserve see: NAC, RG 10, v.501:223, letter, 29 December 1836, Givins to Mr. Lawrence & Givins to Andrew Moffat. On the choice of Rama and the Severn see: v.501:224, 31 December 1836, Givins to Anderson; v.502:121-123, 19 June 1838, Jarvis to Hon. John Macaulay, and 2 August 1838, In Council, John Beikie, CEC to Jarvis; v.71:66024-27, Petition, August 1839, Inhabitants of Oro, Orillia & Medonte to Sir George Arthur. 11. NAC, RG 10, v.64:62629-32, letters, 7 February, Anderson to ID; v.501:240-241, 11 February, Givins to Anderson; v.64:62659-60, marked "Private," 15 February, Anderson to Hepburn and v.64:62663, same date, Anderson to Givins; v.501:246-247, 14 March, Givins to John Cathew; v.64:62891-93, marked "Private," 28 March, Anderson to Hep- bum; v.64:62900, 28 March, Anderson to Givins; Notice, v.64:63001-03, 31 March, signed Anderson; 31 March, "Inventory of Real and personal property delivered up to the Indians of coldwater and the narrows..."; v.50:2541, 31 March, Givins to Anderson; v.65:63136, 8 April 1837, Anderson to Givins. 558 RHONDA TELFORD

Control of the Coldwater saw mill on the River Severn also figured prominently in the months before the rebellion and did not subside. Here the issue was how the mill could be made saleable and who would obtain it. Contrary to the views of the Indian Department, Chief Aisance claimed sole control of its disposal. Only 5 days before the outbreak of rebellion, Aisance refused to lease the mills to one John Cathew in spite of threats that the latter would sue for damages the longer he was kept out. At least one reason Aisance was reticent to part with his property was that he could not obtain the advice of Chief Yellowhead at the Narrows who was presently at his hunting grounds. Another reason Aisance wanted control of both the grist and saw mills was to ensure a winter supply of flour and Superintendent Anderson believed that unless sufficient flour was offered them, they would not relinquish the mills. Aisance and Yellowhead headed a large deputation to the Lt. Governor on this matter, although Bond Head had unsuccessfully tried to stop their coming.12 As we shall see, once the rebellion was underway, the Indian Department began acting unilaterally to lease the mills. Since at least the late 1820s, over-crowding had been an issue for the Mississagua on Grape Island in the . At a large Mississagua council held at York, the Grape Islanders told Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs Col. Givins that they wished to extend their land base onto Mississagua Point on the mainland and wanted to reclaim Big Island, also in the Bay of Quinte, from the whites whom they had been unilaterally renting it to and from whom they had received no rentals for three or four years. Chief Pautash, wanted and eventually obtained under the auspices of the New Company, an official Reserve for his people on the mainland at Rice Lake where they had always lived, he also wanted Crown recognition that the Mississagua owned all the Islands in that and

12. Note: John Cathew is the same man who masterminded a Petition from himself and the inhabitants of the Township of Medonte warning about "the serious evils likely to result to the public by permitting the management of the Mills at coldwater to pass into the hands of the Indians..." NAC, RG 10, v.501:246-247, letter, 14 March 1837, Givins to John Cathew. See also, v.67:64148-49, Memorial, 2 November 1837, John Aisance to Bond Head; v. 124:69656-58, "Report on Petition of John Aisance..." 2 November 1837, Jarvis; v.67:64150-51, Reports on Severn Saw Mill, 23 November 1837, signed Macaulay; In Council 15 March 1838, signed Sullivan; and 23 November 1837, signed Jarvis. v. 124:69653-55, 69683, letters, 24 November 1837, Anderson to Jarvis; and v.502:76-77, 29 November 1837, Jarvis to Anderson; v. 124:69669-70, 2 December 1837, Anderson to Jarvis. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 559 other lakes in the vicinity. Chief Ajutance of the River Credit wanted his Reserve secured so that each family would be assured a land base at least as large as the neighbouring whites.13 The issues of where the Grape Islanders would live, ownership and sale of the islands and water, and white depredations on Mississagua tim­ ber, game and fish continued to be contentious issues throughout the 1830s. By 1834, the Grape Island Mississagua were moving to Alnwick, some already having relocated at Rice and Mud Lakes. The Mississagua paid for their own resettlement from the proceeds of the sale of Big Island for which they never obtained fair market value. An additional relocation from Mud Lake to was necessary when that Reserve was found to be low and swampy. Lots making up the Reserves at Rice Lake and Alnwick were not obtained all at once, but continued to be purchased in a piecemeal fashion when they could be purchased from surrounding settlers well into 1837.14 Thus, as the rebellion was about to break, the Chippewa had much to be unhappy about, while the Mississagua were preoccupied with building new homes, schools and mills.

