Fear and Loathing in Tehrani Suzanne Maloney

ike mom and apple pie, trajectory too unpredictable to wait out its supporting democracy in current leadership; moreover, even a more L has universal appeal in U.S. robust form of isolation failed to satisfy politics. So it is predictable that the Feb- the administration’s ideological predilec- ruary 2006 surprise request by Secretary tions for idealistic interventionism. And of State Condoleezza Rice for $75 mil- so even as Washington reluctantly prof- lion in supplemental funding to support fered tactical engagement with Tehran on the democratic aspirations of the Ira- Iraq and the nuclear question, the under- nian people won ready bipartisan acclaim lying rationale for American policy shifted and the sort of unquestioningly adulatory in favor of direct U.S. efforts to influence U.S. media coverage that was all too rare the nature of the regime and the structure for an administration mired in Iraq and of power in Iran. This has not entailed a increasingly on the defensive at home. full-fledged American embrace of regime The dramatic new initiative found favor change—which Rice has disavowed point- with American pundits and policymakers edly even as reports of U.S. covert pro- because it offered something for every- grams have surfaced in the media—but an one. It represented a low-cost, feel-good amateurish array of programs and tactics means of leveraging palpable dissatisfac- intended to splinter Iran’s political elite tion among Iran’s young population and and strengthen its opponents. From the intensifying pressure on the regime—all Iranian perspective, this may be a distinc- while bolstering the administration’s bona tion without a difference. fides on its much-hyped “Freedom Agen- Some of the assumptions that inform da” and placating advocates of more ag- this new approach to Iran are not par- gressive action toward Tehran. ticularly controversial. That change in Rice’s democracy initiative signaled Iran is necessary—advancing both Iranian a subtle but important transformation in aspirations and American interests—is America’s approach—one that had long self-evident. But if the need for political relied on isolation as the primary tool for change in Iran is uncontestable, the same containing the Islamic Republic. For the cannot be said for the administration’s Bush Administration, the challenges posed chosen means for advancing it: Its self- by Iran were too urgent and its political imposed constraints on contact with Teh- ran and a hopelessly flawed, one-size-fits- Suzanne Maloney is a senior fellow at the Saban all approach to democracy promotion. Center for Middle East Policy at the Brook- The faces a two-fold ings Institution and was a State Department problem: The legacy of bungled Ameri- official until May 2007. can involvement in Iran and a misreading

42 The National Interest—Sep./Oct. 2007 of Iran’s current political dynamics that internal politics were reinforced in the stems from a worryingly familiar exag- 1980s by the disastrous consequences of geration of our ability to shape positive the Iran-Contra affair, which was, in part, outcomes in countries we know noth- an attempt to restore American influ- ing about. Our efforts to open political ence in an anticipated post-Khomeini era. space in Iran are helping to constrict it, Iran-Contra reminded U.S. policymakers exacerbate the persecution complex of that covert efforts to influence Iran’s po- Iran’s revolutionaries and lessen the pros- litical future were likely futile and that in- pect for advancing diplomatic solutions teracting with any segment of the Iranian to the Iranian challenge. Like other Bush political elite was politically risky. Administration endeavors, a radical new The United States continued to mis- policy that seemed like a “slam dunk” at read, miscalculate and disregard its painful home is imploding on implementation. historical experience. By the mid 1990s, partisan wrangling in Washington revived he nature of Iran’s Is- the desire to venture into Iran’s treacher- lamic regime is at the heart ous political waters. House Speaker Newt T of Washington’s concerns Gingrich called for a comprehensive strat- about Iranian policies. Yet until recently egy “designed to force the replacement the impetus to reshape Tehran was re- of the current regime”, which he called strained by the humbling U.S. experience “the only long range solution that makes in Iran, particularly the U.S. role in the any sense.” Toward that end, he pushed 1953 coup that unseated Prime Minister for an $18 million appropriation to oust Mohamed Mossadegh and reinstated the Iran’s government and other measures shah to the throne, and the limitations to advance change in Iran. Although the imposed by our lack of presence there. administration diluted its provisions, the The Mossadegh episode profoundly af- “regime change” fund sparked a predict- fected Iran’s future leaders, and its prin- ably vituperative response from Tehran, cipal conclusion—a deep-seated suspicion including a reciprocal anti-American fund. toward external powers—became inter- Together with tough new sanctions nalized within the state they created. that banned virtually all U.S. trade with In the aftermath of the 1979 Revolu- and investment in Iran, these develop- tion, this legacy fed intense Iranian fears ments helped refuel Iran’s enduring sus- of an externally orchestrated counter- picions about Washington’s intentions. coup, exacerbated by the unrest facing Sadly, this came just as Iranian political the post-revolutionary government. As a dynamics were beginning to shift, thanks result, one of the Iranians’ primary con- to intra-regime competition and the com- ditions for ending the 444-day U.S. hos- ing of age of Iran’s post-revolutionary tage crisis was a pledge by Washington, baby boom. The 1997 election of mod- incorporated in the 1981 Algiers agree- erate presidential candidate Mohamed ment, “that it is and from now on will be Khatami sparked interest in Washington the policy of the United States not to in- in engaging with reformers, but a positive tervene, directly or indirectly, politically outcome was not in the cards. Since the or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.” key levers of power remained in the hands Although the United States appeared to of orthodox hardliners, the most egregious consider the language purely ceremonial, dimensions of Iranian foreign policy—its it remains salient for Iranians, who rou- support for and nuclear ambi- tinely invoke the non-intervention pledge tions—remained unchanged. Ultimately, in protesting U.S. actions. the Clinton Administration’s efforts to American trepidations about Iran’s purge some of the historical baggage of

