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SEPTEMBER 2020 Waiting for blowback CRU Policy Brief The Kurdish question and Turkey’s new regional militarism ş Recent Turkish interventions in parts of Syria, Iraq and Turkey itself, look like pushing im Tekine various Kurdish armed forces and political groupings towards ‘defeat’ via a concerted ş regional strategy that combines battlefield action with repression and co-optation. But the ‘anti-terrorist’ frame and tactics that Ankara uses in a bid to solve its Kurdish problem feature many sticks and no compromises to improve Kurdish collective minority rights. It is likely that this approach will inhibit peaceful resistance and fail to reduce support for armed groups like the PKK and PYD despite their own authoritarian practices. Moreover, Turkey’s new regional militarism risks escalating conflict across the Middle East because of the complex international and transnational contexts in which Ankara’s interventions take place. Introduction1 The Turkish offensive ‘Peace Spring’ of strengthened the position of the Syrian 3 October 2019 seized control over a strip of regime in the country’s northeast. & Ha Yüksel Engin Erwin Veen, van north-eastern Syria, including the towns of Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ain. It caused But that was only the operation’s immediate the dominant Syrian Kurdish force (the effect. It also put another piece in place Democratic Union Party – PYD) and its of a larger Turkish strategy against the armed forces (the People’s Protection Kurds across the region that includes the Units – YPG) to turn to the Syrian regime Turkish ‘liberation’ of the borderlands north and Russia for protection against the threat of the Syrian city of Al-Bab4 as well as its of Turkey’s border incursion turning into a fully-fledged invasion.2 By doing so, the operation diminished the prospect of Syria’s 3 The regime always maintained a small presence in Kurds achieving greater autonomy. It also the towns of Qamishli and Hasaka after 2011. 4 These lands are largely Arab-populated but connect the Kurdish majority areas of Afrin and Al-Jazira. The main aim of the Turkish intervention 1 We would like to thank Prof. dr. Martin van arguably was to prevent the YPG from establishing Bruinessen (University of Utrecht), Kamal Chomani such a connection. We use the word ‘liberation’ (Tahrir Institute for Middle East policy) as well as because many of the areas citizens welcomed the another expert (who prefers to remain anonymous) Turkish intervention that also liberated them from for their review of this brief. Its contents naturally the Islamic State. In Afrin, the opposite was the remain the responsibility of the authors. case and we use the word ‘occupation’ to reflect 2 See: Al Jazeera online (accessed 13 July 2020). popular sentiment. CRU Policy Brief ‘occupation’ of the majority-Kurdish district Islamic State (IS),7 rapidly expanding PYD/ of Afrin; a series of Turkish offensives against YPG control over north-eastern Syria in the the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) across process. Turkey increasingly came to face Iraqi Kurdistan; air strikes against PKK-linked the prospect of having a PYD-run statelet forces in Iraq’s Sinjar area; and the expansion run along its southern border. In response, of Turkish military control over its own south- Ankara shifted its Syria strategy from aiming eastern provinces of Sirnak and Hakkari. to overthrow the Assad regime to containing the Kurdish PYD.8 In brief, Ankara has engaged in a full-scale regional offensive against its main Kurdish Turkey executed its new strategy effectively opponents: the PKK and the PYD, which and prevented Syrian Kurdish territories from it views as identical.5 Each confrontation coalescing by occupying the triangular area highlighted the dominance of the Turkish north of the Syrian city of Al-Bab in 2016/17 army over Kurdish forces and reduced the (also liberating it from IS), conquering the latter’s freedom of manoeuvre. Ankara’s majority-Kurdish Syrian district of Afrin military assertiveness, which has its in 2018, and forcing the PYD to accept an roots in the failure of the AKP-PKK peace extended military presence of the Syrian negotiations in 2015, have put a significant regime and Russia along the Syrian-Turkish damper on the prospects of a ‘Kurdish border in 2019.9 These offensives also earned Awakening’ across the region.6 Ankara the renewed enmity of the Syrian regime and negatively affected Turkey’s standing in the West insofar as its operations The rise of the PYD as trigger for in Afrin, Ras al-Ain and Tel Abyad were renewed anti-Kurdish militarism concerned. In 2015, YPG-forces defeated Islamic State The peace that was not (IS) in the battle for the town of Kobani (Syria), together with Iraqi Peshmerga, Turkey did not always approach the Kurdish elements of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and question in such militarist fashion. In fact, the US air force. The battle was preceded by between 2013 and 2015 Ankara sought to growing PYD/YPG control over north-east enlist the PYD in its fight against Assad.10 and northwest (Afrin) Syria. Its aftermath The PYD’s leader, Salih Muslim, visited featured