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Fear and Loathing in Tehrani Suzanne Maloney Fear and Loathing in Tehrani Suzanne Maloney IKE MOM and apple pie, trajectory too unpredictable to wait out its supporting democracy in Iran current leadership; moreover, even a more L has universal appeal in U.S. robust form of isolation failed to satisfy politics. So it is predictable that the Feb- the administration’s ideological predilec- ruary 2006 surprise request by Secretary tions for idealistic interventionism. And of State Condoleezza Rice for $75 mil- so even as Washington reluctantly prof- lion in supplemental funding to support fered tactical engagement with Tehran on the democratic aspirations of the Ira- Iraq and the nuclear question, the under- nian people won ready bipartisan acclaim lying rationale for American policy shifted and the sort of unquestioningly adulatory in favor of direct U.S. efforts to influence U.S. media coverage that was all too rare the nature of the regime and the structure for an administration mired in Iraq and of power in Iran. This has not entailed a increasingly on the defensive at home. full-fledged American embrace of regime The dramatic new initiative found favor change—which Rice has disavowed point- with American pundits and policymakers edly even as reports of U.S. covert pro- because it offered something for every- grams have surfaced in the media—but an one. It represented a low-cost, feel-good amateurish array of programs and tactics means of leveraging palpable dissatisfac- intended to splinter Iran’s political elite tion among Iran’s young population and and strengthen its opponents. From the intensifying pressure on the regime—all Iranian perspective, this may be a distinc- while bolstering the administration’s bona tion without a difference. fides on its much-hyped “Freedom Agen- Some of the assumptions that inform da” and placating advocates of more ag- this new approach to Iran are not par- gressive action toward Tehran. ticularly controversial. That change in Rice’s democracy initiative signaled Iran is necessary—advancing both Iranian a subtle but important transformation in aspirations and American interests—is America’s approach—one that had long self-evident. But if the need for political relied on isolation as the primary tool for change in Iran is uncontestable, the same containing the Islamic Republic. For the cannot be said for the administration’s Bush Administration, the challenges posed chosen means for advancing it: Its self- by Iran were too urgent and its political imposed constraints on contact with Teh- ran and a hopelessly flawed, one-size-fits- Suzanne Maloney is a senior fellow at the Saban all approach to democracy promotion. Center for Middle East Policy at the Brook- The United States faces a two-fold ings Institution and was a State Department problem: The legacy of bungled Ameri- official until May 2007. can involvement in Iran and a misreading 42 The National Interest—Sep./Oct. 2007 of Iran’s current political dynamics that internal politics were reinforced in the stems from a worryingly familiar exag- 1980s by the disastrous consequences of geration of our ability to shape positive the Iran-Contra affair, which was, in part, outcomes in countries we know noth- an attempt to restore American influ- ing about. Our efforts to open political ence in an anticipated post-Khomeini era. space in Iran are helping to constrict it, Iran-Contra reminded U.S. policymakers exacerbate the persecution complex of that covert efforts to influence Iran’s po- Iran’s revolutionaries and lessen the pros- litical future were likely futile and that in- pect for advancing diplomatic solutions teracting with any segment of the Iranian to the Iranian challenge. Like other Bush political elite was politically risky. Administration endeavors, a radical new The United States continued to mis- policy that seemed like a “slam dunk” at read, miscalculate and disregard its painful home is imploding on implementation. historical experience. By the mid 1990s, partisan wrangling in Washington revived HE NaturE of Iran’s Is- the desire to venture into Iran’s treacher- lamic regime is at the heart ous political waters. House Speaker Newt T of Washington’s concerns Gingrich called for a comprehensive strat- about Iranian policies. Yet until recently egy “designed to force the replacement the impetus to reshape Tehran was re- of the current regime”, which he called strained by the humbling U.S. experience “the only long range solution that makes in Iran, particularly the U.S. role in the any sense.” Toward that end, he pushed 1953 coup that unseated Prime Minister for an $18 million appropriation to oust Mohamed Mossadegh and reinstated the Iran’s government and other measures shah to the throne, and the limitations to advance change in Iran. Although the imposed by our lack of presence there. administration diluted its provisions, the The Mossadegh episode profoundly af- “regime change” fund sparked a predict- fected Iran’s future leaders, and its prin- ably vituperative response from