NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF BOSNIAN AND KOSOVO CRISES
ABSTRACT ^^ THESIS SUBMITTED FQRTHE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
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Under the Supervision of Dr. Aftab Alam (M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D) ^^s\S
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH, (INDIA) 2005 ABSTRACT
NATO and European Security: A Case Study of Bosnian and Kosovo Crises The political history of Europe for the last two centuries may be viewed, at least in part, as a continual process of alliance formation and dissolution as the great powers and their smaller consorts sought the elusive goals of security and aggrandizement. If in 1812 Britain, Prussia and Russia could combine to defeat ihe Imperial Napoleon, why in 1949 should not Britain, France and later West Germany join to oppose the more contemporary threat of Soviet expansionism? True, crucial to the new pact, was the United States, culturally if not geographically European, but the method remained the same: to ally in order to meet a common enemy. An attempt is made in this thesis to trace out the bond between the United States and its European allies since the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. This Thesis "NATO and European Security : A Case Study of Bosnian and Kosovo Crises" consists of five chapters and select bibliography. The first chapter deals with the origin and historical development of NATO. For a short period after 1945 the Americans talked about rolling back the frontiers of Communism, but any attempt to do this would provoke a World War III, because Russians regarded control of Eastern Europe as essential to their security. The mission was clearcut in Greece. To the American planners of 1947, World Communism had chosen Greece as its target, with Greek communists as the agent. Hence the United States had undertaken to arm, train, and supply a successful Greek resistance to communist subversion. In March 1947 the United States announced that instead of rolling back Communism it would not allow the Soviet Union to control areas other than those they held in 1947. The American followed up this statement with attempts to form alliance system which would effectively surround the Soviet Union. The most important of these alliances was the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); formed in April 1949. The second chapter deals with NATO and European Security, when Soviet power collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989, and intense debate developed over the roles Europe's security institutions should play in the new era. Some, led by Moscow, favored abolishing both the Warsaw Pact and NATO and giving primacy to a pan - European collective security organization, perhaps in the form of a strengthened Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Others, led by Paris, believed that NATO was still needed, but that primacy should be given to European institutions such as the Western European Unions and the European Community (now European Union). Still others, led by Washington and London, believed that direct American engagement in European security affairs was still indispensable and that NATO, which provided the organizational framework for American engagement in Europe, was indispensable as well. According to this line of thinking, NATO needed to be preserved, reformulated, and made the centerpiece of Europe's new security architecture. American policy - makers wanted NATO to serve both as framework for European security and as' a vehicle for supporting US strategy in the rest of the world. The NATO Summit held in Madrid on July, 1997, was lo invite the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary any to join the alliance by 1999. The NATO summit held in Prague on November 2002, NATO took the historic step of inviting seven Central and East European States, i.e. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria to join NATO, increasing the number of NATO's member states from 19 to 26 countries. The third chapter deals with role of NATO in Bosnian crisis. The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed part of the Turkish (Ottoman) Empire for almost 400 years. Following the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June, 1991. On 1** March, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared the republic's independence but Serb-dominated territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their intent to remain within the Yugoslav federation, then war broke out in Bosnia. NATO foreign ministers, meeting in June 1992, approved for the first time the formation of a force that could be used outside the territory of the alliance states. On 12 April 1993, NATO began enforcing the 'no-fly' zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a further precedent, member states operating in the NATO framework had been providing protective air cover for UNPROFOR troops operating on the ground to deter attacks against the 'safe areas' established by the Security Council, namely Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde. Zepa. The Serbs provoked the Western allies on August 28,1995, by firing a shell into a Sarajevo market, killing 38 civilians and triggering NATO's air strikes. Then NATO conducted the largest combat operation in its history. American, French, British, Italian, Dutch, Spanish and Turkish warplanes flew 500 missions from
111 bases in Italy and aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. Even as the diplomats put the final touches on their agreement to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into "two entities", 49% of Bosnia to go to the Serbs and 51% to go to Muslim-Croat Federation, NATO warplanes were blasting Serbian military targets throughout Bosnia for the second straight week. By Friday, (September 11, 1995), when the diplomats met in Geneva, NATO airforces had flown more than 2000 sorties. The Dayton Accord, which ended the war was signed on December 14, 1995 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The forth chapter deals with role of NATO in Kosovo crisis, Kosovo was the autonomous province of Serbia. In 1974, the Kosovo Albanians had been given autonomy by Tito, to help protect their tradition and culture. On July 5, 1990, when the Serbian Parliament took over the functions of the Assembly and the government of Kosovo, thereby withdrawing from the province the autonomy it was granted by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974. The North Atlantic Council was firmly opposed to independence for Kosovo and to a continuation of the unacceptable status quo. In mid-1998, NATO conducted a number of military exercises in Albania, in conjunction with the Albanian armed forces, in an attempt to increase pressure on the Serbian Government to end military action in Kosovo. On March 24, 1999, U.S.-led NATO forces launched cruise missiles and bombs at targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), plunging America into a military conflict thai President Clinton said was necessary to stop ethnic cleansing and bring stability to Eastern Europe". On June 10, 1999 , UNSC Resolution 1244 set the basis for ending air campaign. The air
IV operation was suspended by Secretary - General Javier Solana of NATO on June 10, 1999, after Milosevic had accepted the prescribed conditions and was formally ended on June 20, 1999, consequent to the withdrawal of all Serb military, special-police and para-military forces from Kosovo. The fifth chapter, the concluding section deals with the distinctive aspects of NATO and European Security and its future course of action. The larger issue for NATO is how to deal with such security threats far from its traditional sphere of operation. The alliance last revised its strategic concept in 1991, shifting from a policy of static defence against the Soviet Union to a regional - oriented one reflecting the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact. When NATO intervened in Bosnia that involvement at least had the formal sanction of the U.N. Security Council and the Dayton Peace Accord signed by all parties involved in the conflict. In the Kosovo crisis, it had no mandate from the U.N. Security Council for acting against Yugoslavia. Its indulgence in military muscle flexing was quite contrary to the wishes of the Security Council which in its resolution 1199 on Kosovo had refrained from prescribing use of force to achieve the purpose of the resolution. But Washington and NATO had sidelined the U.N., thus signalling the formal transition of NATO from an organisation committed to mutual defence to that of international policemen. NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF BOSNIAN AND KOSOVO CRISES
^- <^ SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
POLITICAL SCIENCEo
•>*. ^ By C^ / c^^NARON& G OKAD v''^
Under we supervision of Dr. Aftab Alam (M.A., M.Phil., Ph.O) c* .^s^ v
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH, (INDIA) 2005 I'ed in Ccsin„t tf:ui»
# # c^^
T7114 Dr. Aftab Alam Department of Political Science M A.MPhil. PhD(Alig) Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh-202002 (India) Tel.: 0571-2700806 (R) 0571-2701720(0)
Certificate
This is to certify that this study entitled ''NATO and
European Security : A Case Study of Bosnian and Kosovo
Crises" carried out by Mr. Narong Okad in the Department of
PoUtical Science, Ahgarh Muslim University, Aligarh, is to the
best of my knowledge an original work and is quite suitable for the
award of the degree oi Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.
)\t— (Dr. Aftab Alam) Supervisor
d^ f ^ r
In Memory of Victims of War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992^95) CONTENTS
Page No. Acknowledgement iv-vi Introduction vii-x List of Abbreviations xi-xiii List of Figures xiv-xxii CHAPTER -1 The Origin and Historical Development of North Atlantic Treaty 1-46 Organization (NATO) 1. American Participation in the Alliance 1-6 2. Rationale and Objective In the Formation of NATO 6-16 3. The Structure of NATO 16-18 3.1 The North Atlantic Council (NAG) 18-19 3.2 The Permanent Representatives and Delegations 19-20 3.3 The Secretary General and the International Staff 20-22 3.4 The NATO Theatre Itself Was Divided into Three 22-26 Commands Areas 4. Developments Soon After NATO's Formation 27-32 5. NATO's Policies 33-37 6. NATO's New Structures 37-38 CHAPTER - 2 NATO and European Security : An Overview 47-76 1. Europe after the Collapse of Soviet Union 47-51 2. North Atlantic Cooperation Council(NACC) 51-52 3. NATO Enlargement and the Partnership for Peace (Pi'P) 52-62 4. NATO and The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 62-64 5. The Mediterranean Dialogue 64-65 6. European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 65-70 CHAPTER - 3 Role of NATO In Bosnian Crisis 77-111 1. The Background of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 77-80 2. The Role of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-93) 80-84 3. The Role of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994 84-89 4. The Role of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 89-95 5. The NATO's Role After the Dayton Agreement 95-101 6. NATO on War Criminals in Bosnia and Herzegovina 101-104 CHAPTER - 4 Role of NATO in Kosovo Crisis 112-157 1. The Background of Kosovo Crisis 112-114 2. The Causes of the War in Kosovo 115-131 3. How Did NATO End the War in Kosovo? 131-135 4. NATO and the Outcome of the War in Kosovo 135-137 4.1 The Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac 138-138 (UCPM) 4.2 The National Liberation Army (NLA) 138-139
5. The UN General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" 139-141 Mechanism and the Veto Power of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council 5.1 NATO and International Law in the Kosovo Crisis 141-145 5.2 International Lawyers and the Kosovo Crisis 145-157 CHAPTER - 5 Conclusion 158-168 Bibliography 169-202
111 Fif'st and fofe-mosi, J mwst e^cpress my Keaf+ful tKat^Us anci
Qfc\V\\ucie. to my learned supetvisoK/ P>*. y\f+ab ^Mam of tKe
DepaH-ment of Political Science, AMU, Aliga**!^ fo*' Kis scKolat^ly
guidance ay\ci matenal Kelp. He spa»*ed no effoi4s and neve** felt titled
in c>*eating a good atmospKefe fot* me wKlle D woj'Ued on tKis tUesis^
constantly encou>'aging and showing me tke nghf paf't ani^ vision of
**eseafcK woi^k. XKe same gi'atitwde must go to Kis family too.
My since»'e tKanUs a»*e also due to Pfof. }\A\>^za /^sme.*' ^^9/
Faculty DepaH-ment of Political Sc\e.y\ce., y\.J\A.i\.j yMigafK fot'
p>*oviding >'esea»*cK facilities and taking keen intef'ests in tKe pcogi'ess
of my wot*k/ Ke immensely motivated me to complete my wo(*k fo**
voKicK D wisK to exp^'ess wxy gv'atitwde.
D express my cie.e.p sense of g>*atitude to P»*of. J\A. J^i^Haza
KKan, CKaifman, Depa>'tment of Political Sc-'\e.nce. and Pfof. ~C.:A.
J^\zam\, pKof. M'A- KisKo»*ey Pf'of. B. RaKmatKwIla; Pr'of. TSJaKid
AAutaza, Pt'of. 7\nf Hameed/ P>*. M-A- Abid/ Di*. M. Alasim KKan
and otKe** lea>*ned and distingwisKed teacKe»*s of tKis Depaj'tment fo**
tKe!** contribution to my intellectual growtK and inspij'ation. D avn also
gt*eatly indebted to all tKe scKolai*s and autKot»s wKose woi*ks Kave
been consulted of used in one oi^ tKe otKe** way in tKis wo>'k.
TKe ynofe. painstaking pai*t of tKis »*esea>*cK \\>oA< Kas been
g»*eatly facilitated and t^e.nde.t'ed by tKe staff members of tKe /^aiAlana
/^zad Library, Sem\na>^ Library of my depa>^me.ni/ Department of
Political Science, y\.J\A,lA., Aliga>'K and Library of tKe jfawaKarlal
7\)eKru University, Constitute for Defence. Studies and Analysis, A)evv
IV PelKi fo** pr-ovicl'mg me tKe necessat'y •'eseai^cK ma+eHal. J am also tKa^\l Asif Siddiqwi & M»*. ¥\an\ynacii^y\ A)aseef foi* quick and efficiet^t typiiAg cxnd composing. As our loving p>"opKet MoKammad (SAW) said:- ("+-le wKo does not tKanU people does not tkanU AHQK")- <^t would be wnfofgivable if ^ fail to ej fatkei* M**- Jsmoil 0\ mate»*nal g>'andmotKe»* J\At^s. Abida A^oodsem. O gratefully acknowledge tKe financial assistance and mot^al suppo»*t given by tkem. Witkout tkeit* love, affection and support, it would not kave been possible on my pa**t to stay in CTndia fot» suck a long period to do researck study. O owe keartfelt tkanks to all my relatives particularly ^f, 3ukkari •Hmanbinkeem, A^iss. A'^alina 'Hmanbinkeem, A^iss. Laila AAoodsem, J\At^. tldon Okad, A^r. Wickit Okad and my friends specially AA»*. A^okd. Alasrul }^oda, M**- Skakeel Akmad, Pr. Mosaib jW\mad, Dr. Tariq Anwar, ]\A^. Ai^war Bokgomea, M**- Kisdakorn Wongsakgeam, A^r. C7brar yWam, AAr. Tayyeb /K\an\, AAr. Kavnar^usaman, AAr. Skamsul ]-^asan, Miss Famida •Hasan, M^*- Sadiq Amin Kkan, M»*. Hakeem AAanung, Dr. Sa^ae. ^dam, AAr. Suwit Prikornswadi, Dr. A»>as Amatayakul, AAr. Rody Priyasin, AAr. Asim Zubizevic, Dr. Abdul Qadir S\apoye., AAr. Abdul Qudir Udo, M**. Alokd. Sa\av^ Salek, AAr. Sori ]\AonanQ, AAr. Abdul Razzak Bakusan, AAr. Sue.z AAoodsem, AA>*. Abdullak Hajiyama, AArs. Piangjai Alawae, AArs. AAariam Kuna, Miss. /sJopawan Wakiman, Mi's. Skarifa Leemid, M>*. Santi Vaebmat, Haji Sama\ Okad, -j-laji Vusuf Sonya\e\\, M**s. ]\Aanam Ustad fot* tKeif coi^stant &y\coiM^age.yy\e.nt dunng tny •'esea>*cK wor*l<. C7 also j-eel pleasM>*e to pay Kny p**o|-oMnd gfa+itwde and respect to yr\y •nate»'K\al g»*eat gt»aiAdmotKe>* A^»'s. KKadijaK A^oodsem, my mate»*nal uncle 'Haji /^uWarnvnad A^oodsem^ my patei^nal uncle f-|aji mwd my pate>*nal grandfatKer'Haji T^bdwIlaK cxna my patc>*nal gt^ancifnoi^^et^ J^t^s, Peak Okad (tkey ai*e no vnot'e. witK us, may jAllaK blessy tkei** SOMIS)^ fo»* tKei** love and assistance wKen D was witk tKe>n. On tke e.inci D may mention tkat -pot* tke e>*F'o>*S/ deficiencies and skoftcomings if any/ in tkis tkesis/ tke •responsibility is wndoubtediy mine. VI INTRODUCTION The relationship between the United States of America and its European allies is one of the few in the world today that has remained totally unaffected by the end of the World War. The world war strategy demanded the United States to look for friends and allies in Europe to stop the spread of communism by ihe Soviet Union. The U.S. was guided by its global policy of containing international communism. American military involvement in Europe provided regional security and economic stability in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in this post Cold War era the U.S. now has further strengthened its position in Europe and the world has seen ihe eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1999, the former Warsaw Pact members states Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary became NATO's "position" and NATO's "territory" advanced 800 kilometers eastward all at once. In November 2002, it took the historic step of inviting seven more central and Eastern European States, increasing the number of NATO's member states from 19 to 26 nations. The present study attempts to highlight the roles of the U.S. and its European allies after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The special focus is on the issues of the enlargement of NATO, the European security, the roles of NATO in Bosnian and Kosovo crises, which have involved the United States of America and its European allies. The study is divided into four chapters, each dealing with a specific issue. vu The first chapter endeavours to present the historical development of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). How who America interested to form military alliance with European countries"? It reveals that the U.S. interests in the region were largely dictated by its own security and of course, to maintain security and stability for the free nations of the European democratic camp. The U.S. involvement in the affairs of the European region also strengthened its global strategy. The end of the Cold War has certainly reduced the possibility of nuclear holocaust, but the fear of nuclear war still haunts the minds of the States. The second chapter surveys the security cooperation in Europe in the post Soviet era, the abolition of the Warsaw Pact and the unification of Germany, the expansion of NATO and shows that the American engagement in European security affairs is still indispensable and that NATO which provides the organizational framework for American engagement in Europe, is indispensable as well. NATO needs to be preserved, reformulated, and made the centerpiece of Europe's new security architecture. But the eastward expansion of NATO could lead to tensions and Cold War. The genuine fear of Russia is that by expansion of NATO upto its borders, NATO would become the supreme military of the West. The third chapter attempts to examine the role of NATO in Bosnian Crisis. NATO foreign ministers, meeting in June, 1992, approved for the first time the formation of a force that could be used outside the territory of the alliance states. In June 1992, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean, assisted by NATO maritime Patrol Aircraft, began vni monitorin g operations in the Adriatic Sea. On 12 April 1993, NATO began enforcing the 'no-fly' zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. A demilitarized zone had been established on Mt. Igman in August, 1993, following an ultimatum, from NATO to the Bosnian Serbs to vrithdraw their forces from Mt. Igman. The forth chapter focusssed on role of NATO in Kosovo crisis. On April 30, 1998, the North Atlantic Council was firmly opposed to independence for Kosovo and to a continuation of the unacceptable status quo. It rejected all use of violence either by state security forces to suppress political dissent or by separatist groups to seek political change. In mid - 1999, NATO conducted a number of military exercises in Albania, in conjuction with the Albanian armed forces, in an attempt to increase pressure on the Serbian Government to end military action in Kosovo. On March 24, 1999, four German Tornado fighter - bombers took off from a NATO base and participated in the first wave of air strikes against Serb military targets in Kosovo. Fifteen German aircraft and hundreds of support troops were engaged in NATO's Operation Allied Force for the next 78 days. On June 10, 1999, UNSC Resolution 1244 set the basis for ending air campaign. The air operation was suspended by Secretary General Javier Solana of NATO on June 10, 1999, after Milosevic had accepted the prescribed conditions and was formally ended on June 20, 1999, after the withdrawal of all Serb military, special - police and para - military forces from Kosovo. The fifth Chapter, the concluding section analyses the distinctive aspects of NATO and European Security and its future development. The method of study has been historical, descriptive and analytical. All source material is library based. Most of the library IX data came from libraries in India especially Maulana Azad Library AMU, Aligarh, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (New Delhi). The basis of the present study have been various documents, official and authoritative texts on the subject. Journals, articles, newspapers reports and comments, NATO's documents and so on. The present work attempts and so on. The present work attempts to develop a comprehensive understanding of the issues concerning the role of NATO in European security, peace and stability in Europe. X LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACCHAN Allied Command Channel ACE Allied Command Europe ACLANT Allied Command Atlantic AGO Allied Command Operation ACT Atlantic Command Transformation ACTORD Activation Order AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe AFNORTH Allied Forces Nortt^em Europe AFSOUTH Allied Forces Souttiem Europe AWACS Airborne Warning And Control System CDU-BH Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation CINCHAN Allied Commander - In - Chief Channel CJTF Combined Joint Tasl< Force CNN Cable News Networl< CPY Communist Party of Yugoslavia CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe DCI Defence Capability Initiative DPC Defence Planning Committee EAF Entity Armed Forces EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council EASTLANT Eastern Atlantic EC European Community ECSC European Coal and Steel Community ESDI European Security and Defence Identity XI EU European Union EUCOM US Command In Europe EUFOR European Force FOR Implementation Force FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia GCSP Geneva Centre for Security Policy H.Q. Headquarters ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia IDPs internally Displaced Persons KFOR Kosovo Force KLA Kosovo Liberation Army LDK Democratic League of Kosovo MC Military Committee MNCs Major NATO Commands MSCs Major Subordinate Commands Mt. Mountain NAC North) Atlantic Council NACC Nortti Atlantic Co-operation Council NAEW NATO Airborne Early Warning NAT Nortti Atlantic Treaty NATO Northi Atlantic Treaty Organization NLA National Uberotion Army NPT Nuclear Non - Proliferation Treaty. Opian Operations Plan OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OTHFs Over Vne Horizon Forces PDC Party of Democratic Party PfP Partnership for Peace XII PJC Permanent Joint Council RNLAF Royal Nettieriands Air Force RS Republikc Srpska RTS Radio - Television Serbia SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic SCMM Standing Committee on Military Matters SDP Serbian Democratic Party SFOR Stabilization Forces SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SRSG Special Representative of \he Security General SRT Srpska Radio - Televizlka UCK Ushtria Clirlmtare e Kosoves UCPMB Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovoc UKAIR United Kingdom Air Force or Royal Air Force UNHCR United Nations Higti Commission for Refugees UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCR UN Security Council Resolution USCOMEUR US Commander in Europe WEU Western European Union WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction Xlll LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. AlHed Command Atlantic Figure 2. Allied Command Channel Figure 3. Allied Command Europe Figure 4. Major NATO Commanders Figure 5. NATO International Staff/Secretariat Figure 6. NATO's Civil and Military Structure Figure 7. NATO's New Military Command Structure Figure 8. North Atlantic Council XIV o l-H d 90 ON ea B u "E B a _o Su .2 o B e o < < s Z P & c« Z O o U O -a z •o y B > o n •< u 9) U. O H < Z V u 3 O (/3 XVI IT) 00 0^ go s (A 2 s u o u o I < i .o O o H < .:£' T 1 o o l3 Z .c a si o ^ z 5^ u. o > < il <1 V uis: u u S o {/3 XVIII s 41 U Z e 'u •a .S u .a e i| 1 a a 'u 5.1 < Ok 5 I 2 S s h ••J A M a Si •2|g S s U « U 111 1 <: a i 1^ hH P 1 1 I o s M ^1 ll '1 o <.s-a| S£ o « a Z c~ o 11 O o H O M 1*1 U WS EB fi . 1 1 .a d a ^2 Oft OH u 0U, < .2 H £< 1^ I" •^r 2« 5-= La Oi S C 11 9 -M II S;S •i, U 4> 4> L. «3S U _ XIX H H H 12; <: O H t XX oi ^H (T X a- X X < 5 5 s. •J B H •K 3 •M S Q k! o 5 •^ I E H n O U a D e f •i CL. 5 J •1 H ^ a: o •§ ^ ^ g g a. is X d o u o VI u O o B o 1t 2 « z EC K o i g s ?IS u u co 0£ e J3 w o <£ V) 1 CQ us I iS < ,W w« M I s OTu 1>-> E ^ Vi 5 5 < 2 C8 2 i= CQ OoH k. CQ •*- f s • C/3 o o s Z u< 3 .Qa H 1- > 5 •^-^ 1 1 Si u 2 i OS <—1• o ^ g a i 1p U S o o H U < c W 7: o X& t) I I/» c«5 2 I s -< • ^ H o s o S >^ oi V) o_ «e "wO u CUB ^ o c ^1 = 3 E'^E o Si E E > 2 i v o o III J U U NJ b H XXI V S B > S z o u K U ID 3 ut U S I < 5 >^ 90 9 w B B S O -1 u S U z _ V 8 •; a it =V- s£ 2 S mm < Z o < -1 O < K Z J! I? •** K ^ u o a. o 90 0\ E B XXII CHAPTER- 1 The Origin and Historical Development of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1. American Participation in the Alliance. World War II left Europe economically enfeebled. The industrial infrastructure of most countries had been virtually destroyed. In the winter of 1945-6 there was famine in parts of Germany; bread rationing was introduced in France (a major agricultural country) and was fightened up again in Britain. Only American aid could ameliorate Europe's short-term problems and lay the foundations for long-term recovery. Although the USA, with its role in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Pacific, China and the Philippines had become a major world power long before World War II, the feeling persisted in both public and political opinion that it was not and should not become one. Sending forces to Europe in World War I was not seen as a precedent but as an isolated incident. Doing the same in World War II was seen in the same way by many sectors of influential opinion which, at the end of the war, sought nothing but a return to the status quo ante. This issue is often understood as American 'isolationism' but that is largely a misnomer and misperception. The USA has been isolationist at least since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 which attempted to shut the European powers out of the Americas, and thus retain the western hemisphere as an arena of US power and influence. Indeed, even before that, the United States had taken sides in the great European wars from the French revolution through to 1815 and the final defeat of the Emperor Napoleon.' The used of alliances has unquestionably been a major element in the traditional international politics of Europe. Whenever one state has threatened to dominated Europe, others have joined together to meet that threat. The political history of Europe for the last two centuries may be viewed, at least in part, as a continual process of alliance formation and dissolution as the great powers and their smaller consorts sought the elusive goals of security and aggrandizement. If in 1812 Britain, Prussia and Russia could combine to defeat the imperial Napoleon, why in 1949 should not Britain, France and later West Germany join to oppose the more contemporary threat of Soviet expansionism? True, crucial to the new pact, was the United States, culturally if not geographically European, but the method remained the same: to ally in order to meet a common enemy. President Woodrow Wilson's ill-fated attempt to reorient American foreign policy around the principle of "Collective security" is too well known to require elaboration here. Senate rejection of the League of Nations graphically - reaffirmed American isolationist attitude toward Europe. But it is significant that in the World War 11 the United States believed that the greatest threat to its own security emanated from Europe; hence American policy makers consistently gave a higher priority to the European theater of War than they did to the Pacific theater.' Western Europe in the immediate postwar period, denuded of military strength following the rapid allied demobilization, was also economically and politically prostrate. It became clear that it was incapable of reviving itself unassisted, certainly not within an acceptable period of time. In this condition Europe faced the largely undemobilized and massive military strength of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was imbued with an ideological urge and supported by propaganda forms almost stridently hostile to Western concepts and institutions of representative government or any loriii of collaboration in the political and economic recovery of Western Europe/ Russia and America emerged from World II; They had different ways of life and different views of the World. The year after 1945 the Americans talked about 'rolling - back' the frontiers of Communism which meant a threat to remove the Communisl governments which ruled in Eastern Europe. However, this talk soon stopped as it was obvious that any attempt to do this would provoke a world war because the Russains regarded control of Eastern Europe as essential to their security. So in March 1947, the United States announded that instead of rolling - back Communism it would contain it. The containment of Communism meant that the United States would not allow the Soviet Union to control areas other than those they held in 1947.* By 1947 the Monroe Doctrine had been superseded by the Truman Doctrine's principles of containment as the guiding rule of America's relationship to Europe.* The mission was clearcut in Greece. To the American planners of 1947, World Communism had chosen Greece as its target, with Greek communists as the agent. Hence the United States had undertaken to arm, train, and supply a successful Greek resistance to Communist subversion. The absence of a requirement for official Greek reciprocity further simplified the situation. The aid itself would be increasingly military. The $ 300 million allotted for the economic rehabilitation of Greece was quickly shifted to the hard - pressed Greek army, barely able lo hold its own against the querrila forces. Such was the situation when the first U.S. supplies reached Greece in the Summer ol 1947.^ The threat was that the fabric of the West European economies and societies would come apart. There was an urgent need for a huge increase in the flow of imports to Europe to be paid in Dollars thai would supply the working capital. Unless the economies could be made to function again, a Communist takeover could occur without resort to external invasion or internal subversion, a strong economy would give strength to those who would defend themselves against the Communist alternatives." The Truman Doctrine set in motion a massive foreign aid programme in Europe. President Harry S. Truma, for whom the doctrine was named, stated the reasons clearly in his message to Congress on 12" March 1947: I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. The Marshall Plan projected at the Harvard Commencement o( 5" June 1947, provided another major influence on the future military assistance programme. It stressed the importance of Europeans helping themselves through expanding their own resources and cooperating with their neighbors as a prerequisite for American help. The Marshall, Plan, then, would not only promote greater efficiency in the use of funds but also accelerate the restoration of a United Europe in close relationship with the United States'. So under French and British leadership, the countries of Western Europe responded immediately to this lifeline. The 'Marshal Plan' officially came to an end in 1951'". It was in this atmosphere that, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, commented to Marshall that what was really needed to support the economic reconstruction of western Europe was a military alliance. Marshall agreed-there was, he said, 'no choice in ihe matter' - but he also said it was necessary for the Europeans to take the initiative. The first steps followed quickly. The British government agreed on Bevin's course, and in the first months of 1848 a mutual defence treaty was negotiated between Britain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg-the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective self-Defence. The heart of the treaty, not withstanding various commitments to raising living standards, common civilization and cultural exchanges, is Article IV which promises that if one party is attacked, the others will provide ' all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'. The European part of the groundwork for the future NATO had been laid". Indirectly, of course, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter encouraged this sort of security relationship. More concretely, in March 1947 the British and French signed the Treaty of Dunkirk. The main potential threat noted at that time was Germany. The text of the treaty mentioned that the signing nations would protect one another from any threat, 'a rising from the adoption by Germany of a policy of aggression or from action by Germany designed to facilitate such a policy? A year later, in March 1948, the Dunkirk alliance was widened into the Brussels Pact'\ The Signing of the Brussels Pact constituted the first European pole of defence. The signatories were only five powers, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Britain and France put forward several objectives. In the face of Communist danger, England suggested that moral and spiritual forces determined to defend the Western system be organized with the support of the Americans and the dominions. The Communist threat which could endanger the European democratic system'\ European security required U.S. participation to offset Soviet power NATO, we must keep in mind, was a European not an American product, having been based so closely upon the model provided by the Brussels Pact. American participation in the Alliance resulted inevitably in the Americanization of the pact - there was no gainsaying U.S. hegeniony'\ The constant diplomatic driving force behind the Ireuly came from Britain's great post war Foreign secretary Ernest Bevin. However, within the State Department and the Truman administration there were strong doubts and divisions for months about the wisdom or the necessity of an alliance with Europe. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) in the Inter- Departmental Auditorium on Constitution Avenue in Washington on April 4, 1949, was a simple low - key businesslike affair. There were short speeches from each of the twelve foreign ministers from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the UniUul states of America. The special applause for Ernest Bevin when lie lumbered up to the podium. President Truman delivered a brisk address declaring the hope that the treaty "would create a shield against aggression and fear of aggression - a bulwark - which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all of our citizens"'*. 2. Rationale and Objective In The Formation of NATO Britain, American and Russia had been allies in the Second World War. However, almost immediately after the war in Europe ended distrust grew between Russia and her other wartime allies. There were several complex reasons for this. It was, however a fad that after the war Russia directly or indirectly forced Eastern European countries to adopt Communist governments. As a result the Western European countries with America and Canada, came lo believe that their individual security was threatened by Russia. They considered that unless they did something about it, one country afl(M- another in Western Europe might be taken over by \\\v Russians. They best course they believed was to band together in the NATO alliance for collective protection. The United Stales acknowledged that its security was inextricably connected with developments on the European continent. It believed in the domino theory of Communism which stated that if one country falls to the Communism its neighbors might fall next. The domina theory partly provoked the formation of NATO. It was testimony to the clumsiness if not the wickedness of Soviet behaviour in the years immediately following the Second World - War that the security concerns of Moscow's east-while allies should have so quickly shifted from their fiercely anti- German orientation to a primarily anti-Soviet one." The relevant circumstances in which that event took place were these: 1. The Red Army stood along a line in Eastern Europe "from Stettin [Szczecin] in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic". As a result, the Soviet Union had ultimate power with respect to the organization of government and society and the foreign policies of the countries to the east of that line. 2. The countries of Western Europe were individually much weaker militarily than the Soviet Union and were divided among the traditional national sovereign states. The leaders of most of them acted as if they felt threatened, more or less acutely and directly depending on their individual situations, by the proximity of Soviet power and their weakness in the faced of it and as if they wanted a guarantee of their security by the only power able to provide it; the United States. 3, The United States, whose leaders acted as if they believed that the expansion of Soviet power or influence westward of the line that divided Europe would be harmful to American interests, provided that guarantee to the West European countries in the form of the Atlantic alliance. The guarantee included a declaratory commitment to and a substantial military presence in Western Europe and was proclaimed to be one manifestation among others of the U.S. Policy of "Containing" further Soviet expansion. NATO was constituted in accordance with the United Nations clause permitting regional organizations, but it was intended to provide the collective defence that was needed to meet a situation not envisaged by the drafters of the United Nations Charter just four years earlier. They had believed that the concept of collective security - backed up as necessary by an international army created by the Great Powers existing in a more or less harmonious alliance with each other and with the lesser states, could keep aggressors under control with moral persuasion at first and with force if necessary. Collective security, in other words was designed to preserve peace among the members of the United Nations. Escott Reid, for one, had written even before the San Franscisco Conference created the United Nations that if a Great Power should in future act in such a way as to convince the other great powers that it is determined to dominate the world by force, the only way to prevent a world war from breaking out will be for the other great powers to form immediately an alliance against that power and to declare that the moment it comits aggression they will wage total war against it... That declaration may bring the state which is planning aggression to its senses and so prevent the war from breaking out... Reid may have written this, but neither he nor anyone else had truly foreseen a situation in which the Soviet Union would threaten to turn itself into an aggressor and simultaneously tie up the United Nations with procedural tactics and the consistent use of its Veto. NATO came inlo existence in other words, because in 1949 the UN had already demonstrated that it was going to be completely unable to provide the collective security it was supposed to deliver and the collective security that the Western democracies so desperately wanted. Moreover, it had no capacity whatsoever to offer collective defence against what seemed to be and was a genuine threat from the Soviet Union. Collective defence, to state the obvious, was the coming together of like-minded states to protect the group against an outsider. To be sure, the move of the NATO founding members toward collective defence was for all practical purposes a recognition that collective security was an idea that had failed.'" In effect, NATO was to be prepared to engage in "enforcement measures" against a fellow UNSC member (or any other possible threat) - if such action proved necessary. By counter-balancing a potential threat from a fellow UNSC members themselves and, if possible, to ultimately bring UNSC members NATO was consequently intended to deter the possibility of conflict among the UNSC members into cooperation in case of conflict among regional powers, in accord with the original purpose of the UN charter. While NATO was primarily forged against the threat of any potential aggression, including that posed by UNSC members, it was secondarily formed for the pursuit of general UN goals. Put another way, behind-the scenes NATO supporters for the predominant powers in Western Europe, and for cooperation among these governments, would indirectly help to maintain stability and well-being throughout the globe in the process of re-equilibrating international society.