THE CHIPPEWA AND MISSISSAGUA AND THE REBELLION The pre-rebellion issues identified above were not the only ones caus­ ing tension between the Chippewa and Mississagua and the colonial gov­ ernment, but they were the main ones. In no case did the actions of the colonizers endear them to the First Nations. This is why the uncritical statements made by Colin Read and Jack Stagg in their scant treatment of Aboriginal People in the rebellion warrant question and context. Accord­ ing to Read and Stagg, there never was any doubt that Native people would "defend a government which they felt had always looked after them," or that they would unthinkingly stand "by their traditional alliance with the crown."15 However, when one considers the relationship between the Chippewa and the Crown in the period 1830 to 1837, such automatic assumptions are groundless. Anishinabe support was immedi-

13. See for example, NAC, RG 10, v.791:7194-98, "Minutes of a Council held at the Post of York on 30th January 1828." 14. See for example: NAC, RG 10, v.56:58796, letter, September or October 1834; v.501:53, 10 June 1835, Givins to Alexander McDonell, v.501:242, 244, letters, 17 Febru­ ary 1837, Givins to John Simpson, Mississagua Chief, Grape Island, care of Mr. Parker, and 21 February 1837, same to same. 15. Read and Stagg 1985: lvi, lxv. 560 RHONDA TELFORD ate, but not for the reasons given by Read and Stagg. It had far more to do with the desire for guns, clothing and provisions and a clear reading of what a successful rebellion would bring for First Nations. Namely, the annexation of to the United States and the implementation of the American removal policy on Aboriginal lands. Furthermore, First Nations likely hoped that if they aided the government at its time of crisis that they would be able to use their loyalty later as a bargaining chip in their land and resource dealings with the Indian Department. Theoreti­ cally, the fact of their loyalty would serve to increase, not reduce, their ability to argue that the government was obligated to aid them and to treat them generously. Read and Stagg emphasize the propaganda value which the rebels made of Native warriors, whipping up rebel sensibilities to defend themselves and to attack the vile government which would unleash such a terror. But, they fail to examine the psychological and mil­ itary advantage enjoyed by the government. The placement of Aboriginal forces in a rebel area served to scare the disaffected and to quiet rebel activity to a much greater extent than the appearance of the non-Native militia would. Thus, the contribution of the Native Peoples in the rebel­ lion cannot be judged on the basis of their raw numbers alone. Read and Stagg lead themselves and others not to see the Aboriginal contribution to the defence of the province. This oversight appears to be a consequence of their research agenda which pays particular attention to the December 1837 rising, but barely mentions the threat of American invasion during 1838. It was, however, in this latter period that Native assistance was extensive and important.16 Chippewa and Mississagua settlements lay to the north of the rebel hot spots at Toronto, Lloydtown and other places in the Home District and at Cobourg and Port Hope in the Newcastle District.17 These Anishinabe were ideally located to aid in the suppression of the first round of the rebellion. On December 7th, when the rebellion began at Montgomery's Tavern, 21 Warriors under Chief John Aisance were immediately des­ patched to Holland Landing by Supt. Anderson. Others were called from their hunting grounds by runners and on the 10th, 20 Pottawatomi War­ riors under Chief Waukai joined them. On the 12th, six more Warriors

