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The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet

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The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet RECA ll The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet By NICHOLAS E. SARANTAKES British warships with U.S. Third Fleet off coast of Japan preparing for Japanese surrender Naval Historical Center n the long and proud history of the enemy on its own, and although there Royal Navy, the largest formation were drawbacks to engaging with allies, ever to see combat fought under the British presence provided diplomatic, I the operational command not of political, and operational advantages that Drake, Nelson, Jellicoe, or Cunningham, far outweighed ensuing complications. but rather of Americans Raymond Spru- ance and William Halsey. The British The Political Issues Pacific Fleet was massive and today In 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff would be the largest navy on the planet, Committee under the leadership of Field but in 1945 it fought the Imperial Japa- Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Impe- nese Navy as a component of the U.S. rial General Staff, forcefully argued that the Fifth and Third Fleets. Present-day United Kingdom should take part in the final warfighters, quartermasters, strate- operations against Japan in order to preserve gists, and commanders should keep its close relationship with the United States. this case study in coalition operations Brooke explained that an operation designed in mind when dealing with allies, since to retake colonies would have been the the operational distribution of power is “easiest to stage but limited itself to the recap- similar. Even though the U.S. Navy had ture of British possessions without any direct the immediate resources to defeat the participation with American and Australian Nicholas E. Sarantakes is a visiting professor at the Air War College and the author of Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., and Joseph Stillwell and Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 40, 1st quarter 2006 / JFQ 85 BR itis H P AC ifi C fl EE T HMS Formidable HMS Indomitable navyphoto.co.uk navyphoto.co.uk forces in the defeat of Japan. I felt that at this prove our own dominance in the air, we will ways of maintaining contact with their ships, stage of the war it was vital that British forces create in the United States a hatred for Great he realized early on that the British would should participate in direct action against Britain that will make for schisms in the have to adopt American methods. “They Japan in the Pacific.” The British Ambassador postwar years that will defeat everything that won’t accept us unless we use their signal in Washington, the Earl of Halifax, noted, men have died for in this war. books; it won’t work,” Fraser’s communica- “Even if British participation were of neces- tion officer told him. The Admiral concurred, sity small or comparatively so, there would be As the U.S. minutes of this meeting and in an agreement he negotiated in Hawaii an overwhelming difference between this and state, “The President said that the offer was with Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, he com- total absence.”1 accepted on the largest scale.”2 mitted his fleet to the American system. A related issue requiring explanation Nimitz distributed codebooks to the British is why the Americans accepted this detach- The Burden of Logistics and provided a liaison team to each of His ment. Diplomatic considerations, rather than The commander of the new fleet, Majesty’s ships.5 enhancement of operational performance, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, served British were clearly the main factor behind American interests well. Fraser realized that his fleet Churchill offered the ser- interest in having the British join the effort in had an important operational mission. In the waters off Japan. At the second Quebec his report to the Admiralty after the war, he vices of the Royal Navy to conference codenamed Octagon, Winston declared, “On purely strategic grounds it is the crusade against Japan, Churchill broached the subject of a British clearly the best policy to employ the largest noting that the British contribution. He explicitly offered the services forces possible against the centre of the wanted to take part of the Royal Navy to the ongoing crusade enemy’s power, and it would be uneconomi- against Japan, noting that there were factions cal to dissipate one’s total forces in areas away in the United States hostile to Great Britain from the centre.”3 At Quebec, the Chief of Naval Opera- and that the British wanted to take part in The Admiral also realized that the tions, Admiral Ernest King, accepted the the defeat of their Japanese enemy. Once the deployment of the fleet served British diplo- British Pacific Fleet only under the provision matter was out in the open, President Franklin matic interests: that it be self-sufficient in supply. Although