sustained American support for Ankara twice for high-level consultations the PYD/YPG to lead the fight against on relatively good terms.11 Turkey started viewing the PYD as a threat mostly after it 7 To fight IS in Syria’s Arab-majority areas, the PYD and US created the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Mostly Arab in its composition (and in 5 On paper the groups profess different agendas. its casualties against IS), it is largely led by YPG Whereas the PKK’s primary stated objective officers. remains to wage an armed insurgency against 8 Van Veen, E. and Yüksel, E., Too big for its boots: the Turkish state, the PYD claims to aspire to the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East from creation of a more ‘autonomous democratic sphere’ 2002 to 2018, The Hague: Clingendael, July 2018. in Syria, albeit under PYD-control and via the use 9 We leave the matter of Idlib out of account here of repressive measures. See: ANF News, online; since it has little relevance to Syria’s Kurds or The Kurdish Project, online (all accessed 14 July the PYD. 2020). In practice, the organisations have close ties. 10 It did so via a carrot-and-stick approach by See: International Crisis Group, The PKK’s Fateful simultaneously threatening military intervention Choice in Northern Syria, Brussels: ICG, 2017; against the PYD in the summer of 2012. Hurriyet, Rifai, O., ‘The Kurdish identity; from Banishment to online (accessed 14 July 2020). Empowerment’, Syria Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2016. 11 Gurcan, M., ‘Is the PKK worried by the YPG's 6 Barkey, H., ‘The Kurdish Awakening’, Foreign growing popularity?’, Al Monitor, 7 November 2019, Affairs, March/April 2019. online. 2 CRU Policy Brief refused to refrain from unilateral steps to who know ancient Anatolia as Turkey should declare autonomy, sever its ties with the know that their coexistence with Kurdish PKK, and join the Syrian opposition.12 Just as people dates back to a historical agreement the prospect of a PYD-run statelet along its of fraternity and solidarity under the flag of southern border was problematic for Turkey, Islam. [...] It is time not for opposition, conflict so were closer ties with the Syrian opposition or contempt towards each other, it is time for problematic for the PYD. After all, Ankara cooperation, unity, embracing and mutual holds sway over the Syrian opposition (the blessing.”15 Erdoğan himself stated clearly on extent of which has varied per actor and over several occasions that a political solution to time), which was also initially ambiguous the Kurdish question was inevitable. with regard to Kurdish demands for greater collective rights, especially political ones.13 Despite progress, the negotiations ultimately foundered.16 The fatal hurdle were the Syrian In addition, since the mid-1990s, Turkey built territories controlled by the PYD, which a partnership of sorts with Barzani’s Kurdish is closely linked with the PKK.17 Erdoğan Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq, a insisted that there could be no second process that accelerated after the 2005 Iraqi Kurdish statelet along Turkish borders, constitution recognised the Kurdistan Region while Öcalan was just as adamant that the of Iraq (KRI). The Turkey-KDP relationship autonomy gains of the PYD would not be even survived the 2017 Iraqi Kurdish jeopardised.18 Paraphrasing Mehmet Alaca referendum for independence and flourishes (an Ankara-based Turkish journalist), the today, albeit on an uneven keel and under PKK saw Syria as an important opportunity growing tensions (see below). to establish an internationally recognised, semi-legal entity in Syria - in the form of the Moreover, the AKP conducted intense PYD - that would significantly upgrade its negotiations with the PKK until 2015 in own illegal and internationally condemned pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the standing in Turkey.19 Realistic or not, Turkey’s Kurdish question after earlier attempts in political elites clearly perceived such a 1993 and 2009 failed. Since the AKP was step as having the potential to transform firmly in control of Turkish politics between the PKK’s struggle. The PKK’s refusal to 2009 and 2015 while the country’s economy disarm and disband was another cause of was booming, it could negotiate from a failure of the peace negotiations, as was the position of strength. The leaders of both unwillingness of the Turkish government sides – Abdullah Öcalan (the imprisoned to permit local governance autonomy or chief of the PKK) and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Kurdish language education in public (Prime Minister of Turkey at the time) – schools.20 Other issues that played a role outdid each other in public declarations of included the escalating AKP- Gülenist support for Turkish-Kurdish co-existence rivalry and the 2015 electoral victory of the in ‘civic and religious brotherhood in People’s Democratic Party (HDP),21 which a democratising Turkey’ during the negotiations.14 Öcalan wrote: “Turkish people 15 See: https://www.euronews.com/2013/03/22/ web-full-transcript-of-abdullah-ocalans- 12 Park (2020), op.cit; Acun and Keskin (2017) op.cit.
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