DOCSLIB.ORG

The Role of International Law and Politics in Resolving Iran's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Case

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Role of International Law and Politics in Resolving Iran's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Case The Role of International Law and Politics in Resolving Iran's Nuclear Non-Proliferation case A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Mahshid Yaraghi Esfahani Department of Politics, History and the Brunel Law School Brunel University London Abstract The international conflict over Iran’s nuclear programme continued for more than two decades before a negotiated settlement was finally reached. This thesis will explain why Iran has proved so resistant to compromise by analysing separate but related factors. Firstly, it will examine the historical roots of today’s nuclear co-operation and non-proliferation regime. It will argue that this regime has serious weaknesses and that a better alternative had been available but was rejected in the immediate post-war period. Secondly, it will look at the origins of Iran’s hostility to America and Israel, which emerged from a separate dispute with Britain, and which was indirectly related to the political decisions that were taken at the end of the World War II. Thirdly, it will analyse the reaction of international community to Iran’s nuclear programme and the rights of states to take unilateral countermeasures under the law of state responsibility. Finally, it will examine the negotiations that have been held between 2002 and 2015 which led to the agreement called the JCPOA. The more general aim of the thesis is to suggest that in conflicts between states which involve their core interests, international law plays a largely instrumental role in helping those states to achieve their political objectives. i Table of Contents Abstract .................................................................................................. i List of Abbreviations ........................................................................... iv AcKnowledgments .............................................................................. vii Dedication .......................................................................................... viii Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 Research Question, Hypothesis and Perspectives ........................................................... 2 Methodology of the Research .................................................................................................. 3 Limitations of the Research ..................................................................................................... 8 Structure of the Research ...................................................................................................... 10 Chapter One ........................................................................................ 13 The Failure of International Control of Nuclear Weapons .............. 13 1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 13 1.2 Atomic Development Authority ................................................................................... 14 1.3 Debates for and Against the Use of Atomic Bombs ................................................ 20 1.4 Atomic Energy Commission ........................................................................................... 26 1.5 The Baruch Plan ................................................................................................................ 32 1.6 “The Man of Peace” ........................................................................................................... 35 1.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 39 Chapter Two ........................................................................................ 41 How Iran Has Developed into a Threatening State.......................... 41 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 41 2.2 From the Qajar Dynasty to the Pahlavi Era .............................................................. 41 2.3 A Golden era in Persia ..................................................................................................... 45 2.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 52 Chapter Three ..................................................................................... 54 Iran’s Nuclear Issue and the International Community .................. 54 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 54 3.2 Iran’s Nuclear Dispute ..................................................................................................... 55 3.3 Iran’s Nuclear Programme Amongst Others ............................................................ 65 3.4 Intention to Use Nuclear Weapons .............................................................................. 72 3.5 Iran’s Nuclear Issue referred to the Security Council ........................................... 76 3.6 Iran’s Legal Arguments: The Unlawfulness of the Council’s Resolutions ....... 84 3.6.1 Article 39 of the United Nations Charter .......................................................................... 84 3.6.2 Inability to Issue Verification under the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Statute ......................................................................................................................................................... 90 3.6.3 The Right to Utilise Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes under the NPT: Article IV .................................................................................................................................................... 94 3.6.4. The Invocation of the Self-Determination Principle under International Law ..................................................................................................................................................................... 101 3.7 Western States’ Legal Arguments: Iran Violated the NPT ................................ 103 3.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 109 Chapter Four ..................................................................................... 112 ii The Right of an Injured State to Resort to Non-military Countermeasures ............................................................................. 