Special articles Possession and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia An Assessment of Some Risks

This paper examines some of operational requirements and the dangers that come with the possibility that in the foreseeable future India and Pakistan may deploy their nuclear arsenals. The authors first describe the analytical basis for the inevitability of accidents in complex high-technology systems. Then they turn to potential failures of nuclear command and control and early warning systems as examples. They go on to discuss the possibility and consequences of accidental explosions involving nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Finally some measures to reduce these risks are suggested.

R RAJARAMAN, M V RAMANA, ZIA MIAN

s citizens of nuclear armed states, ing periods of crises. Bruce Riedel, for- (DND) released by the National Security the people of India and Pakistan merly the Senior Director for Near East Advisory Board.4 It states that “India Amust confront the risks that go and South Asian Affairs at the US National shall pursue a doctrine of credible with possessing nuclear weapons. There Security Council, has disclosed that the minimum nuclear deterrence” and that is some public awareness of the holocaust “Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear this in turn requires that India maintain: that results when nuclear bombs are used arsenals for possible deployment” during (a) sufficient, survivable and operationally in warfare, a legacy of the ghastly attacks the 1999 Kargil crisis.1 Similarly, Raj prepared nuclear forces, (b) a robust com- by the US on the Japanese cities of Chengappa, a senior journalist with India mand and control system, (c) effective Hiroshima and Nagasaki over five decades Today with access to defence personnel, intelligence and early warning capabili- ago. But experience in the nuclear weap- reported that during the Kargil crisis, India ties, (d) planning and training for nuclear ons states shows that grave dangers attend “activated all its three types of nuclear operations, and (e) the will to employ even the mere possession and deployment delivery vehicles and kept them at what nuclear weapons.5 of nuclear weapons, not just when they are is known as Readiness State 3 – meaning The requirement for India to have ‘op- used deliberately in war. that some nuclear bombs would be ready erationally prepared’ nuclear forces is Deployment means keeping the warheads to be mated with the delivery vehicles at usually interpreted to mean deployment of that contain nuclear explosives attached to short notice… Prithvi missiles were de- nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles. delivery vehicles, ballistic missiles or ployed and at least four of them were Deployment of India’s nuclear weapons aircraft, and having them ready to be used readied for a possible nuclear strike. Even would, according to the DND, involve a to attack a designated target. In the case an Agni missile capable of launching a “triad of aircraft, mobile land-based mis- of the US and Russia, cold war crises, nuclear warhead was moved to a western siles and sea-based assets” structured for military planning, technological advance- Indian state and kept in a state of readi- ‘punitive retaliation’ so as to ‘inflict dam- ment, and nuclear doctrines that are tied ness”.2 More recently, there were a few age unacceptable to the aggressor’. The closely to each other have ensured that reports that as part of the military DND envisages “assured capability to shift even now many of their nuclear weapons mobilisation following the December 2001 from peacetime deployment to fully em- are deployed on a high state of alert, ready attack on India’s parliament and the sub- ployable forces in the shortest possible to be launched in a matter of minutes. From sequent crisis following the May 2002 time” (emphasis added). all that we know publicly, India and Pa- attacks in Kashmir, Pakistan and India had Pakistan does not have a comparable kistan are yet to deploy their missiles and deployed nuclear weapons.3 document detailing its envisaged nuclear bombers with nuclear warheads. Never- There is good reason to fear that the policy. One of the closest contenders is a theless the same factors which led the US operational deployment of nuclear weap- newspaper article authored by three lead- and Russia to deploy their weapons are ons may become a permanent condition in ing Pakistani statesmen, Agha Shahi, also evident in south Asia. the foreseeable future. The most official Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar. They Indeed, there have been reports of guide to India’s intended nuclear posture recommend that “In the absence of an nuclear forces being readied for use dur- is the August 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine agreement on mutual restraints, the size of

Economic and Political Weekly June 22 , 2002 2459 Pakistan’s arsenal and its deployment US National Aeronautics and Space Ad- composite system. Normal accident theory pattern have to be adjusted to ward off ministration (NASA) were responsible for undercuts this method by highlighting the dangers of pre-emption and interception.” the January 1986 explosion of the Chal- unexpected and unquantifiable pathways They also suggest that “A high state of lenger space shuttle. In analysing this, that translate failure of small components alert will become more necessary as India sociologist Diane Vaughan observed that of a complex system to a failure of the proceeds with deployment of nuclear the ultimate origins of the accident “were whole. weapons”. in routine and taken-for-granted aspects of Due to its emphasis on both the tech- All of these raise the possibility that in organisational life that created a way of nology and the politics of interactions the foreseeable future India and Pakistan seeing that was simultaneously a way of within and between organisations, may deploy their nuclear arsenals. In this not seeing”.7 normal accident theory offers a more paper we examine some of operational Large bureaucratic organisations also faithful and troubling understanding of requirements and the dangers that come exhibit a tendency to downplay the possi- how nuclear weapons are handled in the with such deployment. We first describe bility of failures for fear of the reputation real world. This is in contrast to the per- the analytical basis for the inevitability of and even their budgets. This is reflected fectly operating machines and robot-like accidents in complex high-technology in a lack of recognition of all possible humans assumed by standard theories of systems. Then we turn to potential failures contingencies and not incorporating ad- nuclear deterrence.10 Therefore we have of nuclear command and control and early equate safety measures. This sense of no choice but to take the possibility of warning systems as examples. We go on infallibility is particularly marked in accidents seriously. We look now at some to discuss the possibility and consequences institutions that are characterised by of the kinds of accidents that could of accidental explosions