Special articles Possession and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia An Assessment of Some Risks This paper examines some of operational requirements and the dangers that come with the possibility that in the foreseeable future India and Pakistan may deploy their nuclear arsenals. The authors first describe the analytical basis for the inevitability of accidents in complex high-technology systems. Then they turn to potential failures of nuclear command and control and early warning systems as examples. They go on to discuss the possibility and consequences of accidental explosions involving nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Finally some measures to reduce these risks are suggested. R RAJARAMAN, M V RAMANA, ZIA MIAN s citizens of nuclear armed states, ing periods of crises. Bruce Riedel, for- (DND) released by the National Security the people of India and Pakistan merly the Senior Director for Near East Advisory Board.4 It states that “India Amust confront the risks that go and South Asian Affairs at the US National shall pursue a doctrine of credible with possessing nuclear weapons. There Security Council, has disclosed that the minimum nuclear deterrence” and that is some public awareness of the holocaust “Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear this in turn requires that India maintain: that results when nuclear bombs are used arsenals for possible deployment” during (a) sufficient, survivable and operationally in warfare, a legacy of the ghastly attacks the 1999 Kargil crisis.1 Similarly, Raj prepared nuclear forces, (b) a robust com- by the US on the Japanese cities of Chengappa, a senior journalist with India mand and control system, (c) effective Hiroshima and Nagasaki over five decades Today with access to defence personnel, intelligence and early warning capabili- ago. But experience in the nuclear weap- reported that during the Kargil crisis, India ties, (d) planning and training for nuclear ons states shows that grave dangers attend “activated all its three types of nuclear operations, and (e) the will to employ even the mere possession and deployment delivery vehicles and kept them at what nuclear weapons.5 of nuclear weapons, not just when they are is known as Readiness State 3 – meaning The requirement for India to have ‘op- used deliberately in war. that some nuclear bombs would be ready erationally prepared’ nuclear forces is Deployment means keeping the warheads to be mated with the delivery vehicles at usually interpreted to mean deployment of that contain nuclear explosives attached to short notice… Prithvi missiles were de- nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles. delivery vehicles, ballistic missiles or ployed and at least four of them were Deployment of India’s nuclear weapons aircraft, and having them ready to be used readied for a possible nuclear strike. Even would, according to the DND, involve a to attack a designated target. In the case an Agni missile capable of launching a “triad of aircraft, mobile land-based mis- of the US and Russia, cold war crises, nuclear warhead was moved to a western siles and sea-based assets” structured for military planning, technological advance- Indian state and kept in a state of readi- ‘punitive retaliation’ so as to ‘inflict dam- ment, and nuclear doctrines that are tied ness”.2 More recently, there were a few age unacceptable to the aggressor’. The closely to each other have ensured that reports that as part of the military DND envisages “assured capability to shift even now many of their nuclear weapons mobilisation following the December 2001 from peacetime deployment to fully em- are deployed on a high state of alert, ready attack on India’s parliament and the sub- ployable forces in the shortest possible to be launched in a matter of minutes. From sequent crisis following the May 2002 time” (emphasis added). all that we know publicly, India and Pa- attacks in Kashmir, Pakistan and India had Pakistan does not have a comparable kistan are yet to deploy their missiles and deployed nuclear weapons.3 document detailing its envisaged nuclear bombers with nuclear warheads. Never- There is good reason to fear that the policy. One of the closest contenders is a theless the same factors which led the US operational deployment of nuclear weap- newspaper article authored by three lead- and Russia to deploy their weapons are ons may become a permanent condition in ing Pakistani statesmen, Agha Shahi, also evident in south Asia. the foreseeable future. The most official Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar. They Indeed, there have been reports of guide to India’s intended nuclear posture recommend that “In the absence of an nuclear forces being readied for use dur- is the August 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine agreement on mutual restraints, the size of Economic and Political Weekly June 22 , 2002 2459 Pakistan’s arsenal and its deployment US National Aeronautics and Space Ad- composite system. Normal accident theory pattern have to be adjusted to ward off ministration (NASA) were