^' The Atlantic alliance was the core organization of the Western security system. NATO was a partnership of free nations for the purposes of security, based on a common conviction of civility, human rights and the underlying principle of individual freedom. The overdoing objective of the alliance was the preservation of peace and freedom so that its members could perfect their societies. Theoretically, the alliance would operate against any external threat, in practice, the purposes of the alliance had been to guarantee the security of the West vis-k-vis the common threat from the East. The North Atlantic alliance was not limited purely to military matters. It combined collective defence with the readiness to enter into dialogue and practical co-operation with the East, interalia, in the field of arms control and disarment, in accordance with concept of promoting international stability and a meaningful state of peace . The Atlantic Alliance had two main functions. Its first function was to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur... the Allies would maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to ensure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence. In this climate the Alliance could carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues could be solved. Military security and a policy of detente were not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence was a stabilising factor in world politics. The military capability of NATO, including its nuclear means, had not been acquired for the enhancement of power or for posturing, but exclusively for preventing aggression and war. ' The pledge in Article 5 of the Treaty that an armed attack against anyone or more of the members "shall be considered an attack against them all" and the agreement of each one to take "such action as its deemed necessary; including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area; "was a strong commitment, prescribing action under specified circumstances, and thus in fact limiting the freedom of action of each member of the alliance, because its treaty required no surrender of sovereignty by its members.^" The first Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Lionel Ismay, had succinctly described NATO's real aims in 1957. "The U.S." he said, "needs NATO to keep America in Europe, Germany in rein, and Russia outside Europe." These goals had already been achieved. One of the major tasks of the European allies would be to keep the USA engaged with the alliance. "The US would only be interested in NATO if it is viable military organization. But NATO will only remain a viable military organization if the US is properly engaged. ^ The United States could reasonably expect to maintain its leadership status by taking advantage of NATO's consultative II function, by granting aid lo its NATO allies, and by profiling from NATO's ability to deter the Soviet Union." And through NATO the United Stales had induced research, development, and product ion programs for military purposes-first in individual countries and later across national boundaries in cooperative undertakings and had promoted other kinds of cooperative programmes, including certain service functions for NATO forces. " Bradley Klien, in a number of works, made the claim for NATO as a means by which its member stales had formed a collective political identity and community. Klien asserted that Western strategies concerning deterrence, nuclear weapons, overseas military bases and institutions were pari of an 'ambitious attempt lo erecl a globally stable framework for multilateral trade'. For Klien these pieces of the puzzle combined to create the 'Western System', with its focal point being the 'transatlantic network embodied - and consolidated - under the protective umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization'. Thus NATO was and is more than just a military alliance between western countries. It is 'one particular manifestation of a larger and more ambitious set of political and cultural relations that...have as their aim the reconstruction, intensification and perpetuation of a post-war order at both its core and its periphery'. Klien, after citing a member of leading politicians of Western Europe and North America to strengthen his argument, revealed what he meant when speaking of this set of relations. He posited that what was constructed was a 'whole way of life, a distinct civilizational project, which makes both promises to and claims upon its people? Above and beyond the political - economic aspects of this project is the military - strategic one which overlays the other." 12 In a radio speech to the country on March 18, 1949 U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that after the successful completion of the Charter of the United Nations, the countries of North America and Western Europe were 'joining' in the formation of a second arrangement, pertaining to the North Atlantic area'. The institutions (read : NATO) that will underwrite the peace and security of this area will express the underlying realties and commonly held interests of the countries of this area, those bciii the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law Finally, the NATO partners were anxious not only to deter a Soviet attack upon Europe but also to create the conditions on a worldwide scale for the growth of a reasonably stable international order of law in which the uses of violence would be minimised and the process of peaceful change guaranteed. In short, the NATO countries stood apposed to the forces of destructive revolution on the world scene; they stood for the forces of constructive evolution, looking forwards a genuine international community." The North Atlantic Treaty was the political frame work for an international alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur. It provided for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic and military fields. It was of indefinite duration. The signatory countries stated their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. Reaffirming their faith in the principles of the United Nations, they undertook in particular to preserve peace and international security and to promote stability and well - being in the North Atlantic area. 13 To achieve these goals, ihey signed their names to a number of undertakings in different fields. They agreed, for example, to settle international disputes by peaceful means, in order to avoid endangering international peace, security and justice. They also agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force in any way, which would not be consistent the purpose of the United Nations. They undertook to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage economic collaboration between their countries. Under this Treaty, the member countries therefore adopted a policy of security based on the inherent right lo individual and collective self-defence accorded by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Appendix 1), while at the same time affirming the importance of cooperation between them in other spheres. The text of the Treaty (appendix 1) consisted of 14 Articles, and was preceded by a Preamble, which emphasized that tlie Alliance had been created within the framework of the United Nations Charter and outlines its main purposes. Article 1 defined the basic principles to be followed by member countries in conducting their international relations, in order to avoid endangering peace and world security. Article 2, inspired by Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, defined the aims which the member countries will pursue in their international relationships, particularly in the social and economic spheres, and their resulting obligations. In Article 3, signatories slated that they will maintain and develop their ability, both individually and collectively to resist attack. 14 Article 4 envisaged a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of one of the member countries of the alliance and provided for joint consultation whenever one ol them believed that such a threat exists. In practice, this consultation took place in the North Atlantic and its subordinate committees. Article 5 is the core of the Treaty v^rhereby member countries agreed to treat an armed attack on anyone of them, in Europe or North America, as an attack against all of them. It committed them to taking the necessary steps to help each other in the event of an armed attack. Although it left each signatory free to take whatever action il considered appropriate, the Article stated that, individually and collectively, the member nations must took steps to restore and maintain security. Joint action was justified by the inherent, individual and collective right of self defence embodied in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; but it was agreed that measures taken under the terms of the Article shall be terminated when the Security Council had acted as necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Article 6 to defined the area in which the provisions of Article 5 applied. However it did not imply that events occurring outside that area could be the subject of consultation within the alliance. The preservation of peace and security in the North Atlantic Treaty area could be affected by events elsewhere in the world, and the North Atlantic Council must therefore, as a matter of course, consider the overall international situation. Article 7 and 8, member nations stipulated that none of their existing international commitment conflicted with the terms of the 15 Treaty and that they will not enter into any commitments in the future, which did so. In particular, they slated that rights and obligations pertaining to membership of the United Nations were unaffected by the Treaty, as was the primary role of the United Nations Security Council in the sphere of international peace and security. Under Article 9, the parties to the Treaty established a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, which shall he able to meet promptly at any time. The Council in turn was charged with the creation of such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to implement the provisions of the Treaty. This was the basis on which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been gradually built up. Article 10 provided the possibility of accession to the Treaty by any other European state in a position to further the principles of the Treaty. In 1952, Greece and Turkey, in 1955, the federal republic of Germany and in 1982, Spain acceded to the treaty under the terms of this Article. Article II described the process of ratification of the Treaty, in accordance with the constitutional processes of the signatories, and the manner in which the Treaty was to enter into force. Article 12 and 13 dealt with the possibility of revision of the Treaty after a period of ten years, and renunciation of the Treaty by any party to it, after 20 years. They had never been invoked. Article 14 gave equal authority to the English and French texts of the Treaty, and arranged for their safe deposit in Washington D.C.'' 3. The Structure of NATO 16 The Treaty having come into force on August 24, 1949, after all the ratifications had been deposited, the Governments of member countries were faced with two tasks: that of setting up the various bodies necessary for the implementation of the Treaty and working out a common defence policy. At its first meeting in Washington on September 17 and 19, 1949, the North Allanlic Council began the establishment of the various NATO bodies. In particular, it decided that the North Atlantic Council, the principal authority in the Alliance and composed of the Foreign Ministers of member countries, would meet in ordinary session annually and could, at any time, at the request of any of its members invoking Article 4 or Article 5 of the Treaty, convened in extraordinary session. In accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, the Council created a Defence Committee composed of the Defence Minsiters of member countries, charged with drawing up co-ordinated defence plans for the North Atlantic area. It was agreed that this Defence Committee would meet at least once a year. The military structure of the Alliance was begun by setting up a number of permanent bodies, first and foremost the Military Committee. It consisted of the chiefs-of-staff of the member countries and its function was to give the Council advice on general questions of a military nature and to provide guidance to its executive agency, the Standing Group. The latter consisted of representatives of France, United Kingdom and the United States, who were responsible for strategic guidance in areas in which NATO Forces operated.*"* The first organizational chart for NATO established five geographical planning groups under the Standing Group: Northern European Group; Western European Group; Southern European Group; Southern European /Western Mediterranean Group; Canada/United States Group; and the North Atlantic Ocean Group. 17 At a second meeting a month later, the Council established two further bodies, which had also been features of Western Union Organization: a Defence Financial and Economic Committee and a Military Production and Supply Board. The Defence Financial and Economic Committee was to be composed of the Finance Ministers of member governments and was to report directly to the Council thus matching the Defence Committee.' 3.1 The North Atlantic Council (NAC)* The Council was the only formal NATO organ mentioned in the Treaty. Article 9 stipulated that the members establish a Council "on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty". Although the Treaty did not explicitly state that the representation would be equal, this had always been understood. In fact, the term "representation" was not well chosen, for the Council was not a representative body; it was a vehicle for executive co-ordination. Within NATO the traditional concept of the legal equality of stales prevailed. Undoubtedly the four major allies (United States, Britain, France and West Germany) carried a great deal more political weight than, said, Iceland or Luxemburg. But, unlike the Charter of the United Nations, which reserved special privileges to five powers, the NATO Treaty did not spell out any special powers (such as a veto) for the major members which were withheld from the lesser allies. The Council reached decisions by unanimous consent. The Council was fundamentally a meeting ground for governmental Ministers. Actually, however, it could meet at three levels (1) the Permanent Representatives; (2) the Ministers; and (3) Heads of Government. Since the Lisbon Meeting in February, 1952, See Figure 8. North Atlantic Council, p.XXII ihe North Atlantic Council had been a permanent body. The permanent representatives, who were of ambassadorial rank, met in sessions of the Council at least once a week during the intervals between Ministers' meeting, and wield virtually the same powers of decisions as did the Ministers themselves, with whom they remained in close consultation.' Whatever the level at which the Council met, its chairman was the Secretary General of NATO, Each year the Foreign Minsiler of a member state was honorary president of the Council. This presidency rotated annually according to alphabetical order in English. Since the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty was not supranational, all decisions taken were the expressions of the collective will of the member governments. It was in the Council that the views of governments were exchanged on all major issues. Consultation covered political, military, economic and a wide range of other subjects. Military policy matters were discussed at the same level in the 'Defence Planning Committee'. As in the Council, members countries were represented on this Committee by their Permanent Representatives. They met round the same table as the Council and also under the same chairmanship of the Secretary General. Since the withdrawal of France from the integrated military organization in 1966, her representative did not attend this meetings. 3.2 The Permanent Representatives and Delegations The Permanent Representatives were assisted by national delegations also located at NATO Headquarters. The Delegations varied in size but the majority of them included officers specifically charged with representing their countries on the various specialized committees. Before a meeting of the council notice was given of the 19 agenda and any subjects to be discussed so that representatives had time to seek the instructions of their governments," ' 3.3 The Secretary General and the international staff. Committees established by the Council were supported by an International Staff, made up of personnel drawn from all member countries, responsible to the Secretary - General. The Secretary General himself was responsible for promoting and directing ihc process of consultation within the Alliance. He proposed items for discussion. He had the authority to use his good offices at any lime in cases of dispute between member countries, and with their consent, to initiate enquiries or mediation, conciliation or arbitration procedures. The Deputy Secretary General assisted the Secretary General in his functions and deputised for him in his absence. The international staff comprised the Office of the Secretary General, five major Divisions, the Office of Management and the Office of the Financial Controller. Each of the Divisions was headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, who was normally the Chairman of the main committee dealing with his responsibilities^'. The Council accordingly decided at its fourth session in May 1950 to establish the council of Deputies to be in continous session and to be responsible for implementing the decisions of the Council and for formulating issues requiring decisions by member governments. " Before even the Council of Deputies had time to meet, however, war had broken out in Korea. What might happen in Europe. There were only 200,000 poorly armed Allied occupation forces in Western Germany many, and in all no more than 14 Allied divisions and 1000 aircraft in Western Europe, compared with See Figure 5. NATO International Staff/Secretariat, p. XIX. 20 between 175 and 200 Soviet divisions and 20,000 aircraft,'" Europe, in other words, was more afraid of the Soviet Union than was the United States. The United States benefited in the bargaining which led to the alliance because she had to be persuaded, some what reluclanlly, to assist in Western defence/" However, President Harry S. Truman decided to station American combat troops permanently in Europe, and appointed Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in September 1950. He encouraged planning for a defence of Europe based on the thousands of nuclear weapons. He took orders from President Truman to proceed forthwith to Europe to establish a Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). On F' January 1951, Gen. Eisenhower Landed in Frankfurt with a small personal staff including his Chief of Staff-designate, Gen. Alferd M. Gruenther. They then began a quick initial round of the NATO capitals with plans for organizing the new command. In 1 February, 1951 the French government requisitioned the Old Hotel Astoria to serve as temporary headquarters for Eisenhower's new command. However, the French decided to provides the new command post on the outskirts of Paris at an Old military drill and training grounds of the French Kings near Versailles. Under SHAPE there would be subordinate headquarters for Northern Europe at Oslo, Central Europe at Fontainebleau and Southern Europe at Naples and later on Atlantic Naval Command at Norfolk, Virginia. And on April 2,1951, Gen. Eisenhower formally declared SHAPE Headquarters lo be "operational".''^ On June 19, 1951, the NATO states signed an agreement on the status of their armed forces, providing the mechanism for maintaining "internal stability". This document gave the NATO 21 military command the right to deploy its armed forces, bases, command and control and other military bodies in member countries and what was the main thing, to introduce any number of its troops to any country which was part of NATO's militancy wing/' In the event of aggression, the role of the Alliance was to re establish the territorial integrity of the North Atlantic area. NATO must therefore maintain sufficient forces to preserve the military balance with the Warsaw Pact and to provide a credible deterrent. NATO forces were made up of three interlocking elements known as the NATO Triad. They were: a Conventional forces strong enough to resist and repel a conventional attack on a limited scale, and to sustain a conventional defence in the forward areas against large - scale conventional aggression; a Theatre nuclear forces to enhance the deterrent and defensive effect of NATO conventional forces against large-scale conventional attack, with the aim of convincing the aggressor that any form of attack on NATO could result in very serious damage to his own forces, and of emphasizing the dangers implicated in continuing a conflict; • United States and United Kingdom strategic nuclear forces which - provided the ultimate deterrent.** In peacetime NATO's military forces were subordinated to the political North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Defence PI annine Committee (DPC) through NATO's Military Committee (MC)*'* See Figure 6. NATO's Civil and Military Structure, p.XX 22 3.4 The NATO ihealre itself was divided into three commands areas: (1) Allied Command Europe (ACE)'; ACE was commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), ACE was NATO's principal military command. Its militancy forces operated over area bounded by the northern most part of Norway, the southern most part of the Mediterranean, the western most part of the European Atlantic coast and the eastern most part of Turkey. SACEUR, as commander of ACE, thus had the dominant military role in NATO and, although his authority was theoretically subordinate to the Military Committee, in practice this was not so. In addition to SHAPE, Allied Command Europe composed four major subordinate commands (MSCs); (i) AFNORTH, headquartered at Kolsaas (Norway), was the command area of Allied Forces Northern Europe. (ii) AFCENT was the command area of the "Allied Forces Central Europe" which extended from the Elbe river in the north to the borders of Austria and Switzerland in the South. AFCENT had its headquarters in Brunssum in Netherlands. (iii) AFSOUTH was the command area of Allied Forces Southern Europe which covered Italy, Greece, Turkey and the entire Mediterranean Sea. AFSOUTH was geographically the largest of the three ACE MSCs and had its headquarters at Naples in Italy. See Figure 3. Allied Command Europe, p.XVII 23 (iv) 'UKAIR' was a unique ACE MSC in that it was essentially a single service (RAF), single nation MSC. UKAIR was based at high Wycombe in the UK and provided both air defence and attack airforces for employment within ACE. UKAIR operated British nuclear weapons. SACEUR also had the responsibilities of commander -in- chief of American forces in Europe (USCOMEUR), in accordance with the double-hatting system, thereby placing him in the exclusive chain of command of the American civilian and military authorities. It was the latter provision more than any other that explained how NATO functioned as a military organization. This independence of the American commander with respect to the political authorities of the Alliance was greatly strengthened by another circumstance which derived from the fact that his area of responsibility as US commander in Europe extended over an area much greater than that available to him as SACEUR. It included both shores of the Mediterranean and a large part of East Africa and the Middle East. In this sector, USCOMEUR clearly could not be subjected to any multinational control, a reality which gave him wide scope for independence in all his activities, including those that came under his SACLEUR hat. This circumstances explained the significant gap between the written word and reality in the structures of the Alliance. Political consultation did exist inside the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate committees, but the state of independence into which the geographical imbalance put the European nations relative to the United States guaranteed that these negotiations were very often no more than a formality. 24 NATO in its military sense-that was, mainly the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was essentially designed not to implement the military plans that it had formulated, but to enable the United States in the shape of the US Command in Europe (EUCOM), to take charge of military operations, using its own concepts and its own plans if it thought fit. In Cold War scenarios, therefore, once operations had been launched, the military organization was to be placed under a command that appeared to be SACEUR, subjected to the theoretical political authority of all the nations in the Alliance, but was in reality USCOMEUR, subjected to exclusive political control by U.S. national authorities. SACEUR and the other commanders* were the Council's military stewards, directing the pooled citizen-armies. The United Stales, of course, did retain national control over the nuclear umbrella, but American plans and strategies for Europe's defence were ihe product of intensive consultation among partners. If, in theory, the Council was the political master and SACEUR the military steward, in practice, even strong partisans of NATO saw little integration between the political machinery and the military commands. Hence the Council had never functioned as the Alliance's principal center for policy making, or even consultation. The Council's role had always been peripheral to the military machinery built up around the Supreme Allied Commander. This lack of integration between the political authority and the military command had led one famous observer. General Beaufre, to call NATO " a body without a head". But there was a head-not in Europe, but in Washington. The Supreme Allied Commander had never been the first servant of the Council, but * See Figure 4. Major NATO Commands, p. XVIII 25 the viceroy of the American President.'" Nevertheless, he was a man from the center, and it was from Washington that his ultimate authority came, for Washington controls the nuclear weapons everyone believes constituted the real defence of Europe. The line of nuclear authority passed directly from Washington to the American military commander in Europe, who, almost necessarily, was also SACEUR. NATO was the rather elaborate apparatus by which we had chosen to organize the American prorleclorate over Europe. In practice, the arrangements reflected dependence and not interdependence, hegemony and not integration. In short, NATO, which in theory suggested interdependence, integration, and potential federation, in practice involved dependence, subordination and potential empire.' 2. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)* The second of NATO's major NATO commands (MNC's) ACLANT commanded an area, which extended from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North American to those of Europe and Africa, though not including the British Isles and the Channel. The office of SACLANT, as with SACEUR, was always held by an American officer and was headquartered at Norfork in Virginia, U.S.A. The ACLANT was commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).'" 3, The third major NATO command was the Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN)* Allied Command Channel managed to pack no less than five subordinate commands into its tiny but important area of responsibility in the Channel and the southern part of the North Sea. The commander (CINCHAN) was a British admiral who worked See Figure 1. Allied Command Atlantic p. XV ' See Figure 2. Allied Command Channel p. XVI 26 from Northwood, near London. Wearing another figurative hat he also directed the Eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT) major subordinule command under the authority of ACLANT. 4. Developments Soon After NATO'S Formation Following Germany's defeat, it was divided into four zones controlled by the occupation forces of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. The former capital, Berlin, which fell within the Soviet Union Zone, was also divided into four sectors of Britain, France, and the United States." During the Winter and Spring of 1948, the economic aid under the Marshall Plan was extended to the Western occupation zones. The Soviet Union, concerned that Germany could again pose a threat, sought to keep Germany economically weak, and made it clear that it considered these Western initiatives as violations of the Potsdam Agreement between the victors of 1945. A decision to introduce currency reforms in the Western occupation zones was the immediate cause of the crises. On March, 1948, the Soviet imposed the "baby blockade" by demanding inspection of military trains bound for Berlin through Soviet-occupied territory. The Allies responded by dispatching a train with armed guards with orders not to submit lo search, but the Soviets shunted it into a siding from which il eventually had to be withdrawn. They allied then mounted a small airlift to carry supplies to the military garrison. Soviet harassment resulted in a midair collision with some fatalities. Allied cargo planes were than given fighter escorts, whereupon the Soviets formally apologized for the incident. Ten days after its inception, the baby blockade was suddenly liflecl without explanation. On June 24, 1948, the Soviets imposed the "real" Berlin Blockade by halting all military and civilian surface traffic to West Berlin. The Soviets did not hide their objective: The 27 Soviet military governor told his American counterpart, General Lucius Clay, that the Blockade "would continue until the West abandoned plans for a West German government." The Soviets sought to prevent the formation of a separate West German government by means of the blockade, as George and Smoke summarized it: The Soviet hoped that the blockade would help to achieve their primary objective by shattering western unity. The blockade provided almost perfect leverage for exerting political - diplomatic pressure. Furthermore, in the event that the blockade failed to achieve its primary objective it could be expected to at least remove the West from Berlin. Neither objective was achieved, however. Instead, the airlift kindled public attitudes in the West that facilitated the birth of NATO and the Federal Republic. The Berlin Blockade, therefore, culiminated in a serious setback for the Soviet Union. Ultimately the West Berlin was given special status within the Federal Republic of Germany, known as West Germany, which was created in 1949 in the British, French and United States occupation zones and a Communist German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was established in the Soviet Zone." In an effort to built good credentials with NATO, both Turkey and Greece eagerly dispatched combat forces to Korea in 1950 that performed credibly on the battlefield. Turkey in the early 1950s pursued it diplomatic objective for NATO entry without respite. Foreign Minister Fuat Koprulu declared publicly on August 1, 1950, that NATO entry would be an "acid test of U.S. interest in Turkey"." However, on 15"" May 1951, the U.S. State Department finally convinced of "mutuality of benefits", announced its decision to support Turkey's case for full NATO membership. It was followed by British declaration of support on 30 May 1951." With the United States leading the way, a NATO foreign ministers meeting in Ottawa 28 (Seplember 1951) approved Greek and Turkish accession inlo NATO.'" Throughout 1951, the Council of Deputies sitting in London took two major decisions: first, to admit Greece and Turkey to the alliance, and second, to recognize the political machinery with a new Permanent Council and a strong internalionul secretarial under a Secretary General.*'' At the meeting in Lisbon of Foreign Ministers of the alliance - now enlarged to February 1952. Patrick Lione Hastings Ismay (Lord Ismay) from the United Kingdom was appointed the first NATO Secretary General. On February 18'\ 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and their forces were incorporated in Allied Command Europe. After successful missions in Europe, Gen. Eisenhower returned back to the United States for the Presidential election. General Mathew Ridgway succeeded him as SACEUR on May 1952." In the same year the Atlantic Command (SACLANT) and the Channel Command (CINCHAN) were established**^ President Dwight D. Eisenhower had been elected in 1952, he then proposed that East and West exchange blueprints "of their armed forces and permit mutual "open skies" aerial inspection of their territory found no favour with the Russians. On the European Security, Russian insistence that NATO be disbanded and American troops withdrawn from Europe was equally unacceptable to the West' . The Soviet conventional military threat to Western Europe could not possibly be countered without Germany, just as Germany could not possibly defend itself on its own. The only way for Germany to protect itself was to receive protection from the United States. And the only way for America to protect Western Europe was to protect Germany.** 29 The 'Schuman Plan', secretly prepared by the French technocrat Jean Monnel, bounced through the French Cabinet, and released with a flourish in May 1950: A United Europe was iiol achieved [After 1918]; and we had war. Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity. The gathering together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age - old opposition of France and Germany. The first concern in any action taken must be these two countries. With this in view, the F'-ench government proposed to take action immediately on one limited but decisive point to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common higher authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. So 1951 brought agreement on a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to consist of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.''^ In September 1950, Dean Acheson, US Secretary of the Stale Department, asked his French and British colleagues to accept Germany's rearmament so as to enable West Germany to participate in the defence of its own territory. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, reacted promptly with the cold comment: 'Germany's malady dates too far back to have been permanently cured; Reading this comment, one can gauge the extent of reservation there was in the attitude of the French. Schuman had been the architect of Franco-German reconciliation when he had proposed in May 1950 the plan which was to engage the future European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a treaty signed in Paris on 18"" April 1951), but the matter of defence was a stake of an altogether different kind.'"' With the failure of the French Parliament to ratify the E.D.C. 30 'European Defence Community' in 1954. The gap left by the collapse of E.D.C, had to be filled, and it was the British Foreign Secretary who took prompt action to fill it. As the result of his lour of the European Capitals, a Western European Union was created to take the place of the defunct E.D.C. at the price of an unprecedented British commitment to the Continent.' A nine power conference was convened in London to try to reach a new agreement. This conference's decisions were embodied in a series of formal agreements drawn up by a ministerial conference held in Paris in October 1954. The agreements entailed arrangements for the Brussels. Treaty to be strengthened and modified to include llu; Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, the ending of the occupation regime in the FRO and the invitation to the later to join NATO."" In order to calm the French fears of a rearmed Germany, SACEUR'S powers were expanded to ensure in effect, that all German armed forces would be under his command, and at the same time the members of NATO declared that the North Atlantic Treaty was of "indefinite duration".'''^ As a result the West European Unity Treaty was signed and the Western European Union established. It was under this treaty that West Germany agreed not to attempt any changes to its borders by forces, and not to make nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. It also agreed not to make large naval vessels) long - range missiles . So West Germany had become a sovereign state by joining NATO in 1955.'' And on May, 1955, Germany acceded lo the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and contributed forces to the Alliance. In order to counter aggressive NATO moves, the countries of the Socialist Community signed, on May 14, 1955-(six years after 31 NATO was formed), the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, subsequently called the Warsaw Treaty. The Treaty itself was formally modeled on the NATO treaty, although it did not establish institutions comparable to those of the North Atlantic Alliance." The Treaty explicitly stated that in case of armed attack against any signatory, the others would immediately come to its aid. The birth of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was a forced response. It was and continued to be strictly defensive. The French caused a further sensation when, on 29" March 1966, President de Gaulle announced that France was pulling out of the Integrated command structure (though not the alliance itself), and that all foreign NATO establishments must leave French territory in short order. The followed some complicated reshuffing and uprootings. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) abondened Rocquen Court outside Paris for a new home al Casteau near Mon in Belgium, while the headquarters of Allied Forces Central Europe betook itself to a still - smoking coalmine at Brunssum in the Netherlands. The Americans transferred their naval units in the Mediterranean from France to Italy, they had to re-route their lines of communications to Germany around French territory, and they transferred their aircraft from French airfields to bases in Britain and a dangerously crowded area of Germany. In the Rhineland and the Palatinate." In due course it transpired that France was quite willing to have NATO's political headquarters stayed in Paris. However, the other allies, spurred on by Brilain and the USA, decided that, partly for operational reasons, it would have to accompany SACEUR'S military headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, alias SHAPE) in a more to the Brussels area. 32 Bill ihc last Paris tneeling of NATO Council, wliicli look pUicc that December, showed how prevalent a desire to keep close relations with France was among NATO members. 5. NATO'S Policies In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb and in 1953 its first hydrogen bomb, only nine months after the first similar test by the USA. In 1950s they both brought the so called tactical (or battle field or theatre, nuclear weapons to Europe - the USA about 1953, the USSR about 1957." The Eisenhower administration (1953-61) developed a strategy known as 'massive retaliation' to deal with the growth in nuclear capability. According to this doctrine, aggression against the United States or its allies would be deterred with the threat of massive retaliatory nuclear strikes.^" The Alliance adopted "The Massive Retaliation" in 1957 (contain in NATO document MC 14-2). This was based on the firm intention that, should deterrence fail, nuclear weapons would be used at any early stage. The conventional forces would not, because of their limited size, be expected to defeat a determined attack but rather to act as a trip-wire to allow time for nuclear retaliation to be implemented.'" The whole concept of nuclear deterrence, especially in its present version which called for maximum deterrence, and above alls, the insistence of NATO on the first-use option for nuclear weapons was based on the assertion that the Socialist States had massive superiority in the field of conventional weapons in general and in the military situation in Europe in particular."" During 1950s, NATO adopted a military strategy of "ihe sword and the shield". NATO ground forces supplied the shield. They served the dual purpose of blunting an enemy's initial attack and (sometimes referred to as the "trip-wire") alerting Western 33 government lo the threat. Then the NATO "sword" - overwhelming nuclear air and missile power was to strike against both the source of aggression and hostile armies in the field."' It was said that the American and other allies NATO ground forces deployed in Germany were there as 'trip-wire' designed to set off the NATO nuclear deterrent."^ On July 1953, General Mathew Ridgway was succeeded by General Alferd M. Gruenther as a new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)" In 1954, in response to NSC162/2, NATO, under the direction of General Alfred M. Griuenther, conducted a study to assess the implications of changing NATO's strategy to a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. The findings of this study, leaked to the press in July 1954, by nothing: 1. Warfare in the future would inevitably by nuclear; 2. the first atomic targets would be armed forces and military installations rather than major centers of population; 3. the peak of destruction would come at the outset of war; 4. therefore the outcome would be determined by the active forces in being. On November, 1956, General Lauris Norstad succeeded General Alferd M. Gruenther as a SACEUR. On the other hand Paul - Henri Spaak (from Belgium) succeeded Lord Ismay as NATO's Secretary - General in 1957''^ In this period General Norstad a NATO Supreme Commander had twenty - five divisions or the equivalent, most of them in markedly improved fighting condition.''^' The strategy of massive retaliation changed when the Soviet Union developed a nuclear arsenal comparable with that of the United States. It was all very well to threaten the Soviets with genocide when they could not reply in kind. But when ihey could NATO changed its tune and took on a policy flexible response."' The adoption of flexible response (advocated by the Kennedy administration from the start and continued by Johnson, although not adopted as official NATO doctrine until 1967."" This strategy 34 went through various iterations, its last formulation being in document known as MC-14/3, which was approved by NATO in 1967. According to MC14/3, NATO military strategy aimed to preserve or to restore the territorial integrity of NATO countries. Initial reliance should be placed on foreward defence along the inter-German border or other frontiers, subjected to Soviet military penetration. If the Soviet advance was not halted, NATO forces should fall back, continuing the struggle with conventional weapons. If this still did not produce a successful defence, NATO would then go through a process of flexible response, gradually escalating to the use of battlefield nuclear weapons, theatre nuclear weapons, and, if necessary, intercontinental nuclear weapons. NATO 'flexible response' strategy was the result of a political compromise between Americans who desired more options before nuclear weapons were used, and Europeans who felt too many options would weaken rather than strengthen deterrence." The doctrine of 'flexible response' was regarded as a strategy primarily for countries with vast space, time and resources, the doctorine which it replaced of an early resort to nuclear weapons. But this posture soon lost its appeal in the early 1980s when the Soviet nuclear threat was enhanced by the SS-20s and NATO planned to meet this threat through the deployment of cruise missiles.'^' By 1980 NATO had 7,000 tanks on the Central Front (in Europe) compared to Warsaw Pact's 20,500 and 13,500 of which were Soviet. Soviet plans for rapid rates of advance, if successful, would overwhelm NATO's forces more quickly than they could be reinforced. Soviet deployment of SS-20s had also served the same purpose. It was a gross oversimplification to see the Soviet's maneuvers and arms buildup as a clear indication that they contemplated offensive action against NATO, just as it was naive to 35 wonder why Warsaw Pact forces were being expanded and equipped far beyond the defensive needs of the Soviet bloc. In 1982 the Alliance was shaken by the reverberations of the Siberian gas pipeline issue. To the unwelcome spectacle of public bickering among Alliance members over strategic dependence on the Soviet Union and contributing through trade to Soviet military potential was added the trauma of sanctions being applied by one member state against commercial companies in others. This unfortunate state affairs had arisen by degrees as a result of marked changes in international economic intercourse. Western European Countries, in the light of a relatively recent experience of an oil embargo, had decided to diversity their sources of energy and raw material supplies. Meanwhile economic recession and unemployment had driven them to intensify, in part by offering - advantageous credit terms, their attempts to exploit the market offered by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."^ Edmund Burke wrote, "A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation". The North Atlantic Alliance had shown since its foundation that its leaders appreciated the truth of that commend. NATO had never been afraid of change and indeed had welcomed it whatever it had seemed to offer the prospect of building a safer and saner world. In doing so the Alliance had been guided and would continue to be guided by the fundamental principle of renunciation of the threat and use of force which was enshrined in Article 1 of he North Atlantic Treaty. NATO's program for peace in Freedom adopted by the Bonn Summit in June 1982, provided another guideline enabling the Alliance to face further changes in the international environment whenever they occurred. The summit declaration also confirmed the purely defensive nature of the Alliance by stating that none of its weapons - and thai 36 comprised conventional as well as nuclear weapons would ever be used, except in case of attack. The Eastern European revolutions against Communist rule occurred during Manfred Werner's chairmanship of NATO, he succeeded Lord Carrington as Secretary General of NATO in 1989.'^ On November 9, 1989, the decision of the East Germany government to pull down the Berlin Wall at the height of the Eastern European revolutions against Communist rule, and set the seal on the momentous political changes that took place during the year.'""' At the insistence of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, the military structures of the Warsaw Pact were dissolved on April 11, 1990 in Moscow and the seventh member East Germany ceased to exist with German Unification on October 3, 1990. Finally on July 1, 1991, the leader of the Warsaw Pact signed the protocol dissolving the Warsaw Pact, thus ending a 36 year era of East-West conformation. Thus in one sense NATO had outlived its utility because its aim of arresting expansion of Communism had almost been achieved with the breaking up of the Soviet Union.'^^ 6. NATO'S NEW STRUCTURES* Just a little more than a year after the terror attacks of 9-11, Alliance members met at a NATO Summit held in Prague in November 2002. The outcome of this historic summit resulted in an agreement providing for a truly remarkable set of changes for the Alliance, transforming the fifty year old, cold war structure of NATO into an organization designed to meet the uncertain world. NATO set a new course that is transforming virtually every aspect of the organization. Among the changes, NATO leaders agreed to at the Prague Summit were to streamline its command structure to provide a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable force See Figure 7. NATO's New Military Command Structure, p.XXI 37 capable of meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions . With remarkable decisiveness and discipline, NATO best demonstrated its commitment to transformation by reducing the number of major headquarters from twenty to eleven. Considering that NATO's military command structure during the Cold War stood at 78 major headquarters, this achievement is truly revolutionary. The most substantial changes was the redesignation of Strategic Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) as Atlantic Command Transformation (ACT), which no longer has an operational command function. With its headquarters located in Norfolk, Virginia, ACT's primary function is to "oversee the transformation of NATO's military capabilities".'"" Allied Command Europe (ACE) is now designated as Allied Command Operations (ACO) but its functions remain unchanged. With three major joint forces commands, ACO has assumed an expeditionary posture. Joint Headquarters Command is located in Lisbon and has assumed the operational command function of SACLANT with the capability to form a maritime Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Joint Forces Command North and South integrate their land, air, and naval component commands into a functional joint force. Between them, they can form a land-based CJTF.'"' 38 REFERENCES 1. Dan Smith, "Pressure How America Runs NATO", Bloomsbury, Publishing Limited, London, 1989, pp. 53-54. 2. Robert S. Jordan with Michael W. Bloome, "Polilicul Leadership in NATO: A study in Multinational Diplomacy", Weslview Press, Colorado, 1979, p.4 3. Cecil V. Crabb Jr., 'American Foreign Policy in The Nuclear Age', Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1972, p. 236. 4. John J. McCloy, "The Atlantic Alliance: Its Origin and ils future", Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, P. 25 5. Peter Griffiths, "Nuclear Weapons: The Last Great Debate?','Edward Arnold (publishers) Ltd., London, 1987, pp. 61-62. 6. Op.cit. no.3, p.238. 7. William H. Mcneill, "Greece: American Aid in Action, 1947- 1956", Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1957, pp. 37-38. 8. Hohn W. Spanier, "American Foreign Policy since World War II," Praeger publishers, New York, 1960, p. 34 9. Lawrence S. Kaplan, "A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military - Assistance Programme, 1948-1951", The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1980, p.6 10. Clive Rose, "Campaigns Against Western Defence NATO's, Adversaries and Critics", The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1985, p. 21 11. Op.cit. no.l, pp. 67-68. 12. Arthur Cyr, "U.S. Foreign Policy and European Security", The Macmillan Press Ltd., Houndmills, 1987, pp. 19-20. 13. Elisabeth Dureau, "Defence in the Construction of Europe: The Stakes of security and Problems of Cooperation", in 39 "Nalional Ulenlily and Regional Cooperalion Experiences ol European in Integration and South Asian Perception", eds H.S. Chopra, Robert Frank, Jurgen Schroder, in collaboration with Bruno Dorin, Gert W. Kueck, Ajay Kumar Jain For Manohar Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 222-223. 14. Edwin H. Fedder, "Transformations in the Aliance", in "Defence Politics of the Atlantic Alliance," ed by Edwin H. Fedder, Praeger Publishers CBS Educational and Professional Publishing A Division of CBS, inc.. New York, 1980, P.7. 15. Don Cook, "Forging the Alliance NATO; 1945-1950," Martin Seeker & Woburg Ltd, London, 1989, p.222 16. Op. Cit. no 5, pp 62-63. 17. William Park, "Defending the West A History of NATO", Wheat sheaf Books Limited, Brighton, 1986, p-4. 18. A.W. Deporte, "The First Forty Years", in "NATO in the 1990s", ed. by Stanley R. Sloan, Brassey's Defence Publishers, Ltd., London, 1989, p.43. 19. Escott Reid, "Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949", McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1977, p. 29. 20. Jack L.Granatstein, "The United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", in "A History of NATO The First Fifty Years", Volume 1, ed Gustav Schmidt, Palgrave Publishers Ltd, New York, 2001, p. 32 21. Hall Gardner, "NATO and the UN: The Contemporary Relevance of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty", in "A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years", ed Gustav Schmidt, Palgrave Publishers Ltd. Volume 1, New York, 2001. p. 41 40 22. Robert E.Osgood and Henning Wegener, "The United Stales and Federal Republic of Germany", in "The International Politics of Deterrence", ed by Barry Buzan, Frances Pinter (Publishers) Limited, London, 1987, p. 53. 23. Ibid, p.54 24. W. Randolph Burgess, "Consideration About Cooperation", in "NATO in Quest of Cohesion," eds by Karl H. Cerny and Henry W. Briefs, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1965, p.183. 25. John Cherian, "Policy the World", Frontline, April 23, 1999, Volume 16, no. 8, p. 54. 26. Darren Lake, "U.K. Committee gives backing to seven NATO applicants," Jane's Defence Weekly, Volume - 38, no. 6, 7 August, 2002, p.5 27. William T.R. Fox and Annette B. Fox, "NATO and The Range of American Choice", Columbia University - Press, New York, 1967, p. 56 28. Ibid, p. 66. 29. Bradley Klein, "Beyond the Western Alliance", in "Atlantic Relations: Beyond the Reagan Era", ed. by S. Gill, St. Martins Press, New York, 1989, pp. 201-202 30. Adam Bronstone, "European Security into the Twenty - first Century. Beyond traditional theories of international relations", Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 2000, pp. 60- 61 31. Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, "The Atlantic Alliance A short Political Guide", The Pall Mall Press Ltd, London, 1964, pp. 174-175. 32. NATO Facts and Figures, Published by the NATO Information Service, NATO, 1110 Brussels, 1989,pp. 13-14. 41 33. NATO Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO - Information Service - Paris, Printed in the Netherlands by Bosch - Ultrecht, 1965, p.20. 34. Wing - Commander J.D. Warne, 'NATO and its Prospects?, Published by Federick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1954, pp. 7-8 35. Cottrell and Dougherty, nos., 31, pp.28-29. 36. Robert Hunter, "Security in Europe", Published in Great Britain by Elek Books Limited, London, 1969, pp. 178-179. 37. NATO HANDBOOK North Atlantic Treaty Organization", NATO Information Service, 1110 Brussels, 1980. p. 32. 38. Op. Cit. no. 34, p.8. 39. Op. Cit. no. 10, p. 24. 40. Richard Rosecrance, "U.S. Relations with NATO", Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Volume - 8, Nos. 2-3, June, 1986, p.l 41. Kurt Gottfried and Bruce G. Blair, "Crisis Stability and Nuclear War", Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, 1988, p.48. 42. Op. Cit. no. 15, pp. 250-253. 43. Andrei Krutskikh, "US Militarism," Allied Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi, 1987, p. 78. 44. NATO HANDBOOK, nos., 37, pp.21-22. 45. Shaun R. Gregory, "Nuclear Command and Control in NATO Nuclear Weapons Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response," Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1996, p.52 46. Ibid, p.56 47. Guillaume Parmentier, "Redressing NATO's Imbalances", Survival, volume 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 98-99. 42 48. David Callio, "The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and Europe," The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970, pp. 26- 27. 49. Ibid, pp. 28-29. 50. Op. Cit. no. 45, p.57. 51. Hugh Faringdon, "Strategic Geography NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers", Second edition, by Roulledge, London, 1989, p. 186. 52. Peter Taylor, "The Power of Politics, An Encyclopedia of World Government", Time - Life Books, Amsterdam, 1991, p. 143. 53. Op. Cit. no. 41, p.162. 54. Ibid, p. 163 55. Op.cit. no. 52, p.143 56. Theodore A. Couloumbis, 'The United States, Greece and Turkey. The troubled Triangle?", Praegers Publishers, New York, 1983, p.15 57. Sunita Pathania, 'Soviet policy towards Turkey (1945- 1965)", A. Banerjee for Khama Publishers, New Delhi, 1994, p. 77. 58. Op. Cit. no. 56, p.15. 59. Op. Cit. no. 15, p.254. 60. The Europa Year Book 1964, Volume: 1, p. 193. 61. The Europa Year Book 1959, First Edition, p. 93 62. The Europa Year Book 1982, A World Survey, Volume: 1, p. 243 63. Julius W. Pratl, 'A History of United Slates Foreign Policy", Prentice - Hall, INC., New Jersey, 1972. p. 451. 43 64. Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Slill a 'Civilian Power? ", Survival, Volume: 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, p. 67. 65. J.P.D. Dunbabin, "Inlernalional Relations Since 1945 A History in Two Volumes The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies", Longman Group UK Limited, Harlow, England, 1994, p. 362 66. Op. Cit. no. 13, p.225. 67. Saul Rose, "The Foreign Policy of Britain", in "Foreign Policies in a World of Changes", ed. Joseph E. Black, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1963, p. 44 68. The Europa World Year Book, 1998. Volume: 1, p. 241. 69. Op. Cit. no. 27, p.15. 70. S.F. Goodman, "The European Union", Third Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1996, p. 37. 71. Hilmar Linnenkemp, "The Security Policy of the New Germany", in "The New Germany and the New Europe", ed. Paul B. Stares, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1992, p. 93. 72. The Europa Year Book 1966, Volume: 1, p. 238 73. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Military Policy A Historical Analysis", Published by Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1966, p. 146. 74. Nikolai Luzin, "Nuclear Strategy and Common Sense," Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p. 31 75. Op. Cit. no. 51, p.183. 76. Neville Brown, "European Security 1972-1980", The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, (April 1972), p. 27. 44 77. J. Miettinen, "Mini - nukes' and enhanced radiation weapons", in "Tactical Nuclear Weapons " European Perspective", ed. Dr. Frank Barnarby, Taylor and Francis Ltd, London, 1978, p. 233. 78. Robbin F. Laird, "The Soviet Union, The West, and the Nuclear Arms Race", Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, Brighton, 1986. p. 50. 79. Op. Cit. no. 10, p.25. 80. Manfred MuUer, 'German Democratic Republic', in 'The International Politics of Deterrence', ed. Barry Buzan, Frances Pinter (Publishers) Limited, London, 1987, p. 34 81. Op. Cit. no. 3, p.254 82. Stephen J. Cimbala, "NATO Strategies and Nuclear Weapons", St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1989, p. 140 83. The Europa Year Book 1972, Volume; 1, p. 318 84. Op. Cit. no. 45, p.17. 85. The Europa Year Book 1962, Volume: 1, p. 77 86. Op. Cit. no. 63, p.445. 87. Frank Barnaby, "The Invisible bomb, The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East", I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London, 1989, p.57 88. Michael MccGwire, "Military Objectives In Soviet Foreign Policy", Washington Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1987, pp. 32-35. 89. Samuel P. Huntington, 'U.S. Defence Strategy: The Strategic Innovations of the Reagan Years", in "American Defence Annual 1978-1988", ed. by Joseph Kruzel, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1987 p. 25. 90. Op. Cit. no. 82, p.48. 45 91. Geoffrey Williams, "Global Defence Motivalion and Policy in a Nuclear Age", Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984. p. 302 92. Adam B. Ulam, "The World Outside", in "After Brezkhnev Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s", ed. by Robert F. Byrnes, Frances Pinter (Publishers) Limited, London, 1983, p. 405 93. Joseph Luns, "The North Atlantic Alliance in a Changing International Environment?", in "Arm Disarm for Peace", ed. by Waris Shere, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1988, pp.64- 65. 94. Ibid, p. 70 95. The Europa Year Book 1984, Volume; 1, p. 180. 96. Op. Cit. no. 52, p.150. 97. S.K. Kapoor, "International Law", Ajanta Offset Printers, Allahabad, 1998, p. 587 98. Ibid, p. 586. 99. NATO'S NATIONS and Partners For Peace, Volume.49, No.1/2004, P.151. 100.Lieutenant Colonel Raymon A, Millen, "Reconfiguring NATO for Future Security Challenges", Comparative Strategy, Volume: 23, 2004, P. 129. 101.Ibid, P. 130 46 CHAPTER - 2 NATO And European Security: An Overview 1. Europe after the Collapse of Soviet Union In the 'Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany' of 12 September 1990, the four allied powers and both German states agreed on (Bulletin, 1990J: • the recognition of the borders of the FRG and GDR as the borders of the United Germany ( Art. 1); • a commitment to peace and the non-use of force with the exception in accordance with its constitution and the UN Charter ( Art. 2); • a binding commitment of the United Germany to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and not to produce, acquire or control the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and to reduce its forces to 370,000 within three to four years ( Art. 3); • an obligation that no nuclear weapons and launchers and no foreign troops may be deployed on the territory of the former GDR after the withdrawal of all Soviet troops ( Art. 5); • the right of the United Germany to join alliances (Art.6); • the announcement that all allied prerogatives pertaining to Berlin and Germany as a whole will end on 3 October 1990 and that the United Germany will acquire full sovereignty (An.7).' Germany also promised 13 billion marks towards paying and supplying the Soviet troops on German soil and towards their 47 repatriation and housing in the Soviet Union which was to be completed in 1994. The defence of the Atlantic organized within NATO appeared to continue to be valued as the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR did not bring to an end all threat to Europe. Right from the time of the London summit in June 1990, the heads of state and of government of the countries of the alliance drew the lessons of these first changes and concluded thai il was necessary to renew NATO, hence implicitly rejecting the idea of disbanding it. After the reunification of Germany in 1990, then the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991, the disintegration of the USSR proceeded at a faster pace (it was finally completed in December 1991).' The American response had been based on the assumption that at the end the Soviet Union would prefer to preserve NATO because Moscow looked to Washington to act as a restraint on a unified Germany. That was why together with its allies, the United States had proposed a number of concessions to make the idea of German NATO membership more palatable. Among them; changing the emphasis of NATO to make it a more political institution; imposing a variety of arms limitations on Germany; asking a unified Germany to provide economic assistance to the Soviet troops to remain in present - day East Germany for a specified period, and reducing the number of nuclear forces on German soil.^ As a hegemon outside Europe, the United States had equalized the European powers by burying the enmities that had led to two World Wars. It pacified Europe even though il provoked hostility in those countries that resented their loss of sovereignty, and it becomes the umbrella under which the E.U. could be established. For these reasons, Western Governments wanted the United Germany to 48 remain in NATO, for a Germany outside NATO would have caused concern, especially among the East and West Europeans and a NATO without Germany would have been deprived of personnel, logistics, and space/ The Western Countries in cooperation with a Soviet Union thai was then rapidly changing, seized the chance and produced what could be considered as the greatest triumph of diplomacy in this century. Not even a full year passed between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the final act of creating a United Germany. Along with East Germans, 400 million human beings were free from Communism, an achievement unthinkable without the persistent efforts of the NATO Allies.** In November, 1991, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed in Rome on NATO's new strategic concept. The new strategic concept and developments since its adoption underline that crisis management; peacekeeping and peacemaking in regional conflicts were becoming new and central tasks for the Alliance. The concept no longer emphasized massive mobilization but rather enhanced crisis management capabilities using more mobile and flexible force and cooperative efforts to project peace. NATO's contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management consists of three essential politico-military elements: • the provision, by its existence, a cohesion and strength of security anchor and stabilizing factor in Europe; • the contribution, through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council which united NATO with the former member of the Warsaw Pact and their successor states of a mechanism for achieving a common understanding in security matters and a collective approach to the peaceful settlement of local conflicts; 49 • a close interaction with the UN, the CSCE,' the Western European Union and the European Community in a complementary framework of interlocking, mutually reinforcing international institutions. NATO's involvement in peacekeeping operations could find its expression in three main forms; • by contributing Alliance assets to a UN or CSCE peacekeeping operation; • by conducting or coordinating a peacekeeping operation on behalf of either organization; • by supporting the involvement of individual Allies in a peacekeeping operation. It is important to recognize that NATO is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end. And that end should the elimination of interstate war in Europe, not the preservation of NATO's Cold War form and function. NATO remains crucial to the defence and security needs of the nations on both sides of the Atlantic. It is an placeable guarantor of Euro-Atlantic Security, an unparalleled provider of political and military stability for Western Europe and now for the new democratics of Central and Eastern Europe as well. The real and potential threats to the physical security of Europe have to set alongside the growing threats to the values, to the trade, to the economic prosperity and, perhaps, to the political beliefs of both Europe and North America. What is needed is an Atlantic Community, a Community that will rest on the four pillars. The first pillar is its shared belief in the rule of law and parliamentary democracy. The second is liberal capitalism and free trade, which has given its entire people unprecedented prosperity. The third is The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), establishn^ent in 1975. In \994 the CSCE evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 50 the shared European cultural heritage emanating from classical Greece and Rome through the Renaissance to the shared values, beliefs and civilization of its own centuries. The fourth pillar must be defence and security as represented by the NATO Alliance. In a nutshell, NATO needs North America, and North America needs NATO. Europe is inextricably linked to North America and security. The logic goes something like this : peace and stability in Kurope create the conditions for economic growth and economic growth is what creates the opportunity for prosperity. Peace and stability are fundamental prerequisites for prosperity. 2. North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) The German - American initiative in December 1991 to create the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which brought together foreign and defence ministers of the 16 countries, reflected US State Department determination that NATO should develop a broader role in European Security through extending its security regime across eastern Europe. By 1997 the NACC had been transformed into the Euro - Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), bringing together to allies and 27 partners. Its wide-ranging agenda included cooperation on political and security related matters, arms control, international terrorism, peace keeping, defence, economic issues.'^ The inaugural meeting of NACC was held on 20 December, 1991, attended by all 16 NATO allies as well as representatives of 9 other countries including member states of the then already dissolved Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union) and three Baltic Stales (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). On 10 March 1992, a further 10 newly - independent states on the territory of the former Soviet Union joined the NACC. Georgia and Albania followed suit at the NACC meeting in Oslo on 5 June 1992, NACC member stales were Albania, Armenia, 51 Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uzbekistan. ^ It was an important step to raise the alliance's liaison relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to a qualitative new level in recognition of the democratic progress they had made. The invitation to these nations, including the three newly independent Baltic States, to join the NATO allies in an institutionalized framework of consultations was more than a symbolic gesture and may evolve soon into a primary security forum of a future Euro-Atlantic community. The NACC was conceived as a means for NATO to contribute to healing the division of Europe. It aimed to foster political dialogue, practical cooperation, transparency in military affairs, and the peaceful integration of the new democracies into the translantic community. The NACC was becoming a central element in the growing web of security ties thai bound European and North Atlantic together. 3. NATO enlargement and the partnership for peace (PFP) American policy - makers wanted NATO to serve both as framework for European security and as a vehicle for supporting US strategy in the rest of the world. These two objectives might well prove irreconcilable. Further enlargement to Europe's east and south-east spread security and stability across the region, but weakened NATO as a strictly military alliance."' The idea was first planted with President Bill Clinton in April 1993, during a Washington ceremony to open the Holocaust Museum. With time on 52 their hands before the speech making, Vaclav Havel and Le(;h Walesa, the President of the Czech Republic and Poland, cornered Clinton to urge that NATO admit East European countries. Havel and Walesa had got nowhere with George Bush on the idea, but Clinton, in office only three months, was intrigued. In October, 1993, the US government decided the policy that the immediate issue was not enlargement of NATO but promotion of Partnership for Peace (PfP), and proposed the unofficial meeting of defence ministers for the first time in NATO's history to discuss the opinions of the allied states. As a result, this proposal by he US was approved at the Travemunde talks, and the North Atlantic Council made a decision on PfP in December 1993. In January 1994, NATO officially announced its policy for PfP. It was not a good idea to openly promote the NATO enlargement issue at this point of time considering the conditions of the former East European states that contained a number of uncertainties and the expected opposition by Russia. " In the Russian eyes, there had been a series of unfulfilled promises and slapped in the face by the West. Mikhail Gorbachev thought that Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany meant that NATO would not expand eastward." Some observers still see the Alliance mainly as an insurance guarantee against a future revival of Russian power. Others see NATO as a vehicle for exporting stability and ensuring democratic development in the new democracies of Central Europe, some see the Alliance as an instrument for developing multilateral responses to new security problems, particularly with regard to crisis management in Europe and beyond.^" Analysis have identified at least four threats which NATO may need to face. Firstly the issue of latent Russian power, Russia remains a large military state in possession of large nuclear arsenal which is still one of the primary 53 concerns of analysis and governments in NATO member stales. Whether Russia a remains politically stable, the complexion of its leadership, and the nature of Russia's relations with the West will all be key determinants of concerns about the risks of latent Russia military and particularly nuclear power. A second threat is associated with new fault lines which some analysts argue are opening in relations between the West and other states or regions of the world. Such concerns have explored with varying degrees of conviction by scholars such as Huntington who points to a 'clash of civilisations which may shape the future security. A third concern lies in the divisions between the prosperous developed, industrial and technically advanced 'North and the less prosperous, undeveloped, less industrialised and less technically advanced 'South'. In this analysis the North and South or the West and the Third World, may clash over issues as diverse as population migration, access to natural resources, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical and nuclear) and political and social instability. Finally, the West has also begun to articulate concerns about an 'Islamic threat with particular resonance in Europe given the close proximity of the Middle East and North Africa and the presence of large Islamic populations within many European states. Whatever the respective force of these arguments it is difficult to argue that NATO lives in a threat-free context, despite the end of the Cold War." The reality is that NATO, like most defensive alliances before it, lost its original purposes with the end of the cold war. It survives because it has redefined itself as an instrument for consolidating new European democracies." The PfP had become a learning experience on the NATO to international security planning, budgeting and civilian control over the military. PfP is based on the declaration that the alliance has no offensive 54 anti-Russian objective rather, it welcome Russianr'SsBaLClDamid^^n the promotion of peace, security, democracy and a free-markel economic system in all of Europe. Albeit with reluctance, Russia joined the PfP with the reassurance that it would have a voice but not a veto power in the enlargement process, and that the eastern extension of the alliance would include a parallel strategic partnership between Russia and NATO. ^ In June 1994, Russia had agreed to NATO's proposal of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which in effect simply meant that Russia would be associated with NATO without any decisive or effective role in it. The West also tried to placate Russia by agreeing against deployment of nuclear warheads in the territory of the proposed new member countries of Eastern Europe and also to inform in advance any joint exercise or troop movements. * The wider scope of PfP is reflected in its objectives, as sci out in the Framework Document, issued at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, i.e. (1). to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes; (2). to ensure democratic control of defence forces; (3). to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; (4). to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercise in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping search and other as may subsequently be agreed, and; (5). to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of North Atlantic Alliance. 55 The Brussels Summit therefore invited PfP partners to establish their own liaison offices at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to facilitate their participation in NACC/PfP meetings and activities." The strategic objectives of NATO and PfP in this context can be summarized as follows; • to involve Central Asian countries in the European security architecture based on cooperative process is and on mutual consultations in case of threat; • to increase military cooperation and information exchange; • to increase inter-operability for interalia peace keeping operations on the basis of common conceptual approach. According to the Central Asian governments, the PfP programmes serves the objective of strengthening and modernizing their national armies. They consider this cooperation, supplemented by other military cooperation agreements with individual NATO countries, especially with the U.S., Turkey and Germany, as an efficient way of reducing their dependence on Russia. Partnership for Peace (PfP) participants at 30 April 1995); Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan." The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), created in 1997, provides the overaching political framework for all the outreach and cooperation activities among allies and partners to complement the expanded opportunities provided by an enhanced PfP. The EAPC superseded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 56 (NACC), which had been NATO's first means of giving ils outreach 28 a systematic structure. The Manfred Werner building, a new annex to NATO headquarter was officially inaugurated on 7 April 1998 by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. The building housed diplomatic delegations of non NATO partner countries members of the Euro- Allanlic Partnership Council (EAPC). In addition, 24 out of a lolal of 28 EAPC partner countries have now named ambassadors and established diplomatic missions to NATO under the 1997 Brussels Agreement. These include Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Macedonia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Allied leaders launched the Training and Education enhancement Programme at the Washington Summit in April 1999-a structured approach to improving and harmonising NATO and Partner training and education activities, particularly through the establishment of PfP training centers.