involving nuclear ‘expertise’ and ‘discipline’ and further happen in south Asia and their possible weapons and their delivery systems. Fi- compounded where national security is consequences. nally we suggest some measures to reduce involved. these risks. More than any other, systems for the Command and Control Issues command and control of nuclear weapons Accidents in Complex Systems possess these characteristics. Political The problem of managing nuclear weap- scientist Scott Sagan, in an important ons in the real world poses unprecedented Almost 20 years ago, sociologist Charles and wide-ranging study of several de- challenges.11 As one description has viv- Perrow analysed a variety of accidents cades of experience with nuclear weapon idly laid out, managing nuclear weapons involving complex technological systems, systems in the US, identified a number of “involves the unpredictability of circum- including the Three Mile Island nuclear accidents, close calls and near misses stances and human behaviour interacting reactor, various petrochemical plants, ships and concluded that while on any given with complex sensors, communications and aircraft and more. He identified two day the risk of a serious nuclear weapons systems, command centres and weapons. structural features of these technologies – accident may be low, in the long run such The smallest details can assume central ‘interactive complexity’ (sub-systems in- an accident is extremely likely.8 Sagan importance and range widely in substance, teracting in unexpected ways) and ‘tight points out how in ‘total institutions’ like from the legitimacy of presidential succes- coupling’ (sub-systems having rapid im- a military command, the strong organi- sion to computer algorithms, from the pact on each other) – which make them sational control over members can “en- psychology of stress to the physics of accident prone.6 Perrow coined the term courage excessive loyalty and secrecy, electromagnetic pulse…Even the most ‘normal accidents’ to explain how serious disdain for outside expertise, and in some advanced experts and the most experi- accidents appear to be an inevitable con- cases even cover-ups of safety problems, enced practitioners are narrowly and in- sequence of such technologies, regardless in order to protect the reputation of the completely informed. No one understands of the intent or skill of their designers or institution.”9 the whole.”12 operators. Other scholars have applied the Normal accident theory does not provide same insights to a variety of different a quantitative estimate of the probability Authority and Procedures systems. of any given accident. This should not be Normal accident theorists highlight the taken as a deficiency of the theory. Broadly It is a normal requirement of every interplay between complex technologies, speaking there are two traditional ways of deployed military weapon that it should the organisations and bureaucracies con- generating numerical probabilities of fail- only be used when authorised by the trolling them and society at large. The rigid ures of systems. The first is to look at the appropriate authority and that the weapon and hierarchical nature of many organi- history of operations of these systems and will function as and when required (i e, sations that operate high-technology the number of failures during this period. it should be both reliable and safe). With systems prevents the vertical flow of This might work when the statistics of the nuclear weapons these demands become information from the field to the control- system and its failures are sufficiently large, especially important since unlike ordinary ling administration. At the same time, the as for example when dealing with auto- weapons nuclear weapons have acquired compartmentalisation of different wings mobile accidents around the world. But an important diplomatic and political of such organisations suppresses this assumption does not hold for nuclear utility short of their use as an explosive. horizontal flow of information. These weapons and their associated systems. The Only the highest political authorities are affect the ability of individuals in these second method, sometimes called the Fault meant to be able to authorise the use of organisations to recognise signals of po- Tree method, is to look at failure rates of nuclear weapons. [There is however the tential failures and react appropriately. individual components and use them to possibility that the head of the state breaks Some of these factors in the case of the compute the probability of failure of the down in a crisis. Political scientist Bruce

2460 Economic and Political Weekly June 22, 2002 Russett mentions how “Richard Nixon, survivability. All of these create problems of these occasions, the world was just under the strains of his final days in the for effective and robust command and con- minutes away from a possible nuclear presidency, is said to have sobbed, beaten trol. A different complication is introduced holocaust through error. With a missile his fists on the floor of his office, and to by the widespread, large-scale effects of flight time of 25-30 minutes from the US have mused about his ability to release the nuclear war – these could disrupt commu- to Russia and vice versa, the time available forces of nuclear disaster. Defence secre- nication systems that allow leaders or to the US president for deciding how to tary Schlesinger took special precautions commanders to communicate with field respond was at most 15 minutes – which to prevent unauthorised military acts or personnel. It is an often overlooked fact US officials admit would be available only irrational orders.”13 ] that no nuclear command and control “if every procedural and physical element Even the most intelligently designed system has ever had to operate under the in the whole warning and strategic com- system of command and control will not conditions in which it is intended to mand and control structure works per- work unless the rules are carefully fol- actually function, i e, during nuclear war. fectly”.20 An independent assessment of lowed. An example of this was during the It is possible that fearing such worst-case the same system suggests that there might 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis at Malmstrom circumstances, field commanders may be only be about 10 minutes available to the Air Force Base in Montana, US. An given the physical ability to launch nuclear US in which to make a decision, with an independent historical investigation sug- weapons without authorisation by high- even tighter constraint on Russia.21 gested that during this crisis official safety level political leaders. Technology and operating procedures rules were not implemented and personnel combine at times to create major failures at the base had the ability to launch these False Alarms of early warning systems. A vivid example missiles without authorisation.14 from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in- Moreover, there can be no manual The possession of a nuclear arsenal volved an early warning radar that picked containing