Fear and Loathing in Tehran 43 U.S.-Iran relations failed to change Irani- which regime-change proponents saw as an behavior or mend the breach between the death knell for the neighboring gov- the two governments. ernment. They scorned the utility as well as the morality of dealing with Tehran on he failed U.S. forays the eve of its presumptive collapse, and into Iran’s internal politics, events inside Iran, such as the student un- T coupled with the Clinton rest that erupted in June 2003, appeared Administration’s ineffectual kid-gloves to confirm their expectations. Any con- approach, paved the way for the Bush tact with official Iran was tantamount to Administration’s aggressive intervention- “legitimizing” the Iranian regime, a new ism. First was President Bush’s inclusion Washington taboo. As a result, the admin- of Iran alongside Iraq and North Korea istration did not even seriously consider a in the “axis of evil.” Then came a White back-channel overture from mid-ranking House statement on the anniversary of Iranian officials to explore the possibilities a major student protest, promising that for a “grand bargain.” “[a]s Iran’s people move towards a fu- Meanwhile, many in Washington were ture defined by greater freedom, they will pressing for even more robust U.S. ac- have no better friend” than Washington. tion. The atmosphere was something of a Sharp rebukes emanated from the Iranian free-for-all, with both the erstwhile heir to regime, with Tehran depicting the state- the Iranian throne, Reza Pahlavi, and the ment as “open interference” and some re- Mujaheddin-e Khalq, a reviled opposition formers decrying U.S. rhetoric for com- group on the U.S. terrorism list, agitating promising their efforts with the taint of publicly as the presumptive spokesmen for American approbation. “the Iranian people.” The administration’s The administration used this episode early efforts to foster political change were to signal its rejection of the faltering re- mostly comic fumbling, such as the Penta- form movement and its “conscious de- gon’s dispatch of several staffers to Europe cision to associate with the aspirations for renewed contact with discredited Iran- of Iranian people”, as one senior official Contra figure Manucher Ghorbanifar. described at the time. An American “dual In 2004, frustrated with the admin- track” approach emerged: twin focuses istration’s failure to initiate Iran-focused on pressuring the regime and consciously democracy programming, Congress used embracing the “generic” Iranian people. a soft earmark of $1.5 million to require “U.S. policy is not to impose change on the State Department to award grants to Iran but to support the Iranian people in ngos to “support the advancement of de- their quest to decide their own destiny”, mocracy and human rights in Iran.” State , then–Special Presiden- used the funds to support the National tial Envoy for , said in August Endowment for Democracy and establish 2002. “Our policy is not about Khatami a center for documenting Iranian human- or Khamenei, reform or hard-line; it is rights abuses, along the lines of an initia- about supporting those who want free- tive by Iraqi exiles before Saddam’s re- dom, human rights, democracy, and eco- moval. Congress doubled the earmarks in nomic and educational opportunity for 2005 and expanded them to $10 million themselves and their fellow countrymen in 2006, although the projects and indi- and women.” viduals who received this funding were As part of this shift, the administra- classified out of concern for their safety. tion cut off its successful quiet dialogue The 2005 election of a provoca- with Tehran on regional issues following tive new president, Mahmoud Ah- the initial successes of the Iraq invasion, madinejad, only strengthened

