Cartel and Gangs in Chicago
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Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002
ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN MEXICO, 1999-2002 A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the United States Government February 2003 Researcher: Ramón J. Miró Project Manager: Glenn E. Curtis Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540−4840 Tel: 202−707−3900 Fax: 202−707−3920 E-Mail: [email protected] Homepage: http://loc.gov/rr/frd/ Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Criminal and Terrorist Activity in Mexico PREFACE This study is based on open source research into the scope of organized crime and terrorist activity in the Republic of Mexico during the period 1999 to 2002, and the extent of cooperation and possible overlap between criminal and terrorist activity in that country. The analyst examined those organized crime syndicates that direct their criminal activities at the United States, namely Mexican narcotics trafficking and human smuggling networks, as well as a range of smaller organizations that specialize in trans-border crime. The presence in Mexico of transnational criminal organizations, such as Russian and Asian organized crime, was also examined. In order to assess the extent of terrorist activity in Mexico, several of the country’s domestic guerrilla groups, as well as foreign terrorist organizations believed to have a presence in Mexico, are described. The report extensively cites from Spanish-language print media sources that contain coverage of criminal and terrorist organizations and their activities in Mexico. -
Managerial Economics Unit 6: Oligopoly
Managerial Economics Unit 6: Oligopoly Rudolf Winter-Ebmer Johannes Kepler University Linz Summer Term 2019 Managerial Economics: Unit 6 - Oligopoly1 / 45 OBJECTIVES Explain how managers of firms that operate in an oligopoly market can use strategic decision-making to maintain relatively high profits Understand how the reactions of market rivals influence the effectiveness of decisions in an oligopoly market Managerial Economics: Unit 6 - Oligopoly2 / 45 Oligopoly A market with a small number of firms (usually big) Oligopolists \know" each other Characterized by interdependence and the need for managers to explicitly consider the reactions of rivals Protected by barriers to entry that result from government, economies of scale, or control of strategically important resources Managerial Economics: Unit 6 - Oligopoly3 / 45 Strategic interaction Actions of one firm will trigger re-actions of others Oligopolist must take these possible re-actions into account before deciding on an action Therefore, no single, unified model of oligopoly exists I Cartel I Price leadership I Bertrand competition I Cournot competition Managerial Economics: Unit 6 - Oligopoly4 / 45 COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR: Cartel Cartel: A collusive arrangement made openly and formally I Cartels, and collusion in general, are illegal in the US and EU. I Cartels maximize profit by restricting the output of member firms to a level that the marginal cost of production of every firm in the cartel is equal to the market's marginal revenue and then charging the market-clearing price. F Behave like a monopoly I The need to allocate output among member firms results in an incentive for the firms to cheat by overproducing and thereby increase profit. -
The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules Robert H
University of Baltimore Law ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship 2000 The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules Robert H. Lande University of Baltimore School of Law, [email protected] Howard P. Marvel Ohio State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons Recommended Citation The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 941 (2000) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES THE THREE TYPES OF COLLUSION: FIXING PRICES, RIVALS, AND RULES ROBERTH. LANDE * & HOWARDP. MARVEL** Antitrust law has long held collusion to be paramount among the offenses that it is charged with prohibiting. The reason for this prohibition is simple----collusion typically leads to monopoly-like outcomes, including monopoly profits that are shared by the colluding parties. Most collusion cases can be classified into two established general categories.) Classic, or "Type I" collusion involves collective action to raise price directly? Firms can also collude to disadvantage rivals in a manner that causes the rivals' output to diminish or causes their behavior to become chastened. This "Type 11" collusion in turn allows the colluding firms to raise prices.3 Many important collusion cases, however, do not fit into either of these categories. -
Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests
Home Country of Origin Information Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests (RIR) are research reports on country conditions. They are requested by IRB decision makers. The database contains a seven-year archive of English and French RIR. Earlier RIR may be found on the European Country of Origin Information Network website. Please note that some RIR have attachments which are not electronically accessible here. To obtain a copy of an attachment, please e-mail us. Related Links • Advanced search help 15 August 2019 MEX106302.E Mexico: Drug cartels, including Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel (Cartel del Golfo), La Familia Michoacana, and the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO); activities and areas of operation; ability to track individuals within Mexico (2017-August 2019) Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1. Overview InSight Crime, a foundation that studies organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean (Insight Crime n.d.), indicates that Mexico’s larger drug cartels have become fragmented or "splintered" and have been replaced by "smaller, more volatile criminal groups that have taken up other violent activities" (InSight Crime 16 Jan. 2019). According to sources, Mexican law enforcement efforts to remove the leadership of criminal organizations has led to the emergence of new "smaller and often more violent" (BBC 27 Mar. 2018) criminal groups (Justice in Mexico 19 Mar. 2018, 25; BBC 27 Mar. 2018) or "fractur[ing]" and "significant instability" among the organizations (US 3 July 2018, 2). InSight Crime explains that these groups do not have "clear power structures," that alliances can change "quickly," and that they are difficult to track (InSight Crime 16 Jan. -
Street Gang Recognition and Awareness
STREET GANG RECOGNITION AND AWARENESS Objectives: • To inform teachers/adults in or out of the school system about gangs. • To be able to identify gang members or those that want to be in gangs. (Wannabe’s) • To learn how to help juveniles before its too late. What is a Criminal Gang? 35-45-9-1 “Criminal Gang” defined as: • At least five or more persons that specifically participate in and require as a condition of membership to commit a felony which share a common: – Symbol –Name –Sign That engage in criminal activity. What is Criminal Gang Activity? 35-45-9-3 “Criminal Gang Activity” defined as: • A person who knowingly or intentionally actively participates in a criminal gang commits criminal gang activity. What is a confirmed gang member? Must meet at least three of the following criteria: • Admits gang affiliation • Has gang related tattoos • Wears gang colors • Identified by other affiliates • Writes about affiliation • Photographed with affiliates • Associates with known members • Has family members affiliated with a gang What is a suspected gang member? • Must meet one quality from the criteria list. • Maybe bumped to confirm gang member status with additional contact. What makes one join a gang? Family motives for joining: • Stressful family life at home • Lack of parental involvement • Low or non-existent expectations from parents • Limited English speaking households • Abuse or neglect • Permissive truancy attitudes What makes one join a gang (cont.)? Personal motives for joining: • Low motivation • Low educational/occupational expectations • Low self-esteem • Behavior/discipline problems • Drug abuse • Peer pressure • Protection • Negative police involvement • Glamorization by media (Fashion, music, T.V., etc.) What family vs. -
Estimating the Causal Effect of Gangs in Chicago†
Competition in the Black Market: Estimating the Causal Effect of Gangs in Chicago† Bravo Working Paper # 2021-004 Jesse Bruhn † Abstract: I study criminal street gangs using new data that describes the geospatial distribution of gang territory in Chicago and its evolution over a 15-year period. Using an event study design, I show that city blocks entered by gangs experience sharp increases in the number of reported batteries (6%), narcotics violations (18.5%), weapons violations (9.8%), incidents of prostitution (51.9%), and criminal trespassing (19.6%). I also find a sharp reduction in the number of reported robberies (-8%). The findings cannot be explained by pre-existing trends in crime, changes in police surveillance, crime displacement, exposure to public housing demolitions, reporting effects, or demographic trends. Taken together, the evidence suggests that gangs cause small increases in violence in highly localized areas as a result of conflict over illegal markets. I also find evidence that gangs cause reductions in median property values (-$8,436.9) and household income (-$1,866.8). Motivated by these findings, I explore the relationship between the industrial organization of the black market and the supply of criminal activity. I find that gangs that are more internally fractured or operate in more competitive environments tend to generate more crime. This finding is inconsistent with simple, market-based models of criminal behavior, suggesting an important role for behavioral factors and social interactions in the production of gang violence. Keywords: Competition, Crime, Gangs, Neighborhoods, Urban, Violence JEL classification: J46, K24, O17, R23, Z13 __________________________________ † Previously circulated under the title "The Geography of Gang Violence.” * Economics Department, Brown University. -
Eau Brummels of Gangland and the Killing They Did in Feuds Ho" It