16. Read and Stagg 1985:xl, lxxxi, lviii, lxxiiin, 123, 206, 325-6. On research agenda see p. xxi. Bennl993:96, 94-102. 17. Read and Stagg 1985:xxxi, xxxvi, lxxxii, lxxx. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 561 came down under the Narrows Chief, Nainikishkung, with 13 more arriv­ ing the following day, when another group of 12 Pottawatomi appeared under their Chief Waubecan. Finally, on the 15th, when the combined force of 90 Warriors would be dismissed, 18 additional Pottawatomi War­ riors arrived under Chief Waimikisego. Thus, 90 Anishinabe Warriors had been employed for a total of 423 days. Militia Captain Gerald Alley of Orillia, led an undisclosed number of Chippewa out to Yonge Street dur­ ing the first few days. Similarly, the Mississagua provided immediate sup­ port. On the 7th, militia Captain Charly Anderson, also their Indian agent, brought out 170 Rice Lake Mississagua intending to transport them to Toronto by steamer. Initial Aboriginal support was important because set­ tler support in the Home District seemed unreliable, the militia was low and Bond Head had previously sent most of the regular troops to Lower Canada.18 In spite of the initial turnout of the Chippewa and Mississagua in sup­ port of the government, it feared the Native Peoples could be easily swayed to the other side. There was some suggestion that the Methodist minister, Mr. Miller at Coldwater, unsuccessfully attempted to deter the Chippewa from supporting the Crown. Other unknown voices were also attempting interfere with Mississagua loyalty around Balsam Lake, but the Anishinabe continued to support the government when called to do so.19 The threat of American invasion into Upper Canada on behalf of the rebels or independently started to become a serious consideration for the government during the early months of 1838. It was widely believed that the Americans would try a "reverse" attack, "by landing an armed force at

18. NAC, RG 10, v.68:64592-95, "Memo Shewing the number of Indians who were employed under my direction in the late Rebellion, between the 7th and 15th December 1837 inclusive" 26 June 1838, signed T.G. Anderson, and subsequent letters from Gerald Alley. v.67:64191-92, letters, 10 December 1837, Anderson to Jarvis; v.124.69672, 14 December 1837, same to same. Note: in this letter, Anderson states he dismissed 70 men from Holland Landing on the 14th, however, his 1838 memo states that 90 were dismissed on the 15th. v. 124:69972-73, 30 November 1838, Alley to Jarvis. Read & Stagg 1985:xliii-xlv and lvi. Fryer 1987:13, 26,42 and 46. 19. NAC, RG 10, v. 124:69788-90, letters, 7 January 1838, T.G. Anderson to Jarvis. See also, RG 7, Civil Secretary's letter books, G16C, v.43:134, 12 January 1838, J. Joseph to Rev'd Joseph Stinson, Christian Guardian Office, Toronto. See also, v. 124:69794, 6 Feb­ ruary 1838, T.G. Anderson to Jarvis; v.502:80, 15 February 1838, Jarvis to T.G. Anderson. Note: the author has checked the United Church Archives at the to locate any Diaries, Journals or correspondence left by Miller relating to this issue - he left no such papers. 562 RHONDA TELFORD

Penetanguishine & marching upon Simcoe." While some commentators thought this unlikely because of the difficult navigation required to round the Bruce Peninsula into and go south to Notawasaga, oth­ ers concentrated on how simple it would be for invaders, once having reached , which was inadequately defended, to link up with the rebels in Lloydtown and Newmarket. EG. Dunlop, the MPP for Huron, believed a more likely landing place would be his town of Goder- ich; John Macaulay believed Americans would land at Toronto, the Hum- ber or Credit Rivers or at Big Bay; Bishop Macdonell feared for the safety of Kingston; and Colonel Foster, commanding at Toronto suspected that simultaneous attacks along the entire water frontier would be attempted.20 All of these theories recognized that the exceedingly long water borders with the U.S. along the St. Lawrence River, Lakes Ontario and Erie, the Niagara and St. Clair frontiers and Lake Huron and Georgian Bay needed to be especially secured. Successful American attacks occurred at Point Pelee in Lake Erie, Fighting Island in the Detroit River and Navy Island in the Niagara River, while pirate raids were frequent along the St. Clair 91 frontier. Native people were involved in the counter-attacks. In general, the militias, Native, Black and EuroCanadian played the most important roles in the defence of the water frontiers. Regular troops were usually not placed on the water borders because of their tendency to desert. In several of the townships behind Toronto, local inhabitants flatly refused on more than one occasion to support the government, thus under­ lining the importance of Aboriginal allies and of the Chippewa and Potta-

