The Central Ontario Anishinabe and the Rebellion, 1830-40
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The Central Ontario Anishinabe and the Rebellion, 1830-40 RHONDA TELFORD Hamilton, Ontario This paper is not intended to be a technical military history or an exhaustive revision on the subject of all Upper Canadian Native Peoples in the Rebellion. It will primarily consider the situation, aims and goals of the central Ontario Chippewa and Mississagua, who supported of the gov ernment at Holland Landing, Rice Lake and elsewhere during the 'Yonge Street' rebellion from December 1837 into 1839. Several colonial policies or practices concerning presents, land trans fers and control of Aboriginal property coalesced to produce a potentially volatile and uncertain situation for the Chippewa at Coldwater and the Narrows by the eve of the Upper Canadian rebellion. For example, by 1837, colonial policies concerning the content of the presents meant that most Native men had no working guns. More serious, however, was the alleged land surrender of the Reserve at Coldwater and the Narrows, in 1836, which the Chippewa afterward claimed had been forced on them by Lt. Governor Sir Francis Bond Head. The Mississagua were in serious dispute with the Lt. Governor over the ownership of islands in their lakes. At first glance, one might well wonder why they supported the govern ment at all. The implications of many of its policies were clearly not ben eficial to either the way of life or the land base of the First Nations. The rebellion was a small and relatively unimportant episode in the lives and circumstances of the central Anishinabe. While First Nations supported the Crown in order to preclude the possibility of annexation by the United States and the imposition of a massive removal policy similar to the one that was underway south of the border during the 1830s, Aboriginal peo ple in Upper Canada during the same decade were already familiar with the relocation aspirations of Bond Head. The Americans would likely have been more aggressive occupiers, but the British colonial government continued along in the same manner after the rebellion as it had before, occupying and taking their lands and exploiting their waters and other resources. Yet, as we shall see, the Chippewa and Mississagua were able to use the fact of rebellion, and particularly the government's fear of American invasion in some positive and empowering ways. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 553 Most secondary sources on the Upper Canadian rebellion consistently fail to give much weight to the role of the Native peoples in the defence of the province. Aboriginals appear to be parachuted into the rebellion as random elements acting in someone else's play rather than as primary actors in their own right with their own immediate and different history and their own agendas. The Rebellion has not been considered from a Chippewa and Mississagua perspective. BEFORE THE REBELLION Since at least the 1820s, there had been a concerted effort on the part of the Crown and colonial administrators to encourage Aboriginal assimi lation and civilization along European agricultural lines. One of the ways in which this was done was through the manipulation of the annual pre sents. Originally these were given by Sir William Johnson, "General Superintendent of all the North American Indians", representing the crown to solidify the Peace and Friendship Treaties with the various Aboriginal nations during the 1760s and particularly in 1764. This last- mentioned treaty, signed at Niagara, promised presents in perpetuity in exchange for peace and alliance. By the 1790s, if not before, administra tors seemed to have forgotten the reason why presents were given to the Nations and by the 1820s, administrators were modifying the status and content of the present lists to facilitate agricultural pursuits at the expense of hunting, trapping and fishing ones. These activities, nevertheless, did not die out. By the late 1820s the designation "Extra Articles" started appearing on present lists and included some important hunting equip ment and all the fishing and trapping equipment. Indeed, the Indian Department sold most of the Indian guns below cost at public auction prior to the rebellion and at its outbreak raided the remainder to make up the deficiency in the arsenals. This particular administrative adjustment had important implications by 1837, namely, that at the outbreak of the Upper Canadian rebellion, the Chippewa and Mississagua (as well as other nations) had very few guns (working or otherwise) in their possession. They, therefore, viewed their 1. Treaty of Niagara, 7 July to 4 August 1764 (with Chippewa, Mississagua &c). The papers of Sir William Johnson v.XI, ed. by Milton W. Hamilton, (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1953), 262-280. NAC, RG 10, v.504:202-203, letter, 17 November 1840, Chief Supt. Jarvis to Col. Napier. 