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NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN NATO This page intentionally left blank Nuclear Command and Control in NATO Nuclear Weapons Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response Shaun R. Gregory Lecturer Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford First published in Great Britain 1996 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-39607-8 ISBN 978-0-230-37910-7 (eBook) DOl 10.1057/9780230379107 First published in the United States of America 1996 by ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for --- -- -- -------------------- © Shaun R. Gregory 1996 Soficover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1996 978-0-333-64697-7 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written pemlission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written pennission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the tenns of any licence pemlitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WI P 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable 10 criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages_ 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 For Tracey Jayne Gregory This page intentionally left blank Contents List of Figures viii Acknowledgements ix List of Abbreviations x Introduction 1 1 Political Control of Nuclear Weapons in NATO 15 2 Nuclear Command and Control in NATO 51 3 US Nuclear Command and Control in NATO 80 4 Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons 103 5 French Nuclear Command and Control 130 6 Political Decision-Making in Crisis and War 149 Conclusion 192 Notes and References 201 Bibliography 229 Index 246 vn List of Figures 2.1 NATO Civil and Military Command Structure 53 2.2 Allied Command Europe (ACE) Command Structure 55 2.3 NATO Central Region Area Corps Sectors 58 2.4 Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) Command Structure 59 2.5 Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) Command Structure 61 vm Acknowledgements I am indebted to Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers for their support and encouragement over many years. My thanks are also due to the following who in many diverse ways have helped me: William Arkin, Desmond Ball, Bruce Blair, Paul Bracken, William Burrows, Duncan Campbell, Malcolm Chalmers, Daniel Charles, Admiral Sir James Eberle, Lawrence Freedman, Owen Greene, William Hall, Paul Helm, Jolyon Howorth, Andrew Kelly, Stuart Kemp, Richard Ned Lebow, J. M. Legge, Milton Leitenberg, Malcolm Spaven, John Steinbruner, and Philip Weber. Responsibility for errors is, however, entirely my own. I would also like to thank NATO and the MITRE Corporation for providing me with documentation and arranging visits, and the Center for Defense Information, Institute of Policy Studies, New Statesman and Society and the RAND Corporation for letting me look through relevant files. Thanks are also due to the Charities Aid Foundation, the Rowntree Trust and the Sir Robert Menzies Fellowship for supporting parts of the research. SHAUN R. GREGORY IX List of Abbreviations AAFCE Allied Air Force Central Europe ACCHAN Allied Command Channel ACCS Air Command and Control System ACE Allied Command Europe ACE-HIGH ACE Troposcatter Communications Network ACENET ACE Communications Network ACLANT Allied Command Atlantic ADGE Air Defence Ground Environment ADM Atomic Demolition Munition (nuclear mine) AEC Atomic Energy Commission AEGIS Airborne Early Warning/Ground Environment Integration Segment AEW Airborne Early Warning AFB Air Force Base AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe AFNORTH Allied Forces Northern Europe AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe AMF(L) ACE Mobile Forces (Land) ANMCC Alternative National Military Command Centre AOC Air Officer Commanding ARP Alert Response Plan ASTARTE Avion Station Relais de Transmissions Exceptionelles (France) ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network AUTO VON Automatic Voice Network AWAC Airborne Warning and Control BAOR British Army on the Rhine BICES Battlefield Intelligence Collection and Exploitation System BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System CCIS Command and Control Information System CDS Chief of Defence Staff CENTAG Central Army Group 'Chop' Transfer of NATO member's forces to operational command of SACEUR x List of Abbreviations XI CINCEUR Commander in Chief Europe CINCHAN Commander in Chief Channel CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CODA Centre d'Operations de la Defense Aeriennes (France) COEC Command Operations and Exercise Committee COFAS Centre d'Operations des Forces Aeriennes