^" The PfP Training Centres already designated in Partner countries are described below : • Yavoriv Training Centre, Ukraine. This was the first Partner facility to be recognised as a PfP Training Centre, and has a long track record of P&P and similar exercise. • Almnas PfP Training Centre; Sweden: with excellent facilities and accommodation for 80 participants, this centre aims to enhance PfP cooperation generally, as well as more specifically promoting PfP cooperation in the Baltic sea region. 57 • Bucharest IMP Training Cenlre, Romania: Eslablisheil in 1997 to conduct joint training activities and promote a better understanding of common NATO/PfP related issues, this centre offers "army brigade", joint service, peace support operations and other courses in English. • Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Switzerland; This international foundation with NATO/PfP members was created within the framework of Swiss Participation in PfP .Its core missions are training, research and conferences for diplomates, military officers and civil servants from the foreign and defence ministries of NATO and PfP countries. • Austrian International Peace Support Command: successor to the former Austrian Training Centre for Peacekeeping, this centre specialises in training civil and military personnel and units for peace-support operations. In major foreign policy statement delivered in Detroit. President Bill Clinton declared that "by 1999-NATO's 50th anniversary and 10 years after the fall of the Berlin wall-the first group of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged members of NATO. At the same time, the President pointed out that "NATO enlargement is not directed against anyone", and he invited Russia to take advantages of "the best chance in history to help to build that peaceful and undivided Europe, and to be an equal respected and successful partners.^^ President Boris Yeltsin's stance against NATO expansion, however, underwent a dramatic change during his Helsinki meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton in April 1997. In return for vague promises on the future Russian membership in what is now G-7, Yeltsin gave the green signal to the West on NATO expansion. On May 27,1997, amid much fanfare and media hype, the leader of the 58 16 NATO countries and Russia signed a charier al llie Elysce Palace in Paris, by the terms of which Moscow formally agreed to NATO's eastward expansion. The charter, called the NATO-Russia Founding Act, gives Russia on paper a permanent consultative role on security issues relating to Europe. Russia however, will have absolutely no say in the affairs of NATO.^"* The parlies agreed lirsl on the establishment of the "Permanent Joint Council (PJC) " and the deliberation system (Joint Chairmanship by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member states on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia). They also agreed the PJC would meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and that of Defence Ministers twice annually, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council. It may also meet, as appropriate at the level of the heads of State and Government. Many in Europe feel that the hidden American agenda is to ensure that NATO and not the E.U., defines the structure of a wider Europe, and that the European allies share the bulk of the financial burden that NATO expansion will entail. The U.S. arms manufacturers apparently had an important role to play in influencing the US administration's aggressive blue print for NATO expansion .The NATO Summit to be held in Madrid in July, 1997, was to invite the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to join the alliance by 1999.'' The U.S. had ruled that only three new countries would be admitted to NATO in the first round, though others are to come in later. The welcome mat was out for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. But France, Italy, Canada and other members of the alliance were pushing the candidacies of Romania and Slovenia. The U.S. would prevail, on these countries, because such decisions 59 must be unanimous."' At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO leaders invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks with the Alliance. These accession talks were followed by the signing and the subsequent ratification of accession protocols. The formal accession of the three new members took place on 12 March 1999. The Washington Summit in April 1999 provided a fitting opportunity to respond to this desire. NATO was able to draw upon the experience gained not only during the three years of intensified dialogue meetings, but also through the integration of three newest members, into the Alliance. The result was the Membership Action plan, which provides assessment and feedback mechanisms for partners aspiring to NATO membership. Each aspirant is invited to submit an annual national programme on its preparations for possible membership, covering political and economic, defence/military, resource, security and legal aspects. Indeed, the decision by NATO to open its doors has led many countries in Central and Eastern Europe to accelerate their political, economic and military reforms. It has also encouraged them to bury old enmities and establish good neighbourly relations. Moreover, NATO's opening to Central and Eastern Europe is not happening in a vacuum. NATO's other initiatives the Partnership for Peace programme, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO/ Russian Founding Act, the NATO- Ukraine Charter and its dialogue with six countries from the Mediterranean - have created a powerful momentum for continent- wide security cooperation. These initiatives have united almost all the nations in the Euro-Atlantic area around a common security standard.''" The ending of the Cold War and of East-West confrontation has not eliminated serious threats to the Western democracies or to the world as a whole. These threats do exist, and 60 will p(;rsist until the new states-the Republics of the former Soviet Union and, above all, Russia-achieve final success on their round to democratic transformation and economic reform. ^' Privately, there were suggestions that Russia would eventually like to join NATO. While the idea caused a stir of interest in alliance think- tanks, most rejected it. The allies ultimately concluded that even to start a study on Russian membership would be a mistake, for it might lead Moscow to think entry was an eventuality, thereby reducing its incentives to reform and become more transparent. However, a Europe without Russia cannot be peaceful, undivided and democratic. If Russia remains on the outside, it will be a destabilising presence for the Baltic countries, for Ukraine and the Caucasus and for Western interests in central and southeastern Europe. It follows that the United states and Europe have much to gain by engaging Russia as a partner in building the new Europe rather than as a potential adversary."* Since the threats to Russia now come, not from America or NATO in the west, but from the south and the east, it makes sense to work with America and Europe to counter the problems of terrorism and weapons proliferation. America and Europe, moreover, are home to the firms and stock markets Russia needs to help finance its economic revival. On May 28,2002 President Vladimir Putin along with the leaders of NATO nations were present at Pratica Di Mare, a military base just outside the Italian capital, to sign the new "Rome Declaration". The Rome Declaration establishes a NATO- Russia Joint Council. The new deal gave Russia equal standing in decision of common interest, ranging from counter terrorism to peacekeeping and arms control. President Putin declared thai while Russia would not itself seek to join NATO, it would not 61 oppose the next round of NATO's expansion, which looked likely to include the three Baltic republics/'' In November 2002, NATO issued membership invitations to seven former Soviet block countries stretching from Estonia in the North to Bulgaria in the South. All seven states: Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia formally joined the alliance in April 2004, bringing the number of NATO members to 26, as the flags of the seven new Allies were raised at the entrance to the Alliance's Headquarters in Brussels.** After that, NATO had identified the three countries of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia as candidates for the new batch of countries to accede to the alliance. NATO would fulfill the process of accession of the 3 countries around 2007.**^ 4. NATO AND THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD); The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery are identified as a threat to NATO. "The principle non-proliferation goal of the Alliance.... is to prevent proliferation from accuring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. "The non-reference to "diplomatic means" of preventing proliferation is not accidental , the use of force is clearly what NATO has in mind.*^ In 1994's Summit, NATO Heads of state and Government formally acknowledge the security threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and recognized this as a matter of direct concern to the Alliance. They therefore decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation. The North Atlantic Council subsequently established two groups to carry out this work. The first is the Senior Politico- Military Group on Proliferation, chaired by the NATO Assistant Secretary General for 62 Political Affairs. The group's focus is on the political and preventive aspects of NATO's approach to dealing with proliferation. The second is the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. This group is co-chaired by a European and North American nation. The group is responsible for considering how NATO's defence posture can support NATO's non-proliferation effects but also provide protection should those efforts fail. The work of the two groups is brought and reported to the North Atlantic Council by the Joint Committee on Proliferation, Chaired by the Deputy Secretary General.* NATO allies have resolved to quickly ramp up their capacity to respond to attacks involving chemical, biological and radiological weapons while at the same time not ruling out pre emptive strikes as part of their strategy against terrorists. The increasing likelihood that terrorists will obtain and use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was a central theme at the 6-7 June 2002 meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels. At the end of the meeting , ministers issued a statement identifying four general areas whose European allies and Canada need to improve capabilities, including response to WMD threats as well as acquiring strategic lift, secure communications and modern weaponry.*" In December 1998, Alliance Foreign and Defence Ministers expressed their determination to prepare NATO's forces to succeed in the full range of missions that they might have to face despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons .Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on proliferation that were created as a result of the 1994 NATO Summit, Ministers indicated that they were prepared to expand NATO's effort to address the evolving proliferation risk. A WMD 63 Centre will be created in the NATO International Staff in Brussels to improve coordination of all WMD- related activities at NATO. The Centre will: • Maintain the Matrix of Bilateral WMD Destruction and Management Assistance Programmes, a data base designed lo expand information sharing between member states on national contributions to WMD withdrawal and dismantlement in the former Soviet Union; • Serve as a repository for information on WMD- related civil response programmes in Allied nations; • Support the Alliance Groups dealing with WMD proliferation and through them, the North Atlantic Council; • Develop briefings, fact sheets and other information documents on WMD issues for a wider public audience.* 5. The Mediterranean Dialogue NATO has already started a dialogue with six countries of the region-Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. They have all said they find it useful and want to go further. The purpose of the dialogue is to build confidence and to lay the ground for future cooperation, ' NATO's dialogue with six-non- NATO countries of the Mediterranean region, launched in 1995, aims to dispel possible misconceptions about the Alliance and lo build confidence through greater transparency, discussion and cooperation. Simple geography means there will always be a link between security in Europe and that of the Mediterranean. The main purpose of the dialogue is to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterenean, achieving a better mutual understanding and correcting any misperceptions between NATO and the Mediterranean partners countries and NATO's dialogue is meant to reinforce other international efforts such as those undertaken by ihe 64 52 E.U., the OSCE, the WEU, and the Middle East Peace Process. Another important step in the effort to exchange information was the decision taken by Alliance foreign ministers in May 1998 to establish "Contact Point Embassies " in Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Under this system, similar to that which has been successfully operating in Central and Eastern European partner countries since 1992, the embassy of a NATO member country will represent the Alliance in each Dialogue country/ And every year, some 500 representatives from NATO member states and countries participating in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean Dialogue come together at the College to attend an increasingly wide range of courses. Key Alliance and geo-strategic issues are analysed with the help of top political, military and civilian leaders, as well as outstanding international academics.^ 6. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY (ESDI) NATO has transformed itself from an alliance for collective defence and transatlantic consultation into an organisation with most emphasis on defence cooperation and cooperative security. In the 1991 Alliance strategic concept, NATO's political strategy, it was agreed that within NATO " a European security identity "should be developed. The 1994 NATO Summit endorsed concepts of "Separable but not separate forces and 'Combined Joint Task Forces"(CJTFs) that could be made available for European led operations other than collective defence.** The Combined Joint Task Forces" (CJTFs) concept. This will provide NATO for the first time with deployable and mobile commands, trained and ready to respond to a range of contingencies. CJTF would also allow NATO assets to be put under WEU command in cases where NATO itself decides not to act. Providing forces for the WEU which are 65 "separable but not separate " from NATO will help the European Allies lo turn an emerging European Security and Defence Identity into an operational reality/'' The foundations for the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept were laid by NATO Heads of state and Government at their Brussels Summit in January , 1994, ' and was approved at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin on June 1995.*" The creation of a permanent framework for implementing the CJTF concept poses particular challenges. These include the need:- • to ensure that its development is consistent with other elements of NATO's adaptation, including in particular the prospective revision of the command structure; • to take full account of the WEU dimension by developing the concept of separable but not separate capabilities which could be used either by NATO or by the WEU; • to provide for the possible involvement of non-NATO nations in a CJTF; • to maximize cost-effectiveness and avoid duplication.^'^ The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept is closely linked to the emerging European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). By making available such NATO assets and logistic, and command and control for operations, the CJTF will avoid wasteful duplication of capabilities and prevent competition between NATO and the WEU.*" At their meeting in Berlin in June 1996, NATO Foreign Ministers took the decision to build ESDI within the Alliance. The main element of ESDI include ; • Political commitment to making a more effective European contribution to the Alliance and to close cooperation between NATO and WEU. 66 • ESDI lo be developed within NATO. • Regular joint meetings of NAC and WEU Council. • Potential availability, case by case of NATO assets and capabilities to support a WEU-led operation. • Mechanisms for releasing and returning NATO assets and capabilities and monitoring their use. • Close consultation between NATO and WEU on planning and conduct of WEU-led operation involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities. • Requirements for WEU-led operations to be taken into account in NATO's defence planning system. • NATO's command structure to be able to provide H.Q. elements and command positions to command and conduct WEU-led operations • Planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions to be conducted by NATO at request of, and in coordination with, WEU." The further impetus by Heads of State and Government at NATO's Madrid Summit on July, 1997, gave the Europeans more clout in Alliance decision making and provided the WEU the tools it needed to carry out its own missions. The ESDI formula endorsed by Alliance leaders in Madrid includes: • NATO's full support for the development of ESDI within NATO by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations; • Providing for the support of WEU; • Led operations as an element of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept; 67 • Provision wilhin ihe fuUuc new comimuul slnicluro for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operation; • Creation of forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU; • Arrangement for the identifications of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU- led operations and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of such operations; • Commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management , including through joint consultations; • Strengthening of the institutional cooperation between the two organisations; • Involving WEU in NATO's defence planning processes/'^ The European Union's efforts to develop a credible, autonomous European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) were concretized with the launch at the France-British Summit at St Malo, France in December 1998 of ESDI. It has been the top defence policy priority for many European members of NATO for the past several years. New, EU-based security organisations-a Political and Security Committee, a European Military Staff-have been set-up in Brussels, and the Union is developing its 'head line goal' force of 60,000 troops, capable of being deployed with 60 days notice and sustained on mission for at least a year.**^ In November 2000, when European governments individually pledged to put up enough troops, aircraft and warships to enable a 60,000 strong force to begin operating over a wide range of missions from 2003.The largest contributor to the force will be Germany, which has pledged 13,500 ground troops, while the UK has committed 12,500 and France 12,000. Italy and Spain will each contribute 68 upto 6,000 and the Dutch 5000. Other contributions range from Greece's 3500 to Luxembourg's 100 of the 15 EU nations, only Denmark has declined to take part. The new 100-strong EU military Staff will be in place in Brussels by early 2001 under its first Director of Military Staff German Army Lt Gen Klaus Schuwirth.*** However, General Gustav Hugglund, the EU's military chief, said in January ,2002, the 60,000 strong rapid reaction force would launch its first exercises in May,2002 but he admitted it would be another 10 years before it could carry out "all operations'/* Lord Robertson, the Secretary General of NATO quoted Mr. Jovier Solana-Chief of the proposed common European defence and foreign policy assignment who wrote recently . "If NATO and the US want to tackle the crises, all the better. But if the US does not engage, as we saw in the Balkans from 1991, to 1995, someone else may need to , it is better for our over all security, if we Europeans can do so effectively. "Hence he argued that "Europe would have to ask the United States to do something they feel reluctant about, and the United States and NATO would be dragged into operations simply for lack of alternative".'** The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was introduced by US Secretary of Defence William Cohen in 1998 and formally accepted at April 1999's Washington Summit. The DCI, which according to one NATO official, is "to direct national plans increasingly to NATO priorities" address five areas: mobility; sustainability; precision engagement, command, control and communications (C*); and survivability."^ NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) has provided a sharp focus for nations to improve capabilities in critical areas. On a list of 59 action items, adopted at Washington on March 1999, only a few are in a 69 stage of being "nearly or fully implemented." These include resource implementations for joint logistical centres; requirements for multinational logistic formations; interoperability though standardisation; national exercise programmes; concept development and experimentation; NATO policy on training; evaluation and exercises; clearing house mechanism for multinational formations; exercises for multi-national forces lo promote command and control procedures and common (hjclrinc ; and the need for a wide-Area Net work. Another 23 DCl action items were said to be showing "Significant progress as given by the heads of state and government. However, other DCI areas, mostly supporting key improvements in "effective engagement " and "survivability of forces and infrastructure work either started late, move studies needing to be completed before further activities can be launched or, progress depends on procurement of resources not forthcoming. Examples include capabilities against weapons of mass destruction; suppression of enemy air defence and support jamming; combat identifications system; and nuclear, biological and chemical protection and detection means. NATO's Prague 2002 Summit, decided to consider 27 of the 59 action items as candidates for either multinational, joint or common NATO funding. Of those, only 15 were found to be promising, including sealift and airlift, co-operative approaches to logistic stocks, precision-guided munitions, combat identification, sea-mine protection equipment and tactical communications, air-ground battlefield surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance systems and unmanned air vehicles,**" 70 REFERENCES 1. Hans Gunler Brauch, "Nuclear Disarmament Prospects for Europe in the 1990s: Political Change and the future Role of Nuclear Weapons", In "Nuclear weapons in a changing Europe", eds Vilho Harle and Pekka Sivonen, Pinter Publishers Limited, London, 1991, PP-161-162. 2. Peter H. Merkl, "German Unification in the European Context," The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1993, p,313. 3. Elisabeth Dureau, "Defence in the construction of European: The Stakes of Security and Problems of Cooperation", in "National Identity and Regional Cooperation Experiences of European Integration and South Asia Perceptions", eds. H.S. Chopra, Robert Frank, Jurgen Schroder, in collaboration with Bruno Dorin, Gerl W. Kueck, Ajay Kumar Jain for Manohar Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi , 1999, p.231. 4. Henry A. Kissinger, "A Plan For Europe, "Newsweek, June 18,1990, Volume CXV, Number 25, p.24. 5. Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Implications of German Unification", in "The New Germany and the new Europe", ed. Paul B.Stares, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1992, p.268. 6. Karl Kaiser, "Forty Years of German Membership in NATO", NATO Review, July 1995, Volume 43, Number 4,p.6. 7. John Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping", NATO Review, June 1993 Volume-4, Number 3, pp.16-17. 8. Ibid, p. 18. 9. Ivo H.Daalder and James M.Goldgeier, "Putting Europe First", Survival, Spring 2001, Volume- 43, Number-1, p.81. 71 10. Malcolm Rifkind, "Need for an Atlantic Community to belter reflect US- European Relations"? NATO Review, March 1995, Volume 43, Number-2, pp.11-12. 11. Lt. General Nicholas Kehoe, "Sustaining a Vibrant Alliance," NATO Review, Summer 1998, Number- 2, Volume 46, p.13. 12. Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What is NATO for?", Survival, Winter 2001, Volume-43, Number -4, p.115. 13. Robert Weaver, "NACC's five years of Strengthening Cooperation," NATO Review, May-June 1997, Volume-45, Number -3, p.24. 14.Manfred Gorlemaker, "Unifying Germany 1989-1990", St.Martin's Press, Inc., New York,1994, p.226. 15.Warren Christopher, "Towards a NATO Summit", NATO Review, August 1993, Volume-41, Number-4, p.15. 16. Op. Cit. no. 12, p.m. 17. Bruce W. Nelan, "NATO Plus the Three", Time, July 14, 1997, Volume 149, Number -28, p.34. 18. Yuzuru Kaneko, "The birth of a new NATO, NIDS Security Reports ; No.l (March 2000), National institute for Defence Studies (NIDS), Tokyo, p.85. 19. Eve Conant, "His big gamble," Newsweek, October 22, 2001, Volume CXXXVIII, Number 17, p.44. 20.Karsten Voigt, "NATO Enlargement: Sustaining the Momentum", NATO Review, March 1996, Volume 44, Number -2, p.20. 21. Shaun R. Gregory, "Nuclear Command and Control in NATO Nuclear Weapons Operation and the Strategy of Flexible Response", Macmillan Press LTD, Houndmills, 1996, p. 196. 72 22. Fareed Zakaria, "Could Russia Join the West? "Newsweek, June 25, 2001, Volume CXXXVII, Number 26, p.13. 23. Arthur D. Rachwald, "NATO Hopes and Frustrations", in "Transition to Democracy in Poland," ed. Richard F. Slaar, Macmillan Press LTD, Houndmills, 1998, pp.276-277. 24. Zafar Imam, "Foreign Policy of Russia 1991-2000", New Horizon Publishers, New Delhi, April 2001, p.17. 25. Gebhardt Von Moltke, "Building a Partnership for Peace," NATO Review, June 1994, Volume -42, Number 3, p.4. 26. Werner Bauwens, Bruno Coppieters, Brono De Cordier and Firouzeh Nahayandy, "The Central Asian Region in a New International Environment", NATO Review , September 1996, Volume -44, Number -5, p.29. 27. Robert E Hunter, "Enlargement Part of a Strategy for Stability into Central Europe, "NATO Review, May 1995, Volume-43, Number-3, , p.5. 28. Sergio Balanzino, "A year after Sintra;Achieving Cooper ative Security Through the EAPC and PfP", NATO Review, Autumn, 1998, Volume-46,Number 3,p.6. 29. Rob de Wijk, "Towards a New Political Strategy for NATO," NATO Review, Summer 1998, Volume- 46, Number -2, p. 16. 30. Barak Akcapar, "PfP Training Centres: Improving Training and Education in Partnership for Peace", NATO Review, Autumn 1999, Volume-47, Number -3, p.31. 31. Ibid, p.32. 32. Op. Cit. no. 23, p.278. 33. John Cherian "Eastward March, "Yeltsin's about-turn on NATO expansion", Frontline, June 27, 1997, Volume-14, Number -12, p.48. 34. Op. Cit. no. 18, p.90. 73 35. Op. Cit. no. 33, p.49. 36. Op. Cit. no. 17, p.32. 37. Klaus-Peter Klaiber, "The Membership Action Plan", NATO Review, Summer 1999, Volume-47, No. 7, p.24. 3B. Javier Solatia,"Open Doors, "Time for Special Issue: Vision ol Europe, Winter 1998-1999, editor James Geary, p.55. 39. Eduard Shevardnadze, "Georgia's Security Outlook", NATO Review, August 1993, Volume- 41, Number-4, p.7. 40. Luke Hill with Alexander Golts, "Despite Russia's Co operation In the Campaign Against Terrorism, NATO is Reticent about President Vladimir Putin's Vision of a Western Nations Club?," Jane's Defence Weekly, November 2001, Volume-36, Number 19, p.21. 41. Op. Cit. no. 9, p.83. 42. "To Russia for love". The Economist, May 18th,2002, Volume 363, Number 8273, p.11. 43. John Cherian,"Changing Course", Frontline, June 21,2002, Volume-19, Number-12, p. 51. 44. Christian Caryland and Michael Meyer, "The Bush and Putin Encore", Newsweek, May 27,2002, Volume-CXXXIX, Number - 21, p.36. 45. Najam Rafique, "NATO's expanding Role and its implications for South Asia", Strategic Studies, Spring 2004, Volume: XXIV, no.l, p.42. 46. Hu Qianghong, "A preliminary Analysis of NATO's Trends Around Its Istanbul Summit," International Strategic Studies, 4" Issue, 2004, p.50. 47. Siddharth Varadarajan , "NATO's New Strategic Concept", Time of India, Monday, May 10,1999, p-12. 74 48. Gregory L.Schulte, "Responding to Proliferation, NATO's Role," NATO Review, July 1995, Volume- 43, Number-4, p.16. 49. Luke Hill, "NATO Spells out Strategic Against Terrorism", Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 June 2002, Volume-37, Number- 25, p-5. 50. Crispin Hain-Cole, "The Summit Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Rationale And Aims", NATO Review, Summer 1999, Volume - 47, Number 20, pp. 33-34. 51. Javier Solana, "Preparing for the Madrid Summit", NATO Review, January 1997, Volume -45, Number 2, p.5. 52. Jette Nordam, "The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and Building Confidence", NATO Review, July- August 1997, Volume -45, Number-4, p.26-27. 53. Alberto Bin, "Strengthening Cooperation in the Mediterranean: NATO's contribution". NATO Review, Winter 1998, Volume- 46,Number-4, p.26. 54. Lt.General Dr. Hartmul Olboeter, "A New College For a New NATO", NATO Review, Autumn 1999, Volume -47, Number-3, p.28. 55. Rob De Wijk, "Is the fundamental nature of the transatlanlic security relationship changing ?', NATO Review, spring 2001, Volume 49, p. 16. 56. Willy Claes, "NATO and the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture", NATO Review, December 1994-January 1995, Number 6 Dec.94/Number-1 Jan 95, Volume- 42, p-6 57. Lt. General Mario da Silva, "Implementing the combined Joint Task Force Concept", NATO Review, Winter 1998, Volume 46, Number-4, p.16. 75 58. Erik Deryeke, "Belgium's conlribulion lo securily in llic Euro-Atlantic area", NATO Review, November 1996, Volume - 44,Number 6, p.4. 59. Anthony Cragg, "The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: a key component of the Alliance 's adaptation ", NATO Review, July 1996, Volume-44, Number -4, p-8. 60. Les Aspin, "New Europe, New NATO", NATO Review, February 1994, Volume 41, Number-1, p.14, 61. Anthony Cragg, "Internal adaptation Reshaping NATO lor the challenges of tomorrow", NATO Review, July-August 1997, Volume-45, Number-4, p-34. 62. Lluis Maria de Puig, "The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO", NATO Review, Summer 1998, Volume- 46, Number 2, p. 6-7. 63. Philip H.Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", Survival, Winter-2001, Volume-43, Number 4, p. 68. 64. Jac Lewis, "Europe moves forward with rapid reaction force", Jane's Defence weekly, 29 November 2000, Volume-34, Number -22, p.4. 65. "Portuguese Crises first test of single currency". The Hindu, New Delhi, January 2 7, 2002, p. 10. 66. Batuk Gathani, "E.U. Army, NATO have common goals", The Hindu, New Delhi, November 22,2000, p. 10. 67. Sharon Hobson, "NATO allies agree need to upgrade capability", Jane's Defence weekly, 29 September 1999,Volume-32, Number -13, p. 3. 68. Luke Hill, "NATO Initiative progress lags," Jane's Defence Weekly, SO"" May 2001, Volume 35, Number -22, p. 2. 76 .vi^"' /r.- ^'^^4 CHAPTER - 3 Role Of NATO In Bosnian Crisis 1. The Background of the Bosnia and Herzegovina The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed pari of the Turkish (Ottoman) Empire for almost 400 years before annexation to the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878, On 4" December 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were proclaimed when the Serbs and Croats agreed with ethnic groups to establish a common state under the Serbian monarchy, and in January 1929 King Alexander imposed a dictatorship, changing the name of the country to Yougoslavia. Though officially banned in 1921, the Communist Part of Yugoslavia (CPY) operated clandestinely, and in 1937 Josep Broz (alias Tito) became the General Secretary of the CPY. During the second World War, Tito's Partisans, who were from a variety of ethnic groups and were united by ideology rather than ethnicity, dominated most of Bosnia and Herzegovina, simultaneously waging war against invading German and Italian troops, the 'Ustasa' regime in Croatia and the Serb-dominated 'Chetniks'. On Tito's victory, after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina was made a constituent republic of the Yugoslav federation (despite Serbian pressure to limit the region to provincial status).^ The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed on 29 November 1945. A Soviet-type Constitution, establishing a federation of six republics (Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina was adopted in 77 January 1946.'^ The death of Tilo and ihe collapse of Commuiiisl rule destroyed the fabric which has held the country together. The federal system, which balanced power between the large republics, slowly broke down, and the newly elected nationalist leaders in Croatia and Serbia set the course which led to war. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (formerly the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was situated in South-eastern Europe. It was bounded by Croatia to the north and West, by Serbia to the east and by Montenegro to the South-east. The Muslims (the majority of whom belonged to the Sunni sect) were the largest religious grouping in Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprising 43.7% of the population in 1991. Religions affiliation was roughly equaled with ethnicity, the Serbs (31.4% of the population) belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Croats (17.3%) being members of the Roman Catholic Church,^ In the republican election in November and December 1990, The ruling League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina was ousted, and the three main parties to emerge were all nationalist: the Muslim (Bosniak) of the Party of Democratic Action (PDA), with 86 Seats; the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP), with 72 seats; and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CDU-BH), an affiliate of the ruling CDU party of Croatia, with 44 seats. On 20 December 1990 they announced that Dr. Alija Izetbegovic of the PDA was to be President of the Presidency, Jure Pelivan of the CDU-BH was to be President of the Executive Council (Prime Minister) and Momcilo Krajisnik of the SDP was to be President of the Assembly." 78 In 1991 the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina were increasingly dominated by the Serb-Croat conflict. Following the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June, Serb-dominated territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina decJiircd their intent to remain within the Yugoslav federation (or in a 'Greater Serbia'). On 9-10 November 1991 the referendum of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Serbs overwhelming supported their remaining in a Yugoslav or Serb State. However, in another referendum held on 29' February and 1" March 1992, which was open to all ethnic groups but was boycotted by the Serbs, 99.4% of the 63% of the electorate who participated, were in favour of full independence. President Izetbegovic immediately declared the republic's independence and omitted the word 'socialist' from the new state's official title. When Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence and appealed for international recognition. Macedonia had no choice but to follow suit. Otherwise it would have been swallowed up by Serbia. The European Community (EC, now European Union - EU) and USA recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence on 7' April 1992. On 27' March the Serbs announced the formation of a 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which comprised Serbian-held area of the republic (about 65% of the total area), which was to be headed by Dr. Radovan Karadzic' On June 1992, Francois Mitterrand visited Sarajevo. The French President's trip galvanized humanitarian relief efforts in Sarajevo. Until the visit. Western leadership had been in a stupor. NATO declined a large role; the EC, riven by dissent and discouraged by its inability to make a cease-fire stick, more or less 79 gave up; the United Stales talked tough but refused to ad unilaterally. ' On July 1992 there was a major development in the Bosnian conflict, when a breakaway Croat state, 'The Croatian Union of Herzeg-Bosna', was declared. The new state covered about 30% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was headed by Mate Boban. Izetbegovic's Government promptly declared it illegal, and Karadzic proposed Serbs and Croats partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina among themselves. The United Nations slarletl dispatching United Nations Protection Force - 'UNPROFOR' lo Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-July 1992, and it had imposed the 'no fly zone' on Bosnian airspace in October of the same year. 2. THE ROLE OF NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1992-93) NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Norway on June 1992, approved for the first time the formation of a force that could be used outside the territory of the alliance states. Finally, impelled by scenes of civilian slaughter in Sarajevo, the U.S. and its European allies went to work on June, 1992 to impose economic sanctions on Serbia. NATO stated its readiness to provide support to peace operations under the auspices of the UN Security Council. So NATO adopted a series of critical decisions leading to NATO naval and air force operations. In June 1992 NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft, began monitoring operations in the Adriatic. NATO undertook these operations independently in support of the UN arms embargo against all republics of the formers Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 'FRY' (resolution 713) and sanctions against FRY (resolution 757). They also established full control of the Yugoslav coast. According to NATO reports, since 80 November 1992, 63,000 vessel were inspected, and after April 1993 no ship managed to break the barrier and violate the embargo, additionally tightened by resolution 820.' In July 1992, Washington scnl conClicling signals. First il ordered a naval task force, including 2,200 marines, into the Adriatic Sea off the coast of Yugoslavia. Then, apparently satisfied that the Serbs took the point, Washington sent the ships to liberty ports in Italy and Greece for the Fourth of July weekend. The U.S. restricted itself to sending in supplies into Sarajevo abroad airforce C-130, transport planes transport and threatening air and naval action if the Serbs interfered. So the first two flights into Sarajevo completed safely, and there were contingency plans for retaliation of something went wrong later on. NATO began enforcing the 'no-fly' zone over Bosnia- Herzegovina on 12' April 1993. The Alliance's action, which was being pursued under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 816, was decided by the North Atlantic Council on 8" April 1993. * NATO airborne warning and control planes were monitoring the 'no-fly' zone established by the Security Council over Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1992, and since April 1993, fighter and reconnaissance planes of NATO member states, now numbering some 100, were providing the teeth to enhance the Council's interdiction on military flights. And, since July 1993, as a further precedent, member states operating in the NATO framework had been providing protective air cover (or UNPROFOR troops operating on the ground to deter attacks against the 'Safe areas' established by the Security Council.'' Srebrenica was the first town to be adopted as a safe area in April 1993. The next June this formula was applied to another five areas, namely Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa.'" According lo Bosnian governmenl sources uplo July 1993, Uir war in Bosnia alone had cost 139,000 dead and missing; 68,000 seriously wounded; 3 million refugees; 38 towns substantially destroyed; 800 mosques demolished; 200 Churches destroyed; 3 million people without power; 2.5 million people without water. The Bosnian forces, which included Serbs and Croats as well as Muslims, now controlled only 10%of the land and were desperately seeking Western military intervention lo reverse the Serbian tide.