Tehran, cipal conclusion—a deep-seated suspicion including a reciprocal anti-American fund. toward external powers—became inter- Together with tough new sanctions nalized within the state they created. that banned virtually all U.S. trade with In the aftermath of the 1979 Revolu- and investment in Iran, these develop- tion, this legacy fed intense Iranian fears ments helped refuel Iran’s enduring sus- of an externally orchestrated counter- picions about Washington’s intentions. coup, exacerbated by the unrest facing Sadly, this came just as Iranian political the post-revolutionary government. As a dynamics were beginning to shift, thanks result, one of the Iranians’ primary con- to intra-regime competition and the com- ditions for ending the 444-day U.S. hos- ing of age of Iran’s post-revolutionary tage crisis was a pledge by Washington, baby boom. The 1997 election of mod- incorporated in the 1981 Algiers agree- erate presidential candidate Mohamed ment, “that it is and from now on will be Khatami sparked interest in Washington the policy of the United States not to in- in engaging with reformers, but a positive tervene, directly or indirectly, politically outcome was not in the cards. Since the or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.” key levers of power remained in the hands Although the United States appeared to of orthodox hardliners, the most egregious consider the language purely ceremonial, dimensions of Iranian foreign policy—its it remains salient for Iranians, who rou- support for terrorism and nuclear ambi- tinely invoke the non-intervention pledge tions—remained unchanged. Ultimately, in protesting U.S. actions. the Clinton Administration’s efforts to American trepidations about Iran’s purge some of the historical baggage of Fear and Loathing in Tehran 43 U.S.-Iran relations failed to change Irani- which regime-change proponents saw as an behavior or mend the breach between the death knell for the neighboring gov- the two governments. ernment. They scorned the utility as well as the morality of dealing with Tehran on HE faILED U.S. forays the eve of its presumptive collapse, and into Iran’s internal politics, events inside Iran, such as the student un- T coupled with the Clinton rest that erupted in June 2003, appeared Administration’s ineffectual kid-gloves to confirm their expectations. Any con- approach, paved the way for the Bush tact with official Iran was tantamount to Administration’s aggressive intervention- “legitimizing” the Iranian regime, a new ism. First was President Bush’s inclusion Washington taboo. As a result, the admin- of Iran alongside Iraq and North Korea istration did not even seriously consider a in the “axis of evil.” Then came a White back-channel overture from mid-ranking House statement on the anniversary of Iranian officials to explore the possibilities a major student protest, promising that for a “grand bargain.” “[a]s Iran’s people move towards a fu- Meanwhile, many in Washington were ture defined by greater freedom, they will pressing for even more robust U.S. ac- have no better friend” than Washington. tion. The atmosphere was something of a Sharp rebukes emanated from the Iranian free-for-all, with both the erstwhile heir to regime, with Tehran depicting the state- the Iranian throne, Reza Pahlavi, and the ment as “open interference” and some re- Mujaheddin-e Khalq, a reviled opposition formers decrying U.S. rhetoric for com- group on the U.S. terrorism list, agitating promising their efforts with the taint of publicly as the presumptive spokesmen for American approbation. “the Iranian people.” The administration’s The administration used this episode early efforts to foster political change were to signal its rejection of the faltering re- mostly comic fumbling, such as the Penta- form movement and its “conscious de- gon’s dispatch of several staffers to Europe cision to associate with the aspirations for renewed contact with discredited Iran- of Iranian people”, as one senior official Contra figure Manucher Ghorbanifar. described at the time. An American “dual In 2004, frustrated with the admin- track” approach emerged: twin focuses istration’s failure to initiate Iran-focused on pressuring the regime and consciously democracy programming, Congress used embracing the “generic” Iranian people. a soft earmark of $1.5 million to require “U.S. policy is not to impose change on the State Department to award grants to Iran but to support the Iranian people in NGOs to “support the advancement of de- their quest to decide their own destiny”, mocracy and human rights in Iran.” State Zalmay Khalilzad, then–Special Presiden- used the funds to support the National tial Envoy for Afghanistan, said in August Endowment for Democracy and establish 2002. “Our policy is not about Khatami a center for documenting Iranian human- or Khamenei, reform or hard-line; it is rights abuses, along the lines of an initia- about supporting those who want free- tive by Iraqi exiles before Saddam’s re- dom, human rights, democracy, and eco- moval.
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