Strategiques (France) COTAM Commandement du Transport Aerien Militaire (France) DCN Defence Communications Network DCS Defense Communications System DDN Digital Defence Network DEB Digital European Backbone DEFCON Defence Condition DOD Department of Defense (US) DPC Defence Planning Committee DSN Defence Switched Network DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System DSSS Defence Secure Speech System (UK) DSP Defense Support Program (satellites) EAM Emergency Action Message EBAU Extended Battlefield Area Use EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECCCS European Command and Control Console System EDG European Deterrent Group EMP Electromagnetic Pulse ELF Extremely Low Frequency (radio) ERCS Emergency Rocket Communications System ETS European Telephone System FATAC Force Aerienne Tactique (France) FSL Field Storage Locations GEP Ground Entry Point GOP Generated Operations Plan GPG General Political Guidelines GPS Global Positioning System GWEN Ground Wave Emergency Network HF High Frequency (radio) IDCSP Initial Defence Communication Satellite Program IFF Identification Friend or Foe IMS International Military Staff IONDS Integrated Operational NUDET Detection System xii List of Abbreviations IVSN Initial Voice Switched Network JCEC Joint Communications and Electronics Committee JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System JSTPS Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff LAN Local Area Network LDU Limited Defensive Use LERTCON Alert Condition LF Low Frequency (radio) LNO Limited Nuclear Option MAO Major Attack Option MC Military Council MCC Missile Control Centre MEECN Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network MLF Multilateral Nuclear Force MNC Major NATO Command MOD Ministry of Defence (UK) MSC Major Subordinate Command NAC North Atlantic Council NACISC NATO Communications and Information Systems Committee NADGE NATO Air Defence Ground Environment NAEWF NATO Airborne Early Warning Force NARRS North Atlantic Radio Relay System NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCA National Command Authority NCCDPC NATO Command and Control and Data Processing Committee NCEB NATO Communications and Electronics Board NCP Nuclear Capability Plan NDAC Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee NEACP National Emergency Airborne Command Post NICS NATO Integrated Communications System NICSMA NICS Management Agency NJCEC NATO Joint Communications and Electronics Committee NMCC National Military Command Centre NMCS National Military Command System NOP Nuclear Operations Plan NORAD North American Air Defence List of Abbreviations xm NORTHAG Northern Army Group NPG Nuclear Planning Group NSC National Security Council NSTDB National Strategic Target Database NSTL National Strategic Target List NSVN NATO Secure Voice Network NUDET Nuclear Detonation Detection System NWAS Nuclear Weapon Accounting System NWS Nuclear Weapon Storage Site OTH-B Over-The-Horizon Backscatter (radar) PACCS Post Attack Command and Control System PAL Permissive Action Link PNL Prescribed Nuclear Load PNS Prescribed Nuclear Stockage PPG Provisional Political Guidelines PSC Principle Subordinate Command PTT Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications (commercial communications) QRA Quick Reaction Alert RAMSES Reseau Amont Maille Strategique et de Suivre (France) RBAU Restricted Battlefield Area Use RITA Reseau Integre de Transmissions Automatiques (France) RNO Regional Nuclear Options SAC Strategic Air Command SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic SAO Selective Attack Option SASP Special Ammunition Supply Points SATCOM Satellite Communications SCARS SACEUR Control Alerting and Reporting System SDS Survivable Defence System SEP Selective Employment Package SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan SITCEN Situation Centre SLFCS Survivable Low Frequency Communications System SSBN Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarine SSIP Sub System Integration Project STRIDA Systeme de Traitement et de Representation des Informations de Defense Aeriennes (France) XIV List of Abbreviations TACAMO Take Charge and Move Out' (US SSBN Airborne Command Post System) TARE Telegraph Automatic Relay Equipment TNF Theatre Nuclear Forces TTM Terrestrial Transmission Media TWU Theatre Wide Use UHF Ultra High Frequency (radio) UKADGE UK Air Defence Ground Environment VHF Very High Frequency (radio) VLF Very Low Frequency (radio) WEU Western European Union WHIDDS War Headquarters Information Display and Dissemination System WIS WWMCCS Information System WWMCCS World Wide Military Command and Control System .
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