112 4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 112 4.2 The EU Restrictive Measures Against Iran ............................................................ 113 4.3 Legal Identification of EU Measures ........................................................................ 116 4.4 Definition of Countermeasures ................................................................................. 119 4.5 Conditions for the Lawfulness of Countermeasures .......................................... 122 4.6 The Existence of a Wrongful Act ................................................................................ 125 4.7 The Concept of an Injured State and a Non-Injured State ................................ 131 4.7.1 The Concept of a Non-injured State ................................................................................. 136 4.8 The Requirements of Proportionality ..................................................................... 140 4.9 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 144 Chapter Five ...................................................................................... 145 Legal Examination of Iran’s Nuclear Agreement: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ........................................ 145 5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 145 5.2 Understanding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action .................................. 147 5.2.1 The Joint Plan of Action (JPA) ............................................................................................. 147 5.2.2 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ..................................................... 149 5.3 The Structure of the JCPOA ......................................................................................... 150 5.4 The JCPOA Implementation Timetable ................................................................... 151 5.5 Principal Provisions of the JCPOA ............................................................................ 154 5.5.1 The Enrichment of Uranium ............................................................................................... 155 5.5.2 Producing Plutonium ............................................................................................................. 157 5.5.3 Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) .............................................................................. 159 5.5.4 Joint Commission ..................................................................................................................... 161 5.5.5 Monitoring Process of Iran’s Fulfilled Commitments .............................................. 163 5.5.6 Procurement Channel ...........................................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Harry Truman, the Atomic Bomb and the Apocalyptic Narrative
    Volume 5 | Issue 7 | Article ID 2479 | Jul 12, 2007 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus The Decision to Risk the Future: Harry Truman, the Atomic Bomb and the Apocalyptic Narrative Peter J. Kuznick The Decision to Risk the Future: Harry stressed that the future of mankind would be Truman, the Atomic Bomb and theshaped by how such bombs were used and Apocalyptic Narrative subsequently controlled or shared.[3] Truman recalled Stimson “gravely” expressing his Peter J. Kuznick uncertainty about whether the U.S. should ever use the bomb, “because he was afraid it was so I powerful that it could end up destroying the whole world.” Truman admitted that, listening In his personal narrative Atomic Quest, Nobel to Stimson and Groves and reading Groves’s Prize-winning physicist Arthur Holly Compton, accompanying memo, he “felt the same who directed atomic research at the University fear.”[4] of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory during the Second World War, tells of receiving an urgent visit from J. Robert Oppenheimer while vacationing in Michigan during the summer of 1942. Oppenheimer and the brain trust he assembled had just calculated the possibility that an atomic explosion could ignite all the hydrogen in the oceans or the nitrogen in the atmosphere. If such a possibility existed, Compton concluded, “these bombs must never be made.” As Compton said, “Better to accept the slavery of the Nazis than to run a chance of drawing the final curtain on mankind.”[1] Certainly, any reasonable human being could be expected to respond similarly. Three years later, with Hitler dead and the Nazis defeated, President Harry Truman faced Truman and Byrnes en route to Potsdam, July a comparably weighty decision.
    [Show full text]
  • Examining 10 Warning Signs of Iran Nuclear Weapons
    International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) President: Dr. Alejo Vidal-Quadras Rue d’Arlon 63, B-1040 Brussels Belgium Tel : +32 2 400 1071 [email protected] www.isjcommittee.com EXAMINING 10 WARNING SIGNS OF IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT NOVEMBER 20,2014 Dr. Alejo Vidal Quadras, Former Vice‐President of European Parliament, Professor of Atomic and Nuclear Physics: “An objective, thoroughly researched report on the core issue of the nature of Iranian nuclear program and its status”. Bob Jospeh, Former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior White House Security Council staff on weapons of mass destruction: “A critically important report at a critically important time”. John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security: "A timely and well document report with alarming findings on Iran's nuclear program." Contents Executive summary Chapter 1: SPND (organ in charge of weaponization) Chapter 2: Procurement of dual purpose equipment and its possible use for military dimensions of nuclear program Chapter 3: Secret enrichment of uranium Chapter 4: Enrichment using laser technology Chapter 5: High explosives tests and trigger mechanism Chapter 6: Neutron initiator Chapter 7: Manufacturing uranium metal (uranium hemisphere) Chapter 8: Hydro-dynamic tests and explosion vessels at Parchin site Chapter 9: Research on nuclear warhead Chapter 10: Key scientists and researchers engaged in possible military dimensions of nuclear program International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) was initially formed in 2008 as an informal group of EU parliamentarians to seek justice for the Iranian democratic opposition.