minutely detailed procedures invites possible attacks by nuclear weap- up what appeared to be a missile launch to cover all possible situations. As the US ons of others. This has prompted nations from Cuba against the US and reported it found for its SAGE warning and control to build systems to provide early warning over the voice hotline to the command system, “it was impossible to specify in of impending attack. The DND has posited centre. Even after rechecking, the data was advance all of the contingencies that a requirement for “effective intelligence unambiguous. Since the missile was short could be faced in the course of actual and early warning capabilities”; it has also range, there was nothing to do but wait for operations. Reliance on formal written called for the creation of “space based and the detonation – which did not occur. It procedures proved impractical, and un- other assets” to “provide early warning, took a few minutes after that for analysts written work-arounds soon developed communications, damage/detonation as- to realise that someone had inserted a among the human operators.”15 The larger sessment”. software test tape at the same time as when lesson drawn in a study of this and other With these shall come the danger of false the radar had detected a satellite, resulting systems is that “any nuclear command alarms and miscalculations. The history of in confusion.22 organisation circumvents official proce- the cold war between the US and the USSR Early warning systems in India and dures in order to carry out its assigned abounds with examples. The US for in- Pakistan will, of course, also be prone to mission. Such rule short-cutting is likely stance had built an elaborate ‘early warn- false alarms. The situation in south Asia to be oral and informal, and therefore ing system’ which would warn them about is made more severe by geography. The invisible to outside observation except impending missile attacks. The US early missile travel time between Pakistan and under the high-stress conditions of actual warning system was very sophisticated and India is only about 10 minutes – far too war or crisis”.16 used the latest state of the art technology short a time to provide any meaningful One of the problems during a war or a involving a worldwide network of satel- warning or permit sensible decision-mak- crisis stems from that the fact that the lites and radars, with layers of filters to ing. Bombs delivered by planes will take command and control authorities have not remove false signals. Yet, from 1977 longer, but that is offset by the difficulty only to transmit their orders to military through 1984, the only period for which in spotting the bombers carrying nuclear personnel on the field, i e, issue a com- official information has been released, the weapons from the dozens of other similar mand, but receive feedback on the situa- early warning systems gave an average of planes in action during wartime. In light tion on the field necessary for control. 2,598 warnings each year of potential of these constraints, DND’s call for setting However, military forces may need to be incoming missiles attacks. Of these about up early warning systems must be bal- covert to ensure their survival and there- 5 per cent required further evaluation.18 anced by a recognition that such a system fore cannot transmit information for the Information about the Russian experi- would be more a source of last-minute fear that it would divulge their location. ence is scarce, but there have been many false signals and confusion than timely and The contradiction deepens as the tempo of false alarms there too. In 1995 for instance, reliable information for effective decision- the battle increases, since information a Norwegian scientific rocket launch was making. transmitted back would decrease, and the interpreted by the Russian early warning These problems would be compounded orders from higher authorities become system as a possible attack and the matter during military crises. Amid the threats of increasingly divorced from the realities on went all the way up the command chain attack, a dysfunctional early warning sys- the field.17 to president Yeltsin.19 tem will exacerbate the fear that nuclear India’s DND recommends that nuclear Fortunately in each of these cases the attack is imminent, creating profound forces shall operate through “a combi- mistake was discovered in time to forestall dilemmas for policy-makers. They may nation of multiple redundant systems, the ultimate counter-attack decision. Nev- find themselves under immense pressure mobility, dispersion and deception” for ertheless, the shocking fact is that on many to prepare or launch a pre-emptive attack

Economic and Political Weekly June 22 , 2002 2461 thereby compounding the crisis. Their discipline for the duration of such special released by the US Department of Defence alternatives might seem to be to use their projects. However, nuclear weapons in 1981 lists 32 accidents involving US nuclear weapons first or sit on their hands command, communication and launching nuclear weapons between 1950 and and wait for the bombs from the other sides systems are different in nature.24 They are 1980.26 These accidents are typically to land. Under such circumstances decla- not going to be used on some pre-specified caused by mishaps of delivery vehicles, rations of No First Use may serve as no date, or periodically, from time to time. either aircraft or missiles. Notable among obstacle. Hopefully they will remain unused for missile accidents is the 1960 case of a US The dilemmas of command and control years together. Yet, in the event of a nuclear BOMARC missile at the McGuire Air Force mentioned earlier become more acute with crisis the system will be called upon, within base in New Jersey, which suffered an the installation of an early warning system a matter of minutes, to function from end explosion, and a fire in the missile’s fuel that is inevitably prone to false alarms and to end with full efficiency. Therefore, it tanks.27 There have also been accidents create the risk of inadvertent launch through will have to be maintained in perfect involving aircraft, the most famous being failure of technology. Nuclear weapons working order day after day at a zero margin near Palomares, Spain, and Thule, and missiles utilise a vast array of sensitive of error in anticipation of a sudden crisis. Greenland. In both cases, aircraft carrying hi-tech components as do satellite-based Periodic checks and practice drills on nuclear weapons crashed and the high detection systems and command and con- individual links of the system are no explosive surrounding the nuclear core trol structures. At a time of nuclear crisis, substitutes for the real thing, when the detonated, leading to the dispersal of each of these systems has to work with entire system has to function amidst the plutonium over a large region.28 total precision. A failure could lead to chaos and tension of an impending nuclear Information about accidents in the erst- misinterpretation or miscalculation result- attack. In the past, our proven record with while