Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 2018
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AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL Annual Report for 2018 NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC 20546 Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair January 1, 2019 The Honorable Jim Bridenstine Administrator National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC 20546 Dear Mr. Bridenstine: Pursuant to Section 106(b) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act 2005 (P.L. 109-155), the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit the ASAP Annual Report for 2018 to the U.S. Congress and to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The Report is based on the Panel’s 2018 fact-finding and quarterly public meetings; insight visits and meetings; direct observations of NASA operations and decision- making; discussions with NASA management, employees, and contractors; and the Panel members’ past experiences. NASA’s role in leading the advancement of space technology involves pushing the envelope on technology development and human exploration. In seeking the benefits of these endeavors, there are immense uncertainties and inherent risks. Large-scale, technically complex space systems and operations in the hazardous space environment should not be overly constrained by schedule and cost but focus on achieving mission success and managing risk. We encourage NASA to continue to acknowledge these challenges as they balance the risk-benefit equation. As both the Commercial Crew Program and Exploration Systems Development move beyond design into hardware production and test, we continue to note that NASA maintains focus on the requisite details for risk management and mission success without apparent neglect or omission of planned content. To date, but with technical challenges remaining, there has been no direct evidence that schedule pressure is driving decisions that will adversely impact safety. As NASA transitions from development to operational launch and flight of its astronauts—something it has not done for several years, since the end of the Shuttle era—it is essential to remain cognizant of the perils inherent to space flight. Given the great uncertainties of the space operational environment, it is critical to maintain vigilance and attention to test results, engineering understanding, disciplined processes, and consideration of mitigation alternatives. We have often commented on the need for constancy of purpose for exploration, but along with that must go constancy of standards for certification, flight test, and acceptable risk. Our advice includes a recommendation that NASA and the Congress agree on a mitigation plan to ensure continuing U.S. presence on the International Space Station until commercial crew providers are available. We also advise that NASA maintain a persistent presence in low-Earth orbit for the long term in order to mitigate the considerable risk of human exploration in the far reaches of space. We continue to urge serious attention to the hazards posed by Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris, and we continue to recommend that the language in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 requiring the establishment of a Presidential Commission for Human Space Flight Independent Investigations be reviewed and revised. I submit the ASAP Annual Report for 2018 with respect and appreciation. Sincerely, Dr. Patricia Sanders Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Enclosure NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC 20546 Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair January 1, 2019 The Honorable Michael R. Pence President of the Senate Washington, DC 20510 Dear Mr. President: Pursuant to Section 106(b) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act 2005 (P.L. 109-155), the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit the ASAP Annual Report for 2018 to the U.S. Congress and to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The Report is based on the Panel’s 2018 fact-finding and quarterly public meetings; insight visits and meetings; direct observations of NASA operations and decision- making; discussions with NASA management, employees, and contractors; and the Panel members’ past experiences. NASA’s role in leading the advancement of space technology involves pushing the envelope on technology development and human exploration. In seeking the benefits of these endeavors, there are immense uncertainties and inherent risks. Large-scale, technically complex space systems and operations in the hazardous space environment should not be overly constrained by schedule and cost but focus on achieving mission success and managing risk. We encourage NASA to continue to acknowledge these challenges as they balance the risk-benefit equation. As both the Commercial Crew Program and Exploration Systems Development move beyond design into hardware production and test, we continue to note that NASA maintains focus on the requisite details for risk management and mission success without apparent neglect or omission of planned content. To date, but with technical challenges remaining, there has been no direct evidence that schedule pressure is driving decisions that will adversely impact safety. As NASA transitions from development to operational launch and flight of its astronauts—something it has not done for several years, since the end of the Shuttle era—it is essential to remain cognizant of the perils inherent to space flight. Given the great uncertainties of the space operational environment, it is critical to maintain vigilance and attention to test results, engineering understanding, disciplined processes, and consideration of mitigation alternatives. We have often commented on the need for constancy of purpose for exploration, but along with that must go constancy of standards for certification, flight test, and acceptable risk. Our advice includes a recommendation that NASA and the Congress agree on a mitigation plan to ensure continuing U.S. presence on the International Space Station until commercial crew providers are available. We also advise that NASA maintain a persistent presence in low-Earth orbit for the long term in order to mitigate the considerable risk of human exploration in the far reaches of space. We continue to urge serious attention to the hazards posed by Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris, and we continue to recommend that the language in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 requiring the establishment of a Presidential Commission for Human Space Flight Independent Investigations be reviewed and revised. I submit the ASAP Annual Report for 2018 with respect and appreciation. Sincerely, Dr. Patricia Sanders Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Enclosure NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC 20546 Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair January 1, 2019 The Honorable Paul D. Ryan Speaker of the House of Representatives Washington, DC 20510 Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to Section 106(b) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act 2005 (P.L. 109-155), the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit the ASAP Annual Report for 2018 to the U.S. Congress and to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The Report is based on the Panel’s 2018 fact-finding and quarterly public meetings; insight visits and meetings; direct observations of NASA operations and decision- making; discussions with NASA management, employees, and contractors; and the Panel members’ past experiences. NASA’s role in leading the advancement of space technology involves pushing the envelope on technology development and human exploration. In seeking the benefits of these endeavors, there are immense uncertainties and inherent risks. Large-scale, technically complex space systems and operations in the hazardous space environment should not be overly constrained by schedule and cost but focus on achieving mission success and managing risk. We encourage NASA to continue to acknowledge these challenges as they balance the risk-benefit equation. As both the Commercial Crew Program and Exploration Systems Development move beyond design into hardware production and test, we continue to note that NASA maintains focus on the requisite details for risk management and mission success without apparent neglect or omission of planned content. To date, but with technical challenges remaining, there has been no direct evidence that schedule pressure is driving decisions that will adversely impact safety. As NASA transitions from development to operational launch and flight of its astronauts—something it has not done for several years, since the end of the Shuttle era—it is essential to remain cognizant of the perils inherent to space flight. Given the great uncertainties of the space operational environment, it is critical to maintain vigilance and attention to test results, engineering understanding, disciplined processes, and consideration of mitigation alternatives. We have often commented on the need for constancy of purpose for exploration, but along with that must go constancy of standards for certification, flight test, and acceptable risk. Our advice includes a recommendation that NASA and the Congress agree on a mitigation plan to ensure continuing U.S. presence on the International Space Station until commercial crew providers are available. We also advise that NASA maintain a persistent presence