44 The National Interest—Sep./Oct. 2007 course. The historical baggage associ- ated with any direct American role in Ira- nian civil society prompted a crescendo of objections from a range of prominent Iranian activists and dissidents. Only weeks after Rice’s $75 million request, re- nowned Iranian human-rights lawyer Ab- dolfattah Soltani told that the funding would have a “negative effect”, and Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi described the initiative as “very danger-

AP Images ous to society.” Noted dissident Meh- rangiz Kar predicted with hard-gained prescience that the U.S. funding “will destroy these newly developed [civil-so- I’ve got my ayatollah on you. ciety] organizations like a storm.” These admonitions were echoed by dissident American interest in fostering change and hunger-striker Akbar Ganji upon his in Iran. This served as the backdrop for March 2006 release from nearly six years Rice’s February 2006 decision to gain that in prison. “Political change in Iran is nec- extra $75 million to “begin a new effort essary, but it must not be achieved by for- to support the aspirations of the Iranian eign intervention”, he declared. people.” Ultimately, Congress appropri- The Bush Administration effectively ated $66.1 million. In the supplemental shrugged off these concerns. The combi- funding, $20 million was designated for nation of congressional zeal, the adminis- democracy programs, which in addition to tration’s infatuation with fostering “color the regular 2006 fiscal-year coinage meant revolutions” along the lines of Georgia a total of $31.5 million directed toward and Kyrgyzstan, and the sense that “it civil-society activities in Iran. While the was about time we did something”, as one administration continues the protracted senior administration official acknowl- work of spending the funds—only about edged, propelled the program forward. half of the 2006 monies for civil society The only nod to the potential sensitivi- had been obligated as of June 2007—the ties associated with U.S. funding was the appetite for cash appears to be growing decision to continue classifying its re- quickly. For fiscal year 2008, the State cipients, a move that predictably has only Department has requested an additional intensified the conspiracy theories associ- $75 million. ated with the program. The near-term outcome of U.S. de- mong the array of U.S. mocracy promotion has been a fierce diplomatic, military and finan- backlash from the regime and a corre- A cial tools for influencing Iran, sponding freeze of Iranian civil society, democracy promotion is hardly the most curtailing Iranians’ ability to engage with consequential. But in its philosophy and international organizations or accept ex- implementation, the initiative is emblem- ternal support. For Washington, the loss- atic of the misconceptions and fallacies es from the current wave of repression are that have undermined the broader Amer- more profound than the new scarcity of ican effort to pressure Iran into abandon- Iranian participants for Track II dialogues ing its rogue behavior and to persuade its and other exchanges. By fostering debate leadership to adopt a more constructive and channeling political activism, Iran’s