20. AO, Bishop Alexander Macdonell Papers, MU 1774:19-21, letters, 20 February 1838, Macdonell to A. Manahan, MPP; 24 February, Macdonell to Manahan; MU 1774:25-30, 10 March, Macdonell to Lt. Gen. Sir John Macdonell, London. NAC, British Military Records [BMR], v.608:206-213, 29 March, F.G. Dunlop, MPP Huron to Col. Foster, Commander of the Forces, Toronto; 27 May, Col. J. Macaulay to His Excellency, Maj. Gen. Sir George Arthur; 28 May, Col. Foster to George Arthur; v.611:9-10, 20 July, Edward G. Wien, Col. Comm'g 23rd Simcoe to Macaulay. RG 10, v.68:64577-86, series of letters beginning 22 June; v.69:65109-14, 26 November, Keating to Jarvis. 21. NAC, RG 10, v.503:38, 5 February 1838, Jarvis to Macaulay. BMR, v.608:l 17-119, letters, 14 April, Tighey Lomient to Lt. General, Sir John Colborne; v.608:167-173, 17 April, Wainfield Scott to Col. J. Maitland, see also other correspondence on this issue, v.608:174-177; v.610:210-212, 1 July, H. Reid to Col. John Maitland, Commanding the London & Western Districts; v.610 213-215, 2 July, J. Elmsley, Lt. R.N. Comm'g to Col. Maitland; v.610:17-19, Aug, C. Chichester to Lt. Col. Markham. NAC, CO 42^ B-348, v.450:199-204, 28 September, George Arthur to Lord Glenelg. NAC, RG 1, G16C, v.47:179, 27 November, Macaulay to Capt. R.E. Vidal. BMR, v.60859-64, 22 December, Richard Ballork, Adj. Militia to Sir George Arthur. Benn 1993:100. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 563 watomi forces in particular. When the commander at Penetanguishene needed additional forces, he by-passed the loyal petitioning Orillia inhab­ itants, asking instead for a detachment of Indians to be posted as lookouts. One Chief and nine Warriors stood guard on rotating 10 day shifts in Notawasaga Bay. In addition, the Anishinabe north of Penetanguishene were despatched, with provisions and equipment, to guard the Georgian Bay coast for 30 days. Col. Foster noted that as early as May 1838, the volunteer militia had been greatly diminished, by the end of June it would be non-existent, and most of the regular troops were in Lower Canada, leaving the province in a very awkward position. By June, however, the first of the British regular troops were landing in Quebec and by Novem­ ber, there had been an infusion of about 5000 regular troops into Upper Canada.22 The rebellion must have interfered to a certain extent in the traditional seasonal rounds of the Chippewa and Mississagua, especially hunting, fishing and sugaring. This intrusiveness, however, did not stop Chief and Fishing Chief John Aisance from continuing to organize and augment the Nation's capacity for subsistence and commercial fishing when he pur­ chased, with annuity monies, a boat with sails and oars for £25 (or $100) from Joseph Craddock, a Native. Neither did the Chippewa forsake land matters during the rebellion. For example, John Gill, purchaser of land in the Coldwater Reserve, could not take possession of his lot in Medonte because the Aboriginal occupier refused to relinquish his two houses there, threatening to abscond with the windows and doors. The incident provides more evi­ dence of the unpopularity of the alleged November 1836 surrender. Gill proposed to exchange his lot for one beside it, but Jarvis refused, claiming the government would "adhere strictly to the terms of the treaty..." and that he would advise Sir George "not... to admit the right of the Indians to