    [Show full text]
  • Examining 10 Warning Signs of Iran Nuclear Weapons Development
    International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) President: Dr. Alejo Vidal-Quadras Rue d’Arlon 63, B-1040 Brussels Belgium Tel : +32 2 400 1071 [email protected] www.isjcommittee.com EXAMINING 10 WARNING SIGNS OF IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT NOVEMBER 20,2014 Dr. Alejo Vidal Quadras, Former Vice‐President of European Parliament, Professor of Atomic and Nuclear Physics: “An objective, thoroughly researched report on the core issue of the nature of Iranian nuclear program and its status”. Bob Jospeh, Former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior White House Security Council staff on weapons of mass destruction: “A critically important report at a critically important time”. John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security: "A timely and well document report with alarming findings on Iran's nuclear program." Contents Executive summary Chapter 1: SPND (organ in charge of weaponization) Chapter 2: Procurement of dual purpose equipment and its possible use for military dimensions of nuclear program Chapter 3: Secret enrichment of uranium Chapter 4: Enrichment using laser technology Chapter 5: High explosives tests and trigger mechanism Chapter 6: Neutron initiator Chapter 7: Manufacturing uranium metal (uranium hemisphere) Chapter 8: Hydro-dynamic tests and explosion vessels at Parchin site Chapter 9: Research on nuclear warhead Chapter 10: Key scientists and researchers engaged in possible military dimensions of nuclear program International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) was initially formed in 2008 as an informal group of EU parliamentarians to seek justice for the Iranian democratic opposition.
    [Show full text]
  • UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The new prophet : Harold C. Urey, scientist, atheist, and defender of religion Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3j80v92j Author Shindell, Matthew Benjamin Publication Date 2011 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO The New Prophet: Harold C. Urey, Scientist, Atheist, and Defender of Religion A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in History (Science Studies) by Matthew Benjamin Shindell Committee in charge: Professor Naomi Oreskes, Chair Professor Robert Edelman Professor Martha Lampland Professor Charles Thorpe Professor Robert Westman 2011 Copyright Matthew Benjamin Shindell, 2011 All rights reserved. The Dissertation of Matthew Benjamin Shindell is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: ___________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ Chair University of California, San Diego 2011 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page……………………………………………………………………...... iii Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………. iv Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………….
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Iran a Glossary of Terms
    Nuclear Iran A Glossary of Terms Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen Policy Focus 121 | May 2013 Update HARVARD Kennedy School A COPUBLICATION WITH BELFER CENTER for Science and International Affairs Map: Nuclear installations in Iran. TURKMENISTAN TABRIZ Bonab Lashkar Abad TEHRAN MASHAD Karaj Marivan Parchin Fordow Arak QOM IRAQ Natanz AFGHANISTAN Isfahan Ardakan Saghand Darkhovin Yazd IRAN KUWAIT SHIRAZ Bushehr PAKISTAN Gchine BANDAR ABBAS BAHRAIN SAUDI ARABIA QATAR © 2012 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy UAE OMAN Map: Nuclear installations in Iran. Nuclear Iran A Glossary of Terms Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen Policy Focus 121 | May 2013 Update HARVARD Kennedy School A COPUBLICATION WITH BELFER CENTER for Science and International Affairs n n n The authors extend special thanks to Mary Kalbach Horan and her editorial team at The Washington Institute. n n n All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2012, 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Copublished in 2012 and 2013 in the United States of America by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036; and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 79 JFK St., Cambridge, MA 02138. Cover photo: Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visits the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility.
    [Show full text]
  • María Goeppert Mayer: De Gotinga a Premio Nobel De Física
    José Manuel Sánchez Ron José Manuel Sánchez Ron María Goeppert Mayer: de Gotinga a Premio María Goeppert Mayer: Nobel de Física de Gotinga a Premio María Goeppert Mayer (1906-1972) fue una de las cuatro José Manuel Sánchez Ron se Nobel de Física mujeres que, hasta la fecha, han obtenido el Premio Nobel licenció en Física en la Universidad de Física: Marie Curie (1903), María Goeppert Mayer Complutense de Madrid y doctoró en la Universidad de Londres. (1963), Donna Strickland (2018) y Andrea Ghez (2020). Desde 2019 es catedrático emérito Insertando su biografía y contribuciones en el contexto de de Historia de la Ciencia en la los mundos científico y nacional en los que vivió (Alemania Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, y Estados Unidos), el catedrático emérito de Historia de la donde antes de obtener esa cátedra en 1994 fue profesor titular Ciencia en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid y miembro de Física Teórica. Es autor de de la Real Academia Española, José Manuel Sánchez Ron, numerosas e influyentes obras de reconstruye en este libro los avatares de su carrera, que la historia de la ciencia internacional llevó de la Universidad de Gotinga a la de California en San y española. En 2015 recibió el Diego, pasando por Johns Hopkins, Columbia y Chicago. Premio Nacional de Ensayo por El mundo después de la revolución. Dotada especialmente para la física teórica, sin embargo las La física de la segunda mitad del “circunstancias” de su vida no le permitieron desarrollar un siglo xx, el primer Premio Nacional programa de investigación con cierta coherencia y continuidad.