1 9 -- THE SUN; SUNDAY, AtlGtlSTriSWi 1! eau Brummels of Gangland and the Killing They Did in Feuds ho" it v" A!. W4x 1WJ HERMAN ROSEHTHAL WHOSE K.1LLINQ- - POLICE COMMISSIOKER. EH RIGHT WHO IS IN $ MARKED T?e expressed great indignation that a KEEPING TJe GANGS SUBdECTIOK. BEGINNING-O- F crime had been committed. Ploggl .TAe stayed in. hiding for a few days whllo tho politicians who controlled the elec END FOR. tion services of the Five Points ar- ranged certain matters, and then ho Slaying of Rosenthal Marked the Be surrendered. Of courso ho pleaded e. ginning of the End for Gangs Whose "Biff" Ellison, who was sent to Sing Sing for his part In the killing of by Bill Harrington in Paul Kelly's New Grimes Had Been Covered a Brighton dive, came to the Bowery from Maryland when he was in his Crooked Politicians Some of WHERE early twenties. Ho got a Job' as ARTHUR. WOOD5P WHO PUT T5e GANGS bouncer in Pat Flynn's saloon in 34 Reformed THEY ObLUncr. Bond street, and advanced rapidly in Old Leaders Who tho estimation of gangland, because he was young and husky when he and zenship back Tanner Smith becamo as approaching tho end of his activities. hit a man that man went down and r 0 as anybody. Ho got Besides these there were numerous stayed down. That was how he got decent a citizen Murders Resulting From Rivalry Among Gangsters Were a Job as beef handler on the docks, other fights. bis nickname ho used to be always stevedore, and threatening to someone. -
Tacoma Gang Assessment January 2019
Tacoma Gang Assessment January 2019 Prepared by: Michelle Arciaga Young Tytos Consulting Tytos Consulting would like to express our appreciation to the City of Tacoma for underwriting this report and to the Neighborhood and Community Services Department for providing support and coordination during the assessment process. Personnel from Comprehensive Life Resources – Rise Against the Influence (RAIN) Program and the Washington Department of Corrections - Community Corrections Gang Unit (WDOC-CCGU) were responsible for arranging the gang member interviews. Calvin Kennon (RAIN Program) and Randi Unfred, and Kelly Casperson (WDOC-CCGU), as well as other personnel from these agencies, dedicated considerable time to ensuring access to gang-involved individuals for gang member interviews. We are very grateful for their help. Kelly Casperson also provided data on security threat group members in Tacoma which was helpful for this report. We would also like to recognize the individuals who participated in these interviews, and who so candidly and openly shared their life experiences with us, for their valuable contributions to this report. Jacqueline Shelton of the Tacoma Police Department Gang Unit spent considerable time cleaning and preparing police incident report and gang intelligence data for analysis and inclusion in this report. We are indebted to her for this assistance. Focus groups were conducted with personnel from the Washington Department of Corrections Community Corrections Gang Unit, Pierce County Juvenile Court, agency partners from the RAIN multidisciplinary team, safety and security personnel from Tacoma Public Schools, and officers from the Tacoma Police Department Gang Unit. These focus groups contributed greatly to our ability to understand, analyze, and interpret the data for this report. -
An Introduction to Gangs in Virginia
An Introduction to Gangs in Virginia Office of the Attorney General Photographs Provided By: Virginia Gang Investigators Association Virginia Department of Corrections Fairfax County Gang Unit Pittsylvania County Sheriff’s Office Boys & Girls Clubs of Virginia Galax Police Department Richmond Police Department unless otherwise specified Videos Provided By Dr. Al Valdez and are NOT from Virginia Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II Attorney General of Virginia American Violence Contains some graphic content Overview I. Facts About Gangs II. Identifying Signs of Gang Association III. Safety Issues for EMS Part I FACTS ABOUT GANGS Gangs In History Gangs have been present throughout human history. Blackbeard and other pirates plundered the Caribbean during the 1600’s and 1700’s. The word “Thug” dates back to India from around 1200, and refers to a gang of criminals. Gangs In History Irish gangs were a part of riots in NYC during the 1860’s. Gangs like “The Hole in the Wall Gang” and Billy the Kid’s Gang robbed in the Southwest during the 1800’s. Gangs In History Picture from The United Northern and Southern Knights of the Ku Klux Klan website with members in Virginia. This from a 2007 cross lighting ceremony. Al Capone’s Organization and the Ku Klux Klan are examples of prominent gangs in the 1900’s. Gangs Today Many of today’s gangs can trace their roots to the later half of the 20th Century. El Salvador Civil War – 1980’s. The Sleepy Lagoon Boys – 1940’s Zoot Suit Riots. The “Truth” in Numbers There are at least 26,500 gangs and 785,000 gang members in the U.S. -
We Were Minority. Italiani Ed Afroamericani a Chicago Tra Emancipazione E Conflitti, 1945 –1965