22. NAC, RG 10, v. 124:69809, letters, 19 February 1838, T.G. Anderson to Jarvis; v.502:82, 3 March, Jarvis to Anderson; 5 March, Jarvis to the Senior Commissariat Office, Penetanguishene. NAC, RG 7, G16C, v.43:128, 8 January, J. Joseph to Gerald Alley, Esq., Justice of the Peace, Orillia. RG 10, v. 124:69801, 5 February, T.G. Anderson to Jarvis. Note: on 8 February, the Chippewa of Lake Huron and Simcoe petitioned Bond Head reaf­ firming their loyalty and availability to aid the government: see, RG 7, v.43:223, 19 Febru­ ary, Joseph to T.G. Anderson. BMR, v.608, 28 May, Col. Foster to Sir George Arthur. RG 10, v. 124:69974-77, 14 December, Alley to Jarvis. 23. NAC, RG 10, v. 124:69824, letters, 17 March 1838, Anderson to Jarvis; v.502:87, 24 March 1838, Jarvis to Anderson. 564 RHONDA TELFORD keep possession, after having, Solemnly promised to give it up..." How­ ever, Jarvis did not consistently follow such a policy, having promised Joseph Craddock undisturbed possession of the SW 1/4 of 23/12 in Medonte in the Indian Reserve in lieu of his property which fell within the saw mill block.24 Land issues were also brought to the forefront by the Methodists who, apparently for the first time, demanded that Governor-General Lord Glenelg issue title deeds to the First Nations for their Reservations. Jarvis was vehemently opposed to this course and no such deeds were ever issued. The Methodists probably believed they could use the climate of the Rebellion and the government's reliance on Aboriginal support to extract such a promise from the Crown which would lead to the protection 25 of First Nation land after the rebellion was over. Sometime during the late summer of 1838, when there was a lull in paranoia over an American invasion, the Indian Department began a uni­ lateral correspondence with Miles Stennett and his partner Mr. Barret for the rental of the Coldwater mill site, including all the out-buildings and the 150 acre farm. Stennett balked at the initial £200 [or $800] rental demanded, suggesting instead a 21 year lease at half that amount, with first option to purchase. Without prior consultation with the Chippewa, the Indian Department let the mill lands to Stennett and Barret on their terms, having the lease drawn up by Mr. Gwynne under the direction of the Attorney General and verbally obtaining their assurance that they would insure the mill for £1000 and pay the taxes. The former agreed to give up the site as soon as directed to do so in writing, but Aisance said nothing, later telling Stennett to leave as he would never give up the mills. Stennett reported that Fan-gai-win-e-ne advised the Chippewa to burn the mills rather than relinquish them. White inhabitants of the five surround­ ing townships shortly petitioned Jarvis pleading that the Chippewa not be allowed to retain the mill. By the end of October, Aisance and others had damaged the mills and dismantled parts of the cottages and buildings and

24. NAC, RG 10, v. 124:69822, letters, 20 March 1838, Anderson to Jarvis; v.502:88, 27 March 1838, Jarvis to Anderson; 1 June 1838, Jarvis to Joseph Craddock. 25. NAC, RG 10, v.68:64840-43, letters, 17 September 1838, Sir Augustus de Este to Francis Maconce; v.69:64862-73, 20 September 1838, signed, Jarvis; v.502:131-137, Report, 20 September 1838, Jarvis. AO, A.E. Williams, United Indian Bands of the Chippewas and Mississaguas Papers, 11-0-7, 19 September 1838, Auguste Este to Chief John Sunday, n.p. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 565 the Indian Department sent an appraiser to investigate, threatening to hold the Chief fiscally responsible.26 Although the Indian Department was quite angry with Chief Aisance and his followers for their latest round of activities at the Coldwater mills, no immediate consequences followed. This was, no doubt, because by November 7th fear of renewed American invasion was at fever pitch and all the Nations south of the River Severn were to be organized into Native militia units. Thus, Captain Alley was ordered to gather all the Chiefs and Warriors from Lakes Simcoe and Huron, including the Saugeen Pen­ insula, at Holland Landing where they would be outfitted and supplied with ammunition and provisions and Charly Anderson was commanded to assemble the Rice and Balsam Lake Mississagua at Port Charles. War­ riors from the River Credit were also called out. Jarvis requested the com­ mand of a Native force so that he could collect pay as a militia officer as well as his usual salary as the Chief Superintendent. However, as soon as the immediate threat of invasion died down, Jarvis informed Alley that Sir George Arthur wanted to see both Yellow­ head and Aisance about the mills, in Toronto. Nevertheless, the Holland Landing group (about 170 Warriors) was not disbanded and Alley ordered a large amount of supplies for use during December. Aisance left Toronto abruptly without agreeing to relinquish the mills. When pressed about earlier comments he had made to Aisance, Alley defended himself, point­ ing out to Jarvis that it was better to drop the matter of the mills than risk