Fear and Loathing in Tehran 45 semi-governmental organizations and in- the Iranian regime retains enormous re- tellectuals have played a critical role in pressive capacity over society and ap- advancing its political evolution. The on- pears to be firmly entrenched in power going intimidation of Iranian civil society for the foreseeable future. Its track record and academia means that these parts of is worth noting. The Islamic Republic society that had improbably managed to has survived every calamity short of the thrive within the fierce political and cul- plague: war, isolation, instability, terrorist tural restrictions of the Islamic Republic attacks, leadership transition, drought and are now under siege. This leaves a void epic earthquakes. This does not imply in Iran’s political life and in the organiza- that the regime is impregnable, nor that tional and ideational development of any its leaders view it as such. Rather, the future opposition movement. endurance of Iran’s revolutionary regime There is some merit in the adminis- through multiple crises is a testament to tration’s argument that the current round the adaptive capacity of the system and its of repression is a predictable outcome of leaders as well as to the lack of any viable Iran’s dogmatic leadership, particularly alternative power center. Ahmadinejad and his appointees. Still, the The Islamic Republic’s persistence can U.S. tendency to evade its own responsi- be credited in large part to its resource bility in exacerbating the regime’s para- base. In the short term, the steady stream noia and inciting a new crackdown bodes of oil revenues (an estimated $60 billion in poorly for the prospect that the adminis- 2007) provides ample financing for Iran’s tration will exercise prudence in navigat- security apparatus and politically-driven ing the minefields of Iranian politics. subsidies, as well as a cushion against sanc- tions and the consequences of the regime’s he U.S. democracy initiative policies. And Ayatollah Khomeini’s about- is based on the faulty assump- face to embrace family planning in the T tion of the Iranian regime’s mid-1980s has produced a dramatic shift vulnerability. Although the administra- in Iran’s demographic patterns that will tion generally concedes that democracy shortly begin to temper the inherent po- promotion is the work of generations, it litical risks and economic costs posed by is clear from the size of the program and its young citizenry. With the last of Iran’s the breathlessness of U.S. appeals to Ira- “baby boom” generation soon entering the nians that a much faster timetable is in- labor market, the strain on resources and tended. Anticipating the next revolution competition for jobs will begin to abate. is a longtime Washington parlor game, The regime’s longevity also reflects and each new rumble of discontent from the paucity of credible challengers. De- Tehran brings a new avalanche of head- spite rampant popular dissatisfaction with lines predicting the regime’s imminent the system, no individual or group has demise. These expectations, while faulty, emerged as a focal point for an organized are not entirely without foundation. Iran opposition. Iran today has a pantheon has all of the risk factors for a revolution- of dissidents whose contributions to the ary break: a disproportionately young cause of political change are momentous, population; restive ethnic minorities; an but none has proven willing or capable of inefficient, distorted economy; and a re- navigating a serious movement to take on gime mired in an obsolescent ideology, the regime. The Islamic Republic’s crit- riven by factional feuds and reliant on ics have slogans but no strategies. And, repression. most of the political operatives who are But the focus on these weaknesses interested in promoting change continue overlooks the unfortunate evidence that to channel their energies toward captur-

46 The National Interest—Sep./Oct. 2007 ing or transforming existing institutions, bate of the Iranian press and blogosphere rather than dismantling a corrupt system. are impenetrable for Washington, as are Proponents of U.S. funding, how- a wide range of basic facts, such as the ever, see the endurance of the Iranian identities of influence-makers, composi- regime and the opposition’s weakness as tion of factional groupings and history of a justification for an even more strenuous opposition politics. American capacity to American investment in Iranian democ- cultivate Iran’s future democratic leaders racy. That remedy presumes that insuf- must be weighed against its failure to pre- ficient resources are the primary deter- dict the rise of the reform movement or rent to revolutionary change in Iran and Ahmadinejad’s ascension, and its reliance that American engagement will boost the on an internet search to identify targets prospects of such change. Unfortunately, for un sanctions in drafting a December both assumptions are incorrect. 2006 Security Council resolution. Iran today appears trapped by revolu- This dearth of knowledge is not pure- tionary fatigue and political cynicism. The ly a weakness of the Bush Administration. majority of Iranians may not like their These same deficits are largely shared by political system, but they are also unwill- American ngos and the larger purveyors ing to indulge once again in revolutionary of democracy assistance, which have little passions or even engage in mass boycotts direct experience on the ground in post- of its rigged elections—not after having revolutionary Iran and whose opportuni- their hopes dashed most recently by the ties to interact on a normal basis with reform movement’s failure and having wit- Iranian civil-society organizations are nessed the instability associated with the fast evaporating. The decision to classify recent transitions to their east and west. the recipients of the democracy initiative This is compounded by the general- precludes any external effort to evaluate ized antipathy toward external interven- its efficacy or even calculate how much tion and the specific legacy of U.S. policy. of the funding has been spent in Iran. Any association with Washington rep- Moreover, the tortuous effort to spend resents the kiss of death for activists and the 2006 funds raises real doubts about organizations in Iran—a double whammy Washington’s capacity to spend the next that incites regime repression even as it round of funds in a responsible manner. erodes popular perceptions of legitimacy. The tone-deaf U.S. approach high- And yet the United States has remained lights a broader inconsistency: the ques- stunningly oblivious to the disadvanta- tion of strategic trade-offs. The very tools geous ricochet of its generally clumsy at- that the United States and its allies uti- tempts to inspire of democracy in Iran. lize to pressure Iran—economic sanctions, diplomatic and cultural isolation, and the t the root of Washington’s threat or use of military force—provoke democracy-promotion blun- nationalistic responses. This helps consoli- A ders is a simple but startling date the regime, mitigate elite competition unfamiliarity with contemporary life and rally the population behind the very in Iran. After a three-decade absence, system Washington wishes to see them the U.S. government is singularly unin- confront. Conversely, the sensitivities as- formed about the country’s political cul- sociated with any external involvement ture and day-to-day dynamics. With only in Iranian internal politics ensure that a handful of Persian language speakers in Tehran would interpret the high-profile the State Department and none involved American democracy fund as an explicit in the design or implementation of the attempt at regime change, an interpreta- democracy initiative, the fractious de- tion that could only complicate efforts to