Roosevelt could hardly say no. The American a recent study shows that King had legiti- public was likely to be outraged if it discovered From a point of view of national prestige, it has mate reasons for imposing this requirement, that only Americans would have the privilege been of the utmost importance that our Domin- many American naval officers in the Pacific of dying in Japan and that the President was ions should see the British navy engaged, if not did their best to ignore it. In fact, a good responsible for increasing their numbers while in equal numbers, at least on an equal footing, number of admirals had problems with this he kept allies out of the fight. Even before the with the American forces in the Pacific, and it stipulation as well. “Undisturbed by any conference, John Winant, the U.S. Ambassador would have been disastrous from this point of logistic responsibilities, they have frequently in London, argued: view if the British Pacific Fleet, after being sent denounced the rule of self sufficiency as to the Pacific, had been relegated, as the Aus- uneconomical in overall effort, as it most If we allow the British to limit their active tralians consider their own forces to have been certainly is, and quite unworkable, which in participation to recapture areas that are to relegated, to a “back area.”4 fact it has not proved to be,” Fraser recorded. their selfish interests alone and not partici- The requirement had to be heeded, though, pate in smashing the war machine of Japan, if Fraser was determined to integrate his at least on paper. The Americans were quite British soldiers don’t cross the Atlantic to our command into the U.S. Pacific Fleet with as willing to provide the British with surplus ports and entrain for our Pacific ports, and few complications as possible. Since the two items. Commanders and supply officers, if we shuck the British air force in order to English-speaking navies had very different however, had to turn down requests that 86 JFQ / issue 40, 1st quarter 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu Sarantakes would go to Washington, at least officially. The Divine Wind have caused a great sensation among the American officers told Rear Admiral Despite the many supply problems, the Americans and have certainly proved their Douglas Fisher, commander of the British British Pacific Fleet did see combat in Japanese worth against suicide aircraft with their com- Fleet Train, that he could have anything waters in three different periods. The first was paratively small penetrating power,” Fraser and everything “that could be given without from March 26 to April 20, during Operation observed. The U.S. liaison officer on the Inde- Admiral King’s knowledge.”6 Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa. The fleet fatigable was impressed at the resilience of the Another area in which the allies worked steamed out of Sydney on February 28 under ship. “When a kamikaze hits a U.S. carrier it together was sea rescue. The Americans had the seagoing command of Vice Admiral Sir means 6 months of repair at Pearl. When a developed a system of submarines, flying- Bernard Rawlings. To avoid command compli- boats, and destroyers designed to rescue the cations with the Americans, Fraser decided he crews of downed planes. The British contrib- would be a shore-based commander.11 designed to take a beating uted resources to this network as well, but the The British ships became Task Force 57 from enemy aviation, the operation was primarily American. Admiral and operated as part of the U.S. Fifth Fleet British carriers had more Sir Philip Vian, the British carrier commander, under Spruance. The Americans assigned defensive plating observed, “The knowledge that there was the British to the southwestern flank of every chance of being picked up if they were the fleet. Their mission was to neutralize forced down in the sea was a vital element in Japanese airfields in the Sakishima islands, kamikaze hits a Limey carrier it’s just a case the upkeep of the aircrews’ morale.”7 which were between Okinawa and Formosa, of ‘Sweepers, man your brooms.’” In one of Despite American assistance, the but they faced a serious threat from the the worst attacks on a carrier, a Japanese British still faced a huge problem. Naval kamikaze onslaught. These suicide attacks strike turned the USS Franklin into a floating architects had designed British ships for turned Okinawa into the bloodiest battle inferno. Fraser reported to the Admiralty, duty in the confined waters around Britain, in the history of the U.S. Navy. Nimitz later “The toll taken by the suicide bomber of the not in the vastness of the Pacific. “The explained, “This was not a battle by vast more lightly armoured American carriers distances were staggering to those of us opposing forces, but an unending series of led to an increase in the proportionate effort accustomed to the conditions of the Euro- small fights.”12 provided by our carriers, and the evidence pean War,” Vian stated.
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