^" In March, 1993, without firing a single shot, America had intervened in Bosnia. Bill Clinton's decision to parachute food and medicine to besieged eastern villages moved the United States a critical step deeper into the Balkan crisis if only by talking the lead in providing humanitarian aid. In fact, despite backing from allies, the United Slates ended-up acting alone: with the exception of Turkey and the Netherlands, NATO members declined to offer planes or supplies.^' Containing the conflict in the Bosnian area was one of the prime goals of President Clinton. The constrict and contain option was a hash of measures already in place. It preserved the no-fly zone and sanctions against Serbia and renewed the threat of a war-crimes tribunal. In addition, it aimed to :- • Press Serbia to accept U.N. monitors or troops along with Serbia-Bosnia border to police Belgrade's blockade of Bosnian Serb territory, and to place monitors on the Bosnia- Croatia border. • Threaten Croatia with sanctions unless it cuts off support to Bosnian Croats. This new option also raised fresh suspicious that the West was implicitly ratifying the process of "ethnic cleansing". The first cracks in the alliance were French made. Foreign Minister of 82 France, Alain Juppe criticized Washington's minimalism, citing its continued refusal to commit ground forces to a United Nations contingent and its unwillingness to use air power to protect the Muslims. Italy was next, apparently miffed that it wasn't consulted. Then Germany and Turkey weighted in with objections on moral grounds, arguing that they ratified Serbian aggression. ^ Lastly, in June 1993 the United Stated began deploying 300 troops to join a 700-strong U.N. peacekeeping force already in Macedonia. The force was supposed to be a tripwire, though after Clinton's cave-in over Bosnia, it was not clear that the Serbs would be deterred from attacking," In August 1993's attacks on U.N. troops in Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs - at the Olympic Stadium and T.V. Station-the allies seemed willing to help this time. Washington called a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing political body, to determine when and how airstrikes would be launched from Aviano, the Italian air base. Among the possible targets: Serbian artillery batteries and ammunition dumps, transport depots and routes, command-and-control centers and bridges over the Drina river. A demilitarised zone had been established on Mt. Igman in August 1993, when Bosnian Government forces were in full retreat from the Bosnian Serbs. Following an ultimatum from NATO to the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Mt. Igman, an agreement was negotiated on 14 August 1993 by Gen. Briquenmont for all forces to be withdrawn from the region." On 6 October 1993, a Bosnian Army patrol crossed the demilitarised zone and killed 20 Serbian soldiers. The NATO's position regarding the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Army, which was in permanent violation of the NATO ultimatum covering the demilitarised zone on Mt. Igman. NATO was not prepared to carry out airstrikes against the Bosnian 83 Army merely because they were in the demililarised zone in violation of the NATO ultimatum. For the first time it was being officially told that NATO had taken sides in the war/" In the same month, President Bill Clinton once again warned of possible airstrikes on Serbian positions in the hills around Sarajevo. The Serbs, who on October 16, 1993 gave the city its worst one-day drubbing in at least three months. 3. THE ROLE OF NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1994 At the moment, NATO air forces were operating in support of UNPROFOR whose ground operations were essentially humanitarian in nature, while the highly effective maritime embargo had been mounted in conjunction with the WEU to support the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 820. The reality was that NATO integrated forces made the largest single contribution to the international effort in former Yugoslavia. Excluding forces serving directly under UN Command, there were now over 100 aircraft, more than a dozen highly capable ships and some 10,000 men and women from Alliance nations conducting NATO integrated maritime and air operations in support of the United Nations effort, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In addition, a further 15,000 personnel were contributed directly by Alliance nations to UNPROFOR operations. Thus out of a total of approximately 34,000 personnel now committed in support of UN operations associated with the former Yugoslavia, about 25,000 - that was about three quarters of them - came directly or via the Alliance from NATO nations.'" In January, 1994, once again NATO repeated its threats of airstrikes against the Serbs if they didn't let up. The Serbs continued a bombardment heavier that any in the war so far. "Sarajevans will not be counting the dead", Bosnian Serb leader 84 Radovan Karadzic cawed in a speech to his rump parliament in January. "They will be counting the living". "" The Serbs had been threatened so many times with so little alliance follow up-more than 1,000 violations of the no-fly zone over Bosnia had gone unchallenged." When a Serb shell killed 68 people and wounded an additional 200 in February 1994, NATO established a 20.12 KM heavy weapons - exclusion zone around the city of Sarajevo and forced the Serbs to put their guns under U.IN. Control. Il was decided that, ten days from 2400 GMT 10 February 1994, heavy weapons of any of the parties founded within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless controlled by UNPROFOR, would, along with their direct and essential military support facilities, be subjected to NATO airstrikes which would be conducted in close coordination with the UN Security Council and would be consistent with the North Atlantic Council's decisions of 2 and 9 Augustl993.''^ In February, 1994, NATO was satisfied that virtually all heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo had either been withdrawn or placed under effective UNPROFOR control. NATO's objectives set on9 February were now being met. Diplomacy could succeed when il was backed by credible actions. The solidarity and resolve of this Alliance had borne fruit.''* In March, 1994, six Serbian Jastreh ground-attack fighters left Banja Luka on a bombing mission to the Muslim munitions depot at Novi Travnik. Two U.S. Air Force F-16s, patrolling the no-fly zone over Bosnia, ordered the jets to descend; when their warnings were ignored, they shot down four of the Jaslrebs in what amounted to NATO's first military action in its 45- year history.•'^' It was in March, 1994 also in Washington Bosnian and Croatian leaders signed two documents to establish a Bosnian 85 ftuleralion and link lo Croatia. The federation agreements was holl) complex and incomplete. It provided for a merger of the Croat and Muslim areas of Bosnia under a strong central government and for a system of cantons with their own legislatures and courts. Within weeks after the Croat formed the federation with Bosnia planeloads of Iranian arms began arriving at Zagreb airport, waiting for shipment over the border to the weapons starved Muslims. John Kenneth Galbraith, the first U.S. ambassador to Croatia, his role in permitting Iranian arms to be sold to the Bosnian Muslims, not withstanding a U.N. arms embargo, Galbraith convinced Franjo Tudjman (Croatian President) that the road to favor in Washington was through friendship with Sarajevo.' A three-week assault by Serbs during April 1994, turned Gorazde into a slaughter house, leaving more than 700 people dead and more than 1,900 wounded. NATO threatened the Bosnian Serbs with immediate airstrikes if they continued to attack Gorazde, giving them 24 hours to withdraw 1.9 miles from the centre of the town, and five days to pull back heavy weapons beyond a 12.4 mile exclusion zone.*' By Friday, April 15, 1994, Serb forces had moved artillery and armored vehicles into surrounding hills and pounded away at city of 65,000 civilians with howitzers, and mortars and tank cannons. On Saturday, April 16, 1994, afternoon, as Bosnian radio reported fretfully that tanks were rolling through Gorazde and firing into residential areas, NATO dispatched six planes to search for a Serb tank lobbing shells into Gorazde from the city's outskirts. Bad weather forced the planes back, but not before a surface-to-air missile launched by the Serbs downed a British Sea Harrier Jet.'" The Bosnian Serbs wanted to just say no. They did not intend to accept the U.S. - European proposal for partitioning war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina. The map was the heart of last-ditch peace 86 effort offered by the so-called Contact Group of the U.S., Russia, Britain, France and Germany. When the proposal was presented to the Muslim-led Bosnian government and the Serb rebels on July 6, 1994, it came with a ultimatum: if they turned it down, they would be punished. The Bosnian government signed on without conditions. But the Serbs, who never met a peace plan they liked, with called the bluff. The Bosnian Serbs, also viewed the 49% share they were allotted as too small, their troops had already captured 72% of the country.*' In August, 1994, NATO aircraft conducted airstrikes at request of UNPROFOR, NATO aircraft attacked a target within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone on the afternoon of Friday, (5 August, 1994). The Strikes were ordered following agreement between NATO and UNPROFOR, after weapons were seized by Bosnian Serbs from a weapons collection site near Sarajevo early ihul morning. The Serbs in the zone brushed aside U.N. troops in the suburb of Ilidza and took back a T-55 lank, two armored personnel carriers and a mobile gun and shot at a U.N. helicopter trailing their escape. At this provocation, the United Nations asked NATO to strike. Two U.S. 'A-10 Warthogs' soon found an M-18 mobile "tank buster" cannon 14 kilometers outside Sarajevo and chewed it to pieces in seconds with their 30 MM Machine guns. Russia, which had opposed such action in the past, promptly blamed the Serbs for provoking it. Earlier in the week the rebel's longtime patron, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, slammed their borders shut and even cut off their phones, furious over their final refusal lo accept the peace plan devised weeks ago by the joint Western Russian Contact Group."'' On Thursday night (September 18, 1994) that NATO planes had struck again on the outskirts of Sarajevo. NATO fighter-bombers hit Bosnian Serb positions near the capital for the fourth time since February in retaliation for attacks on U.N. 87 forces. The planes struck a Bosnian Serb position 11.3 km west of Sarajevo, destroying a tank. The NATO action was authorized by Yasushi Akashi, the top U.N. official in the former Yugoslavia, after two French soldiers were wounded, one seriously, in four separate attacks. The peacekeepers had placed themselves between opposing Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government troops, when heavy fighting broke out on September 18, in the Sarajevo suburb of Sedrenik.*"* Once again, NATO had bombed an obsolete Serb tank on September 22, 1994, in an attempt to enforce the breached heavy- weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, the Serbs quickly stopped all aid convoys.** In the course of two weeks, for the first time in 31 months of war, the Bosnian government forces had retaken some 150 sq. km. of territory from the Serbs near Bihac in the north, made significant gains around strategic Mount Igman overlooking the capital of Sarajevo and recaptured the town of Kupres and perhaps an additional 100 sq. km. in central Bosnia. '' After the two Serbian jets bombed Bihac and the centre of the nearby two of Cazin. On Saturday (November 19, 1994), the U.N. Security Council voted to permit NATO airstrikes into Croatia, forcing NATO officials to confer nervously on how to put the resolution into effect. On Monday (November 21, 1994), 39 allied planes repaid Croatian Serbs for using napalm and cluster bombs against civilians in Bihac a so-called "safe area" in northwest Bosnia-by cratering an airbase in Udbina. "Clearly the signal had been sent", said Adm. Leighton Smith, commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe. Problem was, the Serbs didn't get it: they responded by repairing the runway, pressing their attack on the besieged enclave and firing on a couple of patrolling British jets. On Wednesday (November 23, 1994), more than 50 NATO aircraft hit three Serbian missile sites. In return, the Serbs took 250 U.N. soldiers hostage, and moved lo 88 within a half - mile of Bihac, where they rained shells on 45,000 apartment dwellers, 20,000 refugees and the hundreds of mostly unarmed Bangladeshi U.N. troops. On Friday (November 25, 1994) NATO planes set off to pound the offending artillery pieces, but failed to find them. At a NATO meeting in Brussels, the U.S. proposed creating a weapons-exclusion zone around Bihac, like the one around Sarajevo, from which all artillery and tanks would have to be withdrawn. For the French and British, it was typical American naivete. Exclusion zones need ground troops to monitor the terrain, take weaponry into holding areas and report violations. The U.S. suggested policing the proposed zone with aircraft. The allies again d no. 49 4.THE ROLE OF NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1995 The United Nations embargo on arms shipments to Bosnia was full of holes. Of 24,200 vessels challenged by NATO warship in the Adriatic Sea over the past two years, only three were found to contain military contraband intended for Bosnia. Arms and ammunition filtered into the beleaguered country on other routes: by air from Muslim supporter such as Turkey or Iran and over land from Croatia, Bosnia's new - ally. Tanks and heavy weapons were harder to smuggle, but even they were beginning to show up on the Bosnian side of the lines.*" On May7, 1995, a Bosnian Serb shell killed 11 people in a Sarajevo suburb. The next day Bill Clinton asked Anthony Lake, his national security advisor, to persuade the allies to strike back. Soon after the attack Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith, the U.N. commander in Bosnia, requested airstrikes, but was overruled by his civilian counterpart in the U.N. mission, Yasushi Akashi."^' The Serbs had 89 already been shelling the Bosnian capital from inside the zone, breaking the February 1994, agreement. The Serbs made the nose; thumbing official by brassily pulling three artillery pieces and a mortar out of U,N. impoundment depot, firing them at Sarajevo and ignoring a U.N. - NATO ultimatum to hand them back. This time, that was too much even for Yasushi Akashi; the top U.N. Official in Bosnia. He had vetoed several previous requests by local U.N. commanders for bombing strikes, but this time he approved one. It came on Thursday (June 1, 1995) and was more than the usual pinprick: a squadron of 15 NATO planes flying out of Italy-Mostly American-bombed ammunition dumps just outside Pale, the Bosnian Serb's so called capital. The Serbs retaliated by shelling five to the six U.N. - established "safe zone" in Bosnia, killing 76 people.^ On Friday (June 2, 1995), a U.S. Air Force F-16 had been shol down over the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka.' After using tanks to drive Dutch peacekeepers out of their observation posts and taking several of them hostage, the Serbs drew up less than a Kilometer from Srebrenica. On Monday (July 10, 1995), Bosnian Serb Gen. Ratko Mladic issued his ultimatum: the population of the enclave and the 400-man Dutch battalion must leave. Throughout the day, fighting had been going on all over the area between Serbs and some 4,000 lightly armed Bosnian government troops; one Dutch peacekeeper was killed at a Bosnian roadblock. Serbs had already entered Srebrenica when NATO planes, finally called in for support, dropped their first bombs-500 pounders (225 kg) aimed at two tanks. That prompted the Serbs to threaten to kill the Dutch soldier they had captured and to shell the crowds of refugees already heading for the Dutch battalion's base at Potocari." Srebrenica enclave fell on July 11, 1995. The relief workers and war-crimes investigators suggested that civilians in 90 Srebrenica around 6,000 to 9,000 men were killed by the Serbs." The war in Bosnia flared like a midsummer forest fire, defying the West's wavering attempts to contain it. On Friday, July 21, 1995, the NATO allies announced a bold new plan to deter Serb aggression. In the days that followed this call to arms. Gen. Kalko Mladic, the commander of the rebel Bosnia Serbs seized and "ethnically cleansed" one "safe area", Zepa, and intensified a brutal assault of another, Bihac. By Tuesday, July 25, 1995, Bosnian Serbs finally occupied the eastern enclave of Zepa, which they had been attacking since June, and promptly ejected 5,000 women, children and old men because they were Muslim. ^ "There are only 69-Ukrainians there," said a senior NATO official. "And half of them are drunk". The U.N. troops fired warning shots-not at the Serbs, but to warn Muslim Civilians of the Serb advance. This time, when the attackers closed in on the enclave, they reportedly left their tanks and artillery outside the town limits. "They are leaving them outside because they don't want to suffer and more bad press", said the NATO official.*' The Croats helped out the Bosnian Muslims and took two towns in Bosnia controlled by the Serbs. Following that action, the Croats seemed to gear up for a full scale offensive to retake Krajina from the Serbs. On Friday (August 11, 1995), A Danish Soldier was killed and two poles were wounded when Croatian units began shelling several U.N. observation posts, two more peacekeepers, both Czech, had been killed, and more than 90 U.N. soldiers had been detained by the Croats. There was no immediate allied military response to the attacks, French General Bernard Janvier, head of U.N. troops in the former Yugoslavia, pledged air support to U.N. peacekeepers who were coming under fire. A pair of U.S. Navy EA-6B warplanes demonstrated the allies' resolve at dust on Friday, when they unleashed a pair of missiles at a Serb missile battery near Knin.** France and Britain condemned the assault, while the U.S. and Germany all but applauded it." The Serbs finally provoked the Western allies in August 29, 1995, by firing a shell into a Sarajevo market, killing 38 civilians and triggering NATO's air Strikes. At 2 a.m. on Wednesday (August 30, 1995), the first wave of aircraft took off in the dark from NATO bases in Italy and the USS Theodore Roosevelt. They bombed Serbian airdefence inslallalioiis from Mostar to Gorazde to Tuzla, A second wave of F-18 and F-16 fighters and radar-jamming planes targeted ammunition depots and Serb command posts near Sarajevo. Succeeding waves on August 30, targeted Serb command posts and ammunition depots. NATO suspended bombing to look for French Pilots shot down near Pale. On August 31, NATO warplanes continued to strike targets around Sarajevo, hitting at least two ammunition dumps. Bad weather and low clouds prevented wider attacks. ' Over three successive days from Wednesday (August 30, 1995) to Friday (September 1, 1995), NATO conducted the largest combat operation in its history. American, French, British, Italian, Dutch, Spanish and Turkish Warplanes flew 500 missions from bases in Italy and aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. ' When Richard Holbooke landed in Belgrade on Wednesday (August 30, 1995), the bombs had already been dropping from nine hours, and he had no idea whether Milosevic would even agree to see him. However, Milosevic handed the American envoy a document signed by Bosnian Serb leaders, including Gen. Ratko Mladic and Patriarch Pavie of the Serbian Orthodox Church. "Look", said Milosevic "I now speak for Pale". The Serbian President did what he had boasted he could do he had 92 delivered the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table." The idea was to bring the warring parties in Bosnia closer together, and with some overt stage management, the U.S. accomplished it literally. When the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serb-led Yugoslavia arrived at the American mission in Geneva of Friday (September 11, 1995). All of them accepted the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its present borders, they also approved dividing il in some undefined way into "two entities", one a Bosnian Serb republic and the other the Muslim-Croat federation, 49% of Bosnia lo go to the Serbs and 51% to the existing federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Even as the diplomats put the final touches on their agreement, NATO warplanes were blasting Serb military targets in Bosnia for the second straight week. By Friday, (September 11, 1995), when the diplomats met in Geneva, NATO airforces had flown more than 2,000 sorties.*** For Holbrooke persuaded the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. Milosevic assured him he could force such an outcome. So NATO would halt the air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs moved some of their heavy weapons out of a 12.4 mile exclusion zone and the Bosnian Muslims refrained from the capital." On September 14, 1995, Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo and allow U.N. access, opened up the Sarajevo airport and one of two relief routes for the first time in months.'*'* NATO promptly put its airstrikes on hold and gave the Serbs three days-until Sunday (September 17, 1995) night - to begin fulfilling their promises. If they did so, the bombing pause would be extended for another three days to complete and verify the pullback.'"' The agreement, negotiated by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke in October, 1995, signed by Izetbegovic 93 and Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ralko Mladic, and witnessed by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, called for: • A comprehensive cease-fire lo commence al one minute after midnight (Tuedsay, October 5, 1995) and continue for 60 days or until completion of peace talks. • Restoration of gas and electricity to the besieged Bosnian Capital, Sarajevo. • Exchange of all prisoner of war. • Free passage of non-military traffic between Sarajevo and Gorazde, the Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia.' In Dayton, Ohio, on November 1995, where the President of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia were beginning negotiations aimed at ending the brutality of the war in Bosnia. Bosnia will be remained as a single state, with an equitable distribution of territory, free elections and democratic government. If peace is achieved, NATO must help secure it - and only NATO proven, strong, effective - can give the Bosnian people the breathing space they need to begin to reconcile and rebuild. One proposal was for Bosnia's new territories to be bordered by "zones of separation" that would provide a 2-KM wide buffer zone to keep opposing armies apart. There would also be "heavy- weapons-exclusion zones" to keep artillery, mortars and tanks an additional five miles from each side of the line. One task for the NATO troops would be maintaining those zones.^" In November 1995, NATO planners were also working flat- out. They seemed to have made a breakthrough-an agreement on the terms under which Russian troops would join the 60,000 person "implementation force" that was designed to oversee a peacedeal.^' 94 The overall commander of IFOR, U.S. Adm. Leighton Smith, would set up his headquarters in Sarajevo. The country would be divided into three sectors: The American, headquartered at Tuzla; the British, at Gornji Vakuf, and ; the French, at Sarajevo. A Russian contingent of roughly 3,000 men probably would deploy in American zone. IFOR troops would employ standard NATO rules of engagement, meaning that they can shoot first if they think they have to.'^ President Milosevic had agreed to give up the safe haven of Gorazde, connected by a corridor to Sarajevo. In return, Bosnian Muslim would give up Srebrenica and Zepa, and permitted a widening of the Posavina Corridor, which linked Serb-controlled Bosnian territories in the northwest and the northeast with each other and with Serbia. The settlement on Sarajevo not only turned the city over to the Muslim-Croat federation's administration but also ceded four Serb Suburbs. It would be a very tricky business for the Muslims and Croats to take control of them.^^ 5. The NATO's Role After the Dayton Agreement The Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska (RS) were created by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (commonly known as the "Dayton Accord") which ended the war. The Accord was signed on December 14, 1995 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." when the transfer of authority took place on 20 December 1995, from the commander of UN Peace Forces to the commander of IFOR, IFOR'S first priority was to establish a secure environment, in which that IFOR was indeed different from its predecessor, UNPROFOR-the United Nations Protection Force. This was accomplished within hours of transfer of authority by IFOR forces knocking down checkpoints and crossing 95 the former confrontation lines into Serb-held areas, areas in which UNPROFOR had not previously been allowed to venture."^ In Sarajevo, some 40 positions (20 Serb and 20 Bosniac) were evaluated and/or destroyed on D+7 that was seven days after transfer of authority; former warring faction forces removed all forces and weapons from the two-kilometer exclusion zone along the entire former line of confrontation and the checkpoints were removed." 60 days after the authority was transferred from the U,N. to NATO on December 1995. Some 2,500 transport flights, 50 ships and 380 trains moved over 200,000 tons of Cargo and nearly 40,000 troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina/" In January, 1996, an Italian sentry in Vogosca, Serb Sarajevo Suburb, was shot, apparently by a serb. In the move difficult British and French sectors - as had four of the five woundings of NATO troops by mines so far. In this month also, it forced a resolution of the most serious incident D-Day. Serbs in the heartline Sarajevo of Ilidza, which was not under French jurisdiction, abducted 16 Muslims traveling through llic area. NATO sent its top aides to visit the Serbs in Ilidza and read them the riot act. The 16 were quickly released.^'^ In February 1996, a NATO unit of commando from a U.S. Special Forces Blackhawk helicopter landed onto a snow-covered former skichatet 20 miles west of Sarajevo, in territory controlled by the Bosnian government. They stormed in. By the mission's end, they had arrested end, they had arrested 11 men suspected of being terrorists, three of them Iranians, the rest of them Bosnian Muslims. The commandos found a stunning array of sniper rifles, rocket- launchers and children's toys wired with plastic explosives - one a booby - trapped ice-cream cone. And NATO also discovered six similar outposts in Sarajevo, Zenica and Tuzla, the base of the American forces."" 96 IFOR's original mandate was to separate the warring parlies and take away their heavy weapons, arresting accused war criminals only "if they happened to bump into them," as a U.S. official put it. Already, NATO forces were paying more attention to war crimes. As many as 200 U.S. troops were assigned to protect investigators digging up mass graves near Srebrenica. Some 7,000 IFOR military engineers had repaired and maintained over 2,500 kilometers of roads, repaired and opened up airports, demined and repaired rail- lines; surveyed damaged power supplies and assisted local engineers with repairs, assisted in repairing water supply system and constructing new systems, and constructed or repaired over 60 bridges in the country. IFOR had a specialised group of about 350 personnel such as lawyers, educators, public transportations specialists, engineers, agriculture experts, economists, public health officials, veterinarians, communications experts and many others. These were part of a Civil-Military team, referred to as CIMIC, who provided technical advice and assistance to various commissions and working groups, and to parties, civil organizations and non-governmenlal organizations, IFOR units and local authorities."^ In July, 1996, war crimes investigators, guarded by NATO troops, began exhuming the mass graves of the victims, more than 60 bodies had been founded at a site called Cerska. when the Dayton accords that ended the fighting in Bosnia were signed, the national and municipal elections scheduled for September 14, 1996."' NATO deployed every available soldier to guard 4,000 polling places and in effect instructed troops to shoot anyone who tried to disrupt the process."' The world's most complicated election. Fifty-five parties were fielding 3,492 candidates for federal and regional offices, electing three ethnic presidents to a joint presidency, and a separate Serb 97 president, and two pair of parliamentary bodies, one for the Muslim-Croat federation and one for the Serb Republic. 4.1 IFOR support covered three areas: • Planning: A team of IFOR officers worked with the OSCE for some three months to assists in preparing the elections, assisted in selecting polling station sites, organizing local election commission. • Logistics: IFOR provided extensive air and ground transportation for OSCE officials, supervisors and observers. IFOR arranged for printing the massive voter registration list. Out-of-theatre, and then transported them to Bosnia. IFOR delivered election material to and from the 4,000 polling stations, including over 17,000 ballot boxes. • Security: On election day, IFOR conducted deterrent patrols for voters to cross the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, closely monitored the 19 recommended sites and established quick response teams. IFOR successfully completed its mission during its one-year mandate. At the end of 1996 a two-year civilian consolidation plan was drawn up in Paris and London. NATO foreign and Defence Ministers concluded that a reduced military presence had to maintained to provide the necessary stability for this plan to succeed. The result was the organization of a Stabilization Force, which was subsequently activated on 20 December 1996. The mission of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) was to deter fresh hostilities and to stabilize peace. The North Atlantic Council intended to review the force levels of SFOR periodically with a view to shifting the focus from stabilization to deterrence and completing the mission by 1998."" 98 During the first 100 days of its 18-month mission, the NATO- led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina: • Ensured continued compliance with the 1995 Peace Agreement; • Promoted freedom of movement throughout the country; • Confiscated and destroyed 3,147 unauthorised weapons; • Conducted over 1,600 weapons site inspections; • Monitored 900 training and movement activities; • Oversaw approximately 150 de-mining activities; • Directed the parties to the Agreement to reduce their weapons sites, by 25 percent and increase de-mining" Under IFOR, the Entity Armed Forces (EAF) were separated, their heavy weapons were put into cantonment sites, and their training was brought under IFOR control. SFOR continued to ensure thai the EAF remained in compliance with the mililaiy aspects of the Peace Agreement, SFOR patrolled a 1,400 KM- long Zone of Separation, all year in all weather conditions of cantonment sites - almost 450 inspections per month. SFOR was requiring the EAF to carry out their responsibilities for de-mining. Failure to carry out these de-mining activities could result in unit training bans. With SFOR encouragement the entities produced detailed plans for counler-mininj;; operations in 1997, and more than 20,000 mines and 1,100 other unexploded objects had been removed.''" In an effort to assist Bosnia to build confidence and mutual trust in the military sphere, NATO conducted a two-week course on international security for military and civilian defence officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The course was held from 23 June to 4 July 1997 at the NATO School in Oberammergua, Germany. A 99 lolal of 45 military officers and civilian officials participated Iroiii both the Federation and Republika Srpska and from all three ethnic groups in Bosnia.'" Until autumn 1997, the international community in Bosnia was obliged to tolerate the hale speech spewing from Srpska Radio-Televizija (SRI), the station controlled by Milosevic's poleges in Pale, Republika Srpska, just outside Sarajevo. On October 1, 1997, SFOR, troops intervened and seized four transmission towers.''^ Thanks to its action, SRT had now been put under international supervision and was being reoriented and restructured to conform to democratic standards of broadcasting. In August, 1997, British and Czech troops intervened in the northern city of Banja Luka, to clean out several nest of pro- Karadzic police. They confiscated 12 tons of weapons. In the same month, SFOR's announced a new policy for control and restructuring of paramilitary Special Police. SFOR's Operation SECURE BEAT was designed to ensure that these forces were disbanded or properly incorporated into the armed forces or civil police. On 10 November 1997, SFOR took military action to shut down a non-compliant Special Police unit in Doboj."* NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers, meeting in Brussels on December 1997, noted that "securing the peace over the long-term will all require further steps to promote confidence and cooperation among the armed forces of Bosnia and to encourage the development of democratic practices and central defence mechanisms". Accordingly, they endorsed an initial set of Security Cooperation Activities between NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to involve representation from both entities and all three ethnic groups. Building on the trail Security Cooperation Course conducted by NATO in June 1997, these activities would include additional such courses, seminars, visits and assessment of how NATO can assist 100 the Bosnian government's central defence institution, the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM). The aim of the Security Cooperation Activities is to contribute to regional stability by: • Promoting confidence and cooperation among the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and • Encouraging the development of democratic practice and central defence structures such as the SCMM. 6. NATO ON WAR CRIMINALS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA On 10 July 1997, during a daring operation, UK peacekeepers arrested one war crimes suspect, Milan Kovacevic, and killed another, Simo Drljaca. Kovacevic and, in particular their removal broke the cycle of impunity which had characterized the wars of Yugoslav dissolution." On 22 January, 1998, SFOR acted to detain Goran Jelisic, who was indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He had been indicted by the ICTY for the murder of more than 16 persons, torture, theft, plunder and ordering the murder of many others.'" The Alliance determined its commitment to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was reconfirmed by February 1998's, decision to continue SFOR's mission beyond its initial mandate which ended in June 1998. ' Simo Zaric surrendered himself voluntarily to SFOR on February 1998 and on 4 March 1998, Dragoljub Kunarac surrendered himself voluntarily to SFOR. They had been indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.'**" On 8 April, 1998, SFOR detained Miroslavkvocka and Mladeii Radio, who were indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.'"' On 28 May, 1998, SFOR detained Milojica Kos, who was indicted by the (ICTY) for grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, violations of the laws and crimes against humanity and command responsibility and on 15 101 June, 1998, SFOR detained Milorad Kronjelac indicted for war crimes by the ICTY. He was a commander of the KP DOM Prison camp. He was accused of beatings, murder, willful killing, and inhuman acts towards prisoners in this camp during the period of April 1992 until 1994."" On 22 July, 1998 SFOR detained two individuals who were believed to be indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.'" On 27 September 1998, SFOR detained Stevan Todorovic, indicted by the ICTY for war crimes committed while serving as the Chief of Police for Bosanski Samac between 13 June 1992 and 29 July 1992, and on 2 December 1998, SFOR detained General Radislav Krastic, who was indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.'"^ On Wednesday, December 2, 1998, NATO forces arrested the most senior Bosnian Serb military figure yet seized and within hours were preparing to send him to The Hague for trail by the ICTY on genocide and war crimes charges. Gen. Radislav Krastic was arrested in the sector of north Bosnia controlled by American troops as part of the NATO - led Stablization Force (SFOR).'"