Soviet Union is harder to obtain, but ing in an inadvertent launch. the long-term maintenance of important there are reports of at least 25 serious The US experience teaches us the valu- but mostly dormant systems has not been nuclear weapon accidents there.29 These able lesson that even a system using the so glorious. There is a tendency to start include a 1977 accident in which fuel most sophisticated technology in the world, with great alertness and efficiency and leaked from a nuclear missile in its silo made with the best available components then, as nothing untoward happens for a and subsequently exploded. Even as re- and manned by a highly trained elite corps while, to let the vigilance slip. cently as June 16, 2000 a ballistic missile of the US military can fail time and again that was being unloaded near Vladivostok due to factors as mundane as human error Explosions Involving Nuclear from a transport ship caught on the pier and computer chip malfunction. We must Weapons railing.30 This led to a leak of approxi- add to this a realistic assessment of the mately 3 tonnes of the oxidising agent, state of technology and organisation in There is a family of risks associated with which in turn exploded. A number of people south Asia. One telling example is the the storage and deployment of nuclear were injured and villages had to be evacu- report that prime minister Vajpayee cannot weapons, with the risk increasing with ated. Fortunately in that instance the missile make a direct phone call from his aircraft alert status.25 These arise because deployed did not carry a nuclear warhead. since Air India One, a 20-year-old Boeing nuclear weapons are part of a system that Liquid fuelled missiles, India’s Prithvi 737-200, doesn’t have the facility.23 No includes the missiles or planes or other and Pakistan’s Ghauri, are of particular one familiar with the way infrastructural delivery systems into which they are in- concern, especially during launch prepa- facilities function in India or Pakistan can tegrated when they are operational, as well rations. The Prithvi missile, for example, fail to be concerned about our ability to as the physical environment during their is fuelled by a liquid propellant consisting maintain and run, day after day, such a vast storage and transport. These are tightly of an oxidiser of inhibited red fuming and complex array of communication coupled systems that can be prone to many nitric acid (IRFNA) and a 50:50 mixture systems at a zero-error level. This is not kinds of accidents. of xylidine and triethylamine.31 This due to inherent inability. After all, both Of particular concern are accidents and combination is hypergolic, i e, self-ignit- countries have successfully completed fires involving the highly combustible fuels ing and highly volatile and has to be loaded many complex technological missions. used in missiles and aircraft in the vicinity just prior to launch. However, there are important differences of nuclear weapons. Although tucked away Solid fuel missiles carry their own haz- between something like a space launch and inside a metal shell, a nuclear bomb is still ards, associated with inadvertent ignition. the maintenance of nuclear command and vulnerable to being ignited by external This can be caused by a number of sources, control systems. A failure in some com- fires and explosions. The most vulnerable including stray or induced electrical cur- ponent of a space launcher may lead to element is the shell of powerful chemical rents and electrostatic discharges; it is rescheduling, or at worst the loss of the high explosive (HE), which surrounds the believed that a US Pershing missile was rocket and satellite. Those are certainly core of either plutonium or highly enriched ignited while in its transporter erector very serious and expensive consequences, uranium in a typical nuclear fission weapon. vehicle by such effects.32 Impacts, such but nowhere as catastrophic as the possible (In fusion weapons, there is a second stage as being struck by a bullet or being dropped consequences of a failure of some crucial that is in turn ignited by the fission weapon on to a hard surface, and “excessive communications link or a weapon safety described here.) The purpose of the HE is mechanical vibration, e g, prolonged mechanism. to crush the fissile material core into a bouncing during transport” can also trig- Another difference is that a space launch critical mass and trigger a chain reaction, ger ignition.33 The latter could be a par- or a nuclear test is an individual time- leading to the nuclear explosion. ticularly acute problem for road mobile bound project climaxing in a particular There have been many accidents involv- solid fuelled missiles such as India’s Agni event. It may be possible to maintain tight ing nuclear weapons. An official summary and Pakistan’s Shaheen if they were to be

2462 Economic and Political Weekly June 22, 2002 inducted into the armed forces and de- catches fire due to some external accident plosion, this is still a huge tragedy. Even ployed into the field. or fire it could result in one of three the lower estimate of this casualty count There have been no reports so far of possibilities, listed below in increasing is larger than the total number of fatalities accidents in south Asia involving long- order of seriousness: in the September 11 attack on New York’s range ballistic missiles, but there have been (i) the High Explosive burns but does not World Trade Centre that shook the world. accidents at missile development and detonate; The risk of such an accident is not far- production facilities. A recent example (ii) the HE detonates leading to vaporisation fetched. There are bases and cantonments was the fire at the High Explosive Mate- of the plutonium and its dispersal into the at the edges of large cities and there is no rials Research Laboratory, Pune, belong- atmosphere; publicly available information that assures ing to the Defence Research and Devel- (iii) The HE detonates triggering an un- us that a nuclear weapon will not be stored opment Organisation on April 25, 2002; controlled fission reaction and a nuclear in one of these or transit though them. the accident involved sensitive chemicals explosion. Even if such an accident did not take in the solid rocket propellant section of the In the first scenario, the burning of the place at the edge of a major metropolis but laboratory and killed six people including HE will lead to the melting of the weapon happened, say, 50 kilometres upwind of four casual labourers.34 and could release a limited amount of a middle-sized town the resulting toll Even familiar military systems show a plutonium into the environment. But this would still be considerable. Our estimates disturbing safety pattern in south Asia. will be localised in the immediate vicinity show that it would lead to approximately India’s Comptroller and Auditor General of the accident and limit the severity of 200-900 fatalities from the town and the reported in 1997 that there had been 187 its effect on the environment and public surrounding countryside. In all these cases, accidents