Fear and Loathing in Tehran 47 persuade Iran to bargain away the ultimate its would permit a thousand flowers to deterrent capability—its nuclear program. bloom and would erode some of the taint The program undermines the broader of official American approval. American strategy of trying to pressure Washington should also endeavor to and persuade Iran to the negotiating table “re-brand” U.S. outreach, particularly by reinforcing Tehran’s long-held paranoia the State Department’s new Dubai of- that the principal U.S. objective is the fice, which was unfortunately described by eradication of the Islamic Republic. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns as a 21st-century version of the “Riga ny future administration station”—the U.S. listening post along must come to grips with two the Soviet border during the Cold War. A unpleasant truths about Ira- Rather, the Dubai office should serve as nian politics. First, the regime is here to the shadow embassy and launching pad stay for the foreseeable future, and sec- for enhanced diplomatic mechanisms and ond, American involvement is far more people-to-people dialogue. In the short likely to impair rather than advance Iran’s term, none of these steps promise a break- democratic potential. An alternative through, but they can slowly foster condi- American approach to democracy pro- tions conducive to democratic outcomes. motion in Iran should begin with an eye Iran’s volatile politics present Wash- toward realism and viability. There are ington with a profound dilemma. At min- no quick fixes. imum, a more democratic political frame- We need responsible leadership to work would mitigate the most troubling promote prudent long-term investments dimensions of Iran’s current policies—the rather than high-profile but low-impact regime’s nuclear ambitions, its support initiatives. It will be difficult to abandon for Iraqi militias and terrorists across the altogether the extravagant funding and region, and its treatment of its own peo- official U.S. operational role; however, ple. For legitimate reasons, curtailing a more sensible approach would redi- these policies ranks high on the adminis- rect funds from direct civil-society sup- tration’s agenda, with nearly universal bi- port toward the less politicized arena of partisan support. Unfortunately, though, educational opportunities and exchanges. the Bush Administration has adopted a Subsidizing hundreds of scholarships for prescription for Iran’s democratic deficit Iranians at U.S. colleges and universities that disregards the fundamental realities would have a vastly greater public-diplo- of the disease. Recognizing what is truly macy benefit inside Iran today, and would achievable is axiomatic for success, par- expose Iran’s best and brightest to Ameri- ticularly in countries where our interests can culture and opportunities, helping vastly outweigh our expertise. create a new generation of U.S.-trained Finally, we should recognize that Iran’s intellectuals poised to steer their country internal developments are largely beyond in a new direction. In addition, we should the influence of Washington. This should move from a U.S. government-centric not imply hopelessness about Iran’s po- approach to a more broad-based effort litical future; a history of semi-competitive by authorizing all U.S. ngos to network politics and a well-educated populace give with Iranian partners and engage in hu- the country perhaps the strongest platform manitarian projects, capacity building and for democracy in the region. Rather, Iran’s community development in Iran. Such persistent unpredictability and unexpected work is currently barred by U.S. sanc- evolution since 1979 only reminds us that tions except for case-by-case licenses. A we truly don’t know what twist Iranian general license for American non-prof- politics may yet take. n

48 The National Interest—Sep./Oct. 2007