26. NAC, RG 10, v.406:233-234, letters, 1 September 1838, Stennett to Jarvis; v.407:236-238, 2 October, Anderson to Jarvis; v.407:245-246, 3 October, John Heel to Jarvis; v.407:240-242, 8 October, Stennett to Jarvis. v.502:144-145, 22 October, Jarvis to Aisance; 22 October, Jarvis to Henry Howard, Barrister; v.503:124-126, 15 April 1839, Jarvis to Macaulay; v.503:145-148, 15 May, Jarvis to Macaulay. 27. Note: Several documents indicate that the Aboriginal militia were gathered to thwart those who would tamper with their loyalty, but while significant, this was not the sole rea­ son. John Macaulay, the Civil Secretary and the Lt. Governor were very afraid that an American invasion was imminent. One of the first letters to be circulated on this threat read: 'The extensive organization of a force within the US Frontier for the purpose of invading their Province having become fully known to the Lt. Governor I am directed to request, that you will hold the Indians in your neighbourhood in readiness to take the field & act with promptitude & effect under your command on the first notice, which you may receive of actual invasion by a foreign enemy or of insurrection in expectation of foreign aid, in any part of the province." See, NAC, RG 7, G16C, v.47:89-90, circular letter, 7 November 1838. NAC, C042, B-350, v.452:165-167, letters, Arthur to Lord Glenelg. On the issue of tampering see for example: RG 10, v. 124:69972-73, 30 November 1838, Alley to Jarvis; v.502:178-179, 17 December 1838, Jarvis to Charly Anderson. 566 RHONDA TELFORD

Chippewa support. He declared that the wrangling over possession of the mills was at the root of much dissatisfaction ... existing among the Indians as well as, Many of the people in our neighboring townships - that when the white Inhabit­ ants had refused to come voluntarily forward, and even when ballotted still refused, there was no other than conciliatory means prudent to be adopted with the Indians - I well know the disposition of J. Aisance ... I have not the slightest power to change the determination of John Aisance or his band in this local affair - His answer has been repeatedly given in a similar way, and I am obliged to confess that, I should fear the result of strong measures at this critical moment... However, by the end of the year, Alley manoeuvred to bring Stennett and Aisance together in Toronto so that Jarvis could continue his harass­ ment of the Chief on the mill lease. Jarvis' tactics remain unknown, but a document with Aisance's name and totem on it agreeing to allow Stennett and Barret to take possession of the Coldwater mill and out buildings on the NE 1/2 of 25 and the SW 1/2 of 22/12, Medonte township, where the Chippewa were not allowed to harvest timber, was present in Indian Department files.30 It is not at all clear why Aisance would suddenly have agreed to relin­ quish his rights to the mill which he had carefully and actively guarded since 1837. Furthermore, his alleged declaration does not specify the terms and conditions under which the operators are to hold the property: no time limit was given, no rental was mentioned. Presumably, the docu-

28. NAC, RG 7, G16C, v.47:89-90, circular letters, 7 November 1838, signed John Macaulay. v.47:102, 103, 10 November, George Arthur to Gerald Alley; 10 November, Macaulay to Cols. Maitland, Airey, Chichester and Lt. Col. Kerr (duplicate in: C042, B- 350, v.452:169-70); NAC, RG 10, v.69:65019-20, Circular Instructions: 10 November, signed Macaulay (duplicates in: RG 10, v.502:198-9; NAC, C042, B-350, v.452:170; RG 7, G16C, v.47:228-229; BMR, v.612:80 and v.270:214-5). See also, NAC, RG 7, G16C, v.47:112, 113, letters, 13 November, Macaulay to Capt. de Rottenburg, Belleville; same date, Macaulay to Wm. Kerr, Wellington Square; same date, Macaulay to Charly Ander­ son, Rice Lake, v.47:116, 14 November, same to same; v.47:137, 19 November, Macaulay to Alley; same date, Macaulay to Jarvis, Holland Landing; v.47:146-147, same date, Macaulay to Kerr; v.47:142, 20 November, Macaulay to A Cathew, Newmarket. RG 7, G16C, v.47:177, 26 November, Macaulay to Jarvis. RG 10, v.69:65122-31, 29 November 1838, Alley to Jarvis. RG 10, v.503:5, 4 January 1839, Jarvis to Chief Joseph Sawyer, River Credit. 29. NAC, RG 10, v.502:158-160, letters, 5 December 1838, Jarvis to Alley; v69:65196, 8 December, Alley to Jarvis; v.502:170-171, 12 December, Jarvis to Alley; v.l24:69974- 77, 14 December, Alley to Jarvis. 30. NAC, RG 10, v. 124:69936-37, letter, 31 December 1838, Alley to Jarvis" v406"232, 3 January 1839, Declaration by John Aisance. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 567 ment signed by Aisance was to legitimize the lease already made between the Indian Department and Stennett and Barret. However, troubles soon arose when the lessees refused to abide by the verbal promises concerning their payment of insurance and tax. By May 1839, Jarvis was questioning the integrity of the lessees and strongly recommended the abrogation of the lease and the resumption of the property if they refused to comply with the verbal conditions.3 The Lt. Governor began dismantling the Aboriginal forces in the early days of January 1839, seemingly because it was running out of money. Jarvis announced "that the state of the Provision rendering it nec­ essary that so large a number of Indians as are now assembled along the line of Frontier should be kept from their usual occupations [it has been deemed] ... proper to relieve such of the Bands whose services can with safety be dispensed with..." Rations would continue until the end of the month, but afterward the Anishinabe would have to scatter to obtain food, a situation which concerned Captain Alley since many of the townships in which they would hunt were disloyal. Furthermore, the Anishinabe were angry that they were being disbanded in the middle of winter which would preclude them from making a proper living during the remainder of the hunting season, that their pay would not permit them to return to homes and that their families would starve before they could reach their hunting grounds. Aboriginal tempers flared when the Indian Department began calling for the return of arms issued during the rebellion, an order which could only exacerbate the difficulties of procuring game and which was consid­ ered tasteless in the extreme. The Six Nations, for example, were very bit­ ter when the issue was broached, taking it as a sign that the government questioned their loyalty. They raised the subject of the Covenant Chain of Silver, stating that they had kept their promises, and suggested that some government officers must now want its abrogation. Lt. Colonel William Kerr, a citizen of the Six Nations and their leader during the rebellion, after relaying their message asserted that "I do think it would be impossi-