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MODENA E REGGIO EMILIA Dottorato di ricerca in Scienze Umanistiche Ciclo XXXII TITOLO della TESI We were minority. Italiani ed afroamericani a Chicago tra emancipazione e conflitti, 1945 –1965. Un'analisi storica tra documenti d'archivio e fonti orali. Candidato Moschetti Marco Relatore (Tutor): Prof. Lorenzo Bertucelli Coordinatore del Corso di Dottorato: Prof.ssa Marina Bondi A mia madre e mio padre. Migranti. C'è il bianco, il nero e mille sfumature Di colori in mezzo e lì in mezzo siamo noi Coi nostri mondi in testa tutti ostili E pericolosamente confinanti siamo noi Un po' paladini della giustizia Un po' pure briganti, siamo noi Spaccati e disuguali, siamo noi Frammenti di colore, sfumature Dentro a un quadro da finire Siamo noi, che non ci vogliono lasciar stare Siamo noi, che non vogliamo lasciarli stare Siamo noi, appena visibili sfumature In grado di cambiare il mondo In grado di far incontrare Il cielo e il mare in un tramonto Siamo noi, frammenti di un insieme Ancora tutto da stabilire E che dipende da noi Capire l'importanza di ogni singolo colore Dipende da noi saperlo collocare bene Ancora da noi, capire il senso nuovo Che può dare all'insieme Che dobbiamo immaginare Solo noi, solo noi, solo noi… (Sfumature, 99 posse. Da La vita que vendrà, 2000) Marco Moschetti , We were minority. Indice INDICE INTRODUZIONE p.1 1. CAPITOLO I: stereotipi, pregiudizi e intolleranza. Gli italiani negli Stati Uniti e l’immagine dell’italoamericano. 1.1 Lo stereotipo anti-italiano ed il pregiudizio contro gli immigrati. -
FY17 Annual Report Metropolitan Enforcement Group
State of Illinois Illinois State Police FY17 Annual Report Metropolitan Enforcement Group Printed by the Authority of the State of Illinois ISP Central Printing Section Printed on Recycled Paper ISP 5-583 (1/18) M www.illinois.gov www.isp.state.il.us Illinois State Police INTRODUCTION Metropolitan Enforcement Groups (MEGs), authorized by the Illinois General Assembly in 1977 under the Intergovernmental Drug Laws Enforcement Act (30 ILCS 715/6), continue to be an important component in the effort to combat illegal drug traffic throughout Illinois. MEGs represent a collaborative effort among state, federal, and local law enforcement agencies to enforce Illinois drug laws and investigate street gang activity. MEGs partner with Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Center (STIC) and Illinois National Guard Counterdrug analysts to reduce crime through intelligence led policing which focuses enforcement efforts on felony level drug distribution and trafficking. MEGs partner with community groups, health organizations, and local stakeholders to address and prevent substance abuse disorders (SUDs) affecting communities throughout Illinois. Illinois has nine MEGs encompassing 20 counties, including Scott County, Iowa. Combined populations of these counties is 3,968,508 or 31 percent of the total population of Illinois. The MEGs are staffed by 100 officers, 24 (24 percent) from the Illinois State Police (ISP), and 76 (76 percent) from local and federal agencies. Twenty-five administrative staff members manage budgets, analyze intelligence data, and coordinate asset seizures and forfeitures. Each MEG is overseen by a policy board composed of ISP officers, elected officials, and chief law enforcement officers or their designees. A 2017 report by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA), concluded MEG units were effective at making proportionally more felony and manufacture/delivery arrests than their local counterparts. -
CRIME and VIOLENCE in CHICAGO a Geography of Segregation and Structural Disadvantage
CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO a Geography of Segregation and Structural Disadvantage Tim van den Bergh - Master Thesis Human Geography Radboud University, 2018 i Crime and Violence in Chicago: a Geography of Segregation and Structural Disadvantage Tim van den Bergh Student number: 4554817 Radboud University Nijmegen Master Thesis Human Geography Master Specialization: ‘Conflicts, Territories and Identities’ Supervisor: dr. O.T Kramsch Nijmegen, 2018 ii ABSTRACT Tim van den Bergh: Crime and Violence in Chicago: a Geography of Segregation and Structural Disadvantage Engaged with the socio-historical making of space, this thesis frames the contentious debate on violence in Chicago by illustrating how a set of urban processes have interacted to maintain a geography of racialized structural disadvantage. Within this geography, both favorable and unfavorable social conditions are unequally dispersed throughout the city, thereby impacting neighborhoods and communities differently. The theoretical underpinning of space as a social construct provides agency to particular institutions that are responsible for the ‘making’ of urban space in Chicago. With the use of a qualitative research approach, this thesis emphasizes the voices of people who can speak about the etiology of crime and violence from personal experience. Furthermore, this thesis provides a critique of social disorganization and broken windows theory, proposing that these popular criminologies have advanced a problematic normative production of space and impeded effective crime policy and community-police relations. Key words: space, disadvantage, race, crime & violence, Chicago (Under the direction of dr. Olivier Kramsch) iii Table of Contents Chapter 1 - Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 § 1.1 Studying crime and violence in Chicago .................................................................... 1 § 1.2 Research objective ...................................................................................................