554 RHONDA TELFORD participation in the rebellion as a means to obtain new guns and access ammunition, which was also in short supply. Not only would the young men be able to obtain "warrior" status, afterward they expected to keep the guns and would be able to better continue their hunting. In addition, lending their military support to the government had had other advantages in the past, such as the customary issue of clothing, rations and presents.2 In the depressed economy of the late 1830s, these were welcome bonuses. The Chippewa Nation under consideration here, resided principally in the area between Coldwater and the Narrows, but also around Penetan guishene and Notawasaga. The Mississagua Nation, considered below, primarily lived at the River Credit, Grape Island then Alnwick, Rice, Mud and Balsam Lakes. From at least 1830, the Chippewa were expending large sums of money in building houses, a school and grist and saw mills at Coldwater. Within a few years, the Chippewa wanted to take complete control of the school and regain management of the Coldwater saw mill from its present lessee. Preparations were made early in 1835 to begin the erection of Yellowhead's mill at the Narrows, near Orillia. But even before the end of the year, Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs Samuel Peters Jarvis had leased this mill to Barret and Stennett without Yellow- head's knowledge or consent and he was very angry. Another issue, flaring shortly prior to the rebellion, was that of the upkeep of the 14 mile road between the Narrows and Coldwater running through the Chippewa Reserve. The local white inhabitants petitioned Lt. Governor Bond Head wanting the Native people to perform statute labour for the maintenance of the road, despite the fact that they themselves had done nothing. This prompted their local Superintendent T.G. Anderson, to note that it was the whites and not the Natives who conducted heavy transport over the road, deriving all the benefit from it, as they similarly had from Indian mills at Coldwater. Anderson saw no reason why the Chippewa should be forced to repair the road from which they obtained "scarcely any profit."3 2. Benn 1993:17-21; special thanks to Carl for allowing me to interview him regarding this paper. 3. NAC, RG 10, v.59:60240-42, letter, 30 November 1835, Anderson to Givins See also, NAC, RG 7, G16C, v.44:251-252, 8 June 1838, Civil Secretary to Gerald Alley RG 10, v.503:124-126, 15 April 1839, Jarvis to Macaulay. THE CENTRAL ONTARIO ANISHINABE AND THE REBELLION, 1830-40 555 By the fall of 1836, the Chippewa had sharpened their earlier sugges tions concerning the control of their property, now demanding unilateral rule of the schoolhouse and mills and wanting their land divided into 50 acre lots for each head of family. While the Lt. Governor acquiesced in the Chippewa running their own affairs, he refused to sanction the divi sion of land.4 The reason, although not expressly stated, was that the Lt. Governor wanted to purchase the Reserve, a request he appears to have made when he visited the Chippewa at the Narrows sometime in the late summer or early fall. Bond Head did indeed take a surrender, although that course had been strongly objected to in an article in the Christian Guardian, after his whirl-wind surrender tour of 1836.5 In this concerted campaign, beginning in August, the Lt. Governor obtained alleged surrenders of Manitoulin Island, its out-islands and the southern Saugeen lands, of parts of the Huron and Moravian Reserves, and finally, in Toronto, of Coldwa ter and the Narrows. The First Nations involved in these so-called "trea ties" complained either that they had never agreed to them or that the verbal treaties were not accurately represented on paper by Bond Head. Only days before the Coldwater Treaty was signed, Anderson reported to Givins that he had received an application to rent the saw mill, located on the first fall of the Severn River a few hundred yards from Lake Simcoe. Anderson recommended the rental, even for a small amount, as he argued that if it was left in its present state it would soon fall down. Anderson's fatal mistake was that he did not consult with the Chippewa on this matter. As we shall see, the physical possession of the mill and who had the right to dispose of it would be the most contentious 4. NAC.RG 10, v.59:60337-41, letters, 11 December 1835, Anderson to ID; v.501:191- 193, 6 October 1836, Givins to Anderson. 5. Givins did not raise the issue of a previous suggestion to surrender the Reserve in his 6 October 1836 letter to Anderson. However, several following ones indicate that the Lt. Governor had left the Chippewa to think about and answer a "question," which was likely whether they would cede their land.