responsible for undercuts this method by highlighting the dangers of pre-emption and interception.” the January 1986 explosion of the Chal- unexpected and unquantifiable pathways They also suggest that “A high state of lenger space shuttle. In analysing this, that translate failure of small components alert will become more necessary as India sociologist Diane Vaughan observed that of a complex system to a failure of the proceeds with deployment of nuclear the ultimate origins of the accident “were whole. weapons”. in routine and taken-for-granted aspects of Due to its emphasis on both the tech- All of these raise the possibility that in organisational life that created a way of nology and the politics of interactions the foreseeable future India and Pakistan seeing that was simultaneously a way of within and between organisations, may deploy their nuclear arsenals. In this not seeing”.7 normal accident theory offers a more paper we examine some of operational Large bureaucratic organisations also faithful and troubling understanding of requirements and the dangers that come exhibit a tendency to downplay the possi- how nuclear weapons are handled in the with such deployment. We first describe bility of failures for fear of the reputation real world. This is in contrast to the per- the analytical basis for the inevitability of and even their budgets. This is reflected fectly operating machines and robot-like accidents in complex high-technology in a lack of recognition of all possible humans assumed by standard theories of systems. Then we turn to potential failures contingencies and not incorporating ad- nuclear deterrence.10 Therefore we have of nuclear command and control and early equate safety measures. This sense of no choice but to take the possibility of warning systems as examples. We go on infallibility is particularly marked in accidents seriously. We look now at some to discuss the possibility and consequences institutions that are characterised by of the kinds of accidents that could of accidental explosions involving nuclear ‘expertise’ and ‘discipline’ and further happen in south Asia and their possible weapons and their delivery systems. Fi- compounded where national security is consequences. nally we suggest some measures to reduce involved. these risks. More than any other, systems for the Command and Control Issues command and control of nuclear weapons Accidents in Complex Systems possess these characteristics. Political The problem of managing nuclear weap- scientist Scott Sagan, in an important ons in the real world poses unprecedented Almost 20 years ago, sociologist Charles and wide-ranging study of several de- challenges.11 As one description has viv- Perrow analysed a variety of accidents cades of experience with nuclear weapon idly laid out, managing nuclear weapons involving complex technological systems, systems in the US, identified a number of “involves the unpredictability of circum- including the Three Mile Island nuclear accidents, close calls and near misses stances and human behaviour interacting reactor, various petrochemical plants, ships and concluded that while on any given with complex sensors, communications and aircraft and more. He identified two day the risk of a serious nuclear weapons systems, command centres and weapons. structural features of these technologies – accident may be low, in the long run such The smallest details can assume central ‘interactive complexity’ (sub-systems in- an accident is extremely likely.8 Sagan importance and range widely in substance, teracting in unexpected ways) and ‘tight points out how in ‘total institutions’ like from the legitimacy of presidential succes- coupling’ (sub-systems having rapid im- a military command, the strong organi- sion to computer algorithms, from the pact on each other) – which make them sational control over members can “en- psychology of stress to the physics of accident prone.6 Perrow coined the term courage excessive loyalty and secrecy, electromagnetic pulse…Even the most ‘normal accidents’ to explain how serious disdain for outside expertise, and in some advanced experts and the most experi- accidents appear to be an inevitable con- cases even cover-ups of safety problems, enced practitioners are narrowly and in- sequence of such technologies, regardless in order to protect the reputation of the completely informed. No one understands of the intent or skill of their designers or institution.”9 the whole.”12 operators. Other scholars have applied the Normal accident theory does not provide same insights to a variety of different a quantitative estimate of the probability Authority and Procedures systems. of any given accident. This should not be Normal accident theorists highlight the taken as a deficiency of the theory. Broadly It is a normal requirement of every interplay between complex technologies, speaking there are two traditional ways of deployed military weapon that it should the organisations and bureaucracies con- generating numerical probabilities of fail- only be used when authorised by the trolling them and society at large.