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Stanford University Recent Trends of Organized-Crime Related Violence in México Eduardo Guerrero Violence and Policing in La<n American and US Ci<es, April 28, 2014 Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 02 Outline § President Calderón’s Strategy § Cartel Fragmentaon and Geographical Dispersion of Violence § Violence epidemics § Recent Violence Trends and the Public Security and Violence Index § Vigilan8sm § Ins8tu8onal Development and Organized-Crime Social Base Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 03 President Calderón’s Strategy § Federal forces engaged in a “frontal combat” against criminal organizaons, especially through high profile captures. § While the Federal Police was revamped (event though the prevailing corrup8on was not tackled), the judiciary remained overall unreliable. § The US supported Mexico primarily providing intelligence (whenever the interest of both countries concurred). § No programs were implemented in order to prevent massive recruitment by criminal organizaons. Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 04 The Strategy’s impact on violence The strategy did not tackle three phenomena linked to organized-crime related violence: 1. The systemac capture of kingpins begets an agency problem within criminal organizaons. 2. Violence fosters extor8on and other criminal ac8vi8es. 3. Violence follows epidemic trends. Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 05 Sinaloa Juárez Tijuana Golfo La Familia Michoacana Milenio 2007: 6 cartels Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 06 Sinaloa Beltrán Leyva Juárez Tijuana Facción de El Teo Golfo La Familia Michoacana Milenio 2008: 8 cartels Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 07 Sinaloa Pacífico Sur La Barbie Juárez Tijuana Facción de El Teo Golfo Los Zetas La Familia Michoacana Milenio 2009: 10 cartels Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 08 Sinaloa Pacífico Sur CIDA Cártel del Charro Juárez Tijuana Golfo Los Zetas La Familia Michoacana La Resistencia CJNG 2010: 11 cartels Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 09 Sinaloa Pacífico Sur La Mano con Ojos Nueva Admi nistración CIDA Juárez Tijuana Golfo Los Zetas La Familia Michoacana Caballeros Templarios Los Incorregibles La Empresa La Resistencia CJNG 2011: 16 cartels La Nueva Federación Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 10 Sinaloa Pacífico Sur CIDA Juárez Tijuana Golfo Los Zetas La Familia Michoacana Caballeros Templarios La Resistencia CJNG 2012: 11 cartels Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 11 Sinaloa Pacífico Sur Nuevo Cártel de Juárez Tijuana Golfo Los Zetas La Familia Michoacana Caballeros Templarios CJNG 2013: 9 cartels Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 12 Cartel fragmentaon and geographical dispersion of violence § Kingpin captures increased agency problems within criminal organizaons, and lead to cartel fragmentaon. § A consequence of this fragmentaon was the territorial relocaon of criminal fac8ons, which have also engaged into ac8vi8es different from drug-trafficking. § The previous landscape of naonal cartels has been replaced by smaller regional organizaons. Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 13 Municipali<es with 12 or more annual organized-crime related deaths 2007: 52 municipali8es 26% of the populaon Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 14 Municipali<es with 12 or more annual organized-crime related deaths 2008: 85 municipali8es 32% of the populaon Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 15 Municipali<es with 12 or more annual organized-crime related deaths 2009: 132 municipali8es 37% of the populaon Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 16 Municipali<es with 12 or more annual organized-crime related deaths 2010: 199 municipali8es 44% of the populaon Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 17 Municipali<es with 12 or more annual organized-crime related deaths 2011: 208 municipali8es 50% of the populaon Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 18 Municipali<es with 12 or more annual organized-crime related deaths 2012: 178 municipali8es 47% of the populaon Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 19 Municipali<es with 12 or more annual organized-crime related deaths 2013: 172 municipali8es 51% of the populaon Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 20 § Organized-crime related violence precedes and fosters the increase of extor8on rates. Organized-crime related deaths per 100,000 people (logarithmic scale) and extor:on victmiza:on rate in 2010 y 2011 10% 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0 1 10 100 2010 2011 Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 21 § Organized-crime related violence precedes and fosters the increase of extor8on rates. Organized-crime related deaths per 100,000 people (logarithmic scale) and extor:on victmiza:on rate in 2010 y 2011 10% 9% 8% 7% Veracruz 2011 6% 5% 4% Vercaruz 2010 3% 2% 1% 0 1 10 100 2010 2011 Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 22 Monthy organized-crime related deaths in Juárez 350 Violence outbreak 300 Jan-Feb/2008 250 200 150 Post-oubreak avrg: 122 100 50 0 Pre-outbreak avrg: 11 Jul-11 Jan-09 Jan-14 Jun-09 Oct-07 Oct-12 Apr-10 Sep-10 Feb-11 Dec-06 Dec-11 Aug-08 Aug-13 Nov-09 Mar-08 Mar-13 May-07 May-12 Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 23 Monthy