^ On April 3, 2000, NATO-led peacekeepers in Bosnia arrested Momcilo Krajisnik, an ally of the notorious former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. On 21 April 2000, SFOR peacekeepers arrested war crimes suspect Dragan Nikolic, and transferred him to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Haque. Nikolic was commander of the Susica detention camp and was accused of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.'"" On 25 June, 2000, Dusko Sikirica, was snatched in Bosnia by SFOR peacekeepers and transferred him to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Haque. Sikirica, a former commander of the Keraterm prison camp, was accused of genocide, violation of the laws and customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva conventions,'"" During the night of October 12-13, 2000 (NATO-led) 102 SFOR forces conducted an operations to arrest Janko Janjic, a Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect indicted for gang-rape and his war crimes committed between April 1992 and February 1993 in Bosnia. During the course of the arrest on October 12,2000, Janjic detonated a hand grenade, which killed himself. On 15 April 2001, SFOR troops detained Dragan Obrenovic, one of three Bosnian Serbs Indicted for the Srebrenica massacre, and transferred him to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Haque."" In April, 2001, roughly 4,00 NATO - troops descended on the Bosnia's strongest private financial institution headquarter (Herce - govacka Banka in the city of Mostar), in 80 armored vehicles, backed by 20 helicopters and two fixed-wing aircraft. The troops loaded six trucks with confiscated documents from the bank. The bank raid was supposed to help prevent a new ethnic collapse. International officials believed that militant Croat secessionist were using the bank to launder money for their cause. SFOR helped to expel the breakaway forces from military bases and weapons depots. Instead SFOR commander Lt. Gen. Michael Dodson, ordered all units to retrieve munitions from Bosnian Croat storage sites and consolidated them under SFOR control.'" The NATO-led Stabilisation Force troops maintained control of the Croatian component of the Federation Army arms and ammunition throughout the crisis, forcing hardliners to drop their demands."^ On 29 and 30 October 2001, two illegal arms caches were discovered by SFOR troops, in Han Pijesak, a Serb-controlled village in Bosnia and Herzegovina which served as a Bosnian Serb- military headquarters during the Bosnian War."' In March 2002 NATO-led SFOR had launched the operation to arrest Radovan Karadzic, former Bosnian Serb leader in the village of Celebici involved armored vehicles and helicopter-borne troops but found no 103 sign of Mr. Karadzic who had been indicted for war crimes. Bui the operation uncovered nothing more than a weapons store. By the end of 2004, NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) would be handed over to the European Union Force (EUFOR), The next stage in the path from the active peace enforcement of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and reduction of military presence in SFOR to co-operative arrangements of EUFOR. NATO approved EUFOR at its Istanbul Summit on 28-29 June, 2004, and the transfer to the new force was planned by the end of 2004. EUFOR would be supported by 'Over The Horizon Forces' (OTHFs) that could respond to areas that flare up. These included both rapid reaction forces capable of deploying within 48 hours and a larger capability that could respond over a longer time.' * Finally , the 7,000 - strong European Union Forces took over from SFOR on December 1, 2004.'" REFERENCES 1. The Europa World Year Book 2000, Volume 1, p.702. 2. The Europa World Year Book 1994, Volume 1, p.567. 3. The Europa World Year Book 2000, Volume II, p.4065. 4. 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Sir Michael Rose, "Fighting for Peace" Bosnia 1994", The Harvill Press, London, 1998, p. 184. 28. Ibid. pp. 186-187. 29. Rod Nordland, "Leaving the Balkans to Their Fate", Newsweek, November 1,1993, Volume CXXII, Number 18, P. 18. 30. Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, 'The Brussels Summit - a military perspective", NATO Review, February 1994, Volume 42, Number l,p. 10. 31. Joel Brand, "Counting the living Sfu-ajevo: Reflections on a city whose troubles define its times", Newsweek, January 24, 1994, Volume CXXIII, No. 4, p. 11 32. Christopher Ogden, "Clinton's Battered Hymnal", Time, January 24, 1994, Vol. 143, No.4, p.l8 33. Alexandra Stiglmayer, "Scarred by Siege, a City Allows Itself Some Hope," Time, September 11,1995, Volume-146, No.ll, p. 20. 34. Op. Cit. no. 30, p. 11. 35. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, April 1994, Volume 42, Number 2,p,22. 36. Tom Post, "Crossing a No Man's Land", Newsweek, March 14, 1994, Volume- CXXm, Number ll,p.38. 37. Bruce W. Nelan, "A Whiff of Spring In a negotiating flurry, the factions have produced a plan for federation and an easing of the long siege of Sarajevo", Time, March 28,1994, Volume- 143, Number 13,P.21. 38. Melinda Liu and Christopher Dickey, "A Call to Open Arms", Newsweek, June 3, 1996, Volume CXXVII, Number 23, pp. 22-23. 39. Tom Post with Joel Brand, 'Testing the West's Resolve", Newsweek, May 2,1994 Vol.CXXIII, No. 18, p. 36. 106 40. Bruce W. Nelan, "A Lillle Bombing Is a Dangerous Thing DcspiU; NATO laids, the Serbs tighten their vise around Gorazde, confounding Clinton and his allies", Time, April 25,1997, Volume- 143, Number 17, p. 19 . 41. Bruce W. Nelan, " A Pink Envelope, but The Answer Is Not yes Another peace plan fizzles, and International mediators struggle to put persuasive pressure on the Serbs", Time, August 1, 1994, Volume- 144, Number 5, p.28. 42. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, August 1994, Number -4 Volume 42, p. 6. 43. Rod Nordland with Karen Breslau, " An Overstep in Sarajevo Bosnia: Did the Serbs miscalculate ihis lime?", Newsweek, August 15, 1994, Vtilunie CXXIV. Number?, p. 40. 44. Zlatko Dizdarevic, " Remember Sarajevo? Winter is coming the suffering goes on- and the outside world is far away," Time, October 3, 1994, Volume 144, Number 14, p.32. 45. James L. Graff, " Caught in the Thorns", Time, December 12,1994, Volume - 144, Number 24, p. 19. 46. Mark Thompson, " Reversal of Fortunes? With new tactics, an improved arsenal and Croat help, the Bosnian military begins to taste victory". Time, November 14, 1994, Volume 144, Number 20,p.24. 47. James L. Graff, Alexandra Stiglmayer, " Doesn't Anybody Want Peace?", Time, November 28,1994, Volume-144, Number 22, p. 29. 48. Tom Post with Rod Nordland, " A Fight Among Friends", Newsweek , December 5, 1994, Volume CXXIV, Number 23, p. 20. 49. Bruce W. Nelan," Marching Toward Bihac After 31months of war, the world has still not found a way to stop the Serbs", Time, December 5, 1994, Volume -144, Number 23, p. 16. 50. Russell Watson with Rod Nordland, " Opting Out on the Adriatic", Newsweek, November 21,1994, Volume-CXXlV, Number 21, p.38. 51. Michael Elliott with Karen Breslau and John Barry, " Striking Back", Newsweek, June 5, 1995, Volume-CXXV, Number 23, P. 17. 52. George J. Church, "Pity The Peacekeepei-s", Time, June 5,1995, Volume-143, Number 23, p. 15. 107 53. Edward Barnes, and Massimo Calabresi, "Unshakable Vacillation The Serbs release hostages, but down a U.S. Plane", Time, June 12, 1995, Volume- 145, No. 24, p.l6. 54. Bruce W. Nelan, " Tears and Terror Mercilessly, the war tramples "safe areas", revealing the hollow promise of western and U.N. protection". Time, July 24, 1995, Volume 146, No. 4, p.33. 55. Rod Nordland, "A Death March in the Mountains", Newsweek, July 31, 1995, Volume -CXXVI, No. 5, p. 47. 56. Bruce W. Nelan, "Bombs Bursting, Soldiers Dying", Time, August 7, 1995, Volume-146, No. 6, p.l6. 57. Tom Post with Rod Nordland and Stacy Sullivan, " So Much for the Vaunted 'Safe' Areas", Newsweek, July 24,1995, Volume CXXVI, No. 4, p. 13. 58. Kevin Fedarko, " Battle Cries It's a whole new war as Croatia Launched a huge offensive in Serb-held krajina". Time, August 14, 1995, Volume- 146, No. 7, pp. 20-21. 59. Kevin Fedarko, "New Victims, New Victors", Time, August 21, 1995, Volume- 146, Number-8, pp.24-25. 60. Kevin Fedarko, "At The Edge Of Peace with a nudge here, a shove there, I he Balkans move tantalizingly closer to embracing a deal". Time, October 2,1995, volume - 146, Number - 14, p. 19. 61. Tom Post with Melinda Liu, and Tara Sonenshine, " Make War, Make Peace", Newsweek, September 11,1995, Volume -CXXVI, Number 11, p.l7. 62. Kevin Fedarko, " Louder Than Words", Time, September, 11, 1995, Volume- 146, No. 11, pp. 16-17. 63. Ibid, p. 19. 64. Bruce W. Nelan, " More Talking, More Bombing", Time, September 18, 1995, Volume 146, Number 12, p.38. 65. Tom Post with Melinda Liu, and Tara Sonenshine, "Enough About Me...", Newsweek, September 25,1995, Vol. CXXVI, No. 13, p.26. 66. George J. Church, " Let No More Children Die", Time, November 6,1995, Volume-146, No. 19, p.26. 108 67. Bruce W. Nelan, " Silence of The Guns", Time, Seplembcr 25,1995, Volimic- 146, No.l3,p.28. 63. James 0. Jackson, "Silencing The Guns", Time, October 16, 1995, Volume- 146, No. 16, p.44. 69. Bill Clinton, " Why Bosnia Matters to America Our values, interests and security are all at stake", Newsweek, November 13,1995, Volume -CXXVI, No.20, p.24. 70. Kevin Fedarko, "Getting Down To Business", Time, November 13, 1995, Volume 146, No.20, P.53. 71. Tom Masland and Melinda Liu, " War-Weary in Ohio", Newsweek, November 20, 1995, Volume- CXXVI, No.21, p.32. 72. Russel Watson and John Barry "Imposing a Tough Peace", Newsweek, November 27, 1995, Volume CXXVI, No.22, p.25. 73. Kevin Fedarko, " A Bosnian Peace Deal in Dayton Is inches Away"', Time, November 27,1995 Volume 146, No.22, pp. 30-31. 74. Bruce W. Nelan, " A Perilous Peace", Time, December 4, 1995, Volume- 146, No.23, p.31. 75. Lynn Hastings, " Implementation of the Property Legislation in, Bosnia Herzegovina", Stanford Journal of International Law, Summer 2001, Volume- 37, Number- 2, p.222. 76. Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., 'The pillars of peace in Bosnia", NATO Review, July 19%, Volume 44, Number 4, p.U. 77. Ibid, p. 13. 78. General George A. Joulwan, "SHAPE and IFOR: adopting to the needs oi tomorrow", NATO Review, March 1996, Volume -44, Number-2, p.8. 79. David H. Hackworth, "Face to Face with 'the Guy in Charge", Newsweek, Januai7 15,1996, Volume CXXVII, Number 3, p.l8. 80. Michael Hirsh, " The Fraying of the Peace", Newsweek, February 26, 1996, Volume -CXXVII, Number- 9, p.l7. 81. Rod Nordland, " The Fugitive Gen. Ralko Mladic has been indicted twice for war crimes against the Muslims", Newsweek, April 22, 1994, Volume - CXXVII, Number ,17, p.25. 82. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, September 1996, Volume 44, Number 5, p.23. 109 83. Rod Norland, "Angry at Everybody A year after the fall of Srebrenica, there is little relief for the women who survive it", Newsweek, July 22, 1996, Volume- CXXII, Number 4, p.40. 84. David Rieff, "Opinion: Abandoning Bosnia", Newsweek, September 9,1996, Volume-CXXVIlI, Number 11, p. 19. 85. Rod Norland and Stacy Sullivan, "Starling Over?", Newsweek, September 23, 1996, Volume-CXXVIII, Number -13, p.23. 86. Rod Norland, "It'll Be Messy No One expects that Saturday's election will be pretty. Bui hope thai it comes off peacefully", Newsweek, September 16, 1996, Volume-CXXVIII, Number 12, p.29. 87. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, November 1996, Volume -44, Number -6, p.8. 88. Gregory L.Schulte, "Bringing peace to Bosnia and change to the Alliance", NATO Review, March 1997, Volume.45, Number -2, P. 23. 89. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, May-June 1997, Volume-45, No.3, p.6. 90. General Wesley Clark, "Building a Isisting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina", NATO Review, Spring 1998, No. 1, Volume-46, pp.19- 20. 91. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, July-August 1997, Volume-45, No.4, p.31. 92. Daniel Deluce, "Media Wars", NATO Review, Winter 2000-2001, Volume- 48, pp. 16-17. 93. Greg Schulte, "SFOR continue", NATO Review, Summer 1998, Volume- 46, No.2, p.28. 94. John Barry and Russel Watson, 'The Devil They Know Biljana Plavisic may be a bigot and a warmonger, but she's fighting someone even worse", Newsweek, September 1,1997, Volume - CXXX, No.9, p.34. 95. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, November -December 1997, Volume -45, No.6, p.ll. 96. David Lightbum, "NATO Security Cooperation Activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina", NATO Review, Summer 1998, Volume- 46, No.2,p.31. 97. Op. Cit. no. 92, p.8. 98. Texts of Statements and Communiques issued during 1998, NATO office of Information and Press 1110 Brussels, Belgium Fax : (32- 2)707, 1252 E-mail Distribution @ HQ, NATO, INT., p. 146. 10 99. Op. Cit. no. 93,p.27 100. Op. Cit. no. 98, pp.151-152. 101. Ibid, p.l53. 102. Ibid, pp. 156-157. 103. Ibid, p.l58. 104. Ibid, pp.160-161. 105. "Serb general arrested on genocide charges". The Hindu, New Delhi, December 4, 1998, p. 12. 106. "Karadzic ally held". The Hindu, New Delhi, April 4,2000, p.l2. 107. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, Summer /Autumn 2000, Volume 48, p.5. 108. Ibid, p.4. 109. "Suspect kills himself, The Hindu, New Delhi, October 14, 2000, p. 12. 110. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, Summer 2001, Volume-49, p. 5. 111. Roy Gutman, "Bank Job In A Battle Zone", Newsweek, April 30,2001 .Volume CXXXVII, No.18, pp.24-25. 112.Zoran Kusovac, "VF-H to re-admit it Croatian member", jane's Defence Weekly, 30 May, 2001, Volume-35, No.22,p. 10. 113. "Focus on NATO", NATO Review, Winter 2001/2002, Volume 49, p.4. 114. "French trooper tipped off Karadiz", The Hindu, New Delhi, March 6,2002, p. 15. 115. Damian Kemp, "Stabilizing Bosnia From NATO To EU", Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 August 2004, Volume: 41, No.31, pp. 22-23. 116. "Change of Guard", The Hindu, New Delhi, December 3, 2004, p.l7. Ill CHAPTER - 4 Role Of NATO In Kosovo Crisis 1. The Background of Kosovo Crisis In the Middle Ages most of Kosovo's people were Serbs, or at least they were Orthodox Christians, by 1389 Serbia had been carved up by feuding nobles. Under the leadership of one of them, Lazar Hrebeljanovic, several of Serbia's barons came together in that year to take a stand at Kosovo Field against the Ottoman Turks.' The Serbs were not able to stop the Turks. Their last effort to stop the invaders was made at the Kosovo Polje. So strong were the memories of the Battle of Kosovo Polje that they became the most important historical event in the perception of the Serbian nationhood. On the feast day of St. Vitus (Vidovdan), 15 June 1389 (28 June in the Gregoria calendar), the Serbs, led by Lazar and joined by the Bosnians, led by Stefan Turtko, were defeated by the army of Sultan Mourad I. Both Mourad and Lazar lost their lives in the battle," laying the foundations for 500 years of Turkish rule. Most Serbs in Kosovo moved north, to be replaced over the centuries by Albanians, who largely converted to Islam.* Vov centuries after the battle, the Ottoman ruled Kosovo and the rest of Serbia, but no empire lasted forever, and the Ottoman spent most of the 1800s getting smaller. Serbia regained its independence in 1878 and in 1912 briefly reasserted control over Kosovo. After World War I, Serbia (including Kosovo) was in corporated into llio Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Solvenes, later known as Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was formed in 1918, incorporating Serbia with territories formerly under Austrian or Hungarian rule. The 12 Federal Republic was a mosaic of different nalionalilies consisling of six republics-Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia.* During the Second World War, 'I'ilo and his partisans found very few willing recruits amongst the Kosovo Albanians, who did not want to be part of a future Yugoslavia. Some Albanian recruits did join after the 1944 Bujan Conference, which declared that the future Communist Kosovo would have the option of remaining united with Albania. The promise was not kept. By the late 1960s things began to change, as Tito allowed the Albanianisation of the province. By 1974 Kosovo had become a Yugoslav republic in all but name. It had it own assembly, police force and local government, and all the prerogatives of the other Yugoslav republics such as Croatia or Slovenia, In theory the Yugoslav constitution gave the republics llic right to secede: Kosovo did not have this right. The powers that the 1974 constitution granted to the republics and Serbia's two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina in the north, were in many ways more theoretical than real. The republics and provinces did have a large measure of autonomy but Tito was the final arbiter and the real law of the land.^ In tracing the rise of Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, one was led to Kosovo. Following the ouster of his mentor Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic used Kosovo to initiate an anti-Albanian campaign, beginning in 1987. Fanning the flames of discontent, he took a hard-line position against Kosovo's Albanians. Following a 'wildcat' strike at the Trepca mines which brought the province to a standstill, Milosevic rallied over 500,000 Serbs in Belgrade's main square. He promised that those responsible would be punished and that Serbia would never give up Kosovo. He succeeded by late 1989 in increasing police precincts in Kosovo by 63 percent, police units by 58 percent and more importantly, in 113 gaining the majority he needed in the Kosovo Assembly to retract Kosovo's status as an autonomous province. Moving swiftly, Milosevic used the Serb-led Assembly to legislate Serbia's control over Kosovo's police, civil defence, courts and selection ol officials.' In July 1990, the Serbs dissolved the Kosovo provincial assembly and indicted 111 of ils members for Ireason. Thousands of ethnic Albanian employees of the provincial government were fired because they were Albanians, Serb police occupied the province's television and radio stations, closed the main Albanian-language newspaper, detained hundreds of suspected dissidents, and killeld at least 50 participants in street demonstrations. After Croatia and Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991, Serbia sent additional police and army units to Kosovo and increased patrols and roadblocks there, turning the province into " a virtual police state". Milosevic's reimposition of Serbian power in Kosovo sparked a cycle of competitive nationalisms, which by 1991, was to lead to the demise of Yugoslavia and to war. The Albanians had fought the Serbs at least four times in the twentieth century, so the Albanians decision not to fight in the early 1990s was born not of passivity but of Shrewd logic. With the demise of Communism and the one-party state, Kosovo Albanian politics came to be dominated by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova. But with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, he declared Kosovo's independence and became President of the Republic. Unlike Slovenia or Croatia, however, Kosovo had no means to make this independence real.' Ibrahim Rugova believed that mounting an insurrection against the Serbs would be suicidal since they would use their vastly superior forces to respond with 'ethnic cleansing' and a campaign of massacres. Instead, he promoted a strategy of passive resistance and 'created parallel' state structures.'" 114 2. The Causes of ihe War in Kosovo Until 1996, the resistance in Kosovo was generally passive. Thai year with Milosevic under intense pressure from the West, the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) made its appearance. The heavy flow of illegal weapons from neighboring Albania strenghetened the KLA. The KLA (also known under its Albanian acronym UCK for - Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves) was the main military organization fighting for the liberation of Kosovo from Serbian rule. Its origins went back as far ar- 1996. Only in November 1997, however, did UCK members identified themselves for the first time to the public.'^ The KLA had adopted a classic insurgency strategy lo undermine Belgradt's control. This included; • attacks on Serbian forces; • intermittent pressure on Serbian civilians to leave their homes; • assassinations of local Albanian 'collaborators'. By early 1998, the KLA succeeded in driving the Serbian police from Drenica. On 4 March, the police struck back in Drenica and killing some 80 people, including many women and children, this indiscriminate Serbian violence infuriated the Kosovars and sparked a rebellion, for which the KLA was not prepared. The organization found itself attempting to manage and arm an uprising that grew far faster than it had anticipated.''* On April 30, 1998. The North Atlantic Council was firmly opposed to independence for Kosovo and to a continuation of the unacceptable status quo. It rejected all use of violence, either by state security forces lo suppress political dissent or by separatist groups to seek political change. 15 In mid-1998 NATO conducted a number of military exercises in Albania, in conjunction with the Albanian armed forces, in an attempt to increase pressure on the Serbian Government to end military action in Kosovo," Vowing not to permit another slaughter like Bosnia' s the NATO allies threatened Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in June, 1998 with air strikes unless he hailed his security force's attacks on the rebellious Albanians. Secretary of State Madeliene Albright wanted the White House to push harder for NATO military action, but Defence Secretary William Cohen balked, fearing air strikes would only embolden the Kosovo Liberation Army, then at the peak of its strength and demanding an independent state, which Washington opposed. Serbian forces dealt the Kosovo Liberation Army a severe blow on 14 August 1998, when they captured the Junik in Western Kosovo. Situated in the hills just below the mountainous frontier with Albania, the village had served as the main distribution point for arms, ammunition and men smuggled - across the border to the KLA. The operation inflicted heavy casualties and drove thousands of ethnic Albanians from their villages.'" Press accounts suggested a dramatic change in the attitude of NATO members after the discovery on September 29, 1998, that the Serbs had massacred Albanian civilians in the villages of Gornje Obrinje and Golubuvac. This time, the NATO countries did belter at orchestrating words and deeds and conveying threats by deed as well as by word. Over the course of two carefully scripted weeks September 30 to October 13 - attack aircraft were moved to bases in Italy and Great Britain, an aircraft carrier and other naval vessels were moved closer to Yugoslavia, and an activation order authorizing an strikes was issued.'** On September 23, 1998, the UN Security Council had demanded an immediate cease-fire and the 116 slarl of a credible political dialogue between Serbs and Albanians. Shortly thereafter, the Serbs launched new offensives aimed ul eradicating the KLA in the Drenica region, in the Cicavica Mountains northwest of Pristina, and in the Southwest part of Kosovo.^" This Serb offensives occurred even as the United Stales was asking the North Atlantic Council canvass NATO members concerning their willingness to contribute personnel and equipment to a military operation in Kosovo.^ Most of the NATO debate on llu; use of force against Yugoslavia took place between the Security Council voted on Resolution 1199 on 23 September 1998 and NATO's brandishing the threat of force on 12 October. That threat took the form of an Activation Order (ACTORD) authorizing the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) to launch air strikes within four days if Milosevic did not comply with the provisions of the UN resilution." NATO had insisted on full and unconditional compliance by President Milosevic with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 (to maintain the ceasefire and withdrawal the Special Police Force from Kosovo) and Resolution 1203 (The unrestricted access of NATO's aerial surveillance assets and the Kosovo Diplomatic Mission in Kosovo). NATO knew that President Milosevic would move when he was presented with the credible threat of force." The agreement reached on 12 October between the US and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia removed the immediate threat of NATO air strikes, and was an important step towards the internationalisation of the Kosovo conflict. The document stipulated that: • Serbian forces in the province should be reduced to their pre- conflict levels (around 10,000 police and 11,000 army troops, compared to a total of more than 50,000 before the agreement); 117 • refugees should be able to return to their homes; and • upto 2,000 'compliance verifiers' from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would be deployed to monitor the situation on the ground. Just before the Serbian redeployment began on 26 October, 1998, KLA sources were saying that the KLA had not signed ihe agreement and was thus not bound by its terms. After heavy US pressure to the KLA, however, they declared on 27 October thai they would: • abide by a cease fire; • not set up checkpoints; and • not begin any new offensives, as long as Serbian forces kept out of the areas in which KLA fighters were deployed. The agreement concluded between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO established the air verification mission, complementing the OSCE ground mission, to verify compliance with UNSCRs 1199 and 1203. Sustained pressure was instrumental in achieving these results and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. The threat of the use of NATO airpower to verify compliance through the conduct of the air verification mission over Kosovo, Operation "Eagle Eye". In order to provide the ability to withdraw verifiers in an emergency, NATO had deployed an Extraction Force, Operation "Joint Guarantor", in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Experts estimated that by the end of 1998, 2,500 Kosovars had been killed in the struggle for autonomy , and more than 200,000 had fled their homes in the province for fear of Serb paramilitary assaults.^^ The Serbs not entirely living upto the October agreement in any case, responded accordingly. In January 1999, the discovery of forty-five Albanian bodies in the village ol Racak, most apparently murdered by Serb security forces or paramilitaries. Thus all the parties were summoned to Rambouillel, France, to try to achieve a permanent negotiated solution. Brilaiti, France and the United Stales controlled the February negotiations, drafting the settlement document with little input from the Albanian and Serb delegation that were present. The proposed Rambouillel accords would have provided Kosovo with substantial autonomy, essentially self-government for its Albanian majority. The province would have been policed by NATO for three or more years. The Serb regular army would have been required to leave Kosovo except for 2,500 border troops permitted to remain in the province to survey its external borders. Twenty five hundred Serb interior ministry police would have been allowed to remain for one year. NATO forces required complete and unimpeded military access (including basing rights) any where in Yugoslavia." Sources in the U.S. intelligence community reported toward the end of February 1999 that "6,500 more Yugoslav troops, along with 250 tanks and 90 artillery pieces, were massing just outside (Kosovo) in apparent preparation for a large-scale offensive". Other intelligence reports indicated that Yugoslav "army units and other security forces throughout Serbia were being mobilized for a possible attack." That winter, NATO intelligence officers learned that the Serbs planned a massive encircling operation against the KLA, code-named "Potkova" (Horseshoe), after the Spring thaw. One report published in March 1999 concluded that Milosevic intended to ethnically cleanse all 1.8 million Albanians living in the province within a 1 29 week. 119 The 17-day-long peace conference on Kosovo held in Rambouillet, France, in February ended in deadlock. Milsoevic maintained that his government would not agree to the stationing of armed NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo and his government was against the Western proposal for holding referendum in three years time on the question of independence for Kosovo. NATO issued a warning that 400 aircraft were kept ready to strike if Yugoslavia did not sign an accord which would be readied in March 1999.' The Kosovo Albanians signed an international peace plan for the Serbian province on March 19, 1999, but their Yugoslav adversaries boycotted the event and Russia declined to countersign the historic document as a witness. In a televised ceremony, four ethnic Albanian leaders signed an 82 page "interim agreement for peace and self-government in Kosovo "negotiated in February 1999 in Rambouillet, near Paris." On March 24, 1999, four German Tornado fighter bombers took off from a NATO base and participated in the first wave of air strikes against Serb military targets in Kosovo. Fifteen German aircraft and hundreds of support troops were engaged in NATO's Operation Allied Force for the next 78 days. The same day (on March 24, 1999) U.S. led NATO forces launched cruise missiles and bombs at target throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), plunging America into a military conflict that President Clinton said was necessary to stop ethnic cleansing and bring stability to Eastern Europe". By bombing the FRY, Clinton informed the nation, "we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace". "We cannot respond to such tragedies everywhere, but when ethnic conflict turns inlo ethnic cleansing where we can make a difference, we must try, and that is clearly the case in Kosovo". Had we faltered in what ihe 120 heading of his speech calls "A Jusl and Necessary War", ''\\\v result would have been a moral and strategic disaster. The Albanian Kosovars would have become a people without a homeland, living in difficult conditions in some of the poorest countries in Europe", a fate that the U.S. cannot tolerate for suffering people". From a NATO perspective, Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing started well before the initiation of airstrikes. In January 1999, two months before Allied Force, the Serb special forces had already forced 300,000 Kosovo Albanians from their homes and ethnic cleansing of the local civilian population was on upward trend and would have increased whether NATO had acted or not.^ NATO's objectives in starting the raids were two fold. One was to induce President Slobodan Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet Plan, the minimlalist agenda of which was to restore Kosovo's autonomy abrogated by Milosevic in 1989. The other objective was to save the civilians of Kosovo from immenenl 'ethnic cleansing'.'' A total of 20 F-16 fighter aircraft of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF), was made available to the NATO operations "Allied Force". The contribution of the Netherlands was part of a combined Belgian Dutch detachment operating under the name of DATF. DATF flew its missions from the military arirfield Amendola in the South of Italy. The Italians provided round-the-clock host nation support which included, inter alia, fire services, air traffic control, security etc. Transport aircraft were also flying almost round-the-clock from the Netherlands, carrying the right type of munitions on schedule to Amendola, while two KDC-10 tanker aircraft of the RNLAF provided air-to-air refuelling to NATO fighter aircraft. During the first hours of the strikes the RNLAF downed an MIG-29 Fulcrum by means of a Beyond Vision Range radar-guided missile." In the first days of the war, most air attacks 121 were directed against the Serb air defence network. But although NATO destroyed 12 of Yugoslavia's 15 most modern MIG-29 fighters and ten anti-aircraft missile sites, the bulk of Serb low- level air defence systems remained intact.' On April 14, 1999, NATO warplanes dumped bombs and missiles on a convoy of Albanian refugees on the Dakovica Prizren road; they included elderly people, women and children. In the attack, 82 people were killed and 50 were injured. In the same month, Serbian state television accused NATO of using its helicopters to transport guerilla forces to positions from where they could launch attacks inside Yugoslavia.*' And according to Belgrade, by the third week of April, NATO had conducted more than 1,000 airstrikes using 600 aircraft and 800 cruise missiles. Three thousand tonnes of explosives were expended on 150 targets; more than 300 civilians were killed and 3,000 more were seriously injured.^" And the bombing of Radio-Television Serbia on April 23, 1999, as pari of NATO's airstrikes against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict. Sixteen people died in the attack. The weight of evidence suggested that NATO forces began the war over Kosovo without a well worked-out plan for employing airpower to affect directly the ability of Serb forces to.operate in Kosovo: President Clinton's initial claimed that the purpose of the war was to punish Serb forces that were attacking Kosovar Albanians, and to reduce their ability to do so, had not been translated into an operational plan. Once it became clear that the initial limited air attacks would not influence the Serbs, who parallel campaigns were launched: one against Serbia proper and one against the Serb Forces in the field. NATO never came up with an answer to Serb forces in the field, though it often claimed to have them on the ropes. From the outset of the war through mid-May, it was reasonable for Milosevic to be 122 believe thai his political strategy was working, if not perfectly. The Russians provided substantial diplomatic support. Germany, Italy, and Greece proved uneasy about the war. The expulsion of the Albanians had not, however, worked to undermine NATO's cohesion. Russia immediately proved deeply distressed with NATO's action, suspending most formal cooperative arrangements with NATO after the first night of the war.*^ Milosevic's efforts to exploit collateral damage failed to erode significantly U.S. or allied support for the short-term fighting of targeting restrictions on NATO bombers: in April, for instance, NATO modified its procedures to require that U.S. pilots receive authorization before striking military convoys, after a U.S. warplane mistakenly hit a refugee convoy.*"' During Operation Allied Force, the U.S. airpower doctrine was not fully applied. It was a phased air campaign without 'massive and overwhelming force'. The NATO intervention was not an intensive war, but an air campaign with sequential phases. The first phase was the so-called limited air response, with phase 1 of Operations Plan (Oplan) 10601, which required air superiority. The second phase was aimed to Serb units in Kosovo. This was the so- called tactical air campaign. Third phase was the so- called strategic air campaign throughout the FRY. It was aimed at isolating the Serbs in Kosovo.** At the start of April, NATO thus decided to shift to a new phase in its air campaign. This involved targeting economic and communications points in Serbia, including bridges, oil refineries and power stations. Attack on civilian infrastructure were intended to cripple the Yugoslav army's fuel supplies. They also signaled to the Serbian authorities and ihc population that, if they refused to surrender, NATO would do great damage in the long run Yugoslavia's economy and to any prospects of national growth and prosperity. The second aspect of NATO's 123 strategy: the move to hit Yugoslav forces in Kosovo with ground- attack aircraft and helicopters. The aim was both to restrict the ability of these forces to attack the ethnic - Albanian population, and to underline to Belgrade that NATO was determined to carry on its air campaign over a long-period and even at the cost of casualties. NATO thus deployed new aircraft, including, most importantly, some 24 US air force A-10 Warthog ground-attack aircraft, and a similar number of US army AH-64 Apache helicopters. The Albanian government gave permission for the Apaches to be stationed near its border with Kosovo, together with 18 multi-launched ground-attack rocket systems and 2,600 American ground troops. The declared purpose of these forces was to provide security for the Apaches and their crews and support staff against Yugoslav forces infiltrating across the border, " a threat highlighted by the capture on 31 March 1999 of three US soldiers on the Macedonia border by Yugoslav forces. ' NATO war planners had the suppression of Serb air defences as their initial military objective. Once air defences had been suppressed, other attack aircraft could be avoided because the political leaders of NATO feared that there was not enough political support at home to continue the war in the event of sustained losses. The Serbs seemed to have understood NATO's tactical hopes, and operated lo thwart ihem. So long as Serb defences survived and continued lo engage NATO aircraft, NATO's overall effectiveness could be diminished. Thus the Serbs took great care in each potential engagement to weigh risk against opportunity. They had to show NATO that their air defences were still dangerous, everyday so they had to launch some weapons. At the same time, the Serbs had to take into account the limitations of their own systems vis-a-vis those of NATO. If radars were left on too long in the hopes of completing an 124 engagemenl, a NATO hunter-killer aircraft, the F-16 CJ equipped with high-speed anti-radiation missile and special targeting gear to locate Serb radars, would surely attack them. The Serbs played cat and mouse, ihey would turn off llieir eiigugciiKMil radars if ihcy thought they would come under attack. On average, they fired only about 10 SAMs per night for the duration of the war-but occasionally as many as three dozen. On the eve of NATO's 50' anniversary summit meeting in Washington, British and French leaders began pressing allies to consider sending ground forces into Kosovo.* Critics warned, however, that holding the alliance together even during the air war nearly impossible, and they believed that the ground troops contingency might very well bring down governments across Europe. For example, leftists in the Italian government threatened serious political action unless the government could convince allies to offer a bombing pause as a concession for peace negotiations. The Greek government was deeply opposed to any use of force in the region, and the German government faced potential opposition to a ground war from the political left and right. Thus, NATO leaders sought a delicate comprises on the eve of the 50' anniversary summit: Prime Minister Tony Blair would stop talking publicly about an invasion, and NATO officers would update old contingency plans for ground operations in the Balkans. Within weeks they had come up with a preliminary plan for an attack on Kosovo by 175,000 troops set to begin on September 1, 1999. The ground troops issue came to a head on May 27, 1999, in a secret meeting of NATO Defence Ministers held at the German Defence Ministry Office outside Bone, U.S. Secretary of Defence William Cohen, German Defence Minister Rudoff Scharping, British Defence Minister George Robertson, and the Defence Ministers of France and Italy met for seven intense 125 hours of debate about ground troops. While they did not reach a final decision, the ministers were united in their opinions that NATO could not afford to lose the war and that their five governments needed to reach a consensus on ground troops wilhin the next week. On a very practical level, allied leaders were aware that initial deployments to ready a ground offensive were urgently needed; the first snowfall in Kosovo would arrive by the end of October.