and 2,729 incidents involving health. So we will not elaborate on this in addition to the fatalities there will be Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft between possibility any further. the medical costs of treating the fatal and April 1991 and March 1997, in which the Let us now consider the second scenario. non-fatal cancers resulting from inhala- IAF lost 147 aircraft and 63 pilots.35 The Even if the detonation of the HE does not tion of plutonium. To this human cost has Comptroller’s report suggested 41 per cent result in a full-scale nuclear explosion, it to be added the massive financial cost of of the losses were due to human error while can convert all of the plutonium into a fine even limited decontamination of just the 44 per cent were due to technical defects, aerosol.42 This aerosol will rise with the immediate neighbourhood of the accident, and claimed, “The IAF attributed the acci- hot gases created by the explosion, mix which could be hundreds of crores of dents to technical defects due to deficient with the air and spread. Any prevailing rupees.45 operation/maintenance procedure”.36 wind would transport it to considerable According to the Pakistan Institute for Air distances, typically up to tens of kilometres. Accidental Nuclear Detonation Defence Studies, there were 11 major People and animals in this region would Pakistan Air Force (PAF) accidents between inhale this plutonium-laden atmosphere. The estimate of casualties and damage January 1997 and August 1998 in which The biological damage caused by plu- described above is not for a nuclear ex- planes were lost.37 There were at least tonium exposure is a complicated matter, plosion, but only for the detonation of the another seven accidents involving airforce but it has been studied extensively. The high explosive in the weapon. The deto- planes by April 2000. Accidents involving two primary routes of damage by pluto- nation of the high explosive surrounding Pakistani military jets have included crashes nium contamination are ingestion and a nuclear core could trigger in turn a nuclear into heavily populated areas. In July 1998 inhalation. Ingestion of plutonium is a less explosion. This possibility has prompted a PAF jet from PAF Masroor crashed into significant risk since almost all of the the US and Russia to build in safety fea- a residential area in Karachi, killing six plutonium is excreted within a few days.43 tures into the design of their weapons. For people and injuring at least 25.38 The more serious risk comes from inha- instance, modern nuclear weapons in the There have also been many major fires lation of very small plutonium particles, US arsenal are said to be ‘one-point safe’, in large ammunition depots. In April 2000, which can stay imbedded deep in the lungs i e, their design ensures that the accidental a fire at the Bharatpur field ammunition typically for periods of the order of a year, explosion of just one of the HE packages depot destroyed around 12,000 tonnes of leading to increased rates of lung, liver and will not trigger a nuclear explosion.46 ammunition, including surface-to-air mis- bone cancers. Even at arbitrarily low con- However, considerable testing has to be siles, anti-tank guided missiles, tank and centrations inhalation of this plutonium done before installing such safety mea- artillery shells.39 There were other similar poses a non-zero cancer hazard. Conse- sures into weapon design. The US is fires at Birdhwal Head and at Bikaner. In quently there is a substantial cumulative estimated to have carried out about 130 April 1988, the Ojhri ammunition depot contribution to cancer fatalities even from very low yield safety related tests, of which located close to the twin cities of Islamabad areas faraway from the site of the accident. 62 are officially acknowledged as one- and Rawalpindi exploded; the official toll Imagine a nuclear weapons accident of point safety tests.47 The USSR reportedly was about a hundred people killed and a this type at an air force base or nuclear conducted about 25 safety tests between thousand injured.40 Other tallies suggested weapons depot, which happens to be at the 1949 and 1990.48 that between 6,000 and 7,000 people were edge of a major city in our subcontinent. It is in the face of this history that we killed and many thousands injured.41 If If the city happens to be downwind at the have to assess nuclear weapons safety in Prithvi or Ghauri missiles loaded with time of the explosion then our calculations the subcontinent. Given that officially there nuclear weapons happened to be in a depot show that there could be approximately have been only two sets of tests by India during one such fire, the type of accidents 5,000-20,000 cancer deaths from the re- and one by Pakistan, it is quite possible we are concerned about can easily happen. sulting plutonium inhalation.44 While less that their nuclear weapons may not incor- Once the HE inside a nuclear weapon devastating than a full-scale nuclear ex- porate such design-level safety. It is there-

Economic and Political Weekly June 22 , 2002 2463 fore reasonable to be concerned about the cies, changing operational practices would through measures such as removing the possibility of accidents triggering nuclear be strongly opposed by these institutional gas generators that open the heavy silo lids explosions. Should such an accident take interests. Despite the end of the cold war before missile launch or replacing the place, the nuclear yield could be as large and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the missiles’ aerodynamic shrouds (nose cones) as the design yield of the nuclear bomb inability of the US and Russia to signifi- by non-aerodynamic covers that prevent or warhead. cantly decrease their reliance on nuclear normal missile flight.59 Other de-alert An accidental nuclear explosion with a weapons is proof of the power of such measures proposed have included removal yield of 15 kilotons, the same as the weapon institutional interests.54 of guidance systems from submarine detonated over Hiroshima, would destroy launched ballistic missiles and storing them over 5 square kilometres from the combined Non-Deployment and Non-Mating separately, and redirecting US nuclear effects of blast damage and firestorms. submarines to patrol deep in the southern Over 24 square kilometres would be subject Deployment of nuclear armed missiles hemisphere out of immediate range of their to radioactive fallout at levels such that and bombers decreases the time available targets in Russia. half the adult, healthy population would to political leaders to evaluate signals of In the case of south Asia, non-deploy- die from radiation sickness. If this were impending attack and deliberate, possibly ment and demating are simple, robust and to happen in the vicinity of a large south in conjunction with leaders of other coun- inexpensive forms of de-alerting. They Asian city, several hundreds of thousands tries, before responding. It also tempts require no new technologies or organisation of people would die.49 In addition, such them to use nuclear weapons as means of and