    [Show full text]
  • IAEA Decision to Find Iran in Non-Compliance, 2002–2006
    CASE STUDY SERIES 6 The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Decision to Find Iran in Non-Compliance, 2002–2006 Nima Gerami and Pierre Goldschmidt Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University DR. JOHN F. REICHART Director DR. W. SETH CARUS Deputy Director, Distinguished Research Fellow Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center) has been at the forefront of research on the implications of weapons of mass destruction for U.S. security. Originally focusing on threats to the military, the WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to the challenges of homeland security. The center’s mandate includes research, education, and outreach. Research focuses on understanding the security challenges posed by WMD and on fashioning effective responses thereto. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has designated the center as the focal point for WMD education in the joint professional military education system. Education programs, including its courses on countering WMD and consequence management, enhance awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates to defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, and operations. As a part of its broad outreach efforts, the WMD Center hosts annual symposia on key issues bringing together leaders and experts from the government and private sectors. Visit the center online at www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/. Cover: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei before start of regular Board of Governors meeting, Vienna, June 15, 2009.
    [Show full text]
  • HISTOIRE DE LA PHYSIQUE Lors De La Réunion De 2001 En L'honneur De
    HISTOIRE DE LA PHYSIQUE Les physiciens et la décision de larguer la bombe Lors de la réunion de 2001 en l'honneur de Enrico Fermi à l'Université de Chicago, Nina Byers a été invitée à donner une conférence intitulée "Fermi et Szilard". Le présent article a été adapté de l'original par l'auteur. Le cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale s'inversa en faveur des Alliés en ments classiques de même puissance, ils tentèrent d'informer les déci­ 1943. En janvier, le siège de Leningrad fut levé et en février l'armée alle­ deurs politiques que les notions sur lesquelles reposait le projet Manhattan mande capitula à Stalingrad et battit en retraite sous la pression des ne pouvaient rester secrètes et que de nombreux pays et organismes non troupes soviétiques. L'aviation anglo-américaine écrasait les villes alle­ gouvernementaux seraient en mesure de fabriquer des bombes atomiques mandes sous un tapis de bombes. Dans le Pacifique, l'agression japonaise s'ils venaient à disposer de matières fissiles. Au premier rang d'entre eux avait été stoppée en mai précédent lors de la bataille de la Mer de Corail. figuraient Leo Szilard et James Franck. Selon eux, le contrôle international La crainte d'une utilisation par l'armée allemande de bombes atomiques1 des matières fissiles s'imposait. Il fut question de s'abstenir même d'une se dissipait. De nombreux scientifiques du projet Manhattan constatèrent explosion d'essai, puis recommandé d'y procéder dans une région inhabi­ qu'une autre inquiétude s'y substituait- celle d'une course aux armements tée pour en constater la puissance.
    [Show full text]
  • GOV/2006/27 Date: 28 April 2006
    Derestricted 12 June 2006 International Atomic Energ (This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 12 June 2006) Board of Governors GOV/2006/27 Date: 28 April 2006 Original: English For official use only Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General 1. On 4 February 2006, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14) in paragraph 1 of which it, inter alia, underlined that outstanding questions concerning the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran1 (Iran) could best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme by Iran responding positively to the Board’s calls for confidence building measures. In this context, the Board deemed it necessary for Iran to: • re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency; • reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water; • ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; • pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003; • implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Program of Iran