*" Hungary was in a uniquely sensitive position among the allies vis-a-vis Serbia for several reasons. First, Hungary was the only NATO member that shared a border with Yugoslavia, so fears related to the spread of the war were foremost in the thinking of political leaders. Second, 300,000 ethnic Hungarians lived in the Vojvodina region of northern Serbia. Concern about Yugoslav reprisals against this segment of the Hungarian Diaspora drove Hungarian policy to oppose a NATO ground war and to refuse direct participation in a ground war should it occur. Only NATO, and certainly not the relief agencies, could resolve the worsening refugee crisis-one that would grow worse so long as Kosovo remained in the hands of Milosevic's thugs. It was NATO that took care of the refugees in Albania and Macedonia. Only a military organization had the money, the logistical capability and the political muscle to build camps for hundreds of thousands. If NATO were to withdraw from the camps in Macedonia, where the Kosovar refugees were hated by the ethnic Macedonian majority, new catastrophe would be all but a certainty, ^ In this context, NATO during its April 1999 fifteenth anniversary meeting declared that il had the authority to intervene in conflicts beyond its borders without the sanction of the United Nations." NATO had provided an unprecedented level of humanitarian support to alleviate the suffering to those refugees. NATO supported for the UNHCR-led 126 humanitarian operation in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. When Yugoslav aggression against ethnic Albanians began to generate large numbers of forced expulsions and refugees, UNHCR again turned to NATO for assistance in: • Managing the airlift of relief supplies; • Easing pressure on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by Iransfering some refugees to NATO countries on a temporary basis; • Off loading and providing immediate storage of aid cargoes; • Setting up refugee camp sites; and • Providing information regarding numbers and locations of internally displaced persons (IDPs). NATO countries responded to appeals from UNHCR and the Skopje government by offering to provide temporary asylum for more than 110,000 Kosovar refugees in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. They had provided aircraft to move more than 60,000 people to all 19 NATO member countries.*^ On Friday, May 7, the CNN was reporting that NATO had bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade", The B2 bombers really had dropped bombs on a building that NATO's pilots had thought was a Yugoslav weapons acquisition agency. Tragically, the targeters had confused the agency with a similarly shaped building nearby the Chinese embassy. The fateful error caused the death of three Chinese and injured twenty. The fact that the embassy had been hit several times prompted Beijing to accuse NATO of a deliberate attack." NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy on May 7, probably encouraged the Serbs to stay in the game. Bombing of downtown Belgrade was suspended for nearly two weeks after this mistake. Given the minor diplomatic firestorm that immediately ensued, it was reasonable for 127 Milosevic lo wail and see if he could profit from ihe error. And l!ie change in NATO targeting no doubt suggested to him that he was profiting from it. On the other front, little damage was done to the Serb forces in Kosovo between May 8 and May 29, so Milosevic would not have felt under any great pressure in the province. And another colosal NATO targeting error on May, 13, in which perhaps eighty-seven Kosovar Albanian civilians were killed in bombing of the village of Korisa, might also have convinced the Serbs that there was still hope that collateral damage would produce internal fissures in the alliance. The NATO campaign aimed to prevent the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo from spilling into Macedonia. This 'doomsday scenario' foresaw a war pitting Macedonian Slavs against Macedonian Albanians, which would then suck in the neighbours, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece, and later, possibly even Turkey. The entire 78-day operation, AWACS aircraft in nearly three continuous 24-hour orbits controlled the Kosovo and Serbian airspace. Operation Allied Force required the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) Force to operate at 200% of its peace-time flying rate. NATO E-3s flew 656 sorties and 6,110 hours in support of Operation Allied Force from 24 March-9 June, 1999,^" More than 23,000 weapons were delivered with devastating effect against hundreds of fixed and mobile targets througout Serbia and Montenegro. By early June, moderate damage had been inflicted upon Serb ground forces and the air defence and command and control systems. Significant damage had been inflicted upon the supply routes into Kosovo, fuel and other key military industries. The electrical power system, the sinews of the modern industrial state, was taken down but in manner that permitted rapid restoration upon termination of the conflict. Despite the launch of 128 uliiiosl BOO uir doroiioc missiles uiid signiliiuml ex|)(Mi(liliiics ol other air defence munitions, only two NATO aircraft were lost. Both pitots were recovered from Serb territory by Allied search and rescue teams.*^ Operation Allied Force was also military significant. It was NATO's largest combat operation to dale, demonstrating significant prowess and featuring the most precise air campaign conducted in history, with a minimum of collateral damage. The technology was the key to their success, some of the innovations introduced in Kosovo were the result of a U.S. Department of Defence Initiative called the Advance Concept Technology Demonstration Programme, such as the Predator unmaned aerial vehicle. This aircraft carried video cameras and other sensing devices. In Kosovo, Predators often flew over areas too dangerous for manned aircraft. They kept almost constant surveillance on enemy forces operating in open country and were also used to observe refugees and assess battle damage. NATO's extensive surveillance during the Kosovo campaign increasingly drove Serbian forces into hiding, forcing them to rely extensively on camouflage and concealment. Though this made it more difficult for Alliance planes to find them, it also prevented their offensive employment.*" The damage count after these two and a half months read something like this: bridges demolished: 24; bridges damaged: 12; petrochemicals industry, totally destroyed; automobile and aeronautical industry, bombed to extinction; airports damaged : 7; television stations hit:6; power plants destroyed in Belgrade, Kolubara, Kostulac and on the river Drina.*' In Washington, it was now frequently said that the war to undo Milosevic's campaign for murder and mass deportation of the Kosovo Albanians could help usher in a new global moral order. But NATO's unwillingness to attack on land meant that the moral claims it was now making for 129 itself needed to be treated with skepticism. Kosovo did indeed break new ground in terms of the lengths that great powers now seemed willing to go in ordering their soldiers to kill for high moral principles. But Kosovo revealed little about the far more imporlaril commitment that would have been involved had NATO been willing to have its soldiers die for such principles. It was all very well to talk about the defence of human rights. But such talk rang hallow when the commitment was not permitted to go much below 15,000 feet." West Europeans were entitled to think that America's way of waging war was ugly, for it involved putting thousands of civilians at risk while minimizing the dangers to its own armed forces. Yet the European method was even uglier; it was to pretend that war was such a horrible thing that it could always be avoided so long as men of good will were prepared to talk, and talk, and talk to each other. But sometimes men of good will were nowhere to be found. Then war might be necessary; but modern Europe was not ready for it. So for nearly a decade, Europeans had been unable to stop a succession of brutal conflicts in the Balkans. Even as sneered al the reluctant cowboys of the United States, the old World had to rely on the New World's muscle."^^ From a NATO perspective, the most helpful observations was that Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing started well before the initiation of air strikes that in January 1999, two months before Allied Force, the Serb special forces had already forced 300,000 Kosovo Albanians from their homes. The ethnic cleansing of the local civilian population was on an upward trend and would have increased whether NATO had acted or not. In doing so, he gave the lie to commentators who alleged that NATO caused the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo by taking action and that its cure was worse than 130 ihe disease. NATO task for starling the air campaign loo slowly and ruling out a ground option at the beginning, thereby depriving the Alliance's strategy of the element of surprise, which would have kept Milosevic guessing. They had a point, but conflict was the url of the politically possible as well as the militarily desirable. NATO's choice was not between the perfect campaign and the imperfect variant. Given the need to achieve consensus among the 19 NATO governments, it was a choice between an imperfect campaign and none at all. Better perhaps to win ugly than to lose beautifully.** 3. HOW DID NATO END THE WAR IN KOSOVO? On May 30, 1999, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot held talks in Bonn with Schroder, Fischer, President Ahtisari, and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, as the international diplomats prepared for the final shuttle mission to Belgrade the next day. Schroder was optimistic about the prospects for peace, and he told reporters that the world was "on the way to a political solution of the problem and substantial progress had been made. He was right. One June 2, 1999, Ahtisari and Chernomyrdin negotiated a final settlement with Slobodan Milosevic to end the Kosovo War. The G-8 hammered out a consolidated taxt by the morning of June 2, which was taken Belgrade the same day. The agreement included all of NATO's critical demands for ending the war: the end of violence, the withdrawal of all Serb security forces, the deployment of substantial and unconstrained NATO force in Kosovo, the return of refugees, and commitment from Yugoslavia to "substantial self government for Kosovo". From the Russian and Serb points of view, the document included a central political role for the UN in the "interim" administration of the province, an acknowledgement that "self-government" must also take into 131 account the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, "the demilitarization of the KLA, and no explicit reference to any process that could lead to dejure independence for Kosovo. Indirectly, the document also included a military role for Russia.*' Thus, while NATO insisted on a unified NATO command in Kosovo, its negotiators allowed ambiguity in the draft peace accords about the relationship of Russian troops lo NATO. Had all ambiguity been eliminated, it seemed possible that Russia would have abandoned the negotiations which might have caused Milosevic to hang on a little longer to see if Russian anti- NATO diplomacy and concomitant European unease would reemerge to provide the possibility of a better deal. The diplomatic action then shifted lo the technical talks in Macedonia between the Serb military and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) about the modalities of the Serb withdrawal, where the fight over the role of the UN continued. NATO leaders expected that these talks, which began on June 5, 1999, would go quickly, but both the Serbs and NATO (and arguably the Russians) continued to argue over the terms of the settlement. The original NATO draft military agreement included no reference to the UN, and thus from the Serbs point of view represented a substantial deviation from the G-8 peace proposal they had just endorsed.*" In the last fortnight of the war, KLA operations near the Kosovo-Albanian border forced Yugoslav soldiers out into the open. This enabled NATO aircraft to attack them, causing what were probably the most substantial military casualties of the whole campaign. A NATO air attack on 7 June, in which US B-52s used cluster bombs against Yugoslav forces near Mount Pastrick, killing several hundred, appeared to have put effective pressure on the Serb negotiators in the stalled talks al Kumanovo, Macedonia.*' On June 10, 1999 UNSC Resolution 1244 132 set the basis for ending the air campaign. The air operation was suspended by Secretary General Javier Solana on June 10, 1999 after Milosevic had accepted the prescribed conditions and was formally ended on June 20, 1999 after the withdrawal of all Serb military, special police and para-military forces from Kosovo. The elite force for 200 Russian paratroopers outmanoeuvred the force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and arrived in Pristina on June 12, Russian paratroopers had taken control of the Pristina airport before NATO troops could move in. NATO officials said off the record that Russian peacekeepers were not given a separate sector to patrol because such a move would have led to the partition of Kosovo, with the slavs protecting the Serbs and the Kosovars refusing to return to a Russian-controlled zone. Under the terms of the deal negotiated in July, 1999, Russia could send 3,600 peacekeepers to Kosovo, Around 750 of them would be located in the vicinity of Pristina airport a Russian would be designated commander of the airfield but the overall air operations would be under the NATO command. The rest of the Russian troops would be in the three sectors located in the north and north-west of Kosovo, under the control of the U.S., Germany and France."The Chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Duma (the lower House of the Russian Parliament), Vladimir Lukin, said the United States was trying to dupe Moscow. He said that the Security Council resolution provided for the deployment of an international security force - under a joint command. However, after the resolution was signcul, there was an announcement that NATO would conduct the operation. ^ KFOR entered Kosovo from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 12 June ("D-day"), with a force of 20,000 troops split up into six brigades led by France, Germany, Italy, the US and two from the U.K. In 11 days, the operation achieved that 133 stated aim: the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and their replacement by KFOR as the only legitimate military force under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244. The outcome on 9 June was a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) that set out in detail that was to be in effect a "relief in place" between the withdrawing Yugoslav forces and the advancing KFOR troops. On 10 June, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 which formalized the mission for the International Security Presence, provided by the NATO led KFOR, and the International Civilian Presence known as UNMIK (UN Interim) Administration Mission in Kosovo. The NATO forces were entering Kosovo on the basis of a U.N. mandate rather than an agreement between Belgrade and the Atlantic Alliance. Kosovo was explicitly described as a part of Yugoslavia, albeit an autonomous one; the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia were affirmed. The provision for a referendum at the end of three years had been abandoned, and the initial insistence on complete NATO control had been watered down some extent by a series of U.N. mandates. Given the magnitude of the tasks required by Resolution 1244, they obviously had to be carried out in an integrated manner with a clear chain of command. But reality did not quite comply. There was dualism at the top of the international administration between the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR and also significanl divisions with UNMIK. Dualism at the top of the command of an international administration was not a novel problem. The Dayton Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina envisaged a similar arrangement (although in that case, the civilian component was run by a specially created international authority rather than the UN). 134 This dualism rei'lecled iho relucluiice ol' key NATO slules lo pkur their military forces under UN command, with inevitably created an accountability gap in the chain of command, and the capacity of the civilian administrators to display credible authority to the local population. During the first phase of Kosovo's international administration, the problem of enforcing a clear chain of command were in fact bigger within KFOR, particularly between the commander of KFOR and national contingents, than between UNMIK and KFOR. The generally excellent personal cooperation between and first Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Bernard Kouchner, and the first four KFOR commanders reduced considerably the potential problems of this top-level dualism. Still, given that UNMIK could not promptly deploy a credible international police force, its ability to enforce political initiatives was limited by what KFOR was willing or able to do. One important consequence was the failure to exercise full authority in Serb-majority areas of northern Kosovo and divided Mitrovica." 4. NATO and the outcome of the War In Kosovo The European Union had estimated that rebuilding Kosovo would cost atleast S30 billion. The NATO bombardment had set Yugoslavia back into an almost pre-industrial state. A Belgrade research unit estimated that costs of rebuilding could run $50 billion to S150 billion and could take decades.'*^ The President of the European Union (E.U.), Romano Prodi, recently admitted that the NATO ignited war in the Balkans had "created a horrible environmental problem that is for us to take care of"." The United States dropped more than 1,100 cluster bomb on Kosovo: that was 1,100 "dispensers" containing a total of more than 200,000 "bomblets" as the soda-can-sized explosive were called. The British dropped hundreds more. Others were jettisoned into the Adriatic by 135 Allied pilots who deemed it unsafe to land with unused ordnance still attached to their wings. According to the World Health Organization, about 150 Kosovars were killed or injured by "land mines and unexploded ordnance" - including bomblets - in the first four weeks after the war ended on June 13, 1999, In just two weeks on KFOR's operation, it had detained more than two hundered detainees, many of them held for such serious criminal offenses as arson, violent assaults and murder, but also for grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws." On 20 September 1999, the KLA was officially approved the statement by KLA (also known as (UCK) Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Agim Ceku that declared: "The UCK has complied with all provisions of the Undertaking (to disarm) and completed its process of demilitrization". The Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation, signed by the KLA on 21 June 1999, stipulated ihai the KLA would hand over its weapons to be stored under NATO supervision. More than 9,000 rifles, 800 machine guns, 300 anti- lank weapons, 178 mortars, 27,000 handgrenades, 1,200 mortar bombs, over a ton of explosives and 5.5 million rounds of ammunition were handed in."" The Kosovo Force (KFOR) had been instrumental in much of the progress made in many areas of the province's daily life. Mandated by the United Nations with prime responsibility for preventing renewed hostilities, securing the province and ensuring public safety, KFOR was also tasked lo support the lead civilian agencies in the areas of humanitarian relief and reconstruction, as well as the work to rebuild Kosovo's civil society. One priority that was to clear mines. Explosive experts had cleared mines and other devices from 1,700 kilometers of roads, over 1,200 schools and 16,000 houses or public buildings. But the main challenge would be keeping a lid on ethnic tensions 136 and tacking crime. On any given day, two out of every three KFOR soldiers were out conducting between 500 to 750 patrols, guarding over 550 key sites and operating over 200 vehicle checkpoints. During the past year (1999), the number of serious crimes, such as looting, kidnapping and arson, had decreased dramatically and the murder rate was down from some 50 revenge killings a week to an average of five-fewer than many Western capitals. But many KFOR Commanders expressed their frustration in terms of being unable to place an armored vehicle outside every home. In fact, every Serbian or Roma pocket had a KFOR guard force, as did every Orthodox church and cemetery or Serbian monument. Despite the large number of troops engaged in guarding minorities, violence and murders continue and serve to further undermine KFOR authority."^ 137 4.1 The Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB in Albanian) On 21-22 November 2000, when ethnic Albanian militants launched attacks against Serbian police units stationed in the Presevo Valley bordering Kosovo. The area was within the demilitarised zone specified within the agreement between the Yugoslav government and NATO that ended the alliance's 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia. The militants were fighting to unite the predominantly Albanian Presevo Valley with Kosovo. After four Serbian policeman were killed in the fighting and 12 others were injured. The NATO-led Kosovo Force closed all routes leading to the border with the Presevo Valley and seized mortars, rocket launchers ammunition in a raid prompted by mortar fire into the valley originated from Kosovo."^ The Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB in Albanian) named after three towns in this ethnic Albanian-dominated sliver of southern Serbia, the well-armed rebels were fighting for autonomy and the right to unify their region with neighbouring Kosovo. In December, 2000, NATO peacekeepers seized a truckload of ammunition, mortars, camouflage uniforms and shoulder patches bound for Presevo from Kosovo's Drenica region, the birthplace of the KLA."* 4.2 The National Liberation Army (NLA) NATO - led units based throughout Kosovo had all contributed to the success of alliance efforts to slop ethnic Albanian rebel forces of the National Liberation Army (NLA) usiti}^ the U.N. administered province as base for their operation in Macedonia. The evidence was that it had been successful. More than 2,000 weapons, 1,500 handgrenades, over 132,000 rounds of ammunition had been seized. The border interdiction programme, dubbed 'Operation Eagle', aimed to seize arms, ammunition and 138 personnel smuggled across from Kosovo into Macedonia and involved between 11-15 companies of KFOR troops at any one time. "Operation Eagle was a highly successful operation", it was only one part of KFOR's campaign against extremist violence in Kosovo." Following the deployment of KFOR to the north, NATO had maintained about 2,500 troops in Macedonia. During Operation Essential Harvest, NATO forces helped enforce a cease-fire agreement between Albanian separatists and the Macedonian government. NATO forces collected 3,300 small arms and more than 70,000 rounds of ammunition. Alliance troops also provided border security and arrested more than 300 suspected rebels who were endeavoring to cross illegally into Macedonia.* 5. The UN General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" mechanism and the Veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council The veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council has been questioned in its present form. During the Korean War (1950-53), the then Western majority of the United Nations did not accept that the Security Council could be blocked out of action and influence by the use of the veto by the Soviet Union, at a time when peace was being threatened or broken. The so-called "Uniting for Peace" resolution, adopted by the UN General Assembly in November 1950, allowed a qualified majority of the Assembly to assume responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, whenever the Security Council was unable or unwilling to do so. During the Kosovo crisis-when both Russia and China threatened to veto any enabling Council resolution - NATO could have appealed to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" mechanism for approval of its armed intervention."' 139 The latest report concerning NATO's compliance with international humanitarian law took the form of a decision rendered on the 13 June 2000 by a Special Committee established on 14 May 1999 by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in pursuance of article 18 of its statute. Assessing whether the operations led by NATO in Kosovo violated articles 35(3) and 55 of protocol I pertaining to the protection of environment, the Committee concluded that the extent of harm did not reach the threshold encapsulated in these provisions. It also came to the conclusion that the damage to the natural environment was collateral, i.e. unintentional and furthermore proportionate to the military purpose. Such reasoning was also applicable to the use of deplecled uranium projecliles. As to the use of cluster bombs, the report noted, unlike in the case presented in front of ICTY's Trial Chamber, that NATO's intention was not to attack the civilian population. The first incident reviewed by the Committee was the attack on a civilian passenger train at the Grdelice Gorge on 12 April 1999, upon which the basic facts had been agreed. In the instance of the first attack on ihe train, the Committee declared that the information provided "did not provide a sufficient basis to initiate on investigation", for the bridge should be considered as a legitimate military objective and it appeared that the train "was not deliberately targeted". As to the second incident related to the attack on the Djakovica convoy that was composed refugees the Committee declared that it had "divided views" as to its legality but nonetheless held that "the incident should not be investigated" as it did not reach the threshold set forth in paragraphs 5 of the Commitee's report dealing with the Review Criteria. The careful formulation of the Committee showed that whereas some members doubted as to the legality of the second 140 attack, they nevertheless did not believe that NATO should be held criminally liable for it.'" NATO officials explained to Amnesty International that, in practice, if a NATO member who had been given a bombing assignment by NATO staff, believed that "the target was illegitimate or that the attack would otherwise violate international law and possibly their national law", then, that stale might refuse to execute it. The attack would however not be reassigned to another member in that case. Rather frightening was the fact that NATO admitted that, in some instances, not all members were aware of the selected targets or the means and method used for a given attack. This meant that, despite its ignorance of an attack, a member state might be held legally responsible for the attack. In addition, some accounts suggested that the United States chose to bomb the Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) despite objections raised by other NATO members. For example, the British forces refused to take part in the bombing of the Serbian Television while the French refused to hit bridges. These positions "drove the level of American involvement upon 90% range, simply because they read the Geneva Conventions [in a different way] and they were prepared to go and Europeans were not. In a rather consternating conclusion pertaining to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, the Committee declared that the aircrew should not be held criminally responsible as they were given the wrong target and that seniors leaders should not either be assigned criminal responsibility as they were provided with wrong information. 5.1 NATO and International Law in the Kosovo Crisis When NATO threatened in October 1998 to bomb Yugoslavia for the first time over Kosovo, everyone of its then 16 members resisted the idea, as did the U.N. Security Council. As a U.S. 141 administration official said back then, "The Chinese didn't like it because of Tibet. The, Russians hated it because of Chechnya, France and Spain have Corsica and the Basques". NATO's intervention in Kosovo with the unsparing logic, a tension between "two pillars of world order": the United Nations Charter prohibits the forcible violation of state sovereignty while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the individual's right against slate supression.'' U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan provided unexpected backing for NATO's military threats. Portrayed at being at adds on the use of force during the Kosovo crisis in October 1998, Annan told NATO ambassadors that the international community must have no "illusions", about the need to use force when all other means have failed"."' The better legal view is that the NATO bombing was not unlawful if it was a genuine and proportionate response as a matter of humanitarian necessity, to stop ( or even to punish) an ongoing crime against humanity."* One of the most assertive proponents of military action was the US Washington's arguments, however, was based more on political than legal arguments. Indeed, answering a journalist's question on 8 October 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that she did not think she had to answer international legal questions in detail."* NATO Secretary General Javier Solana relied on a cluster of reasons to justify the threat of military action in October 1998. These reasons included: • The failure of Yugoslavia to fulfil the requirements set out by Resolutions 1160 and 1199, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter'; Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. 142 • The imminent risk of a humanitarian catastrophe, as documented by the report of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on 4 September 1998; • The impossibility to obtain, in short order, a Security Council resolution mandating the use of force; and • The fact that Resolution 1199 states that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.^ Resolution 1199 on 23 September 1998, in particular, had demanded that Yugoslavia inter alia' cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population, and had referred to possible 'further action' if measures demand in the resolution were not taken. In addition. Resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998, by demanding Serb compliance with a number of key provisions of accords concluded in Belgrade on 15-16 October (including with the NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo), accepted that the Alliance had direct standing and interest in the Kosovo issue. An argument can be made that, even if the Security Council was not able to follow these resolutions on Kosovo with a specific aulhority to use force, they provided some legal basis for military action. On 26 March 1999, two days after the bombing began, the Security Council did, in a curious way give at least a crumb of legal comfort to the NATO cause. A draft resolution sponsored by Russia (and supported by two non-Council members, India and Belarus) called for 'an immediate cessation of the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'. Only three states (Russia, China and Namibia) voted in favour, and 12 against. In the debate, the speeches in support of the resolution did not address in any detail the question of what to do about Kosovo. The representative of 143 Slovenia, which was among ihe stales opposing ihe resolulion, made, the key point that the Security Council did not have monopoly and decision-making regarding the use of force. It has the primary, hul not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan showed awareness of this when, at the beginning of the bombing campaign, he issued a statement which recognised that there were occasion when force might be necessary, but also referred to the importance of Security Council authorisation."" The most important was that the situation in Kosovo was indeed a threat to international peace and security. Both President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair, in their major speeches on the war, put emphasis on the proposition that a large new wave of refugees from Kosovo could destabilize neighbouring countries and lead to an expansion of the war. " Further, it became increasingly clear that the recommendations, resolutions and roles of outside institutions - the European Union (EU), NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN-were being ignored or violated, especially by the Yugoslav authorities. The absence of U.N. Security Council authorization for the use of force against Yugoslavia was always going to be a difficult problem for NATO. Russia and China had consistently made it clear that they would veto any proposal for military action against Yugoslavia regarding its conduct in its own territory. Was NATO right to have launch Operation Allied Force without at least making an attempt to get authorization from the Security Council? The argument for and would have enabled people around the world to see exactly which states were refusing to authorise action to stop atrocities.'"" But NATO's unilateral use of force, critics argued, was, at best, a significant departure from 144 international legality. At worst, it jeopardised the international order based on the UN Charter which entrusts the Security Council with the responsibility to monitor and guarantee international peace and security. The Alliance's military action was necessary on moral and political grounds. 5.2 International Lawyers and the Kosovo Crisis. The legal question, however, is important. It goes, indeed, to the foundation of the international order established since 1945 on the basis of the UN Charter. By and large, despite their criticism on the UN as an organisation, the countries of NATO had stood staunchly against 'rouge' and other lawless stales that threaten lo upset that order. More significant perhaps, NATO regarded itself as an alliance of democratic nations, whose political system is based on the rule of law and it had certainly been, accepted as such by the new members eager to join the 'Club of democracies'. Presumably, respect for the rule of law domestically should be joined by a similar respect for the rule law on the international scence."" The use of forces is governed in international law by the UN Charter. At the root of that Charter is the principle of the sovereignty and integrity of states. As a result, the Charter sets clear prohibitions on 'the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state' (article 2 S 4), allowing for the two exceptions only. The first is individual or collective self- defence (art.51), when a member state is the victim of aggression. Called to rule on attempts by some states to justify encroachment on other states' sovereignty by claims of self-defence.'"^ In late September 1998, Italian Defence Minister Benjamino Adreatta hinted that the danger of humanitarian catastrophe caused by Belgrade created the 'conditions for the application of article 51', meaning, presumably, the right to collective self defence. 145 According to the UN Charter, however, this right only applies lo states not entities such as Kosovo. International law governing the right of humanitarian intervention is incomplete. International practice has evolved swiftly during the 1990s. Yet the incipient political and moral consensus that intervention is somelinics necessary to prevent human-rights violation on a major scale has not been formalised into a set of rules of international law. It is now urgent that this consensus should be transformed into law. Incoming Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping came perhaps closest in spirit to German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel's argument in stating that he considered it essential that international law be further developed so that massive human-rights violations could be considered as legitimate ground for military intervention. International human-rights law is an offshoot of the UN's Declaration of Human Rights, and consists of a body of rules adopted either at the universal level (for example, the 1966 Covenants on International Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic and Social Rights; and the 1984 Convention against Torture), or the regional level (the 1949 European Convention on the Human Rights). These provides for a set of political or judicial procedures to monitor and respect for the rights involved. Some of these rights, such as the prohibition of torture, have been confirmed as having erga omnes quality. One of the weakness of human-rights law, however, is that apart from genocide-which is the object of a specific convention (1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) - definition of 'gross and massive violations of human rights' is no where to be found. Even in the case of genocide, which each state is obliged to 'prevent' and 'punish', the Convention does not have an enforcement mechanism, and is virtually silent on means to prevent the crime.'"^ But what is 146 also common to international human-rights law and humanitarian law is that however sophisticated they are becoming in laying out sanctions, they are silent on preventive measures. Yet, it is precisely the prevention of massive human rights violations of humanitarian catastrophes that has become the basis ol 'humanitarian intervention' practices in recent years. These practices have not yet been codified into law. The only certainly, about them is that, increasingly they give primacy to human rights over the sovereignty of states when the two principles conflict. At the root of humanitarian intervention is the recognition that population in danger of starvation, massacre or other forms of massive suffering have the right to receive assistance. That principles set-out by the Geneva Assembly's Resolution 43/131 (8 December 1988), reaffirmed and specified in the General Assembly's Resolution 45/100 (14 December 1990)-has been confirmed by many subsequent Security Council Resolutions.""' One therefore has to agree with French lawyer Mario Bettati that there is a certain 'hypocrisy' in international right of victims to assistance, it is not possible to derive a right of states to bring this assistance by all means, including military force. At best one has lo consider that states face a moral obligation which consists for the slate where a humanitarian disaster is occurring, in refraining from obstructing relief operations, and, for other states, in bringing assistance to those in need. The unfinished state of international law, and its strong political coloration. As stressed above, there is increasing recognition that human rights do not belong exclusively to the domestic affairs of slates. In addition, since ihe early ]99()s it has become the practice of the Security Council, supported by international opinion, to allow military intervention to rescue the victims of domestic conflicts.'"' Most international lawyers would 147 agree that the current law of the UN Charter does not accommodate the bombing of Yugoslavia, since the action was neither based on a Security Council decision under Charter VII of the UN Charter, nor pursued in collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter- the only two justifications for use of force that are currently available under international law. Nevertheless, many of these same lawyers, would also agree that there is a trend in today's international community towards a belter balance between iho security of states, on the one hand, and the security of the people, on the other. Recent statements by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also support this view. Addressing the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on T"" April 1999 - in the early days of NATO's bombing campaign and referring to the "universal sense out outrage"-provoked by the repression of Kosovo Albanians by Milosevic's regime, he stated: "Emerging slowly, but I believe surely, is an international norm against the violent repression of minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of sovereignty", and that the UN Charter should "never [be] the source of comfort or "justification" for "those guilty of gross and shocking violations of human rights".'10 8 148 REFERENCES 1. Thomas Emmerl, "Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo 1389", Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p.133 2. Dr. Gojko Vuckovic, "Ethnic Cleavages and Conflict: The Sources of National Cohesion and Disintegration", Ashgate Publisher, Aldershol, England, 1997, p.65. 