simply take advantage of the fact that an explosion, especially in times of crises, coercive diplomacy.55 Both of these con- neither India nor Pakistan have driven might be assumed to be a nuclear attack cerns are made more acute if weapons and themselves to the very large continuously and lead to a nuclear response. Thus an delivery systems are kept on alert status. deployed hyper-alert nuclear forces of the accidental nuclear explosion may even The first step to address these concerns superpowers. These measures ensure that initiate a nuclear war. Table below shows in India and Pakistan is to maintain the it would take anywhere from a few hours (to the nearest thousand) the numbers of current status of non-deployment. This both to a day before a launch can be executed dead, severely injured and slightly injured increases the decision-making time and after orders are given. Such an in-built persons after a nuclear attack on each of makes it more difficult to rattle nuclear time-gap between the decision to fire and ten large south Asian cities. A total of 2.9 sabres, thus reducing the risk of accidental its execution will reduce many of the risks million deaths is predicted for these cities or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. listed earlier. in India and Pakistan with an additional There will then be little or no incentive for The pressure to launch a pre-emptive 1.5 million severely injured. relying on early warning and fewer de- attack would be all the more intense if mands on command and control. Safety missiles and bombers loaded with nuclear Reducing Risk would be enhanced if the weapons them- weapons were already fully deployed and selves were not mated to delivery systems, ready to take off in minutes. When such From all that we know publicly, India as is reported to be the case so far in firepower is kept primed day after day, and Pakistan are yet to routinely deploy India.56 But it must be ensured that this ready to be used any moment, it is itching their missiles with nuclear warheads. But situation is not just a feature of the early to be fired. The mere availability of such as we pointed out in the beginning of the stages of nuclear armament and will be capability generates a momentum of its paper, the Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine a matter of policy as long as nuclear own to the decision-making process. calls for the ability to shift to “fully weapons are around. Further, should there be a perception of employable forces in the shortest possible In November 1998, India introduced a military imbalance or advantage accruing time”. A missile regiment to handle the resolution at the General Assembly of the to the one who strikes first, this pressure nuclear-capable Agni missile is being UN calling for immediate and urgent steps would be enhanced. raised.51 Military officers are being trained to reduce the risks of unintentional and Another benefit of storing the weapons to handle nuclear weapons.52 There have accidental use of nuclear weapons through separately from the missiles and bombers been statements by senior officials about de-alerting.57 The term de-alerting arose is that the chances of explosions involving Agni being mated with nuclear warheads.53 in the context of the US and Russia and nuclear weapons described earlier would All of this is consistent with eventual refers to deliberately standing down one’s be greatly reduced. This safety can be deployment. Pakistan will likely find its nuclear arsenal from a state of heightened further augmented by keeping the weap- own path to the same point. With deploy- readiness by introducing built-in delays. 50 ment come increased risks of the many Arms control analysts have discussed at Table: Estimated Nuclear Casualties dangers we have outlined. length various de-alerting scenarios for the City Killed Severely Injured 58 It is therefore appropriate to think of risk US and Russia. Some de-alerting (though India reduction measures. Since the Indian and far from full) had actually been done by Bangalore 3,14,000 1,75,000 Pakistani nuclear arsenals are still in the the US around 1991 when Minuteman Bombay 4,77,000 2,29,000 Calcutta 3,57,000 1,98,000 early stages, with nuclear strategies still missiles (slated for later elimination under Madras 3,64,000 1,96,000 not firmly in place, there may yet be time the START 1 agreement) were ordered to New Delhi 1,76,000 94,000 to influence policy-makers into incorpo- stand down. Pakistan Faisalabad 3,36,000 1,74,000 rating some of the following risk reduction In the case of the US and Russia, there Islamabad 1,54,000 67,000 measures. Once the nuclear arsenals are have been suggestions to strengthen the Karachi 2,40,000 1,27,000 fully developed with constituencies in the de-alert status of the missiles by building Lahore 2,58,000 1,50,000 Rawalpindi 1,84,000 97,000 armed forces and government bureaucra- in further delays in loading the weapons

2464 Economic and Political Weekly June 22, 2002 ons themselves disassembled with the substantial gains in readiness by replacing warning technologies or complicated com- fissile core separated from the chemical more time-consuming operational safe- mand and control structures. Safety could high explosive. This would preclude the guards and by making higher alert postures be further augmented by keeping nuclear need to use, as the US does, ‘Insensitive politically acceptable”.62 Control through weapons disassembled with the nuclear High Explosives’, which cannot be set off technology rather than relying on people cores separated from the chemical high so easily, or using ‘Fire Resistant Pits’, that is presented as making risks seem less explosive systems. are less susceptible to fires. daring and thus easier to rationalise. While India and Pakistan are yet to This temptation may be particularly great deploy their weapons on a permanent Permissive Action Links in south Asia where both India and Paki- operational basis, there are many sources stan believe that in a crisis the US would of pressure driving the two countries to- A safety measure widely used in the US use spy planes, satellites and electronic wards that posture. It is imperative that against accidental or unauthorised signals intelligence to closely monitor these pressures be resisted now, before launch of nuclear weapons is the instal- events, and may be incited into interven- these weapons are actually deployed. lation of Permissive Action Link (PAL). ing. In the past, Pakistan, in particular, has The lives of more than a billion people are PALs are electronic switches that serve to sought to elicit such intervention through at stake. EPW protect a nuclear weapon against readying their nuclear weapons for de- unauthorised use, and are meant to be ployment, most notably in the Kargil Notes effective even when the weapon is as- conflict of 1999. It is easy to imagine how 1 Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the sembled and mated to its delivery system. in a crisis a perceived increase of control 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Centre Recent PALs use a set of multiple, six digit may