organized-crime related deaths in Culiacán 120 Violence outbreak May-Jun/2008 100 80 60 Post-oubreak avrg: 43 40 20 Pre-outbreak avrg: 20 0 Jul-11 Jan-09 Jan-14 Jun-09 Oct-07 Oct-12 Apr-10 Sep-10 Feb-11 Dec-06 Dec-11 Aug-08 Aug-13 Nov-09 Mar-08 Mar-13 May-07 May-12 Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 24 Monthy organized-crime related deaths in Chihuahua 120 Violence outbreak 100 Jun-Jul/2008 80 60 40 Post-oubreak avrg: 40 20 Pre-outbreak avrg: 4 0 Jul-11 Jan-09 Jan-14 Jun-09 Oct-07 Oct-12 Apr-10 Sep-10 Feb-11 Dec-06 Dec-11 Aug-08 Aug-13 Nov-09 Mar-08 Mar-13 May-07 May-12 Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 25 Monthy organized-crime related deaths in Tijuana 250 Violence outbreak Sept-Oct/2008 200 150 100 50 Post-oubreak avrg: 30 Pre-outbreak avrg: 16 0 Jul-11 Jan-09 Jan-14 Jun-09 Oct-07 Oct-12 Apr-10 Sep-10 Feb-11 Dec-06 Dec-11 Aug-08 Aug-13 Nov-09 Mar-08 Mar-13 May-07 May-12 Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 26 Monthy organized-crime related deaths in Acapulco 160 Violence outbreak 140 Oct-Nov/2010 120 100 80 60 Post-oubreak avrg: 64 40 20 Pre-outbreak avrg: 10 0 Jul-11 Jan-09 Jan-14 Jun-09 Oct-07 Oct-12 Apr-10 Sep-10 Feb-11 Dec-06 Dec-11 Aug-08 Aug-13 Nov-09 Mar-08 Mar-13 May-07 May-12 Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 27 Violence epidemics evolu:on by March 2014 Average deaths Months since outbreak Outbreak City Pre- Post- Under pre- date Variation Total outbreak outbreak oubreak avrg Juárez Jan/08 11 122 1050% 73 0 Chihuahua Jun-08 4 40 900% 68 0 Culiacán May-08 20 43 112% 69 1 Mazatlán Jul-08 2 14 552% 67 5 Tijuana Sept-08 16 30 88% 65 18 Laguna Feb-09 5 47 845% 60 0 Monterrey M.A. Mar-10 7 63 816% 47 0 Guadalajara M.A. May-10 7 43 547% 45 0 Acapulco Oct-10 10 64 519% 40 0 Veracruz Jun-11 2 17 674% 32 2 Total 566 26 Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 28 Organized-crime related deaths (President Calderón last year/President Peña Nieto first year) 13,657 1,400 11,296 1,300 1,200 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 § 18% reducon Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 29 Public Security and Violence Index Goals Providing informaon for investors, decision-makers and the general public, in order to generate public security scenarios. Following the evolu8on and trends of incidents which have a larger impact on public percep8on in: § 31 States and Mexico City § 56 Metropolitan Areas § 403 Municipali8es over 50,000 people Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 30 Public Security and Violence Index States with most negave scores (2013 4th quarter) Score Category State PSVI Insecurity Insecurity Trend Trend Level Level Morelos 0.79 0.89 0.56 Critical Stable Guerrero 0.77 0.92 0.45 Critical Improvement Michoacán 0.66 0.61 0.77 Very high Rapid deterioration Estado de México 0.64 0.68 0.55 Very high Stable Distrito Federal 0.63 0.62 0.64 Very high Deterioration PromedioAverage 0.50 0.48 0.54 Moderate Stable Stanford University RECENT TRENDS OF OGANIZED-CRIME RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO 31 Public Security and Violence Index States with most posi8ve scores (2013 4th quarter) Score Category State PSVI Insecurity Insecurity Trend Trend Level Level Zacatecas 0.33 0.41 0.17 High Rapid improvement Nayarit 0.33 0.30 0.41 Low Improvement Nuevo León 0.38 0.45 0.23 High Rapid improvement Yucatán 0.38 0.24 0.68 Low Deterioration San Luis Potosí 0.39 0.35 0.49 Moderate Improvement PromedioAverage
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  • List of Sanctions Pursuant to the Kingpin

    List of Sanctions Pursuant to the Kingpin

    SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN NARCOTICS KINGPIN DESIGNATION ACT (Last updated June 8, 2021) PRESIDENTIAL AND TREASURY IDENTIFIED KINGPINS (33) ESPARRAGOZA MORENO, Juan Jose (34) PALMA SALAZAR, Hector Luis The following individuals and entities have been identified by (35) QUINTERO MERAZ, Jose Albino the President or the Treasury pursuant to section § 1904(b)(1) (36) REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF of the Kingpin Act. COLOMBIA (37) UNITED SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF COLOMBIA On June 1, 2000, the President identified the following 12 foreign (38) UNITED WA STATE ARMY persons as significant foreign narcotics traffickers under the Kingpin Act. On June 1, 2004, the President identified the following eight foreign persons and two entities as significant foreign narcotics (1) AMEZCUA-CONTRERAS, Jose de Jesus traffickers under the Kingpin Act. (2) AMEZCUA-CONTRERAS, Luis Ignacio (3) ARELLANO-FELIX, Benjamin Alberto (39) ARELLANO FELIX ORGANIZATION (4) ARELLANO-FELIX, Ramon Eduardo (40) ARELLANO FELIX, Eduardo Ramon (5) CARO-QUINTERO, Rafael (41) ARELLANO FELIX, Francisco Javier (6) CARRILLO-FUENTES, Vicente (42) CARRILLO FUENTES ORGANIZATION (7) CHANG, Chi Fu (43) VALENCIA CORNELIO, Armando (8) HEATH, Noel Timothy (44) NEMBHARD, Norris (9) Individual removed on February 3, 2016 (45) RAMCHARAN, Leebert (10) OGUNGBUYI, Abeni O. (46) ZEVALLOS GONZALES, Fernando Melciades (11) OGUNGBUYI, Oluwole A. (47) Individual removed on February 3, 2016 (12) WEI Hsueh Kang (48) NOORZAI, Haji Bashir On June 1, 2001, the President identified the following 12 foreign On June 1, 2005, the President identified the following eight persons as significant foreign narcotics traffickers under the foreign persons and one entity as significant foreign narcotics Kingpin Act.