3. J.F.O. Mcallister, "The Fire Next Time", Time, September 21, 1992, Volume 140, Number 12, p.23. 4. Madeleine Albright, "Madam Secretary A memoir", Macmillan, New York, 2003, p.379. 5. Valsan Cherian, "Turmoil in the Balkans", Frontline, March 30, 1991, Volume-8, Number-7, p.48. 6. Tim Judah, "Kosovo's Road to War", Survival, Volume-41, Number-2, Summer 1999, p.8. 7. Gazmen Yhudo, "Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans A. US Foreign Policy Perspective", Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1996, p.57. 8. Wallace J. Thies, "Compellence Failure of Coercive Success? The case of NATO and Yugoslavia", Comparative Strategy, Volume-22, Number-3, 2003, p.245. 9. Op. Cit. no. 6, p.11 10. "The Kosovo Liberation Army", IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 5, Issue 4, May 1999, p.l. 11. John Cherian, "Balkan dilemmas", Frontline, June 3, 1998, Vol.15, No.14, p.61 12. Hansjorg Strohmeyer, "Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor", American Journal of International Law, Volume- 95, Number-1, January 2001, p.49. 149 13. "Another Balkan Crisis", IISS Strategic Comments, VoIume-4, issue-5, June 1998, p.l. 14. "The Kosovo Liberation Army", IISS Strategic Comments, Volume-4, issue-7, August, 1998, p.2. 15. Council Statement of the Situation in Kosovo Brussels 30 April 1998, in "Texts of Statement and Communiques issued during 1998", NATO Office of Information and Press 1110 Brussels, Belgium Fax: (32-2) 7071252, E-mail: Distribution® H.Q. NATO INT, p. 163. 16. The Europa World Year Book 2000, Volume - 1, p.373. 17. Douglas Nailer, "The Balkan Mess", Time, October 5, 1998, Volume-152, Number 13, p.41. 18. Op. Cit. no. 14, p.l 19. Op. Cit. no. 8, p.253. 20. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Yugoslavia Trims Kosovo Presence", Washington Post, Washington, October 4, 1998, pp. A29, A35. 21. John Goshko, "US, Allies Inch Closer to Kosovo Intervention", Washington Post, Washington September 23, 1998, p. A21. 22. Catherine Guicherd, "International Law and the War in Kosovo", Survival, Volume -41, Number 2, Summer 1999, p.25. 23. Secretary General's Statement to Press following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 27 October 1998", NATO Review, Winter 1998, Volume 46, Number 4, p.12. 24. "War suspended in Kosovo", IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 4, issue-9, November 1998, p.l. 25. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers session. Final Communique, Brussels, 17, December 1998, NATO Review, Spring 1999, Volume 47, No.l, p.28. 150 26. Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's war Against Yugoslavia", Foreign Affairs, Volume-78 number-5, September/October 1999, p.2. 27. Rambouillet Agreement, http://www. State.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet text.html. 28. Op. Git. no. 8, pp.255-256. 29. Craig Whitney and Eric Schmitt, "Crisis in the Balkans: NATO Had Signs Its Strategy Would Fail Kosovars", New York Times, New York, April, 7, 1999, p. Al. 30. John Cherian, "Kosovo Statement", Frontline, March26,1999, Volume-16, Number-6, pp.50-51. 31. "Albanians sign peace accord", Hindustan Time, New Delhi, March 20, 1999, p.l4. 32. Jeffrey Lantis, "The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo", Comparative Strategy, 2002, Vol.21, no.l, p.21. 33. Noam Chomsky, "The New Military Humanism Lessons from Kosovo", Pluto Press, London, 1999, p.3. 34. Jamie Shea, "Instant history", NATO Review, Summer 2001, Volume-49, p.22. 35. Eqbal Ahmad, "Why NATO has failed". Frontline, May 7, 1999, Volume -16, Number 9, p.56. 36. Lieutenant General B.A.C. Droste, "Decisive Airpower Private", NATO's and partners for Peace, Issue Number- 2/1999, pp. 127-128. 37. "Air power over Kosovo", IISS Strategic Comments, Volume- 5, issue-7, September 1999, p.l. 38. Dr. Dragan Jovasevic, "NATO Genocide in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", Review of International Affairs, Volume-Ll, Number 1091-93, p.65. 151 39. N.C. Menon, "More planes for Kosovo likely", Hindustan Time, New Delhi, April 14, 1999, p.14. 40. John Cherian, "Raising the stakes in Kosovo", Frontline, May 7, 1999, Volume 16, No.9, p.54. 41. "Hearings on Case against NATO", The Hindu, New Delhi, October 25, 2001, p.14. 42. Blaine Harden, "Crisis in the Balkans: Doing the Deal", New York Times, New York, June 6, 1999, p.Al. 43. Elaine Harden and John M. Border, "Clinton's War Aims : Win the War, keep the U.S. Voters Content", New York Times, New York, May 22, 1999, p.Al. 44. Rob de Wijk, "Operation Allied Force : A Model for the Future", in "A Continent Apart: Kosovo, Africa and Humanitarian Intervention", ed. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2001, p.136. 45. Op. Cit. no. 10, p.l. 46. Ibid, p.3. 47. U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) news briefing, June 2, chart, "Serbian Air Defence" see http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Junl999/990602-J-000-M- 003jpg. 48. Michael R.Gordon and Craig R. Whitney, "Two Allies Press U.S. to Weigh the use of Ground Forces", New York Times, New York, April 22, 1999, p.Al. 49. Dana Priest, "A Decisive Battle that Never Was", Washington Post, Washington, September 19, 1999, p.Al. 50. Caroline King, "The New German Government and the Kosovo Conflict: A Painful Awakening", Politik, Summer 1999, number 11, pp.4-5 152 51. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "The new NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: Managing European Security in the Twenty- First Century", in "Almost NATO Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security", ed. Charles Krupnick, Rowan & Littlefield publishers, INC, Maryland, 2003, p.28. 52. David Rieff, "The Death of a Good Idea" Newsweek, May 10, 1999, Volume - CXXXIII, No.21, p.51. 53. Anuradha M. Chenoy, "The Making of New Russia", Har- Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2001, p.250. 54. Sergio Balanzino, "NATO's humanitarian support to the victims of the Kosovo Crisis", NATO Review, Summer 1999, Volume 47, No.2, pp. 10-11. 55. Madeleine Albright, "Madam Secretary A Memoir", Macmillan Press, New York, 2003, p.417. 56. Eric Schmilt, "Germany's Leader Pledges to Block Combat on Ground", New York Times, New York, May 20, 1999, p.l. 57. Tim Judah, "Greater Albania", Survival, Volume-43, no.2, summer 2001, p.7. 58. Major General Gary A Voellger, "NATO Airborne Early Warning Force Balkan Operations", NATO's Nations and Partners for peace. Issue No.2/1999, pp.30-31. 59. General Wesley Clark, "Air power in NATO's Future", NATO's Nations and partners for peace. Issue No.2/1999, p.12. 60. Joseph J. Eash III, "Harnessing technology for coalition warfare", NATO Review, Summer/Autumn 2000, Volume-48, pp.32-33. 61. Biswajit Choudhary, "Daunting Prospects for Serbia", Frontline, July 2, 1999, Volume-16, no.13, p.53. 62. David Rieff, "A Just war is still a War", N ewsweek, June 14, 1999, Volume-CXXXIII, No.24, p.25. 153 63. Michael Elliott, "We Owe Them", Newsweek, June 21, 1999, Volume -CXXXIII, No.25, p.20 64. Jamia Cohen, "Instant History", NATO Review, Summer 2001, Volume 49, p.22. 65. Roger Cohen, "Milosevic Agrees to U.N. Presence Inside Kosovo", New York Times, New York, June 2, 1999, P.Al. 66. Blaine Harden, "Crisis in the Balkans: Doing the Deal", New York Times, New York, June 6, 1999, P.Al. 67. "Full text of peace document", BBC, June 4, 1999, see http :// news. bbc. co. uk /hi /English /world /europe/newsid. 68. Elizabeth Becker, "Tricky Point for the Serbs: No Mention of U.N. Role" New York Times, New York, June 7, 1999 p.A17. 69. William Drozdiak, "Yugoslav Troops Devastated by Attack: B- 52 Raid Leaves Forces Pulverized", Washington Post, Washington, June 9, 1999, p.19. 70. Major General, Walter Jertz, "Decisive Force: Air Power Over the Balkan", NATO's Nations and Partners for peace, issue no.2/1999, p.54. 71. John Cherian, "A Key role for Russia", Frontline, July 30, 1999, Volume 16, No.l5, pp.53-54. 72. Ibid, p.53. 73. Lt. Gen. Sir Mike Jackson, "KFOR: Providing Security for building a better future for Kosovo", NATO Review, Autumn 1999, Volume 47, no.3, pp.16-17. 74. Henry A. Kissinger, '*As the Cheers Fade", Newsweek, June 21, 1999, Volume - CXXXIII, no.25, p.28. 75. Alexandres Yannis, "Kosovo Under International Administration", Survival, Summer 2001, Volume-43, no.2, pp.32-33. 154 76. Fareed Zakaria, "What price victory?", Newsweek, June 14, 1999, Volume - CXXXIII, No.24, p.14. 77. John Cherian, "War Crimes of the West", Frontline, February 16, 2001, Volume-18, No.3, p.58. 78. Christopher Dickey, "Seeds of Carnage", Newsweek, August 2, 1999, Volume - CXXXIV, No.5, p.36. 79. Hansjorg Strohmeyer, "The United Nations Missions in Kasovo and East Timor", American Journal of International Law, Volume-95, No.l, January 2001, p.49. 80. Zoran Kusovac, "Disbanded KLA to transform in 60 days", Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 September 1999, Volume 32, number 13, p.5. 81. General Klaus Reinhardt, "Commanding KFOR", NATO Review, Summer/Autumn, 2000, Volume-48, pp.16-17. 82. Jim Dorschner, "The political and social complexity of post war Kosovo means KFOR is set to stay for a long while yet", Jane's Defence Weekly, 22", Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 November 2000, Volume-34, No.22, p.8. March 2000, Volume- 33, No.22, p.25. 83. "NATO urged to curb Kosovo militants 84. Joshua Hammer, "The Writing on the Wall", Newsweek, December 11, 2000, Volume CXXXVI, No.24, p.49. 85. Tim Ripley, "Interview Brig Graham Binns Commander British Forces in Kosovo and KFOR's Multinational Brigade (Centre)", Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 August 2001, Volume - 36, No.8, p.32. 86. Lord Robertson, "Press Statement", PR/CP (2001) 168 (7 December 2001). 87. Ibid, pp.25-26. 155 88. Noelle Quenivet, "Report of the prosecutor of the ICTY concerning NATO bombing against the FRY: A Commenl", Indian Journal of International Law, July-September 2001., Volume 41, no.3, pp. 478-482.Ibid, p.484. 89. Ibid, p.484. 90. Ibid, p.492 91. Michael Elliott and Michael Hirsh, "Globallism and Sovereignty", Newsweek Special Issue, 2000, p.23. 92. Iqbal Ahmad, "Why NATO has failed", Frontline, May 7, 1999, Volume-16, No.9, p.57. 93. Greg Seigle, "Contact Group issues ultimatum on Kosovo", Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 February 1999, Volume-3l, No.5, p.3. 94. Geoffrey Robertson, "Not an Open-and-Shut Case", Newsweek, June 7, 1999, Volume - CXXXIII, No.23, p.26. 95. Press Conference of Secretary of State Madeliene K. Albright, London, U.K. 8 October, 1998; see http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/981008a.html. 96. Summary of the North Atlantic Council Consolations of 9 October 1998 by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, as given in the Statement of Foreign Minister Dr. Klaus Kinkel following the special session of the Bundestag in Bonn on 16 October 1998; see http: //www. bundesregierung .de/os/themenf.html. 97. Account of the Security Council debate. Press Release Sc/6659, 26 March 1999. 98. Kofi Annan's earlier exposition of the possible necessity for intervention, with particular reference to Kosovo, in his Ditchley Foundation Lecture, 'Intervention', Ditchley Park, England, 26 June 1998 (unpublished). 156 99. President Clinton, television address, 24 March 1999, published in the Washington Post, 25 March 1999, P.A 34. 100. Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo", Survival, Volume-41, no.3, Autumn 1999, p.104. 101. Jean Combacau and Serge Sur, "Droit international public," Monchrestien, Paris, 1997, p.645. 102. Catherine Guicherd, 'International Law and War in Kosovo", Survival, Volume 41, No.2, Summer 1999, p.20. 103. Ibid, pp.28-29. 104. Bundespress Amt Dokumenlation, Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 October 1998; see http;//www.bundesregierung,de/os/themenf,html 105. Malcom shaw, "International Law", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.210. 106. Catherine Guicherd "International Law and the War in Kosovo", Survival, Vol.41,no.2, Summer 1999, p.22. 107. Ibid p.23. 108. Malhias Ruch, "Reconstructing Kosovo: On the right track-bul where does it lead?", NATO Review, Autumn 1999, Volume 47, no.3, p.25. 157 CHAPTER - 5 Conclusion A stable peace on the planet in many respects also depended on peace of Europe. The whole of Europe has been trampled by jackboots and sodden with the blood of its peoples. No part of the continent has been spared the horrors of war from ancient times to ourday. It had witnessed the Greco-Persian and the Punic wars, the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the conquest of Gaul by Julius Caesar, the movement of the Goths against Italy, the wars of the Huns against the Goths, the struggle against the invasion of Genghis" Khan, the conquest of the Scandinavians, the Crusades, dynastic wars of the feudal lords, the Napoleonic wars for the division and the repartitioning of the World, wars that lasted seven, thirty and even one hundred years. Both World wars began in Europe. NATO was always intended to be both more and less than a military alliance. The original idea was the brainchild of Britain's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin. In Jan 1948, Bevin suggested to Washington that it would be possible to stem the further encroachment of the Soviet tide only "by organizing and consolidating the ethical and spiritual forces of Western civilization". The alliance had been created in 1949, in order to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and to solve the German problem. Besides preventively deterring the elusive Soviet threat, did NATO fend off other threats to Europe's peace? "Keeping the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down" has been cited as a triple raison d'etre ever since the alliance's first secretary-general. Lord Ismay, uttered the quip. Yet the nation of German menace was a fallacy. The first West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, had a hard time convincing his compatriots that the new German state needed an army at all. The alliance justified German rearmament on the 158 specious grounds that Germans has to be contained in a Western defence stnicture to proclivities; this excuse was originally intended to reassure the fearful postwar generation in France. Once the West had been reassured, the curious idea took hold that even the Russians liked NATO because it kept the German Bundeswher under American rein. When Soviet power collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989, an intense debate developed over the roles Europe's security institutions should play in the new era. Some, led by Moscow, favored abolishing both the Warsaw pact and NATO and giving primacy to a pan - European collective security organization, perhaps in the form of a strengthened Conference on Security and Cooperation on Europe. Others, led by Paris, believed that NATO was still needed, but that primacy should be given to European institutions such as the Western European Union and the European Community, which became the European Union (EU) when the Maastricht Treaty and European Union went into effect in November 1993. Still others, led by Washington and London, believe that direct American engagement in European security affairs is still indispensable and that NATO, which provided the organizational framework for American engagement in Europe, was indispensable as well. According to this line of thinking, NATO is needed to be preserved, reformulated, and made the centerpiece of Europe's new security architecture. European war has been avoided; who deserved the credit for that, as with anything that did not happen, will remain forever uncertain. Did NATO deter intended Soviet aggression? Did it curb the bellicosity of Germans and keep the lid on a crisis? Did it shorten the Cold War, bring it to a happy end? Did it keep the nuclear genie safely under control while the conflict lasted? Did it husband its other military forces well? With the Cold War over, evidence is now available to broaden the judgment on NATO and help provide answers to questions like these. NATO is not only a political and military reality but also an institution with a powerful legacy of historical success. Almost half a century of democracy, 159 stability, and prosperity in Western Europe, with most of those years passed under stressful Cold War conditions, has been possible because of NATO's defensive umbrella. This protection has also symbolized moral values in international affairs. NATO has been eminently successful in achieving the goal of deterrence. As a NATO publication has expressed it: "Not one square inch of free territory in Europe has fallen under Soviet domination since the signature of the Treaty". Now that the object has been achieved, voices are being raised suggesting that the marriage should be dissolved and its partners left free to look elsewhere for their security. But another characteristic of arranged marriages was thai they did not dissolve even after the children had grown up. For one thing, a household had been created that remained the family home. For another, spouse had grown used to one another, and even if there was still little affection, they had learned to make allowances for each other's infirmities. For a third, they could think of no other arrangement that was equally convenient to both. Most important of all, a separation was likely to have serious repercussions for their extended families and the society that surrounded them. So it is with NATO. It has built up a politico-military infrastructure that integrates the armed forces of much of Europe and provides the United States with a unique capacity to influence the policy of its allies and vice versa. It remains, astonishingly and perhaps absurdly and the Americans can meet to discuss their politico-military problems and make provisions for them. . Advocates of NATO expansion had given their views as follows;- First, It was said that NATO enlargement was needed to deter Russian aggression in Eastern and Central Europe. Second, advocates of NATO expansion maintained that, even if there is no Russian military threat, membership should be offered to Central Europe because this would "project stability" into the region. Michael Mandelbaun argued that NATO expansion would extend the Alliance's "Zone of Stability" 160 eastwards, while Volker Ruhe insisted that "if we do not export stahiiity, we will import instability. Third, advocates of NATO expansion maintained that, because it would take many years for former Warsaw Pact Slates to meet the economic and political standards of the European Union, the West must do something to reassure these states about their prospects of being fully integrated into the West. So NATO must provide a political and security anchor to these countries to the West. Fourth, advocates of NATO expansion, claimed that taking steps to bring Yisegrad states of Hungary, Czeck Republic, Slovakia into the Alliance would help to dampen aggressive nationalism and promote democracy in the region. There is nothing wrong with inertia so long as its keeps the object moving in the right direction, and few would deny that continuously solidarity and cooperation between the United States and the Nations of Europe remains an unexceptional goal. It might be argued that a military alliance is no longer a military threat, but it should be remembered that NATO was not just a military alliance in the first place. Today the threat that made its members emphasize their obligations under Article 5 at the expense of those under Article 2 no longer exists. So far as Article 2 is concerned, there is no reason why the membership of the Alliance should not be indefinitely extended, and the more widely the better. Who could possibly object to "the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded and by promoting conditions of stability and well- being"? If that were all that was involved the partners could extend their family indefinitely and rub along forever. Even the obligations undertaken under Article 5, the regard an armed attack against one or more of the members as an attack against them all, are not especially rigorous: all that the parties undertake to assist the parties so attacked is to take "such action as [they] deem necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain international peace and 161 security", What action is deemed necessary is left to the discretion of each party, and armed forces is seen only as a possible option. As the allies developed this comprehensive framework to reconcile contending interests and ensure NATO's relevance for the 21" century, they began realizing that their plans for the future v^rere mocked by the reality of war in Bosnia. They had treated Bosnia and Herzegovina as backwater, lying beyond the formal NATO treaty area, lacking in interest for all but a few of them, and clearly contained within its remote comer of the Balkans. That analysis proved unsound. As the moral and political implications of war and atrocity intruded on public attention, the allies came to see that NATO could achieve little else unless it also stopped the Bosnia war. They were finally impelled to use military force in the successful air campaign of August - September 1995 when they understood that allied credibility and political support for the broader security agenda demanded intervention in Europe's only open conflict. Responding decisively to ethnic conflict thus became an added NATO mission. A prime one was that active diplomacy needed military backing to be effective. NATO had provided that instrument. Without NATO's support, the UN could simply not have enforced the Adriatic embargo or the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. UNPROFOR personnel would not have the protection afforded by NATO air power as they carried out humanitarian and related peacekeeping tasks in threatening circumstances. The UN could not handle by itself the ever- increasing demand in the fields of crisis prevention and conflict resolution. There is no doubt that close cooperation between the UN and organizations such as NATO will be increasingly important in the future. The Western powers backed by NATO's military capabihty, finally succeeded in stopping the killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. In a vary real sense, a Bosnia that had almost destroyed the alliances proved its salvation. The alliance's actions in Bosnia brought every element of its future into play. Its military commands were reconfigured in particular to deploy combat forces through the Implementation Force, then the Stabilization Force, 162 now the European Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia learned new political-military duties of peace making. Built relations with the U.N. and Non governmental organizations and integrated operations in space and air, at sea and land. With military success in Bosnia and its new security architecture in place, by 1997 NATO was finally ready to decide which central European countries should be asked to joined. Three countries of Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic were chosen at the Madrid summit on a compound of several criteria. NATO needs to take steps to ensure that old, new, and prospective members live to its political standards, thereby securing the organization's coherence and relevance. If NATO is truly dedicated to protecting democracy human rights, and the rule of law, its own membership cannot be exempt from upholding those principles. The golden ring of NATO membership has certainly served as a powerful incentive for internal reform and modernization throughout central and eastern Europe. For many months in 1998, the allies temporized in the face of conflict and atrocity in Kosovo, as they has earlier done with Bosnia. Kosovo did present special problems it was part of sovereign stale, not independent; the U.N. Security Council has not asked NATO to act; and allies differed about the desirable outcome of the crises. Most insisted that the ambition of Kosovar Albanians be limited to some form of autonomy with few prepared to accept independence for Kosovo. Nevertheless, in October, 1998, NATO decided to use airpower to Serbian assaults, based on each ally's judgment of the legal basis for doing so, but most allies were relieved that a cease-fire agreement obviated the need to act. In February, 1999, however, renewed fighting and Serb atrocities required NATO to confront its responsibilities again. This time, before the alliance's resolve could be tested, the parties to conflict agreed to bargain at an Anglo-French peace conference at Rambouillet, France. The alliance did undertake to provide an implementation force if peace were achieved, structured along the lines of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. After the collapse of 163 negotiations and a major Serb military assault on Kosovo, NATO finally agreed to redeem its pledges to act. Serbia's decision to end the war over Kosovo is treated by many as a capitulation. The peace deal was however, very different from the Rambouillel draft accords, Yugoslavia's rejection of which in March 1999, had provided the occasion for NATO's attack. NATO officials do not like to acknowledge these differences. They have a logic to paint the outcome of the war as a complete victory - more than ample reward for the preceding eleven weeks of military effort and political stress. And there is little doubt that NATO achieved more of its objectives in this war than did the Serbs. But the Serbs did not come away with nothing. The peace deal leaves open the possibility of a continued Serb political struggle for Kosovo. It attenuates the very real possibility opened by the terms of the Rambouillet accords that NATO would use its new presence in Kosovo to push for further demands on Serbia. Milosevic can claim credit for these changes with his nationalist supporters; he can also claim that he did not give in without a hard fight. In contrast to the terms of the Rambouillet accords, the Serbs achieved five gains. First, the UN rather than NATO is the overarching political authority in Kosovo. Thus Serbia now has two friendly great powers - Russia and China - with influence over Kosovo's political future. Second, the legitimate political consolidation of Kosovo's independence may prove impossible. Third, the UN resolution is slightly more respectful of the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yougoslavia" with reference to Kosovo than was the Rambouillet document, though this is a subtle and perhaps debatable point. Fourth, the presence of Russian troops in Kosovo must be counted a Serb gain. Although Russian peace keepers may well have been deployed had Serbia accepted the Rambouillet plan, this was not to assume once that the UN became the overarching political authority in Kosovo, it would have 164 been very difficult for NATO to legitimately block the presence of Russian troops, even though NATO was the designated military presence. Fifth, the built in ability of the Rambouillet accords to lead to further NATO military interventions against Serbia has been eliminated. The strange clause of the Rambouillet accords (Appendix b, paragraph 8), tacked on late in the negotiations, that would have given NATO troops the freedom to operate anywhere in Yugoslavia was gone. Since the NATO victory and the withdrawal of all Serb police and Yugoslav troops in June 1999, Kosovo has been occupied by the Kosovo Force (KFOR)-42,000 troops dominated by NATO - and theoretically governed by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), UN Resolution 1244, which formally ended the war, recognizes Yugoslav sovereignty while instructing UNMIK to establish the institutions of 'substantial autonomy and self government' within Yugoslavia, 'pending a final settlement'. NATO and Russia say that independence is, therefore, out of the question. However, the Albanians of Kosovo will never accept any kind of Yugoslav rule. Contention centered on the very concepts of self-government and 'substantial autonomy'. While these concepts were perceived by the international administration as it key policy objectives, they meant very little to Albanians or Serbs. Both sides continued to pursue their completing objectives; secession and independence for the Kosovo Albanians; and preservation of Yugoslav sovereignty and return to rule from Belgrade for the Serbs. Thus, any policy decision undertaken by the international administration towards self-government and substantial autonomy was constructed by the local rivals as a move towards independence, and any decision appearing to preserve Yugoslav sovereignty, as a move away from independence and towards the reintegration of Kosovo into Yugoslavia. The main cause from optimism, however, is that the international administration now enjoys the confidence of both sides, a marked contrast to summer 1999, when UNMIK and KFOR were received as liberators by the 165 Kosovo Albanians and as an occupying force by the Serbs. The Serbs, both in Kosovo and Belgrade, are now prepared to cooperate - not merely by out of pragmatism but also because they believe that the international administration can be an impartial and constructive player. The positive relationship establishment by the new regime in Belgrade with the major international actors in Kosovo has been a significant help. The Kosovo Albanians continue lo maintain a high degree of confidence in the international administration and are largely convinced that the international community will not allow Kosovo lo fall under Serb rule again The conflict between Milosevic and the rest of the international community was at its very essence a conflict between two visions of Europe one vision-Milosevic's vision - is of a Europe of nationalism, authoritarianism and xenophobia; of a past that nobody should want to visit. The other vision - the vision of NATO Allies, E U members states and many Partner countries - is that of integration, democracy and ethnic pluralism. In short, the Euro-Atlantic community of the future. Kosovo is now one of the most difficult and complex issues, not only for the Balkans but, with its wider implications, especially, for the UN and European Union and, to some extent, for the USA and NATO. The FRY was transformed into the Association of the two States of Serbia and Montenegro. The Constitutional Charter of this new association treats Kosovo as a part of Serbia. The Situation in Kosovo and around remains as complex as ever, due lo the opposing positions of both sides Serbia and Kosovo Albanians. In the international community, divergent voices are heard on the future of Kosovo. The prevailing thinking, especially in UN and EU, seems to be that it is still too early to try and determine the final status of Kosovo. They feel that before discussing the final status of Kosovo, first certain conditions should be created. These include among others, the return of refugees and freedom of movement for all and a situation of security for Serbs and other non-Albanian ethnical groups. One of the arguments against the independence of Kosovo is that, it could lead to the 166 changing of borders, which is against basic provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, 1975. However, the borders in the Balkans are practically fixed since the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo's international status is strange in that although it is formally a province of the Republic of Serbia, actual administration is presently conducted by the United Nations with no involvement on the part of the Serbian governments (under Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999; The government of the province is the responsibility of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Under the terms of the Kumanovo agreement and subsequent UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which ended the Kosovo War, security is provided by the Kosovo Force, (KFOR), which is led by NATO and is answerable to UNMIK. The Albanians reject Serbian sovereignty, most Kosovo Albanians also do not believe that the Serbian side will respect Albanian rights. On the other side Serbia is adamantly opposed to the independence of Kosovo and for historical and religions reasons continues to see the province as the heartland of Serbian culture. The international community is reluctant to see Kosovo become independent, as its independence without Serbia's consent would violate international law (The principles of territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs). It could also potentially provide a precedent for the secession of the Republika Srpska from Bosnia, which could re-ignite the war in thai country. The most likely outcome is the indefinite continuation of the current situation (with EU institutions taking over the roles of UN and NATO, a process which can be observed in present-day Bosnia). The Suggestions to the Kosovo problem can be considered as follows: 1. Independence of Kosovo - For the'time being this option does not look realistic or promising, not only because of the Serbian resistance, but also it seems that the international community (UN, EU, USA) is not, as yet, inclined to accept such a solution. 167 2. Return to Serbia under its Sovereignty - Such solution seems at llie moment also unlikely and the international community might not be willing to impose it. 3. Continuation of the present status - in the absence of a final solution, this option might be necessary. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the UN would be ready to play its role through UNMIK much longer. 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Nelan, Bruce W., "A Perilous Peace", Time, December 4, 1995, Vol. 146, no. 23. Nelan, Bruce W., "A Pink Envelope, but the Answer Is Not Yes Another Peace Plan Fizzles, and international mediators struggle to put persuasive pressure on the Serb", Time, August 1, 1994, Vol. 144, no.5. Nelan, Bruce W., "A Whiff of Spring time In a negotiating flurry, the factions have produced a plan for federation and easing of the long siege of Sarajevo", Time, March 28, 1994, Vol. 143, no.l3 Nelan, Bruce W., "Bombs Bursting, Soldiers Dying", Time, August 7, 1995, Vol. 146, no.6. Nelan, Bruce W., "Marching Toward Bihac after 31 months of war. The World has still not found a way to stop the Serbs", Time, December 5, 1994, Vol. 144, no. 23. Nelan, Bruce W., "More Talking, More Bombing", Time, September 18, 1995, Vol. 146, no 12. Nelan, Bruce W., "NATO Plus the Three", Time, July 14, 1997, Vol. 149, no. 28. 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Nordland, Rod, "Angry at Everybody A year after the fall of Srebrenica, there is little relief for the women who survive it", Newsweek, July 22, 1996, Vol. CXXII, no.4. Nordland, Rod, "Leaving the Balkans to their Fate Bosnia : As Winter closes in, the West seems less likely than ever to intervent with military force", Newsweek, November 1, 1993, Vol. CXXII, no. 18. 196 Nordland, Rod, "The Fugitive Gen. Ratko Mladic has been indicted twice for war crimes against the Muslims", Newsweek, Apirl 22, 1996, Vol. CXXVII, no.l7. Ogden, Christopher, "Clinton's Battered Hynnal", Time, January 24, 1994. Vol. 143, no.4. Post, Tom and Barry John, "Not Crying Wolf This Time? Bosnia: Clinton gets tough on the Serbs again", Newsweek, August 9, 1993, Vol. CXXII, no.6. Post, Tom and Barry, John, "Out of the 'In' Box The White House has another new Bosnia Policy", Newsweek, May 31, 1993, Vol. CXXI, no.22. Post, Tom and Barry, John, "The latest Peace Plan : Dead on Arrival?", Newsweek, June 7, 1993, Vol. CXXI, no. 23. Post, Tom and Barry, John, "Uncle Sam Drops In Clinton's new relief plan for Bosnia pushes Washington into an aggressive role in the conflict", Newsweek, March 8, 1993, Vol. CXXI, no.lO. Post, Tom and Brand, Joel, "Crossing a No Man's Land", Newsweek, March 14, 1994, Vol. CXXIII, no.11 Post, Tom and Brand, Joel, "Testing the West's Resolve", Newsweek, May 2, 1994, Vol. CXXIII, no.18. Post, Tom and Liu, Melinda and Sonenshine, Tara, "Enough About Me", Newsweek, September 25, 1995, Vol. CXXVI, no.l3. 197 " Post, Tom and Liu, Melinda and Sonenshine, Tara, "Make War, Make Peace", Newsweek, September 11, 1995, Vol. CXXVI, no. 11. 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Watson, Russel and Lane, Charle, "Europe into a New Quagmire?", Newsweek, July 13, 1992, Vol. CXX, no.2. 199 • Watson, Russel and Nordland, Rod, "Opting out on the Adriatric", Newsweek, November 21, 1994, Vol. CXXIV, no. 21. • Zakaria, Fareed, "Could Russia Join the West", Newsweek, June 25, 2001, Vol. CXXXVII, no. 26. • Zakaria, Fareed, "What price victory?", Newsweek, June 14, 1999, Volume - CXXXIII, No.24. NEWSPAPERS • Batuk, Gathani, "E.U. army, NATO have Common goals", The Hindu, New Delhi, November 22, 2000. • Becker, Elizabeth, "Tricky Point for the Serbs: No Mention of U.N. Role", New York Times, New York, June 7, 1999. • Cohen, Roger, "Milosevic Agrees to U.N. Presence Inside Kosovo", New York Times, New York, June 2, 1999. • Drozdiak, William, "Yugoslav Troops Devastated by Attack : B-52 Raid Leaves Forces Pulverized", Washington Post, Washington, 9 June, 1999. • Gordon, Michael R. and Whitney, Craig R., "Two Allies Press U.S. to Weigh the use of Ground Forces", New York Times, New York, April 22, 1999. • Goshko, John, "U.S., Allies Inch Closer to Kosovo Intervention", Washington Post, Washington, September 23, 1998. 200 " Harden, Blaine, "Crisis in llie Balkans: Doing llic Deal", New York Times, New York, June 6, 1999. • Harden, Blaine and Border, John M., "Clinton's War Aims: Win the War, keep the U.S. Voters Content", New York Times, New York, May 22, 1999. • Harden, Blaine, "Crisis in the Balkans : Doing the Deal", New York Times, New York, June 6, 1999. • Hindu, New Delhi March 6, 2002. • Hindu, New Delhi, April 4, 2000. • Hindu, New Delhi, December 3, 2004. • Hindu, New Delhi, December 4, 1998. • Hindu, New Delhi, January 27, 2002. • Hindu, New Delhi, October 14, 2000 • Hindu, New Delhi, October 14, 2000. • Hindu, New Delhi, October 14, 2001. • Hindustan Time, New Delhi, March 20, 1999. • Menon, N.C., "More planes for Kosovo likely", Hindustan Time, New Delhi, April 14, 1999. • Priest, Dana, "A Decisive Battle that Never Was", Washington Post, Washington, September 19, 1999. • Schmitt, Eric, "Germany's Leader Pledges to Block Combat on Ground", New York Times, New York, May 20, 1999. 201 Siddharth, Varadarajan, "NATO's New Strategic Concept", Time of India, New Delhi, May 10, 1999. Smith, R. Jeffrey, "Yugoslavia Trims Kosovo Presence", Washington Post, Washington, October 4, 1998. Whitney, Craig and Schmitt, Eric, "Crisis in the Balkans: NATO Had Signs Its Strategy Would Fail Kosovars", New York Times, New York, April 7, 1999. 202