lead to a greater willingness among for the Advance Study of India Policy Paper, or 12 digit codes with a limited try capa- Pakistani policy-makers to pursue this University of Pennsylvania, 2002. Available bility. Since these are electronic locks, the strategy further. on the internet at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/ limited try capability stops any effort to casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm While keep trying codes until the correct one is Conclusion disturbing in itself, what is even more disturbing 60 is that during the meeting between prime determined. minister Nawaz Sharif and president Bill The Soviet Union seemed to have been The only sure way to eliminate these Clinton, Sharif seemed ‘taken aback’ when sceptical about relying on the technical nuclear risks is to abolish all nuclear confronted with this fact. effectiveness of coded locks for its nuclear weapons, regionally and globally. This 2 Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret weapons, especially bombs to be used by should continue to be the ultimate goal of Story of India’s Quest to be a Nuclear Power, Harper Collins, New Delhi, 2000, p 437. aircraft. It chose to store its bombs in all rational and peace loving people. But 3 Mayed Ali, ‘Tactical N-Warheads Moved along depots a kilometre or two from the airbases as of now, nuclear weapons are here. Even Borders’, The News, May 28, 2002; ‘Yes, with its strategic bombers and placed as we strive to eliminate them altogether, Pakistan Has Tactical Nukes: Interview with the depots under the custody of special it would in the meantime be prudent to Lt Gen D B Shekatkar’, Outlook, June 10, troops commanded by the senior general press for various risk reduction measures, 2002. staff.61 The nuclear weapons were kept that could make the chances of a destruc- 4 ‘Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, Available away from the bombers during normal tive nuclear war lower. But no level of risk on the internet at http://www.indianembassy. operations. There were additional safety is acceptable enough to justify living with org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_ measures for when the bombers were armed nuclear weapons. As long as the nuclear aug_17_1999.html and in flight, including special on-board weapons are there, there will be a risk of 5 The contradictions in the notion of a credible navigation equipment to assure the use of nuclear weapons and hence these minimum nuclear deterrent are elaborated in aircraft’s flight pattern conformed to pre- measures should only be considered as M V Ramana, ‘A Recipe for Disaster’, The Hindu, September 9, 1999. For broader planned operations before the bomb could transitional elements en route to nuclear critiques of the notion of deterrence, especially be released. disarmament. within a south Asian context, see Praful Bidwai Both India and Pakistan have hinted Nuclear weapons and the systems for and Achin Vanaik, South Asia on a Short about their need for PAL systems. Whether their control, delivery and use are enor- Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of PALs are introduced into south Asia or mously complicated systems. Our discus- Global Disarmament, Oxford University Press, not, it is important to appreciate that they sion of the theory of normal accidents New Delhi, 1999. 6 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with are not without problems. At first sight, strongly suggests that catastrophic acci- High-Risk Technologies, Basic Books, New by limiting unauthorised access to nuclear dents would be inevitable in such systems. York, 1984. weapons PALs may seem as contributing By their very nature, bureaucracies con- 7 Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch to reducing possible dangers. However, trolling and operating nuclear weapons Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and the matter is more complex. The prospect tend to underestimate the possibility of Deviance at NASA, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996, p 394. of tight, assured control over nuclear forces such accidents and not take adequate 8 Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Princeton that PALs appear to offer may tempt precautions. University Press, Princeton, 1993. political leaders and military planners to The primary risk reduction measure we 9 Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety, p 254. deploy their nuclear forces and use these have suggested is that India and Pakistan 10 On the artificial world of nuclear war planners, as instruments of diplomacy. This was not deploy, as a matter of formal policy, see Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational in fact an early argument for PALs and nuclear armed missiles and aircraft. These World of Defence Intellectuals’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 12, no 9 brinkmanship; Fred Ikle, described as the steps require no new technologies or (1987). ‘father’ of PALs, advocated in the late organisations – indeed not deploying would 11 This discussion draws upon a forthcoming 1950s that such devices “could permit reduce enormously the demands for early essay by Zia Mian, ‘A Nuclear Tiger by the

Economic and Political Weekly June 22 , 2002 2465 Tail: Some Problems of Command and Control 52, No 4, April 1987, pp 453-61. four pounds of TNT equivalent in the event in South Asia’, to appear in M V Ramana, and 29 Shaun Gregory, The Hidden Cost of of a detonation at any one point in the HE C Rammanohar Reddy (eds), Prisoners of the Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons Accidents, system. Sidney Drell and Bob Peurifoy, Nuclear Dream, Orient Longman, New Delhi, Brassey’s, London, 1990, pp 184-90. ‘Technical Issues of a Nuclear Test Ban’, 2002. 30 British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Toxic Annual Reviews of Nuclear and Particle 12 Ashton B Carter, John D Steinbruner, Charles Cloud Moves Along Russian Far Eastern Coast Science 44 (1994), pp 285-327. For com- Z Zraket, ‘Introduction’ in Ashton B Carter, After Missile Fuel Leak’, June 16, 2000 parison, the weapon that exploded over John D Steinbruner, Charles Z Zraket (eds), 31 For details on the Prithvi and its operational Hiroshima in 1945 had a yield of about 13,000 Managing Nuclear Operations, The Brookings practices see Zia Mian, A H Nayyar and tonnes of TNT equivalent. Institution, Washington, 1987, pp 1-13, p 3. M V Ramana, ‘Bringing Prithvi Down to Earth: 47 Thomas B Cochran and Christopher E Paine, 13 Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: The Capabilities and Potential Effectiveness ‘Hydronuclear Testing and the Comprehensive Nuclear Deterrence, The Arms Race, and Arms of India’s Prithvi Missile’, Science and Global Test Ban: Memorandum to Participants Control, W H Freeman and Company, San Security 7, No 3, 1998, pp 333-60. JASON 1994 Summer Study’, Natural Francisco, 1983, pp 120-21. 32 George P Sutton, Rocket Propellant Elements: Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, 14 Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp 81-90. An Introduction to the Engineering of Rockets, 1994, p 11. 