31. NAC, RG 10, v.503:124-126, 145-148, letters, (both) 15 May 1839, (both) Jarvis to Macaulay; v.503:213, 24 September, Jarvis to S.B. Harrison. 32. NAC, RG 10, v.503:5, 6, letters, 4 January 1839, Jarvis to Sawyer; 7 January, Jarvis to Alley; v. 124:69943-44, 69945, (two) 24 January, (both) Alley to Jarvis; v.30:70057-58. January, Andrew Borland to Gerald Alley; v.503:40, 4 February, Jarvis to Wm. Jones & Joseph Clench, St. Clair frontier. 570 RHONDA TELFORD

On the other hand, the impact that the Anishinabe had in the defence of the province was much more significant than the impact it had on them. On a per capita basis, many more Native people defended the province than did peoples of other origins. The multi-national militia, of which the First Nations were a part, defended the long, strung-out water boundaries on Lakes Ontario, Erie and St. Clair from American invasion. The Chippewa and Mississagua played a significant and unique role in the defence of the Home District, one of the most troubled with pockets of rebel activity. The Chippewa in particular were used to defend the prov­ ince from a potential 'reverse' American invasion through Lake Huron and Georgian Bay, a task for which they were ideally suited both geo­ graphically and culturally.

REFERENCES

Archives of Ontario (AO). Bishop Alexander Macdonell Papers, MU 1774. —. A.E. Williams, United Indian Bands of the Chippewas and Mississaguas Papers, Ms. 2607(11-0-7). Benn, Carl. 1993. Historic Fort York, 1793-1993 Toronto: Natural Heritage Books. Canada. 1891. Indian treaties and surrenders Vol. 1. : Brown Chamberlain, 1891 & 1912. Facsimile reprint, Toronto: Fifth House, 1992. Fryer, Mary Beacock. 1987. Volunteers & redcoats - rebels & raiders: a military history of the rebellions in Upper Canada. Toronto: Dundurn Press. National Archives of Canada (NAC), British Military Records (BMR) Vols. 270, 608,610, 611,612. —. MG 11-C042, Colonial Office Records. —. RG 7, Governor General's Office Records. —. RG 10, Department of Indian Affairs Records. Read, Colin, and Ronald Stagg, eds. 1985. The Rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada: a col­ lection of documents. Toronto: Champlain Society & Carleton University Press. Telford, Rhonda. 1998. How the West was won: land transactions between the Anishinabe, the Huron and the Crown in , Papers of the 29th Algonquian Conference, ed. by David H. Pentland (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba), 328-351. Treaty of Niagara, 7 July to 4 August 1764 (with Chippewa, Mississagua &c). The Papers of Sir William Johnson v. 9, ed. by Milton W. Hamilton (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1953), 262-280.