    NuclearNuclear ProgramProgram ofof IranIran -- CurrentCurrent StatusStatus Olli Heinonen Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government 22 November 2010 This presentation is based on information publicly available since 2002 from 30 reports of the Director General of the IAEA. Background - Iranian nuclear program originates from 1950’s - Pre-revolution: = US, France and Germany were involved in the program = interested also to get fuel cycle technology - After the revolution: program was in decline until it was revitalized in mid- 1980’s - Iran tried to acquire nuclear technology: Germany, France, Brazil, Argentina etc, but unsuccessful. - Attempts also included uranium enrichment and heavy water reactor technology. - Some success with China and Russia, but no real access to sensitive technologies apart from laser enrichment. - Turned in mid-1980’s to nuclear black markets to get technology. BackgroundBackground contcont’’dd - Iran failed to report some of its uranium conversion activities from mid-1980’s. - Iran failed to report uranium enrichment activities from early 1990’s. -The existence of Natanz enrichment facility revealed in August 2002. WhatWhat WeWe KnowKnow Iran continues: -Uranium exploration and mining: Saghand mine and Ardakan Yellow Cake Production Plant under construction Gcchine mine producing yellowcake -Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan: Produced 371 tonnes UF6 since March 2004 About 35 tonnes UF6 sofar used in Natanz -Uranium Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Isfahan:
    [Show full text]
  • USAF Coutnerproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal #955
    Issue No. 955, 8 November 2011 Articles & Other Documents: Featured Article: U.N. Says Iran Is Working on Nuclear Arms 1. Iran Has Nuclear Explosive Testing Facility 2. Iran Dismisses Reported UN Claims of Nuclear Work 3. Iran Says IAEA's Documents on Its Missile Program "Baseless": FM 4. IAEA Says Foreign Expertise Has Brought Iran to Threshold of Nuclear Capability 5. China Tells Iran to Show 'Flexibility and Sincerity' over Nuclear Issue 6. Russia Says Timing of UN Report on Iran Nuclear Weapons ‘Wrong’ 7. Barak Not Optimistic about Int'l Will to Stop Iranian Nukes 8. Iran Says West Has ‘No Proof’ of Bomb Drive 9. Israeli Minister Warns Iran Strike is Possible 10. U.N. Says Iran Is Working on Nuclear Arms 11. N. Korea's Uranium Program Close to Being Operational: Source 12. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Vulnerable to Theft: Report 13. Pakistani Nukes Are 'Very Hard Targets': Musharraf 14. Pakistan Rejects Reports of Nuclear Insecurity 15. Threat to Pak Nukes Exists: US 16. US Invites Russia to Take Part in Antimissile Flight Test 17. Russia Rebukes US 'Look But Don't Touch' Offer on Missile Defense 18. Osama Bin Laden Was Betrayed by His Deputy 19. Ex-U.S. General Urges Frank Talk on Cyber Weapons 20. Rethink China's Nuke Weapons Strategy 21. No Optimism on NK Nukes 22. Nuclear Terrorism Threat 23. James A. Baker, on Reducing Nuclear Arms 24. More Documentation Of Iran's Relentless Pursuit Of Nukes 25. The Growing Threat of Iran’s Nuclear Program 26. Now For a Real Iran Debate Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Nuclear Ambiguity. the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
    PREMIO CESARE ALFIERI CUM LAUDE – 6 – PREMIO CESARE ALFIERI CUM LAUDE Commissione giudicatrice Anno 2018 Elena Dundovich (Presidente, area storica) Emidio Diodato (area politologica) Giorgia Giovannetti (area economica) Laura Magi (area giuridica) Gabriella Paolucci (area sociologica) Michele Gerli Beyond Nuclear Ambiguity The Iranian Nuclear Crisis and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action FIRENZE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2019 Beyond Nuclear Ambiguity : the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action / Michele Gerli. – Firenze : Firenze University Press, 2019. (Premio Cesare Alfieri Cum Laude ; 6) http://digital.casalini.it/9788864538655 ISBN 978-88-6453-864-8 (print) ISBN 978-88-6453-865-5 (online PDF) ISBN 978-88-6453-866-2 (online EPUB) Progetto grafico di Alberto Pizarro Fernández, Pagina Maestra Immagine di copertina: © M-sur | Dreamstime.com Peer Review Process All publications are submitted to an external refereeing process under the responsibility of the FUP Editorial Board and the Scientific Committees of the individual series. The works published in the FUP catalogue are evaluated and approved by the Editorial Board of the publishing house. For a more detailed description of the refereeing process we refer to the official documents published on the website and in the online catalogue (www.fupress.com). Firenze University Press Editorial Board M. Garzaniti (Editor-in-Chief), M. Boddi, A. Bucelli, R. Casalbuoni, A. Dolfi, R. Ferrise, M.C. Grisolia, P. Guarnieri, R. Lanfredini, P. Lo Nostro, G. Mari, A. Mariani, P.M. Mariano, S. Marinai, R. Minuti, P. Nanni, G. Nigro, A. Perulli. The on-line digital edition is published in Open Access on www.fupress.com.
    [Show full text]