15 Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of 6th Edition, John Wiley, New York, 1992, 48 Robert S Norris and William Arkin, ‘Soviet Nuclear Forces, Yale University Press, New p 427. Nuclear Testing, August 29, 1949-October 24, Haven, 1983, p 12. 33 George P Sutton, Rocket Propellant Elements, 1990’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of pp 400, 427. May/June 1998. Nuclear Forces, pp 12-13. 34 ‘Six Die in DRDO Lab Fire in Pune’, The 49 M V Ramana, Bombing Bombay: Effects of 17 Bruce Blair, ‘Alerting in Crisis and Times of India, April 26, 2002. Nuclear Weapons and a Case Study of a Conventional War’ in Managing Nuclear 35 Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General Hypothetical Explosion, International Operations, pp 75-120, p 117. of India on the Ministry of Defence for the Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 18 Bruce Blair, The Logic Of Accidental Nuclear year ending March 1997, http:// Cambridge, 1999, p 31. War, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, www.cagindia.org/reports/defence/ 50 Matthew McKinzie, Zia Mian, A H Nayyar DC, 1993, fn 46, pp 342-43. Also see H L 1998_book1/index.htm and M V Ramana, ‘The Risks and Abrams, ‘Strategic Defense and Inadvertent 36 Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General Consequences of Nuclear War in South Asia’ Nuclear War’ in H Wiberg, I D Petersen and of India on the Ministry of Defence for the in Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (eds), Out of P Smoker (eds), Inadvertent Nuclear War: The year ending March 1997, http:// the Nuclear Shadow, Lokayan and Rainbow Implications of the Changing Global Order, www.cagindia.org/reports/defence/ Publishers, New Delhi and Zed Books, London, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1993, pp 39-55. 1998_book1/index.htm 2001, pp 185-96. 19 Bruce G Blair, Harold A Feiveson and Frank 37 Attrition Statistics, Pakistan Institute for Air 51 ‘Agni Missile Group for Army Cleared’, The von Hippel, ‘Taking Nuclear Weapons off Defence Studies, http://www.piads.com.pk/ Hindu, 16 May 2002. Hair-Trigger Alert’, Scientific American, users/piads/attritionpaf.html 52 Vishal Thapar, ‘Navy, IAF Train in Handling November 1997. 38 Ghulam Hasnain, ‘Air Force Plane Crashes Nukes’, The Hindustan Times, February 15, 20 Weapons Systems Evaluation Group Report into Pakistani Neighbourhood’, Associated 2002. 50, Enclosure C, September 1960, cited in Press, July 30, 1998. 53 Some of these are listed in M V Ramana, ‘A Bruce Blair, John Pike, and Stephen Schwartz, 39 ‘War Reserves Worth Several Hundred Crores Nuclear Wedge’, Frontline, December 8, 2001. ‘Targeting and Controlling the Bomb’ in Wiped Out’, The Times of India, April 30, 54 For an analysis of failed attempts at post-cold Stephen Schwartz (ed), Atomic Audit, 2000. war restructuring of US nuclear arsenals see Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 40 ‘80 Killed, 1000 Injured: Army Ammunition Janne Nolan, An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear 1998, pp 197-268, p 207. Dump Blows Up in Pindi’, Dawn, April 11, Weapons and American Security After the 21 Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear 1998. Cold War, Brookings Institution Press, War, pp 188-91. 41 ‘MRD Convenor Seeks Judicial Probe Into Washington, DC, 1999. 22 Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp 130-31. Ojhri Blasts’, Dawn, April 21, 1988. 55 Richard K Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and 23 Bhavna Vij, ‘Minor Embarrassment: Vajpayee 42 We will focus on such accidents involving Nuclear Balance, Brookings Institution, Cannot Dial Direct from His Aircraft’, Indian plutonium. India has used plutonium in its Washington, DC, 1987. Express, November 7, 2001. nuclear weapons. Though Pakistan has so far 56 Manoj Joshi, ‘Our Nukes Have Safety Locks’, 24 See for example Lloyd Dumas, ‘Why Mistakes relied on uranium, with production of The Times of India, November 4, 2001. Happen Even When the Stakes are High: The plutonium from the Khushab reactor starting, 57 Rebecca Johnson, ‘First Committee Report’, Many Dimensions of Human Fallibility’, Pakistan may follow India in developing Disarmament Diplomacy, No 32, November Medicine and Global Survival 7, No 1, April plutonium based weapons as well. 1998, available on the web at http:// 2001, pp 12-19. 43 The International Commission on Radiological www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd32/32first.htm; 25 This is discussed in much greater technical Protection estimates that only 0.05 per cent Also see ‘India Moves Resolution on De- detail in Zia Mian, M V Ramana and of ingested plutonium is absorbed by the alerting N-forces,’ Rediff on the Net, R Rajaraman, ‘Plutonium Dispersal and Health gastrointestinal system. ICRP, Age-dependent November 3, 1998. Hazards from Nuclear Weapon Accidents’, Doses to Members of the Public from Intake 58 See for example the discussion in Harold Current Science 80, No 10, May 25, 2001, of Radionuclides: Part 2 Ingestion Dose Feiveson (ed), The Nuclear Turning Point: A pp 1275-84. Coefficients, ICRP Publication 67, Pergamon, Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of 26 US Department of Defense in coordination New York, 1994, p 127. Nuclear Weapons, Brookings Institution Press, with Department of Energy, Narrative 44 Zia Mian, M V Ramana and R Rajaraman, Washington, DC, 1999. Summaries of Accidents Involving US Nuclear ‘Plutonium Dispersal and Health Hazards from 59 Bruce Blair, Harold Feiveson and Frank von Weapons, 1950-1980 (Interim), 1981. Nuclear Weapon Accidents’. Hippel, ‘De-Alerting Russian and American 27 Jaya Tiwari and Cleve J Gray, ‘US Nuclear 45David Chanin and Walter Murfin, ‘Site Nuclear Missiles’, UNIDIR NewsLetter, No 38, Weapons Accidents’, available on the internet Restoration: Estimation of Attributable Costs 1998, pp 19-22. at: http://www.cdi.org/Issues/NukeAccidents/ From Plutonium-Dispersal Accidents’, Sandia 60 See Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring accidents.htm National Laboratory Report, SAND96-0957, Control of Nuclear Weapons, CSIA Occasional 28 In the case of Palomares, several square May 1996, Available on the internet at Paper No 2, Centre for Science and International kilometres were contaminated with high http://plutonium-erl.actx.edu/restoration.html Affairs, Harvard University, 1987. plutonium ground concentrations. E Iranzo, 46 The formal US definition of one point safety 61 Bruce G Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear S Salvador and C E Iranzo, ‘Air Concentrations requires that the nuclear weapon design Forces, Brookings Occasional Papers, The of 239Pu and 240Pu and Potential Radiation inherently, i e, without any external devices, Brooking Institution, Washington, 1995. Doses to Persons Living near Pu-contaminated have a probability of less than one in a million 62 Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring Control Areas in Palomares, Spain’, Health Physics of producing a nuclear yield greater than of Nuclear Weapons, p 24.

2466 Economic and Political Weekly June 22, 2002